Imagineering Place
The Branding of Five Chinese Mega-Cities

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Abstract
Cities, regions, nations and other places have in recent decades become active participants in the global competitive economy, and now operate in a global marketplace, competing with other places all over the world for investors, tourists, residents and workforce. As a result, places use marketing and branding strategies and practices to gain reputation and competitive advantage. Chinese cities have, over the past decades, increasingly engaged in branding activities, and even taken the role of spearheads for China in its positioning in the global economy, seen for example in the organization of mega-events. The branding of Chinese cities nevertheless exhibits some differences compared with city branding in the West. The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to our knowledge of the internal-political aspects of place branding, using field studies of the imagery used in city branding practices in five Chinese mega-cities, namely Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chengdu and Chongqing. The focus is on the images and language used in the cities’ branding, and on key political aspects involved in the branding of Chinese mega-cities. The theoretical lens incorporates concepts tied to images, language, imaginaries, ideology and power, and the study relies on an ethnographic, multiple case study approach, including longitudinal fieldwork in China. The findings consist of rich illustrations of the branding of the five Chinese mega-cities, and include an analysis of similar imagery found in all five cities, grouped into economic, international, cultural, social and environmental imaginaries. This shows that city branding in Chinese mega-cities is focused on creating international and competitive cities, while also paying attention to the environment, culture and internal target groups such as residents. A central contribution of this dissertation is the development of the concept ‘imagineering’, used in this study to conceptualize key political aspects of city branding in Chinese mega-cities. Imagineering contains three main elements, namely local adaptations of national directives, policies, plans and concepts; a strong future orientation while also accentuating selected elements from the past; and a focus on local populations with the creation of stability and harmony as a central goal. Imagineering is also conceptualized as a policy instrument exercised by a powerful elite, closely intertwined with urban governance, and used to influence people, values, places and, ultimately, city futures.

Keywords: China, Chinese mega-cities, city branding, fieldwork, ideology, imagery, images, imaginaries, imagineering, language, multiple case-study, place branding, power.

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Sammanfattning

Städer, regioner, länder och andra platser har under de senaste decennierna blivit aktiva deltagare i den globala ekonomin, och befinner sig nu på en global marknad där de konkurrerar med andra platser runtom i världen – om investerare, turister, invånare och arbetskraft. Som en följd av detta använder platser marknadsföring och varumärkesbyggande för att öka sitt anseende och stärka sin konkurrenskraft. Kinesiska städer har under de senaste decennierna alltmer använt sig av stadsmarknadsföring och till och med intagit rollen som spjutspetsar för Kina i landets positionering globalt, vilket blivit tydligt exempelvis vid stora evenemang. Kinesiska städers marknadsföring uppvisar dock en del skillnader jämfört med stadsmarknadsföring i en västerländsk kontext. Syftet med denna avhandling är att bidra till vår kunskap om de interna och politiska aspekterna av platsmarknadsföring, genom fältstudier av bildspråk som används i marknadsföringen av fem kinesiska megastäder, nämligen Peking, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chengdu och Chongqing. Fokus är på bilder och språk som används i städernas marknadsföring samt på politiska aspekter som rör stadsmarknadsföringen i kinesiska megastäder. Den teoretiska linsen innehåller begrepp som knutna till bilder, språk, ‘imaginaries’, ideologi och makt, och studien bygger på en flerfallsstudie som innefattar longitudinellt fältarbete i Kina. Resultaten består av innehållsrika beskrivningar av stads marknadsföringen i de fem kinesiska megastäderna, innehåller en analys av liknande bildspråk som återfunnits i städerna, och visar att stads marknadsföring i kinesiska megastäder är inriktad på att stärka städernas konkurrenskraft och skapa internationella städer, medan den också är fokuserad på miljö, kultur och invånare. Ett centralt bidrag i avhandlingen är utvecklingen av begreppet ’imagineering’, som används i denna studie för att teoretisera huvudsakliga politiska kännetslag för stadsmarknadsföring i kinesiska megastäder. Imagineering består av tre huvuddelar, nämligen en lokal anpassning av nationella direktiv, policies, planer och koncept; en tydlig framtidsinriktning kombinerad med en betoning på utvalda delar från det förflutna; samt fokus på invånare med skapande av stabilitet och harmoni som ett centralt mål. Imagineering conceptualiseras också som ett politiskt instrument som utövas av en maktelit, är sammanflätat med stadsförvaltning, och används för att påverka människor, värderingar, platser, och, inte minst, städers framtid.

Nyckelord: Bilder, bildspråk, flerfallsstudie, fältarbete, ideologi, imaginaries, imagineering, Kina, kinesiska megastäder, makt, platsmarknadsföring, språk, stads marknadsföring.
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1. Chinese cities on the move

Cities, regions, nations and other places have in recent decades become active participants in the global competitive economy (Hospers, 2010), and now operate in a global marketplace, competing with other places all over the world for investors, tourists, residents and workforce (Anholt, 2007; Kavaratzis, 2005; Sevin, 2011; Zenker, 2009). One result of this is that places use marketing and branding strategies and practices to gain reputation and competitive advantage (e.g. Acharya & Rahman, 2016).

Impacts from globalization have been felt strongly in Chinese cities (Wu & Ma, 2006), and in China’s rise to international influence and power, large Chinese cities play key roles in terms of economic growth and innovation (The Economist, 2015a), while at the same time taking on important, powerful and purposeful positions on the global stage (Berg & Björner, 2014). It has even been argued that, driven by market reforms and globalization forces, Chinese cities have taken on the role of spearheads for China in its positioning in the global economy (Lin, 2004; Wu & Ma, 2006).

When seen from this perspective, it is easy to understand the recent interest in city branding in China as an attempt by the cities to increase their competitiveness in a global market (Wu, 2000). One example is the use of major sports and cultural events, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, as instruments to develop and brand cities and make them globally competitive (Wen & Sui, 2014). The importance assigned to city branding in China was also highlighted when the Chinese government in 2011 included ‘promotion of Chinese city images’ in its new national 12th Five-Year Plan (Fan, 2014a). Since then, various levels of Chinese governments have started to incorporate multiple marketing tactics to brand cities, and many local governments have injected resources into promoting their city brand through branding campaigns (Fan, 2014a; Zhou & Wang, 2014).

According to Berg and Björner (2014), city branding in China exhibits many similarities with place branding activities in a Western context. The common body of knowledge (books, manuals and references) are basically the same; for example, city brand templates and brand elements (big events, visual identity campaigns, etc.) used are similar, and even the critique of city branding is expressed in similar ways as in the West.
However, when I was conducting a preparatory field study in China in 2011, I was struck by some apparent differences in city branding in China vis-à-vis the West, including the ideological language and images used and communicated, the strong internal orientation of branding campaigns, and the highly political nature of the city branding practices. One of the cities I visited during my initial fieldwork in 2011 was Chongqing. At that time, the city logo ‘Renren’ (人人 – see Picture 1.1) could be seen all over the city – on buses, water bottles and souvenirs, to mention a few examples.

One respondent, the head of a news corporation in Chongqing (Practitioner, I71, 2011), told me that Chongqing’s city logo means two people, and was aimed at symbolizing double celebration, a couple, doing things together, and devotion to the city. The red and yellow (or orange) colours were, moreover, used to symbolize the government (red) and the residents (yellow), as well as local enterprises (red) and foreign enterprises (yellow). On the official website of Chongqing Municipal Government (2007), the logo was described like this:

Designed around the theme of double celebration – the literal meaning of the city’s name, the emblem of Chongqing Municipality features two jubilant people forming the Chinese character ‘慶’ (qing), which means ‘celebration’. The emblem conveys the city’s spirit of putting people first, as well as displaying the broad-mindedness and openness of the citizens of Chongqing. It also looks like two people advancing forward hand in hand, implying that the government and the people are making concerted efforts to build a better future. The emblem also incorporates elements reflecting the ancient Ba-Yu culture of the region. The design embodies the dedicated patriotism, indomitable heroism and open-mindedness of Chongqing people (Chongqing Municipal Government, 2007).

Apart from the city logo, a city branding campaign called ‘Five Chongqing’ was also promoted around the cityscape. The Five Chongqing programme included five focus areas that were communicated with the help of large posters or banners placed in public spaces. The themes aimed at creating a liveable, smooth, healthy, safe and green city, and each of these themes were commu-
icated with supportive images. The poster in Picture 1.2, for example, represents ‘Safe Chongqing’ (安全重庆), yet is typical for all five themes. This poster was on display by a road in Chongqing’s city centre, and shows a group of children out in the open air, under blue skies, guided by a smiling and friendly ‘uniformed’ adult wearing a helmet.

Picture 1.2: Safe Chongqing poster in the centre of Chongqing, in the Five Chongqing programme (photo by author, 2011).

Chongqing’s city logo and the Five Chongqing campaign illustrated above caught my attention for three main reasons. The first was the way in which language, pictures, colours and other forms of appealing images were used to contribute to Chongqing’s city brand. In relation to this, I was struck by the use of ideologically loaded images and language, to describe what was considered to be key identity markers for Chongqing and its people, such as dedicated patriotism, indomitable heroism and open-mindedness.

The second reason was that the imagery (i.e. communicated images and language) used seemed to be largely targeting local populations, through the emphasis on, for example, safety, liveability and healthiness of Chongqing citizens, more than centring on external target groups and the creation of attractiveness and commercial competitiveness of the city in a market. It seemed to me that there was some sort of ideological persuasion of internal target groups taking place, facilitated by ideologically loaded imagery, and contributing to the formation of certain imaginaries (i.e. the sum of similar imagery).

Finally, I was struck by the strong proposed connections between the people and the government. An example here is the imagery of ‘two people advancing forward hand in hand’, implying an ideologically loaded language, and indicating that ‘the government and the people are making concerted efforts to build a better future’. Through my interviews in Chongqing, I also noted that
the political élite – and in particular the Party secretary – seemed to be in control of the branding process. Moreover, Chongqing’s city branding was carried out in response to a mission from the central government.

Taken together, these observations led me to reflect on the possibility that a study of the ideological imagery used in city branding in China, as well as its underlying powerful and political aspects, might provide new and exciting insights into the character of city branding processes in general, and in China in particular. The driving force behind this dissertation is thus to find out more about the seemingly ideological and political aspects of Chinese cities in particular, and place branding in general.

1.1 Problematizing place branding

Academically, as well as professionally, city branding is a subset of the wider concept of place branding, which is an approach to urban governance that incorporates a number of activities and methods with the overall aim to forge and project a desirable image or appearance of a place (Kavaratzis & Ashworth, 2005). Place branding is also about applying marketing techniques and brand strategy to the economic, social, cultural and political development of places and destinations, including nations, regions, cities and districts (Anholt, 2004; Kerr, 2006). Over the past few decades, the practice of place branding has grown rapidly – and globally – and is today increasingly described as a major policy instrument to rejuvenate cities and make them more attractive to external and internal audiences.

The professional core in the practice of place branding is ‘the city attraction hypothesis’, (Anttiroiko, 2014), that is the assumption that cities are to be seen as rational (in searching for the highest possible value of global value flows), instrumental (in their pursuit of resources and positions), and strategically conscious as well as goal-oriented (focusing on local prosperity). In relation to this, Berg (2016) has argued that:

[…] even though few researchers – or practitioners for that matter – would agree that this overly rationalistic view of city development reflects reality, the very formulation of the hypothesis is valuable as it mirrors general assumptions of why and how cities should get involved in branding activities (Berg, 2016, p. 2081).

The city attraction hypothesis has led to practices aimed at boosting the attractiveness and thus the competitiveness of cities through branding (Kavaratzis, 2004; Kavaratzis & Ashworth, 2005). This kind of boosterish city brand management depended largely on crude promotion, and especially advertising
Cities have even been called neo-liberal ‘growth machines’, based on an ideology of competitive individualism (Jansen, 2008; Kaneva, 2011), implying that their main goal is to attract capital (Chang & Huang, 2011; Logan & Molotch, 1987). In these growth machines, place branding is part of an ‘economic apparatus’ (Lucarelli, 2015), with continued focus on external target groups and the attraction of investors, tourists and talented people (Kong, 2012). As such,

[…] the dominating mainstream approach held by much of the conventional marketing and brand management oriented place branding literature has helped to frame a view based on a certain economic and behavioural deterministic rationale over the political (but also the cultural, natural, etc.), a view that puts the notion of the ‘private’ over the ‘public’ and the notion of the ‘commercial’ over the ‘non-commercial’ (Lucarelli, 2015, p. 33).

However, from different disciplinary perspectives and various vantage points, current research on place branding in general and city branding in particular, has shown that a more complex and dynamic reality needs to be taken into account when it comes to understanding the underlying mechanisms of place branding. In relation to the short example from Chongqing at the beginning of this chapter, there are three areas that needs to be further explored.

The first area that I came across in Chongqing centres on the use of ideologically loaded imagery used in city branding. Even though a key element in all branding activities is the use of imagery to rejuvenate and reposition cities, the amount of studies using an imagery focus is relatively few, and often limited to the graphical imagery of the city brand or visual representation of the place by means of logos and slogans (Hospers, 2011; Berglund, 2013). Various studies nevertheless incorporate a wider focus with regards to images and language in the context of branding and places, and for example shed light on the use of stories and history that connect people (Cayla & Eckhardt, 2008), communicative powers of place branding (Giovanardi, 2012), visual rhetoric and representation (Campelo, Aitken & Gnoth, 2011; Rampley, 2005), symbols and discourses (Koller, 2008; Johansson, 2012), ideological narratives (Dynon, 2011), and political propaganda (Svensson, 2014).

The use of imagery in relation to city strategies and brand visions as a means to express what the city is now and where it will go in the future has also been
studied previously (Metzger & Rader Olsson, 2013; Vanolo, 2014), and Kornberger and Clegg (2011) claims that imagery inhabits seductive powers that can engage people, lift their thinking and capture their view. In another study, it was held that language and texts in the shape of strategy documents are ‘powerful devices through which specific objectives, values and ideologies – and not others – are promoted and legitimated’ (Vaara, Sorsa & Pälli, 2010, p. 699). It has similarly been stated that imagery incorporates powers that can create shared meaning (Hansen, 2010; Sandercock, 2003), and guide places (Giovanardi, 2012). Johansson (2012) also emphasizes the importance of paying attention to the images and symbolic acts selected to represent the brand, as well as how they are put in place, and in this way providing possibilities to unpack the branding process.

However, even though the authors above claim that ideologically loaded imagery plays an important role in understanding city branding practices, there are very few empirical studies of city branding practices that address the ideological features and underlying powers of images and language.

Tied to my observation in Chongqing, the second area that needs to be explored relates to the way in which the ideologically loaded imagery targets many aspects of the life of local populations. According to the short example from Chongqing, cultural, social and ecological imagery was evident in the city logo and the Five Chongqing programme. We are thus facing a problem if we are trying to understand what goes on in Chongqing – and in similar city branding activities – through the framework of the city attractiveness hypothesis only, without respect for the multitude of other dimensions at work.

In place branding research, there is similarly an increased interest in accounting for the more complex reality that the branding of places incorporates, including research centring on the ethical, cultural, political, critical, social, and environmental aspects of place branding imaginations (e.g. Bianchini & Ghilardi, 2007; Mommaas, 2002; Kavaratzis, 2008; Lucarelli & Berg, 2011; Therkelsen, Halkier & Jensen, 2010; Van Ham, 2008).

One area, which, over the past decade has been increasingly emphasized in place branding research, is internal features of place branding, and thus a focus on residents and inclusiveness (e.g. Eshuis & Edwards, 2012; Govers, 2011; Kavaratzis, 2008; Kemp, Williams & Bordelon, 2011; Zenker, Petersen & Aholt, 2013), and there have even been claims that the ultimate goal of place branding is the achievement of resident satisfaction (Guhathakurta & Stimson, 2007; Insch, 2011; Insch & Florek, 2008). Residents are increasingly seen as a main target group in place branding, a main reason being that they ‘are’ the place. It has also been argued that place brands should be based on the identity of the local population and actors in the city (Govers, 2011), and that social inclusiveness is a key pillar of place branding legitimacy (Fan, 2014b).
Inclusion and participation of local stakeholders in the place branding process has also been emphasized (Jernsand & Kraff, 2015), and place branding has been likened to a community-building exercise with a central aim being to ‘identify common ideas and directions for the future of the community and to produce collectively generated stories and visions’ (Ashworth et al., 2015, p. 6). There is, however, also a common perception in the place branding literature that residents are largely ignored in place branding practices (Zavattaro, 2010; Oguztimur & Akturan, 2016). Hence, even though more and more research is published on the role of social, cultural and ecological dimensions in internal place branding processes (e.g. Kavaratzis, Giovanardi & Lichrou, 2017), there is still a lack of empirical studies and related conceptualizations focusing on place branding centring on local populations. Considering that residents seemed to be a central target group in the case of Chongqing’s city branding, it would be problematic to conceptualize the branding of Chinese cities without an internal perspective.

The third area is related to my observation in Chongqing of a local political élite, orchestrating and controlling the city branding practices, with the help of ideologically loaded imagery. In the literature, it is by now widely recognized that place branding is essentially a highly politicized activity driven by political élites and involving many stakeholders (Lucarelli, 2015; Molotch, 1976; Morgan, Pritchard & Piggott, 2003). Previous research has also shown that the place branding process in itself is political and powerful, with various conflicting interests attempting to control the brand and direct the branding efforts in certain directions (e.g. Bennett & Savani, 2003; Lucarelli and Hallin 2015; Ward, 2000; Youde, 2009). Moreover, more critical perspectives propose that place branding is radical and conflictual, and a form of social control (Colomb & Kalandides, 2010; Harvey, 1989; Lucarelli & Brorström, 2013).

The political nature of place branding has also been conceptualized as an urban governance strategy used to manage perceptions about places (Eshuis & Edwards, 2012), as a powerful broadband instrument of policy (Lucarelli, 2015), and as a necessary supplement since policies alone cannot change the perception of a place (Anholt, 2008). Likewise, Bellini et al. (2010) state that marketing is no substitute for, but can be functional to, policy. Apart from a few exceptions (e.g. Berg & Björner, 2014; Liu, Xu, Björner & Zhao, 2016), limited studies conceptualize the linkages between political interests on the national level with branding practices on the local, city level, embodied through policies, plans and governance strategy, for example.

Some scholars have focused on the characteristics of the politics of place branding, and provided a wider understanding of the instrumental and procedural empirical materialization at the basis of the political practices of place branding seen as a democratic-legal policy process (e.g. Eshuis & Klijn, 2011; Eshuis & Edwards, 2012; Wæraas, Bjørnå & Moldenæs, 2014), but without
grounding their analytic inquiries in the ideological, hegemonic and critical dynamics of politics (Lucarelli, 2015). Others have focused on hegemonic, ideological and critical dynamics of place branding, centring on for example place branding as political propaganda (e.g. Jansen, 2008; Rose, 2010), pure ideology or ideological apparatus (e.g. Browning, 2013; Mehta-Karia, 2012; Varga, 2013), yet focused on nations rather than cities in their analyses and have primarily been based on a neo-liberal foundation. These scholars have also been critiqued for disregarding an empirical base, and for being abstract and normative (Lucarelli, 2015).

There are, consequently, few analyses combining a focus on the political practices of place branding as a policy process with underlying powerful and ideological dynamics. However, the Chongqing case has indicated a need to understand both the political perspective at the city level, including stakeholders and the role of control mechanisms, and the ways in which city branding is influenced by ideology, power and control tied to the political party system.

1.2 Aim and research questions

Summing up the discussion above, a key problem to be addressed in place branding research concerns the unclear relationship between ideologically loaded place branding imagery, the ways in which imagery is contextualized, and how ideologically loaded imagery is related to, and played out by, political and powerful interests at different levels. As a consequence, in this study I conceptualize place branding imagery in relation to the context in which it is used and with a focus on the techniques employed. I also analyse the creation of place imaginaries, with a focus on imaginaries centring on local populations and inclusion; and conceptualize how place branding plays out as a power exercise, analysing political interests at the city level and national level.

Thus, the aim of this study is to contribute to our knowledge of the internal-political aspects of place branding, by field studies of the imagery used in city branding practices in five Chinese mega-cities.

The outcome will be a conceptual framework that can help us to understand the branding of Chinese mega-cities, and place branding processes more generally, with a certain emphasis on communicative powers, internal features, as well as ideological and political features of place branding. I have outlined three research questions (RQs) used to guide the study, presented next.

1. What imagery is used in the branding of Chinese mega-cities?
RQ1 centres on the use of images and language in the branding of five Chinese mega-cities. It also ties the imagery used to the wider context in which it is used, and how it is put in place. The primary focus is on the content of city
branding images and language communicated through various channels, for example promotional material, posters in the cityscape, local and national policies and plans, official concepts and ideas, and media portrayals. RQ1 will primarily be answered in Chapter 6.

2. What imaginaries are used in the branding of Chinese mega-cities?
RQ2 relates to the increased interest in place branding research in accounting for the more complex reality that place branding represents. As argued in relation to the brief illustration from Chongqing, it is not possible to understand city branding in China through the city attractiveness framework or hypothesis alone. Instead the multitude of other dimensions at work (e.g. cultural, social and environmental imaginaries) needs to be respected and considered. This research question takes this as a starting point and aims to investigate the various imaginaries that make up the complex reality of city branding in China. RQ2 will primarily be answered in Chapter 7.

3. What are key political aspects of the branding of Chinese mega-cities?
RQ3 is concerned with the political nature of place branding, and focuses on place branding as a power exercise driven and controlled by political élites. The political perspective taken here also implies a focus on urban governance and policy, as well as power interests at local and national levels and the linkages between these. This research question also builds on previous place branding research by raising concerns in relation to ideological and critical dynamics of politics. RQ3 will primarily be answered in Chapter 8.

To find answers to these three RQs is important for three main reasons. First, China’s largest cities play central roles as key players in China’s current process of re-entering into a position as the most powerful nation in the world. It is, consequently, important to learn more about how these cities reimagine and create image, identity and power. Second, Chinese mega-cities are not only externally oriented, but also highly focused on internal target groups and the creation of community, stability and harmony. This, along with a politicized and controlled type of place branding, as well as the use of ideological and powerful images and language, can contribute with additional theoretical perspectives to the place branding research domain. Third, the considerable challenges and opportunities facing China and Chinese mega-cities today are of great scale, and can imply important lessons about China, but also be generalized to other contexts, and thus have relevance for and create interest amongst both researchers and practitioners around the world.
1.3 Dissertation outline

This dissertation consists of nine chapters, illustrated in Figure 1.1, and outlined briefly thereafter.

1. Chinese cities on the move
2. Place branding theory and practice
3. Conceptual framework
4. Research design and methodology
5. The Chinese context
6. Branding of five Chinese mega-cities
7. Imaginaries at play
8. Imagineering place
9. Summing up

Figure 1.1: Dissertation outline.

Chapter 2 is a review of the place branding literature relevant for this study. Here, the conceptual development of place branding is first discussed, followed by a focus on the use of language and images in place branding as well as the communicative powers of place branding. The increased focus on place branding as a dynamic and complex exercise involving various dimensions, such as economy, culture and the environment, as well as a growing focus on internal target groups and residents, is then discussed, followed by an elaboration of the political nature of place branding.

In Chapter 3, the conceptual framework is presented. Here, I use inspiration from disciplines outside business administration, marketing and place branding, in order to assist a further understanding of the aim of this study and the related RQs posed, and to supply an understanding for some of the concepts used in this study and the definitions of these. First, I focus on conceptualizations of imagery, including definitions of image, language and related terms. Second, I focus on conceptualizations and definitions of the imagined and imaginaries, and third, I focus on concepts of ideology and power.
In the Chapter 4, the research design and methodology is presented and discussed, including a focus on my research approach, case selection, fieldwork, data collection, data analysis and methodological reflections. Chapter 5 is an introduction to the Chinese context, and is about the use of language and images in the form of political narratives and ideological concepts, China’s globalizing efforts and domestic challenges, as well as the political context and with that a focus on governance, reform and the Chinese Communist Party.

In Chapter 6, empirical illustrations from the five Chinese mega-cities studied, namely Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chengdu and Chongqing, are presented. These city cases are rather descriptive in character, and aim primarily to answer RQ1. Chapter 7 is the first discussion chapter, and centres on the various city imaginaries identified in the five cities, and the ideological base that permeates them all. Primarily, Chapter 7 answers RQ2. In Chapter 8, which is the second discussion chapter, the conceptual apparatus of ‘imagineering’ is presented and developed, answering mainly to RQ3. In Chapter 9, the concluding chapter of this thesis, I summarize the main findings, emphasize the contribution of this study, and highlight possible strands for future research.
2. Place branding theory and practice

The aim of this chapter is to review current and relevant research within the field of place branding. The review does not aim to cover all research within the place branding domain, but rather focus on literature related to the aim and RQs posed in this study. This review is, moreover, an extension of the problematization of place branding literature discussed in the previous chapter. Even though the focus for this thesis is city branding, the broader concept of place branding is used primarily in this review to incorporate relevant insights from the literature, and because this is increasingly the term used when researching and theorizing the marketing and branding of places such as cities, regions and nations (Hanna & Rowley, 2008).

I have divided this chapter into four sub-chapters. The first sub-chapter introduces place branding and its conceptual development, with a focus on roots, growth, models and frameworks, in order to provide a contextual understanding of the research field to which this dissertation aims to contribute. The second sub-chapter reviews research on the way in which images and language have been used in place branding research. This part primarily addresses RQ1, focusing on the use of imagery in place branding.

The third sub-chapter is an analysis of conceptualizations of place branding as an externally oriented economic apparatus, the increasing focus on the multiple dimensions that place branding incorporates, and with a cumulative focus on local populations, such as residents. This part primarily addresses RQ2 and, thus, the different imaginaries (economic, cultural, social, etc.) employed in place branding. The fourth sub-chapter reviews previous research centring on the ideological foundation and political nature of place branding, focusing on urban governance, policies and plans, stakeholder issues, critique and soft power. As such, this part primarily addresses RQ3 which aims to unveil key political aspects of the branding of Chinese mega-cities.
2.1 Conceptual development of place branding

2.1.1 Roots and growth

To date, there is limited agreement on the definition of place branding (Braun, Kavaratzis & Zenker, 2013; Hankinson, 2004; Kavaratzis & Ashworth, 2005). Following Kavaratzis and Ashworth (2005), place branding is here seen as an approach to urban governance that includes a number of activities and methods with the overall aim to forge and project a desirable image of a place. Place branding is in this study also seen as the forming of a ‘unique selling proposition’ that will secure visibility to the ‘outside’, while reinforcing ‘local identity’ to the ‘inside’ (Colomb & Kalandides, 2010).

Even though place branding as a concept is relatively new (Lucarelli & Berg 2011; Kavaratzis, 2015), the phenomenon is much older. Places, such as nations, regions, cities and districts, have been branded through coats of arms, flags and other forms of signs and symbols almost since the beginning of human history. However, the most recent practice of branding places can be traced back to colonial times, for example as governments tried to convince people to move to newly conquered territories (Avraham, 2004).

The reasons for getting involved in branding places has also varied. For example, researchers and practitioners have depicted branding as important for places since branding can help them to differentiate themselves from competitors (Kavaratzis & Ashworth, 2015; Tiebout, 1956), create competitive advantage (Anholt, 2007), enhance economic development (Allen, 2007), attract people from the ‘creative class’ (Zenker, 2009), shape the city’s identity (Kavaratzis & Hatch, 2013) build relationships with residents (Zenker & Seigis, 2012) and increase local pride (Kavaratzis & Ashworth, 2015).

The growth of place branding is often tied to a neo-liberal discourse (Eshuis & Edwards, 2012; Lucarelli, 2015), and as an example of how corporate discourse has spread to the public context (Koller, 2008). Consequently, places around the world have found a valuable ally in marketing theory and practices, and have adopted concepts from business, marketing and management (Hospers, 2010; Kavaratzis, 2005). Over the years, a shift has occurred from the application of promotional techniques towards place branding as a fundamental part of urban governance (Eshuis, Braun & Klijn, 2013; Zavattaro, 2014). Today, the study of place branding extends across a wide range of academic areas (Hankinson, 2001) and place branding and its related concepts have been described as stemming from varying fields, such as tourism marketing (Hanna & Rowley, 2011), policy (Hankinson, 2001) and general branding and corporate branding (Anholt, 2005; Dinnie, 2011; Kavaratzis, 2004).
Early academic place branding research, then called ‘place promotion’, began emerging in the 1970s (Hankinson, 2001). Since then, various concepts have been used in the literature, referring to the branding, marketing and promotion of places, such as place branding, city branding, city marketing, tourism marketing, place promotion, nation branding, destination marketing and destination branding. Researchers have emphasized the need for an agreed vocabulary in the place branding arena (Hanna & Rowley, 2008) and raised questions about the continued use of umbrella concepts such as place marketing and place branding, as opposed to the adoption of more precise designations that reflect each type of locale, such as city marketing and nation branding (Gertner, 2011a, 2011b). Increasingly, however, researchers use the terms place branding and city branding rather than place marketing and city marketing (Lucarelli & Berg, 2011).

Place branding literature is still fairly young and, therefore, in a development phase (Dinnie, 2011), yet there is a growing body of both research and practice related to place branding (Hanna & Rowley, 2011; Lucarelli & Berg, 2011; Gertner, 2011a). In the last decades, place branding research has grown exponentially, generating a large number of publications and several literature reviews (e.g. Acharya & Rahman, 2016; Andersson, 2014; Berglund & Olsson, 2010; Dinnie, 2004; Hanna & Rowley, 2008; Kavaratzis, 2005; Lucarelli & Berg, 2011; Oguztimur & Akturan, 2016; Vuignier, 2016). Moreover, criticism has been directed at the large number of opinion pieces and the lack of methodological robustness (ibid). Lucarelli and Berg (2011) found in a review of city branding literature, that the majority of research focused on one city alone. Andersson (2014), focusing on place branding in human geography, similarly found that the vast majority of case studies had been based on one case. Twenty per cent of the empirical papers contained data from two to four cases, whereas only about 5 per cent of the empirical studies were based on data from more than four case studies.

The geographical scope of place branding research and practice has moreover primarily been centred on a European context (Skinner, 2005) and in the Western world (Berglund & Olsson, 2010; Lucarelli & Berg, 2011; Oguztimur & Akturan, 2016), with more limited research depicting place branding in African and Asian places (Acharya & Rahman, 2016). In China, which is the central focus of this study, place branding practices have been implemented and developed and have increased in importance since the 1990s, when a small number of Chinese cities started to experiment with place branding (Liu, 2009; Wen & Sui, 2014). As a concept, place branding is still very new in China (Fan, 2014a), yet research on the topic, in English and Chinese, is growing rapidly. However, a truly robust theory is still under construction in the field of place branding and there have been calls for additional theoretical contributions to further develop the research domain (Gertner, 2011a).
2.1.2 Models and frameworks

As a research domain, place branding still lacks a sound theoretical background (Acharya & Rahman, 2016). One way to advance the field theoretically has been to propose a multitude of more or less empirically founded conceptual frameworks and models – often related to ‘how to describe or manage’ city branding processes. Amongst the earliest attempts were Olins (1999), proposing the ‘Seven-step approach for place branding’, and Kotler, Asplund, rein and Haider (1999), suggesting the ‘Strategic market planning approach’, focusing on the fixed environment and its characteristics. Another model, ‘City brand management’ by Gaggiotti, Cheng and Yunak (2008), focuses primarily on economic growth, proposing a step-by-step linear process including four main questions, namely ‘What are we now?’, ‘What are our options?’, ‘What do we want to be?’ and ‘What do we need to do?’.

Another kind of framework that has guided much subsequent research, as well as this study, is Kavaratzis’ (2004) ‘City image communication framework’, which is composed of three types of communication, namely primary, secondary and tertiary. Primary communication is described as unintentional, meaning that the city’s actions – such as the city landscape, infrastructure and city structure – have communicative effects, even though communicative messages are not the main goal. Secondary communication is described as the intentional communication that often is carried out by the help of traditional branding practices, and tertiary communication is tied to communication by media and word of mouth (Kavaratzis, 2004).

Central elements in frameworks and models that aim to conceptualize place branding include vision and strategy (Kavaratzis, 2008; Van den Berg & Braun, 1999), internal city culture (Hanna & Rowley, 2011; Kavaratzis, 2008), stakeholders and stakeholder engagement (Hanna & Rowley, 2011; Therkelsen et al., 2010), management and leadership, political and societal support (Van den Berg & Braun, 1999), physical place-making and implementation (Therkelsen et al., 2010), communication platforms (Therkelsen et al., 2010), brand experience (Hanna & Rowley, 2011), feedback and evaluation (Kavaratzis, 2008) and mirroring, which leads back to revisiting the vision and the strategy (Kavaratzis & Hatch, 2013). A change in the literature has occurred over the years in the illustration of place branding, from depictions of a linear process of necessary steps, towards conceptualizations of it as an iterative, complex web of coincident, intertwined processes (Kavaratzis, 2012).

One criticism of place branding models is that they are limited to the context of a specific case study and the perspectives they represent, and that they fall short in offering a more holistic model of place brand management (Hanna & Rowley, 2011). In response to this, Hanna and Rowley (2011) made an overview of existing place branding models and proposed an integrative model
called the ‘Strategic Place Brand-management Model’. This model consists of nine main elements, namely brand evaluation, stakeholder engagement, infrastructure, brand identity, brand architecture, brand articulation, brand communications, word of mouth and brand experience. Models and frameworks are necessary for research and theory development, not least in the place branding domain which lacks theoretical robustness, yet it is highly challenging to develop models for such complex constructs as places (Acharya & Rahman, 2016; Zenker, 2011). Furthermore, the vast majority of frameworks and models have been developed in European cities, regions and countries and the applicability to other cultural contexts can thus be questioned.

State-of-the-art reviews of place branding have also contributed to theoretical frameworks. Lucarelli and Brorström (2013), for example, conceptualize the city branding literature based on its theoretical foundations, adopting a framework developed by Burrell and Morgan (1979), and structure city branding around three main emerging perspectives, namely branding as production, branding as appropriation and critical studies. In turn, Acharya and Rahman (2016) examined constructs covered in previous place branding literature, and from this developed a nomological network of constructs that indicates the relationship between the constructs.

To sum up, there are today a number of different, and to a certain extent conflicting, conceptual frameworks and models for the key elements involved in place branding practices. For the time being, I conclude that place branding seems to emerge as the umbrella term for the whole area of different spatial branding initiatives, and that models and frameworks differ greatly.
2.2. Place branding from a communication perspective

In this fourth sub-chapter, I will take a closer look at place branding from a communication perspective – the way in which images and language are used to communicate the city to external and internal stakeholders. How this can be seen as a gradual shift from functional marketing to strategic place branding is first discussed, followed by a discussion on the place branding literature analysing place identity and place image, before focusing on powers of images and language.

2.2.1 From functional place marketing to strategic place branding

The shift from a focus on place marketing to place branding (Hankinson, 2004; Rainisto, 2003) and the wider use of branding rather than marketing with regards to places (Gertner, 2011a) can be related to the shift from a functional marketing approach (e.g. Kotler, Haider & Rein, 1993; Young, Diep & Drabble, 2006) towards a more strategic approach to branding (Berg, 2009; Braun, 2008; Kavaratzis & Hatch, 2013; Lucarelli & Berg, 2011). The marketing approach has been described as involving techniques or processes of selling, promoting and positioning the city in areas such as place marketing, destination marketing, urban marketing and city promotion (Lucarelli and Berg, 2011). Branding, on the other hand, has been depicted as providing a certain emphasis on the communicative aspects of all marketing processes (Kavaratzis, 2004) and as a ‘continuous process interlinked with all marketing efforts and with the whole planning exercise’ (Kavaratzis, 2007, p. 704).

Previous research has also elucidated a shift from fragmented city promotional and marketing activities to a state of more strategically oriented place branding (Kavaratzis, 2007). Various scholars have witnessed and acknowledged this shift towards a more strategic approach of place branding, and maintained that places and cities need strategic tools to attract tourists, companies and talented people (Kotler & Gertner, 2002; Rainisto, 2003). Govers (2011) has discussed the importance of creating an overarching brand strategy to reflect the place’s history, achievements and aspirations and sees strategy coupled with substance and symbolic actions as key components to gain reputation. These are all viable statements, yet, considering the vast majority of place branding literature being based on scarce empirical research in combination with the author’s personal opinions (Gertner, 2011a), one would be forgiven for feeling sceptical about the actual degree of strategically oriented place branding practices.

In the literature, there is still a lack of agreement regarding the relation between place branding and place marketing. Some scholars have included branding within the array of marketing tools (e.g. Braun, 2008; Hospers, 2010; Kotler et al., 1999), whereas others have accepted branding as the general
Strategic guideline for marketing (e.g. Govers, 2013; Hankinson, 2010; Kavaratzis, 2004; Zavattaro, 2014). Govers (2011) belongs to the latter group, and has claimed that branding should inform marketing and function as a strategic compass in the context of places and cities. There has also been a shift towards viewing marketing and branding as complementary (Giovanardi, 2012; Govers, 2011; Lucarelli & Brorström, 2013). For example, Giovanardi, Lucarelli and Pasquinelli (2013) have stated that the marketing approach enables an understanding of place branding with regard to the functional aspects, whereas the branding approach is valuable as it reveals the power of the intangible and symbolic elements of a place.

Similarly, Kavaratzis (2008) claims that, even though the concept of branding implies a move away from the functional, rational character of marketing, it does not mean that the functional aspects have become less important. On the contrary, Kavaratzis claims that ‘[…] it signifies a change of direction in that the desired brand is what guides the marketing measures on the city’s physical environment and functionality’ (2008, p. 11), which supports Kornberger’s (2010) reasoning related to the brand society, namely that branding has the power to structure actions and responses. Likewise, mainstream, or commercial, branding has experienced a shift away from a managerial approach (e.g. Aaker & Joachimsthaler, 2000) towards a more symbolic perspective emphasizing the creation of stories that connect people (Cayla & Eckhardt, 2008) and the role of brands in changing cultures (Nixon, 2003; Ritzer, 2003; Thompson & Arsel, 2004). Moreover, place brands have been conceptualized as symbolic constructs that are meant to add value or meaning to something (Eshuis & Edwards, 2012).

I strongly sympathize with the ideas expressed above, that a key element of place branding is its function as a strategic communicative instrument with the power to structure actions and responses in relation to its external environment. However, one should not forget the role of place branding in the formation of internal place identities, and this is what I will take up next.

### 2.2.2 Place identity and place image

Two key concepts related to the communicative aspects of place branding are those of place identity and place image. Govers and Go proposed that place branding is ‘the link between identity, experience and image’ (2009, p. 23), and it has also been suggested that if the place brand is not based on the place identity, the branding effort will result in a brand that is strange and alien to the place (Houghton & Stevens, 2010; Therkelsen et al., 2010; Kavaratzis & Hatch, 2013). This supports Avraham’s (2004) reasoning about the importance of distinguishing between trying to change a city’s image while simultaneously changing the reality of the city, and trying to change the image without making changes to the city’s reality.
City identity has been linked to the city’s history and key elements that traditionally have characterized the city (Deffner & Metaxas, 2010). Moreover, place identity has been described as being created through cultural, political, religious and historical discourses about a place, shared through stories, photographs and power struggles (Govers & Go, 2009; Kavaratzis & Hatch, 2013). Place identity is also often mentioned in place branding research (Anholt, 2007, 2010; Ashworth & Voogd, 1990; Kavaratzis, 2004, 2007; Kalandides, 2011). However, with a few exceptions (e.g. Kavaratzis & Hatch, 2013), few attempts have been made to conceptualize it and there is limited discussion on how identity is constituted, negotiated or contested (Kalandides, 2011). Indeed, claims have been made that place identity should be conceptualized together with power, since power relations are deeply intertwined into the identity of a place (Kalandides, 2011); an argument that is relevant in the context of this study. Furthermore, a broader understanding of identity has potential in moving place branding beyond marketing to incorporate elements of sociology, planning and urban design (Hospers, 2009).

Place branding has also been accused of adopting a rather static view on place identity; a view which is limited since it fails to disclose the full complexity of place identity (Kavaratzis & Hatch, 2013). In this study, place identity is seen as the character of a place, yet also as a complex and constant dialogue between the internal and external (ibid). As I see it, an understanding of what constitutes the identity of a place is important, since place branding often centres on what the city is and should be, and because place identity and place image are closely intertwined.

Place image can be regarded both as perceived image and as constructed or communicated image. Perceived place image has been defined as the sum of impressions, beliefs and ideals people have towards a certain place (Kotler et al., 1993), with some classifying image as ‘rich’ versus ‘poor’. Cities with a rich city image are said to be cities that we know a lot about, usually from various sources. Cities with a poor city image are cities that we know little about, and the knowledge we have typically comes from a single source (Elizur, 1986). Various factors are said to influence the perceived image of a city, such as population, location, history, political power, crime rate, atmosphere, media coverage, physical appearance, entertainment, culture (Avraham, 2004), policies and events (Zavattaro, 2014).

In place branding research, various scholars have depicted how nations, regions, cities, districts and communities are branded with the aim of creating a favourable image of the place (Kavaratzis, 2008; Eshuis & Edwards, 2012). A place’s image is described as a central factor in the way businesses and citizens respond to a place (Zavattaro, 2014) and, moreover, place branding has been depicted as a strategic approach to improving the image of a place.
Various approaches are involved in the study of place image, ranging from urban design to geography, and from environmental psychology to semantics (Vanolo, 2008).

The seminal work of Lynch (1960) is considered a key starting point in putting research on place image on the agenda, and discussing place image in the context of urban design and the city as a built image. Vanolo (2008) discusses place image as analysed from two different perspectives: internal and external image. The internal image is the city image perceived and reproduced by the local actors in the city, and thus people that identify their geographical identities with that particular place (Lalli, 1992). The external image is the perception and representation of the city by and for people and organizations outside the city (Vanolo, 2008).

Constructed or communicated image, the view adopted in this study, has been related to the creation of charming and positive images to attract investment and tourists from the global landscape and with the purpose of stimulating local development (Gold & Ward, 1994). The creation of representations (Kavaratzis & Ashworth, 2010) is an essential feature of place branding, and places have been described as constituted through a plethora of representations and images (Hubbard & Hall, 1998; Warnaby & Medway, 2010). In order to build place images, certain symbols, labels and communicative stereotypes are commonly created and distributed (Vanolo, 2008).

In this creation and distribution process, places take on various images, tied to the global city, the informational city and the modernist city, for example, and reflect these images in practices in the place (Zavattaro, 2014). For example, images linked to high technology have been used in place branding practices, being seen as a solution to many different urban problems, such as social cohesion, competitiveness and mechanisms of governance (Vanolo, 2008). However, even places without technological profiles have used high-tech images in their promotion, leading to ironic expressions amongst scholars, such as ‘high-tech fantasies’ (Massey, Quintas & Wield, 1992) and ‘technodreams’ (Dobers, 2003). These examples relate to criticism directed at place branding for creating a gap between image and reality, also seen when neglecting poverty and social deprivation in representations and images, for example (Eshuis & Edwards, 2012; Paddison, 1993).

To sum up, place image is closely associated with, and sometimes even confused with, the concept of identity. Some use ‘place identity’ instead of ‘place image’ (Skinner, 2008), whereas others consider identity as the ‘objective reality’ and thus different from image (Kalandides, 2011). In the words of Kavaratzis (2007), ‘At the heart of the matter lies the interaction between the city’s identity and the image of the city that is used in and, at the same time
formed by marketing’ (p. 708). Identity can mean both unity and sameness (Martin, 2005) and distinctiveness or not being ‘the other’ (Kalandides, 2011).

2.2.3 Place imagery

In both research and practice, much attention has been paid to the visual representation of places through the use of pictures, logos and slogans (Hospers, 2010). However, recent research (e.g. Campelo et al., 2011) has also shown that places around the world are constructed by a wide variety of representational forms – encompassing pictures, graphics and language, as well as architecture design and sound. The development and communication of these different representations are central to the context of places and place branding since they cultivate and advance identity (Berg, 2001). Physical, as well as symbolic, representations are crucial in place branding also because they can ‘stand in’ for experience as a source of information, and serve as a base for future knowledge (Borgerson & Schroeder, 2002).

Contemporary place branding has been criticized for being limited to visual communication and for devoting so many resources to the design of new logos and catchy city slogans (Kavaratzis & Hatch, 2013). Decision makers in cities have been criticized for their tendency to take ‘the easy path’, only designing a city logo and slogan (Ashworth & Kavaratzis, 2009; Kalandides, 2011) rather than incorporating the visual representations as an integral part of more strategic place governance efforts (Eshuis et al., 2013). The focus on logos and slogans has been called superficial and insufficient (Ashworth & Kavaratzis, 2009; Govers & Go, 2009) since place branding has been considered a pure communicative exercise not implemented in harmony with the ‘product’ development of the place (Ashworth & Kavaratzis, 2010; Giovanardi, 2012), and the need to move beyond using a logo and a slogan in place branding is by now well expressed in the literature (e.g., Anholt, 2008; Ashworth & Kavaratzis, 2009; Govers, 2013; Zavattaro, 2010).

Scholars have, however, also observed that place branding practitioners continue the ‘logo fetish’ and maintain that this is problematic since logos and slogans are ascribed with powers that they do not have (Govers, 2013). Another criticism evident in the literature is the ‘crowding’ of similar images (Vanolo, 2008) and the overuse of certain kinds of images (Hudson & Ritchie, 2009). It has been stated that communicative exercises often lead to similar manifestations, resulting in uniformity of visual identity systems rather than creation of distinctiveness (Colomb & Kalandides, 2010). Another concern is misrepresentation of images, and the creation and use of images that fail to reflect thoughts and feelings amongst local residents (Colombino, 2009).
Despite the criticism of logos and slogans, communicative aspects of place branding – including symbols, icons, visual representations, rhetoric and narratives, etc. – nevertheless continuously occupy a central position in place branding research and practice. Logos and slogans are still important since they are visual statements that form vital representational constituents of the brand and identity of a place (Floch, 2001; Hayden & Sevin, 2012). A focus on logos, and the potential rhetorical moves as a response to them, which Hayden and Sevin (2012) convincingly illustrate in their study of the controversy over the logo in the city of Ankara, can for example be regarded as revealing political aspects of place branding. Many have also stated that images have power (e.g. Balfour & Mesaros, 1994; Borins, 2011; Fox, 1996; Miller, 2012; Morgan, 2006; Wittgenstein, 2001), that images are important and that behind them hides a grey eminence of politics (Baudrillard, 1983). Moreover, images, as well as signs, logos, slogans and narratives, are said to rule our discourse, in a period of ‘hyperreality’ (Baudrillard, 1994) and act as powerful change agents in the public policy arena (Miller, 2012).

The creation of aesthetic imagery has also been described as a crucial feature in engaging people, lift their thinking and capture their view (Kornberger & Clegg, 2011). The development and communication of visuals is moreover said to cultivate and advance identity (Berg, 2001). Visual rhetoric has, in turn, been described as an effective tool to create awareness of places (Campelo et al., 2011), and is said to go beyond visual representation and communication, since it is more about strategies of communication and representation, and because rhetoric is about persuasion (Rampley, 2005). Visual rhetoric has also been tied to the framing of messages (Scott, 1994) and to finding techniques and means for effective persuasion (McQuarrie & Mick, 1996). For example, globalization has been used as rhetoric in order to validate or discard various planning decisions and actions in cities (Waters, 1995).

Relatedly, rhetoric skills have been described as tools to convey meanings (Weiman & Walter, 1957), and the rhetoric of marketing communications has moreover been depicted as having the potential to influence image creation by conveying meanings, symbolically and metaphorically (Campelo et al., 2011). There have been calls for ‘a theory on visual rhetoric that is more concerned with ideological and ethical matters than with systemic and operational issues’ (ibid, p. 11). This study argues that a focus on visual rhetoric of place branding can say something about underlying values and beliefs and advance an understanding of what is represented, in what context and with what purpose.

Language, and in particular texts, used in place branding – such as written city strategies and communication policies, or investment promotion programmes, can highlight values and ideologies promoted and legitimated (Vaara et al., 2010) in line with the assumption that place branding is a kind of ‘selective storytelling’ (Jensen, 2007; Sandercock, 2003) that is fundamentally about the
construction of powerful narratives that create meaning (Hansen, 2010). Koller (2008) put emphasis on language in place branding and applies a cognitive critical approach to discourse in the context of city branding, conceptualizing texts as ‘vehicles for their producers’ mental representations, disseminated to align recipients’ representations with those of producers’ (p. 431).

A focus on the communicative efforts involved in the formation of the brand can advance a critical scholarship relevant to both practical and theoretical concerns (Hayden & Sevin, 2012). Also, paying attention to the images and symbols that are chosen to represent a place brand; to what is portrayed in place branding imagery, and how it is portrayed, can offer opportunities to understand the branding of places (Campelo et al., 2011; Johansson, 2012).

To sum up, research has offered important contributions about visual representations and the powers of language tied to place branding. Various scholars have also emphasized the centrality of ideologically loaded imagery in place branding, yet there are still few empirical studies of city branding campaigns that address ideological features and the underlying powers of imagery.
2.3 Multiple dimensions of place branding

In this third sub-chapter, I will discuss the recent shift in focus from conceptualizations of place branding as an economic apparatus to conceptualizations of place branding as more complex, and as a process including, for example, social, cultural and environmental dimensions. At the end of this sub-chapter, I will also show how this opening-up of place branding research has led to an increased attention on internal target groups and inclusive place branding.

2.3.1 Economic and international dimensions

The growth of place branding is commonly tied to a neo-liberal discourse, and place branding is often described as having neo-liberal features (Eshuis & Edwards, 2012; Lucarelli, 2015). Place branding is, moreover, said to be influenced by an ideology of competitive individualism (Rossi & Vanolo, 2015) and tied to an economic rationale that puts emphasis on the ‘private’ and the ‘commercial’ rather than the ‘public’ and the ‘non-commercial’ (Lucarelli, 2015). Consequently, the growth of place branding is intertwined with the rise of the ‘entrepreneurial city’ (Hall & Hubbard, 1998) and the ‘creative city’; concepts that arose in the 1970s (Kavaratzis, 2004).

Place branding is thus often regarded as contributing to an essential ‘economic apparatus’ (Lucarelli, 2015), centring on its capacity to attract investors (Hao & Liu, 2013), tourists and talented people to a place (Kong, 2012), and emphasized in relation to the expansion of export markets and the attraction of outside investments (Kavaratzis & Ashworth, 2005). An externally oriented framework has consequently come to dominate place branding.

This ‘external framework’ is closely connected with the global discourse and a focus on places’ positions in the global marketplace (Kotler & Gertner, 2002), and the creation of global and economic competitiveness (Ni & Kresl, 2012). Place branding is thus tied to a narrative of the global economy being in transition, with the outcome that places compete on a global stage for investors, tourists, residents and workforce (Anholt, 2007). The ambivalent effects of neo-liberal urbanism are highly visible in established global cities and the most dynamic city-regions, such as Los Angeles, Dubai and Chinese globalizing cities (Lin, 2004), where social disadvantage has intensified and affects migrants and ethnic minorities in particular (Rossi & Vanolo, 2012).

Nevertheless, how to make a place attractive for capital-rich ‘creatives’ has been a significant focus area in place branding research and practice (Therkelsen et al., 2010). Relatedly, culture and creativity have become central concepts in place branding and city planning policies all over the world (Vanolo, 2008). Ideas and stereotypes of culture and creativity are used in place branding strategies to promote attractive urban images (Vanolo, 2008), while cities
often are regarded as centres of culture, creativity, art and experimentation (Zukin, 1995; Scott, 2000). In a Chinese context, culture and creativity are increasingly drawn on in relation to place branding (O’Connor & Liu, 2014; Song, 2013). Cities focus on culture and creativity in order to find greater sources of differentiation and to develop their city uniqueness (Kong, 2012). Many cities also invest heavily in cultural industries and cultural images, using creativity as an important umbrella concept (Vanolo, 2008).

Related to the place branding discourse and its economic rationale, as well as notions of entrepreneurialism and competitiveness, is the hosting of events of various sizes. In Hubbard and Hall’s (1998) ‘generic entrepreneurial model of city governance’, events are emphasized as one out of six elements, important in developing a spectacular city. Moreover, events have been depicted as an imagining strategy for place branding, with the purpose of attaining interurban competitive advantage (Hiller, 2000). It is argued that events can make it possible for the host community to create economic impacts and business networking, prestige and civic pride, media coverage and putting the city on the map, as well as increased tourism (Getz, 1997).

Perceived benefits from events are hard to evaluate and the impacts that events are said to have on an economy are, by some authors, argued to be much lower than estimated (Getz, 1997). The 2008 Beijing Olympics, for example, only had limited impacts on the city’s brand (Zhang & Zhao, 2009). Additional scholars have in the recent decade depicted mega-events arranged in a Chinese context, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics (Berkowitz, Gjermano, Gomez & Schafer, 2007; Lai Lee, 2010; Zhang & Zhao, 2009) and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo (Cull, 2012; Deng & Poon, 2012; Dynon, 2011), illuminating drivers pertaining not only to an economic apparatus, but also to sustainability (Lamberti, Noci, Guo & Zhu, 2011), cultural values as well as political interests and power dynamics (e.g. Dynon, 2011).

Some have argued that major Chinese events have improved the image of many cities by the help of different innovative marketing and branding campaigns, and that mega-events have operated as a powerful development instrument to create globally competitive Chinese cities (Wen & Sui, 2014). Events like the Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai World Expo can moreover intensify a sense of proximity with other people by simultaneously promoting nationalistic values (Cayla & Eckhardt, 2008). Yet, other studies have suggested that the Chinese government used the Beijing Olympics to emphasize Chinese culture and civilization to the Chinese population, concluding that further research is needed to substantiate the idea that the Chinese government intends to target domestic audiences with mega-events (de Kloet, Chong, & Landsberger, 2011; Chen, 2012).
2.3.2 Cultural and environmental dimensions

Over the years, place branding scholars have criticized the extensive focus on economic features that has infused place branding research and practice, and called for more holistic perspectives, including a focus on social, cultural, political, critical and ethical dimensions (e.g. Mommaas, 2002; Kavaratzis, 2008; Lucarelli & Berg, 2011; Therkelsen et al., 2010; Van Ham, 2008), as well as environmental dimensions (e.g. Caprotti, 2014; Chan & Marafa, 2013; Liu, 2016; Li & Qi, 2014). It has also been suggested that place branding ‘should be more “cultured”, knowledgeable, and critically aware of traditions of cultural expression’ (Bianchini & Ghilardi, 2007, p. 285). Moreover, city administrators have been advised to view place branding not only as a matter of image and perception, but also as an important phenomenon related to the impact it can have on the city and its surroundings, in terms of economic, political, cultural and social effects (Lucarelli, 2012).

The identity of a city is often linked to the city’s history and certain elements that traditionally have characterized it (Deffner & Metaxas, 2010; Wen, Liu, Li & Li, 2013). History, heritage and culture can, in other words, be a potent resource in place branding (Fan, 2014c; Lai & Ooi, 2015; Zhang & Zhang, 2013) and in shaping city image (Liu, 2011). However, in the process of globalization and modernization, the past runs the risk of being forgotten and its material heritage destroyed, and interpretations of history are often framed to fit contemporary needs (e.g. Harvey, 2000; Lai & Ooi, 2015; Ooi, 2008).

In Asian countries and cities, including China and Shanghai, for example, the state has played a key role in the generation of cultural icons and artefacts, and used these as catalysts of urban change (King, 2007; Olds, 1995; Rossi & Vanolo, 2012). Furthermore, as so persuasively put by Lai and Ooi, ‘[...] the ambiguity of cultural heritage – for example in terms of stories, form, shape and appearance – allows the imaginations of the past to be exploited and employed as desired by branding authorities’ (2015, p. 277). Culture has also been emphasized as vital to the narrative of place (Jensen, 2007), which branding in turn can reinforce (Kavaratzis & Ashworth, 2015).

Explanations of the economic, competitive, global, entrepreneurial and creative base of place branding can be found in the wide adaptation of corporate branding to places. Following Andersson’s (2014) reasoning, a wider understanding of societal, cultural, political and spatial structures of place branding can be achieved through the inclusion of different disciplinary perspectives, from fields like human geography, sociology and political science, etc.

A wider understanding of place branding is also feasible because the social, cultural, political and economic dimensions are frequently interdependent. Culture and economy have, in a place branding context, for example, been
described as symbiotic (Scott, 2000; Vanolo, 2008), whereas place brands have been depicted as social constructs with both social and political implications (Freire, 2005). The promotion of world-renowned sites has moreover been depicted as permeated by a strong social and political element (Kavoura, 2012). Social and economic dimensions have also been depicted as closely related, as local authorities recognize that more money ought to be invested in improving quality of life while at the same time improving the city’s attractiveness with regard to new immigrants and investments (Avraham, 2004). Similarly, it has been stated that place branding should be part of long-term economic and social development (Zhang & Zhao, 2009).

Related to this is a focus on sustainability and the environment in place branding, which ties into a contemporary view of cities as a source of new environmental remedies and experiments (Chang & Sheppard, 2013). Environmental sustainability is increasingly described as a growth opportunity in policy frameworks, such as ‘green competitiveness’ and ‘eco-economic stimulus packages’, implying linkages between economic and environmental dimensions. Brorström (2014) depicts Gothenburg’s focus on sustainability, and thus concurrent attention to social, economic and ecological perspectives. Also, ‘Sydney 2030’ is the name of a city strategy emphasizing a sustainable, green and prosperous future for all (Kornberger & Clegg, 2011), whereas Seoul has promoted a range of green city initiatives (Braiterman, 2011).

In a Chinese context, environment and sustainability are regarded as an increasingly pressing issue, very visible in place branding, and seen in an increased focus on environmental and related terms, such as ecological civilization construction (Li & Qi, 2014), urban ecology (Liu, 2016), eco-cities (Caprotti, 2014; Li & Qi, 2014), green urbanism, resilience, sustainable cities (Caprotti, 2014; Lin, 2013; Liu, 2015) and green branding (Chan & Marafa, 2013). Previous research has depicted the recent development of numerous ‘ecological cities’ in China (Wang-Védrine, 2014), as well as the conscious efforts to promote a new, green identity that symbolizes the city as a good place to live, while nurturing local, national and international acknowledgement, and putting cities like Hangzhou at the ‘top of the national class’ as an imagined green community (Delman, 2014).

Some studies are explicit about the link between an economic apparatus and a focus on the environment. Liu (2016) for example, suggests that cities can pursue economic development while also paying attention to development of the place’s urban ecology. Li and Qi (2014), in turn, discuss place branding with a focus on eco-city development, ecological low-carbon and environmental protection, maintaining that such a focus can enhance competitiveness. A focus on the environment moreover ties into political dimensions, as eco-projects are becoming more and more predominant in policy and political-economic discourses (Caprotti, 2014).
In addition to these perspectives, a focus on ethical, political and social perspectives, for example, has also been called for in the place branding literature. Ethical perspectives in place branding have been elaborated on by Sevin (2011), for example, who applied a communicative action framework to identify and analyse ethical issues that often are overlooked in place branding, including questions of inclusion, legitimacy and responsibility. These are issues that also tie into social and political perspectives of place branding – which will be elaborated on next, in turn.

2.3.3 Social dimensions – resident satisfaction and inclusion

In the early days of place branding, local authorities enthusiastically embraced marketing in order to attract inward investment (Ashworth & Voogd, 1990; Kavaratzis, 2004) and, for a long time, place branding involved primarily place promotion (Hospers, 2010). However, since the mid-1980s, local authorities started to use place branding as part of their urban development policies (Hospers, 2010), and the realization came that external markets are actually of minimal importance compared to internal markets (Kavaratzis, 2004). The focus on internal audiences, resident satisfaction and inclusive place branding is in this study considered to fall within social dimensions.

Hospers (2010) argues, from a geographical perspective and with empirical illustrations based on Dutch migration data, that residents and firms do not move easily, questioning the usefulness of attracting newcomers and advocating for a focus on local populations in place branding. In place branding research more generally, scholars have become increasingly focused on internal audiences such as residents (e.g. Govers, 2011; Insch & Florek, 2008; Kavaratzis, 2008; Therkelsen et al., 2010; Zenker et al., 2013), and it has been stated that a focus on residents is especially critical in large cities and metropolitan areas where social disadvantage intensifies (Rossi & Vanolo, 2012).

Govers (2011) emphasizes the importance of building the place brand based on the identity of the local population and societal actors. By rooting the place brand in the internal place image, in the place’s cultural life and cultural representations and in the place’s history, place branding will become more ‘cultured’ and critically aware of traditions of cultural expression, which are desired traits, according to Bianchini and Ghilardi (2007).

Even though urban authorities have begun realizing that local populations are highly important in place branding (Kavaratzis, 2008), there is nevertheless agreement in the literature that residents still are largely ignored in place branding practices (Oguztirimur & Akturan, 2016). Consequently, it is not surprising that extant literature contains limited empirical illustrations of place branding with regards to or targeting local populations and existing residents.

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Moreover, those empirical illustrations discussed in the place branding literature present different – often contradictory – findings, conclusions and analyses with regards to participatory place branding.

Others advocating an internal focus in place branding claim that citizen satisfaction is one of the most significant results of place management (Insch & Florek, 2008) and place branding (Zenker & Martin, 2011). Zenker et al. (2013) maintain that place branding should primarily be about creating a good place to live for residents, whereas others hold that the ultimate goal of place branding is the achievement of residents’ satisfaction (Guhathakurta & Stimson, 2007; Insch, 2011; Insch and Florek, 2008). To achieve residents’ satisfaction, policymakers should enhance residents’ everyday experiences, guarantee things such as affordable and accessible housing, transport, education, healthcare, leisure and recreation facilities, as well as opportunities for social interaction (Insch, 2011; Kemp et al., 2008). This ties into notions of social inclusiveness, related to the creation of an inclusive society (Merrilees, Miller, Shao & Herrington, 2014) which, in a Chinese context, have been described as key pillars in the creation of place branding legitimacy (Fan, 2014b).

There have also been suggestions that place branding with a focus on local populations can foster civic consciousness (Kavaratzis, 2004) and lead to the creation of commitment and loyalty (Kemp et al., 2011). Strong internal branding is thus conceptualized as a prerequisite for successful place branding, linking into Ind’s (2004) ideas about the public, private and civil society ‘living the brand’. Culture, along with the local populations who live it and create it, has furthermore been described as the core of the place brand (Aitken & Campelo, 2011; Kavaratzis & Hatch, 2013), in line with the reasoning that culture is collectively owned (Aitken & Campelo, 2011).

Moreover, a focus on local populations in place branding can result in residents becoming ‘brand evangelists’ for a place (Kemp et al., 2011; Kornberger, 2010), or local brand ambassadors (Govers, 2011) who are emotionally invested in the prosperity of the place. This ties into the notion of ‘brand communities’ (Kornberger, 2010; Muñiz & O’Guinn, 2001) and, thus, the involvement of people in a community with shared consciousness, connected to each other through history and traditions, and with a sense of responsibility towards others. It also relates to the interpretation of place branding as a ‘community-building exercise’ (Ashworth et al., 2015) with a key purpose being to generate shared stories and visions regarding the future of the community.

To sum up, as depicted in this review, there is an increased interest in place branding research in accounting for the complex reality that the branding of places incorporates, including studies of ethical, cultural, political, critical, social and environmental aspects of place branding, for example. Over the past decade, place branding research has increasingly highlighted internal features
of place branding, and thus focused on local audiences, resident satisfaction and inclusiveness. Even though more and more research is centring on internal audiences and residents in the field of place branding, there is nevertheless still a lack of empirical studies and related conceptualizations of place branding centring on local populations.

2.4 Political nature of place branding

In this fourth section, some of the literature on political aspects of place branding is reviewed, in relation to RQ3. The section starts with a review of research about the interrelation between governance, policies, strategies and plans; followed by a discussion of critical perspectives, stakeholder issues and participatory place branding; and concluded by an elaboration of concepts tied to policy, ideology and power as they appear in the place branding literature.

2.4.1 Governance, policies, strategies and plans

Place branding has been conceptualized as a highly politicized activity (Morgan et al., 2003), and it has been stated that the role of local government and public policy in place branding is extensive (Parkerson & Saunders, 2005). More and more scholars have moreover come to address political dimensions of place branding (e.g. Eshuis & Edwards, 2012; Gibson, 2005; Kaneva, 2011; Lucarelli & Giovanardi, 2014), and have called for a further focus on this area (e.g. Lucarelli, 2012; Lucarelli, 2015; Lucarelli & Berg, 2011).

The place branding process is intrinsically political, with varying interests trying to control the brand or influence the branding in certain directions (e.g. Bennett & Savani, 2003; Lucarelli, 2015; Pasquinelli, 2013; Ward, 2000; Youde, 2009). It has even been claimed that successful place branding processes are reliant on the ability to manage the political interests related to the place brand (e.g. Hornskov, 2007; Lucarelli, 2015; Pedersen, 2004; Stigel & Frimann, 2006), and political stability is thus seen as a precondition for an efficacious place branding campaign (Lucarelli, 2015).

A central political feature tied to the management of the political structure of the place brand is urban governance strategy used to manage perceptions about places (e.g. Eshuis & Edwards, 2012). It has, for example, been claimed that a holistic, strategic effort towards place branding can alter the place branding practice into a fundamental governance intervention (Eshuis et al., 2013). Zavattaro (2014) has also referred to place branding as a governance mechanism and claimed that, as place branding is becoming an increasingly popular governance practice, additional devices are needed to fully understand the institutions and practices of governance.
Moreover, Yong and Cheng (2012) claim that governance of cities matters, especially as cities play increasingly important roles economically, socially and politically. They have exemplified Chinese cities, stating that in the past 30 years they have become China’s main economic engine, and that ‘the governance of cities has profound political, economic and social implications that deserve in-depth analysis’ (ibid, p. 306). China’s urban governance structure is moreover described as characterized by strong leadership (Wu, 2000; Wu, 2003; Xu & Yeh, 2005).

Urban governance has been described as intertwined with urban policies and place branding (Anholt, 2008). For example, Eshuis and Edwards (2012) hold that place branding plays a role at the level of urban policies, whereas Eshuis et al. (2013) maintain that place branding increasingly is being used as a governance strategy. On a similar note, Braun (2008) argues that place branding involves policymaking procedures and is subject to political decision-making. However, it has also been argued that policies alone, even if they are effectively implemented, are not enough to make foreign audiences change their perception of a place (Anholt, 2008). Likewise, Bellini et al. (2010) state that marketing is no substitute for policy, but can be functional to policy, and hold that governance processes can result in increased social and political cohesion. Place branding in general, and city branding in particular, has also been depicted as a ‘powerful broadband policy-instrument’ with consequences for various policy areas in cities and places (Lucarelli, 2015, p. 37), from safe streets and education to arts and culture (Parkerson & Saunders, 2005). Zavattaro (2014) emphasizes that urban policies related to place branding do not necessarily imply negative effects and maintains that, just because a city uses urban policy as a place branding tool that enhances the overall place branding strategy, it does not mean that there cannot be positive outcomes. This statement nevertheless sheds some light on issues of power in place branding, with regards to policy and governance, and in line with the idea of place branding as a power exercise imposed by political élites (Ashworth et al., 2015).

Molotch (1976) was amongst the first to expose how place branding in the West was largely driven by political élites. Molotch ties politics to the economy, essentially viewing urban areas as a political economy, and states that growth is the political and economic essence of virtually any place. Van Ham (2001, 2008) also discusses politics in relation to place branding and the economy, and states that place branding needs to keep both a competitive economic and a political edge. Place branding has moreover been described as a power exercise, imposing élite-led interests, and situating place branding within the wider struggles of political, financial and social power (Ashworth et al., 2015), yet limited studies analyse how this power exercise plays out.
Furthermore, city strategies and urban plans are also interconnected with place branding, and the connections between place branding and place development are well expressed in the literature. For example, place branding has been conceptualized as a development approach (Allen, 2007) and as a form of place development (Kavaratzis, 2005). There are still, however, few studies in the field of place branding that combine marketing and planning-oriented approaches (Oguztimur & Akturan, 2016). Ashworth et al. (2015) claim that one of the reasons place branding is important is that place brands provide strategic guidance for place development, in the envisioning of an aspirational and imagined future. This has similarities with Van den Berg and Braun’s (1999) observation that ‘the mission of urban management is guiding the harmonious development of the city or region’ (p. 991).

A central aim of city strategies and visions, similar to that of place branding, is to create an image for the city, and to express what the city is now and where it will go in the future (Metzger & Rader Olsson, 2013; Vanolo, 2014). In planning studies, planning has been described as an enacted and future-oriented narrative in which members are at the same time characters and authors (Throgmorton, 1996). It has been suggested that, by paying more attention to written and oral storytelling, planners can become more effective in translating knowledge into action, which implies expanding the language of planning to make it more engaging and expressive, and to incorporate the language of emotions (Sandercock, 2003), something often lacking in urban plans.

Kornberger and Clegg (2011) studied how Sydney’s city administration departed from the old style of planning documents in the creation of a city strategy. The planning documents consisted of a high degree of technical detail communicated in expert language, whereas the strategy instead contained a form of storytelling as well as aesthetic and iconic imagery. The strategists ‘were fully aware of the seductive powers entailed in the aestheticization of the city’s future’ (Kornberger & Clegg, 2011, p. 152), and the authors further state that images, models, drawings and speeches do not convince through logic, but seduce through aesthetics. In this study, I argue that much of what Kornberger and Clegg (2011) refer to as city strategy in the case of Sydney, could be labelled place branding, especially the parts on ‘the dual aesthetics of the poetry of the image and the prose of numbers’ (ibid, p. 153). Kornberger and Clegg (2011) interpret the role of ‘numbers’ as the underlying mechanisms of how to reach the established vision, supplementing the creativity of visual images and illustration with scientific precision, adding to the legitimacy of the strategy. They write:
Strategy’s power lies in the fact that it operates scientifically while concurrently seducing politically through its projections. If strategy were nothing but a technique, it would not generate interest beyond a small group of experts; if it were simply a spirited conversation about the future, without a visible transmission built into the present, it would be regarded as mere talk (Kornberger & Clegg, 2011, p. 156).

In a Chinese context, there was in the 2000s a sudden increase of strategic plans, reflecting ‘the shift of city planning from a resource allocation tool to a development instrument’ (Wu, 2015, p. 113). The change has been interpreted as a result of the strengthened role of the local government in reaching its development targets. The strategic plans were invented because local governments perceived the orthodox master planning approach as top-down and too restraining; and compared with master plans, strategic plans accentuate policy that can be put into action (Wu, 2015). A main purpose of the strategic plan was moreover place promotion. In Chinese cities, the ‘strategic plan helps to produce a set of discourses that fit the requirements of place promotion’ (Wu, 2015, p. 109). The making of the strategic plan includes international planning prize awards as well as various publicity events, attracting wide media attention, which raise local pride and confidence in the strategic plan (Wu, 2015).

The production of strategic plans also provides the local leader with influence over development plans, and the city strategy can furthermore be used to influence the urban master plan (Wu, 2015). The strategic plan pays attention to governance, and at times suggests innovations and institutional changes needed to realize the vision. It also proposes concrete ideas on adjustments of administrative structures. (ibid). In other words, place branding can, as a fundamental element of city strategy and urban master plans, come to greatly influence place development. Kalandides (2011) similarly states that place branding is a prerequisite for, and fundamental element of, place development. In contrast to more traditional, rigid governmental planning instruments, the more symbolically powerful tool of place branding can be used to enable and legitimize societal change (Berg & Björner, 2014).

Furthermore, the state has been depicted as a strategic actor and a crucial source of power, exercised through urban planning (Rossi & Vanolo, 2012). In a Chinese context, strategic city plans have been conceptualized as pursuing a development vision or concept of the local elite (Wu, 2015; Zhang, 2002), while local city governments are involved in making concrete plans more than ever (Wu, 2015). Local city governments can moreover control the modes and models of the branding and development of Chinese mega-cities as long as they stay within the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) general guidelines, policies and plans (Berg & Björner, 2014). Furthermore, Chinese cities have also increasingly developed entrepreneurial strategies, an entrepreneurial fashion and an entrepreneurial discourse, moving away from top-down planning directives from the nation state (Tang, 2014), which strategic planning is
one example of. Nevertheless, much political power still remains with the central government and the CCP (Chien, 2010).

2.4.2 Critique, stakeholders and participation

An area in place branding research that has received extensive criticism is tied to concepts like stakeholders, residents and participation. Criticism has, for example, been directed at control and power over certain groups, centring on place branding’s democratic legitimacy (Braun, Eshuis & Klijn, 2014; Eshuis & Edwards, 2013). Concerns have also been raised over the ‘political dimension’ in that it can undermine long-term support, a central element in strategic brand programmes, because of conflicting methods and characteristics of key stakeholders (Parkerson & Saunders, 2005). Critical studies (e.g. Broudehoux, 2007; Evans, 2002; Gibson, 2005; Gotham, 2007; Hallsworth & Evans, 2008; Koller, 2008; Searle & Byrne, 2002; Ward, 2000) moreover often commonly view place branding as a radical, conflictual and highly politicized process, discussing the branding of places as a politicized social construct grounded in a neo-liberal discourse (Lucarelli & Brorström, 2013).

A central issue in discussions of place branding tied to politics and power, is related to the numerous types of stakeholders involved in the place branding process (Morgan et al., 2003). Stakeholder relationships have been emphasized in conceptualizations of place branding as a political factor that characterizes the relationships taking place in the branding process (Ooi, 2008; Ward, 2000). Lucarelli and Giovanardi (2014) emphasize the power of stakeholders, and regard the place branding governance process as a ‘text’ in a continuous state of negotiation, with language demonstrating how various actors involved in the branding process express their positionalities.

Political leaders are often regarded as a central stakeholder group in place branding. Jørgensen (2015) discusses political leadership and the role of politicians in Danish municipalities, arguing that a change in political leadership can have damaging effects, including changes in place branding focus and communication. Govers (2011) moreover claims that place brands can be heavily influenced by their leaders, and exemplifies with the Obama effect on ‘brand USA’.

Related to researchers’ calls for a focus on local populations, there have also been demands for more humanistic and people-centred place branding strategies, and claims that residents and communities should be given more opportunities to express their desires and imagination in relation to the place brand (Bianchini & Ghilardi, 2007), which ties into a growing stream of research focusing on inclusive and participatory place branding (e.g. Insch & Stuart, 2015; Jernsand & Kraff, 2015; Kavaratzis, 2012; Kavaratzis, Giovanardi &
Lichrou, 2017), discussing the need to involve local stakeholders, such as residents, in place branding practices. For example, inclusiveness has been depicted from the perspective of participation in planning processes for changing the place brand, and the importance of residents taking part in the formation of the place brand has been emphasized (Kavaratzis, 2012; Paganoni, 2012; Trueman, Klemm & Giroud, 2004). In some instances, a survey about residents’ evaluations and views can be regarded as a participatory tool, or at least as a sign of good intentions (Braun et al., 2013), but actually implying limited possibilities for resident involvement.

In the literature, a participatory approach to place branding is generally focused on as something positive, involving empowerment as well as democratic and people-led processes. In the Swedish town of Arboga, being asked through surveys was described as the most favoured way of participation (Olsson & Berglund, 2009). In turn, Lau and Leung (2011) claim, in their study of Chongqing’s graphic design and place branding, that the city engaged in a participatory place branding approach engaging public and private sectors. Participatory elements in the case of Chongqing consisted of a two-year process during which ten discussion sessions presenting 80 design concepts were held, as well as online polls in which 80,000 members of the public voted for their favourite design, resulting in a city logo.

However, Wu (2015) holds that public participation in China is limited, due to China’s weak civil society, and provides compelling examples from urban planning and the preparation of the Kunshan Strategic Plan, a seemingly participatory mode of strategy work, but where the visions of political leaders in the end came to dominate the strategic plans. On a similar note, Merrilees et al. (2014) find it surprising how often city planning forums in China omit the voices of local residents, especially when considering the social inclusiveness ideology promoted by China’s former president Hu Jintao.

Researchers have raised concerns regarding power inequalities in participatory processes (Jernsand, 2016) and stated that, if practised with the wrong intentions or without caution, such inequalities can lead to the opposite of empowerment, and even become manipulative (Jernsand & Kraff, 2015). Yet others have argued that participation has become a technology with which to control citizens (Eshuis & Edwards, 2013), and maintained that project managers usually prioritize stakeholders that are powerful and interested (Kavaratzis, 2012); an approach that excludes disadvantaged people and prioritizes powerful groups, producing a lack of inclusiveness, elitism and, ultimately, an alien place brand (Jernsand, 2016; Kavaratzis, 2012).

In examples from cases in the UK, Martin (2009) depicts how consultation with residents were obligatory, yet residents were presented with a very lim-
ited number of options, and asked to decide which they preferred. The government sets the rules, and participation consequently becomes a tool to realize policies and shape citizen behaviour rather than giving residents power (Eshuis & Edwards, 2013). Some views are moreover not heard at all, especially those with views that contradict the opinions of policymakers (Martin, 2009). Various studies have depicted it as problematic that the involvement of stakeholders stops at consultation, implying that e.g. residents can say what they think, but are not involved further in the process (Arnstein, 1969).

In examples from cases in China, Li, Wu and Li (2014) found that, although various types of stakeholders were consulted during the planning process, it was only the powerful stakeholders who were heard. However, citizen participation has also been elaborated on in more positive terms, in a Chinese context. Ye and Zhang (2014), for example, depict an open citizen participation scheme as an important factor in the process of developing the metropolitan governance structure in two Chinese cities, inviting university professors, community leaders and ordinary citizens to comment.

2.4.3 Policy, ideology and power

Some studies in the field of place branding have supplied relevant insights into the characteristics of the political practices of place branding as a democratic-legal policy process (e.g. Eshuis & Klijn, 2011; Eshuis & Edwards, 2012; Lucarelli, 2015; Wæraas, Bjørná & Moldenes, 2014). These studies have not, however, grounded their analyses in relation to ideological, hegemonic and critical dynamics. Such elements can however be found in studies centring on, for example, place branding as pure ideology and ideological apparatus (e.g. Browning, 2013; Mehta-Karia, 2012; Varga, 2013) and political propaganda (e.g. Jansen, 2008; Rose, 2010), yet, these studies have criticized for their weak empirical foundation, and for being abstract and normative (Lucarelli, 2015), and moreover centre on nations rather than cities.

Ideological components with regards to nations and nation branding have been illustrated in the literature (by e.g. Browning, 2013; Jansen, 2008; Kaneva, 2011; Mehta-Karia, 2012; Rose, 2010; Varga, 2013). In relation to nation branding, Kaneva (2011) has stated that some see it as a 'post-ideological' form of reputation management for countries at best and, at worst, as an augmented form of propaganda. For Van Ham (2001), nation branding signifies a change in political paradigms, from a modern world of geopolitics and power towards a postmodern world of images and influence. He also argues that nation branding is an alternative discourse of collective identity construction, and that branding can channel national sentiments into an outward-oriented mode of collective identity (Kaneva, 2011; Van Ham, 2001).
Furthermore, concepts such as soft power (Nye, 2006) and public diplomacy (Dinnie & Lio, 2010; Van Ham, 2008) are commonly discussed more in relation to nations than to cities and other places (Van Ham, 2008), and it has even been argued that politicians have realized that every nation has an identity which will manage them – unless they can manage it (Olins, 2003). Anholt (2006) has moreover emphasized the connection between place branding and national policy, governance, planning and economic development, and stated that, if place branding is treated as an integrated discipline closely tied to the way a nation is run, as a style of policymaking rather than a separate method of public affairs, communications or promotion, it has the potential to speed up change dramatically.

In the place branding literature, some studies have addressed the connection between ideology, power and imagery with regards to other places than nations, such as cities (Johansson, 2012), not least in a Chinese setting (e.g. Dynon, 2011; Fan, 2014a; Svensson, 2014). For example, Johansson (2012) has suggested that ideological components in place branding can be interpreted as a vehicle for suggesting suitable ways of living the brand and, in the case of Chinese cities, place branding campaigns and practices have been described as ideological and propagandistic in style (e.g. Fan, 2014a; Svensson, 2014). Dynon (2011) moreover identified the use of ideological narratives tied to the CCP at the time of the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai.

Apart from a few exceptions (e.g. Liu, Xu, Björner & Zhao, 2016, studying political influence by national strategy), however, limited research has analysed the connections between national policies and central governance to city branding strategies and practices, or studied political interests and underlying powerful logics on the city level, in combination with ideological and hegemonic dynamics on the national level. Such an approach is, however, interesting in the context of this study, due to the ideological and hegemonic underpinning on the city and national levels, and because of the clear connections between place branding governance at the city level and the national level.
2.5 Synthesis

In addition to briefly introducing the place branding field, this literature review has centred on three sub-parts of importance for my study, namely: 1) place branding from a communication perspective; 2) the expansion of place branding research from a primarily external- and economic-focused apparatus to considering the complex reality of place branding, and thus including a focus on various dimensions of place branding, not least the social perspective, centring on internal domains of place branding research; and 3) the political nature of place branding, including ties to urban governance, policies and plans; critique, stakeholders and participation; and issues of policy, ideology and power in the context of place branding.

However, as I have outlined in this chapter, more research is needed to further understand the problems I have addressed in Chapter 1. This includes the communicative powers of place branding, the meaning and powers of images and language and its relation to wider discourses in society. Another aspect that needs to be elaborated is the very ‘imagining’ of places with regards to the inclusion of more dimensions (e.g. social, cultural, environmental dimensions). Finally, it includes the political nature of place branding and, thus, place branding as a political act intended to produce certain effects, which needs to be researched further in order to understand not only the place branding process itself, but also the motives behind it.

Research on these themes are especially scarce in a Chinese context, and there is no general conceptual apparatus or framework within which one can describe and understand the type of city branding that Chinese cities engage in; and thus, a form of city branding that seemingly is characterized by: the use of ideological images and language; a focus on local populations or internal target groups; and vast influenced by a political elite. In the Chinese research context, limited number of studies moreover centre on powerful and political aspects of place branding in China.

In order to study this, there is a need for a conceptual framework as a tool to collect the data, guide the analysis and assist with further insights related to the aim and RQs posed in this study. The theoretical lens used in this study consists primarily of concepts from domains outside place branding, and even marketing. The conceptual framework is made up of three main parts, namely: the concepts of place imagery and place imaginaries, and concepts related to ideology and power. These concepts, and the relations between them, will be introduced next, in Chapter 3.
3. A conceptual framework

In this chapter, I present and discuss the theoretical lens of this study. The chapter includes three main parts, namely: place imagery, place imaginaries, ideology and power. The theoretical lens of this study is used to analyse and shed new light on the empirical material, bring forth themes, and assist a further understanding of the internal-political aspects of place branding.

In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the unit of analysis in this study, namely ‘place imagery’. Place imagery is here defined as the composite of images and language that reflects the ideas about a place and that has occurred in the communication I have studied. Place imagery is made up of images (visual images, graphics, pictures, etc.) and language (text, stories, myths, etc.). This first sub-chapter on place imagery relates especially to RQ1, and thus, ‘What imagery is used in the branding of Chinese mega-cities?’, which is discussed primarily in Chapter 6.

In the second part of this chapter, I discuss the concept of place imaginaries as a means to thematically organize the various place imagery identified in the cities studied. I suggest here that clusters of similar place imagery form ‘place imaginaries’. An illustration of how I view the interrelated concepts of place imagery and place imaginaries is included in Figure 3.1.

![Figure 3.1: Place imagery, place imaginary and place imaginaries.](image)

In my conceptualization of imaginaries, as it is used in this study, I also draw on ‘imaginaries’ as conceptualized by, for example, Castoriadis (1987) and Ricoeur (1994). Place imaginaries are in this study mainly used to answer RQ2, namely, ‘What imaginaries are used in the branding of Chinese mega-cities?’ which is discussed primarily in Chapter 7.
The third part of this chapter is concerned with concepts relating to ideology and power. Ideology is in this study conceptualized as a process of producing meanings, signs and values in social life (e.g. Eagleton, 2007), whereas power is conceptualized in relation to concepts such as hegemony, interests, legitimacy and ‘technologies of government’ (e.g. Miller & Rose, 2008). This part of the conceptual framework relates particularly to RQ3, namely, ‘What are key political aspects of the branding of Chinese mega-cities?’ This question will be further analysed and discussed in Chapter 8.

3.1 Place imagery

In this first part of the conceptual framework, place imagery is discussed. Place imagery is in this study seen as comprising images (visual images, graphics, pictures, etc.) and language (text, stories, myths, etc.) used to represent a place, which I will expand on next. Images and language are intertwined and, therefore, hard to separate, which will be seen in the following discussion, yet I discuss them in separate sub-chapters. The reason for this is that image in this study is conceptualized as communicated image, incorporating graphic, pictorial representation and tangible, material objects (Mitchell, 1986) and is more concerned with visual images and pictures, etc., rather than with words, texts and stories (language). Language and its related concepts are seen as elements amongst others within the ‘place imagery’ (Figure 3.2). Reasons for including language in this theoretical frame is that words and concepts (e.g. the ‘Chinese Dream’) and policies and plans (e.g. Five-Year Plans) play central roles in the branding of the cities studied, which permeate the empirical material and Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

![Place imagery](image)

*Figure 3.2: Place imagery comprises images, language and related concepts used to represent a place (words, graphics, icons, symbols, stories, etc.)*
3.1.1 Images

As a concept, ‘image’ is rather tricky to define (Atvesson, 1990). Image incorporates many things – such as pictures, poems, statues and maps, as well as dreams, memories, ideas, hallucinations and illusions – making it difficult to create any systematic, unified understanding (Mitchell, 1986). However, Mitchell (1986) has made an attempt at creating a unified view by organizing the image concept into an ‘Image family tree’ (Figure 3.3), and separating image into five parts: graphic, optical, perceptual, mental and verbal.

![Image family tree](image)

*Figure 3.3: Image family tree (Mitchell, 1986, p. 10).*

On the one hand, image has been conceptualized as somebody's inner picture of a certain object, described as 'inner picture' or 'sense image' (Atvesson, 1990). On the other hand, image has also been conceptualized as 'fabricated' or communicated image (Atvesson, 1990) and as a 'literal' sense of image, incorporating graphic, pictorial representation and tangible, material objects (Mitchell, 1986), which is the view taken in this study. Image has also been tied to ideology, and Mitchell (1986) has claimed that ideology as a concept has its roots in the notion of image.

The concept of image as it is used in this study has its roots in semiotics and semiotics, which are interconnected concepts (Guiraud, 1975). Saussure regarded semiotics as the science that studies the life of signs in society, whereas Pierce called the theory of signs 'semiotics'. Semiology has been conceptualized as a science studying sign systems and thus, languages, codes and sets of signals (Guiraud, 1975), whereas semiotics is regarded as involving the study of anything that 'stands for' something else (Chandler, 2002). Eco (1976) offered a broad definition of semiotics, maintaining that semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as signs (Chandler, 2002). Eco (1976) also held that semiotics studies all cultural processes as 'processes of communication'. From a semiotic stance, signs take the form of images, words, objects, gestures and sounds (Chandler, 2002).

Semiotics is also related to meaning making and representation in various forms, possibly most clearly in the form of 'texts' and 'media' (Chandler,
2002). A ‘text’ is a collection of signs, such as words, images, sounds and/or gestures, and commonly appertains to a message that has been documented in some way, for example through writing, audio recording or video recording (Chandler, 2002). ‘Meaning’ can, in turn, be defined both as an idea that a sign represents, and as an idea to which the object of a thought can be attributed (Guiraud, 1975).

Eco (1976) presented a long list of areas of contemporary research that can be considered as belonging to the field of semiotics – from ‘zoosemiotics’ to ‘aesthetic texts’. The research areas with most connection to this study include natural languages, visual communication (e.g. graphic systems, iconic signs and ‘iconism’), systems of objects (objects as communicative devices), plot structure, text theory (the idea of text as a macro-unit), and rhetoric.

Sign, signifier and signified are all key concepts in semiology and semiotics. Signs’ function is to communicate ideas via messages. This infers an object, a referent (thing spoken about), signs and hence a code, medium of communication, and an emitter and a receiver (Guiraud, 1975). Signs assemble meaning, not just from the signifier/signified connection, but also from other signs in the language system (Miller, 2012). Signs signify concepts, not objects (Saussure, 1983; Miller, 2012) and are marked by an intention of communicating something meaningful (Guiraud, 1975).

Symbolic communication is claimed to be the core of our reality and society, and can take two forms. In one, an actor can use symbols to communicate to others; in another, an actor can use symbols to talk to self (think) (Charon, 2004). Whatever the symbol stands for characterizes its meaning. Symbols are meaningful, significant, social, conventional and arbitrary, and are meaningful both to the user and the actor who receives them. The user of symbols uses them intentionally. Symbols allow for imagination of the world from the perspective of others, and much of creativity depends on symbols, as we create our own reality (ibid). Symbols have also been interpreted as powerful storytellers (Zavattaro, 2014). Bourdieu (1991) has argued that symbols make it possible for there to be consensus on the meaning of the social world, contributing to reproduction of social order. Symbols are, thus, instruments of ‘social integration’ (ibid). In the context of cities and in the study of urban images, symbols are embodied in material elements, such as buildings, roads and monuments, and in intangible constituents, for example habits, routines, institutions and slogans (Vanolo, 2008).

Political contest over symbolizations and public policy discourse brings a focus on identities, emotions and cultural ideography (Miller, 2012) and ideographs. The concept of ‘ideograph’ has been linked to image, and described as symbolic ways of ordering the world (Zavattaro, 2014). An ideograph is moreover defined as ‘symbolic material that brings into view a constellation
of images, emotions, values, understanding, connotations, and facts’ (Miller, 2012, p. 3). The ideograph has been linked to policy narrative, but claimed to be a simpler unit of analysis. A policy narrative can introduce a thick plot to convey a more complex understanding and general coherence. Yet, the ideograph is also complex, deriving partly from the associations between its main constituents of signifier, signified and sign. Ideographs are sewed together through narratives and the use of storylines (ibid). The concept of ideograms is similar to that of ideographs and, as described by Anderson (2006), ideograms in Chinese, Latin and Arabic were emanations of reality, not haphazardly invented representations of it. Furthermore, icons have been defined as images, pictures, or likenesses (Mitchell, 1986). The study of icons starts with the grand idea that human beings are created in the likeness and image of their creator, and culminates in the modern science of ‘image-making’ in advertising and propaganda (ibid).

It has been stated that, by deconstructing and contesting the realities of signs, it is possible to reveal whose realities are suppressed and whose are privileged, relating to the power of images. A focus on this moreover includes exploring the creation and preservation of reality by certain social groups (Chandler, 2002), which can be related to political aspects of place branding and the power of images. Zavattaro (2014) equals image to power, and states that images and slogans, metaphors and narratives, are often adopted as cognitive shortcuts when policy and practical decisions are made (Abel, 2011; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003; Miller, 2012). It has also been argued that the ideas of image, message and manipulation of public opinion have moved from the realm of advertising to invade politics and social relations (Guiraud, 1975). Furthermore, some place branding scholars have regarded semiotics a useful framework (Mick, 1986), and even maintained that place branding has increased in significance partly because of the prevalence of the ‘semiotic society’ (Freire, 2005; Lash & Lury, 2007). It has also been stated that the ‘semiotic society’ allows for critical reflexivity in place branding and for analysis of how place brands are negotiated, challenged and disseminated (Hayden & Sevin, 2012).

Relatedly, in the context of organizations, and tying into notions of corporate culture, concepts like language, stories, images, symbols, ceremonies and rituals have been emphasized as important attributes and tools in the shaping of power relations and in the management of meaning (Morgan, 2006). Moreover, many successful managers and leaders are ‘aware of the power of evocative imagery and instinctively give a great deal of attention to the impact their words and actions have on those around them’ (Morgan, 2006, p. 184), relating to not only image but also language, discussed soon.

But first, to sum up, a focus on images to study ideological and political perspectives of place branding seems particularly suitable in the Chinese context. One advantage is that the image concept has many branches in its family tree,
according to e.g. Mitchell (1986), and as such covers many types of elements used in communication (graphical, optical etc.). Another advantage is that images often are directly accessible through different kinds of media, and thus open for descriptions and interpretations. Finally, images are often ideologically loaded, and thereby provide good opportunities to understand underlying political processes. As conceptualized in this study, images do not, however, primarily incorporate concepts belonging to language (e.g. words, texts, stories). Language is nevertheless also central in this study, and is discussed next.

3.1.2 Language
Charon (2004) maintains that language allows us to understand worlds we have never seen; it allows us to see the future and integrate the past, present and future. Language has also been conceptualized as creating discourses that orient our worlds (Wittgenstein, 2001; Zavattaro, 2014). In Anderson’s (2006) view, the most important capacity of language is that it can generate imagined communities and create, as an effect, certain solidarities. Furthermore, language has historical ties, yet representations will not remain historically and contextually stable, but rather change, which is often the accomplishment of power (Clegg, 1989).

According to Fairclough, ‘we live in a linguistic epoch’ (2001, p. 2), and in a period in which the vast significance of language in the production and maintenance of power relations is largely underestimated. Fairclough also maintains that analysis of language can enhance political analysis, and maintains that ‘[...] nobody who has an interest in modern society, and certainly nobody who has an interest in relationships of power in modern societies, can afford to ignore language’ (2001, pp. 2–3). Major contemporary social theorists, such as Bourdieu, Foucault and Habermas, have recognized the importance of language in their theories, emphasizing its relevance (Fairclough, 2001). Linguists and sociolinguists have also studied language in its social context, as well as language and power, yet have not done justice to the complex and rich interrelationships of power and language (Fairclough, 2001).

Language has by various scholars been tied to action. ‘Language in action’ has been described as an active building process (Gee, 1999), and the ‘active’ feature of language has been captured in the concept of ‘intellectual technology’ and, thus, language as a mechanism for rendering reality amenable to certain sorts of action (Miller & Rose, 2008). Tuan (1991) has argued that, without language and speech, humans cannot formulate ideas, discuss them or translate them into action that, for example, can culminate in built places. In a modern world, where hard science and empiricism are highly valued, people still find it difficult to accept the apparently magical idea that mere words can call places into being even though this is what is actually happening (Tuan,
Language in the form of policy narratives, has moreover been outlined as that which creates action (Zavattaro, 2014).

‘Myths’, stemming from the Greek word ‘muthos’ meaning ‘narrative’, are literary forms signifying a way of organizing society and express a vision of man and the world (Guiraud, 1975). Myths and myth making also tie into notions of language, power and ideology. Barthes (1972) conceptualized myth making as the bringing together of signs and their connotations to shape certain messages, and discussed myth making in terms of political ideology. In political science, and in the context of élite theory, myths have been analysed as means through which political élites justify their rule to the non-élite, and consequently strengthen their power the more profoundly they penetrate the consciousness of the masses (Beetham, 1991). In the context of organizations, the use of symbolic-mythical language has been highlighted, and it has been emphasized that there are links between organizations’ basic belief systems and the structure of myths, stories and sagas that can be found in society at large (Berg, 1986; Broms & Gahmberg, 1983). Berg (1986) also argues that a mythologically loaded language increases the symbolic power of language and communication.

Stories and storytelling are central elements in analyses of language, and storytelling is regarded by Marris (1997) as the natural language of persuasion since all stories have to involve a sequence of happenings and the interpretation of their meaning (Sandercock, 2003). Stories relate to ‘imaginaries’ and actions, in the sense that stories about the past can reshape the future, and because stories can contribute to action and make a difference (ibid). In other words, stories and storytelling have been described as powerful agents of change and as shapers of a new imagination of alternatives (Sandercock, 2003). The use of stories can result in bonding between people and creation of shared meaning (Sandercock, 2003), in line with Anderson’s (2006) ideas about the imagined community. To acknowledge stories is suitable in this study as they can help to shed light on the particular storytelling devices used in a Chinese context, and help unveil powerful and seductive features of place branding. Furthermore, attention to stories at different levels, such as micro-stories versus macro-stories, grand narratives or meta-narratives, can potentially help shed light on power relations, for example.

In conceptualizations, it has been argued that core stories (e.g. Dunstan & Sarkissian, 1994) exist in all communities and nations, and that they give meaning to collective life (Houston, 1982, 1987). A related concept is the mytho poetic story of origins, which is described as a story that cities and nations tell about themselves (Sandercock, 2003). Other related concepts include grand narratives, meta-narratives and macro-stories (Boje, 1995, 2011). Grand narratives have been defined as a regime of truth, and as a meta-narrative that suppresses and downgrades other discourses (Boje, 2011). Moreover,
macro-stories have been described as the stories that support and confirm the grand narrative (Boje, 2001; Wigren, 2003). Grand narratives are said to incorporate excluding mechanisms, such as exclusion of voices that do not have the power to speak (Boje, 1995; Wigren, 2003). Boje, Luhman and Baack (1999) have used the concept of hegemony, as used by Clegg (1989), when defining what a grand narrative is, seeing hegemony as the ‘successful mobilization and reproduction of the active consent of dominated groups’ (ibid, p. 160). Furthermore, Boje et al. (1999) argue that a grand narrative, or hegemonic, force can be an invisible prison for those with limited power to voice or negotiate stories shaping and defining their existence. In this study, grand narratives and related concepts are especially useful to analyse the dreaming up of city futures and in the shaping of memories of the past, and to shed more light on the use of concepts, policies and plans originating from the central government and infusing city branding.

Language has been conceptualized as a tool to control (Zavattaro, 2014), and as a primary medium of power and social control (Fairclough, 2001). ‘Language games’ (Wittgenstein, 2001) are meant to control and can, for example, limit who gets to speak and who gets to influence meaningful change (Farmer, 2003; Sementelli, 2009). Apart from being a site of, and having a stake in, struggles for power, language has also been conceptualized as the primary domain of ideology (Fairclough, 2001). In Fairclough’s (2001) view, ideology is pervasively present in language, and the ideological nature of language should be a major theme in modern social science. Miller and Rose (2008) shed light on the social language that permeates society, tied to the recent prominence accorded to the language of community in political discourse. This political language shapes strategies and programmes and configures an ‘imagined territory’ upon which these strategies should act, functioning to create a particular set of community values, beliefs and commitments (Miller & Rose, 2008).

Continuing on the theme of language as related to power and ideology, language and politics are similarly interrelated, and even mutually constitutive (Miller & Rose, 2008; Taylor, 1987). Miller and Rose (2008) elaborate on why language is significant for government, and suggest that all government depends on a particular mode of representation. This means that language is used both to depict the nature of a reality, and to represent reality in a way that fits political deliberation, argument and scheming. Furthermore, language is central because it is in language that government programmes are elaborated, resulting in objectives and plans that seek to address certain problems that concern social and economic issues, for example (ibid). In addition, the language that constitutes political discourse is more than rhetoric; it is ‘a kind of machinery or apparatus for rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to political deliberations’ (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 59).

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Miller and Rose’s (2008) reasoning ties into notions of politics as representation and urban representations (Rossi & Vanolo, 2012), understood as the capacity to represent and reproduce a dominant image, and the ‘discursive devices mobilized by urban élites in pursuit of strategies of urban development’ (p. 19). Moreover, Rossi and Vanolo (2012) argue that paths of urban development are greatly influenced by representational processes, and it has consequently been argued that representations offer insights into understanding urban politics. This ties into Gibson’s (2005) suggestion that, in order to understand the construction of narratives of cities, it can be useful to focus on the symbolic politics of urban development as it necessitates a strategic alignment of identities, goals, processes and practices (Lloyd & Peel, 2008).

Propaganda is another concept which relates to language, ideology, power and politics. It has been stated that, in an age of propaganda and public relations, the public sphere is dominated by an emphasis on presentation over reality (Beetham, 1991). Defined broadly, propaganda is a technique of influencing human action through the manipulation of representations which can take various forms, such as written, pictorial or spoken (Lasswell & Marvick, 1977). Propaganda has both an open, clearly stated message, and a hidden, implicit message (Möijer, 1994). The open message often speaks to reason, while the implicit message usually appeals to emotion. The propaganda messages communicated are commonly instilled in people by providing the words with positive or negative fields of association. Influencing people through words and images functions as a mechanism to change or alter the environment, and with the aim of incorporating something new into people’s thinking, causing the receiver of the message to think or act in ways that the sender had in mind. A prerequisite to get people to incorporate something new in their thinking is to convey both intellectual and emotional content, and convey messages that appeal to thought, feeling and imagination (ibid).

The inclusion of language and its related concepts into ‘place imagery’ is in this study seen as important due to the importance of the written word in the representation of places, not least in a Chinese context, where words and concepts spoken by leaders and written in frameworks, policies and plans have such a central position in place branding. Language, as conceptualized here, incorporates elements of ideology and power, making it relevant to study in a Chinese context and in relation to place branding, as it can offer insights into the political aspects of city branding in China.

Place imagery is the central element in collecting data in this study, and it is by identifying what kind of images and language has been used that I will be able to build up an understanding of the way in which the city is communicated to external and internal audiences. The various concepts and components of place imagery just discussed are in this study used to analyse and further understand the branding of the five Chinese mega-cities studied here,
and particularly RQ1, namely, ‘What imagery is used in the branding of Chinese mega-cities?’ Place imagery is also the basis for the descriptions of the cities in Chapter 6.

3.2 Place imaginaries

In this second part of the conceptual framework, the concept ‘place imaginaries’ is discussed. As I view it, this concept is based on the general idea of imaginaries applied to place. Imaginaries have been conceptualized as something envisioned and dreamed up, and as narratives of the past, present and the future (Castoriadis, 1987). In this study, I also claim that clusters of similar place imagery forms place imaginaries (Figure 3.4).

![Place Imaginary and Place Imaginaries](image)

*Figure 3.4: Place imaginary and place imaginaries.*

Following King (2007), I moreover claim that all place imaginaries are formed in relation to the place’s history and other imaginaries in the place, and also draw on the conceptualization of imaginaries (e.g. Castoriadis, 1987) as society’s shared, unifying core conceptions. I also maintain that place branding can play a key role in influencing society’s conceptions, and hold that we can make further sense of cities and their branding by mapping and analysing place imaginaries. I use place imaginaries in this sub-chapter primarily to answer RQ2, namely, ‘What imaginaries are used in the branding of Chinese mega-cities?’, which is analysed in relation to the empirical materials of this study and discussed primarily in Chapter 7.

3.2.1 General definition of imaginaries

Castoriadis (1987) conceptualized the imaginary as something invented; either a story entirely dreamt up, or a shift of meaning in which available symbols are invested with other significations than their normal connotations. Castoriadis, and later Taylor (2004), moreover regarded the imaginary as society’s shared, unifying core conceptions, or a culture’s ethos. Hence, for Castoriadis,
the imaginary, or the social imaginary, was the ethos of a group and society’s unifying and shared core notions (Ivy, 1995). Castoriadis (1987) also theorized the social imaginary as the ‘actual imaginary’ of society; in other words, a society’s imaginings rather than ideas about society, although they might include that. Some have assumed that the imaginary is only a reflection, a mirror-like image, of what is already there. However, Castoriadis (1987) rejected this assumption together with the classical ontology on which it rests, maintaining that the imaginary is rather:

[...] what renders possible any relation of object and image; it is the creation of ex nihilo, of figures and forms, without which there could be no reflection of anything (Thompson, 1982, p. 664).

Hence, Castoriadis (1987) greatly appreciated the imaginary as a potential source of creativity and freedom, for individuals and for societies (Strauss, 2006). For Castoriadis, the imaginary was essentially ‘[...] the capacity to see in a thing what it is not, to see it other than it is’ (Castoriadis, 1987), and the constitution and reproduction of society is, in Castoriadis’ view, consequently dependent on active and creative imaginary representations (Elliot, 2002). In Castoriadis’ view, the social imaginary is about acknowledging the ‘fundamental and irreducible creativity in the institution of the social-historical’ (Thompson, 1982, p. 664). Related to the social-historical, the imaginary involves the orientation of social institutions, the continuation of motives and needs, and the existence of symbolism, tradition and myth (ibid). According to Castoriadis (1987, p. 117), ‘everything that is presented to us in the social-historical world is inextricably tied to the symbolic’, such as language and institutions, for example. The imaginary is regarded as a decisive and essential element of every symbol and symbolism, since:

[...] imaginaries give meaning to symbols, goods, institutions, and are not so far removed from what Hegel called “the spirit of a people” (Castoriadis, 1987, p. 128).

The Ricœurian view of the imaginary has similarities with Castoriadis’ view. Ricœur (1994) maintains that the imaginary draws on what is already in circulation, and what is already there, and holds that the imaginary adheres to existing terminology, narratives and categories, while at the same time introducing something new (Johansson, 2012). Moreover, Ricœur (1994) conceptualizes the imaginary as both a function of producing meaning and the product of this function (Salazar, 2012). Taylor (2004), in turn, defined the imaginary as a cultural model or a widely shared implicit cognitive schema, and defined it as: ‘[...] the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations’ (ibid, p. 23).
Castoriadis (1987) maintains that the role of imaginary significations, in a metaphorical sense, is to provide answers to the questions that all societies attempt to answer. Such fundamental questions include issues such as who we are as a collectivity, what we are for each other, what we want and desire, and what we are lacking. These questions and their related answers are tied into aspects of identity and society’s need to articulate its relation with the world, its needs and desires. The questions are not raised explicitly, not even prior to the answers, yet society constitutes itself by producing a *de facto* answer to such questions in its activity, and it is in the *doing* of each collectivity that the answers to the questions appear (Castoriadis, 1987).

Castoriadis (1987) challenges what he calls the functional-economic, or functionalist, view, and instead advocates a symbolic view; a view also supported in this study. He does not claim, however, that everything is symbolic, but argues that real acts and material products would be impossible outside a symbolic network. He rejects the idea that symbolism is perfectly ‘neutral’ or totally ‘adequate’ to the functioning of real processes, yet maintains that symbolism is bound up with history and with nature in the sense that it is related to ‘what is already there’ (ibid, 1987). Symbolism presupposes an imaginary capacity, since it assumes ‘the capacity to see in a thing what it is not, to see it other than it is’ (ibid, 1987, p. 127). Relations between the symbolic and the imaginary are moreover conceptualized as deep and ambiguous, because:

[… the imaginary has to use the symbolic not only to “express” itself (this is self-evident), but to “exist”, to pass from the virtual to anything more than this (Castoriadis, 1987, p. 127).

The symbolic is first encountered in language and, in a different way and to a different degree, in institutions. Institutions can exist in the symbolic, but not be reduced to the symbolic. An instituted power structure, an economic organization, a legal system, a religion – all occur as legitimate symbolic systems (Castoriadis, 1987). Discourse is caught up in symbolism, yet not enslaved by it, and intends something other than symbolism, namely meaning, which can be imagined, thought or perceived (ibid, 1987). The imaginary is moreover created through discourse, and is characterized by projection – that is, the active production of realities (Ricœur, 1994). In other words, the imaginary is not an expression of pure fantasy; it is a projected image, which is socially mediated through discourse and narration (ibid).

This productive force is especially ascribed to fiction, which has the power to redescribe reality. Consequently, narrative fiction has the ‘capacity to open up and unfold new dimensions of reality, suspending our belief in an earlier description’ (Ricœur, 1994, p. 124). Fiction also adheres to a narrative structure for ‘abbreviation, articulation and condensation’ (Ricœur, 1994, p. 125) of a portrayed reality – much like the techniques of branding (Johansson, 2012).
can also be tied to place branding as a narrative programme that aims to re-describe place by means of sanitizing, obscuring or, alternatively, emphasizing chosen aspects of reality. The imaginary consequently has considerable power in that it determines social positions (Johansson, 2012).

3.2.2 Imaginaries and place

I perceive the concept of imaginaries as particularly useful in this study as it assists me to further analyse: connections between the past, present and the future; the inventive character of place branding; and the production of meaning in society. Moreover, it helps me reflect upon the creation of imaginaries as well as whose imaginaries are projected. In this study, I am particularly interested in analysing and understanding imaginaries as related to place, or I use the concept of imaginaries and apply it to place. To some degree, such attempts have already been made, for example in conceptualizations of urban imaginaries, discussed next.

King (2007), for example, used the ‘urban imaginary’ concept to analyse the construction of an imaginary identity for an urban place, like a city. Çinar and Bender (2007) moreover defined the urban imaginary as ‘[…] the collective imagination of the city, with multiple, contested urban imaginaries acting as sites of negotiation within the city’ (Mah, 2012, p. 153). Delman (2014, p. 280) built on Çinar and Bender’s reasoning, suggesting a future orientation of imaginaries, and maintained that the aim of imaginaries is to ‘[…] generate new collective narratives about the city’s future’. The imaginary has also been described as the root of a constant recreation of cities; a recreation that leads to a rewriting of city identities, histories, spaces, places, areas, territories and, effectively, city futures. In this recreation process:

[…] cities enact themselves as urban laboratories for political, economic, and cultural change where groups of actors promote and contest each other’s imaginaries and their power to mobilize around them (UrbanASIA, 2011, p. 2).

As illustrated here and in the literature, imaginaries can be conceived in a variety of ways, and can be either contemporary or historical (UrbanASIA, 2011). The global or world city logic has also been seen as encapsulating a certain imaginary in itself (Olds, 1995). The global imaginary has been elaborated on by King (2007), for example, and described as a notion that has developed since the mid-1980s, in parallel with the paradigm of globalization, and the view of the world as a single place (ibid). For example, King (2007) pointed out that different cities have their own understandings and different imaginations regarding what ‘global’ is, since the nature of global has been formed in relation to the city’s history, its relation to the region, its economy and the imaginaries in the city. King (2007) also argued that imaginaries ties
into ideas about ‘[…] literary productions, notions of urban myth, memory and nostalgia in the city and its environment’ (p. 3).

3.2.3 Imagined place and invented culture

Additional conceptualizations related to imaginaries, future orientation and place are concepts tied to the imagined (community) and invention of culture, discussed next. Hubbard and Hall (1998), for example, talked about the entrepreneurial city as an imaginary city, whereas Augé (1999) conceptualized the modern city as we like to imagine it, and as a combination of past and now.

The imagined city concept also ties into the notion of vision, which in branding theory has been described as the starting point of any great strategy (Balakrishnan, 2009; Balmer, 2001; de Chernatony & Riley, 1998). Brand vision moreover contains the interface of future environment, purpose and values (de Chernatony, 2010; Zavattaro, 2014), and encompasses the capability of leaders to establish a clearly expressed direction that is easy to understand, embrace and follow (Mathieu, 2005; Winter, 2000). Cayla and Eckhardt (2008) have researched the role of brands related to imagination, describe brands as symbolic forms that can facilitate and mobilize imagination, and maintain that imagination is one of the central social practices influencing modern subjectivities. Bastos and Levy (2012) have also studied branding and imagination, hinting at complexity, creativity and leadership in order to fire imagination:

Ultimately a brand is an opus, a complex design, a mosaic, a symphony, an evolving cultural construction that benefits from a knowledgeable and perceptive director, and that fires imagination (Bastos & Levy, 2012, p. 360).

Conceptualizations of the imagined city have also been tied to the goal of creating the ‘good city’, something that must be reconsidered again and again, especially as cities grow ever larger and the cities and their populations have to address new economic, social, political and environmental risks through change and innovation (UrbanASIA, 2011). King (2007) has claimed that in this process, the city comes to establish an imagined environment and an imaginary identity. However, creating the ‘good city’ pertains to a utopian impulse at the heart of many city-building experiments that have proved disappointing (Sandercocck, 2003), one reason being that visions or dreams are often unrealistic (Kalandides, 2011).

Cities, nations and other types of places have been conceived as imagined because no one can experience a place in its totality (Anderson, 1983; Çinar & Bender, 2007). In Anderson’s (2006, p. 6) view, a nation is imagined also because the members of it ‘never will know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of
their communion’. The same scholar holds that it was the convergence of capitalism and print technology that made it possible to ‘think the nation’, and that created the possibility of a new form of imagined community (Anderson, 2006). However, Anderson’s focus on the nation, and on the nation as an imagined (political) community, can also be applied to other places, such as regions, cities and districts. I propose that place branding can be perceived as contributing to the creation of imagined communities and to people’s shared experiences of the world, similar to the influence of print capitalism.

Related to discussions on the imagined community, Anderson (2006) elaborates on nationalism, and ‘official nationalism’, claiming that, from the start, it was a conscious, self-protective policy closely related to the protection of imperial-dynastic interests. A persistent feature of official nationalism is that it emanates from the state, and that it serves, first and foremost, the interests of the state. Anderson (2006) consequently acknowledges negative associations of the word nationalism, but also argues for the opposite:

In an age when it is so common for progressive, cosmopolitan intellectuals (particularly in Europe?) to insist on the near-pathological character of nationalism, its roots in fear and hatred of the Other, and its affinities with racism, it is useful to remind ourselves that nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love. The cultural products of nationalism – poetry, prose fiction, music, plastic arts – show this love very clearly in thousands of different forms and styles (Anderson, 2006, p. 141).

A key aspect related to the concept of community is the role of identification, and identification projects taking shape in terms of public housing, social insurance, mass schooling, public broadcasting and so on (Miller & Rose, 2008). The ultimate aim was the socially identified citizen, a person who, ‘above all understood themselves to be a member of a single integrated national society’ (ibid, p. 91). Imagined communities are not necessarily created by political authorities, but can also be created by the practices and activities of local activists, for example, who articulate demands upon and resistance towards the authorities (Miller & Rose, 2008).

Tied to a sense of community and the role of identification, is the notion of culture, and invented culture. Culture is often referred to as shared beliefs, shared meaning, shared understanding and shared sense making. Culture is also tied to notions like ‘being cultured’, and as development patterns reflected in a society’s values, ideologies, laws and knowledge (Morgan, 2006). Culture has also been understood as collectively owned and as contributing to creating meanings in each society (Aitken & Campelo, 2011). In Morgan’s words (2006), culture is an ongoing, proactive process of reality construction, and should be understood as an ‘active, living phenomenon through which people jointly create and re-create the worlds in which they live’ (p. 137). Moreover, ‘invention of culture’ refers to how managers draw on culture in the creation
of beliefs and storylines, to validate or darken certain visions of the world (Fjellman, 1992; Hollinshead, 1998), indicating issues of control.

Imaginaries and related concepts discussed in this sub-chapter help me to further analyse and understand the imaginaries of a place. In other words, it allows me to use the general concept of imaginaries and apply it to places. The concepts included in this sub-chapter assist me in analysing the imaginaries identified in the cities studied, especially in relation to how the cities make reference to the past, present and the future, how they form dreams and visions for the future, and how this ties into notions of ‘invention of culture’. The concepts just discussed also help me to analyse the creation of community, and the role of imaginaries in influencing society’s core conceptions. Similar to some of the elements discussed in the previous sub-chapter related to place imagery, some of the concepts discussed here also tie into power and ideological features of place imaginaries and the imagined place. Next I will elaborate further on concepts of ideology and power.
3.3 Ideology and power of place

This third part of the conceptual framework is concerned with the concepts of ideology and power, and how they relate to each other. These concepts are included as part of the theoretical lens because both place imagery and place imaginaries incorporate powerful and ideological elements, and because concepts of ideology and power can assist me in further analysing and understanding key political aspects of the branding of Chinese mega-cities, and thus RQ3.

3.3.1 Ideology

[...] the exercise of power, in modern society, is increasingly achieved through ideology, and more particularly through the ideological workings of language (Fairclough, 2001, p. 2).

As argued by Fairclough (2001) in the above quote, ideology is closely intertwined with both power and language. I will return to this topic, but first attempt to define ideology, a concept with contested definitions (Brown, 2012). According to Eagleton (2007), ideology is a process of producing meanings, signs and values in social life. It is also a body of ideas typical for a particular class or social group, and these ideas often assist in legitimating a dominant political power (ibid). Marx (referred to in Beetham, 1991) proposed that, at the heart of all ideology, is the appearance of the socially constructed as natural, whereas Gramsci (1971) held that ideologies are judged in terms of their social effects rather than their truth values, arguing that ideology is tied to action (Fairclough, 2013).

Ideology has moreover been described as false consciousness, and a system of symbolic representations reflecting a historical condition of control by a certain class (Mitchell, 1986). A more ‘neutral’ view of ideology inclines to link it to the structure of values and interests that informs any representation of reality, and does not mention whether ideology is false or oppressive. To focus on the neutral interpretation of ideology alone, as a system of interests and beliefs, is nevertheless to leave aside the critical force of the concept, its capacity to mobilize meaning and the potential to reveal that which is hidden (Mitchell, 1986).

Similar to power, ideology has been analysed as a primary means of manufacturing consent (Fairclough, 2001). It has also been suggested that alongside a broad definition of ideology, it is useful to incorporate the concept of culture (Therborn, 1980). Parsons’ (1951) theory of socialization relates to both ideology and culture, explained as a process of dominant values, or the central value system, transmitted through cultural mechanisms like family, school and church, with the aim of resolving the problem of social order (Clegg, 1989).
Lefort (referred in Thompson, 1982) interpreted ideology as ideas, myths, beliefs, doctrines and philosophies, tying it to ‘the imaginary’, and stating that ideology is a ‘certain type of discourse subsumed to a specific order of the imaginary’ (p. 666). Related to ideology, and following Bailly (1994), the branding of places and cities can relatedly be seen as based on representations, which in turn enable us to understand not the city itself but rather its meaning in a symbolic and an ideological context (Kavaratzis, 2004).

It has been argued that ideology is no longer as important (e.g. Abercrombie et al., 1980), and that ideology has become much less of an issue in social research (e.g. Fairclough, 2013). There are also opposite claims and arguments, however, for example stating that ideologies map the political and social worlds for us (Brown, 2012; Freed, 2013). Clegg (1989) has directed critique towards those stating that ideology is no longer important, drawing parallels to political leadership, and politicians like Margaret Thatcher, who made considerable efforts to create and respond to explicitly ideological politics (Fairclough, 2013).

Ideology has often been conceptualized as an instrument in the hands of the ruling class (Clegg, 1989); and Marxist notions of ideology are for example often focusing on ideology as false ideas that mask and legitimate the dominance of a ruling class (Miller & Rose, 2008). Habermas (1976) has also made reference to the impact of bourgeois ideology, and raised concerns about manipulation and propaganda orchestrating the public for legitimation purposes, yet does not investigate further the interests of one class or group over another (Clegg, 1989). However, regimes that exercise control over ideological dissemination and means of information cannot be sure that the messages will be accepted. In fact, just the opposite can occur, and regimes can be hampered by an overall scepticism of official sources of information (Beetham, 1991).

Connections between ideology and power are extensive, and it has been stated that ideology is used to establish and keep in place particular relations of power (Fairclough, 2013), that ideology plays a central role in the reinforcement of basic norms that underpin a given system of power (Beetham, 1991), and that ideology essentially is ‘meaning in the service of power’ (Thompson, 1984) that contributes to establishing or sustaining unequal relations of power (Fairclough, 2013). Ideology is moreover referred to as a central component in processes through which power relations are founded, sustained, enacted and transformed (ibid). In a context of ‘one-dimensional’ power, Marcuse (1964) argues that people cannot recognize what their real interests are as long as they are subject to distorting dominant ideologies that mask true needs with false wants. Ideologies are thus used to serve the interests of those who benefit from the ‘false consciousness’ created amongst individuals (Clegg, 1989).
Ideology is also intertwined with the concept of hegemony. Gramsci’s (1971) theory, for example, ties hegemony to ideology, whereas conceptualizations of power often focus on how ideology functions through conceptions of hegemony (Clegg, 1989). Some argue that the concept of hegemony is useful as it provides a framework for theorizing and analyzing ideology and discourse while avoiding both economism and idealism, since hegemony can cut across and integrate economy, politics and ideology (Fairclough, 2013).

Ideology has, in the context of society and organizations, for example been conceptualized as a management tool to shape the organization or society to ‘conform with the image that best suits specific ends’ (Morgan, 2006, p. 197). The creation of an appropriate intellectual narrative is a central driving force in the context of ideology, and to legitimate political strategies, programmes and thus political power (Brown, 2012).

Relations between ideology and images and language are also evident. Images have, for example, been described as arbitrarily coded signs which are infused with ideology (Mitchell, 1986). Images have also been interpreted as a kind of language, which does not provide a transparent window on the world, but takes the form of a process of ideological mystification, concealing an opaque, distorting and arbitrary mechanism of representation (Mitchell, 1986).

With reference to language, Fairclough (2013) ties ideology to discourse, and claims that texts are seen as ideological in so far as they sustain or undermine power relations. Ideology is conceptualized by the same scholar as first and foremost a relation between texts and power, but also a relation between languages and power as well as orders of discourse and power (Fairclough, 2013). Some place ideology as a kind of system, code, structure or formation underlying language practice, whereas others view ideology as a discursive event in itself, and as residing in texts (Fairclough, 2013). Central to Fairclough’s (2013) notion of discourse is that language is a material form of ideology and that language is invested by ideology. Fairclough moreover argues that issues of ideology and language ought to figure in the wider framework of theories and analyses of power.

This discussion on ideology is useful in my analysis of place imagery, in my description of place imaginaries and in my development of the imagineering concept, for three main reasons. First, attention to concepts of ideology and its meaning helped me in detecting ideological features of place imagery in the five cities studied. Second, concepts of ideology assisted me in further understanding in what ways all place imaginaries were influenced by a political ideology and concepts like the Chinese Dream. Third, ideology is a central concept as it became a key component in the development of the imagineering concept, discussed in Chapter 8.
3.3.2 Power

In the previous part on ideology, the connection between ideology and power was emphasized. This is one reason for discussing further concepts of power. Power is moreover included here due to its potential in shedding further analytical light on RQ3, and thus, ‘What are key political aspects of the branding of Chinese mega-cities?’. In this sub-chapter, my aim is to review and discuss concepts such as interests, legitimacy and technologies of government.

Power has to a limited degree been incorporated into the place branding literature, yet it has been maintained that power, as defined by Foucault (1980) for example, is relevant to understanding how the image of a place is created (Marzano & Scott, 2009). Foucault’s notions of power may nevertheless not be sufficient to analyse and understand place branding in a Chinese context, necessitating the use of additional views and conceptualizations of power.

Power is a multifaceted concept, conceptualized and defined in various ways. In a broad sense, the power of a person indicates his or her ability to produce intended effects upon the world, and to realize certain purposes within it, whatever these purposes happen to be (Beetham, 1991; Morriss, 1987). In this general sense, some people have greater power than others, and the ability to achieve our purposes is thus distributed unequally (Beetham, 1991). A somewhat more specific sense of power, which also is relational, is the capacity to control or influence the actions of others (Beetham, 1991; Wrong, 1979).

In a similar vein, power is explained by Barnes (1986) as being the capability to get things done, to impose one’s will and to push through a series of actions, even against opposition. Power is viewed by some as a resource, or even as a possession, whereas others regard power as social relation founded on some kind of dependency, or, in other words, as an influence over someone or something (Morgan, 2006). The ‘supreme exercise of power’ has moreover been described as the ability to get others to have the desires you want them to have (Clegg, 1989; Lukes, 1974). Distinctions have also been made between the exercise of power through coercion of various kinds, including physical violence, versus the exercise of consent (Fairclough, 2001).

The notion of hegemony is central in discussions of power and ‘involves the successful mobilization and reproduction of the active consent of dominated groups’ (Clegg, 1989, p. 160). Hegemony has been conceptualized as occurring when the rulers or leaders succeed in providing a fundamental outlook for the whole society (Bocock, 1986). Gramsci has been described as the theorist of hegemony par excellence (Clegg, 1989), and has argued that hegemony has assisted the ruling class to cope with any threats to its authority. Hegemony has also been depicted as leadership and domination across the economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of society (Fairclough,
Hegemony moreover relates to ‘politics of memory’, and thus the role of politics in shaping collective memory (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014).

‘Interests’ is another central concept in discussions on politics and power, because a focus on interests can provide explanations of actions as well as people’s ‘real interests’ (Hindess, 1986). To maintain that a policy or practice is in the interests of someone is to say that they would in some ways gain advantage from it (Hindess, 1986). Benton (1981) holds that it is possible for power to be exerted over an agent against its desires but in its real interests. The agent would be unaware that this was the case due to the non-existence of democratic participation (Clegg, 1989).

Legitimacy, in turn, is a kind of social approval which is essential to stabilize power relations (Morgan, 2006; Weber, 1968). Habermas (1976) defined the concept of legitimation as the acceptance by the population of a particular social system (Clegg, 1989). Historically, legitimate authority has been reinforced by one or more of three elements, namely: tradition, charisma or the rule of law (Morgan, 2006). Weber (1968) maintained that every power has an interest in cultivating a belief in its legitimacy, and others following this have concluded that it is indeed by cultivating beliefs that legitimacy is sustained (Beetham, 1991).

Legitimacy is different from regime stability, and is not simply a by-product of effective system functioning. Rather, for power to be legitimate, there are three prerequisites: that it complies with established rules; that it is justifiable with regards to shared beliefs; and that subordinates express their consent. Consequently, for a power to be legitimate, it needs to ‘bind in’ at least the most central members amongst the subordinate; to demonstrate to a wider audience the legitimacy of the powerful (ibid). Inspired by Weber, Lipset (1958) defines the legitimacy of a political system as its capability to create and preserve the belief that the current political institutions are the most suitable ones for society (Beetham, 1991).

‘Technologies of government’ has been utilized as a concept to shed light on the mechanisms through which authorities shape, normalize and instrumentalize thoughts, conducts, decisions, and aspirations of others with the goal of achieving certain objectives (Miller & Rose, 2008). Technologies of government aim to translate thought into the domain of reality, and to do this via strategies, techniques and procedures, to create connections between the aspirations of authorities and the activities of individuals and groups (ibid).

Miller and Rose (2008) tie their conceptualization of ‘technologies of government’ to Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’ and its intrinsic discursive character. Foucault asked how discourse functions, and aimed to isolate tech-
niques of power to places where this kind of analysis is seldom done (Rabinow, 1984). Foucault’s (1979) notion of governmentality is moreover a form of power which ‘conducts’ as it leads and motivates various actors to make certain choices, in the creation of certain realities (Kornberger, 2010).

Miller and Rose (2008) maintain that, in order to analyse the governmental field and its internal conceptualizations and explanations, attention to language is needed. Analysis of language, they claim, can assist in ‘understanding the constitution of the objects of politics, not simply in terms of meaning or rhetoric, but as “intellectual technologies” that render aspects of existence amendable to inscription and calculation’ (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 21). Manipulation of language along with indoctrination and surveillance has been referred to as a power exercise and related to a form of Orwellian control (Holmwood, 1998).

In conceptualizations of the ‘imagined community’, Anderson (2006) claims that one persistent feature of nationalism is that it is official, emanates from the state and serves the interests of the state. Relatedly, a characteristic attribute of the powerful is their capacity to delineate what the goals of the collective should be (Beetham, 1991). Power is also about socialization into common values (ibid), and related to conceptualizations of ‘government through community’, which is about the regeneration of society and maximization of social justice through the building of responsible communities (Miller & Rose, 2008).

‘Government through community’ moreover involves a number of strategies for inventing and instrumentalizing commitment between individuals and communities, in the service of projects of mobilization, reform or regulation. Reinvestigation of community for a modern age has also been tied to core values of responsibility, fairness and cooperation (Miller & Rose, 2008). Miller and Rose (2008) also claim that inhabitants of particular locales can be ‘empowered’ by ‘community groups’ who speak ‘in the name of the community’ (p. 94), and hold that a ‘spirit of community’ can evoke communal pride, capacities of self-reliance and entrepreneurship, for example (ibid).

Power in the form of control is discussed by Law (1986) focusing on long-distance control, and states that it depends upon the circulation of documents, devices and drilled people from the centre to the periphery. All sorts of texts, machines and people, sometimes separately but more often in combination, are the raw materials for the actor who seeks to control others from a distance (ibid). Fidelity, or loyalty, is described by Law as a crucial element to enable long-distance control, and fidelity increases if a person is appropriately prepared, or primed, resulting in ‘faithfulness’ (Law, 1986). Law also draws parallels to the concept of ‘drill’, referring to Foucault (1979) and McNeill (1982) who have suggested that (military) drill is important for social control. The
‘model’ worker, for example, was a person who had been drilled, and became a reliable automaton, and who offered a more suitable way of exercising power (Law, 1986).

In the context of organizations, power has largely been conceptualized related to the production of organizational obedience (Clegg, 1989). ‘Organizational outflanking’ is a concept used by Mann (1986) to explain why the dominated tend to comply rather than revolt. Connections between discipline and organizational virtue have also been stressed (Assad, 1987), tied to ideas of inward appreciation and enactment of one’s duty as a member (Clegg, 1989). Power in the context of organizations is also about ‘one’s ability to persuade others to enact realities that further the interests one wishes to pursue’ (Morgan, 2006, p. 183). Relatedly, leadership has been treated as the ability to define the reality of others (Morgan, 2006). Democratic leaders allow definitions to evolve from the views of others, whereas authoritarian leaders attempt to ‘tell’, ‘sell’ or force a reality on subordinates (Morgan, 2006).

The concepts related to power discussed here are important in this study since they have assisted me in further analysing and conceptualizing key political aspects of the branding in the five cities studied in this thesis, and thus answer RQ3. Moreover, the concepts of power helped me in conceptualizing and developing the imagineering concept, presented and discussed in Chapter 8. Under the umbrella of imagineering, I used the concept of power to further elaborate on the use and construction of various place imaginaries, and the meanings and powers of place imagery used in the cities’ branding. Concepts of power also helped me to shed light on different power interests in the branding of the five cities, for example at local and national levels, and the linkages between these. Finally, concepts of power assisted me in defining imagineering as a policy instrument exercised by a political élite.

3.4 Synthesis

In this chapter, the aim has been to define and elaborate on the theoretical concepts that I have used to collect and analyse data, and to explain the patterns I found in my empirical material. The concepts discussed here were: place imagery, which comprises the images (visual images, pictures, etc.) and language (text, stories, myths, etc.) used to represent a place; place imaginaries, which consists of clusters of similar place imagery; and finally ideology and power, where I conceptualize ideology as a process of producing meanings, signs and values in social life, and see power as interconnected with concepts like interests, hegemony, legitimacy and technologies of government. In the next chapter, I will elaborate on the methodology and research design of this study.
4. Research design and methodology

In this chapter, I will present the research design and methodology used to realize the purpose of this dissertation and answer the three RQs that were formulated in Chapter 1. This chapter is organized in the following way. First, the research approach and the case selection are discussed, focusing on the ethnographic multi-case design of the study and introducing the five cases/cities studied. Second, I present the way in which the longitudinal fieldwork was carried out, and the way in which the data was collected. Third, the chapter describes the abductive research approach permeating the study, and how the data analysis was carried out. Finally, methodological reflections are included, with a focus on access, culture and credibility, ending with a discussion on some of the limitations of this study.

4.1 Research approach and selection of cases

The research approach and case selection of this study correlate to the aim of this study, and thus to contribute to knowledge of the internal-political aspects of place branding, and the three RQs posed, centring on place imagery used in the branding of Chinese mega-cities, place imaginaries created in the branding of the cities, and key political aspects of the branding of Chinese mega-cities. To answer the aim and the research questions, I decided early on to choose an open-ended case-oriented approach, simply because I did not know exactly what to look for.

4.1.1 Ethnographic multiple case study

This research is based on a longitudinal field study approach drawing inspiration from ethnography. Thus, the study is qualitative, interpretative and reflexive in character. I found a field study approach suitable as it would help me to realize the aim of the study and answer the three RQs, formulated in Chapter 1 and stated above. As shown in Chapters 2 and 3, there was little support from previous research when it came to studying the political and ideological aspects of place branding activities in Chinese mega-cities. That excluded a deductive approach as I simply was not able to formulate what hypothesis to test. On the other hand, a more inductive path of research, in the
form of ethnographic field studies, offered me the possibility of getting immersed in the research setting, to gain first-hand knowledge of the context and the phenomena of study (Silverman, 2011).

The research approach of this study has similarities with what Czarniawska (1997; 2014) calls ‘window study’, likened to ‘ethnographies’ and explained as the opening of a window in time with descriptions by a researcher of all that is seen through it. However, this study does not follow the traditional definition of ethnography, since it does not describe a people’s way of living; yet it does exhibit similarities with both window studies and ethnographies. Window studies begin with a choice of a site, rather than a case, ‘usually dictated by an imprecise research question, but activated by information that something interesting is happening at a specific site’ (Czarniawska, 2014, p. 23). In my case, this was China. If the researcher decides to follow a chain of events, a window study can develop into a case study, and even turn into an ethnography (ibid). To some extent, this is the case in this research project, and ethnographic features of this study include, for example, the pursuit of an understanding from within; an understanding which is largely created by spending time in the field and resulting in gradually increased knowledge of the field (Lalander, 2015). This study is ethnographic in character also as it is highly concerned with the cultural context (Goulding, 2005).

The goal of this study is to carry out an in-depth study, and theorize on the basis of that (Bryman, 2011). The aim has also been to strive for originality, complexity and specificity of the reality that is studied (Dubois & Gaddes, 2014). To achieve this, and in addition to the suitability of a field study approach with ethnographic inspiration, I found a case study approach the best for this study, since such an approach could help me to understand the complex issue that the branding of Chinese mega-cities encompasses (Flyvbjerg, 2006), and because it is an in-depth study of the particular, where I as a researcher can increase my understanding of the phenomena studied (Ruddin, 2006). Furthermore, a case study approach is also appropriate in this study since it could yield rich, empirical descriptions (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), help to illustrate patterns in certain contexts (Bell, 1999) and provide ‘unique means of developing theory by utilizing in-depth insights of empirical phenomena and their contexts’ (Dubois & Gadde, 2002, p. 555).

Case studies, and especially interpretative case studies, have been critiqued for being hard to generalize (Ruddin, 2006). However, some researchers (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2001; 2006) have put forth convincing arguments that it is certainly possible to generalize on the basis of a single case, adding that formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas ‘the force – of example’ is underestimated (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Ruddin, 2006). It has also been argued that the in-depth study of one case can be a foundation for
generalization, especially when the case is anomalous or peculiar (Ginzburg, 2011, referred to in Czarniawska, 2014).

It has also been argued that theory building from multiple case studies yields more robust, testable and generalizable theory compared with single case study research (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). In this study, I selected five cases, or cities, based on my understanding that they differ from each other, and as such represent extreme or rare cases (polar types), opening up the potential to observe contrasting patterns in the data (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Moreover, my selection of different cities was related to an ambition to capture the complexity and specific nature related to certain cases, and an aim to describe unique features of each case, or city (Stake, 1995).

The case selection was carried out through theoretical sampling, with a key criterion being that each case should contribute to theory development within the set of cases (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). To be suitable in the context of this study, its aim and RQs, the cities needed to actively engage in city branding practices, and do this in a holistic manner, meaning that the cities’ branding activities should include an array of place imaginaries. In addition, to study political features of city branding, it was desired that the cities selected, in a Chinese context, were seen as important from a political point of view. In the early stages of this research project, in order to decide on the cases to be studied, I consulted respondents and contacts, as well as the literature. In the early stages of fieldwork, I also considered potential cities. Apart from the five cities that I finally selected as cases, I also visited and considered Guangzhou (in 2010), Wuhan (in 2011) and Tianjin (in 2012).

4.1.2 Selection of the five Chinese city cases
I decided to study large Chinese cities, and in particular Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chengdu and Chongqing, in part because these cities are increasingly integrating with the global economy and are taking on powerful positions in the world (Wang & Zheng, 2010), meaning that it is important to learn more about them, and how they are developing and communicating. Components pushing China and its cities towards greater global presence include the nation’s thriving economy, its growing middle class and investments in infrastructure (Global Cities Index, 2012). Along with China’s rapid economic development, large Chinese cities have, during the past two decades, increasingly tried to change their relationship to the global economy with a view to becoming more international (Yulong & Hamnett, 2002).

Large Chinese cities have taken the lead in terms of integration with the global economy, encouraged by China’s economic reforms and open-door policy (Wei & Yu, 2006). They are widely regarded as emerging global cities (Wei, Leung & Luo, 2006) and are, in the next 10 to 20 years, expected to become
significant rivals of current global cities, including New York, London, Paris and Tokyo (Global Cities Index, 2012). Indeed, several Chinese cities are already ranked at the very top in the world in terms of economic strength; and in a report from 2012 (Economist Intelligence Unit Report, 2012), of the top 14 cities ranked by economic strength, 11 were Chinese, including the five cities studied in this thesis.

Large Chinese cities are relevant to this study partly because they are regarded as China’s models for the future (New York Times, 2007), indicating that an increased understanding of the branding and functioning of the cities studied in this thesis will provide important lessons about China more generally, which is especially important in the contemporary setting and at a time when China is experiencing greater power and influence worldwide. The selected cities are also relevant to study because what one learns about the organization of a mega-city can act as important and instructive examples for other cities of varying sizes, aligning with Perlman’s (1990) reasoning that, if an innovation works in a mega-city, including difficulties such as scale, bureaucracy, complexity, diversity and conflict, it is probable that it will also work in smaller cities.

The five cities I selected as cases are Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chengdu and Chongqing. Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen are all located on China’s developed east and south coast, whereas Chengdu and Chongqing are located in China’s developing central parts. The five cities are largely impacted by directives, policies and concepts from the central government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but have simultaneously experienced different development paths, and been influenced by varying goals and visions.

All five cities are large cities that envision further economic development and aim to be creative and global, yet also strive for a clean city environment, social well-being, stability and harmony. The cities are different for example in terms of their geographic location in China, their history, size, resources, and in their level of urbanization. The cities have also established different visions, and use varying place imagery in their city branding. Due to their vast size, the cities are also highly complex and heterogeneous, incorporating differences between the various city districts, for example.

I chose Beijing because of its position as China’s political and cultural centre, and due to its long history combined with a strong future orientation. Beijing was also a clear choice due to its vision of becoming a world city and a global innovation centre, because of its city branding efforts at the time of and after the Beijing Olympics in 2008, and due to its interesting campaign steered at internal audiences, namely ‘Beijing Spirit’.
Shanghai was my next choice because it is China’s financial and commercial centre, and the most modern and international city in China, a history that can be seen in the city landscape. Moreover, I selected Shanghai due to its organization of the World Expo in 2010, and its focus on creating a better city in terms of the environment and for people, and due to its branding as innovative and creative.

I selected Chengdu because it was depicted by various respondents and contacts as a city at the forefront of city branding in China. Chengdu was also interesting due to its geographic location in southwest China, its position as an important city and engine of China’s Western Development Program and its status as a leader of China’s ‘new urbanization’.

Based on in its geographical position in China and its role in leading the development of central and western China, Chongqing was my fourth selection. Chongqing was also interesting because of its mission to solve imbalanced development and bridge the gap between urban and rural populations where the majority of the 35 million residents live in the rural areas of the city. Chongqing also interested me because it engaged in a politically led and propaganda-like city branding campaign, largely aimed at local populations.

My fifth choice was Shenzhen, one of China’s first and most successful Special Economic Zones, which has experienced extraordinary growth during the past 35 years. It is a city with a short history that is full of migrants. It is also a highly entrepreneurial place with much focus on innovation, creativity and design. Shenzhen’s proximity to Hong Kong also made it appealing to study, given the influence from Hong Kong in terms of governance and participatory features.
4.2 Field trips and data collection

4.2.1 Longitudinal field study

The generation of empirical data included five field trips to China. I conducted field research in 2010 (one week: September 20–26), 2011 (two weeks: September 17–October 1), 2012 (seven weeks: May 18–July 5), 2013 (two weeks: May 21–June 5) and 2014 (eight weeks: October 15–December 12). In the timeline below (Figure 4.1) the five field sessions are listed.

![Timeline showing field sessions in China, 2010–2014.]

A longitudinal perspective has been realized in this research due to my extended participation in the field (Flick, 2009). The relative strengths of longitudinal studies have already been emphasized, such as the ability to document changes of views or actions over time, and the possibility of analysing development and processes in their course (Flick, 2009). Moreover, using a longitudinal design can shed light on implementation of policies and change (Matanda & Ndubisi, 2013), contribute in mapping the progress of meaning over time (Bulmer & Buchanan-Oliver, 2006) and provide insights into the process of forming a trusting atmosphere and its importance in the sustainable development of place branding (Vuoireni & Vos, 2013).

In this study, a longitudinal perspective has contributed insights into the connection between policy and practice and illuminated various changes over time, such as changes in city branding language and imagery, city branding practices and city branding governance. A longitudinal design has also contributed insights into the change of political leaders and its effects, as well as changes in the wider social, economic and political context. Furthermore, a longitudinal design has allowed for the inclusion of a historical perspective, putting this study into a larger historical discourse, enabling a wider analysis and understanding of contemporary city branding.

This study reports the time element in four main ways. First, it is included through historical descriptions and discussion of changes over time in Chapter 5 (The Chinese context). Second, a timeline depicting main events in the five cities studied is included in the end of every sub-chapter about the cities. Third, change over time is depicted in each of the sub-chapters, including the elements just mentioned (e.g. changes in city branding practices). Fourth, and
finally, connections to a larger contextual and historical discourse are made in Chapter 7 and 8.

The first field trip, in 2010, was a study of Shanghai, conducted by my main supervisor, in which I participated as a research assistant. The second field trip, in 2011, was a pre-study of four cities, namely Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing and Wuhan, which I conducted on my own. A key purpose of the pre-study was to establish important contacts, build relations with key people and identify respondents at an early stage of this research project. Another central purpose of the pre-study was to gain an understanding of city branding in the Chinese context and to identify suitable cities to study.

The third field session was in 2012 and included two weeks in Shanghai, where I was based at the School of Management and the Nordic Centre at Fudan University; one week in Chengdu; and four weeks in Beijing, where I was a visiting researcher at the National Academy of Economic Strategy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. During the fourth field trip, in 2013, I spent one week in Shanghai, attending the Shanghai Forum, and one week in Beijing. The fifth and final field session took place in 2014 and included two weeks in Shenzhen, two weeks in Chengdu, two weeks in Chongqing, one week in Shanghai and one week in Beijing.

Grants I received from Forum for Asian Studies, Stockholm University, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, and the Nordic Centre at Fudan University in Shanghai, impacted which cities I could visit, and how long I was able to stay in each of the five cities. All in all, I ended up spending more time in Beijing and Shanghai than in the other three cities of study. Some of my respondents, acquaintances and friends in Beijing and Shanghai nevertheless also had experience from and/or knowledge of city branding in other cities in China, and thus offered insights into city branding in my five cities of study.

In conducting the fieldwork, I aimed for close interaction and tried to create confidence in me as a researcher. I also opted for good access to the study setting, made efforts to understand the culture and language, and considered how to present my research project in a clear, understandable and interesting way, in line with Alvesson’s (2011) recommendations.

4.2.2 Multiple types of field material
One hallmark of field studies and case studies is the use of multiple data and information, or field material, which in this study were triangulated to enhance credibility (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The methods used most often by qualitative researchers, and in this research project, include interviews, documents and observations (Silverman, 2011). Using mixed methods and a variety of material has the advantage of providing a deeper, broader and more illustrative
account of the phenomenon (Dubois & Gadde, 2014), which has been the aim in this study. Collecting and developing different kinds of field material can, moreover, enable inclusion of complementary and contrasting views and perspectives, and highlight complexities involved in the branding of Chinese cities; a high priority in this study.

**Interviews**

Interviewing has become the heart of much fieldwork conducted in China since it became possible in the late 1970s (O’Brien, 2006). Interviews have been used in this study to capture both the particular and the vivid (Heimer & Thøgersen, 2006) and due to their vital role in theory building (O’Brien, 2006). In total, I conducted 117 interviews in all five field trips, focusing on city branding in China. I have separated respondents into three main groups, namely government officials, practitioners and researchers. Table 4.1 supplies a breakdown of interviews by city and type or respondent.

Table 4.1: Total number of respondents by city and type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Government officials</th>
<th>Practitioners</th>
<th>Researchers</th>
<th>Total number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chongqing</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chengdu</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

City branding in China is carried out primarily by the government. Therefore, I found it important to interview government officials, since they could supply an inside perspective of city branding in the five cities of study. The downside of this was that Chinese government officials were reluctant to meet me for interviews, did not want to be recorded during interviews and tended to share a rather polished description of the branding of their city, often refraining from talking about sensitive issues. I also perceived a reluctance on their part to interview in the later stages of my fieldwork, especially in 2014 when more government officials made it clear that I was not under any circumstances allowed to include their name in my thesis.

The group that I call ‘practitioners’ primarily includes people with knowledge of city branding together with people working practically with city branding in various ways, in culture, tourism, investment and media, for example. Some practitioners were not, however, involved in city branding work, but shared
their views on city branding in China and/or the five cities studied, as residents or as people with insights into the Chinese context and its workings. Some of the practitioners, also those working actively with city branding in the cities studied, at times expressed their views more as citizens than city branding practitioners; views that sometimes were positive and at times more critical or negative. I consider these views and perspectives equally relevant to my research, and see them as contributing to a wider, more complex understanding of the phenomena of study.

The third group interviewed is researchers. They were mostly employed at Chinese universities or think tanks. Most of the researchers interviewed had also been involved with city branding and/or city development in some way, for example by participating in the formulation of city strategies, or by engaging in practical city branding work. Towards the later stages of my study, and during fieldwork in 2014, some respondents reported that cities would rather cooperate with universities than international firms, since that was a safer choice in times of the anti-corruption campaign; indicating further involvement in city branding practices amongst researchers.

As respondents, researchers offered interesting and sometimes critical views about city branding in China. My impression was that the researchers and practitioners felt freer to speak their mind, without much influence from anyone about what to say and not to say. The majority of researchers and practitioners also allowed me to record the interviews, and were happy for me to use their name in my work. Furthermore, these attitudes remained constant throughout the period of my fieldwork.

In order to conduct interviews that generated rich, perceptive and insightful accounts, I aimed at interviewing people who represented different backgrounds, knowledge and experiences, and who viewed the phenomena of study from diverse perspectives. One central perspective represented in this study is of ‘official’ China; the official Chinese discourse and the constructions of Chinese social reality as presented in the language of officials and the media (Thøgersen, 2006). The aim has, however, also been to move beyond this by incorporating voices of the ‘unofficial’ China, including practitioners and researchers, who have offered different perspectives and helped me to understand which images are marginalized or engineered.

The interviews conducted lasted between 25 and 120 minutes, and followed the active interviewing method (Holstein & Gubrium, 1997). In active interviewing, interview situations are seen as interactional, and respondents can stimulate the creation of meanings that address topics concerning the research subject. As such, in active interviewing, the respondent actively participates in interpretative practice, observing, storing and reporting experiences when
the respondent reacts to the researcher. Moreover, the active interviewing method allows the interviewer to ask challenging questions, request further clarification and point out paradoxes and ambiguities (Holstein & Gubrium, 1997).

In my role as a researcher, I consciously and meticulously focused on the respondent and the discussion. Most the interviews were held in an office setting, were recorded after approval had been given and later transcribed verbatim. Recording was not always possible, for example when meetings were held in a noisier milieu such as a restaurant, and when recording was not approved. It was government officials in particular that felt uncomfortable with being recorded. When recording was not possible, I took careful notes, and wrote them out within 24 hours.

When the respondent did not feel comfortable with speaking English, an interpreter assisted with the translation between Chinese and English. The interpreter was usually a student from a university in the city of study, and at times a colleague of the respondent or a colleague of mine. When working with an interpreter, I usually briefed him or her about my research project and the type of questions I would focus on in the discussion. I also aimed at giving the interpreter an active and legitimate role in the interview process, encouraging him or her to ask questions if something was unclear. I also aimed at discussing the interview with the interpreter afterwards, to limit misunderstandings and get the correct information from the respondent.

In this thesis, identities of all respondents have been anonymized. I have, however, made a careful record of all full names, positions and organizational associations of the respondents, but have excluded certain information in order to conceal the identities of the respondents in this manuscript or elsewhere.

In China, it is generally hard to plan interviews a long time in advance, but some planning ahead is usually needed. In my case, as in many other cases when conducting fieldwork in China, I needed help from colleagues, contacts, acquaintances and friends to get in touch with possible respondents. Carrying out longitudinal fieldwork in China over a period of five years has had the favourable outcome that I have been able to establish a network in China including academics, practitioners and government officials that work with and/or have knowledge of city branding in Chinese mega-cities. I got in touch with people in my network prior to and during my field trips, through email and telephone, to schedule meetings and get help with connections to possible respondents. This help was invaluable, since without it I would not have been able to conduct this study.

I often sent two introduction letters to contacts and potential respondents. One letter introduced my research project and myself; the other letter was from my
main supervisor asking for assistance. Both letters were in English and Chinese. They helped me to get interviews and further contacts, and to give a first introduction to my study. Interview questions were drafted before each round of fieldwork, and the questions aligned with the aim and purpose of this thesis. The interview questions changed somewhat during the field trips, as I adapted them to the different cities and to the various people I met, and as the research project developed in an abductive manner. Sometimes the respondents, especially government officials, wanted to see the questions before the interview, in English or Chinese. When a Chinese version of the questions was requested, I got help from Chinese contacts and friends to assist me with the translation. I then sent the questions to the respondent in due time before the interview. Examples of interview questions are included in Appendix 1.

In Appendix 2, all respondents are listed, including an ID for each respondent, consisting of the capital letter I (for Interview) followed by a number. Some information about the organizational affiliation of the respondent is also included. I have moreover added a column called ‘Category’, consisting of a division between the three groups of respondents, namely government officials, practitioners and researchers. The date and time for the interview and the main topics covered are also included in the appendix. The interviews are presented city by city. This is followed by interviews that focused more generally on city branding, and not specifically on a certain city.

Observations: field notes and photographs
I took extensive field notes throughout all fieldwork sessions. I kept a fieldwork diary with me at all times, and took notes whenever I got a chance – in taxis between meetings, during conversations, at the hotel room at night, etc. I followed the advice from a senior colleague and mentor, who wrote to me in an email before my first field study on my own: ‘Good luck and do a good job. Write protocols diligently. Write down everything, and I mean everything, you can remember. Note first what people say, and later your own interpretations. Write your protocol within 24 hours of each meeting.’

My notes included information and details of various sorts gathered in the field, such as content and insights gained in informal meetings and discussions, visits to museums and other sights in the cities, as well as my own reflections about what I experienced. My own reflections included problems encountered and ideas that occurred, and were related to empirical, theoretical and methodological issues. After each field session, I expanded and further reflected on my notes and my experiences from the field. I subsequently presented my findings and my reflections to my supervisors and to colleagues, for example during research seminars. On three occasions, I got the chance to present my ideas to Chinese researchers and students in China. All these encounters provided important lessons and new, meaningful insights.
An important supplement to my observations in the field was to always have a camera with me and take photos of everything that potentially could be of importance. This meant that I took pictures of city landscapes, city branding posters and promotional material, as well as respondents and interview environments. When taking pictures of respondents, I made sure to always send the photos via email after the meeting, as a matter of courtesy. Towards the latter parts of my fieldwork, some respondents agreed gladly to take pictures together, but asked me not to share the photos with others, or share them publicly. I consequently kept most of the photos of respondents to myself.

The fieldwork notes, together with the photo taking wherever I was, has for me contributed to a deeper, more thorough understanding of city branding in Chinese cities and of the cultural context. Taking pictures of city branding banners and images posted around the cities has, for example, provided additional insights to this study, as when I returned to these photos and analysed them I found things I had not seen before. Careful storing of both the notes and the photos has, moreover, meant that I have been able to ‘return to the field’ and my observations again and again, even outside of China, which has contributed to the analysis and conceptualization of the material.

Documents: printed materials, news articles, websites

Another major source of field material is documents, including printed materials, news articles and websites, collected before, during and in the field. The printed materials include 95 pieces, such as brochures, books and magazines, collected during fieldwork. Table 4.2 summarizes this material, and a full list of the collected printed materials is included in Appendix 3.

Table 4.2: Amount of printed materials gathered during fieldwork.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chengdu</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chongqing</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related material</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The news articles were gathered in the field and also accessed online, before, during and after the fieldwork. The news articles used in this study are from the BBC, Bloomberg, China Daily, China Daily Europe, The Economist, Forbes, Foreign Affairs, Global Times, People’s Daily Online, International Daily, New York Times, South China Morning Post, Svenska Dagbladet and Xinhua. The inclusion of articles from various media outlets was purposeful
and has helped me to incorporate different and alternative views into this thesis. The news articles were published and accessed between 2010 and 2017. A list of the news articles included in this study can be found in Appendix 4.

I have also used and referred to various websites as sources of information. Much like the reasoning about news articles and media outlets, my ambition was to incorporate wider opinion in order to gain and represent a thicker, dynamic perspective. Consequently, I referred not only to local government websites of the case cities, but also websites offering alternative views and critical perspectives. In my role as a researcher, I have continually and critically examined the sources of the materials to assess the credibility of the information. The websites were accessed between 2010 and 2017, and a full list is included in Appendix 5.

*Four conferences*

In addition to the already discussed field material, I gained plenty of insight into the branding and development of cities in China by attending four conferences with a focus on branding and urbanization in a Chinese context. I have included some of the points shared at the conferences in the frame of this study, and have listed in Appendix 6 the speakers that I found especially relevant for this thesis. The names of conference presenters have been made anonymous and are referred to as a number and a C for Conference, i.e. C1, C2 etc. The four conferences used in the context of this study are: China Symposium 2012, City Branding Symposium 2013, Shanghai Forum 2012 and 2013.

The first conference was ‘China Symposium 2012: Chinese mega-cities in the world’, which was held at Stockholm Business School, Stockholm University, in August 2012. I was amongst the main organizers and arranged the conference together with my supervisors and my research group (*Stockholm Programme of Place Branding*) and Forum for Asian Studies at Stockholm University. We were able to invite some of the Chinese scholars that I had met during my fieldwork earlier the same year who had been especially impressive. All in all, 35 academics from China and Europe gathered for three days to discuss city branding with a focus on China. I learned much from the Chinese scholars and their presentations, and it was valuable to present and receive feedback on my initial research findings.

A follow-up ‘City Branding Symposium’ was arranged in October 2013 at the School of Journalism and Communication, Tsinghua University, in Beijing, under the theme ‘Positioning Cities: Innovative and Sustainable Strategies for City Development and Transformation’. The main responsibility lied with Tsinghua University, but I was also involved in the planning, together with my supervisors, my research group, Forum for Asian Studies and Chinese partners such as the National Academy of Economic Strategy at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, Fudan University and Peking University. From my perspective, most relevant at the conference were presentations by Chinese scholars and city authorities from Beijing Municipal Government.

The third and fourth conferences were the Shanghai Forum that I attended in May 2012 and in May 2013. Shanghai Forum is an annual international economic forum inviting leaders and experts from all fields to discuss and provide insights on and suggestions for Asia’s economic, political, social and cultural progress. In 2012 and 2013, there was a sub-forum focusing on cities, urban development and urbanization in Asia, which proved highly relevant in relation to my study. Some of the larger, more general sessions were also useful for my work, in that they offered a further contextual understanding of China, its cities and its culture. Participating at Shanghai Forum turned out to be important for my study also because it opened doors to new contacts and additional respondents. For example, I conducted one interview in a lunch break, and met with, and received help from, other participants after the conference.

4.3 Data analysis

4.3.1 Abductive research process

Throughout the research process I moved from the desk to the field and back, in an iterative manner; continually combining empirical and theoretical insights, analysing them and refining the ‘emerging theory’ (Czarniawska, 2014; Dubois & Gadde, 2014). As such, this study has been largely influenced by an abductive approach to research (Dubois & Gadde, 2014). The aim has been to have a pre-understanding and theoretical founding, yet leaving room for serendipity and new, unexpected discoveries (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). My approach has been to let the topic of inquiry, and the concepts and theories employed to understand it, evolve in the course of conducting the research (Heimer & Thøgersen, 2011). Moreover, the framing of research issues focused on in this study has evolved during the study, and the original framework has been successively modified due to theoretical insights gained during the process, and because of unanticipated empirical findings (Dubois & Gadde, 2014).

Consequently, my approach has not been strictly linear, but rather impacted by constantly going back and forth between empirical observations and theory, and from one type of research activity to another (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). This study is also largely inductive and inspired by grounded theory, since the generated theory is derived from the data (Ong, 2012). Yet, the study also follows Dubois and Gadde’s (2002) reasoning that using theory can improve the explanatory power of case studies. This study relies more on theory
than is the case in true induction, but is nevertheless much closer to induction than to deduction. The stance taken in this study is that theory cannot be understood without empirical observation and vice versa; and the aim has been to confront theory with the empirical world, throughout the research process (ibid).

In line with an abductive research approach, I started out with a preliminary analytical framework consisting of articulated ‘preconceptions’. This was developed over time, based on the findings from the fieldwork and constant analysis and interpretation. The evolving framework influenced the search for empirical data. Empirical observations resulted in identification of unanticipated issues that was further explored in interviews and other fieldwork materials, which in turn resulted in a need to adjust the theoretical framework and findings. The longitudinal character of the study also meant that due to changes in the empirical research context, additional features of city branding were found in the later stages of fieldwork.

4.3.2 Analysis and presentation of data

In this study, the analysis has not been one distinct phase of the research process, but rather many interconnected processes which took place before, during, in-between and after the field sessions (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). During and after fieldwork, in my observations and field notes, I kept a provisional running record of analysis and interpretation. Moreover, the analysis of my field material occurred in an iterative fashion, as I went back and forth between my empirical findings and the theoretical frame, with the objective of reconstructing and extending current place branding research.

The data analysis occurred simultaneously with the collection of empirical data. Thus, I began analysing the data shortly after I had accessed the first interviews, observations and documents, which allowed me to make adjustments along the way (Merriam, 2002). After the final field session, however, I combined all data gathered from interviews, observations, documentation and conferences, and analysed it all together in the specific context of this thesis. The starting point for the analysis was the aim and RQs posed in this study, previous place branding research and the theoretical lens, and thus concepts like place imagery, place imaginaries, ideology and power.

I used thematic analysis, inspired by an inductive approach to analyse the interview transcripts. By using thematic analysis, I aimed to identify, analyse and report patterns, or themes, within the data. The use of an inductive, or a grounded theory-inspired approach (e.g. Charmaz, 2006; Frith & Gleeson, 2004) as opposed to a deductive approach (e.g. Boyatzis, 1998; Hayes, 1997), meant that the themes I identified are strongly linked to the data (Patton,
I used the combined interview transcripts in the thematic analysis and followed the six phases of thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

In the first phase, I familiarized myself with the entire material, which I had printed out, by reading through it all once, and taking notes on initial ideas and interesting patterns in the data. In the second phase, I began generating initial codes, and thus the most basic segment or element of the data. I coded the entire data set manually, by reading it line by line, and coding the data by writing notes in the margin and by highlighting the codes with coloured pens. Codes that were similar to each other got the same colour. I concluded phase two by listing all codes and related colours. In the third phase, the aim was to refocus the analysis at the broader level of themes, rather than codes. Consequently, I began to analyse the codes to see how different codes could be combined to form an all-embracing theme. I used mind maps to assist me in visualizing and structuring the codes into themes. Some themes became ‘overarching themes’ whereas other themes became ‘sub-themes’.

In the fourth phase, I reviewed the themes. I first reviewed all the assembled excerpts for each theme, and reflected upon whether they seemed to form a consistent pattern. In this review phase, I combined some of the themes due to their similarity. When I was satisfied with the themes, I reread the entire data set to make sure that the themes actually represented the data set, and to code additional data that was missed in the previous coding stages. After re-adjusting the thematic map somewhat, I moved on to phase five and, thus, the stage of defining and naming the themes. In doing so, I further defined, refined and reflected on the essence of what each theme was about. For each theme, I wrote an analysis, and the ‘story’ that the theme told, while also considering how each theme fitted into the overall ‘story’. Hence, I reflected upon each theme, their possible sub-themes and the relation between themes. In the sixth phase, I conducted the final analysis and wrote up the thematic analysis. In this final phase, I looked for and tried selecting vivid and compelling extracts to be included in the presentation of the findings and in the discussion of the same. I also, again, related the analysis to the aim and research questions of this study; to the relevant literature and to the theoretical lens.

In addition to the thematic analysis of interview transcripts, I also conducted an analysis of pictures, including promotional materials and photos of city branding images and messages, all gathered by me during fieldwork. A large part of these were in Chinese. When conducting the analysis, I met with a Chinese teacher on a regular basis over a period of four months to discuss and analyse the material together. Before each meeting, I prepared the pictures and texts to be discussed and analysed, translating the text from Chinese to English as far as possible. I also noted down contextual information, such as the place where, and the date when, the photos were taken, and the promotion material communicated. In total, we analysed about 100 pictures (including text).
During the meetings, the Chinese teacher and I discussed the pictures, one at a time. First, we finished the translation from Chinese to English, and looked at the meaning of the different characters used. Then, we posed questions such as: What does the text say?; How and why does the text say what it does?; What do the images in the picture symbolize or represent?; Who is the sender/author?; What could be the sender’s intention?; In what context is this picture communicated?; and, finally, What do I/we as reader(s) think of this?

Conducting this picture analysis added additional, valuable perspectives to the thematic analysis and this study. It also created a further understanding of the cultural context and the changes that city branding and Chinese cities have undergone during the years that I have studied city branding in China. One particular perspective that was highlighted through this analysis was communicative directed at local populations. Another thing that stood out was the metaphorical, poetic and ideological images and language used.

In addition to the thematic analysis and the picture analysis, and with the purpose of increasing the depth and breadth of my findings to more accurately reflect the dynamic context that the cities studied represent, alternative voices have also been incorporated into the city ‘stories’, originating from field notes and materials gathered in the field, and from sources such as news articles and websites, for example, gathered both in the field and from desktop research.

Furthermore, in the analysis phase, I compared the emergent concepts with the place branding literature, looking for similarities and contradictions as well as possible reasons for these (Eisenhardt, 1989), and aimed to integrate this study into the ongoing place branding research discussion. In addition, the theoretical lens consisting of concepts like place imagery, place imaginaries, ideology and power, played an important part in the analysis phase, in that it assisted me in grouping place imagery into place imaginaries, and as it helped me to illuminate ideological features and key political aspects. The theoretical lens and the concepts discussed in it moreover contributed to supplying novel perspectives to the field of place branding and to the study of Chinese mega-cities, including insights into the powers of place imagery in a place branding context, the cultivating feature of place branding and its focus on internal audiences, and key political aspects of place branding.

I have organized the findings of this study into three main chapters (6, 7 and 8) responding to the three RQs proposed, i.e. Chapter 6 responds to RQ1, Chapter 7 to RQ2, and Chapter 8 to RQ3. Chapter 6 consequently sets out to answer RQ1 and, thus, ‘What imagery is used in the branding of Chinese mega-cities?’. The empirical material is in this chapter presented as rich and open case studies or city stories. My aim has been to keep the cases open, which, in the words of Flyvbjerg (2006), means to: ‘allow the story to unfold
from the many-sided, complex, and sometimes conflicting stories that the actors in the case have told me' (p. 238). The 'city stories' are richly descriptive, including quotes from interviews and documents, photos from the field, excerpts from news articles, and much more. Chapter 6 is more descriptive than analytical, yet by creating an analytical narrative that makes arguments in relation to the aim and the RQs posed in this study, the city cases/stories nevertheless go beyond mere description.

In Chapters 7 and 8, the analytical narrative is elevated further. In Chapter 7, I set out to answer RQ2 and, thus, 'What imaginaries (economic, social, cultural, etc.) are used in the branding of Chinese mega-cities?' Based on the analysis of the field material — and especially the thematic analysis of the interview transcripts, but also the pictorial analysis and other materials — five 'place imaginaries' emerged as overarching themes. The place imaginaries identified include economic, social, cultural, international and environmental or ecological imaginaries, and each imaginary is based on the sum of similar place imagery found in the five cities (Figure 4.2). These place imaginaries, used in the branding of Chinese mega-cities, were then also analysed in relation to place branding research and the conceptual framework/theoretical lens.

One conclusion from Chapter 7 was that all place imaginaries were permeated by an ideological element and political aspects, which is further conceptualized in Chapter 8. While Chapter 7 centres largely on the content of city branding, Chapter 8 focuses more on various perspectives regarding the process, or how city branding is carried out, and who influences it. In Chapter 8, the aim is moreover to answer RQ3 and, thus, 'What are key political aspects of the branding of Chinese mega-cities?'. In this chapter, I have primarily made use of empirical material that focuses on the political aspects of place branding, and materials that include issues of ideology and power. The empirical material has also been analysed in relation to branding research, especially strands centring on its political nature, and in relation to concepts of ideology and power elaborated on in the conceptual framework. Consequently, the concept
of ‘imagineering’ was developed, seen as useful in further understanding the internal-political features of city branding in Chinese mega-cities.

4.4 Methodological reflections

4.4.1 Reflections on access

When conducting the fieldwork for this study, access to respondents was at times troublesome, which I will come back to. Nevertheless, I met with more than a hundred people who assisted me in various ways, in discussing my research interests, answering my questions, pointing me to other possible contacts and respondents, and showing enormous generosity and willingness to help. My fieldwork in China has also meant that I have been exposed to a large contact space, and as a consequence met with people and gathered materials that would have been impossible with another approach. Being in the field has moreover meant stumbling into new surprising experiences and meeting people by chance.

One occasion related to the latter was when my main supervisor and I did a study of Shanghai in 2010, when we were at Fudan University for a meeting with the programme manager at the Nordic Centre. After the meeting, we had a look around campus and spotted the School of Management on the opposite side of the road to where we had been. We entered the school building, took the lift to the Marketing department, and walked along the corridor to see if we could find someone to talk to about the branding of Shanghai and the World Expo. In one of the rooms we found a professor who invited us to have a chat in his room. We talked about the branding of Shanghai and the Expo, and also found out that we had acquaintances in common. After this first nice, unexpected meeting, we invited Professor Fan to Stockholm, and he agreed to be my co-supervisor and Guest Professor at Stockholm Business School.

Alvesson (2011) has stated that, when conducting field research, it can be very beneficial to find people who can help in guiding the researcher into the studied setting, and help in gaining trust and establishing relationships. In my case, a valuable person with an insider’s perspective on Chinese society is the professor just mentioned, my supervisor in China, which has meant a lot for me and this study as he has shared his views, guided me and assisted me with valuable contacts. Meeting and getting to know a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, focusing especially on place branding, has also been extremely valuable for me and this study, as it has assisted me with many insights and knowledge on city branding in China as well as connections to key respondents. Yet another researcher, in the same field as I, has assisted me with a review of place branding research in Chinese, and translated it into
English. In addition, numerous research colleagues, friends and acquaintances have assisted me in contacting relevant people and potential respondents, and offered valuable advice; and have therefore contributed greatly to this study.

From my experience of fieldwork in China, however, it can also be difficult to get access to or interview certain people, government officials especially. During my last field trip, at the end of 2014, I found that it had become even harder to meet with and interview government officials. I was told that one main reason for the cautious approach amongst government officials was President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. Since the start of the campaign in 2013, government officials, as well as other people in society, have felt worried and anxious, and would rather go with the safer option and decline an interview. In 2014, I was told that to protect one’s personal and political safety had become a top priority in China, which I also experienced in my fieldwork.

During the fieldwork in 2014, and especially the visits to Chongqing and Chengdu, it was difficult to contact new respondents, and hence people that I had not recently interviewed, partly due to the many changes of people in the government in recent years. I was informed that, ‘normally’, Chinese government officials change positions fairly often, but in recent years more often than normal thanks to ‘political washing’. In Chengdu, for example, the dismissal of political leaders also affected the people around them, including staff that had worked with the branding of Chengdu. In Chongqing, my contacts at the Information office were unable to help with additional contacts in other departments or offices, the explanation being that many positions had changed recently, so my respondents did not know people in the other departments or offices. In Chengdu, in 2014, I had difficulty getting in touch with people I had met previously, such as practitioners engaged in promoting Chengdu in terms of culture and tourism, and practitioners involved in the branding of Chengdu to international audiences. I heard rumours about some people I had previously met with and interviewed, including suspicion of corruption.

During fieldwork in Beijing in 2014, the plan was to meet with one of the chiefs of the Publicity Department of Beijing Municipal Government, by the help of a contact who currently was doing an internship there. I was in Beijing twice and was both times very flexible about the meeting time. However, it proved impossible to have the meeting, with the explanation that the chief was ‘very busy’. In Shanghai, as in the other cities, I contacted the people in my network before my arrival. In 2014, there was one person that I was especially interested in meeting again; a professor at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences had supplied me with very interesting answers during an interview in 2012. The professor answered that he was busy, but recommended that I contact the head of the Research department of CCP Shanghai Publicity Com-
mittee, previously the head of the Research department of the Information office of Shanghai. This would have been a very relevant person to meet and interview, but I was quickly told that they had no time to meet.

In Shenzhen, I received help with contacts from academics and a government official involved in promoting Shenzhen as an investment location, and was consequently able to meet government officials in tourism and culture, urban planning and Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong Kong Modern Service Industry Cooperation Zone. I also tried to arrange meetings with the Foreign Affairs Office and other departments engaged in city branding, by the help of my contacts, but did not succeed. My overall impression was that the vast majority of people were very willing to help out in various ways, whereas some were cautious and hesitant, saying that it ‘was rather sensitive these days’ to put me in touch with anyone, and especially government officials.

4.4.2 Culture, credibility and limitations

Understanding the society, culture and language of a research setting is central when engaging in field research (Ooi, 2007). No matter which discipline in the social sciences or humanities one belongs to, an awareness of language use can add an extra dimension to fieldwork. In my case, it can be seen as beneficial that I, prior to my research, lived, studied and worked in China for two and a half years, between 2006 and 2008, and in 2010. These years gave me a good understanding of the Chinese culture, society and people. I also learned the basics of Mandarin Chinese during a year of full-time studies at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou. As a foreigner to China, I am aware of the importance of comprehending the economic, social and political institutions to understand the culture and society. To understand Chinese culture and society demands continuous attention and constant (re-)learning, since it is so dynamic and heterogeneous. I have not avoided complexity in the Chinese society, but rather embraced it to capture a richer economic and social reality. I have also kept in mind that various people (researchers, residents, non-residents, politicians, etc.) interpret a culture in different ways, and that culture as such is a political enterprise (Ooi, 2007).

In a qualitative, interpretative study like this one, subjectivity is an unavoidable element. Moreover, in this study, as in qualitative research more generally, I as a researcher have been the primary instrument for data collection and data analysis (Merriam, 2002). Consequently, my pre-understanding and world view, and my way of conducting the research, selecting theories and analysing the findings, have impacted the study in various ways. Perhaps the most obvious and positive impact I have had through my being the primary human instrument for data collection, is allowing me to respond and adapt my research immediately to circumstances in the field – ideal when collecting and analys-
ing data. I have moreover been able to process information immediately, clarify and summarize material, check with respondents for precision, expand my understanding through verbal and non-verbal communication and explore un-anticipated and unusual responses (Merriam, 2002).

There are, however, also shortcomings and bias of the ‘human instrument’ (Merriam, 2002), which I have tried to identify and monitor throughout the collection and interpretation of data. The aim has been to achieve methodological rigour, with central components being transparency and authenticity, resulting in the potential for robust and empirically and theoretically sound research. The ambition in this study has also been to achieve trustworthiness and credibility. One way of achieving this has been by triangulating data and information. Comparing different kinds of material in my study was thus a conscious decision to gain a rich account of city branding in China, and to increase the trustworthiness of the study. Another way to increase credibility and trustworthiness of the study was through member checks throughout this research project. Towards the final stages of this study, I also asked three Chinese colleagues with much insight into city branding in China to read the final manuscript and examine and give feedback on the accuracy of the findings and the analysis of the data. This provided valuable inputs on different parts of the thesis, and resulted in an overall response that this study entails an accurate account of city branding in Chinese mega-cities.

This study was carried out in a controlled, non-transparent environment, which presents several challenges and limitations. As already discussed with regards to access, the study has limitations due to the scarcity of interviews with those primarily working with city branding in the cities studied, namely government officials. The controlled environment also appears to impact respondents’ expressions, and even though many respondents appeared to speak freely, many also seemed restrained in their views and depictions communicated during interviews, sometimes even appearing to repeat rehearsed sentences as if from a manuscript. Another limitation is the length and scope of the study. The aim of studying five mega-cities could be criticized for being too ambitious for a doctoral thesis to be finished within a four-year period. This, in combination with the difficulty of getting access to respondents, resulted in an overrepresentation in the number of interviews conducted in Beijing and Shanghai as compared with Chengdu, Chongqing and Shenzhen, as well as an overrepresentation in the number of materials/documents gathered from Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen as compared with Chengdu and Chongqing. Another limitation or potential critique of this study is that the interviews focused on educated people with insights into city branding in China. One group that has not been interviewed, in part due to the limited scope of this study, is the city inhabitants, especially disadvantaged socio-economic groups and people with low education, income and social status.
5. The Chinese context

In this chapter, the aim is to draw out some main features of the Chinese context relevant to this study. This is done because it is necessary to have an understanding of the particular cultural, social, economic and political realities of China today in order to understand some of the particular features of city branding practices in China. The structure of the sub-chapter has similarities with how the thesis is structured at large, in that it first focuses on images and language in a Chinese context with an emphasis on political narratives and ideological cohesion. Second, it discusses China in a global context with a focus on economic features as well as cultural, social and ecological elements. Third, it focuses on the political context, centring primarily on China’s reform, governance and the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

5.1 Ideological power and political narratives

During the late imperial period (late nineteenth to early twentieth century) and throughout the years of Republican China (1911–1949), nationalism was the official ideology of Chinese leaders, with the aim of recovering China’s sovereignty from the domination of Japanese and Western empires (Barabantsseva, 2013). During Mao’s rule, ideological indoctrination and national campaigns were used to suppress any alleged threats to national stability and the CCP’s dominance of government (Ogden, 2013). Since the birth of the CCP, various locations have been used to market certain ideas, such as the revolutionary base of Yan’an in the 1940s, the oil capital of Daqing in the 1960s and the special economic zone in Shenzhen in the 1980s (Dynon, 2011).

During the 1980s, ideology was in China expressed through the concept of ‘socialist market economy’ (Brown, 2013). In contemporary China, communism continues as a ruling ideology in the development of a ‘socialist country of Chinese characteristics’ (Li, Hu & Zhang, 2010). Li et al. (2010) have analysed how the Chinese nation state has tried to develop new support for the communist ideology amongst younger generations by engaging in or example red tourism. The purpose of this, the authors claim, is to ‘sustain the communist identity in a rapidly changing China of the twenty-first century’ (p.
102). Consequently, cities can be seen as important sites for marketing certain ideas, and city branding is an important tool in this process.

Four political elements have been outlined as the fundamental basis for Chinese ideology (Kosuge, 2012). The first element is the vast agricultural area in the eastern part of the Asian continent, including significant river and, later, canal networks. The second element is the development of written Chinese characters, which were used to bring cohesion to the Chinese empire. The third element of Chinese ideology is the use of military power and police force to control agrarian wealth. The fourth element is the nature of the administrative set-up serving the supreme political power, and relating directly to political ideology (ibid).

The CCP’s political power has been described as intertwined with ideological power (Guo, 2013), and it has been argued that the CCP offers Chinese society – which is complex and undergoing dramatic transformation – institutional and ideological cohesiveness, originating from the centre in Beijing and reaching out all over China (Brown, 2013). It has also been argued that the CCP tries to ‘dictate’ China’s moral and ethical values (Saich, 2013), and uses ideology to reshape economy, politics, society, culture and law (Guo, 2013).

It has moreover been claimed that a non-ideological Party now runs China (Brown, 2013). However, in light of the statements elaborated on above, this is a claim that can be questioned. Moreover, ideology is still important and apparent in the more than 2000 Party schools distributed across the nation (Brown, 2013), and the Party ideology serves as the guiding principle for the party-state policy and justifies the CCP’s political actions (Guo, 2013). Top leaders modify their governing concepts based on ideology, and in accordance with political desires and needs. Such modifications are commonly demonstrated in the leaders’ official concepts and policies and in their speeches and writing – in the press, in official textbooks, in Party conference documents and in other official statements (Guo, 2013).

Former president Hu Jintao’s official policy narrative included the ‘scientific development concept’ (2004), ‘harmonious society’ (2004) and ‘harmonious world’ (2005) (Callahan, 2013). The ‘Scientific Outlook on Development’ has been described by the previous president, Hu Jintao, as a powerful theoretical weapon providing guidance for the CCP and the nation (China Daily, 2012). The Scientific Outlook was first proposed in 2003, against the backdrop of rapid economic growth causing a number of problems, such as severe environmental pollution, excessive consumption of resources and a widening gap between rich and poor (ibid).

When Hu Jintao reported at the 18th National Congress of the CCP in September 2010, he said that the Scientific Outlook on Development has been one
of the most important achievements of the CCP in the past decade (China Daily, 2012). Moreover, Hu emphasized that the Scientific Outlook on Development embodies a Marxist worldview and methodology for development, and that it is a theory that ‘provides new scientific answers to the major questions of what kind of development China should achieve in a new environment, and how the country should achieve it’, which, he said, is needed in a time when China is yet to face many difficulties and problems on the road ahead (ibid).

The current President, Xi Jinping, who took office in 2012–2013, declared in his first public speech as a leader of the CCP that, in his view, ‘to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream of the Chinese nation in modern times’ (Callahan, 2013, p. 4). ‘The Chinese dream’ is moreover a central theme in Xi’s leadership. According to Xi, China shall be reborn, and this renaissance shall be accomplished under the leadership of the CCP (Ljunggren, 2015). The following are quotes by President Xi, about the Chinese Dream:

The Chinese dream, after all, is the dream of the people. We must realize it by closely depending on the people. We must incessantly bring benefits to the people. Realizing the great renewal of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modern history (Xinhuanet, 2015).

When the CCP year 2021 celebrates its 100-year anniversary, the goal of building a society with high average wealth should be reached, and when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) celebrates 100 years, the dream about the Chinese nation’s renewal should be attained (Ljunggren, 2015). At a time of great power shift in the world, ideas regarding China’s return to the position it once had, as the economic world leader (Foreign Affairs, 2008; Eklund, 2011), have been strengthened; accentuated by the drawn-out, global financial crisis and China’s newly won position as the world’s largest economy, as measured by purchasing power (Ljunggren, 2015). The financial crisis started in New York less than a month after the Beijing Olympics confirmed for many that China can be prosperous on its own terms, not least in relation to the United States. Consequently, it has been claimed that the Chinese dream is starting to replace the American dream in the global imagination (Callahan, 2013).

The humiliating treaty that came out of the First Opium War in 1842 with the superior British invaders is described as ‘Year 1’ in China’s modern history (Ljunggren, 2015). The idea about rebirth is not in any way new, but now, with the economic rise and China’s return to prominence in the world, the time has come, and Xi has made the projection of the Chinese dream a main feature of the propaganda machine (ibid). China’s current rise to global power is described as the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation to its natural place at the
centre of the world (Callahan, 2013). All schoolchildren learn about China’s success, but also that they should never forget the humiliation of the nation in the past. Rebirth and humiliation are thus woven together in a patriotic story, and adjusting history is a given method of telling that story (Ljunggren, 2015).

Myths play a central role in historical drama, and China’s history and culture invite dreams inspired by a past greatness and uniqueness (Ljunggren, 2015). Xi Jinping’s Chinese dream is a projection, not a definite, determined politic, but something larger and more accentuated than the visions that all predecessors since Mao have formulated. To a great extent, it is characterized by an idea about China as unique and predestined to go its own way – ‘the Chinese way’ – and is based on the idea that the West has no monopoly on modernity (ibid).

However, there is to date limited agreement on the meaning of the Chinese dream and spirited discussion about the future of the PRC (Callahan, 2013). Callahan (2013) furthermore argues for the importance of learning about China’s future and China’s futurist plans, since they can offer relevant insights into how China challenges ideas and norms in the establishment of a new world order, and to better understand how Chinese people relate to their past, present and future. To study the branding of some of China’s most important cities is one way to understand the future of Chinese cities and also China, since cities through their city branding strategies envision their desired future, and because the cities’ future is closely intertwined with China’s future.

Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the CCP has tweaked its ideological mantras to sound more Confucian. At the 18th National Congress of the CCP in November 2012, that marked President Xi’s assumption of power, slogans about ‘core socialist values’ were distilled into 12 words, each formed by two Chinese characters and plastered all over Beijing and other cities (The Economist, 2015b). During a visit to Beijing at the time of the congress, I saw the following slogans on bridges and in other visible spaces around the city: ‘We will follow the Party forever’; ‘No Party, no new China’; ‘Long live the CCP’; and ‘Long live the Chinese people, long live the CCP’. The Economist (2015b) has described the socialist core values as a ‘hotchpotch’, with some ideas being strikingly Western, such as freedom, democracy and equality, and others seeming more Confucian, such as harmony and sincerity. It has also been argued that Xi sees Confucianism as a powerful ideological tool, with its emphasis on hierarchy, order and duty to ruler and family. Unlike Marxism, Confucianism has the advantage of being ‘home-grown’ (ibid).

Confucius lived during the ‘spring and autumn period’ (770BCE–256BCE) in a time of major instability and conflict and prior to the unification of China under Emperor Qin Shi Huang (Ryan, 2013). Confucius was a genuine Chinese ideologist rather than a religious leader in the Western sense, and was not
interested in anything global or subjects that existed beyond Chinese borders (Kosuge, 2012). Confucius’ philosophy is based on the central notion of harmony, and has been praised as one of the greatest achievements of Chinese culture (Ryan, 2013). However, Confucianism has also been condemned, for example during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when it was accused of preserving class and power differences (Ryan, 2013). Nevertheless, Confucius has also been acknowledged in Chinese politics as one of the philosophical leaders (Kosuge, 2012).

In the words of Brown (2012), there is certainly ideology in the language that Chinese élite leaders use; in terms and concepts, in their framing of the world, and in the moral and intellectual justifications they invoke for policy. The CCP also put a lot of effort into crafting its ideological messages (Brown, 2012). Language has been given a central role in relation to Chinese cities by Tuan (1991), for example. Historic aspects are often prevalent in language, and it has been argued that, in the Chinese context, for every symbol there is underlying historic essence as well as realistic logic (Beijing Investment Promotion, Catalogue, a, 2012). The connection to the past (already existing verses) when planning for China’s future (new pictures) can also be seen in the use of ancient texts, such as such as ‘Under Heaven’ (天下), ‘Great Harmony’ (大同), and the ‘Kingly Way’ (王道) (Callahan, 2013).

5.2 Globalizing efforts and domestic challenges

Some have argued that China, despite its 5,000-year-old culture and its large population, has supplied the world with little on which to build a positive brand image (Berkowitz et al., 2007). In the contemporary setting, however, China has engaged in diplomatic practice and official rhetoric to promote itself as a new kind of rising power, and a nation that lacks aggressive intent (Ding, 2011). A key element of China’s ‘charm offensive’ internationally is the creation of peaceful or benign images (Chen, 2012). Moreover, China’s national image management has been described as a strategy with ‘Chinese characteristics’ (Ding, 2011).

In China, ‘public diplomacy’ is a foreign concept, and it is more common to use the term ‘duiwei xuan chuan’ (对外宣传) or ‘wai xuan’ (外宣), meaning external propaganda, and putting emphasis on boosting the nation’s image and promoting Chinese achievements (Wang, 2008). Unlike in English, ‘xuan chuan’ (宣传), or propaganda, has a positive connotation in Chinese, and is associated with releasing news, advertisements and shaping of ideology, etc. There are two ‘levels’ of ‘xuan chuan’, namely ‘nei xuan’ (内宣, internal propaganda) and ‘wai xuan’ (外宣, external propaganda), the second term referring to the promotion of the Chinese image to international audiences.
The propaganda system in China is moreover described as very strong and influential (Wang, 2008).

For China, the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo were exhibitions of the new China, and an example of what ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ can deliver (Cull, 2012). These mega-events also operated as powerful development instruments in the creation of globally competitive cities (Wen, 2014). It has been claimed, however, that China has much work to do in improving its global image, and that China’s current image does not tell the full story of this emerging world power (Berkowitz et al., 2007). Flaws in China’s national image are exemplified by the nation’s weak political credibility, social injustice, environmental degradation and corruption (Ding, 2011).

China’s charm offensive should be viewed in relation to globalization and urbanization as well as China’s particular political structure. In recent decades, China’s urban development has been a direct outcome of state articulation and reconfiguration, national political strategizing and shifts in global capital accumulation (Zhao, Chan & Sit, 2003). China’s urban development has also been significantly influenced by national political ideologies and development strategies. China’s urban growth has been described as complex, large and unique (ibid).

In recent years, China’s coastal areas have been faced with increased labour costs, shortage of resources and decreased competitiveness. Transnational companies have thus begun to transfer their production base to the central and western regions of China (Chengdu Investment Guide, 2013). The Chinese government has moreover pushed forward a transformation of the pattern of opening-up to the outside world, changing from the opening-up of coastal regions in the east and south of the country, towards developing the economy of inland China and promoting the opening-up of the western region to the other parts of China and the world (ibid). China’s central government has used its power to direct growth to the inland and western provinces, and a kind of centrist economic planning has been accompanied by the augmented growth of cities such as Chongqing and Chengdu (Zacharias & Tang, 2010).

Seen from a historic perspective, China sheltered itself from the global march forward for much of the twentieth century (Berkowitz et al., 2007). However, in contemporary China, opening up to the world has been a deliberate pursuit of modernization amongst officials who envision the future as including the outside world in China’s return to prominence. Since the 1990s, and especially since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, its urban transformation has been increasingly influenced by globalization (Lin, 2004). Cur-
rently, China is strengthening its global power, with modernized military capability (Kosuge, 2012) and the world’s largest economy, as calculated by the IMF using purchasing power parity (BBC, 2014).

Nisbett (2003) acknowledges scholars who discuss the convergence between Easterners and Westerners, yet makes a distinction between modernization and Westernization, and maintains that many Eastern countries are becoming more modern but not automatically more Western (Ooi, 2007). China is amongst the nations who, in the words of Ljunggren (2008), have cleverly exploited the opportunities brought about by globalization, yet found their own routes and techniques in the globalizing age. It has also been stated that due to China’s unique history and civilization it needs to thread its own development road (Callahan, 2013).

The impact of globalization has been strongly felt in Chinese cities (Wu, 2000; in Wu & Ma, 2006). Driven by market reforms and globalization forces, large Chinese cities have been established as the spearheads for China to communicate with the global economy (Lin, 2004). It is in China’s globalizing cities that the global meets with the local and the (post-)modern interacts with the traditional Chinese – and where the manifestations of this can be seen most clearly and completely (Lin, 2004). Urban transformation should thus not be understood with a single ‘global logic’, as there are also local dimensions of place-making (Wu, 2000; in Wu & Ma, 2006).

However, globalization is merely one of the factors affecting cities. Other factors include local histories and physical and institutional environments (Ma, 2004). Chinese globalizing cities are not only the largest cities and centres of globalization in China, but they are also depicted as ‘new mosaics of urban transformation’ (Lin, 2004, p. 151). Moreover, these cities are described as ‘the progress and hope of the country and at the same time places of anxiety, despair, and misery’ (Pannell, 1992, p. 36).

A few years ago, the number of people in developing countries who migrated to urban areas every year amounted to 66 million (World Bank, 2014a), and the worldwide urbanization process is especially apparent in China (Yuen & Ooi, 2009). By the end of 2012, 52 per cent of China’s population lived in cities, compared with 26 per cent in 1990 (World Bank, 2014b). According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, this number had reached to 57 per cent in the end of 2016 (China Statistical Yearbook, 2016). In the past 30 years, China has urbanized at the fastest rate in the world, and out of all cities with a population greater than 500,000, a quarter are in China (Chen & Gao, 2011). According to estimates, 70 per cent of the Chinese population will live in cities by 2030 (The Economist, 2014a). Furthermore, urbanization is regarded as a central engine in the Chinese economy, and closely tied to China’s economic goals (Ratcliffe & Krawczyk, 2004).
Large Chinese cities have always functioned as the most important centres of economic development, social transformation and political campaigns (Lin, 2004). Large cities have an advantage over smaller cities in a time of globalization in that they can achieve increasing returns and because large-scale machinery and investment can be run more efficiently (Zhao et al., 2003). Large cities also enjoy advantages through their incorporation of land, infrastructure, investment environments and skilled personnel (Lucas, 1988). Moreover, large cities comprise clusters of activities generating a host of synergistic effects (Camagni, 2001).

In China, four municipal cities are managed directly by the central government, namely Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Chongqing. China also has 28 capital cities of provinces and autonomous regions, and two special administrative regions in Hong Kong and Macau. Even though these cities are amongst the most developed cities in China, they differ greatly in terms of population and economic and social development (Yong & Cheng, 2012). In the 1980s, the policy was to strictly control the size of large cities, the aim being to develop small and medium-sized cities. These measures were taken because of strong pressures for urban in-migration and due to the relaxation of rural–urban migration control (Zhang & Zhao, 1995). However, the policy of controlling the growth of large cities was not implemented effectively, with the consequence that large Chinese cities continued to grow (Wei, 1997). One effect of the extreme growth that China’s largest cities have experienced is that they are preoccupied with domestic challenges (Eklund, 2011).

It has been argued that China’s open-door policy, urban reforms, decentralization, uneven regional development policy and the development of a socialist market economy have all contributed to the weakening of the central government’s ability to control the growth and development of large and super-large Chinese cities (Wei, 1997). Almost all Chinese cities, large and small, have experienced major spatial renewal and modernization in recent decades (Ma, 2004). Moreover, some of the largest cities, specifically Hong Kong, Shanghai and Beijing, have been identified as contemporary world cities or global cities (Green, 2010).

China’s economic success has come at a significant cost to its environment, with levels of land degradation and air and water pollution amongst the highest in the world (Economy, 2013). Chinese leaders routinely cite the environment as one of the nation’s most demanding concerns, and recognize the scale of the environmental challenges they face (ibid). During the 18th National Congress of the CCP, the Party proposed that the construction of ecological civilization should be a long-term strategy related to the well-being of people and the future of China (Touch Shanghai, 2016).
The focus on economic development has also come at the expense of culture, or the forgetting of cultural and historical roots. Consequently, Chinese officials have increasingly talked about the importance of remembering the past when educating new generations, and have pointed out that China should show its ancient culture to locals and foreigners alike (The Economist, 2014b). At the beginning of 2014, President Xi assembled a ‘collective study’ session of the ruling Politburo, at which he pointed out that traditional culture should act as a ‘wellspring’, nourishing values of the CCP (The Economist, 2015b).

Along with the development of the nation towards a creative and a knowledge economy, a focus on cultural and creative industries has also increasingly been encouraged and, in 2009, culture was, at a State Council meeting, upgraded to the level of a strategic industry (The Economist, 2014b). Moreover, the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) emphasized the centrality of culture, stating that it is the ‘spirit and soul of the nation’ and a powerful force for China’s development (ibid).

5.3 Reform, governance and the CCP

Before 1978 and the start of the economic reforms in China, the country was in a stage of under-urbanization (Zhao et al., 2003). Since the economic reforms were introduced in 1978, the urban system in China has experienced remarkable growth and a rapid rise of urbanization levels (Zhang & Zhao, 1998; Zhao et al., 2003). The process of economic reform evolved as a result of political necessity after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Chinese leaders enacted policies designed to stimulate national economic growth, and to shore up legitimacy for the CCP (Breznitz & Murphree, 2011).

Deng Xiaoping initially led China’s reform era, and introduced new policies of reform and opening of China to the surrounding world (Bo, 2013). The reform era that started in 1978 has meant a lot of changes in China and its cities, such as decentralization of decision-making and fiscal powers from the central to local governments, privatization of urban enterprises and housing, and marketization of urban land-use rights, to mention a few (Ma, 2004).

These processes have been played out through intricate interactions of various key actors, such as central and local governments, property developers and city planners (Ma, 2004). However, ordinary citizens have not been amongst the actors (re-)shaping China’s urban space, and have been found only at the receiving end of the transformation process (ibid). During the era of reform, decentralization has been a powerful incentive for localities (especially in the coastal provinces) to pursue marketization and local economic growth (Lai, 2013). The first form of decentralization occurred from 1979, when the green
light was given to the establishment of the first Special Economic Zones in Fujian and Guangdong, allowing the two provinces to adopt ‘special policies and flexible measures’ (ibid).

In contemporary China, the Chinese government promotes a dual economic structure and encourages a rather open market economy, referred to as ‘a market economy with socialist characteristics’ (Berkowitz et al., 2007). However, entrepreneurial governance is constrained due to the heritage of state socialism and the robust immersion of the state in the construction and implementation of local development strategies (Xu & Yeh, 2005).

An obvious difference between China and the West is the pervasiveness of a strong state in China (Tang, 2014). Party-state power extends to all spheres of the nation, including politics, economy, culture and social life etc. (Guo, 2013). The party-state in China has been more focused on building socialism with nationalism, than with capital accumulation alone (Lin, 2006; Tang, 2014). The way China has governed its economy and society is thus depicted as very different from the West (Tang, 2014).

China is also different from the West in that it has been uninstitutionalized repeatedly (Breznitz & Murphree, 2011). Mao fought institutionalization, and Chinese policymaking and implementation has since been highly personalized and different from the bureaucratic, professional and routinized procedures idealized by Weber, for example (ibid). However, China is converging in many ways with the West in terms of social and technical norms; yet there is a hunger in the PRC for indigenous Chinese political and cultural models that differ from models developed in America and Europe (Callahan, 2013).

The political and institutional setting in China differs to that in the West, for example in that Chinese city leaders have economic power, whereas political power remains with the central government (Chien, 2010). City leaders in China are moreover promoted and praised based on their performance in the city, a performance that often is measured in terms of economic growth (ibid). This can be interpreted as an indicator that in Chinese cities much focus is still on boosting the economy, rather than considering other dimensions such as culture, well-being of citizens and the environment, and that place branding is used primarily for economic purposes.

The governance structure in China consists of three major elements, namely the legislative structure, the State Council and the provincial administration. The State Council is the executive organ of state power at the national level, and consists of a premier, vice-premiers, state councillors and ministers responsible for different ministries and commissions (Bo, 2013). The Chinese model has adhered to the notion of a single centralized power, and the power
of the state in China has never declined (Kosuge, 2012). However, it has rescaled in favour of local units; a rescaling of power which has greatly enhanced the ability of the cities to shape local events (Ma, 2004). Decentralization of the power of land disposal and greater flexibility at the city level has, for example, led to the rise of competitiveness in Chinese cities (Xu & Yeh, 2005).

Relations between the national and city levels have been, and still are, central to China’s economic development and in the implementation of policies (Lai, 2013). Central–local relations have been described as highlighting a captivating puzzle in public administration, and a matter of great importance to comprehend the Chinese polity (Li, 2013). Furthermore, the movements towards centralization or decentralization have been depicted as the main ‘contradictions’ that are driving policy and political developments in China (ibid).

In the 2000s, there was a sudden increase in strategic planning in China, reflecting ‘the shift of city planning from a resource allocation tool to a development instrument’ (Wu, 2015, p. 113). This change has been interpreted as a result of the strengthened role of the local government in reaching its development targets. Local governments perceived the orthodox master planning approach as top-down and too restraining, and the strategic plan was consequently invented, reflecting an aspiration to enhance economic competitiveness and outbid competitors. However, the main purpose of the strategic plan was place promotion (Wu, 2015), or, the ‘strategic plan helps to produce a set of discourses that fit the requirements of place promotion’ (ibid, p. 109).

The making of the strategic plan includes international planning prize awards along with various publicity events, attracting wide media attention, which raises local pride and confidence in the strategic plan, and is referred to by Wu (2015) as place promotion more than city planning. The production of strategic plans also provides the local leader with influence over development plans, and the city strategy can also be used to influence the urban master plan (Wu, 2015). Furthermore, Wu (2015) suggests that the strategic plan pays attention to governance, and at times suggests innovations and institutional changes needed to realize the vision. It also proposes concrete ideas on adjustments of administrative structures (Wu, 2015).

Chinese cities are influenced by China’s Five-Year Plans. The first Five-Year Plan began in 1953, and the most recent plans include the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) (Callahan, 2013) and the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) (Xinhua, 2015). In China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, the CCP called for steady efforts to build a prosperous and environmentally friendly society to boost cultural development and make steps to deepen reform and opening-up (CCTV, 2010). Within the scope of the 12th Five-Year Plan, the aim was furthermore to maintain stable and relatively fast economic growth, keep prices
stable, create more jobs and boost the quality of economic growth (China.org.cn, 2010). In China’s 13th Five-Year Plan, the nation will strive to improve the environment and stick to green development (Xinhua, 2015). The Plan also holds that China should feature slower, healthier economic growth, restructure the economy and shift to an innovation-driven model (ibid).

The CCP has been described as one of the most difficult political forces in the contemporary world to understand and categorize (Brown, 2013). The CCP is secretive regarding its budget, and its inner decision-making processes are inadequately understood (ibid), which has impelled some commentators to say that the CCP has more in common with multinational businesses than a political party (McGregor, 2010, in Brown, 2013). The CCP has followed Leninist and Marxist principles to create a ‘vanguard party’, modelled on the Leninist party in the former Soviet Union (Guo, 2013). The CCP is dominant in all governance structures of the PRC (Bo, 2013), and is also the world’s largest political party with 80 million members, yet it has little in common with political parties in liberal democracies (Brown, 2013). The Politburo, and especially its Standing Committee, is the most powerful organ of the CCP (Bo, 2013).

The CCP was the power centre in Chinese politics in Mao’s China, and is also the centre of power today (Guo, 2013). The search for national stability has been dominant amongst Chinese élites both before and during the era of the CCP (Ogden, 2013). During its rule, the CCP has marked a continuance with the past, and has focused on control to ensure stability, seen in state ownership for example, a command economy and administration through a centralized and hierarchical power structure based on a one-party state (ibid).

The CCP occupies a privileged domain of politics compared to all other institutions in Chinese society, and articulates its role as the ‘political leadership of the country’ (Brown, 2013). The CCP declares that it is the solitary political organization authorized to represent the real interests of the Chinese population and ‘claims a special ability to interpret what is in the best interest of the nation and the citizens who reside within it’ (Saich, 2013, p. 109). The CCP has tried to create a narrative and extend the reach of the state into the lives of Chinese all over the nation. The CCP presents itself as:

A broad church, reformist in essence, and with legitimacy derived from its narrative of historical struggle unifying the country after the devastation of the early 20th century (Brown, 2013, p. 11).

The CCP and the state are closely interwoven and their functions are included in one body, with the CCP having a dominant role, controlling all sectors of the state. The CCP is the centre of power whereas the government’s function is to implement the Party’s political guidelines and policies (Guo, 2013). The
guidelines and policies from the CCP set the national goal, justify the means to realize or achieve it and provide bases for government policies (ibid).

It has been stated that China’s membership of the World Trade Organization, its successful Olympic bid and the subsequent hosting of the Olympic Games in 2008, the launch of the manned space mission in 2003, the organization of the Shanghai World Expo in 2010 and the steady growth of the Chinese economy have generated pride amongst Chinese and faith in the CCP’s chosen path of development (Barabantseva, 2013). However, the information revolution has also led to an increased questioning of the CCP. In China, there is a long tradition of managing information to make sure that the CCP is the primary or sole provider of information (Wang, 2008). The information revolution and the need for information that is distributed reliably and at high speed imply great challenges for governance (Saich, 2013), especially as the urban Chinese elites have become part of a global information community who refuse to be spoon-fed information as children, or hearing only good news (Wang, 2008).

Xi Jinping is the current General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. He is also President of the nation and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Xi Jinping has been depicted as a self-confident leader with the potential to make bold decisions (Callahan, 2013). Xi has also been depicted as the Communist Party’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping (Ljunggren, 2015). The Economist (2016b) wrote that President Xi Jinping has acquired more power than any Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, and claimed that the crackdown on critics is extensive. Others have claimed that China has become more closed under Xi’s leadership (Svenska Dagbladet, 2017). Ringen (2016) has stated that China, under Xi’s leadership, has turned to more use of control, intensified repression, streamlined and centralized power structures, extended the role of the Party and reverted to Maoist traditions of propaganda and political education. Xi Jinping has moreover broken the CCP’s ban on personality cults; a ban that was introduced in 1982 to avert another episode of Maoist madness (The Economist, 2016b). Official media often refer to Xi using flattering terms such as ‘Uncle Xi’, and a ‘mini-cult’ has started growing up around him (ibid).

From the beginning of the post-Mao reform period (1978–1979), China experienced a noticeable worsening of corruption. Whereas during the Maoist period a lot of the corruption involved relatively low-ranking officials and took place at ‘street level’, in recent years, government ministers, members of the provincial government and Party apparatus, senior bureaucrats and even members of the Politburo have been prosecuted for corruption (Wedeman, 2013). At the end of 2012, following conclusion of the 18th National Congress for the CCP, Xi Jinping and the CCP launched a high-profile anti-corruption campaign (South China Morning Post, 2016a). Four years after the launch of the
campaign, the powerful Central Commission for Discipline Inspection announced that almost 1.2 million people had been punished in the campaign. It has also been reported that Xi’s ‘war on corruption’ was of an intensity not witnessed since the Party came to power in 1949 (The Economist, 2016b).
6. The branding of five Chinese mega-cities

In this chapter, I present and discuss the five Chinese mega-cities studied in the wider context of history, economy and politics. However, the main focus of the description is on the place branding activities and imagery used in the cities. As such, this chapter primarily addresses RQ1 and, thus, ‘What imagery is used in the branding of Chinese mega-cities?’ I present the cities studied in the following order: Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chengdu and Chongqing.

6.1 Beijing: The centre of political power

![Beijing's location in China and a logo promoting Beijing as a travel destination. Beijing does not have an official logo, which, for example, can be explained by the city's weak sense of branding, according to a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (160, 2012).]

6.1.1 Political centre and window of the nation

The name Beijing (北京) means northern capital, and the city is located in the northeast part of China. Beijing has a history dating back 3,000 years, and a deeply rooted past as a political centre over eight centuries (Zhang & Zhao, 2009). Beijing has not been a traditional trade and economic centre within China (Wei & Yu, 2006), but rather served as a political and cultural hub as well as an educational and scientific centre (Li, Bray-Novoy & Kong, 2007). Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Beijing has been China’s official capital, and has been established as the political and cultural centre of the nation (Jun, 2005; Li, et al., 2007).
During the Communist revolution and at the time of the founding of the PRC in 1949, Beijing was an underdeveloped city compared to Shanghai and Hong Kong. Beijing started transforming after the Mao government in 1949 established the city as the capital of China (Green, 2010). After arriving in Beijing in 1949, Mao started turning Beijing into an industrial centre, and even remarked that he wanted to see factory smokestacks everywhere in the capital. During Mao’s leadership, Beijing became the second-largest industrial centre in China, after Shanghai (Li, et al. 2007).

After Mao’s death, and in the early stages of the economic reforms that started in 1978, the economic status of Beijing changed little because much of the initial policies were aimed at cities in southern China (Green, 2010). Heavy manufacturing was the focus for Beijing’s industrial structure, and the city was unable to shift its economic focus towards export-oriented light manufacturing – the Chinese authorities did not want to risk economic experimentation in the early stages of reform in a city as important as Beijing (Wei & Yu 2006). Beijing’s economic growth during the 1980s was, as a consequence, relatively modest. However, since 1990, Beijing has experienced significant economic growth (Green, 2010) and is today one of China’s most developed cities.

Today, Beijing has a population of about 21 million, and is one of the most populous cities in the world. The city is governed as a direct-controlled municipality under the national government, and consists of 16 urban and suburban districts. The infrastructure and transportation system of Beijing is extensively developed, making Beijing an important transportation hub in north China. The architecture in Beijing comprises both the traditional architecture of imperial China, Soviet-inspired box-like buildings built between the 1950s and the 1970s, and modern and neo-futuristic architecture. The development and expansion of the city has led to various problems for Beijing, including pollution and poor air quality.

A researcher at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CASS; I53, 2011) said that Beijing is often regarded as a political city and a political centre, and that sometimes being a political centre can pose problems when it comes to city branding, since political disputes can influence the city brand negatively. Another researcher at CASS (I51, 2011) argued similarly that, by being the capital and a political centre, Beijing has a rather cold city image. Being the capital city, Beijing is also a token of China and a sign of the national image, especially for an international audience, the same respondent maintained (I51, 2011). Another respondent and researcher, at Renmin University (I56, 2012), said that the name ‘Beijing’ does not just represent a city; it represents China. These statements are in line with Sevin and Björner’s (2015) study of international media portrayals of Beijing, showing that almost half of the media coverage of Beijing relates to China as a nation or the Chinese government, rather than the city of Beijing.
In the words of an official in the Publicity Department of Beijing Municipal Government (I31, 2012), ‘Beijing is the window of the nation’. Another official, at the Capital Institute of Social and Economic Development (CISED), Beijing Municipal Government (I29, 2012) said that, because of the close symbolic connection between Beijing and China, Beijing’s city branding is closely tied with the branding of China as a nation, and furthermore stated:

When Beijing proposed to be a world city, this was in close connection with China; with China’s rapid development and strengthened position in the world. So, Beijing is aiming to be a world city, in parallel with China’s development and global aspirations (Government official, CISED, Beijing Municipal Government, I29, 2012).

6.1.2 Creating a global innovation centre

During the leadership of Mao Zedong, Beijing’s global economic ties were minimal (Green, 2010). However, starting from the 1990s, urban planners and scholars in the capital began promoting efforts to make Beijing a global city (Wei & Yu, 2006). The state also started to see the advantages of an increasingly globalized Beijing, and municipal and central government officials started to undertake measures to reach this goal (ibid). Green (2010) sheds light on three strategies that have benefited Beijing in terms of the city’s economic and urban development: the ambition to become a global city, including foreign investment; the establishment of a high-tech sector; and hosting the Olympic Games in 2008.

Enhancing the level of foreign investments has moreover been recognized as central by officials in Beijing to meet the global city vision (Wei & Yu, 2006), and has resulted in efforts not only to showcase the city as the political capital of the PRC, but also as an economic centre with great potential. One step in this direction was when the central government in 1995 afforded Beijing with preferential policy treatment by granting it the same benefits as an ‘Open Coastal City’, making it more attractive for foreign investors (Green, 2010).

According to various respondents, including a researcher at Beijing Forestry University with expertise on the branding of Beijing as a technological centre (I57, 2012), Beijing’s focus on attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) belongs more to the past than to the present. Or, as stated by a Swedish practitioner at Business Sweden in Beijing (I44, 2012), regarding the firms that Beijing wants to attract, and tied to the 12th Five-Year Plan:
The industries that Beijing is especially interested in attracting today are mainly companies focusing on infrastructure projects, energy, the environment and ICT. The 12th Five-Year Plan influences the type of companies that Beijing wants to attract, and includes companies focusing on environmental technology, energy-efficient solutions and new materials. The aim of both Beijing and China is to move up the value chain, so anything that contributes to that, like innovation, is desired (Practitioner, Business Sweden, 1–4, 2012).

Development of a high-tech sector in Beijing has also been important for the city, and has given Beijing comparative advantage over other Chinese cities (Green, 2010). In the Master Plan of Beijing (1991–2010), the Municipal Government announced that Beijing’s industrial development should focus on high-tech and value-added industries (Wei & Yu, 2006). One respondent, the researcher at Beijing Forestry University (157, 2012), said that Beijing has set the vision of becoming a global innovation centre with a certain focus on concepts such as ‘high-tech Beijing’ and ‘innovative spirit’.

An official at the Information Office, Beijing Municipal Government (C1, 2013) moreover said that an innovative spirit has been promoted in Beijing, encouraging people living in the city to be innovative, since innovative people can help Beijing to become a better city. The researcher with expertise on the branding of Beijing as a technological centre (157, 2012) discussed elements that could contribute to Beijing becoming a global innovation centre, exemplifying research institutes and universities, students and researchers, intelligent clusters and Zhongguancun (ZGC) Science Park. Yusuf and Nabeshima (2010) have similarly maintained that Beijing has taken advantage of the proximity to universities and research institutions in the city when developing its research-intensive industries and high-tech sector.

![Image](image.jpg)

On its own website, Zhongguancun, in northwest Beijing, is described as a famous science and technology area, and referred to as China’s Silicon Valley (Zhongguancun Science Park, 2013). ZGC has been depicted by others as a prime example of Beijing’s high-tech development (Yusuf & Nabeshima, 2010), and is regarded as the leading technological and most innovative region in China with a high concentration of scientific and technological institutions and intellectual resources (Liefner, Hennemann & Xin, 2006). However, since these statements were made, much has happened in China, and ZGC has received plenty of competition from other science parks. According to UNESCO (2016), China had 82 science parks in 2016.

Beijing’s master plan for 1991 to 2010 stated the goal that, by the 50th anniversary of the PRC in 1999, Beijing should be an international city ‘open in all aspects’, and that it should become a modernized international city of the first rank between 2010 and 2050 (Gu & Cook, 2011). At the end of 2001, Beijing proposed revising the plan, resulting in a modified plan for the period 2004–2020, which was approved by the State Council in 2005 (Orgnets, 2015). In the words of an official at the Capital Institute of Social and Economic Development, Beijing Municipal Government (I29, 2012), the new objectives, or four city visions, included a capital city, an international or global city, a famous cultural centre and a liveable city. The overall aim in Beijing was moreover to present a modern, cosmopolitan and people-based city that could impact the world (Zhang & Zhao, 2009). A researcher at Tsinghua University, with much experience of working both academically and practically with city branding in China (I63, 2014), referred to Beijing’s vision, and similarly stated that the vision is to create a national political centre, cultural centre, international exchange centre and science and technology centre.

Intertwined with the economic, global and innovative discourse is a focus on creativity in city branding. One respondent, a practitioner with a focus on cultural and creative industries in Beijing (I40, 2012), argued that creativity is a keyword at the heart of Beijing’s city branding and city development. Another respondent, a researcher at Renmin University, with a focus on cultural industries and city branding (I56, 2012), tied creativity to an economic apparatus when stating that the creative industries and the creative economy were recognized as a growth motor for Beijing by the city government in 2005, and were regarded as more important than factories and manufacturing industries. The same person moreover argued that, in 2005, Beijing was repositioned as a famous cultural centre, and the creative and cultural industries have since had key roles in the city. The focus on cultural and creative industries in Beijing, and in other Chinese cities, can be related to the central government’s great emphasis on these focus areas in its 12th Five-Year Plan, discussed by various respondents, including the practitioner focusing on cultural industries in Beijing (I40, 2012).
According to Wei and Yu (2006), the Chinese government has made major efforts to brand Beijing as a global city. In the words of an official at CISED, Beijing Municipal Government (I29, 2012), the vision of becoming a global city and an international city has also been connected to Beijing’s ambition to be a ‘World City with Chinese Characteristics’. Beijing’s aim of becoming a world city was described by one respondent, a researcher at Beijing Forestry University (I48, 2011), as being about reaching the same standards as established world cities, and benchmarking against cities such as New York, London, Tokyo, Paris and Hong Kong, in terms of international coverage and number of international companies, for example. The branding of Beijing as a world city has been regarded as one way to speed up the pace of transition to an international city (Yao & Shi, 2012). One respondent, a researcher at CASS, with much insight into city branding in China (I51, 2011), said:

The world city vision is not merely a dream, but more of an existing plan and a concrete project. Beijing has the world city as its project, and thus the plan to become a world city (Researcher, CASS, I51, 2011).

Beijing’s focus on being an international, global city has been described by Zhang and Zhao (2009) as an effort to reposition Beijing as a participant in the global city system. Moreover, Beijing’s development goal is to attain the rank of world city status by 2050, and by then to be a sustainable city with economic, social and ecological coordination (Yao & Shi, 2012).

However, a big problem for Beijing’s city image, with negative consequences for residents and visitors, and something the city must come to terms with, is the air pollution, emphasized by a researcher and a practitioner at the Communication University of China who were engaged in both academic and practical work with regards to city branding in China (I47, 2014; I62, 2014). Beijing has for many years suffered from serious air pollution, caused by motor vehicles, coal burning in neighbouring regions, local construction dust and dust storms from the north (South China Morning Post, 2017). Moreover, in a China Daily (2014a) article it was stated that ‘The heavy smog in Beijing last week has once again focused attention on the city’s air pollution’.

To come to terms with the polluted environment, Beijing Municipal Government is working to change Beijing into a ‘healthy city’ and a ‘liveable city’, as stated by two officials working with these issues at the Research office and the Capital Institute of Social and Economic Development at Beijing Municipal Government. The same respondents also stated that creating a healthy city is discussed in Beijing’s 12th Five-Year Plan, focusing on coming to terms with pollution, unemployment and the growing elderly population. Beijing’s ‘liveable city’ objective has been regarded as a manifestation of an environmentally friendly and socially harmonious Beijing (Zhang & Zhao, 2009).
However, there is still a long way to go before Beijing can claim to be a liveable, healthy city, and be branded, in an authentic manner, as such.

6.1.3 Centrality of the Beijing Olympics

The hosting of large events was described by some respondents as crucial, including an official at the Information Centre in the Foreign Affairs Office, Beijing Municipal Government (I30, 2012) and a researcher at CASS (I51, 2011), when discussing the branding of Beijing, both in terms of boosting city image and in emphasizing the importance of city branding practices. The researcher at CASS (I51, 2011) moreover said that the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing was the first major event involving city branding notions, and resulted in increased importance attributed to city branding practices in the city.

On 13 July 2001, Beijing was awarded the right to host the Olympic Games (Zhang & Zhao, 2009) and in the summer of 2008, Beijing duly hosted the Summer Olympics and the Paralympic Games (Knight, 2008). The Beijing Olympics had a similar effect to the Asian Games, resulting in increased efforts to brand Beijing, as stated by an official at the Information Centre, Foreign Affairs Office, Beijing Municipal Government (I30, 2012). Furthermore, the researcher from the CASS referred to above (I51, 2011) pointed out:

> During the Olympic Games and before that the Asian Games, Beijing gained knowledge about city branding. This started mainly in 1999 when Beijing applied for the Olympic Games. Professional teams were hired, for example advertising consultancies and professional committees from China and abroad (Researcher, CASS, I51, 2011).

While the branding initiatives taken in Beijing around the time of the Olympic Games were not unique compared with branding practices implemented elsewhere, it was a state-led, top-down process (Zhang & Zhao, 2009). The branding strategy used during the 2008 Beijing Olympics was to publicize the city’s accomplishments and minimize the spreading of negative images and controversial issues. Moreover, focus was steered towards Beijing’s historical legacy, the city’s hospitality and new developments (ibid).

One respondent, a researcher at CASS, with a focus on festival and event planning and festival tourism (I60, 2012), said that the Olympic Games was a political event much more than an economic event. The same person argued that large events such as the Olympic Games and the Asian Games can be especially helpful in raising the image of a city. Another respondent and researcher, also at CASS (I52, 2011), said that the Olympic Games was largely used to market China and Beijing. Furthermore, another respondent, a researcher at the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing
(I50, 2011), similarly stated that political reputation is a key driver in the organization of large events, and is more important than economic effects:

The central government pays more attention to the political reputation of the whole country. Even for the Beijing Municipal Government they spend a lot of money to arrange events. They pay no attention to the economic effects, only to political reputation (Researcher, University of International Business and Economics in Beijing, I50, 2011).

Previous studies support such arguments. Broudehoux (2007), for example, argues that the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games were arranged under the pretence of a global event aimed at boosting Beijing’s economy, yet had an underlying political agenda aimed at consolidating the state’s monopoly over power while making it easier to rule over a tame, unorganized and distracted population. Chen (2012) also emphasized the political intentions of the Olympic Games, arguing that they were largely targeting internal audiences or the Chinese population with a central aim being to legitimize the political regime.

Main slogans and themes used during the Olympic Games included ‘One World, One Dream’, ‘New Beijing, Great Olympics’ and ‘Beijing Welcomes You’. In addition, there were three key concepts, namely ‘green’, technology, and civilized Beijing, or ‘Green Olympics’, ‘High-tech Olympics’ and ‘People’s Olympics’. This was told by two researchers, one at Beijing Forestry University (I48, 2011) and one at the University of International Business and Economics (I50, 2011) as well as a practitioner with insights into Beijing’s city branding (I40, 2012). What they told me is in line with Zhang and Zhao’s (2009) findings related to the Olympics, as well as the Official Report of the Beijing Olympic Games (ORBOG, 2008). The logo and theme slogans also articulated Beijing as a ‘harmonious member of the international family, sharing the same vision with other international members’ (Zhang & Zhao, 2009, p. 248). Tying into a global narrative, Beijing was also, at the time of the Olympics, branded as a friendly global city with enduring civilization that embraced modernity (Zhang & Zhao, 2009).

One respondent, a Beijing resident working in education (I37, 2011), said that many Beijing residents felt proud to be able to welcome people from all over the world. Moreover, the Games were seen by a researcher at Beijing Forestry University (I49, 2011) as creating involvement and engagement amongst Beijing locals, over and above pride. An official at the Capital Institute of Social and Economic Development, Beijing Municipal Government (I29, 2012) said that the Olympics also influenced Beijing’s development and city infrastructure. As part of the planning for the Olympics, and in order to improve the environment and limit pollution, many factories moved out of Beijing, and the
Games consequently became a driving force for Beijing to realize an economic industry structure transformation, as told by a researcher at Renmin University (I56, 2012).

On another positive note, Zhang and Zhao (2009) similarly claimed that Beijing’s city identities at the time of the Games were branded materially through the construction of infrastructure and landmark buildings, and symbolically through the logo, theme slogans and mascots. The same scholars also criticized the mismatch between the core values and identity branded by the government and the realities experienced by residents and visitors.

Broudehoux (2007) has emphasized those groups who were excluded from the vision of the Olympics and from Beijing’s official new image, presented as the realization of a dream to see China’s pride restored, arguing that, for those excluded from this representation, the dream turned into a nightmare of betrayed hopes, injustice and despair. Moreover, Broudehoux stated that the monumental projects and the patriotic recuperation that the Olympics incorporated acted as an ‘intoxicating spectacle to pacify the population, weaken its resistance, and erode its capacity to react’ (p. 393). Additional critique focused on the preparatory phase of the Olympics and the demolition of entire sections of hutongs, or historic neighbourhoods, along with the massive rebranding of Beijing and China (Berkowitz et al., 2007).

An official at the Capital Institute of Social and Economic Development in Beijing Municipal Government (I29, 2012) said that the Olympics greatly boosted the globalization of Beijing, and that Beijing became better known around the world though the Games. Along the same lines, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, studying festivals and events (I60, 2012) claimed that the Olympics impacted and even ‘changed the world’s view on China’, statements that could be viewed with some scepticism.

Nevertheless, it is certain that the Olympic Games attracted global media attention, as illustrated in a study by Sevin and Björner (2015) which found that the number of articles published about Beijing in selected international media were, due to the Games, higher in 2008 compared with following years. Zhang and Zhao (2009) point out that even though an event such as the Olympic Games can generate worldwide attention and global influence, city branding is a long-term process, and the branding opportunities provided by a mega-event like the 2008 Beijing Olympics constitute only a fractional part of the whole process.
After the 2008 Olympic Games, three key concepts were created to brand Beijing, namely humanistic, green and high-tech (Government official, 131, 2012). Since the 2008 Olympic Games, Beijing has also focused more efforts on developing and brandishing the city based on urban design. This has resulted in a lot of new styles, attractions and buildings such as the headquarters of China Central Television (CCTV), a 234-metre high, 44-storey skyscraper nicknamed ‘Big shorts’. The focus on new design has been coupled with recognition of local values as well as Chinese and Beijing culture (Researcher, Renmin University, 156, 2012).

The government began to recognize and treasure its local values; the Chinese culture and the culture of Beijing; and they began to rebuild Beijing’s city image through urban design (Researcher, 156, 2012).

The branding of Beijing has incorporated both physical reconstruction of the city and semantic promotion of certain qualities of the city (Zhang & Zhao, 2009), as well as existing material and non-material elements. Amongst the material elements emphasized as central in Beijing were the six world cultural heritage sites. Non-material cultural heritage mentioned included, for example, the ‘Beijing Opera’ (Researcher, 156, 2012). City symbols discussed included the Great Wall, Tiananmen Square, the Temple of Heaven, the Zhongguancun cluster and Olympic venues like Beijing National Stadium – the Bird’s Nest (Practitioner, 149, 2012).

6.1.4 From Beijing Spirit to Chinese Dream

A central element in descriptions of Beijing and the branding of the capital is reference to history and culture, emphasized by various respondents. For example, an official at the Capital Institute of Social and Economic Development, Beijing Municipal Government (129, 2012) said that words used to describe Beijing included ‘old, ancient city with a long history’. Another official, at the Information office, Beijing Municipal Government (C1, 2013), said that Beijing is ‘a city of Asian tradition and dynamic spirit’, whereas a researcher based at Tsinghua University and with a focus on city branding (C10, 2013),
described Beijing as ‘a treasure of world heritage’. Beijing’s aim to become a ‘famous cultural entity’ has been interpreted by Zhang and Zhao (2009) as a reflection of Beijing’s ambition to emphasize its historical culture and to accommodate a diversity of cultures.

The historical and cultural connections illustrated here, in terms of Beijing’s city branding, is combined with a strong future orientation and depictions of a modern city that is developing rapidly, as stated by an official at the Capital Institute of Social and Economic Development, Beijing Municipal Government (I29, 2012). Beijing’s brand was described by another respondent, a researcher at Renmin University (I56, 2012), as an interesting mix of both traditional and political and, at the same time, modern, creative and active. In Beijing’s Official Guide (2012), Beijing is moreover described as a treasure house of ancient Chinese culture and a city with a very promising future. The capital is also branded as a city of contrasts, encapsulating both imperial history and sizzling creative energy. Beijing’s deep roots are said to be all around, whereas its residents are described as living on the cutting edge of change (ibid).

A central city branding campaign carried out at the time of the fieldwork of this study, ‘Beijing Spirit’, similarly contained clear references to history and the future. The Beijing Spirit (北京精神) campaign was announced in November 2011, with the aim of symbolizing Beijing’s identity. Beijing Spirit includes four keywords: patriotism (爱国), innovation (创新), inclusiveness (包容) and virtue (厚德) (Government Bulletin, 2013). One respondent, an official at the Publicity Department, Beijing Municipal Government (I31, 2012) who was involved in the campaign and positive towards it, elaborated on some of the ideas behind the Spirit, and said:

Beijing Spirit is passed down from the past, from people a long time ago. Beijing Spirit depicts the future, based on history. You can see the past, the present and the future in Beijing. The city’s spirit is the spirit of people in the city; their dreams and visions (Government official, Publicity Department, Beijing Municipal Government, I31, 2012).
The same official said that all kinds of people proposed ideas about the creation of Beijing Spirit, and stated that citizens could vote for the Spirit that they thought represented themselves and Beijing via various channels such as the internet, regular mail and telephone. Moreover, Beijing citizens were said to be ‘really enthusiastic about the process’, according to the official in the Publicity Department (I31, 2012). Everyone agreed, however, that Beijing Spirit was the spirit of Beijing citizens, and another respondent, a practitioner working with communication and city branding (I45, 2012), saw the Spirit as a political slogan, and said:

The Beijing Spirit is interesting as it reflects that China is in transition. In essence, it’s a political slogan, but the government wants to project an image that the slogan is supported by regular people – that’s the image they want to show. But I don’t think residents have strong emotions towards the Spirit (Practitioner working with communication and city branding, I45, 2012).

In November 2011, Beijing’s mayor held a meeting to present Beijing Spirit. According to the official in the Publicity Department (I31, 2012), eight people representing Beijing citizens were also present, including a table tennis champion, a primary school student, a person from a minority group, a person with Southeast Asian origin, a singer and a senior citizen. At the launch of Beijing Spirit, it was stated that a country needs a great national spirit and so does a city (Raqsoft, 2013). The official from the Publicity Department said that, in order to utilize and let citizens know the Spirit, the government produced documentaries, songs and kindergarten storybooks. Ambassadors were given the Beijing Spirit books, and the Spirit was furthermore communicated using printed logos and slogans at subways and around the city, as well as through short spots on TV, stating:

Beijing citizens should understand and memorize the Spirit; know the words, for example patriotism, and then take action; really love their city. Since Beijing is China’s capital, patriotism is important. You should first love your country, then love your family (Government official, Publicity Department, Beijing Municipal Government, I31, 2012).

A researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (I113, 2012) was sceptical about the Spirit and argued for more development of it and increased anchoring amongst Beijing residents. The same person claimed that a city spirit or city identity must be well founded amongst the wider public and citizens and needs to have legitimacy gained, for example, via questionnaires and public hearings. Another researcher, based at Tsinghua University, with much insight into city branding in China (I58, 2012), was also critical of Beijing Spirit, and argued that the Spirit was politically related and more of a propaganda campaign than city branding. The same respondent expressed critique towards the style of the Beijing Spirit campaign, which included red banners with the words Beijing Spirit, along with the four keywords, put up
all around the city. The researcher in question was critical of the Spirit’s communicative style, which seemed to be borrowed from a bygone age, some 30 years ago, and thus largely misaligned with Beijing’s ambition to be an innovative, world city (Researcher, I58, 2012).

In 2012, the Beijing Spirit campaign could be seen all over the city, whereas in 2014, the campaign was not promoted anymore. One respondent, an official in the Publicity Department, Beijing Municipal Government (I36, 2014) said at the end of 2014 that, now, no one talks about the Spirit anymore, and that the Spirit was not very successful, as it was difficult to tell stories about it. The same respondent claimed that Beijing’s Publicity Department had shifted its communication focus instead to the Chinese Dream, and said that there was a general conception that the Chinese Dream ‘has more stories’. By the end of 2014, Beijing’s Publicity Department had consequently switched focus towards telling stories about people’s dreams, and all events arranged by the Publicity Department moreover included the word ‘dream’. The official in the Publicity Department (I36, 2014) also said that the new image of Beijing was related to the new image of China, and Xi’s ‘Chinese dream’.

The use of stories and storytelling in Beijing’s city branding ties into statements made by an official in the Publicity Department, Beijing Municipal Government (C1, 2013), who said that it is important that Beijing has a key message, and that stories are told – ‘stories that move people, and that people can remember’. Zhang and Zhao (2009) argue that Beijing’s city identities have been expressed in a way that could be called ‘selective storytelling’, in the sense that certain stories are highlighted whereas others are downplayed. Nevertheless, alternative stories from those communicated by the government also influence the place brand, as stated by a practitioner working with city branding in China (I47, 2014):

Promotional films by Beijing local government show images of a clean and beautiful city – of Beijing’s culture, hutongs and sports. An independent film documentary instead uses images of demolishment, city change, dirty hutongs and class conflicts (Practitioner, I47, 2014).

Tied to notions of participation, the official in the Publicity Department (I36, 2014) said that the government encourages the involvement of various actors in its city branding work, such as residents and representatives of companies and NGOs. The same respondent argued that, some years ago, city branding was the sole responsibility of the government, whereas now we invite more groups to get engaged. For example, in order to better communicate with residents, the government in Beijing has set up a Weibo (microblog) account, according to a researcher at the University of International Business and Economics (I50, 2012), adding, on a critical note, that the government officials in
Beijing still seldom communicate directly with citizens. An official at the Capital Institute of Social and Economic Development, Beijing Municipal Government (129, 2012) said that communication with local citizens is increasing, and held that residents and local firms are often said to be the target groups for Beijing's city branding. However, the same person also stated the opposite, that local populations are largely neglected in city branding.

This increased focus on local populations is only in theory. In reality, it's not the case. Some citizens do not see how being a world city connects to their life. The real audience for Beijing's city marketing is more investors - international and domestic, which is due to the importance that the leaders of the city put on economic development (Government official, 129, 2013).

Synthesis and timeline
I have just depicted Beijing as China's political centre and a window of the nation. I have also illustrated Beijing's focus on innovation and creativity, and its vision to become a world city with Chinese characteristics. The 2008 Beijing Olympics were central in boosting a further focus on city branding, and incorporated economic, cultural, international and political elements or imaginaries, discussed further in Chapter 7. I then also described the Beijing Spirit campaign, its focus on internal audiences, and the shift towards city branding and storytelling containing the word ‘dream’, tying into the Chinese Dream concept. In the timeline presented below, some central elements in the history, development and branding of Beijing are outlined.

Figure 6.1: Timeline including important events in Beijing with regards to the city's history, development and branding.
6.2 Shanghai: The next-generation global city

![Shanghai's location in China and official city emblem](Shanghai Basic Facts, 2014).

6.2.1 Historical ties and international past

There is a country in the East named ‘China’. There is a city in China named ‘Shanghai’. Wave surges as wind blows. Let’s ride the wave and march towards the world (Stories of Vibrant Shanghai, 2011).

This quote hints at the global feature of Shanghai, today and historically. Today, Shanghai is a modern city with a population of about 24 million, located by the Yangtze River Delta on China’s east coast. During China’s modern history, Shanghai has served as the nation’s economic and commercial centre, whereas Beijing has been the political and administrative centre (Green, 2010). The designation of Shanghai as a treaty port in 1842 served as a motivator to develop Shanghai as China’s leading economic centre (ibid). For many years now, Shanghai has served as a financial, economic and trade centre, both in China and in East Asia (Wu & Li, 2002).

Shanghai enjoyed international attention from the nineteenth century, due to European recognition of the city’s economic and trade potential. In the 1930s, Shanghai was the largest and most prosperous Asian city, and in 1936, Shanghai ranked seventh on the list of the largest cities in the world. At that time, no modern Asian city could match Shanghai’s cosmopolitan and sophisticated reputation (Yusuf & Wu, 2002). Due to Shanghai’s position as a cultural and economic centre of East Asia in the early twentieth century, it has been regarded as the birthplace of everything modern in China. In the 1930s, Shanghai was described as Asia’s most sophisticated city, even more so than Tokyo and Hong Kong, being:

As crowded as Calcutta, as decadent as Berlin, as snooty as Paris, and as jazzy as New York (Yenng, 1996, p. 2).
Shanghai did not willingly open up to international population and trade, but was forced to do so in 1842 as a consequence of China being defeated in the First Opium War (Green, 2010). International settlements then formed in the city, and western capitalist institutions were able to take root (Fu, 2002). A concentration of global capital also accumulated in Shanghai, due to a congregation of foreign banks and trust companies in the city (Gu & Tang, 2002). A modernized Shanghai developed due to the inflow of foreign capital, foreign influences and capitalist institutions (Fu, 2002). During the nineteenth century, Shanghai developed a strong industrial sector, producing goods such as silk, cotton, tobacco and flour (Green, 2010). One respondent, a researcher at the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (I25, 2014), emphasized Shanghai’s history as an international city, with 30 per cent of the city’s population being foreigners in the early twentieth century. Two other respondents, a manager of the Nordic Centre in Shanghai (I7, 2010) and a researcher at the School of Management, Fudan University (I13, 2010), said that, historically, Shanghai has been designated as the ‘Paris of the East’, something that Kosuge (2012) has also written about.

However, Shanghai’s status as a cosmopolitan, international centre came to a halt with the start of the Sino–Japanese War in 1937 and World War II shortly thereafter (Green, 2010). In 1937, Japanese forces occupied the Chinese parts of Shanghai, and in 1941, just after the attack on Pearl Harbor, they entered the international settlement. Chaos ensued in the city during the eight years of Japanese occupation, followed by the civil war between the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. As a result, international capital flowed out of the city (Fu 2002). The communist revolution and the founding of the PRC in 1949 meant that the fortunes of Shanghai changed markedly. Prior to the revolution, Shanghai’s urban development had been capital-driven and primarily funded by foreign commercial investors. Shanghai’s relationship with the West was now completely closed, and domestic capital that had existed in the city flowed out too, mainly to Taiwan and Hong Kong. Any remaining capital was nationalized by the state, and Shanghai consequently lost its role as the economic and trade centre of East Asia (ibid).

When economic reforms were initiated in 1978, Shanghai Municipal Government gained a significant degree of freedom from central government. The economic reforms brought about marketization and liberalization, which reopened Shanghai to the global economy, and allowed foreign capital into Shanghai once again (Green, 2010). However, during the first decade of reform and up to 1990, the level of economic growth in Shanghai was below the national average (Gu & Tang, 2002). The first experiments in Chinese economic reform took place in south China, with the development of the four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) (Green, 2010). The central government under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping felt relatively comfortable experimenting
with reform in areas in south China, but did not want to jeopardize the economic status or the social stability of Shanghai (Han 2000; Tian, 1996). As a consequence, Shanghai’s development was hindered through much of the 1980s (Gu & Tang, 2002). In the early 1990s, however, Shanghai’s development began to really take off (Green, 2010). Things started changing especially from 1992 and onwards, when China’s leader Deng Xiaoping put focus on Shanghai, and, in a speech talked about Shanghai as the dragonhead of China, as told by a researcher at Hamburg University with lengthy experience from doing research in China (I115, 2014).

Since the early 1990s, Shanghai’s economic growth has outpaced that of other Chinese cities, and the city’s urban change has been considerable and far-reaching (Green, 2010). Shanghai has, like other cities and areas in the eastern parts of China, grown significantly faster than cities in the western parts of the country, due to preferential policies, sea access and investments from overseas Chinese (Schlevogt, 2000). In 1990, the PRC State Council recognized that the earlier reform policies had handicapped Shanghai’s economic development, and decided to make the city an international economic, financial and trading centre, as it once was (Fu, 2002; Wu & Li, 2002).

A primary factor accounting for the transformation of Shanghai from the early 1990s was the opening of the ‘Pudong New Area’ (Green, 2010). The opening of Pudong has also been described as the main impetus for Shanghai’s reintegration into the global economy. The plans to develop Pudong were made official in 1990 when Premier Li Peng announced the central government’s decision to develop Pudong into China’s largest SEZ (Green, 2010). In the aftermath of the 1989 student demonstration in Tiananmen Square, the opening of Pudong was politically important as it signalled both to Chinese people and the world that China was committed to the path of reform and economic liberalization (Han, 2000). Shanghai’s Pudong New Area has experienced a startling creation from rural farms before 1990 to an ultra-modern high-tech and financial centre today (Ma, 2004). The area now contains many eye-catching buildings that have come to characterize the city. In 2010, one respondent, a researcher at the Department of Urban Planning, Tongji University (I11, 2010), said that many buildings were designed by foreigners, including the Shanghai Grand Theatre, Grand Hyatt Shanghai and Shanghai World Financial Center.

However, the authorities have also decided to conserve some of the old parts of Shanghai such as the Yu Gardens and the neighbouring China Town, as well as the neoclassical colonialist buildings on the Bund (Ooi, 2010). The Bund is a famous road in Shanghai’s Huangpu district, just by the Huangpu river, with a number of famous buildings in neoclassical style, such as Peace Hotel, The Customs House and the HSBC Building. In a book about Shanghai distributed by the Tourism Administration (Stories of Vibrant Shanghai,
2011), it is stated that the Bund has served both as a financial and political centre for the past century, and is now regarded as a modern landmark with a ‘typical Shanghai temperament’. A respondent, the researcher from Tongji University (I11, 2010) talked about Shanghai’s city landscape and said that there is still evidence of Shanghai’s past as a colonial city, and a meeting point between East and West. Another respondent, a Chinese practitioner working at Business Sweden (I8, 2011), also said:

You can see those buildings on the Bund; it’s the evidence that there has been international influence in Shanghai (Practitioner, I8, 2011).

6.2.2 Four centres, metropolitan and global city

From the late 1980s, Shanghai was granted greater freedom to embrace investors, generating a vitalization of ‘New York in Asia’ (Lai, 2013). Rapid redevelopment back to this status has been ongoing since the 1990s. In the early 1990s, the central government implemented a strategy to build Shanghai as ‘the dragonhead’ and hence an international economic, financial and trade centre, with the aim of driving growth in the Yangtze River Delta. Shanghai’s ambition to be the economic centre of China was a symbol of the strength of China’s political ambition and has been described as one of the world’s most rigorous reshapings of a modern city, as if China wanted to construct its own New York from scratch (Kosuge, 2012).

Since the early 1990s, Shanghai’s city vision and related city branding has been tied to creating ‘four international centres’ and a ‘metropolitan city’. One respondent, a researcher at Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences who has been involved in Shanghai’s strategy work (I17, 2012), said that the focus on four international centres and a metropolitan city has been included in Shanghai’s previous Five-Year Plans. In Shanghai’s 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), the city’s main targets included: sustaining economic and social growth at a fast pace; establishing a framework for an international centre of economy, finance, trade and transport; making major progress in the creation of a socialist, modern international metropolis; and making the 2010 World Expo a successful, memorable and splendid event (Shanghai Basic Facts, 2007; Vaide, 2015).

Key objectives outlined in Shanghai’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015), included making major progress in building Shanghai into an international centre for economy, finance, trade and shipping, and a socialist modern international metropolis (Shanghai Basic Facts, 2014), in line with the creation of ‘four international centres’ and a ‘metropolitan city’. Another key goal in Shanghai’s 12th Five-Year Plan was to improve the living quality of citizens. The more detailed targets included, for example: improving the quality and
efficiency of economic development; boosting Shanghai’s initiative in innovation; enhancing living standards for urban and rural residents; improving the ecological environment; and continuing reform and opening-up policy (ibid).

During my fieldwork from 2010 to 2012, various respondents discussed Shanghai’s ambition of creating four international centres and a metropolitan city. One researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS), who was involved in the strategic planning of Shanghai (I17, 2012), said that the four centres – economic, financial, shipping and trade – were not clearly defined, elaborating further:

> When they set the target, the four international centres and metropolitan city, they didn’t give it a detailed content. They basically set up a target, and let the whole process add content to it. Even if you would ask the Mayor of Shanghai about the exact meaning of the metropolitan city, he could not answer what it is (Researcher, I17, 2012).

Another respondent, a researcher at Shanghai International Studies University with insights into Shanghai’s city branding (I19, 2012), similarly critiqued the metropolitan city vision for being too abstract, stating that:

> In terms of branding, we always call Shanghai the big metropolitan city. But this concept is too abstract, and it does not express Shanghai exactly and uniquely (Researcher, I19, 2012).

The researcher at SASS, with involvement in Shanghai’s strategic planning (I17, 2012), nevertheless expressed his own interpretation of the metropolitan city, arguing that it was related to some ‘concrete targets’, including aims to be a smart city as well as an international, cultural metropolitan city. Another respondent, a Chinese practitioner working at Business Sweden in Shanghai (I8, 2011), tied Shanghai’s metropolitan city vision to the target of becoming a centre for high value-added services. When discussing Shanghai’s vision and the creation of ‘four international centres’, an official at the China Development Centre in Beijing (I28, 2011) argued that Shanghai’s vision tied to the four centres was reasonable, since Shanghai has a history as an international city with a busy port and previous engagement in international trade. The creation of four international centres was depicted by the researcher at SASS (I17, 2012) as largely tied to economic imaginaries, rather than cultural or other elements. This, the same person claimed, did not resonate well with many Shanghai residents who see their city first and foremost as a unique cultural city (Researcher, I17, 2012).

Shanghai’s focus on economic elements can be viewed in a wider perspective, including China and the world. As argued by a respondent, a practitioner at Business Sweden in Shanghai (I8, 2011), the market position that Shanghai
wants to have is largely related to economy and finance, and the aim is to be the centre of finance, in China and the world. An official at the Capital Institute of Social and Economic Development, Beijing Municipal Government (I29, 2012), similarly stated that Shanghai’s aim is to be China’s economic centre, saying, ‘Shanghai’s development goal is clear, is very clear. It is to be the country’s economic centre’. By 2017, this goal can be regarded as reached, considering how Shanghai is often referred to as mainland China’s economic and financial centre (e.g. The Economist, 2016a; The China Perspective, 2017; China Trade Research, 2016).

Shanghai’s focus on economic elements can also be tied to FDI. Since the start of the economic reforms, FDI has been central to Shanghai’s development, even more so than in other major Chinese cities (Green, 2010). Since 1990, increasing levels of FDI have also contributed greatly to Shanghai’s integration into the global economy (ibid). The introduction of FDI has moreover impacted the actions of municipal leaders in Shanghai. Since global capital is mobile and beyond the control of government authorities, Shanghai has had to engage in city marketing in competition with cities inside and outside China (Fu, 2002). As part of the marketing of Shanghai, city leaders have made efforts to market Shanghai in an entrepreneurial fashion and to attract global capital by promoting a favourable ‘business climate’ compared to other locations (ibid).

The aim of creating four international centres and a metropolitan city is expected to be completed by 2020, according to a researcher at the Institute of Population Research and the Center for Urban and Regional Studies, Fudan University in Shanghai (I23, 2014). The same respondent said, at the end of 2014, that Shanghai’s current plan is to reorient the city’s future development and become a ‘global city’ by 2050, further elaborating:

The city government and city Communist Party both take it as a very serious political task, and also see it as very important to reorient the city’s future development. And, as we know, the last time the city government took that kind of discussion was in 1990, to orient Shanghai’s future development into four centres and a metropolitan city (Researcher, Fudan University, I23, 2014).

The same respondent said that the plan is to create a global city amongst the new generation of global cities, which, he emphasized, implies a focus not only on being an economic and financial centre, but also an emphasis on culture, the environment and a socially well-developed society (I23, 2014). Another researcher, based at the Department of Sociology at Fudan University in Shanghai with insights into the city’s strategic work (I24, 2014), stated that in order to reach Shanghai’s global city vision, a focus on Shanghai’s historical heritage has been emphasized as central. Yet another researcher, based at the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, SASS (I25, 2014), expressed similar
ideas and argued that Shanghai’s global city vision is said to bring Shanghai back to what it used to be, also stating that:

In the 1920s and 1930s, Shanghai was a global city – just after London, Paris and New York – more famous than Tokyo, and more famous than today (Researcher, I25, 2014).

Another respondent, a researcher at Fudan University, who has been involved in the development of Shanghai’s global city vision (I23, 2014), stated that the idea is to align Shanghai’s vision and urban planning with China’s national strategy of creating a well-developed society by 2049, 100 years after the new China was established. Shanghai has however already been depicted by some as a global city. Green (2010), for example, stated that Shanghai has become the prime global city of mainland China.

6.2.3 Innovation, creativity and opening up

Shanghai’s branding and city brand has furthermore centred on opening-up and innovation, as depicted in media (e.g. China Daily Europe, 2014), stated at conferences (e.g. an official at the mayor’s office of Shanghai Municipal Government [C2, 2013]) and as told by respondents (e.g. a researcher at the Center for Urban and Regional Studies at SASS [I25, 2014]). For example, Shanghai’s position as a city at the forefront of opening-up and reform was emphasized by Shanghai’s vice mayor in 2013, and communicated by an official of Shanghai’s mayor’s office (C2, 2013) at the Shanghai Forum the same year. A concrete effort in line with Shanghai’s position and branding as a city of opening-up, reform and innovation, was the launch of China’s first free trade zone, in Shanghai (China Daily Europe, 2014). Moreover, the trade zone was described by China Daily (2014) as a test ground for a number of economic reforms, and aimed to encourage innovation. A Framework Plan for China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (SHFTZ, 2014) stated:

The China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone is a national strategy aiming to expedite the functional transformation of government, explore administrative innovation, stimulate trading and investment facilitation, and accumulate experience on achieving a more open Chinese economy (SHFTZ, 2014).

One respondent, a researcher at the Center for Urban and Regional Studies at SASS (I25, 2014), said that the Shanghai Free Trade Zone has been described as a ‘big thing’ for both China and Shanghai. In the annual report of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS, 2013), the creation of SHFTZ was also depicted as the opening of a new chapter for Shanghai’s innovation-oriented transformation and development. The central government, and especially Premier Li Keqiang, emphasized that China wants to develop Shanghai with an increased focus on innovation and innovative development, according to an official (C2, 2013) from the office of Shanghai’s mayor at the Shanghai
Forum 2013. People’s Daily Online (2013) has similarly written that economic restructuring, driven by innovation, is the path that Shanghai must take to seek sound development, and also referred to Shanghai’s 12th Five-Year Plan and its focus on innovation:

Economic restructuring driven by innovation is one of the key targets for the Municipal Government of Shanghai during the 12th Five-Year Plan period (People’s Daily Online, 2013).

Shanghai has also been branded by the Shanghai Municipal Tourism Association (SMTA) as ‘A City of Innovation’. In a leaflet tied to the campaign, numerous creative city areas as well as design and innovation centres around Shanghai were listed, such as ‘Shanghai Red Town’ and ‘1933 Shanghai’ (Red Town website, 2013; 1933 Shanghai, 2013). Shanghai’s ‘new mission to pioneer innovation’ was also referred to in People’s Daily Online (2013). Connections between innovation and creativity is thus evident, and a researcher at Fudan University in Shanghai (C18, 2013) said that cultural and creative industries are central to the future of Shanghai. Moreover, a manager at the Nordic Centre, Fudan University, Shanghai (I7, 2010) said in 2010 that Shanghai already has many creative hubs.

In a report by the Information office of Shanghai Municipal Government (Shanghai Basic Facts, 2014), it is argued that Shanghai has seen a boom in creative industry. Shanghai Red Town was one of the creative areas promoted under the heading ‘A City of Innovation’, and is a cultural and creative area that has developed into a culture and art centre, from originally being a steel factory, as communicated in Stories of Vibrant Shanghai, produced in 2011 and distributed by the SMTA. Shanghai Red Town is described on its own website as an incubation platform of China’s cultural and creative industries (Red Town website, 2013). Moreover, Stories of Shanghai depicts the area as incorporating a large, green plaza with interesting sculptures, such as ‘12 Legs’, ‘Einstein’, the ‘Galloping Horse’ and the ‘Mechanical Cattle’, as well as culture and art centres open to and interacting with the public. When visiting Red Town in October 2014, I encountered a lawn, or a green plaza, full of people, primarily Chinese, in varying ages, including children and elderly. Some parents and their children were even camping. The atmosphere was calm, and quite different from Shanghai’s busy city life.
Another ‘creative industry park’ in Shanghai is ‘Tianzifang’. This is an area that has been refurbished from old factory buildings and residences to a place full of galleries, studios, bars, restaurants, teahouses and shops, and an area that ‘blends historic elegance and modern elegance’ (Shanghai Basic Facts, 2014, p. 65). Yet another area that combines history and modernity is Xintiandi, which is described by Shanghai Municipality as a tourist attraction and an entertainment complex, imbued with Shanghai’s historical and cultural legacies, showcasing traditional shikumen houses as well as state-of-the-art buildings. Xintiandi has also been described as a place where ‘Shanghai’s rich history meets the modern posh lifestyle’ (Shanghai Basic Facts, 2014, p. 81).

In discussions of Shanghai’s branding as a creative and innovative city, Shanghai’s esteemed universities, such as Fudan, Jiaoting and Tongji University, were mentioned by some respondents, including a manager at the Nordic Centre in Shanghai (I7, 2010). The same person argued that these universities add to an innovative and creative city atmosphere, to the profiling of Shanghai as a talent hub and to the development of the city:

> The very best students study in Shanghai, which is very attractive for companies located in Shanghai. The best universities are also used to produce policies. Professors and students participate in ‘consultancy forums’ with the purpose to develop Shanghai (Manager, Nordic Centre, I7, 2010).

In discussions of Shanghai’s branding as an innovative city, another respondent, a researcher at the Department of Sociology, Fudan University (I24, 2014), mentioned the ‘1000 Talent Plan for High-Level Foreign Experts’, describing it as an initiative from the central government that trickles down to city levels. The government established the 1000 Talent Plan in 2008, with the aim of recruiting outstanding overseas scientists, for example, leading figures qualified to achieve critical technological breakthroughs and people starting their own businesses, all announced on the website created for the plan. The Talent Plan was also tied to national policies of opening-up and reform (1000 Plan, 2015).
6.2.4 2010 Shanghai World Expo

In November 1999, the Chinese government officially decided that Shanghai would bid for the 2010 World Expo, and in December 2002 Shanghai won the bid (World Expo 2010, 2013). The 2010 World Expo was arranged for six months, between May 1 and October 31, 2010. It was arranged along the banks of the Huangpu River between Nanpu Bridge and Lupu Bridge (Shanghai Basic Facts, 2007). The overall theme or slogan for the Expo was ‘Better city, better life’. The meaning of the slogan and the associated brand identity was, according to Shanghai’s Party Secretary, Yu Zhengsheng, to improve the quality of life of residents, and to build a harmonious, international and modern society with traditional Chinese values (Larsen, 2014).

Amongst the respondents in this study, a plausible reason for the choice of the theme ‘Better city, better life’ was given by one person working in communication and PR at the 2010 World Expo (I5, 2010), explained by the difficulties that China is facing today:

The economy is growing very quickly. We have to balance the urban construction and the nature. It’s time to find the answer and way to how to have a better life in the city (Practitioner, I5, 2010).

The slogan was also accompanied by a number of sub-topics, namely diversification of culture, prosperity of the economy, restoration of science and technology, recreation of harmony in urban communities, and interaction between urban and rural areas (Shanghai Basic Facts, 2007). A number of brand identity components were moreover outlined in the World Expo Communication and Promotion Plan, communicated to domestic and international audiences, such as traditional Chinese values, harmonious society, modernity, quality of life and building a better future together (Larsen, 2014).

The official Expo logo was in green, and resembled the Chinese character for ‘world’, shaped as two adults and one child and the number 2010 (Shanghai Basic Facts, 2007). The logo was meant to symbolize ‘Chinese people’s strong
resolution in pursuing a bright future and their passion for achieving sustainable development’ (ibid, p. 127). The mascot ‘Haibao’ (see Picture 6.7) was also created for the Expo. Haibao is an imaginary object created from the Chinese character ‘Ren’ which means people. Haibao also means the treasure of the seas, and was supposed to symbolize and manifest a ‘people-oriented’ spirit, emphasizing that ‘people’ are the foundation to building a better life, as explained by the organizers and communicated via the Information office of Shanghai Municipality (2016).

It has been argued that the World Expo was used strategically both to assist the production of Deng Xiaoping’s envisioned society, and to foster a new vision of the city and the whole nation (Vaide, 2015; Wu, 2000). Shanghai Municipal Government hoped that the Expo would contribute positively to Shanghai’s international profile and enhance its image as an international metropolis (Vaide, 2015). Shanghai’s organization of the World Expo has been interpreted as ‘a badge of its membership of the exclusive club of the world’s premiere cities worthy of a mega event’ (Cull, 2012). Dynon (2011) has also stated that the Expo site possessed normative value in its suggestion of what Shanghai and China aspires to become:

In this way, the branding significance of the Expo for Shanghai is aspirational in that it tells a story of and attaches an identity to an imagined future (Dynon, 2011, p. 185).

A related interpretation is that the World Expo functioned as a tool to rebrand the city, the nation and the ruling ideology of the CCP (Dynon, 2011; Vaide, 2015). One respondent, a manager at the Nordic Centre, Fudan University, Shanghai (I7, 2010), stated that one reason for why the central government in China located Expo 2010 in Shanghai was because Beijing was unable to so soon after the 2008 Olympics, and because Shanghai is China’s financial centre and most modern city. Yu Zhengsheng, Shanghai’s Party Secretary (CCTV, 2010) referred to the wider context of urbanization when discussing the localization of Expo 2010:

How to make the city more liveable? How to reduce the harm that the city life has on the environment? These are all global issues. Hence, the appeal of the Expo’s theme. Shanghai is the largest city in China. So, how Shanghai develops while reducing environmental harm and global warming is a major issue affecting the quality of life (Yu Zhengsheng, Shanghai’s Party Secretary, in an interview with Robert L. Kuhn, CCTV, 2010).
One respondent, a manager at the Nordic Centre in Shanghai (I7, 2010), said that various parts of the city were constructed and reconstructed as a consequence of the Expo. Yu Zhengsheng, Shanghai’s Party Secretary, similarly stated in an interview with Robert L. Kahn (CCTV, 2010), that the Expo has boosted Shanghai’s infrastructure construction, including an extension of the metro system. Another respondent, working in communication and PR at the Expo (I5, 2010), argued that the Expo had various positive impacts:

The Expo has changed people’s lives. Nowadays people enjoy the city more, and can feel the changes in the city: the good customs, the transportation and the international habits. And people living in Shanghai are proud of their city, more now than before (Practitioner, I5, 2010).

The same respondent, on a similar positive note, stated that events like the Expo can modify the image of the city, and the country. The Expo could also be regarded as ‘a window to the world’ in that it was a chance for Chinese from all over the country to learn about countries and cities around the world, the same respondent claimed. Additional positive outcomes from the Expo emphasized by this respondent, were that Shanghai became more active, developed efficient transportation and turned into a more interesting city.

A researcher at the Department of Urban Planning at Tongji University in Shanghai, who had been involved in the planning of the Expo (I11, 2010), said that foreigners and foreign media were impressed by the great organization of Expo 2010, and claimed that people all around the world got to know Shanghai through Expo 2010. Also, a researcher at Shanghai International Studies University, who wrote his PhD dissertation about large events (I19, 2012), outlined three main impacts from Expo 2010, primarily aspects that affected the development of the city, and on future branding practices:

The first aspect is that, because of the Expo site, the city has been renewed. The second element is that the Expo has improved Shanghai’s modern services industry. The third impact is that Shanghai has built a lot of experience from the Expo, which can be used in further branding (Researcher, I19, 2012).
Even though the majority of respondents in this study tended to describe the World Expo in a positive light, there are also those that expressed critical views and reflections. For example, one respondent based at the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing (I50, 2011), argued that the Expo caused a lot of trouble for local people in Shanghai, and stated that, overall, the Expo was a waste of money. Another respondent, a manager at the Nordic Centre, Fudan University, Shanghai (I7, 2010) depicted the Expo as a gigantic propaganda project for China, stating:

> Chinese from all over China travelled to Shanghai to visit the Expo, and witnessed Shanghai’s positive development and the city’s return to its previous historical position. The Expo showed to Chinese and the world that China is entering into its ‘natural position as a world power’, back to how it used to be (Manager, Nordic Centre, Shanghai, I7, 2010).

Dynon (2011) also draw parallels between the World Expo and propaganda, arguing that the Expo was a political project in the sense that it was used to ensure the political legitimacy of the CCP. Green (2010) also emphasizes the political nature of the event, by connecting the organization of the Expo to the global aspirations of the PRC. At the time of the 2010 World Expo, Shanghai was branded as an exemplary harmonious city and as an agent of change for the better, which was interpreted by Dynon (2011) as ‘a geographic mascot appropriated to sell an idea or set of ideals to domestic and international audiences’ (p. 186).

In the preparations for the Expo, Shanghai Municipal Government launched a campaign called ‘Civilized behaviours for Shanghai to welcome the World Expo – seven objectives to achieve’ (Vaide, 2015). The campaign centred on the creation of a city ruled by law, a healthy and educated city, a city where the environment is protected, and a city where people are polite, trustworthy and friendly (ibid). Vaide (2015) draw parallels from the campaign to Deng and Jiang’s efforts to advance culture and increase people’s quality (素质), and interpret the acts by Shanghai Municipal Government as a modernizing force with the goal of cultivating its residents.

### 6.2.5 Emblem, logos and the civilized city

Shanghai’s official city emblem is a triangle consisting of a white magnolia flower, a large junk, and a propeller (Shanghai Basic Facts, 2014). The magnolia is meant to symbolize the vitality of the city; the large junk represents one of the oldest vessels used in Shanghai’s harbour and symbolizes the long history of the port; and the propeller is meant to symbolize the continuous advancement of Shanghai. The design of Shanghai’s city emblem was approved by the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress in 1990, and has since been used in communication originating from the
Information office of Shanghai Municipality (ibid). The white magnolia flower in Shanghai’s city emblem has been Shanghai’s city flower since 1986, when the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress decided on it (Shanghai Basic Facts, 2014).

The flower has large, white petals, delicate fragrance and its eye always looks towards the sky. Therefore, the flower is hired to personify the pioneering and enterprising spirit of the city (Shanghai Basic Facts, 2014, p. 2).

At the end of 2008, as a step towards the 2010 World Expo, the SMTA launched an additional logo and slogan, or ‘city tagline’, namely ‘Shanghai China More Discovery More Experience’, with the aim of branding Shanghai with ‘a fresh look and feel’. The logo was supposed to symbolize both Shanghai’s traditional Chinese style and the international spirit of the city, at the time of the Expo and beyond, communicated online by a China-based consultancy firm working with brand innovation (Brandsource, 2013), and by a respondent, the vice director of Shanghai International Conference Management Organization (SICMO), a subsidiary of SMTA (I4, 2014). The same respondent said that the logo was supposed to symbolize Shanghai’s spirit, and the water in the logo should represent inclusiveness and adaptability, referring to the saying: ‘The sea accepts a thousand rivers’.

SMTA, the creator of Shanghai’s new look, has been described as a government department in Shanghai Municipal Government with responsibility for the tourism industry in Shanghai. SMTA includes various divisions, such as domestic and international tourism promotion, travel agency and hotel management, and policy and law. SMTA’s overall purpose is consequently to draw up policy and law of the tourism industry, promote Shanghai as an ideal destination and attract tourism, organize large tourism events and festivals, and to supervise and inspect the tourism market system (Pacific Asia Travel Association, 2014). The respondent at SICMO (I4, 2014), involved in Shanghai’s MICE (i.e. meetings, incentives, conventions and exhibitions) and tourism industry, emphasized that:
Shanghai’s vice mayor wants to build Shanghai into a world-famous tourist city, and a popular, premier MICE destination for the whole world (Director of SICMO, SMTA, 14, 2014).

The central role of the SMTA and its subsidiary SICMO, and thus tourism, in the branding of Shanghai, can be traced back to the promotion of Shanghai as a tourist choice since China introduced reform policies and openness (He, 2011; Wang, Xiaokaiti, Zhou, Liu & Zhao, 2012). Tourism was, in the early 1990s, largely seen as an important economic sector which could restructure urban industries, produce direct revenues, boost domestic consumption and generate employment opportunities (ibid). Later, tourism was included as a main goal in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2005–2011), with the target of transforming Shanghai into an attractive tourism destination and a first-class metropolis (Wang et al., 2012).

As already indicated, much of Shanghai’s city branding has also centred on the creation of a better city for its residents. During the course of my fieldwork, I could see this in city districts, such as Xuhui district, for example, where a campaign in 2014 was tied to the national Chinese Dream concept, focused on cultivation and civilization, and targeted at local populations.

On one of the posters it said, in large characters, ‘Chinese Dream’. At the top of the poster, in smaller characters, it said: ‘Create a national civilized city, you are the backbone’, and at the bottom of the poster was written: ‘Build core values with one heart, and realize the great Chinese dream with one mind’. In the middle of the poster, next to the ‘Chinese Dream’ concept, three times four words were listed, namely prosperous, democratic, civilized, and harmonious; freedom, equality, justice and rule of law; and patriotic, professional, trustworthy and friendly. In the poster, Xuhui was written with traditional (rather than simplified) Chinese characters, in the shape of an emblem. Behind the poster and the campaign was the Spiritual Civilization Construction Committee of Xuhui District.
Synthesis and timeline

To sum up, I have just presented Shanghai as mainland China’s most international city, today and historically. I have also outlined Shanghai’s vision, branding and development as tied to the creation of four international centres and a metropolitan city from the early 1990s, and mentioned its current vision to become a global city by 2050. Here, Shanghai has also been depicted as a city of opening-up, innovation and creativity, which can be seen in the cityscape, promotional material, etc. I have also discussed the 2010 Shanghai World Expo in relation to Shanghai’s branding and development and in relation to creating a healthier, more liveable city. Finally, I elaborated on Shanghai’s city emblem, logos and slogans as well as its focus on creating a civilized city. In the timeline presented below, some central elements in the history, development and branding of Shanghai are outlined.

Figure 6.2: Timeline including important events in Shanghai with regards to the city’s history, development and branding.
6.3 Shenzhen: The pioneering migration city

![City of Design: Shenzhen](image)

*Picture 6.10: Shenzhen’s location in China and a logo promoting Shenzhen as a City of Design. Shenzhen, like Beijing, does not have an official logo.*

6.3.1 ‘On blank paper, you can draw a beautiful picture’

Shenzhen is situated in the south of China in Guangdong province, on the Pearl River Delta and on the boundary of Hong Kong (Cartier, 2002). Shenzhen has been described as China’s newest major city, and as a city that appeared miraculously from what was a small fishing village prior to 1978 (Ma, 2004) to a mega-city of over 10 million people today, and thus into ‘a world city from scratch’ (McDonogh & Wong, 2005). This kind of message is also communicated by Shenzhen Government Online (2016), and in a booklet titled *Invest in Shenzhen, Building a Winning Future* (2014), which stated that, in the late 1970s, Shenzhen only had about 30,000 residents whereas, at the end of 2013, there were 10.63 million permanent residents in the city. In the book *Shenzhen* (2014) distributed by Shenzhen Municipal Government, it was moreover written:

> Just over three decades ago, few people would have envisioned that a remote fishing town with only 30,000 people could progress so strikingly into the metropolis that it is today. It was the dreams and actions of Shenzhen people that made all this possible (Shenzhen, book distributed by Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2014).

One respondent, an official at Invest Shenzhen, a governmental department promoting Shenzhen as a good place to invest (195, 2014), stated that, ‘on blank paper you can draw a beautiful picture’, referring to the rapid development of Shenzhen from a small town to a huge city, as well as the imaginary, visionary climate in the city. The same respondent added, referring to Shenzhen, ‘We have the imagination, the vision’. In a booklet about Shenzhen distributed by Invest Shenzhen, Shenzhen is also promoted as a city of miracles.
Shenzhen is a city of miracles. Within a short span of 30 years, the people of Shenzhen have used their labour and wisdom to grow from a small fishing village into a modern international metropolis with a population of more than 10 million, offering a beautiful environment, complete infrastructure and quality services. Here, you can feel the pulse of the world and get connected globally (*Invest in Shenzhen, Building a Winning Future*, booklet distributed by Invest Shenzhen, 2014).

In 1980, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen were designed as SEZs (Ng, 2003), and Shenzhen became the first and largest of the four original SEZs (Cartier, 2002). Strategic reasons were behind the central government’s selection of Shenzhen as a leading SEZ, such as the city’s location far away from major cities and centres of real economic and political power. The location far away from Beijing and Shanghai was regarded as important due to the then radical experiment with market economic activity that followed in Shenzhen (Chung, 2009). On the official website of the Shenzhen Government, Shenzhen SEZ is called the brainchild of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, and a touchstone for reform and opening-up policy since then (Shenzhen Government Online, 2016).

As a SEZ, Shenzhen was given certain instructions (Ng, 2003). For example, the city should be a ‘training ground’ for talents in mainland China and a ‘window’ for observing global trends in economic, scientific, managerial and market developments. As a SEZ, Shenzhen should also be an experimental ground for reforms, including special economic management systems and flexible economic measures for enhancing economic cooperation and technology interchange between China and foreign countries (ibid).

The municipal leaders of Shenzhen formulated a strategic vision for the city and for the SEZ. In the 1980s, they started engaging in overseas marketing of the SEZ as an investment destination, aiming to attract large-scale high-tech companies and export-oriented enterprises (Ng, 2003). In the mid-1980s, Shenzhen Government formulated the ‘Strategic Plan for Developing Shenzhen SEZ’s export-led economy’ with the aim of boosting exports. Various measures were taken, including marketing Shenzhen SEZ overseas (Ng, 2003). One respondent, an official at Invest Shenzhen (I95, 2014), said that, in the beginning, when Shenzhen first became a SEZ, investors came very much by themselves, and limited city promotion was needed. However, more recently and according to the same respondent (I95, 2014), Shenzhen has experienced more competition from other cities and, as a result, ‘Invest Shenzhen’ was founded in 2011, with the aim of creating good relations between Shenzhen and other cities in the world, with a focus on innovation, culture and technology.
6.3.2 Business nest and pioneer city

In discussions on Shenzhen’s visions and dreams, an official at the Policy Research office, Shenzhen Municipal Government (I96, 2014), said that the city’s dream is to become a first-class city of the world. The same respondent stated that directives from the central government spell out that Shenzhen shall focus on internationalization, innovation and modernization. An official at Invest Shenzhen (I95, 2014), said that Shenzhen’s vision is to become a well-known international city. The same respondent argued that Shenzhen is on the way to becoming a city for professionals: with law, international trade and commerce at the fore. In previous research, Shenzhen’s strategy has been outlined as centred on the development of a modern world city with a prosperous economy, a friendly environment and a rational, spatial layout with comprehensive infrastructure provision (Ng, 2003).

In discussions about Shenzhen’s image, one respondent, a practitioner with insights into city branding in China and the city of Shenzhen (I102, 2014), said that Shenzhen people think Shenzhen is a very liveable city, a high-tech city and one which is good for entrepreneurs and for starting your own business. Shenzhen was described by another respondent, a researcher at Sun Yat-sen University, School of Government, Guangzhou (I108), as a city that has global capital, is aggressive economically and is the best city for young entrepreneurs. Yet another respondent, an official at the Policy Research office, Shenzhen Municipal Government (I96, 2014), said that Shenzhen is more commercial than many other Chinese cities. Moreover, Shenzhen was described as a business city, not a tourist city, according to another respondent, a researcher at Shenzhen University (I107, 2014).

Shenzhen is one of the richest cities in China and ranks fourth amongst China’s 659 cities in terms of economic output, behind Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou (Shenzhen Economic & Trade Representative Office, 2013; The Canadian Trade Commissioner, 2016). Shenzhen’s economic and investment system has moved towards being more collaborative, multilevel and networked, aiming at facilitating technology transfers, working with the private sector to find new foreign customers and to improve skills (Lin, 2008; McDearman, Clark & Parilla, 2013). In order to brand Shenzhen as a good place to invest, Invest Shenzhen arranges meetings and conferences, and promotes the city as an investment location online through social media such as Weibo and WeChat, according to an official at Invest Shenzhen (I95, 2014). In the branding of Shenzhen as an investment location, Europe is a key target market and activities to attract European FDI include innovation forums and collaboration with European countries and cities, the same respondent said.
According to Ye (2011), Shenzhen has been positioned as the new economic and technology engine of south China, and specifically targeted high-tech industries for its growth, becoming a leader in communication networks, telecom technology and internet innovation. Shenzhen has also been focused on developing emerging industries of strategic importance, as well as a modern service industry. Six emerging industries, including biology, new energies, internet, cultural and creative industries, new materials and next-generation IT, are said to be developing fast (Invest in Shenzhen, Building a Winning Future, booklet, 2014). As Shenzhen has grown beyond its function as a manufacturing zone, the leaders of the city have planned the city’s transformation into a:

World city of business services and high-technology industries distinguished by international standard architecture and urban cultural amenities (Cartier, 2002, p. 1520).

In Shenzhen’s ‘Strategic plan 2030’, the stated goal is moreover to develop a ‘pioneer city’, indicating that Shenzhen wants to continue being a pioneer city compared with other cities on the Chinese mainland, an official at the Department of Masterplan, Shenzhen Municipal Government (1100, 2014) told me. Previous research has also mentioned Shenzhen 2030 Strategic Plan and the city’s goal of becoming a ‘global pioneering city’, including Wu (2015) and Zacharias and Tang (2010). The strategic planning study that laid the base for Shenzhen 2030 Strategic Plan began in 2004 as an attempt to deal with urban development problems (Zacharias & Tang, 2010). The plan meant a shift from traditional blueprint planning towards the macro level and the long term (ibid). However, the ‘global pioneering city’ concept has also received critique for neglecting the creation of a liveable city for migrants (Wu, 2015).

According to Shenzhen Government Online (2016), and a booklet titled Invest in Shenzhen, Building a Winning Future (2014), Shenzhen has become one of China’s most developed cities, one of the fastest-growing cities in the world, and is described as ‘one of China’s gateways to the world’. Others have called Shenzhen the first, new world-class city of the new millennium, whereas others have doubted Shenzhen’s capability to become a contender amongst China’s world cities, given its short history as a city of migrants and economic fortune (Cartier, 2002). Green (2010) has moreover maintained that Shenzhen has already met some of its world city aspirations, since it houses one of three stock exchanges in China, with Shanghai and Hong Kong housing the other two. Yet others have stated that Shenzhen has been designed to symbolize the transformation from a manufacturing town into a ‘world city’ (Friedmann, 1986; Knox & Taylor, 1995).
Shenzhen’s ‘Urban Comprehensive Plan (2007–2020)’ was revised in 2006 (Zacharias & Tang, 2010). The comprehensive plan was followed by the current vision of creating Shenzhen into a world city, as stated by a respondent, a researcher at Shenzhen University with a background in urban planning (I109, 2014). Shenzhen’s development goal for the next five years, presented in May 2015 by Shenzhen’s Party secretary at the time, Ma Xingrui, included that Shenzhen shall lead China’s reform and opening-up, that the city should establish an indigenous innovation demonstration zone and become China’s national economic hub. The development goals also focus on developing Shenzhen as an international city, with greater influence and competitiveness, and to create a happy city with higher living standards (Shenzhen Government Online, 2016).

Internationally, Shenzhen is neither famous nor well known, different respondents pointed out, including an official at Invest Shenzhen (I95, 2014) and a researcher at Shenzhen University (I109, 2014). The official from Invest Shenzhen said that, internationally, people are often more familiar with companies and brands from Shenzhen, such as Huawei and Tencent, than the city itself. In promotional material of Shenzhen, companies originating from and present in the city are used for endorsing purposes. Famous Chinese business leaders, such as Alibaba’s Jack Ma, are also used for similar purposes. In a booklet about Shenzhen titled *Invest in Shenzhen, Building a Winning Future*, Jack Ma’s picture is included amongst other business leaders, and he is quoted as saying:

There are many excellent companies in Shenzhen. Shenzhen’s success makes us think. Shenzhen is a wonderful place, which is the best for us (Jack Ma, founder of Alibaba, quoted in *Invest in Shenzhen, Building a Winning Future*, booklet distributed by Invest Shenzhen, 2014, Picture 6.11).

*Picture 6.11: Promotion of Shenzhen by the help of companies and famous business leaders (booklet distributed by Invest Shenzhen, 2014).*
6.3.3 Culture-based City and City of Design

It has been argued that in Shenzhen’s new city centre there is limited connection to the past (Cartier, 2002). One respondent, an official at the Bureau of Culture, Sport and Tourism, the Division of External Exchange, Shenzhen Municipal Government (I97, 2014) said that Shenzhen’s history is short, and its roots are weak. However, there are signs of its culture, tradition, heritage and history here and there. The Municipal Government building (Picture 6.12), for example, was produced in the sphere of Chinese transnationalism, and is said to have brought Chinese cultural forms back to China on new terms (Cartier, 2002).


Officials in Shenzhen have been engaged in designing Shenzhen as a world city with Chinese characteristics, which has meant design of traditional Chinese architectural forms and cultural symbolism through a language of modernism (Cartier, 2002). The design has then been coded to represent Shenzhen’s leading edge in regional and world economies, while at the same time satisfying the national historic imagination about what a great city in China is (ibid). Moreover, in 2003, Shenzhen established a strategy for a ‘culture-based city’, focusing on expansion and growth of cultural and creative industries (Shenzhen Government Online, 2016).

Shenzhen has been described in the literature as an energetic city with a vision of forging a city of culture that admires creativity and encourages diversity (Merrilees et al., 2014). In discussions on culture and cultural and creative industries, one respondent, a practitioner working in education and in the media industry (I104, 2014), emphasized that culture is only culture and is related to creating stability and harmony; it is not related to cultural industries. The same respondent said that Chinese leaders today have limited cultural training, and tend not to follow traditions, hinting at a loss of cultural values, heritage and traditions, adding:

Those born after the 1960s and 1970s only look to the future, and not to the past. We seldom talk about the past, for example 1989, we just hide it. We don’t want to face the past … (Practitioner, I104, 2014).
Another respondent, a government official at the Bureau of Culture, Sport and Tourism (I97, 2014), said that Shenzhen, partly due to its lack of history and traditional culture, focuses on new things and on the development of trendy things, incorporating a Western style that is simple and modern. In Shenzhen, ‘culture’ is often tied to creativity and commercial elements, the same respondent said, also stating that:

Culture plays a central role in Shenzhen. The leader of Shenzhen and the Municipal Government in the city invest in, and offer a lot of funding to the development of culture in Shenzhen (Government official, I97, 2014).

Different respondents, such as the official at the Bureau of Culture, Sport and Tourism (I97, 2014) and a researcher at Tsinghua University (I114, 2014), said that Shenzhen has invested a lot in becoming, and has been branded as, a ‘City of Design’. On the website of Shenzhen Government (Shenzhen Government Online, 2016), it is written that Shenzhen has become well known for design, with design enterprises covering various fields, including graphic design, industry design, interior and architectural design, fashion design, toy design and jewellery design.

In 2008, Shenzhen was named a member of UNESCO’s Creative Cities Network and awarded the title ‘City of Design’ (UNESCO, 2013, 2015). Shenzhen was the first Chinese city to join the UNESCO Creative Cities Network, and was later followed by Beijing and Shanghai. Shenzhen’s focus on creative and innovative industries and the city’s focus on design enterprises was acknowledged in Shenzhen Design Award for Young Talents (Szday, 2013):

The designation of Shenzhen as the ‘City of Design’ was the result of recognition by the international community of Shenzhen’s achievement in innovation and creative industries, as well as the professional capacities and capabilities of design enterprises and designers in this city (Szday, 2013).
It has been argued that Shenzhen has evolved into the design capital of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as a high-tech city, logistic hub and financial centre (China Pictorial, 2013). The image as a high-tech city has evolved in response to the establishment of some of China’s most successful high-tech companies in Shenzhen, such as Huawei, Konka, Tencent, ZTE, BYD and Hasee (Shenzhen Economic & Trade Representative Office, 2013). Shenzhen has been described as successful in attracting foreign capital and in developing its high-tech sector, with some of China’s most successful high-tech companies having their headquarters in the city, and with many foreign firms present in Shenzhen (Green, 2010). In 2017, Shenzhen was the second most innovative city in China, after Beijing and before Shanghai, according to a research institute under media conglomerate China Business Network Co Ltd, and as reported in China Daily (2017).

Shenzhen’s innovative spirit was discussed by various respondents, and the city was described as innovative by an official at the Policy Research office, Shenzhen Municipal Government (I96, 2014). Another official, at the Department of Masterplan, Shenzhen Municipal Government (1100, 2014), moreover said that all people that work in Shenzhen have an innovative mind; an important feature amongst all Shenzhen residents. In printed material and online, Shenzhen’s innovative features are also emphasized. For example, in a brochure about Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong Kong Youth Innovation and Entrepreneur Hub (E-hub, 2014), the city is depicted as a city of innovation and entrepreneurship, and put forth as the city in China with the most entrepreneurial activity.

Other online sources state that Shenzhen has experienced self-reliant innovation development (Universiade Shenzhen, 2013) over the past 30 years, and that the city has chosen innovation as the dominant strategy for its future development (Shenzhen Government Online, 2016). Central visions include becoming the new research and development centre in south China, and becoming a worldwide leader in communication networks, telecom technology and internet innovation. Shenzhen’s development goal is moreover that the city will be a pilot zone for a national comprehensive reform programme and will be built into a national economic hub, state-level innovative city, and model city with Chinese characteristics (ibid).

6.3.4 In Hong Kong’s back garden

An official at the Policy Research Office, Shenzhen Municipal Government (I96, 2014) exemplified Shenzhen’s innovative spirit by citing people’s attention to innovation, that they easily accept new things and are open to change. The reasons for this, the same respondent argued, is that Shenzhen people are from everywhere, and because Shenzhen is so close to Hong Kong. Another respondent, an official at the Bureau of Culture, Sport and Tourism, Shenzhen
Municipal Government (I97, 2014), similarly stated that Shenzhen’s proximity to Hong Kong contributes to an open mindset amongst residents. Yet another respondent, a practitioner with insights into city branding and the city of Shenzhen (I102, 2014), said that Shenzhen’s development and branding is also influenced by Hong Kong in other ways:

If Shenzhen was a stand-alone city, it could have much faster growth, but because it’s so close to Hong Kong, the central government balances very carefully so that Shenzhen does not grow too fast; or else Hong Kong would be very upset (Practitioner, I102, 2014).

It can be read in official sources that Shenzhen has very close business, trade and social links with its neighbour Hong Kong. In 2007, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive proposed further developing the Hong Kong–Shenzhen metropolis to strengthen the cooperation, which was approved by Shenzhen Government later the same year. The cooperation has included financial services, hi-tech, high-end research, development, transport, environmental matters and ecology (Shenzhen Economic & Trade Representative Office, 2013).

Shenzhen’s geographical position is moreover claimed to be unique and advantageous due to its location in the southernmost corner of the Pearl River Delta, neighbouring Hong Kong. Shenzhen Municipal Government and Hong Kong Administrative Region are cooperating on various additional issues such as education, the service industry, tourism, and science and technology parks (China Pictorial, 2013). Shenzhen is prone to the influence of Hong Kong and of Western cultures (Merrilees et al., 2014). One respondent stated that:

The central government of China thinks Shenzhen should be the back garden of Hong Kong, and that the city should be inspired by Shanghai (Researcher, I107, 2014).

One collaborative project that Shenzhen and Hong Kong have been co-organizing since 2005 is the Bi-City Biennale of Urbanism/Architecture (UABB) in Shenzhen:

UABB situates itself within the regional context of the rapidly urbanizing Pearl River Delta, concerns itself with globally common urban issues, extensively communicates and interacts with the wider public, is presented using expressions of contemporary visual culture, and engages international, avant-garde dimensions as well as discourses of public interest (Szhkbiennale, 2014).

The biennials have built a communication platform for international art scenes in Shenzhen and Hong Kong. An aim for the biennale has been to embody an open attitude, an innovative spirit and constant exploration; all inherited from the history of establishing Shenzhen SEZ. The biennial has operated in accordance with international practices and contributes to building a cultural
brand for Shenzhen and improving the competitiveness of the city (Szhkbiennale, 2014).

In 2015, the theme for the biennale was ‘Reliving the city’ and centred on creating a city that is good for its citizens, as told by a respondent, an official at the Department of Urban Design, Shenzhen Municipal Government, 199, 2014). The same respondent said that the aim with the biennale was also to build a unique symbol for Shenzhen, and communicate that the city is young and full of energy. On the biennale’s website, ‘Reliving the city’ was moreover explained as reflecting the reuse and rethinking of existing buildings and the reimagination of our cities (Biennial Foundation, 2015). Furthermore, the aim of the 2015 biennale was to pay more attention to a sense of participation and interaction, and hence become a platform for discussion and communication for the public (ibid).

Another collaborative project in which Shenzhen and Hong Kong are involved is ‘Qianhai Economic Zone’, a new area developed in Shenzhen focusing on financial services and with the purpose of learning from Hong Kong’s system in areas of economy and law, etc. (Qianhai Financial Policies, 2014). ‘Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong Kong Modern Service Industry Cooperation Zone’ was launched in 2012, with the vision that the area should explore innovation in modern service industries, piloting cooperation between the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong and leading the industrial upgrading of the Pearl River Delta region. With Qianhai, the aim was also that Shenzhen should continue its historic role as a pioneer city in China’s development (Shenzhen Government Online, 2016). In 2010, the State Council of the PRC announced that:

Taking advantage of comparative advantages of Shenzhen and Hong Kong, the decision to develop modern service industry in Qianhai is a significant move in a new phase of the reform and opening process (Qianhai Financial Policies, 2014).

![Qianhai Economic Zone in miniature](photo by author, 2014).
One respondent, a government official at the Authority of Shenzhen-Hong Kong Modern Service Industry Cooperation Zone of Shenzhen (IIIO1, 2014), said that Qianhai has an important position on the Silk Road, and the ‘Road’ initiative centres on connecting China with Southeast Asia, South Asia, East Africa and the Mediterranean through the construction of a network of ports and coastal projects. The same respondent also said that, with Qianhai, Shenzhen wants to set a model for other cities in China.

It has also been stated that Qianhai will capitalize on the proximity and strengths of Hong Kong as a leading international financial and business centre with its global vision and entrenched rule of law (E-hub, 2014):

Through this collaboration and partnership, Qianhai will serve as a door to the further opening up of mainland China to the world (E-hub, 2014).

In 2014 and beyond, Shenzhen is taking steps to realize internationalization, marketization and legalization and to change modes of economic development, with a central element in this being the development of Qianhai strategic platform (Shenzhen Government Online, 2016). Qianhai is planned to create 650,000 jobs and house a population of 150,000. It advocates green and clean transportation modes with an eye towards protecting the environment. The aim in Qianhai is to build a sustainable, low-carbon and intelligent urban district that connects with the world via fibre, Wi-Fi and intelligent urban control systems (Invest in Shenzhen, Building a Winning Future, booklet, 2014).

It is foreseen that Qianhai will play a leading role in promoting the partnership between Hong Kong and mainland China in the area of modern service industries (Qianhai Financial Policies, 2014). Taking advantage of the comparative advantages of Shenzhen and Hong Kong, the decision to develop modern service industries in Qianhai is depicted as a significant move in a new phase of the reform and opening-up process. The development of Qianhai should, according to the State Council, be regarded as an opportunity to innovate, cooperate closely and to work diligently to promote the development of modern service industries, while at the same time continuing to explore the new development model under the Scientific Outlook (ibid).

The stated aim is that, by 2020, Qianhai should have completed the construction of a world-class modern service industry cooperation zone with excellent infrastructure facilities. Qianhai should also be one of the most important manufacturing service centres in Asia-Pacific, play a leading role in the global modern service industry, and be an important global base for service trade (Qianhai Financial Policies, 2014). Shenzhen shall learn from Hong Kong’s experiences in being one of the world’s leading business centres, with sound legal attributes, a global vision and a thorough understanding of global market forces (E-hub, 2014).
The guiding principle and strategic position of joint development of Qianhai modern service industry shall be conducted under the spirit of socialism with Chinese characteristics, using the theories of Deng Xiaoping and the ‘Three Representatives’ as guidance. It has been stated that the scientific development outlook must be implemented, and that emphasis should be placed on openness, cooperation, mutual benefit, systematic innovation, science and efficiency; high-end oriented, concentrated development; and coordination and planning (Qianhai Financial Policies, 2014). One respondent, a practitioner with insights into city branding and the city of Shenzhen (I102, 2014), said that Shenzhen is very proactive in Qianhai’s development, whereas Hong Kong is more hesitant and has less interest in the development of Qianhai.

6.3.5 Young, hospitable, inclusive and pluralistic

References to dreams and the future is evident in the printed and online material of Shenzhen, and were for example included in a brochure about Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong Kong Youth Innovation and Entrepreneur Hub (E-hub, 2014), where Page 1 consisted of only the following words: ‘Dreams drive the future’. One respondent, a practitioner working with education and in the media industry (I104, 2014), moreover said that the future and dreams or visions are prioritized in Shenzhen over history and heritage.

Another respondent, an official at the Policy Research office, Shenzhen Municipal Government (I96, 2014), said that Shenzhen’s dream is part of China’s dream, and added that Shenzhen, compared with other Chinese cities, is making its dream come true faster, hinting at the vast economic development that Shenzhen has already experienced. Another official, working at the Department of Urban Design, Shenzhen Municipal Government (I99, 2014), elaborated on the Chinese dream and the ‘Shenzhen dream’. He said that, in the past 30 years, Shenzhen has attracted young people who all have dreams, stating:

Their dream is to have a better life and to make money. They want to have a quality life; that’s their dream. And most of them who are still living here, their dream came true. So, maybe we can call it the ‘Shenzhen Dream’ (Government official, I99, 2014).

The same respondent (I99, 2014), said that ‘Shenzhen Dream’ can be seen as a mini-version of the Chinese dream, moreover arguing that Shenzhen is a good example for other cities to follow. ‘I think’, he said, ‘that Chinese leaders like Xi Jinping have a positive view of Shenzhen’s development, and would like to introduce Shenzhen’s development style also in other cities.’ In Shenzhen, a book distributed by Shenzhen Municipal Government (2014), the city was described as ‘the charming city where dreams begin and come true’. Connections between the Shenzhen dream and the Chinese dream were also made:
Shenzhen shall compose a new chapter of the Chinese Dream. With determined steps, she will endeavour to cultivate, elevate and reinvent herself until today’s dream becomes tomorrow’s reality (Shenzhen, 2014).

However, another respondent, a researcher at Shenzhen University (II09, 2014) did not see the connection between Shenzhen and the Chinese dream, and stated that the Chinese dream comes from the central government, is for the whole nation and far away from the city. Another respondent, also a researcher at Shenzhen University (II07, 2014), moreover pointed some critique towards the Chinese dream, highlighting that the Chinese government does not act on the words it communicates — words such as ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’.

Huat (2011) describes how a group of urban researchers, who were in Shenzhen for an international conference, and a group of local reporters at a press conference answered to an urban geographer’s question of what they saw as the symbol of Shenzhen. Their answer was instant: the migrant worker. Shenzhen has the largest and youngest migrant population with various cultural backgrounds and from all parts of China (Merrilees et al., 2014). Many young people and migrant workers chose to move to and live in Shenzhen. It has been stated that many single migrants stay in Shenzhen alone, without any family support (Tao, Wang & Hui, 2014), and moreover often lack a local ‘hukou’, meaning that they do not have equal employment, education, housing and public services opportunities as locals in Shenzhen (UNDP in China, 2014; Tao et al., 2014).

A government official at Invest Shenzhen (I95, 2014) said that the parents of newcomers often move to the city to help out, since the young population commonly spend many hours at work. In a booklet titled Invest in Shenzhen, Building a Winning Future (2014) it was moreover written that Shenzhen is one of the cities most favoured by college students and is one of the first-choice cities for students returning from overseas to start businesses or find jobs. Shenzhen is relatedly depicted as a city for young people, and as a dynamic city:

Being young, hospitable, inclusive and pluralistic, Shenzhen is the city most favoured by young people in China. It is also one of the cities with the fastest economic development. Here, you can experience almost all local cultures across China and enjoy high-quality services with international standards. Here, you do not feel like a guest, because ‘once you are here you are a Shenzhener’ (Invest in Shenzhen, Building a Winning Future, booklet, 2014).

One respondent, a researcher at Shenzhen University (II09, 2014), said that the government in Shenzhen is good compared to other Chinese cities, exemplifying public services, including free entrance to parks, free basic education
and free entertainment. The same respondent said that one difference in Shenzhen compared to many other large cities in China is the social relations. Consequently, in Shenzhen, people come from everywhere and have no historical family ties and relations to rely on, meaning that anyone can be successful in Shenzhen, no matter their family background, the same respondent maintained (I109, 2014). An official at the Policy Research office, Shenzhen Municipal Government (I96, 2014), discussed the same matter and stated, ‘In Shenzhen, everyone is a newcomer’.

However, arguments that Shenzhen is not focusing enough on creating a liveable city for migrants have also been put forth, for example by a renowned Chinese urban geographer at Beijing University (Wu, 2015). Zacharias and Tang (2010, p. 230) have moreover stated that ‘Shenzhen is known throughout China as the major city with the poorest public security record, although the government regularly claims this is untrue’, drawing parallels to the urban villages of the city, and arguing that this city image certainly hurts Shenzhen’s ambitions to achieve global city status. The urban villages referred to by Zacharias and Tang (2010) appear both in downtown areas and on the outskirts of large Chinese cities such as Shenzhen, are usually inhabited by the transient and the poor, and are often associated with overcrowding, impoverishment, social problems and criminality. From the perspective of the city government, the urban villages can be seen as detracting from Shenzhen’s overall global city ambitions. On the other hand, the villages can also be regarded a cultural asset for Shenzhen, a city in need of cultural credentials. Some of the villages have existed for centuries, house markets, open spaces and temples, and provide relief from the ordered, planned city landscapes of Shenzhen (ibid).

Shenzhen’s change from a focus on a development influenced by speed (‘Shenzhen Speed’) to quality (‘Shenzhen Quality’) and ‘to build an innovative and environmentally friendly city where people can live happily and make dreams come true’ (Shenzhen Government Online, 2016), can be seen as a step towards an increased focus on residents, including migrants. As a result of the ‘Shenzhen Quality’ logo, proposed by Shenzhen’s mayor, Shenzhen has been undergoing a significant transformation from a city known for its speed to one known for its quality, striving for well-rounded, scientific growth to build a solid foundation for the future and achieve comprehensive, stable and sustainable development (Shenzhen, book distributed by Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2014).

‘Shenzhen Quality’ was discussed amongst some of the respondents, including three officials at Shenzhen Municipal Government and a researcher at Shenzhen University. An official at the Department of Masterplan, Shenzhen Municipal Government (I100, 2014), said that the ‘Shenzhen Quality’ slogan represents the need for change:
We cannot keep up an 8 per cent growth year by year, or only focus on economic growth. We must change and need to also focus on social development. We used to say that it’s all about speed; but now the focus is instead on quality. We focus more on good things, rather than fast things (Government official, I100, 2014).

The transition from speed to quality can be related to increased concerns about nature. One respondent, an official at the Policy Research Office, Shenzhen Municipal Government (I96, 2014), emphasized a green and clean environment as a central element in Shenzhen’s city landscape, as well as access for all. The same respondent claimed:

There are 830 parks in Shenzhen, and they are all free for everyone, which is different from other cities in China, who usually charge entrance fees in parks (Government official, I96, 2014).

Another official, at the Department of Masterplan, Shenzhen Municipal Government (I100, 2014), said that the government pays a lot of attention to urban public transportation, whereas his colleague, from the Department of Urban Design (I99, 2014), stated that the government tries to reduce personal driving and also engages in research centring on the environment, including how wind and sunshine could benefit the city.

Synthesis and timeline

Shenzhen has here been depicted as a young mega-city which has developed from a fishing village into a city of more than 10 million residents in the past few decades, as a result of the city being appointed as one of China’s first SEZs. Shenzhen is often talked about and branded as an entrepreneurial city and a business hub, as well as a city focusing on culture and creativity. However, as a city with a short history, ‘culture’ is more associated with international and modern values than to traditions and heritage. Shenzhen’s development and branding is influenced by and carried out in cooperation with Hong Kong. Finally, I also presented Shenzhen as a city of migrants and as a ‘melting pot of cultures’. In the timeline presented below, some central elements in the history, development and branding of Shenzhen are outlined.

![Timeline](image)

*Figure 6.3: Timeline including important events in Shenzhen with regards to the city's history, development and branding.*
6.4 Chengdu: Home of the panda and engine of the west

![Image of Chengdu's location in China and official city logo.]

*Picture 6.16: Chengdu’s location in China and Chengdu’s official city logo.*

6.4.1 Historically renowned and growth motor of west China

Chengdu is the capital of Sichuan province and is situated at the western edge of the Sichuan Basin (Qin, 2015). The Greater Chengdu, or Chengdu Municipality, has sub-provincial administrative status with direct jurisdiction over nine districts, six counties and four county-level cities (*Chengdu Investment Guide*, 2013). In 2011, Chengdu had a registered population of 11.73 million (Chen & Gao, 2011).

Chengdu has been described as one of China’s most important cities historically (Qin, 2015). The concentration of population and city formation in Chengdu goes back 3,000 years to the Shang and Zhou dynasties, and the Jinsha Civilization. At that time, the success of agriculture stimulated the formation of the ancient urban city of Chengdu, with advanced development of commerce and a handicraft industry (Chen & Gao, 2011; *Chengdu China, Chengdu Real China*, 2010). It has been stated that the city’s long history has left significant and lasting imprints on its urban form, landscape and cultural life (Qin, 2015, p. 8).

Two thousand years ago, Chengdu was crowned with the title ‘Land of Abundance’ (天府之国), because of its fertile Chengdu Plain, along with its prosperity, richness, peace and well-being. A thousand years ago, Chengdu was nicknamed ‘City of Hibiscus’ (蓉城) for its hibiscus landscapes, and ‘Brocade City’ (錦城) for its brocade business. A hundred years ago, giant pandas were first discovered in Chengdu, and the city has been known as the home town of pandas ever since (*Chengdu China, Chengdu Real China*, 2010; Qin, 2015). However, the original city name over the past 2,000 years has been Chengdu.

During the period of planned command economy (mid-1950s to 1978), Chengdu served as an important centre for southwest China with regards to
economy, culture, logistics and technology, resulting in the creation of a broad and competitive industrial base that today helps the city maintain a leading position in the region (Qin, 2015). In 2007, Chengdu was assigned as a pioneer city in coordinating urban–rural development and today Chengdu is a vital political, economic, cultural, technological and logistic centre in Sichuan province and in southwest China (Qin, 2015). Chengdu has even been called one of the most industrialized and urbanized cities in China’s west (Chen & Gao, 2011). In 2010, Forbes magazine predicted that Chengdu would be one of the world’s fastest-growing cities in the next decade (Chengdu China, Chengdu Real China, 2010). In a related Forbes (2010) magazine article discussing Chengdu, the city was depicted as a business-friendly city that is abuzz with new construction, including road and rail connections tying Chengdu to the rest of the world; yet it still has some way to go to reach the same GDP per capita as Shanghai, for example.

To further develop Chengdu as the core economic growth pole in western China, Chengdu is oriented towards advanced, scientific, sound and rapid developments, focusing on integration of economic circles and zones for the entire region, as well as implementation of ‘five city prosperity strategies’, including constructing an open regional centre and an international city (Chengdu Investment Guide, 2013). The aim has been described as giving full play to Chengdu’s ‘four functions’ of being the ‘major transportation hub, major industry support, major city engine and major opening front’ of western China, and to build a ‘world-class ecological garden city with urban–rural integration, comprehensive modernization and complete internationalization’ (Chengdu Investment Guide, 2013, p. 3).

The general strategy implemented by the Municipal Government in Chengdu, has in recent years centred on integrating urban and rural areas (Chengdu China, Chengdu Real China, 2010). The focus on urban–rural integration continued as the State Council in 2007 placed special emphasis on building ‘China’s New Countryside’ with the aim of reducing urban–rural income and development disparities. Chengdu was approved as a ‘National Experiment Zone for Comprehensive Supporting Reforms on Integrated Urban and Rural Development’ and, in 2009, former premier Wen instructed Chengdu and Sichuan province to set an example for the nation with its ‘Coordinated Development’ experiment (ibid; Chen & Gao, 2011).

Chengdu has been described as the core economic growth pole in western China, the ‘engine’ of the Western Development Program, a benchmark city for investment environment in inland China, as well as a major leader in the new urbanization (Chengdu Investment Guide, 2013). In a China Daily article (2014b), Chengdu was moreover depicted as an attractive place for investment, and a city that takes the lead in China’s development of the central and western parts of the country, moreover stating that:
Chengdu, an inland city in southwestern China known for its giant pandas and tasty cuisine, is striving to become a globally appealing city and China’s western gateway for opening up (China Daily, 2014b).

According to the Chengdu Investment Guide (2013), the number of Fortune 500 companies that have settled in Chengdu ranks first amongst those in central and western China. The number of foreign financial institutions moreover ranks first in western China. Chengdu is also said to have the largest pool of professional talents, in various fields, in western China (ibid).

Chengdu has become the favourite place of domestic and foreign investors and investments in western China, not only due to its outstanding advantages in investment environment, but also its broad prospects for future development and tremendous business opportunities (Chengdu Investment Guide, 2013).

In promotional material, Chengdu’s history is often emphasized, for example in statements such as ‘Chengdu is a historically renowned city’ (Chengdu China: Chengdu Real China, 2014). A catalogue distributed by Chengdu Culture and Tourism Group moreover stated:

I always see Chengdu as a city which has over crossed time and space! From ancient Shu culture to Three Kingdoms, from the Tang to the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms, we are exploring history and culture of Chengdu in the monuments. Therefore, this most authentic culture is inherited soundly (My Chengdu Travel Diary, 2012).

Chengdu’s logo also ties into this historical narrative. It was created in 2011, and resembles four birds in a golden circle, as told by a government official at the Information office, Chengdu Municipal Government (180, 2012) and as illustrated in various promotional material and online (e.g. Go Chengdu, 2016). The government official (180, 2012) furthermore stated that the logo was inspired by the Golden Sunbird, which was excavated from the Jinsha ruins in 2001. In printed material and online, Chengdu’s logo is at times accompanied by the tagline ‘Spice it up’. Pictures and images are also supplemented with words and phrases such as harmonious and tolerant, wise and honest, an oasis of tranquillity, charms of the city, the best tourism city of China, China goes west, a way in to western China, the city to be, and a new direction (Go Chengdu, 2014).

Picture 6.17: Chengdu’s city logo (Chengdu China, Chengdu Real China, 2014).
Much of Chengdu’s city branding has also revolved around culture and tradition, such as lantern festivals, arranged in Chengdu and in other countries, such as Japan, Singapore and Poland. On the lanterns are images from Chengdu, such as pandas and the Three Kingdoms. One respondent, a practitioner working with culture and tourism in Chengdu (I89, 2012), elaborated:

During the Lantern Festival, we bring together various traditional elements representing Chengdu, such as Sichuan food, ethnic singing and dancing groups, traditional craftsmanship, and cultural heritage such as Sichuan embroidery (Practitioner, I89, 2012).

Another respondent, a practitioner working at a real estate firm in Chengdu (I92, 2014) said that in Chengdu, historical buildings, including old factories, are now protected, and temples are also preserved in order to protect the cultural heritage of Chengdu. However, the same respondent also mentioned the tragic destruction of many historical buildings around China.

‘Kuangzhai Xiangzi’, or ‘Wide and Narrow Alley’, is a historical area in Chengdu dating back to the Qing dynasty (1644–1911 AD), representing one of Chengdu’s historical and cultural reserves. In 2003, renovation work of the area began, with the aim of building a complex cultural and business district serving recreation and tourism in particular and, in 2008, the area opened to the public (Travel China Guide, 2014). According to the respondent working with real estate development in Chengdu (I92, 2014), 70 per cent of the buildings in Kuangzhai Xiangzi are new, yet similar to the old ones; 20 per cent have undergone major renovation; and 10 per cent have endured minor renovation. In a 2014 travel guide to Chengdu (Travel China Guide), the area was described as a famous tourism site and a popular entertainment and nightlife quarter, with numerous restaurants, teahouses and souvenir stores. One respondent, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (I94, 2014), said that one reason why Chengdu city recreated Kuangzhai Xiangzi was due to an ambition to create international recognition.
During a fieldtrip to Chengdu in 2014, I visited one of the city’s creative parks, namely ‘Eastern Suburb Memory’, which is a digital music industry cluster area. On an information board at the entrance to the park, it was written that the park constitutes an experience block themed by music. The commercial elements of the area were emphasized in the stated cooperation with consumer businesses in the form of music performance and interactive experiences, as well as catering and design hotels. On Chengdu’s city website, Go Chengdu (2015), ‘Eastern Suburb Memory’ is described as a multipurpose platform that brings various art forms, such as music, theatre, fashion and photography, into one place. The park also has a cinema which has hosted several international events, such as the European Union Film Festival. The park is remoulded at the site of abandoned factories in the east of the city. As such, it is depicted as having rich cultural connotations connecting with an era half a century ago (Go Chengdu, 2015).

![Picture 6.19: The creative music park, ‘Eastern Suburb Memory’ (photos by author, 2014).](image)

### 6.4.2 Three stages of city branding

Three main stages in Chengdu’s city branding development can be outlined, according to one respondent, a practitioner working at an advertising and design company in Chengdu (I86, 2012). The first stage was before 1990:

At that time, Chengdu was promoted based on historical resources, like the Three Kingdoms, its food and its natural resources. At that time, as with most Chinese cities, the government was promoting Chengdu based on the images it already had – and had had for thousands of years (Practitioner, I86, 2012).

The same respondent said that, in the past, and in Chengdu’s first stage of city branding, the city was promoted largely through events. The city hosted and created many festivals, such as the 1991 International Panda Festival. People from around the world, including some high-level officials, were invited to the city festivals, as told by the respondent working with advertising and design in Chengdu (Practitioner, I86, 2012). City branding through events has
continued, and at the beginning of 2017, at the time of the Chinese New Year, the ‘Chengdu International Panda Lantern Carnival’ was arranged in Sansheng Village in southeast Chengdu. During the festival, visitors enjoyed food and snacks, performances and amusement, fireworks and the installation of 130 lanterns and festive lamps (Go Chengdu, 2017).

Within China, Chengdu has been branded as the ‘Heart of the west’ and the ‘Modern garden city’, said one respondent, a PR practitioner previously involved on Chengdu’s city branding (I88, 2012). The same person said that the idea behind the ‘garden city’ and ‘heart of the west’ labels is related to the concept of city and country consolidation, promoted by the central government and related to the idea that the countryside and the city should be integrated, like an ecosystem.

In a promotional book titled Chengdu China: Chengdu Real China (2010, compiled by Chengdu Association of Cultural Exchanges with Foreign Countries), features of the modern garden city were listed, including ‘natural beauty, social justice, and integration of urban and rural development’. The vision established for the modern garden city was furthermore to make everyone living in Chengdu enjoy an abundant, equal, free and harmonious happy life. The same book stated: ‘Via hard work, we believe that a supersized, world-class modern garden city will unfold before us’ (Chengdu China: Chengdu Real China, 2010, p. 10).

The second stage in Chengdu’s branding occurred after the 1990s, according to the respondent working at an advertising and design company in Chengdu (I86, 2012). Chengdu then began to look outside Sichuan for promotional opportunities, first within China, but then further afield by targeting tourism from countries in East Asia such as Japan and Korea. In the third stage of city branding, which took place after the year 2000, Chengdu was increasingly branded with international audiences in mind. The previous focus on tourism was moreover complemented by a focus on investments, industries and residents (Practitioner, I86, 2012).
In discussions about city branding in Chengdu, Wenchuan earthquake was mentioned by different respondents, that hit Sichuan province in May 2008. Chengdu was the nearest large city to the epicentre, according to an official at the Information office, Chengdu Municipal Government (I80, 2012). Others have similarly reported that the epicentre of the magnitude 7.9 quake was located about 80 kilometres west-northwest of Chengdu (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013). Almost 90,000 people lost their lives in the earthquake, including more than 5,300 children, and millions of people became homeless after the quake. Several issues also emerged in the aftermath of the disaster, including allegations that poor construction was to blame for the catastrophic collapse of so many school buildings (ibid).

The official at the Information office, Chengdu Municipal Government (I80, 2012) said that, after the quake, people were worried and concerned whether the city was still safe. Consequently, fewer tourists came to Chengdu and real estate prices fell (ibid). The earthquake also drew global attention, and about 3,000 journalists came to Chengdu, according to a PR practitioner who, together with the government, worked with the branding of Chengdu in the period after the earthquake (I88, Practitioner, 2012). Information and messages communicated illustrated what was done after the earthquake, through advertisements on CCTV and in other media channels all over China, the official at the Information office (I80, 2012) said; adding that, in addition to safety, the stories also stressed that Chengdu was still beautiful. There were also advertisements with a focus on investments, featuring CEOs of Fortune 500 companies, confirming that Chengdu was still a safe place. One year after the earthquake, in 2009 and 2010, a lot of work was focused on the affected areas around Chengdu, rebuilding and helping these places recover (ibid):

Many people donated money after the earthquake. We felt it was necessary to show people how all the donated money was used, and show how people lived their lives (Government official, I80, 2012).

The same government official, and a PR practitioner involved in Chengdu’s city branding, said that Wenchuan earthquake became an important event in Chengdu’s city branding (I80, 2012) and a trigger to rebuild the image of Chengdu (I88, 2012). A researcher at the University of Southern California, and originally from Chengdu, commented on the city branding that was carried out after the earthquake (I93, 2012):

It’s interesting how Chengdu used a disaster to change its image. The campaign just after the earthquake, ‘Chengdu is still beautiful’, was a very successful campaign (Researcher, originally from Chengdu, I93, 2012).

As argued by the government official at the Information office, who was directly involved in Chengdu’s city branding work (I80, 2012), since 2010,
Chengdu’s government felt no more need to emphasize the earthquake in its branding, and consequently switched to another branding approach. Similar to the respondent at the advertising and design company (I86, 2012) who outlined three stages in Chengdu’s city branding, the official at the Information office (I80, 2012) said that Chengdu before the earthquake primarily had focused on city branding within China, whereas the city after the quake increasingly was being branded internationally. The PR practitioner involved in Chengdu’s city branding (I88, 2012) added that Chengdu was positioned for the world to see as the ‘Real China’ and the ‘Home of the Panda’. The initiative to brand Chengdu as the Real China was, in the words of the official in the Information office, related to Chengdu’s preservation of the Chinese culture and the traditional character of the city, while also emphasizing that Chengdu had developed economically and still was developing.

The use of words and imagery tied to pandas was not a novel feature in the branding of Chengdu when ‘Home of the Panda’ was first conceived in 2010. Also, prior to the earthquake, Chengdu’s branding had also included images of nature, mountains and rivers, according to one respondent, a practitioner working with advertising and design in Chengdu (I87, 2012). From 2010, panda imagery featured again in Chengdu’s city branding, and was described as a useful symbol in Chengdu’s branding and storytelling (Government official, Information office, Chengdu Municipal Government, I80, 2012). A respondent, a PR practitioner at Ogilvy’s Beijing office involved in Chengdu’s city branding (I90, 2012), said that the panda was a great card to play:

The panda makes our job a lot easier. Or maybe not; maybe it just gives us kind of a fallback to use. The panda is a great card to play, and the media loves it too. I don’t know why, but the media loves pandas, everyone loves pandas (Practitioner, I90, 2012).

6.4.3 Proactive international promotion

From 2010 to 2013, ‘Home of the Panda’ was promoted internationally, with imagery and language tied to pandas incorporated into a number of city branding campaigns, such as ‘Pambassador’ in 2010 and 2013, ‘Panda Awareness Week’ and ‘Chengdu Paw’ in 2012, as well as events in London during the 2012 Olympics, according to a respondent who worked with Chengdu on these events, but from the standpoint of a PR practitioner (I91, 2014). In the ‘Pambassador’ project, for example, the Chengdu Government, going under the name of Chengdu, recruited volunteers worldwide to become ‘Pambassadors’ and visit Chengdu, as told by an official at the Information office, Chengdu Municipal Government (I80, 2012):
A campaign was launched on Facebook, and over 60,000 people applied for the positions. Out of these, six applicants were selected, based on online voting amongst netizens and based on the applicants' knowledge of Chengdu (Government official, I80, 2012).

![Image](image1.jpg)

*Image 6.21: ‘Chengdu Ambassador’ Facebook page (2012) and Chengdu’s Facebook page (2012).*

For the 2012 Olympic Games in London, 50 taxis used around the Olympic venues were covered with images of pandas and information about Chengdu. Chengdu Government sponsored a three-month programme themed ‘Panda Cab Running for the Olympics’. The Panda cabs cruised around London from June 1 to August 31 (Government official, I80, 2012). Inside the taxis, brochures about Chengdu could be found, as well as bar codes that could be scanned using a smartphone, connecting the user to a website in English, called ‘Go Chengdu’, launched in June 2012, just before the Olympic Games started. On the website, it stated:

Chengdu always strives for raising the international community’s awareness of endangered species conservation, promoting harmony between man and nature, and further advocating the Olympic spirit of unity, friendship and peace (Go Chengdu, 2014).

![Image](image2.jpg)

*Image 6.22: Picture of Chengdu’s web portal launched for the 2012 Olympics (Go Chengdu, 2014).*
In 2013, Chengdu arranged the Fortune Global Forum (Fortune conferences, 2013), attracting CEOs from Fortune 500 firms as well as government officials from China and around the world. The Global Forum and Chengdu were promoted through various media, including CNN, the BBC and CCTV. Information about the Forum was also communicated via a Facebook page and through other online channels, including Fortune magazine’s websites and YouTube. Hopes were high in the Chengdu Government before the Forum, as expressed by a respondent from the Information office, Chengdu Municipal Government (I80, 2012):

We really hope we can use the opportunity that the Fortune Global Forum represents, to market Chengdu abroad, and also learn more about how international media works, and learn about city marketing practices abroad (Government official, I80, 2012).

The Global Fortune Forum focused on why companies choose Chengdu, what opportunities the city can offer, what the local regulations are like, what the policies are and what it is like to work with the local authorities. Stories communicated about the Forum focused on first-hand experience from senior executives of foreign companies that validated Chengdu’s story in terms of its economic and financial climate, and in terms of the city as a good place to invest (Practitioner, I90, 2012).

In 2013, at the time of the Global Fortune Forum, Chengdu was promoted as a good place to invest, with the slogan, ‘Chengdu Can Do!’, according to a practitioner working at a PR firm that at the time worked with Chengdu on its city branding (I91, 2014). Films were produced on the theme, including images of the historic and cultural character of Chengdu, combined with its modern and international features.

Other types of film have also been used to brand Chengdu domestically and internationally, using online and offline channels. In 2003, the well-known director Zhang Yimou made the short film ‘Zhang Yimou’s Chengdu’ (2006) depicting Chengdu as a good place:

The film promoted the relaxing lifestyle of Chengdu, and included the sentence that became connected to Chengdu: ‘Once you come, you never want to leave’ (Practitioner, I88, 2012).

Another film, shown on media outlets around the world (e.g. the BBC), shows a panda touring the city of Chengdu. The Chengdu Government invited the wildlife presenter and television producer Nigel Marven to visit Chengdu, resulting in a documentary (Discovery, 2012), an official at the Information office in Chengdu Municipal Government told me (I80, 2012).
The outcome was a documentary film called ‘Panda Adventure with Nigel Marven’, shown on the Discovery Channel in France and the UK, and through online channels (Government official, I80, 2012).

In the past ten years, Chengdu has increasingly been branded globally, and Chengdu has been established as a forerunner amongst Chinese cities in terms of city branding, as told by one respondent, a PR practitioner who worked with Chengdu’s city branding (I88, 2012). The same respondent said that Chengdu has used different messages to reach international, as compared with national, target groups, stating that:

Internationally we are focusing on Chengdu as a city with the fastest growth; but domestically the focus is on Chengdu as a city with the slowest, most relaxing lifestyle (Practitioner, I88, 2012).

The same respondent also said that the branding of Chengdu thus has been combined with promoting a good image of China around the world (I88, 2012). Another respondent, also a PR practitioner working with the branding of Chengdu (I90, 2012), said that Chengdu’s international target markets primarily include the United States and Europe; whereas an official at the Information office (I80, 2012) also mentioned Japan and Korea as target markets. The same official said that one challenge in international city branding is limited awareness of Chengdu amongst international target groups, as well as lack of know-how in international city branding practices amongst officials in Chengdu. In other words:

The biggest barrier or difficulty is to market Chengdu overseas, since the city is not well known outside of China, and we don’t have so much experience in city branding practices (Government official, I80, 2012).

6.4.4 From external to internal city branding

When discussing Chengdu’s city visions in 2011, one respondent, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (I53, 2011), said that Chengdu’s vision is to build itself as an open, regional centre, especially in China’s central and western regions. The same person said that Chengdu also aimed to be an international city. Another respondent, working with the development of culture and tourism in Chengdu, said in 2012 that Chengdu’s vision was to build a truly international tourism destination, attracting a lot of foreign visitors in general as well as many foreign businessmen in particular (I89, 2012). Yet another respondent, working at an advertising and design company in Chengdu (I86, 2012), said in 2012 that Chengdu’s Municipal Government aspires to attract more FDI and tourists to the city, and to increase international awareness of Chengdu.
In 2014, the vision was in some respects altered, compared to the vision articulated in 2011 and 2012. In 2014, a respondent who was working at *Chengdu Daily*, but who had worked in the Information office of Chengdu Municipal Government (I82, 2014) prior to that, said that Chengdu’s vision now could be divided in two, namely cultural heritage and environmental protection. Relatedly, some changes also appeared to have taken place with regards to communication channels. For example, in 2014, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences with much insight into city branding in China (I94, 2014) said that, today, the Chengdu Government relies more on conservative media and less on social media. Another respondent, who used to work at Chengdu Overseas Media Service (I85, 2014), moreover said that, nowadays, the branding to international audiences is less than before.

In 2014, a new slogan had also been launched, namely, ‘The Capital of Success, The City of Fortune’ (成功之都), according to the former official at the Information office of Chengdu Municipal Government (I82, 2014). The same respondent said that:

The new slogan includes four Chinese characters; and if you put the first character and the last character together it means ‘Chengdu’. This is a common language modification method in Chinese (Government official, I82, 2014).

In 2014, on Chengdu’s website, the city was similarly promoted as ‘A City of Fortune and Success’, and the text stated, ‘Better infrastructure, a wealth of business opportunities and untapped consumer markets are attracting global investors to China’s inland areas’ (Go Chengdu, 2014). The former official at the Information office (I82, 2014) said that the aim now is to keep low-level industries out of Chengdu, while attracting high-level industries to the city.

In 2014, another respondent, a practitioner working at a real estate firm in Chengdu (I92, 2014), said that in recent years there has been more focus on ‘green building’ (绿色), and thus the creation of energy-saving buildings and on limiting waste and emissions. Another respondent, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (I94, 2014), added that Chengdu has focused quite a lot on environmental protection in the city in recent years, for example through the ‘Ecological reserve circle’ and the ‘Green route’. In 2014, one respondent, a former official at the Information office in Chengdu Municipal Government (I82, 2014), moreover said that, right now, the central government and Chengdu Government focus on people’s livelihoods and less on GDP and economic growth. The same respondent added that, by paying more attention to people’s livelihoods, the government can improve the image of the city.

At the end of 2014, during a visit to Chengdu, many posters targeting residents, with messages tied to culture, civilization and the Chinese dream, could
be seen around the city (Picture 6.23). Some of the posters communicated ‘Socialist core values’ and, thus, prosperity, democracy, civilization, harmony, freedom, equality, justness, rule of law, patriotism, dedication, integrity and friendliness. Some posters communicated dedication to work and respect for the elderly. The posters were part of a wider ‘Chinese Dream’ narrative, and some of the posters were related to the province, stating, ‘Create a beautiful, prosperous, harmonious Sichuan’, whereas other posters were related to the city of Chengdu. The posters often comprised images of children dressed in traditional clothes, and with hairstyles dating back to the era of the dynasties.

*Picture 6.23: Posters in the centre of Chengdu (photos by author, 2014).*

In Chengdu in 2014, a campaign promoting cultural spirit included messages advocating care for the disabled, and paying attention to children who remain in rural areas while their parents go to find work in the larger cities. The producer of the campaign was the ‘Spirit civilization construction office’ under the Publicity Department of Chengdu Municipal Government and the CCP.

*Picture 6.24: Posters in Chengdu (photos by author, 2014).*
In Picture 6.24, the poster on the left states: “The Chinese dream. Let us embrace hope; Pay attention to children that remain in the rural areas.” The panda is a typical symbol for Chengdu, and the parent panda hugging the child panda can be seen as a reinforcement of the message. The poster on the right states: “Hot Chengdu, warm heart. Understand, respect, care about, help people with disabilities”. The poster’s imagery and message have similarities with narratives centering on the importance of caring for the elderly. The images consist of a symbol for a person in a wheelchair, and a chilli pepper pushing the wheelchair. The chilli pepper and the words “warm” and “hot” also represent the spicy cuisine for which Chengdu is famous.

Another poster focused on the legal environment and stated, “Speed up Chengdu into a national first-class rule of law city” (加快把成都建成全国一流法治城市), emphasizing four key phrases, namely Adhere to scientific legislation (坚持科学立法), Strict law enforcement (严格执法), Impartial justice (公正司法), and Law-abiding (全民守法). The images in the poster included, apart from Chengdu’s logo, also a ‘tripod’ (鼎). The tripod was used in the old days for cooking food, was usually made of bronze or ceramics and can, in this context, be interpreted as symbolizing stability and, hence, the law. The producer behind the poster campaign was the Publicity Department of the CCP Chengdu Municipal Party Committee.

Synthesis and timeline

I have just presented Chengdu as the home of the panda and an engine of China’s western parts, and outlined different stages of Chengdu’s city branding. Here, Chengdu has been depicted as a city with long historical roots, which it makes use of in its city branding, for example in its city logo. Chengdu was originally branded with domestic audiences in mind, followed by increased outward promotion towards international target groups, before returning to a more internal focus and rather discreet, politically safe city branding. In the timeline presented below, some central elements in the history, development and branding of Chengdu are outlined.

![Timeline](image)

*Figure 6.4: Timeline including important events in Chengdu with regards to the city’s history, development and branding.*
6.5 Chongqing: Solving imbalance, creating prosperity

![Image: Chongqing's location in China, and its official city logo.](image)

**Picture 6.25: Chongqing’s location in China, and its official city logo.**

6.5.1 Driving the growth of southwest China

Chongqing is geographically located in the joint zone between the central and western parts of China. It is also situated near Chengdu, and in the conjunction between the more developed eastern parts of China and the less developed western parts (Traffic and tour map of Chongqing, 2011). Chongqing is known for its mountain and river scenery and historic and cultural sites, such as the Three Gorges of the Yangtze River, the Dazu Rock Carvings and the Three Natural Bridges in Wulong (An Overview of Chongqing, a book edited by the Information office of Chongqing Municipal People’s Government, 2014). Rivers and water systems criss-cross the territory of Chongqing, and the central part of the city is built on mountainous terrain, creating a very hilly city. Consequently, Chongqing has been called ‘mountain city’ and ‘city of rivers’ (An Overview of Chongqing, 2014). The city got its name in 1189, meaning literally ‘double celebrations’ (Han & Wang, 2001; Traffic and tour map of Chongqing, 2011).

Chongqing’s history dates back around 3,000 years. In modern history, 1840 is an important year, since it was then, as a consequence of the First Opium War, that Chongqing was forced to open up to Western countries, due to its key location as a gateway to inland China. This speeded up the development of manufacturing, and in the early twentieth century Chongqing’s factories for textile production contributed to one-third of the total production in China (Han & Wang, 2001).

Chongqing became a municipality in 1929. It was designated as the temporal capital of the Guomindang (Kuomintang) government at the time of the War of Resistance Against Japan, from 1937 to 1945 (Traffic and tour map of Chongqing, 2011). As the wartime capital of China, Chongqing became the
political, economic and cultural centre of the nation (An Overview of Chongqing, 2014). Being the wartime capital also meant that many factories moved to Chongqing from Shanghai, Wuhan and Tianjin, and that Chongqing developed into a modern industrial city (Han & Wang, 2001).

In 1942, Chongqing had come to dominate China’s manufacturing in production of steel and machines and material processing. Chongqing had also become the national financial centre and a communication centre (Han & Wang, 2001). As China’s temporary capital, Chongqing was at the forefront of post-war negotiations, and was in 1945 the scene for intense meetings between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong (Chongqing Currents, 2011). After the war, many factories moved back to their home cities, but they nevertheless left an industrial and technological foundation in place (Han & Wang, 2001).

In 1954, Chongqing became a city under Sichuan provincial government. The years following that, Chongqing was given low priority in the development plans of the central and provincial governments (Han & Wang, 2001). However, in 1983, Chongqing was made a pilot city for integrated economic system reform and granted provincial-level authority in terms of economic administration (An Overview of Chongqing, 2014). A year later, in 1984, Chongqing played an active part in the formation of the Economic Coordination Association (ECA), which was formed by five provinces (Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi and Tibet) and two cities (Chongqing and Chengdu) with the head office in Chongqing. The formation of the ECA turned out to be a significant move in that it strengthened Chongqing as the hub of southwest China (Han & Wang, 2001).

In 1992, Chongqing was made one of the cities to carry out the opening-up scheme (An Overview of Chongqing, 2014). Another important event was when, in 1997, Chongqing was designated as the fourth municipality directly under the central government (MCG) (Han & Wang, 2001; Traffic and tour map of Chongqing, 2011), which opened up a new era of rapid growth for Chongqing (An Overview of Chongqing, 2014). The intention of the central government was to build Chongqing into an economic centre serving the needs of southwest China, and into an engine driving the growth of China’s vast western region (Han & Wang, 2001). It has been stated that:

The revitalization of Chongqing depends on the economic development of China’s western region, while the prosperity of China’s western region relies heavily upon the proper functioning of Chongqing as a growth centre (Han & Wang, 2001, p. 115).

Chongqing soon started preparing a new strategic plan to meet its new challenges (Han & Wang, 2001). The focus was on how to further develop Chongqing into a growth pole in southwest China, and on how to use Chongqing as
an anchor link between China’s eastern and western regions. The strategic development plans, ‘Chongqing’s 9th Five-Year Plan (1996–2000)’ and the ‘Guideline of Development towards 2010’, were launched in 1997. Chongqing’s Master Plan for the period 1996–2020 was somewhat later formalized and approved by the central government in December 1998 (ibid). In ‘Chongqing’s Master Plan 1996–2000’, three strategic objectives were specified, namely: to speed up the development of agricultural modernization; to strengthen existing ‘pillar industries’ and to cultivate new ones; and to accelerate development of the finance, commerce, real estate, transportation, telecommunications, and tourism sectors (Han & Wang, 2001).

When becoming a MCG, Chongqing’s land area increased more than threefold (Han & Wang, 2001). Today, the size of Chongqing can be equalled to that of Austria, and Chongqing has been labelled the largest municipality in the world (Callahan, 2013) in terms of population and land area (An Overview of Chongqing, 2014). The population in Chongqing doubled from 15 million in 1995 to 30.59 million in 1998 (Han & Wang, 2001), and grew to approximately 33 million in 2012 (Callahan, 2013). Chongqing consequently became the largest MCG and the only municipality in the central and western parts of China (Zhao & Qian, 2014). The inclusion of new, less urbanized areas reduced Chongqing’s level of urbanization, from 26.7 per cent in 1995 to 20 per cent in 1998 (Han & Wang, 2001). Some years later, it was estimated that 70 per cent of Chongqing’s population was rural, and that large areas of Chongqing’s territory included land beyond the urban core (Callahan, 2013). Chongqing has also been depicted as a city of rapid urbanization, and in 2012 was named one of China’s 13 emerging mega-cities (Economist Intelligence Unit Report, 2012).

6.5.2 Magical economic development

One respondent, an official at the Information office, Chongqing Municipal Government involved in Chongqing’s city branding (I65, 2011), described Chongqing as an old city, and a new city, or as a combination of old and new. In the Preface to the Planning Exhibition Hall in Chongqing it was moreover stated, in 2011:

Time seems to get back to the remote past from now, going from today into the future, looking forward to a glamorous Chongqing, and the sustainable development of both its people and the city itself (Chongqing’s Planning Exhibition Hall, 2011).

When we discussed Chongqing’s city branding, the same respondent referred to above (I65, 2011) said that, before 1997, Chongqing was a heavy industrial city, and it did not have much of an idea about what to become, or what it wanted to be in the future. The same official said that this changed in 1997,
however, when Chongqing became the fourth MCG, because the central government at that time appointed Chongqing as an experimental area, and supplied the city with the mission to find solutions to the problem of imbalanced development that exist in Chongqing and all over China. He continued:

The mission allowed Chongqing to make mistakes, because when engaging in experimental things, you also make mistakes. And you will find the solution. So, this is why Chongqing now has so many creative projects and policies (Government official, I65, 2011).

In 1997, when Chongqing became a municipality, the concept of the ‘Dream city’ was created and communicated.

We wanted people to come to Chongqing to make their dreams come true. So, we positioned the city as a ‘Dream city’. That’s our goal, and our hope. Similar to America when it just started to develop the west (Government official, I65, 2011).

The official at the Information office (I65, 2011) continued, saying that, after the ‘Dream city’, Chongqing was branded as the ‘City of magic’, due to the rapid development that Chongqing had experienced since 1997.

Chongqing developed so fast that we thought it was magic. So ‘City of magic’ is what came to our minds (Government official, I65, 2011).

The rapid economic development, coupled with an envisioning and creation of economic imaginaries, has continued in Chongqing. In a booklet distributed by the Information office in Chongqing Municipal Government (An Overview of Chongqing, 2014), Chongqing’s visions include the creation of a ‘Famous Auto City’ and the ‘Capital of Motorcycles’. One respondent, a researcher at Chongqing University (I73, 2011), however, depicted motorbikes and cars as belonging to the most important Chongqing industries of the past, but not of the present or the future. The same respondent said that Chongqing rather has seen a shift towards a focus on IT and laptops, which was also emphasized in the government’s promotional material (An Overview of Chongqing, 2014) which stated that, in 2012, 42 million laptops were produced in Chongqing, representing a fifth of all laptops produced worldwide. In other informational material distributed by the city, Chongqing is moreover described as an important industrial base, an economic centre and transport hub (Traffic and tour map of Chongqing, 2011). Chongqing is also depicted as becoming the ‘capital of shopping, food, conventions and exhibitions’ (An Overview of Chongqing, 2014).
In 2010, the State Council issued the Approval of the Establishment of ‘Lingjiang New Area’ in Chongqing (An Overview of Chongqing, 2014). The same book describes how the new area was officially established the same year, and furthermore maintains that Lingjiang New Area became the only state-level new area in inland China for national development and opening-up, as well as the third area directly approved by the State Council, after Pudong New Area in Shanghai and Binhai New Area in Tianjin. The central government gave Lingjiang New Area five roles to adopt, namely: to be a pilot area of integrated reform in rural and urban areas; to be a base for advanced manufacturing industry and modern service industry in inland China; to be a financial centre on the upper reaches of the Yangtze River; to be an important gateway for the opening-up of inland China; and to showcase scientific development (An Overview of Chongqing, 2014).

One respondent, a researcher at Chongqing University (I73, 2011), interpreted the focus on Lingjiang New Area as related to the task given by the central government to Chongqing, namely to build an economic, political and financial centre at the upper reaches of the river running through the city. Chongqing appears to follow the directives from the central government and, as stated in An Overview of Chongqing (2014), is argued to be actively making efforts to become by 2017 the financial centre, commerce and logistics centre as well as science and education centre along the upper reaches of the Yangtze River. By the same year, Chongqing should moreover have developed into an integrated transportation hub along the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, and an international logistics centre for western China (ibid).

These efforts are in line with Chongqing’s implementation of the policy of developing western China and making efforts to make the city ‘an open highland in the west’ (An Overview of Chongqing, 2014; Chongqing Commerce Commission, 2012). Making Chongqing into an international logistics centre is moreover tied to the development of transportation infrastructure, such as the Chongqing–Xinjiang–Europe railway, which is described as a new strategic corridor for transporting goods from China to Europe. It is, therefore, also
called the ‘New Silk Road’ or ‘Third Eurasian Continental Bridge’ (An Overview of Chongqing, 2014), tying into national strategies and objectives.

6.5.3 Promoting common prosperity

In 2006, Chongqing created the logotype, or city symbol, called ‘Chongqing Renren’, said one respondent, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (I51, 2011). Another respondent, the head of a news corporation in Chongqing (I71, 2011), added that ‘Renren’ (人人) means ‘two people’ in Chinese, and is said to symbolize ‘doing things together’, a couple, and devotion to the city. In An Overview of Chongqing (2014), Chongqing’s city logo was moreover said to represent ‘two jubilant people’ that together form the Chinese character ‘qing’ (庆), which also means ‘celebration’. Furthermore, Chongqing’s city logo was said to resemble ‘double celebration’, which is also the literal meaning of the city name Chongqing (Han & Wang, 2001). One respondent, a government official at the Information office (I65, 2011), added that the logo should symbolize that the city is for everyone, saying:

You can see the shape of the logo. It also looks like two people holding hands. It means that the city is created by everyone; and that the creations of the city should be enjoyed by everyone (Government official, Information office, Chongqing Municipal Government, I65, 2011).

The logo is in red and yellow (or orange) colours, which, according to one respondent, the head of a news corporation in Chongqing (I71, 2011), were selected because they are regarded as happy colours in China. The same respondent added that the colours were also selected because red is supposed to indicate the government, whereas yellow is to signify the residents. Furthermore, red and yellow were also chosen to symbolize local enterprises (red) and foreign enterprises (yellow) and a hope that they can work together. Yet another reason for the choice of colours was related to openness and diversity, the head of the news corporation said, adding that:

![Picture 6.27: ‘Renren’, Chongqing’s city logo (An Overview of Chongqing, 2014).](image-url)
The two colours in Chongqing’s city logo also symbolize that no matter your skin colour, you are welcomed in Chongqing (Practitioner, I71, 2011).

The official at the Information office of Chongqing Municipal Government (I65, 2011), said that Chongqing’s logo is a very important part of Chongqing’s city branding. During both field visits to Chongqing, in 2011 and 2014, the logo could be seen all over the city, on buses, souvenirs and water bottles, for example.

![Picture 6.28: Chongqing’s logo on a bus, a water bottle and on an embroidered artwork (photos by author, 2011).](image)

From June 2006, Chongqing Municipal Government moreover carried out a number of mass campaigns, including singing red (revolutionary) songs, reading classic books, telling stories and spreading mottos, centring on core values such as socialist construction, solidarity, courtesy, and mutual helpfulness (Hou, Xin & Ren, 2012). This continued during the ‘Five Chongqing’ programme, which was put forth at the third session of the Third CCP Chongqing Municipal Full Committee Meeting in July 2008, and described as the main thrust for the future building of the city (ibid). Chongqing’s Party secretary at the time, Bo Xilai, was depicted by my respondents and in various outlets as the founder of the Five Chongqing programme. In a Global Times article from 2009, the Party secretary and the Five Chongqing programme is referred to:

Bo Xilai said that all aspects of the significant ‘Five Chongqing’ program are targeting in improving people’s lives and guiding people into a moderately prosperous society, which prove to be a successful response to the campaign of the profound study and practice of the scientific outlook on development (Global Times, 2009).

The Five Chongqing programme included five keywords, namely, liveable (宜居), smooth (畅通), healthy (健康), safe (安全) and forest (森林), discussed by different respondents in 2011, including a researcher at Chongqing University (I73, 2011); an official at the Information office of Chongqing Municipal
Government (I65, 2011), and the head of a news corporation (I71), and elaborated on in news outlets, city promotional material and research. Regarding the aim of Five Chongqing, the respondent from the news organization said:

The purpose of the Five Chongqing program is to create fortune and well-being for everyone, all the time (Practitioner, I71, 2011).

Liveable Chongqing (宜居重庆) was described by the official of the Information office (I65, 2011) as being about public housing for no- and low-income families, and for recent graduates that were starting a business or looking for a job. The same respondent also said that ‘Liveable Chongqing’ was also about redecorating old houses in urban areas. In *An Overview of Chongqing* (2014), it was written that, with the opening-up and development of Chongqing, both urban and rural residents are benefiting from steadily increasing incomes together with better unemployment benefits and social security. Housing conditions, the urban environment and people’s livelihoods have also improved (*An Overview of Chongqing*, 2014).

![Picture 6.29: Liveable Chongqing banner (left) and Smooth Chongqing banner (right) (photos by author, 2011).](image)

In turn, ‘Smooth Chongqing’ (畅通重庆) was described by the official at the Information office (I65, 2011) as being about solving traffic problems in Chongqing and shortening the time to travel between the outskirts and the centre of the city; a programme which involved building roads and bridges and improving the traffic lights system. Additional efforts related to Smooth Chongqing were connected to water, land and air, efforts that one respondent, a researcher at Chongqing University (I73, 2011), argued had improved the transportation infrastructure a lot. The same respondent stated that Chongqing airport will be one of the world’s top 100 airports, and that Chongqing railways will become the fifth biggest in China, adding:

Chongqing has built a direct railway to Europe, and Chongqing will become a new bridge to Europe. Chongqing will also become the biggest logistic centre in the west of China. Because of this, a lot of investors from all over the world come to Chongqing (Researcher, I73, 2011).
One respondent, the head of a news corporation in Chongqing (I71, 2011), said that ‘Health Chongqing’ was partly directed at primary school students in the rural parts of Chongqing, including serving them free breakfast and lunch. Another element of Health Chongqing was the establishment of playing fields in schools to encourage the students to exercise, together with squares and public spaces where elderly people could gather to dance, do Tai Chi and other activities, said an official at the Information office, Chongqing’s Municipal Government (I65, 2011). The same respondent also said:

So, if you go to People’s square or other squares, in the morning and at night, you will see hundreds of people dancing (Government official, I65, 2011).

‘Forest Chongqing’ (森林重庆), which was also referred to by some as Green Chongqing (e.g. Global Times, 2009), included the planting of trees and making the city greener, one respondent told me, the official at the Information office (I65, 2011). According to Global Times (2009), Green Chongqing implied an improved environment where people enjoy more fresh air, and an increase of 10,000 square kilometres of forest in the city.

Picture 6.30: Health Chongqing banner (left) and Forest Chongqing banner (right) (photos by author, 2011).

Picture 6.31: Safe Chongqing banner, and one of many small police stations around Chongqing (photos by author, 2011).
‘Safe Chongqing’ (安全重庆, see also Picture 6.31) referred to a reinforced sense of security of people in the city, as well as the creation of safer work environments and a decrease in work accidents (Global Times, 2009). In the words of an official at the Information office of Chongqing Municipal Government, Safe Chongqing was connected to Chongqing’s modern history of having a ‘dark society’, including mafia, crimes and corruption, and the need to make Chongqing a safer place. The same respondent said that this was done partly through changes in the police force and the placement of small police stations around the city, enabling the police to be closer to the residents and act faster in case of a crime or emergency (I65, 2011). However, the small police stations around the city have also been criticized for being unnecessary and too expensive (Digital Commons, 2012).

The official at the Information office (I65, 2011) explained that the Five Chongqing programme was one sub-project under the larger umbrella of creating mutual wealth or common prosperity in Chongqing. Another respondent, the head of a news corporation in Chongqing (I71, 2011), said that the idea behind, and the purpose of, the Five Chongqing programme was in line with the final goal of China’s plan to create well-being for all Chinese people. In July 2011 (a few months prior to my first field visit to Chongqing), in the ninth session of the Third CCP Chongqing Municipal Full Committee Meeting, it was decided that Chongqing should focus on promoting common prosperity, or mutual wealth, and on narrowing the Three Gaps, and thus the gaps between rich and poor, between urban and rural districts, and between regions (Hou et al., 2012), relating closely to the Five Chongqing programme.

One respondent, the head of a news corporation in Chongqing (I71, 2011), said that a key idea behind both the Five Chongqing programme and the promotion of common prosperity was to create and promote a city that is for everyone. Another respondent, the official at the Information office (I65, 2011), explained the promotion of common prosperity or mutual wealth as an overarching goal and ideology that was created in Chongqing as a response to the mission from the central government to solve imbalance and promote balanced urban–rural development.

The Five Chongqing programme can also be tied to decisions made in June 2010, at the seventh session of the Third CCP Chongqing Municipal Full Committee Meeting, when it was decided that Chongqing should focus on improving people’s livelihoods through the ‘Ten Livelihoods’ (Hou et al., 2012). Amongst other things, this included: building 600,000 public rental houses to address the housing problems of 30 per cent of low- and middle-income people; increasing the coverage of forest and urban greening by 35–40 per cent, while creating the ‘Ecological Garden City’, the ‘National Forest City’ and the ‘Environmental Protection Model City’; providing school policemen for Chongqing’s kindergartens, primary schools and middle schools and building
500 police officer patrol platforms around the city; providing pensions for old people in the rural areas; reforming the household registration system; rebuilding 150 township hospitals; and creating 300,000 new jobs and developing 60,000 micro-enterprises (ibid).

The focus on finding solutions to the problem of imbalanced development is moreover tied to the focus on coordinated urban–rural development, and the relationship between agriculture and industry (Long, Zou, Pykett & Li, 2011). In a visit to Chongqing in 2016, China’s current President, Xi Jinping, said that Chongqing faces a difficult task with regards to coordinated urban–rural development, since the city is criss-crossed by rivers and mountains, and covers large urban and rural areas which are imbalanced in development (Xinhuanet, 2016).

The development and branding of Chongqing has moreover centred largely on improving economic development and people’s living conditions in the city, and focused on making Chongqing the leader of western China in realizing the goal of ‘building a moderately prosperous society’ (An Overview of Chongqing, 2014, p. 103), tying into the strategy of ‘One Coordination, Three Moves, Two Transformations’ (一统, 三化, 两转变). ‘One coordination’ refers to balanced urban–rural development; three moves are about accelerating the process of industrialization, agricultural modernization and urbanization; while two transformations refer to the transformation of the economic growth mode and of government functions (An Overview of Chongqing, 2014).

The project to promote common prosperity and the ‘One Coordination, Three Moves, Two Transformations’ strategy, is moreover aimed to enrich the people, improve people’s livelihoods and promote Chongqing, and can be seen in the context of social harmony, stability and ‘scientific development’, proposed by the former president Hu, and advocating comprehensive, coordinated, sustainable development (Xinhua, 2012). This also relates to China’s aim to build a ‘xiaokang’ (moderately prosperous) society, and eliminate extreme poverty by the end of the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) period (World Bank, 2016).

One respondent, the official at the Information office (I65, 2011), emphasized that imbalanced development and income is not a problem faced by Chongqing and China alone, but an issue that most developed countries struggle with, saying:

And there is no solution found to this problem. So, we promote this idea, this experimental idea. We want to find a solution. And if we can find one we can provide the experience to the whole world (Government official, I65, 2011).
The eagerness to communicate Chongqing’s achievements to international audiences could also be seen in the messages of a poster in the office of the Information office in Chongqing Municipal Government, for example, which stated: ‘Let Chongqing march to the world and let the world learn about Chongqing’. In a discussion on the target groups for Chongqing’s city branding, one respondent, a researcher at Chongqing University (I73, 2011), said that the target groups for Chongqing’s city branding could be divided into two groups, namely foreigners and residents. The same respondent added that residents, in turn, can be divided into two groups, namely people who were born in Chongqing and those who have moved to the city, his reasoning being that these target groups have different aims and objectives and should, as a consequence, be targeted differently, furthermore adding that:

Also amongst the group that are born in Chongqing there are differences. Chongqing includes more rural areas, and farmers thus represent a large group of people. Their demands on the city are quite different from people living in the city centre (Researcher, I73, 2011).

6.5.4 ‘No more slogans, now more concrete actions’

Much of what has been depicted here, including the Five Chongqing programme, took place under the leadership of Chongqing’s former leader, Bo Xilai, who served as the city’s Party secretary from 2007 to 2012. At the beginning of 2012, Bo was however expelled from the CCP, and in September 2013 he was sentenced to life in prison (Callahan, 2013). Bo’s fall exposed corruption and power abuses at the very heart of the CCP leadership, triggering the Party’s most serious crisis since 1989, and damaging its legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary people and the élite (Callahan, 2013). After the downfall of Bo, the central government sent Zhang Dejian, then Vice Premier, to stabilize the scandal-ridden Chongqing as its interim leader (Zhao & Qian, 2014). Sun Zhengcai succeeded Zhang, and became Chongqing’s Party secretary in November 2012. Sun has, since he took office in Chongqing, demonstrated a down-to-earth working style, in sharp contrast to the high-profile Bo Xilai (ibid).

In the early phase of my fieldwork, and during a field study in Chongqing in 2011, Bo Xilai was often talked about in very positive terms. One respondent, the head of a news corporation (I71, 2011), said that Bo was very positive for the city, and even became Chongqing’s brand. Another respondent, a leader of a Chinese consultancy firm (Practitioner, I38, 2012), said that Bo did a lot for Chongqing in terms of city development and city branding during his years in the city. I was also told that, ‘people at the bottom of society usually loved him very much’ (Practitioner, I102, 2014).
Towards the later phases of my fieldwork, and during a field study in Chongqing in 2014, extremely few people wanted to talk about Bo, what had happened to him or the consequences for Chongqing’s city branding. The few people who did say anything, including a researcher at Southwest University of Political Science and Law (I78, 2014) said that, ‘a lot has changed since Bo Xi’er’. The same respondent said that the proactive approach to branding, and the international ambitions to show Chongqing to the world, had been changed to a focus on more concrete, practical city branding activities in the city, adding that the new catchphrase for city branding in Chongqing is ‘No more slogans; Now more concrete actions are used’ (Researcher, I78, 2014).

However, various slogans could still be spotted around the city, but referred primarily to the Chinese Dream concept as well as other posters with messages about cultivating values. Moreover, the Renren logo could also still be seen around the city and in various promotional material.

The Five Chongqing programme disappeared with Bo, and has been replaced by the strategy to develop ‘Five Major Functional Areas’, emphasized by Party secretary Sun, and with the aim of developing five functional areas with distinct development strategies and priorities (Zhao & Qian, 2014). One respondent, a researcher at Southwest University of Political Science, with insight into city branding in Chongqing (I76) said, in 2014, that the Five Chongqing programme and the ‘Five Functional Districts’ are very different. In contrast, another respondent, a researcher at Chongqing University, also with insights into city branding in Chongqing (I75, 2014), argued that there are no significant differences between ‘Five Chongqing’ and ‘Five Functional Districts’ other than the former focused more on ordinary people whereas the latter centred more on the economic structure.

In addition to the ‘Five Functional Districts’, Chongqing’s stated vision in 2014 was that the city should continue its ongoing pilot on rural–urban integrated development achieving poverty reduction, balanced development,
equality of public services, and so forth, and turn Chongqing into a globally oriented city with increasing external links (Zhao & Qian, 2014). One respondent, an official at Chongqing Municipal Government (I68, 2014), said in 2014 that Chongqing’s goals included developing various city districts in Chongqing. The same respondent said that Chongqing’s goals are related to the building of a harmonious society, and that the aim is to develop Chongqing based on the directives from the central government (I68, 2014).

The proposition from the CCP Chongqing Municipal Committee and Chongqing Municipal People’s Government is to combine the key functional areas with the city’s overall development (International Daily, 2013). The division of the city into five functional areas moreover means that the city should have an urban core area, an urban functional expansion area, an urban development new area, Chongqing northeast ecological conservation and development area, and Chongqing southeast ecological protection and development area. The urban core area of Chongqing is the most developed area of the city, and a completely urbanized area (ibid). The purpose of the urban core area (or the core metropolitan area) of Chongqing is that it shall reflect the function of Chongqing as a national central city in politics and economy, history and culture, in financial innovation and as a modern service centre (Chongqing Municipal Government, 2013). The aim for the urban core area is also to strengthen the construction of central business districts and important business clusters to make Chongqing the metropolitan centre with ‘powerful radiation effect and nationwide influence’ (ibid).


The ‘urban functional expansion area’ means the expanding construction zone of Chongqing, and a large area of land designed to provide space for the future new urban population, and for advanced manufacturing industry, education, research, business, logistics and exhibitions (International Daily, 2013). The ‘urban development new area’ refers to the satellite town clusters built on the outskirt of the city. The priority for ‘Chongqing northeast ecological conservation and development area’ and ‘Chongqing southeast ecological protection and development area’ is ecological protection and conservation. The focus for these two functional areas will moreover be on environmental protection,
developing an eco-economy and conserving water in the Three Gorges reservoir catchment area, etc. (ibid) The increased focus on the environment could also be seen in the development and promotion of Chongqing’s Bishan district. During my field visit in 2014, ‘Bishan Cultural Week’ was arranged in Chongqing Tiandi, and aimed to brand Bishan as an environmentally friendly district (see also Picture 6.33).

**Synthesis and timeline**

I have just discussed Chongqing in terms of history, development and city branding. Like Chengdu, Chongqing is an important city in driving the growth of China’s southwest and western parts. Since becoming a municipality in 1997, Chongqing has experienced rapid development and has taken on the role of developing common prosperity, which includes bridging between rich and poor and between urban and rural. It has also meant a focus on local populations and the creation of social imaginaries, seen in campaigns like the Five Chongqing and in the city logo. In the timeline presented below, some key elements in the history, development and branding of Chongqing are outlined.

![Figure 6.5: Timeline including important events in Chongqing with regards to the city’s history, development and branding.](image)

**6.6 Summing up**

In this rather descriptive chapter, I have presented the five Chinese mega-cities studied in this dissertation, and sought to answer RQ1, namely, ‘What imagery is used in the branding of Chinese mega-cities?’. I have thus focused here on the content of city branding images and language communicated through various channels, for example promotional material, posters in the cityscape, local and national policies and plans, official concepts and ideas, and media portrayals. I have also focused on how the imagery is put in place, and consequently on how the city branding practices play out in Chinese mega-cities. Finally, I have focused on the wider context in which the imagery is used and, thus, for example the cities’ histories and roles in China.
In this chapter, I attempt to answer RQ2 and, thus, ‘What imaginaries (economic, social, cultural, etc.) are used in the branding of Chinese mega-cities?’ Consequently, I attempt to bring some order into the multitude of imagery used in the branding of the five cities studied (discussed in Chapter 6), by grouping them into place imaginaries that were identified in the analysis phase (discussed in Chapter 4). Based on the empirical material of this study, and building on Chapter 6, I elaborate here on five distinct place imaginaries that I found in the cities studied – namely economic, international, cultural, social, and environmental/ecological imaginaries – which I illustrate next with examples from the five cities studied (see also Figure 7.1), and relate to place branding research (Chapter 2) and the conceptual framework (Chapter 3).

![Figure 7.1: Place imaginaries found in the five cities studied.](image)

The place imaginaries discussed in this chapter are often intertwined and overlapping. The different place imagery that forms the various place imaginaries contains both similarities and differences in the five cities studied. All imaginaries are represented in all five cities, to varying degrees. All five place imaginaries are moreover permeated by an ideological element.
7.1 Economic imaginary

As outlined in Chapter 6, economic realities play an important role in China, not least when it comes to city branding. The economy is also seen as the most central driver for city branding in the Chinese cities studied here (Economist Intelligence Unit Report, 2012). Previous place branding research has emphasized the enhancement of industries and the attraction of outside investments to places (e.g. Kavaratzis & Ashworth, 2005), and the use of place branding strategies to boost the economic development of places (e.g. Acharya & Rahman, 2016; Kotler & Gertner, 2002). In the cities studied here, city branding is not only seen as dependent on the economy, but also as an important tool in economic development and investment promotion. Thus, it is not surprising that the economic imaginary is dominant, and plays a central role in the branding of Chinese mega-cities.

What I mean by economic place imaginary in relation to place branding is the sum of similar place imagery linked to economic and commercial features. In my study of five Chinese mega-cities, I have found three key elements forming an economic imaginary used in city branding in the cities studied: cities as economic centres, attraction of investors, and creation of competitiveness.

7.1.1 Cities as economic centres

One element of the economic imaginary is based on portraying the city as a present or future economic centre. In Shanghai, for example, a central goal has been to take on the role of China’s financial and commercial centre (Fu, 2002; Wu & Li, 2002). A key move taking Shanghai in this direction was the transformation of Shanghai from the early 1990s and especially the opening of ‘Pudong New Area’ (Green, 2010), seen for example in Pudong’s infrastructure development and the area’s startling conversion into the ultra-modern, high-tech financial centre it is today (Ma, 2004). One respondent, an official at the Capital Institute of Social and Economic Development, Beijing Municipal Government (I29, 2012), stated that Shanghai’s aim is to be China’s economic centre. Considering how often Shanghai is referred to as mainland China’s economic and financial centre (e.g. in The Economist, 2016a; The China Perspective, 2017; China Trade Research, 2017), we can now – 2017 – effectively regard this goal as reached.

Chongqing has been envisioned, created and branded as the economic centre of southwest China, and as an engine driving the growth of China’s vast western regions (Han & Wang, 2001; Traffic and tour map of Chongqing, 2011). Similar to Chongqing, Chengdu is also depicted as a core economic growth pole in western China (Chengdu Investment Guide, 2013). Even though Shenzhen is one of the main economic centres in south China, the city is not ex-
licitly branded as such, possibly to avoid challenging Hong Kong and Shanghai. Beijing has not been depicted as a traditional economic centre within China, but rather as a cultural and political hub (Wei & Yu, 2006), yet the capital encompasses the economic imaginary, for example through its focus on attracting investors, discussed next.

7.1.2 Cities as investment hubs

In Chengdu, a central aim has been to attract companies and FDI to the city, as told by one respondent, an official at the Information office in Chengdu Municipal Government (I80, 2012). The same respondent also said that an important event in doing so was the Global Fortune Forum, arranged in 2013, attracting CEOs from Fortune 500 firms and government officials from China and around the world. In Beijing, the ‘real’ audience for the city’s branding was described by one respondent, an official at the Capital Institute of Social and Economic Development, Beijing Municipal Government (I29, 2012), as comprising domestic and international investors which, the same respondent said, is due to the importance that the city leaders of Beijing put on economic development.

An illustrative example of the promotion of cities to investors could be found in Shenzhen, a city that during the last decade actively has promoted itself to international audiences as ‘a good place to invest’. The organization ‘Invest Shenzhen’, which is promoting Shenzhen as a good place to invest, has for example used a poster campaign infused with economic images and language. Some of the posters in their campaign are shown in Picture 7.1.

![Picture 7.1: Posters from Invest Shenzhen (2014), with messages from left to right: ‘Invest in Shenzhen, win-win future’, ‘Attract companies, maintain companies, develop companies’, ‘Understand policy, understand goal, understand the market’.](image)

The economic rationale is clearly emphasized in the posters communicating: ‘Invest in Shenzhen, win-win future’, symbolizing that you are a winner if you invest in Shenzhen, and that Shenzhen, together with partners, will conquer
the future (Picture 7.1, left). The focus on an economic imaginary can also be seen in statements like this one: ‘Attract companies, maintain companies, develop companies’ (Picture 7.2, middle). In addition, political aspects tied to the economic imaginary can be seen in statements like this one: ‘Understand policy, understand goal, understand the market’ (Picture 7.2, right).

7.1.3 Competitive cities

Another element of the economic imaginary used in the five cities studied is the emphasis on the creation of city competitiveness, be it the creation of competitive advantage in a city (Doel & Hubbard, 2002), the entrepreneurial style of cities (Jessop & Sum, 2000), or simply the awareness of the economic competition between cities, regions and nations (Miller & Rose, 2008). Information gathered from the interviews I conducted also provides evidence that the cities compete against each other to win attention, domestically and internationally, which previous research has similarly addressed (Fu, 2002). Shanghai, for example, started to engage in city branding in competition with cities inside and outside China, since global capital is mobile and beyond the control of government authorities (Fu, 2002). Shenzhen, in turn, founded Invest Shenzhen in 2011, as a response to increased competition from other cities, according to one respondent, an official at Invest Shenzhen (I95, 2014).

A key competitive element of Chinese cities was described by one respondent, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences doing research on urban competitive indexes (I54, 2012), as their rapid economic development. The same respondent also said that, amongst the global cities in the world, Chinese cities develop very quickly. Another respondent, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (I113, 2012), argued that Chinese cities face increased pressure to come up with strategies connected to the service economy in order to be competitive and successful. China’s Premier, Li Keqiang, has moreover emphasized that the demand for services is increasing, according to an official in the office of the Finance Sector, Shanghai Municipal Government (C3, 2013). The newly constructed ‘Qianhai Economic Zone’ in Shenzhen, which has been envisioned and developed into a world-class modern service industry cooperation zone, offers one example of a focus on the service economy to enhance competitiveness.

In previous studies, Sum (2010) for example, also identified ‘competitiveness’ as a crucial dimension in a study of Hong Kong. Furthermore, in the context of Chinese cities, the imperative of enhancing competitiveness has been described by Wu (2015) as dictating the rationale for creating strategic plans; plans in which central purposes consisted of ‘strategic actions’ and to ‘benchmark the city against other competitors’ (ibid, p. 110). Examples of actions incorporated into the city master plans, and thus also city branding practices, include tactics to enhance competitiveness and countermeasures to threats.
from competitors (Wu, 2015), indicating an emphasis on economic parameters and a focus on an economic imaginary.

However, many respondents, especially government officials, were quite hesitant to speak of competition, in particular domestic competition between Shanghai and Shenzhen, for example, cities that both are often regarded as economic and financial centres. Respondents instead preferred to engage in discussions of the cities in terms of them having different, complementary roles. One reason for this might be that the mindset of cities competing against each other is relatively new in a Chinese context (Wu, 2015). Another might well be the desire of the ruling elite to maintain ‘harmony’ and the fear of creating conflict by emphasizing competition.

Senior leaders in Chinese cities are promoted based on their performance in the city; a performance that traditionally has been measured in terms of GDP growth (Chien, 2010), but recently has shifted to an emphasis on sustainable development. This was highlighted among some of the respondents, and one respondent, a researcher at Tsinghua University in Beijing (I63, 2014), for example said that there is an increasing tendency in China to evaluate city leaders based on political harmony and stability more than GDP and economic growth. Another respondent, a former official at the Information office in Chengdu Municipal Government (I82, 2014), similarly said that, right now (end of 2014), the central government and Chengdu Government focus less on economic growth, and more on people’s livelihoods. This can be interpreted as an indication that the economic imaginary is weakening, while other imaginaries are increasing in strength and importance.

7.2 International imaginary

Due to their size and their resources, China’s mega-cities are almost automatically branded in a global or an international context. This context, and the cities’ role in it, is also frequently used in the city branding practices. Consequently, the cities studied here have engaged in a transformation process to make their economic systems and ideas more international (Wu, 2000). They have also integrated with the global economy, and increasingly engaged in city branding targeting international audiences (Fan, 2014a; Wen & Sui, 2014; Wu, 2000). The five cities studied have moreover started establishing powerful positions in the world (Wang & Zheng, 2010), have been depicted as emerging global cities (Wei et al., 2006) and are, in the coming decades, expected to become significant rivals of present global cities, including New York, London, Paris and Tokyo (Global Cities Index, 2012).

By international imaginary in relation to place branding, I mean the sum of various place imagery that exhibit international elements. This international
imaginary is created in the context of China’s globalizing efforts and as a response to the central government’s policies and directives stating that Chinese cities should internationalize. In this study, I have identified two main elements of the international imaginary used in the cities, namely international competence and international claims.

7.2.1 International competence

The envisioning and creation of an international imaginary is evident in the hosting of mega-events in China, which has been described as key components of the cities’ internationalization efforts (Wen & Sui, 2014). One respondent, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences doing research on events and tourism (I60, 2012), said that mega-events have contributed a lot to the branding and perceptions of Chinese mega-cities. The same respondent said that mega-events are arranged by the central government and as such attract enough financial resources to reach international standards (I60, 2012). The events also draw influence from international place branding experts and scholars. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the mega-event strategy in China is that it has boosted the image of the cities as competent players when it comes to organizing large events, portraying them as competent and able to handle international business and foreign affairs.

Events such as the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai and the 2013 Fortune Global Forum in Chengdu incorporated internationalization effects as they contributed to exposure of the host cities and of China to international audiences, as stated by different respondents in the cities studied. An official in Beijing (at the Capital Institute of Social and Economic Development, Beijing Municipal Government, I29, 2012) said that by hosting the Olympics, Beijing became better known around the world. A researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences studying festival and events (I60, 2012) said that the Olympic Games even ‘changed the world’s view on China’. Even though such statements can be viewed with some scepticism, previous research has shown that mega-events like the Olympics do generate worldwide attention (Zhang & Zhao, 2009) and attract much global media coverage (Sevin & Björner, 2015).

In Shanghai, effects from the Expo involved the development of more efficient transportation, as well as a more active and interesting city, one respondent said, namely a PR practitioner working in Shanghai at the time of the 2010 World Expo (I5, 2010). Another respondent, a researcher at Renmin University in Beijing, with insights into the hosting of Beijing Olympics (I56, 2012), said that the 2008 Games was an important driving force behind Beijing’s city transformation. Wen and Sui (2014) have similarly stated that large events have been important driving forces behind other city transformations in China,
and that they have contributed to making Chinese cities more international and more globally competitive.

Another aspect is that the imagery created to symbolize internationalization have been used to educate city residents, staff and visitors in what it means to be part of the international community. Mega-events such as the 2010 Expo and the 2008 Olympics educated residents to behave in certain ways, and in accordance with international standards. At the time of the World Expo in Shanghai, for example, the media started debating the appropriateness of wearing pyjamas on the street, outside people’s homes, as people often did, which led to a changed behaviour, according to a PR practitioner working in Shanghai at the time of the Expo (I5, 2010). The same respondent said that locals also learned to stand in line during the event. Similar observations have been made by Dynon (2011), for example, by referring to street-side posters in Shanghai at the time of the Expo, emphasizing queuing at the Expo, civility when cycling, and protecting the environment or stopping littering.

Other efforts to educate local populations in terms of international standards could be found in Shenzhen in 2014. ‘Shenzhen International Etiquette Promotion Month’ (深圳国际礼仪宣传月) had similar intentions, communicating correct international behaviour when travelling in China and abroad. A brochure about the month stated: ‘Behaving with etiquette and in a civilized manner starts from you and me’ (讲文明重礼仪从您我做起) (Picture 7.2).
7.2.2 International claims

The organization of mega-events was also aimed at raising the international profile of the cities. Shanghai Municipal Government, for example, hoped that the 2010 World Expo would contribute positively to Shanghai’s international profile and enhance its image as an international metropolis (Vaide, 2015). Shanghai’s hosting of the World Expo has moreover been interpreted as ‘a badge of its membership of the exclusive club of the world’s premiere cities worthy of a mega event’ (Cull, 2012).

The raising of an international profile can also be related to the expressed ambition in the five cities studied of becoming international, global or world cities. Since the 1990s, Shanghai’s vision has been to develop and brand ‘Four international centres’ and a ‘Metropolitan city’, whereas its current vision is to be a ‘Global city’. Beijing has similarly put forth a vision to be a ‘World city with Chinese characteristics’, and Chengdu’s aim is to be an international city. Shenzhen’s vision is to become a well-known international city, and an international metropolis. Chengdu centres on constructing an open regional centre and an international city, whereas Chongqing aims to develop into an international logistics centre for western China.

The cities’ claim to internationalization has been accompanied by the creation and representation of spectacular architecture, seen in all five cities’ landscapes. Images of Pudong New Area (Picture 7.3) in Shanghai must be amongst the most communicated cityscape images of the five cities in terms of spectacular, international architecture.

Another way of making international claims in the cities studied has been by actively promoting the city abroad, on international platforms. In the case of Chengdu, for example, the city was for some years proactively communicated through Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, platforms that are unavailable in China (Deans & Miles, 2011). In doing so, the city cooperated with international PR firms and carried out a number of city branding campaigns targeting
audiences around the world, also discussed by Björner (2013). The cities studied here, and Chinese cities in general, increasingly use social media in their city branding, but primarily Chinese platforms like Weibo and WeChat (Zhou & Wang, 2014). A consequence is increased interaction with domestic target groups, but reduced online contact spaces for international audiences.

When the cities envision and create their international imaginary, they draw upon their local identity, in line with Yeoh’s (2005) reasoning, meaning that the cities studied here come to influence and shape new urban norms and the ‘new global’ (Roy & Ong, 2011). City branding and the creation of an international imaginary is in this study thus interpreted as actively contributing to the shaping of norms and ideas tied to the urban and the global. This is further elevated by the impact of the Internet and communication technologies that connect large segments of Chinese people to the global system. Consequently, the cities studied here can be regarded as increasingly imperative nodes in the global economic system (Castells, 2011).

7.3 Cultural imaginary

The use of cultural symbolism in place branding is by no means new (Barke & Harrop, 1994; Dicks, 2003). By cultural imaginary in relation to place branding I mean the sum of similar place imagery that exhibits cultural features. Following Dicks (2003), I see culture as something that ‘belongs’ to a place and a people, and that marks the place and its people out as special and distinct. I also concur with Kavaratzis and Ashworth (2015) in that place branding is not only informed and affected by culture, but also informs and affects it. In the five cities studied, I found three key elements forming the cultural imaginary used in city branding, namely culture as part of the city heritage, culture as social identity markers, and culture as creative devices.

7.3.1 Culture and heritage

In all five cities studied, cultural elements related to the historical roots of China – such as its architecture, traditions, language and value systems – have played central roles in the cities’ branding activities. References to culture, history and heritage could be seen in the cities’ branding, for example in the emphasis on keeping their ‘Chinese characteristics’. In Chengdu, for instance, historical ties could be spotted in the references made to the Three Kingdoms and the Jinsha ruins in the city branding communication and the city logo. The symbol accompanying Chengdu’s logo resembles four birds in a golden circle and is inspired by the Golden Sunbird, alleged to be 3,000 years old.

Historical and cultural roots were also evident in the creation of new city districts, such as ‘Xintiandi’ and ‘Tianzifang’ in Shanghai, ‘Kuangzhai Xiangzi’
in Chengdu and ‘Chongqing Tiandi’ in Chongqing, even though these roots are mixed with the modern and contemporary. One example is Xintiandi, which means ‘New Heaven and Earth’, an area in central Shanghai that has been reconstructed based on traditional architecture and narrow alleys from China’s mid-nineteenth century and as such is imbued with Shanghai’s historical cultural legacies and showcases traditional shikumen houses. It is, at the same time, however, an affluent shopping, eating and entertainment district, a tourist attraction and one of the most expensive places to live in China (Shanghai Basic Facts, 2014). Xintiandi has also been described as where ‘Shanghai’s rich history meets the modern posh lifestyle’ (ibid, p. 81).

Shenzhen has a short history and, therefore, weak historical roots, according to one respondent, an official at the Bureau of Culture, Sport and Tourism, Shenzhen Municipal Government (I97, 2014). There are, however, signs of culture, tradition, heritage and history to be found. Shenzhen’s municipal government building (Picture 7.4), for example, was produced in the sphere of Chinese transnationalism, and is said to have brought Chinese cultural forms back to China on new terms (Cartier, 2002).

![Picture 7.4: Shenzhen’s municipal government building (Illustration by Ceder-Johansson, 2017).](image)

Historical roots, culture and heritage were often mentioned in the promotional material of the cities studied. In Chongqing, for example, historical and cultural sites such as the Three Gorges of Yangtze River, the Dazu Rock Carvings and the Three Natural Bridges in Wulong were emphasized in branding material (e.g. in An Overview of Chongqing, 2014). The historical legacy of 3,000 years of history is moreover emphasized in Chengdu, Chongqing and Beijing (Zhang & Zhao, 2009). One official, at the Capital Institute of Social and Economic Development, Beijing Municipal Government (I29, 2012), said that Beijing is an ancient city with a long history, whereas another official from the Information office, Beijing Municipal Government (C10, 2013), described Beijing as ‘a city of Asian tradition and dynamic spirit’. The Beijing Spirit campaign, launched in 2011, was moreover said to be ‘passed down from the past, from people a long time ago’, and was described as depicting the future based on past history, as told by an official at the Publicity Department, Beijing Municipal Government (I31, 2012).
In the place branding research domain, history and heritage related to place branding has been elaborated on with regards to, for example, historical connection and identity (Zhang & Zhao, 2009), through an emphasis on branding as an instrument to promote the history of a city. History, achievements and aspirations have moreover been depicted as key components in the creation of an overarching brand strategy (Govers, 2011). It has also been stated that place branding authorities can accentuate the history of a place to assert place uniqueness, and use the imaginations of the past to be exploited and employed in place branding practices (Lai & Ooi, 2015), which is in line with the findings of this study. However, there have also been calls for a further focus on traditions and cultural expressions (Bianchini & Ghilardi, 2007), and critique aimed at the lack of historical connections in place branding. For example, in a study of Sydney 2030, Kornberger and Clegg (2011) observed that history did not play any role in Sydney’s strategy process, and advised that the strategy process would have benefited from a focus on the past. Seen in this context, and related to current place branding research, Chinese cities offer interesting and relevant insights, especially in connection with the active use of a historical past to create city futures and city brands.

### 7.3.2 Culture and social identity

In all five cities studied, the cultural imaginary also included elements connecting culture with cultural values, cultivation and social identity, and thus intersecting with the social imaginary. One example comes from Chongqing, where the municipal government, under the leadership of the former Party secretary, carried out a number of mass campaigns which included reading classic books, singing red (revolutionary) songs, telling stories and spreading mottos. Telling stories meant inspiring and moving people with tales of the period of opening-up, reform and construction, whereas spreading mottos was explained as the dissemination of the ideological essence of mottos along with sayings about the Chinese nation (Hou et al., 2012). These kinds of mass cultural activity were moreover described as the cultural life that people need, and as integrating noble sentiments into the lives of people. According to Mo (2013), a Beijing-based Chinese intellectual dissident, ‘red songs’ are not a revival of the Cultural Revolution or a return to the orthodox Maoism; rather they merely possess a red ‘surface’, meaning that they represent ideological mobilization without stirring up any social unrest (ibid).

City branding in the five cities was moreover communicating national identity through the appropriation and promotion of the Chinese Dream concept. Posters and banners in the cities communicating the Chinese Dream concept incorporated poetic and metaphoric images and language and included cultural and historic references not tied to the Mao era or the Cultural Revolution, but rather to the era of Confucian values and the time of the dynasties. To illustrate, I discuss below two examples of Chinese Dream posters exhibited in
Chongqing in 2014 (Picture 7.5). One of the posters (Picture 7.5, left) shows two children, dressed in traditional clothes from the dynasty era, playing with firecrackers. Between the children is a lantern with the character 春 (chun), meaning spring. The text in the poster states: ‘The future of the country is to the greatest extent spring’. In China, spring is the most beautiful season of all, and represents the beginning of life. My interpretation is that the poster thus symbolizes that China is on its way back to a period when everything will blossom, as it did during the time of the dynasties.

The second example is a poster (Picture 7.5, right) communicating the Chinese Dream and centring on cultural civilization and morale. The text in the top right corner of the poster states: ‘Chinese spirit, Chinese image, Chinese culture, Chinese expression’. The large text in the middle states, ‘The Chinese civilization is endless’. The image on the left is a tree that has been broken, or cut down, yet is still growing, which in this study (based on the picture analysis) is interpreted as symbolizing that the tree has experienced hard times, but due to its deep roots and great strength it has not given up, and new life is coming. Next to the tree is a man on a horse, representing the person telling the poem. Thus, together, the poem and the man tell a story about experiencing difficult times, but without giving up. The poem states, ‘After disaster, live again’, and ‘Experienced sufferings and glories again’.

The examples just provided, along with other illustrations depicted in this study, including local interpretations of the Chinese Dream, can be interpreted as a reinvention of culture based on traditional Chinese values. In this context, city branding can be seen as a communicative device used to reclaim and re-invent cultural values. This ties into Hollinshead’s (1998) interpretation of Fjellman’s (1992) work on Disney, and the ‘invention of culture’, referring to how managers draw on culture in the creation of beliefs and storylines to validate or darken certain visions of the world, hinting at issues of control. The examples can also be regarded as tools to ‘culturing’ people into society’s shared values, ideologies, laws and knowledge (Morgan, 2006).
7.3.3 Chinese culture, art and creativity

A somewhat different perspective on the way in which culture has been used in the studied cities is the use of modern cultural expressions – architecture, art, design, cultural and creative areas, etc. – to communicate the idea of the city as a home for innovative, entrepreneurial, cultural and creative industries.

A selection of illustrative examples where culture was used in varying forms to brand Beijing, could be seen in the ‘Cultural getaway – Beautiful Beijing’ campaign, promoted in 2014. In a set of posters (some of which are included in Picture 7.6), Beijing is promoted as a ‘Cultural getaway’ and presented with photos of a diabolo performance, acrobatics, traditional painting, and sculptures in the ‘798 cultural and creative district’ (798.china.org.cn, 2014).

![Picture 7.6: ‘Cultural Gateway, Beautiful Beijing’, posters at Beijing international airport (photos by author, 2014).](image)

Cultural expressions in the form of architecture could also be found in all five cities. In the case of Beijing, and since the preparation for and following the 2008 Beijing Olympics, developing and branding the city has focused on architecture and urban design, as stated by an official at the Publicity Department, Beijing Municipal Government (I31, 2012). Modern cultural expressions through urban design and architecture have included flagship buildings in Beijing, comprising Olympic venues such as the Bird’s Nest, futuristic styles in Zhongguancun science park, and the headquarters of China Central Television CCTV, a 234-metre high, 44-storey skyscraper nicknamed ‘Big
shorts’ (Picture 7.7), according to a researcher at the Centre of Cultural and Creative Industries Studies Centre, Renmin University (156, 2012). Following Kavaratzis and Ashworth, these and similar buildings can be interpreted as ‘officially designed structures intended not only to house distinctive public functions but equally to convey, through their very physical presence, statements about the governments that erected them’ (2015, p. 160).

Moreover, modern cultural expressions through art could be found at ‘Huangjueping Graffiti Street’ (黄桷坪涂鸦街) in Chongqing, which is described as an area of 50,000 square metres located in the same district as Sichuan Fine Art Academy, and incorporating a graffiti project by more than 800 painters, students and artists (China Highlights, 2014). It has also been said that the graffiti street has changed the appearance of the old quarter in Chongqing and improved the environment for the cultural creativity of the art institute (ibid). Design as a modern cultural expression could furthermore be spotted in Shenzhen, in the city’s branding as a ‘City of Design’, with design enterprises covering fields like graphic design, industry design, architectural design and fashion design, for example (Shenzhen Government Online, 2016).

Another example of this sort of instrumental way of using culture to promote creativity can be found in Shenzhen where a central vision has been to forge a city of culture that admires creativity and encourages diversity (Merrilees et al., 2014). In 2003, Shenzhen moreover established a strategy for a ‘culture-based city’, focusing on expansion and growth of cultural and creative industries (Shenzhen Government Online, 2016). Since then, Shenzhen has been branded and communicated as ‘Innovative Shenzhen, Capital of Fashion’ (创意 深圳, 时尚之都).

Beijing has, over the past decades, refocused its industry onto cultural and creative enterprises, has added cultural and creative industries to its city master plan and used it as a driver to become an international city. The focus on
cultural and creative industries has moreover been coupled with innovation, and Beijing has, for example, developed three start-up activity centres, within high-tech, creativity and the service industry, namely Zhongguancun (science and high-tech), Wangjing (service industry), and 798 (creativity and design) (Fan & Poshinova, 2016). Districts of this kind can come to reflect the city as a whole (Kavaratzis & Ashworth, 2015), and come to shape city identity.

Similarly, Shanghai has been branded as the ‘City of Innovation’, and has developed creative areas such as ‘Red Town’ and ‘1933 Shanghai’. More recently, ‘Shanghai Free Trade Zone’ has been developed, focusing on boosting innovation, culture and creativity in the city. The Shanghai World Expo and the related experimentation with cutting-edge innovations in urban architecture, industry and design have also been interpreted as a sign of Shanghai’s, and China’s, innovative capabilities. In Chengdu, one cultural and creative area is the ‘Eastern Suburb Memory’, which is a digital music industry cluster area that constitutes a multipurpose platform that brings together art, music, theatre, fashion, photography and other art forms in the same place (Information board at the entrance to the park, 2014; Go Chengdu, 2015).

Hall and Hubbard (1998) refer to great cities in their golden age as ‘cradles of creativity’ and ‘innovative milieus’. In the five cities studied here, there is similarly a very positive approach towards the envisioning and creation of a cultural imaginary, and a strong emphasis on cultural and creative industries as well as innovation and high-tech in the branding of the cities. Consequently, the inclusion of culture and creativity in the five cities studied here has, similar to cities in other parts of the world (Vanolo, 2008), become a common central element of city branding and city planning policies.

In the cities, and amongst the respondents, few criticized the focus on cultural and creative industries, and the possible negative consequences of this. However, in other places, such critique has appeared, highlighting the potential exclusion of low-skilled and low-income people (e.g. Malanga, 2004).

In the cities studied here, there is an apparent political aspect of the focus on cultural and creative industries, due to the strong emphasis put on these industries in China’s national 12th Five-Year Plan and, thus, the close connection between national-level policies and local-level city branding initiatives. In this study, then, the cultural imaginary is interpreted as envisioned and created in harmony with policies and directives from the central government. The focus on culture and creativity is here also seen in the context of China’s ambitions to develop the nation and its cities into an innovative state by 2020, and to change the image of the nation from being known as a world factory to being recognized as a ‘world laboratory’ (South China Morning Post, 2016b). Moreover, according to some respondents, the focus on cultural and creative industries is related to China’s soft power ambitions, and thus the nation’s efforts
to use culture as an ideological tool to establish an attractive and legitimate image in the world. This type of reasoning can also be found in various media outlets and, for example, in an article by a Swedish journalist reporting on China (Svenska Dagbladet, 2017).

7.4 Social imaginary

A striking feature of the city branding campaigns in the five Chinese megacities studied here, was the emphasis on city residents and improvement of society. The social imaginary is the concept I use here to address and discuss the sum of place imagery that exhibits social features, or features concerning, local populations and society. I have outlined two key elements forming the social imaginary, namely inclusion of residents while improving society, and promoting a civilized spirit, which I discuss next.

7.4.1 With residents in mind

As emphasized in Chapter 2, place branding research has, over the past decade, focused increasingly on residents (e.g. Eshuis & Edwards, 2012; Govers, 2011; Kavaratzis, 2004, 2008; Kemp et al., 2011; Therkelsen et al., 2010; Zenker et al., 2013; Zenker & Martin, 2011), and it has even been argued that the ultimate goal of place branding is the achievement of resident satisfaction (Guhathakurta & Stimson, 2007; Insch, 2011; Insch & Florek, 2008), implying that residents are seen as a key target group for branding activities, largely because they ‘are’ the place. It has also been claimed that, in order to obtain resident satisfaction, policymakers should consider the needs of residents, enhance their everyday experiences in the place, and guarantee requirements including affordable and accessible housing, transport, education, healthcare, leisure and recreation facilities (Insch, 2011; Kemp et al., 2008). In the cities studied here, the focus on resident satisfaction is apparent, with some examples discussed next.

The first key element of the social imaginary discussed incorporates place imagery centring on the inclusion of residents and the improvement of society. In the case of Chongqing, the city logo ‘Renren’ (人人 – Picture 7.8, left) was meant to symbolize that the city has been created by everyone, and that the creations of the city should be enjoyed by everyone, according to an official in the Information office in Chongqing Municipal Government (I65, 2011). The same respondent also said that Chongqing’s aim to create ‘mutual wealth’ or ‘common prosperity’ is about bridging between the rural and urban populations of Chongqing and between the rich and poor in the city, whereas the ‘Five Chongqing’ programme centred on branding and developing Chongqing
as a liveable, healthy, safe and green city. These efforts largely targeted local populations, and also had creating a better society as a key objective.

Shanghai’s city logo (Picture 7.8, right) consists of waves, symbolizing that Shanghai is like water, adapts easily and ‘accepts a thousand rivers’, aimed at creating a sense of inclusion, as explained by a director at Shanghai International Conference Management Organization (14, 2014). Shenzhen, which has been depicted as a city of migrants (Cartier, 2002; Tao et al., 2014), has also accused for neglecting the creation of a liveable city for migrants (e.g. Wu, 2015), yet been promoted as a friendly city where people can live happily and make their dreams come true (Shenzhen Government Online, 2016). In Shenzhen, an open atmosphere has also been communicated, and in a flyer distributed by Invest Shenzhen (2014) it was written, ‘Once you’re here you are a Shenzhener’. Shenzhen’s mayor has moreover proposed a focus on ‘Shenzhen Quality’ rather than ‘Shenzhen Speed’, which can be interpreted as a step towards developing and branding Shenzhen as more inclusive and liveable, and a path to achieving stable and sustainable development (Shenzhen, book distributed by Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2014).

The hosting of mega-events, such as the 2010 World Expo and the 2008 Beijing Olympics, had social or internal features in the sense that they created pride amongst local populations, and a sense of unity and togetherness during the opening and closing ceremonies, for example. This study supports previous research indicating that mega-events in China target domestic audiences (Chen, 2012) in an effort to, for example, boost national pride (Dynon, 2011). The two aforementioned events were exhibitions of the new China, to both internal and external audiences, and an example of what ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ can deliver, in line with Cull’s (2012) reasoning.
7.4.2 Promoting a civilized spirit

In the five cities studied here, the focus on local populations is also tied to the promotion of a civilized spirit, conceptualized in this study as the second element of the social imaginary. The Beijing Spirit campaign is one example. It was intended to symbolize Beijing’s city identity, but also the identity and values of Beijing residents, as explained by an official at the Publicity Department, Beijing Municipal Government (I31, 2012). The same person also said:

Beijing citizens should understand and memorize the Spirit; know the words, for example patriotism, and then take action; really love their city. Since Beijing is China’s capital, patriotism is important. You should first love your country, then love your family (Government official, Publicity Department, Beijing Municipal Government, I31, 2012).

In a book about Beijing Spirit, distributed by the Publicity Department of the CCP and Beijing Municipal Committee (50 Questions of Beijing Spirit, 2012), an expressed purpose of the city spirit was moreover to stimulate enthusiasm amongst local populations, and to motivate Beijing residents to better promote the capital. I interpret this promotion of a civilized spirit as illustrated, and the efforts made to engage the local population, as vehicles for suggesting suitable ways of ‘living the brand’ (Ind, 2004; Johansson, 2012) and as efforts to inspire people to become brand evangelists (Kornberger, 2010) who are emotionally invested in the prosperity of the place and contribute to its success.

The promotion of a civilized city spirit could also be seen in the Chinese Dream concept, and the local adaptations of the theme to the cities and the city districts. An example of an adaptation of the Chinese Dream concept to the city level is from Chengdu in 2014, when a campaign promoting a civilized spirit included messages about caring for the disabled, and paying attention to children who remain in the rural areas while their parents go to find work in the larger cities. One poster (Picture 7.10, left) stated, ‘The Chinese dream, Let us embrace hope, Pay attention to children that remain in the rural areas’. The pandas included in the poster represent a typical symbol for Chengdu, and
the parent panda hugging the young panda can moreover be seen as a reinforcement of the message. Another poster (Picture 7.10, right) stated: ‘Hot Chengdu, warm heart. Understand, respect, care about, help people with disabilities’. The images consist of a symbol for a person in a wheelchair, and a chilli pepper pushing the wheelchair. The chilli is a symbol for the spicy food for which Chengdu is famous, and the wheelchair symbol reinforces the message to care for the disabled.

Yet another example of the social imaginary tied to the promotion of a civilized spirit could be seen in Shanghai’s Xuhui district, as part of the Chinese Dream narrative. On one of many roll-up posters (Picture 7.11), the main message communicated was to care for young people, or minors, and to build a better future together.

Yet another example of the social imaginary tied to the promotion of a civilized spirit could be seen in Shanghai’s Xuhui district, as part of the Chinese Dream narrative. On one of many roll-up posters (Picture 7.11), the main message communicated was to care for young people, or minors, and to build a better future together.
The word ‘molecules’ was used in the text to represent young people, who have not yet become anything. One sentence stated, ‘You can never predict the transformation of molecules, there are many possibilities …’, and the poster also declared, ‘Their presence determines the future of the world’.

In the five cities studied here, the creation of shared notions and a social imaginary appears to have been boosted by the Chinese Dream concept. The dream has been used in the branding of the five cities and their districts, using national narratives and images, and localizing the content at city and district levels, centring on speaking and creating a civilized city and establishing a civilized new atmosphere, as well as being a civilized citizen and a messenger of civilization, which relates both to the social and the cultural imaginaries. I maintain here that this focus on instilling cultural values amongst local populations, including the Chinese Dream narrative, should be seen in the context of President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, the economic downturn, and the CCP’s policy of ‘social management’ (社会管理).

Humanistic and people-centred place branding strategies are interpreted in this study as being used to create certainty and order, and to handle change, in an otherwise rather chaotic world (Mommaas, 2002). A related interpretation is the creation of ‘core stories’ of the nation, the city and its districts, aimed at giving meaning to collective life (Houston, 1982). It is, as such, a form of culturalization, cultivation and community construction, which come to influence the ways in which people imagine their social existence and how they fit together with others (Taylor, 2004). As such, it comes to influence society’s shared, unifying core conceptions, the ethos of a group, and a culture’s ethos (Castoriadis, 1987), as well as the creation of imagined communities (Anderson, 1983) with stability and harmony at the core.

This study suggests that the social imaginary is dominant in the branding of Chinese cities. Parallels can be drawn to the reasoning of Miller and Rose (2008) who took issue with those arguing for ‘the death of the social’, and instead claimed that the ‘social view’ and social policies are increasingly important, yet undergoing a mutation. Moreover, the same scholars argue, albeit from a Western standpoint, that a nation should be governed in the interests of social solidarity, social rights, social protection and social justice. This study shows that, in a Chinese context, the social is very much alive, through the focus on residents and on improving society. However, social rights and processes of inclusion differ here from depictions in much of the dominating place branding literature, partly because of the political context in China.
7.5 Ecological imaginary

A final category of place imagery that was prevalent throughout my fieldwork and this study, and has increased in prominence over time, is the environmental or ecological imaginary. In relation to place branding, by environmental or ecological imaginary I mean the sum of various place imagery that exhibit features related to the environment and ecology. In this study, I have identified two key elements. The first element deals with the seriousness of polluted city environments and the various actions taken in the cities, and the other element addresses the focus on the environment as a way for Chinese cities and China to align with global norms.

7.5.1 Taking the environment seriously

In the five cities studied here, similar to cities in China more generally, the widespread focus on economic development has come at the expense of the environment, and many Chinese cities are now struggling with polluted environments and consequently poor quality of life. In the case of Beijing, for example, problems concerning the city environment include transportation, water and pollution, as told by one respondent, an official at the Capital Institute of Social and Economic Development, Beijing Municipal Government (I34, 2014).

In the five cities studied, clean and smooth transportation, clean air, low-carbon solutions, sustainability and liveability have become key concerns on city agendas and in city branding, and all cities are making concerted efforts to come to terms with the environment. Various media outlets, such as The Guardian (2016), have reported on efforts made in Beijing to create a healthier, more liveable city by developing better transportation and garbage recycling systems, for example, yet maintain that the city still has a long way to go, not least with regards to its polluted air and extensive smog. The respondent from Beijing Government referred to above (I34, 2014) said, relatedly, that it will take time before Beijing can call itself a ‘Healthy city’, a concept and goal outlined in Beijing’s 12th Five-Year Plan. Shanghai similarly included a focus on improving the ecological environment in the city’s 12th Five-Year Plan (Shanghai Basic Facts, 2014), yet also has a long way to go.

Other examples in the cities of the focus on creating an environmental or ecological imaginary, include Shenzhen’s shift towards a development influenced by ‘Shenzhen quality’ (as opposed to ‘Shenzhen speed’), the related vision to build an environmentally friendly city (Shenzhen Government Online, 2016), and the city’s emphasis on creating a green and clean environment, as stated by an official at the Policy Research Office, Shenzhen Municipal Government (I96, 2014). The newly built Qianhai Economic Zone, in Shenzhen, is moreo-
ver said to advocate green and clean transportation modes in an effort to protect the environment, and to create a sustainable and low-carbon district (Invest in Shenzhen, 2014). Furthermore, Shenzhen is also cooperating with Hong Kong on matters of the environment and ecology (Shenzhen Economic & Trade Representative Office, 2013).

In recent years, Chengdu has, in turn, focused a lot on environmental protection in the city, for example through the ‘Ecological reserve circle’ and the ‘Green route’, as told by one respondent, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (I94, 2014). The newly approved ‘Chengdu-Chongqing City Cluster’ development plan also implies increased focus on environmental protection and ‘greenness’ in Chengdu, Chongqing and surrounding smaller cities (State council, PRC, 2016). In Chongqing, one part of the Five Chongqing programme, namely Forest (or Green) Chongqing, was moreover especially centred on the environment, and implied planting trees and making the city greener, as explained by an official of the Information office in Chongqing Municipal Government (I65, 2011) and reported in Global Times (2009).

The ‘Ten Livelihoods’ project, proposed in Chongqing in 2010, moreover included directives to create the ‘Ecological Garden City’, the ‘National Forest City’ and the ‘Environmental Protection Model City’ (Hou et al., 2012). Furthermore, in Chongqing, the once very polluted Bishan district has introduced the ‘Deep green concept’, which is about developing environmental protection via a low-carbon and recyclable economy, according to a government official at the Publicity Department in Bishan district (I70, 2014).

The increased focus on the environment has also meant that the five cities studied have become more selective with regards to foreign investors, and avoid attracting companies that pollute the environment. For example, one respondent, a practitioner working for Business Sweden in Beijing (I44, 2012), said that, in recent years, the Chinese have become much more selective about which companies they let in to Beijing and China. This has led to some critical voices arguing that China discriminates against foreign companies while dumping its exports in the West (Svenska Dagbladet, 2017).

7.5.2 Aligning to global norms

In the cities studied, the creation of an environmental or ecological imaginary is central to the cities’ ambitions to become international, global and/or world cities, and to align with the norms of the global community, as also outlined by Berg and Björner (2014). For example, one respondent, a researcher at the Institute of Population Research and the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Fudan University (I23, 2014), said, regarding Shanghai’s vision of being a next-generation global city by 2050, that it is out of the question to focus
only on being an economic and financial centre, and that a major emphasis and focus must be on ecology and the environment.

As depicted in this chapter, various initiatives concerning the creation of an environmental or ecological imaginary are already taking place in the five cities studied. The challenges that the cities face with regards to the environment are not unique for China, but can be found all over the world. Yet, the vast size of many Chinese cities, and in particular the cities studied here, in combination with the rapid development these cities have experienced over the past decades, implies that the environmental problems and challenges faced in Chinese cities may be particularly acute or severe. In the cities studied, there was an expressed ambition to share solutions with the global community, as expressed for example by one respondent, an official at the Information office in Chongqing Municipal Government (I65, 2011) in a discussion on imbalanced development. The official said that Chongqing wanted to find a solution to solve the imbalance, and share the experience with the whole world.

Furthermore, Chinese cities have been described as China’s models for the future (French, 2007). As such, the cities studied here can, by finding solutions to environmental problems, provide experiences and spillover effects to other cities in China and the world, in line with the reasoning that, if an innovation works in a mega-city, including difficulties such as scale, bureaucracy, complexity, diversity and conflict, it will probably also work in smaller cities (Perlman, 1990). Finding solutions to environmental concerns also has potential in supplying Chinese cities with a more positively associated environmental or ecological imaginary and consequently city brands, which certainly is something that the cities desire today.

Mega-events such as the 2010 Shanghai World Expo and the 2008 Beijing Olympics exhibited both alignment with global norms, and ambitions to share the cities’ experiences with the world. At the time of the World Expo, Shanghai’s Party secretary, Yu Zhengsheng, discussed the Expo and its theme in a TV interview (CCTV, 2010), emphasizing that the creation of liveable cities and the reduction of harm that city life has on the environment are global issues. Another example is from Beijing and the Olympics. One of the three themes of the Games was ‘Green Olympics’, implying harmony between man and nature, and included the signing of a memorandum between the Beijing Olympic organizers and the United Nations Environment Programme about environmental protection (Lai Lee, 2010).

The illustrations above show an intertwining between the environmental or ecological imaginary and the international imaginary. In today’s global community, cities are more and more regarded as a source for new environmental experiments and remedies (Chang & Sheppard, 2013). Environmental sustainability is moreover increasingly emphasized in the contemporary setting, and
described as a growth opportunity within policy frameworks, including ‘green competitiveness’ and ‘eco-economic stimulus packages’, and indicating links between an environmental or ecological imaginary and an economic imaginary. Furthermore, the focus on improving the environment in the cities studied is tied to an ambition to create a better city life for residents, and thus interconnected with the social imaginary.

7.6 Imaginaries and ideology

In the five cities studied, the economic imaginary represents a dominant imaginary in terms of city branding, and has been elaborated on in this chapter with regards to competitiveness, investment hubs and economic centres. In terms of the international imaginary, two main elements with regards to city branding were identified, namely the creation of international competence and international claims. The cultural imaginary in the cities incorporate references to the culture, heritage and history of the place and its people; the centrality of culture in creation of social identity; and the development of cultural and creative industries and creative areas. The social imaginary is central to all five cities studied, and ties into the focus on local populations in city branding, efforts to cultivate residents and aims to create a sense of community with stability at the core. The environmental or ecological imaginary has increased in importance over the past decade, partly due to the impact that economic development has had on city environments.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the place imaginaries discussed here are often intertwined and overlapping. Furthermore, all five imaginaries are also represented in all five cities, to varying degrees. All five imaginaries are moreover permeated by an ideological element and political aspects, discussed in brief next, and further elaborated on in Chapter 8.

A few features stand out with regards to the ideological element that can be found in all cities studied and the place imaginaries discussed in this chapter. One element highlighted here concerns the construction of a civilized spirit, which could be seen in the Beijing Spirit, for example, which centred on cultural, Chinese values and historical traditions. One respondent, a researcher at Tsinghua University (I58, 2012) said, for example, that the pictures and colours used (mainly red and white), brought an old era of communism to mind, described the campaign as propaganda more than city branding, and called it a political slogan. Behind the campaign was the Publicity Department of CCP Beijing Municipal Committee. A government official at the Publicity Department working with the campaign (I31, 2012), said that citizens were really enthusiastic about the Spirit; whereas respondents and commentators online exhibited opposite viewpoints.
Another feature concerns the construction of meaning in the service of power, which was illustrated for example in the case of Chongqing, when the municipal government carried out mass campaigns that included reading classic books, singing red (revolutionary) songs, telling stories, spreading mottos, and essentially disseminating ideological sayings about the Chinese nation.

A third feature related to the use of ideology in the creation of place imaginaries and in the branding of the cities studied here, is the connection to the central government and the CCP, and the dissemination of national ideology through national Five-Year Plans and concepts such as the Chinese Dream, for example. The findings in this study support Svensson’s (2014) reasoning that city branding in China has an ideological and disciplining character, and is tied to political propaganda. The ideological element in city branding can be seen as especially apparent in Chinese cities, and also regarded as taking different forms compared to places in the West. Ideological elements are nevertheless to be found in places and branding all over the world. In the West, for example, the ideological features are often seen as captured within a neoliberal fundament, permeating place branding imagery and rationale.

Literature depicting ideological elements in place branding has largely focused on nations rather than cities (examples being Browning, 2013; Jansen, 2008; Mehta-Karia, 2012; O’Shaughnessy & O’Shaughnessy, 2000; Rose, 2010; Varga, 2013). In the case of Chinese mega-cities, the ideological fundament is at times simultaneously related to city branding and nation branding, examples being mega-events such as the Olympic Games and the World Expo. The 2010 Shanghai World Expo incorporated ideological images and language about an imagined, suggested future for both Shanghai and China (Dynon, 2011). Moreover, the Expo and the 2008 Beijing Olympics showcased, to China and the world, that China is entering into its ‘natural position’ as a world power, back to how it used to be.

In 1999, Lu observed that political slogans were coined to meet the changing need of social conditions as well as the need of authorities to establish control. The images and language used in the branding of Chinese cities indicate that there are similar needs today. Ideological imagery in the shape of city branding is used to create and enhance a sense of identity and belonging, and to enforce cultural values and ‘cultural spirit’ in the cities with a prime aim being to create stability. Moreover, the use of ideological images and language can create a kind of contemporaneous community in city branding, similar to Anderson’s (2006) reasoning in connection with imagined communities.

In this chapter, I have attempted to answer RQ2 in this study, namely: ‘What imaginaries (economic, social, cultural, etc.) are used in the envisioning and branding of Chinese mega-cities’. In doing so, I have focused on five different place imaginaries in relation to place branding and, consequently, the sum of
various place imagery that exhibit economic, international, cultural, social and environmental or ecological elements. I have also elaborated on the values, meanings and systems of beliefs tied to the place imaginaries or, in other words, their underlying ideological rationale. I have touched upon, but not delved deeper into, the powerful interests involved, or the ways in which the ideologies are disseminate. I have moreover paid limited attention to the connections between ideology and power, concepts and phenomena that often are conceptualized as interrelated (e.g. Fairclough, 2013).

However, in the next chapter, I aim to further investigate connections to these issues, and answer RQ3 in this thesis, namely: ‘What are key political aspects of the branding of Chinese mega-cities?’. As outlined in Chapter 3, I align with scholars who argue that the exercise of power is increasingly achieved through ideology, and through the ideological workings of language (e.g. Fairclough, 2001). Moreover, I see ideology being used to establish and keep in place particular relations of power (Fairclough, 2013), and agree with Beetham (1991) that ideology plays a central role in the reinforcement of basic norms that underpin a given system of power.
8. Imagineering place

In the previous chapter, I grouped the place imagery identified in the five cities studied into different place imaginaries. I also emphasized that imaginaries often combine the past, present and the future, and claimed that imaginaries play key roles in influencing society’s core conceptions. Five intersecting imaginaries were identified, namely economic, international, cultural, social and environmental or ecological imaginaries. Moreover, I noted that all imaginaries were influenced by language, images, values and beliefs tied to an ideology supported by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Continuing based on these observations, this chapter will answer RQ3, namely, ‘What are key political aspects of the branding of Chinese mega-cities?’. More precisely, this chapter will focus on the underlying logic, interests and political structure behind the use of ideologically loaded imaginaries in the branding of Chinese mega-cities. The political perspective taken here also implies a focus on urban governance and policy, as well as power interests at local and national instances, and the linkages between them. The chapter builds on examples from the five cities together with findings from previous studies on city branding and the governance of Chinese cities, while also drawing on the conceptual framework of this study.

8.1 Imagination and engineering

While studying the branding of the five Chinese mega-cities, one thing that struck me was the systematic use of forceful, ideological imaginaries to communicate an ‘idea’ of the city – its functioning, future, role and governance – to various audiences and stakeholders inside and outside the city. The question that came to my mind was, what kind of logic is behind this? In fact, it was as if the imaginaries were used to ‘engineer’ the city into the future, i.e. to use imagery to guide the imagination, driving change in carefully selected paths of association. Over time, I came to label this rather unique mixture of imaginative images and firm – almost engineering-like – governance for ‘imagineering’. In this chapter, I will discuss this concept, and show how it operates in the branding of the cities that I have studied. Within the umbrella of ‘imagineering’, this chapter also elaborates further on the rationales, or reasons, for the use and construction of various city imaginaries, including the meanings
and powers of certain language and imagery used in the cities’ branding, and power mechanisms tied to city branding in China.

8.1.1 Definition of imagineering

In this study, imagineering is defined as a framework used to conceptualize key political aspects of city branding in Chinese mega-cities. Imagineering is conceptualized as encompassing three main elements, namely local adaptations of national directives, policies, plans and concepts; a strong future orientation while also accentuating the past; and a focus on local populations with the creation of stability and harmony as a central goal. Imagineering is also conceptualized as a policy instrument exercised by a powerful elite, closely intertwined with urban governance, and used to influence people, values, places and, ultimately, city futures.

8.1.2 A short history of the term imagineering

First, however, some notes on the history of the term imagineering, and how it has been used for different purposes. Imagineering has been described as a ‘portmanteau’ word, combining the words imagination and engineering (Kuiper & Smit, 2014). The term first appeared when Alcoa, a company in the aluminium industry, used the term ‘imagineering’ in 1942 when developing an ‘imagineering’ programme, encouraging imagination and engineering (Byko, 2000). Alcoa defined imagineering as:

‘Imagineering is letting your imagination soar, and then engineering it down to earth’ (Kuiper & Smit, 2014, p. 5).

After Alcoa had introduced ‘imagineering’, others also began using it, such as the futuristic illustrator Arthur C. Radebaugh. Radebaugh worked for the department of the American Army designing ‘weapons of the future’ during World War II, and later became known for his excellent airbrush techniques and his work related to Coca-Cola’s advertising campaigns. In a Portsmouth Times article from 1947, titled ‘Black Light Magic’, Radebaugh labelled his own futuristic work ‘imagineering’ (Kuiper & Smit, 2014).

The term ‘imagineering’ really took off when Walt Disney introduced a separate imagineering department in 1952 (Kuiper & Smit, 2014). The verb ‘imagineer’ came to be used by Walt Disney Studios to describe its strategy of ‘combining imagination with engineering to create the reality of dreams’ in creating theme parks (Yeoh, 2005, p. 956). Disney’s ‘imagineers’ follow the principle of ‘blue sky speculation’, a process in which imagineers generate new ideas without limitation (Wright, 2005). The creative process often starts with ‘eyewash’, explained as the wildest, boldest, best idea one can come up with, presented in convincing and absolute detail. Most imagineers regard this
to be the true beginning of the design process, and work in the belief that if it can be dreamt, it can be built (Karal, 1997). Imagineers also strive towards constantly improving their work – something Walt Disney referred to as ‘plussing’ – based on the belief that, as long as there is imagination left in the world, Disneyland is never to be completed, implying that there is always room for improvement and innovation (Scribner & Rees, 2007).

Disney used imagineering to create thematic stories, and employed theatrical elements and innovative techniques to create surprising experiences (Kuiper & Smit, 2014). Alcoa, in turn, used imagineering to explore and search for innovation in application possibilities (ibid). Nijs and Peters (2002, referred to in Kuiper & Smit, 2014) moreover describe imagineering as factual analysis complemented with imagination, used to develop a concept or product which is attractive to consumers on both a rational and an emotional level, referring to both the creative and rational aspects of imagineering as a tool. Imagineering has furthermore been interpreted as a strategic device which can generate cohesion within certain groups, as a process, and as an instrument to create shared memory (Kuiper & Smit, 2014). Furthermore, imagineering has been depicted as ‘a management tool to deal with, and find solutions to, possible marketing challenges’ (ibid, p. 9).

Moreover, imagineering and Disney Worlds have been discussed in terms of their political aspects. In Paul’s (2004) view, the dreams brought to reality in Disney Worlds around the world are not universal visions, but dreams of a certain social group that advance a particular political ideology. Hollinshead (1998) has similarly questioned whose reality is being presented, promoted and narrated, stating that imagineering in the context of Disney Worlds robs individuals of their thinking dignity.

8.1.3 Imagineering in place branding

Imagineering has also been conceptualized in the context of places and place branding; for example as the blending of creative imagination and technological know-how in the theming of goods, services and places (Archer, 1997). Teo’s (2003) definition of imagineering is inspired by Lash and Urry (1994) and is connected to the process of the aestheticization of material objects that will enhance the circulation and consumption of goods (Archer, 1997). Moreover, Teo (2003) depicts imagineering as a ‘total design’ concept that incorporates all elements of the building problem and its use, such as management of traffic flows, architecture of exteriors and interiors, visual design and the creation of authentic landscapes.

In a Chinese context, imagineering has been depicted as purposeful attempts by the cities to establish positions in the global landscape (Berg & Björner, 2014). In discussions on imagineering, Yeoh (2005) has in turn emphasized
how cities in Southeast Asia draw on local identity to gain a competitive edge in the global marketplace. The same scholar has stated that, during the 1990s, Southeast Asian cities began subscribing to discourses and logics of globalization, became integrated into regional and global circuits and rose to global prominence. As a consequence, these cities started to invest in the ‘imagineering’ of global images as they jostled for ‘a place in the new urban utopia’ (ibid, p. 946). Imagineering has also been explained as the creation, formulation and communication of generative ‘city imaginaries’ that are able to mobilize and activate people and resources inside and outside the city; imaginaries that are not only developed to market the cities and their virtues in the global cityscape, but also to make possible, and legitimize, changes in society (Berg & Björner, 2014).

In place branding research, imagineering has hitherto largely been used to either accuse place branding of simplifying places to be marketed as safe, sanitized versions of the original (Teo, 2003), or to interpret the globalization of cities and the promotion of certain city values and goals as orchestrated by an urban élite (Johansson, 2012; Paul 2004). In this study though, the concept of imagineering is developed as an umbrella concept for mechanisms involved in transforming political and professional ideals and ideologies into desired protocols and actions at the city level.

Moreover, this study adds to previous research on imagineering in the context of places and place branding by extending its focus in three main ways. First, this study extends imagineering in relation to place branding by building on its identified political features, including how élites in the form of city governors, administrators and politicians are engineering change through the use of a number of mechanisms; yet arguing (in opposition with previous studies) that the intentions are not always malevolent. Second, while the majority of studies in place branding have focused on the concept of imagineering to describe the way in which cities are coerced into positions on a global market of competitive cities, this study adds an internal perspective, and views the use of city branding as a community-building exercise. Third, while imagineering in relation to place branding primarily has focused attention on material objects and city landscape features, this study adds a focus on ideological language and imagery in the imagineering of place.
8.2 Three elements of imagineering

According to my studies of the place imagery used in the branding of the five Chinese mega-cities studied here; their imagineering processes contain three main elements, namely: local adaptations of national directives, policies, plans and concepts (‘Local adaptations of national visions); a strong future orientation while simultaneously accentuating selected elements from the past (‘Imagining the future while accentuating the past’); and a focus on residents with the creation of harmony and stability as a primary goal (‘Maintaining harmony’). Imagineering is moreover conceptualized as a policy instrument exercised by a powerful elite used to influence values, create stability and a sense of community, and ultimately to change society and control city futures.

8.2.1 Local adaptations of national visions

The first element of imagineering is related to the top-down influence from the Chinese central government and the CCP in the branding of the five cities studied. This occurs through the assignment of roles or positions to the cities and by influencing the cities and their branding through national concepts, directives, policies and plans. It also occurs by imposing ideological narratives such as the Chinese dream on the cities, and through local adaptations of the same, visible in the cities’ branding practices.

Imagineering roles and positions of cities

The central government and the CCP impact the visions, roles and positions of the cities studied here. One example is Beijing’s branding as a centre for science and technology, culture and international exchange and the capital’s vision of developing into a world city with Chinese characteristics. Another example is Shanghai’s role and position as an economic and financial centre. Moreover, Shenzhen’s miraculous transformation over recent decades, from a fishing village to a mega-city, was based on directives from the central government, and so is its current integration with Hong Kong and its position as a door to mainland China and the world. Furthermore, Chengdu and Chongqing have been given the roles of economic engines in the expansion of China’s central and western parts. The mission assigned to Chongqing, of creating common prosperity or mutual wealth, also originated from the central government and the CCP. These findings build on and supplement previous research that has illuminated that the Chinese state plays a central role in influencing the development of Chinese cities (Wei & Yu, 2006), and stressed that China decides which cities emerge and what roles they will play (Vogel, Savitch, Xu, Yeh, Wu, Sancton, Kantor & Newman, 2010).

National strategies are central in influencing what roles and positions cities in China will have. One national strategy, which will have continuous effects on
the branding and development of places around China, is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which integrates the New Silk Road Economic Belt project and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road project, and was publicized by President Xi in 2013 (Callahan, 2016). Chongqing’s development of a railway to Europe can be interpreted as a local adaptation of the ‘Belt’ initiative, which has as its goal to ‘build a network of overland road and rail routes, oil and natural gas pipelines, and power grids that will connect Xi’an, Xinjiang, Central Asia, Moscow, Rotterdam, and Venice’ (ibid, p. 6). Shenzhen, in turn, has been integrating its development of Qianhai Economic Zone into the ‘Road’ initiative, which aims at connecting China with Southeast Asia, South Asia, East Africa and the Mediterranean, through the construction of a network of ports and coastal projects.

The role and positions of Chinese cities are moreover impacted by other strategies, frameworks, policies and plans, originating from the central government and radiating out to the cities, such as national plans including the Five-Year Plans, policies developed for China’s western regions such as China’s ‘Go West Strategy’ (also called ‘China Western Development’), development strategies and frameworks including the ‘Coordinated development’ experiment, and the creation of ‘China’s New Countryside’. The five cities studied here adapt their plans, strategies and branding to national policies, plans and frameworks as well as the imaginative framework of the Chinese dream, and invent local, ideologically controlled interpretations.

**Imposing grand narratives of Chinese society**

The other, related way in which the Chinese government and the CCP influence the branding of Chinese mega-cities, is through the enforcement of the grand narrative of China and the Chinese dream. In the place imaginaries described in Chapter 7, one ideological element which was clearly visible is the Chinese dream, i.e. a collective hope for restoring China’s lost national greatness. As already discussed in Chapter 5 (The Chinese context), the Chinese dream is promoted by President Xi Jinping, who has stated: ‘Realizing the great renewal of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modern history’, and maintained that the Chinese dream is the dream of the people (Xinhuanet, 2015). Moreover, Xi has made the Chinese dream into a main feature of the propaganda machine, disseminating a patriotic story of humiliation and rebirth, while adjusting history (Ljunggren, 2015).

Moreover, the Chinese dream has been described as a projection, not a definite, determined politic, but something larger and more accentuated than the visions that all predecessors since Mao have formulated. It is, to a great extent, characterized by an idea about China as unique and predestined to go its own way – ‘the Chinese way’ – and based on the idea that the West has no monopoly on modernity (Ljunggren, 2015). One can even say that the Chinese dream
is at the very top of the ideological hierarchy in China today, giving a general ‘vision’ of the future to be acted upon by the cities, but within clear ideological boundaries of interpretation laid down by the CCP. In this way, the Chinese dream is one of the driving elements in the cities’ attempts to imagine their future. The Chinese dream is here also interpreted as a grand narrative or meta-narrative that incorporates macro-stories that support and confirm the grand narrative (Boje, 2001; Wigren, 2003). One respondent, a practitioner and researcher with experience both from doing research and working practically with city branding in China (I46, 2014), said:

The Chinese dream is about affordability; now we can afford to travel, buy luxury brands, go to college anywhere, afford to buy and sell stocks, and so on (Researcher and practitioner, I46, 2014).

Another respondent, also engaged in both research and practical work related to city branding in China (I63, 2014), described the Chinese dream as vague and political, and said that the images used relate too much to old Chinese traditions rather than the future. Amongst the respondents in this study, views parted on the meaning and usefulness of the Chinese Dream and, on the whole, the concept comes across as rather ambiguous; a vagueness that, however, can allow for and result in imaginative interpretations. The Chinese dream could moreover be denounced for being ideological and propagandistic; but could also be interpreted as crucial in organizing thought and action (Callahan, 2016), to drive the development of China and its cities.

In this study, local adaptations of the Chinese dream concept could be found in the cities studied. In the case of Chengdu, depicted in this study, the posters presented a local adaptation of the Chinese dream, representing the core values of the dream and of Chinese culture, with imagery and selected words referring specifically to the city of Chengdu. The message in one of the posters; to pay attention to children who remain in the rural areas while their parents leave their hometown to find work elsewhere, is here also interpreted as related to China’s western development policy, in the sense that if China’s central and western parts are developed, parents can stay in their hometowns with their children. This is moreover a good example of how Chinese cities take on difficult social issues in their city branding campaigns.

Local adaptations of the Chinese dream narratives were also apparent at the city district level. In Shanghai’s Xuhui district, for example, roll-up posters (Picture 8.1) communicated the ‘Chinese dream’ (中国梦) in large Chinese characters, supplemented with the text: ‘Build core values with one heart, and realize the great Chinese dream with one mind’. The poster also displayed three vertical lines, each consisting of four keywords, namely: prosperous, democratic, civilized, harmonious (富强民主文明和谐); freedom, equality, justice, rule of law (自由平等公正法治); and patriotic, professional, honest,
friendly (爱国敬业诚信友善). The organization behind the posted was the ‘Spiritual Civilization Construction Committee’ of Xuhui District, similar to the case of Chengdu.

Picture 8.1: Roll-up poster in Xuhui district, Shanghai (photo by author, 2014).

To sum up, when seen as an imagineering mechanism, the Chinese dream – like its predecessor, the Harmonious society – serves to transform long-term, high-level political visions of the future into city policies, strategies and plans and, ultimately, concrete physical and symbolic actions. Moreover, the use of national directives, policies, plans and concepts, to influence the cities and their branding, resulting in local adaptations, exhibit some similarities with Law’s (1986) conceptualization of long-distance control; which depends on the circulation of documents, devices and drilled people from the centre to the periphery, with the purpose to control others from a distance.

8.2.2 Imagining the future while accentuating the past

The overview of the various imaginaries used in the branding of Chinese mega-cities revealed that ideological elements stemming from the CCP and concepts like the Chinese Dream were translated into visions for the future at the city level. These visions for the future also permeated all the five imaginaries described in Chapter 7. I also noted that the future city visions in many cases were anchored in the long and ‘glorious’ history of China, providing the visions with a sense of being the outcome of a natural evolution. As part of imagineering, the process of historically anchoring the envisioning of the city seems to have had two distinct functions. The first is to support and endorse enchanting visions of the city’s future that engage residents, the business community and government officials at the city level. The second is to legitimize these visions by inscribing them into the history of the city.
Endorsing enchanting visions

The rapid development that China and many Chinese cities have experienced in recent decades appears to have boosted a confidence, a faith in the future and a tendency to dream big. This resonates with imagineering, as conceptualized by Wright (2005) for example, as generating new ideas with no limitation, based on the idea that ‘if it can be dreamt, it can be built’ (Karal, 1997).

Amongst the cities studied, both Shenzhen and Chongqing have been called ‘dream’ cities. In the case of Shenzhen, a sense of ‘dream city’ was created by the first generation of ‘explorers’ who built Shenzhen from scratch (O’Connor & Liu, 2014). In the case of Chongqing, the city was branded as a ‘Dream city’, as explained by an official in the Information office, Chongqing Municipal Government (I65, 2011):

We wanted people to come to Chongqing to make their dreams come true. So, we positioned the city as a ‘Dream city’. That’s our goal, and our hope. Similar to America when it just started to develop the west (Government official, Information office, Chongqing Municipal Government, I65, 2011).

Chongqing’s visions have been both internally oriented – as the city has set the vision to solve imbalanced development and integrate urban and rural areas – and externally oriented, in the city’s ambition to transform Chongqing into a globally oriented city (Zhao & Qian, 2014). Shenzhen’s visions include being a model city with Chinese characteristics, a pilot zone for national reforms and a modern world city (Ng, 2003; Shenzhen Government Online, 2016).

In the five cities studied here, visions are of vital importance, similar to conceptualizations in place branding research (e.g. Kavaratzis, 2008; Van den Berg & Braun, 1999). Like cities elsewhere, the branding of the cities studied here is based on the idea of ‘imagining’ the place or, in other words, creating desirable images of a place, and then communicating them to audiences inside and outside the place (as discussed by Berg and Björner, 2014). In the Chinese cities, visions are seen as powerful in the sense that a desired place brand can guide marketing measures and, as a result, influence the physical environment and functionality of the place, in line with Kavaratzis’ (2008) reasoning.

Legitimizing visions through history

Apart from being visionary and future oriented, the branding of Chinese megacities also exhibits historical connections. China is proud to be the longest continuous civilization in the world (Ryan, 2013) and makes use of this narrative in its city branding strategies and practices. China and Chinese cities also view its 5,000 years of culture and history as a way to both differentiate and harmonize with the rest of the world (Berkowitz et al., 2007).
The Chinese Dream concept, Xi Jinping’s national narrative that trickles down to the cities and districts and is incorporated into city branding, is an illustrative example in which language and imagery tie into both the future and the past. The Chinese Dream both tells a story about a disgraced nation, drawing on the humiliating treaty that came out of the First Opium War, and a story about rejuvenation and rebirth, representing China’s current rise to global power and the country’s return to its ‘natural place’ at the centre of the world (Callahan, 2013; Ljunggren, 2015). The BRI and its related Silk Road Dream is moreover used to realize the Chinese Dream, and is celebrated as a ‘revival’ of ancient civilization links from the Tang dynasty, epitomized as a ‘Golden Age’ in China’s history (Callahan, 2016), demonstrating simultaneous connections to the past and the future.

Another example of the focus on both the past and the future is evident in the branding of Chengdu. The symbol accompanying Chengdu’s logo resembles four birds in a golden circle and is inspired by the Golden Sunbird, alleged to be 3,000 years old, which was excavated from the Jisha ruins in Sichuan province. The Golden Sunbird is moreover thought to be an illustration of an ancient Chinese myth included in a Chinese classic text (Classic of Mountains and Seas) written about 2,500 years ago. At the same time, Chengdu is described as the ‘City to be’, as following a ‘new direction’ and is essentially branded with a strong future orientation (Picture 8.2).

![Picture 8.2: Chengdu – the ‘City to be’, and Chengdu city logo (Go Chengdu, 2014).](image)

Shanghai offers another example of both future orientation and historical connection. The city is known for its international past, and in the early twentieth century was described as a global city as well as Asia’s most sophisticated city. Shanghai’s vision is now to return to its position as a global city, and do so by 2050. Yet another example of a focus on both the past and the future was found in Chongqing’s Planning Exhibition Hall (2011):

Time seems to get back to the remote past from now, going from today into the future, looking forward to a glamorous Chongqing, and the sustainable development of both its people and the city itself (Chongqing Planning Exhibition Hall, 2011).
Beijing, in turn, is described as a treasure house of ancient Chinese culture and narrated as a city with a very promising future. The capital is branded as a city of contrasts, encapsulating both imperial history and sizzling creative energy. Beijing’s deep roots are said to be all around, whereas its residents are described as living on the cutting edge of change (Beijing Official Guide, 2012). Different respondents moreover said that a central element in the branding of Beijing is reference to history and culture, and the city has been described as an ‘old, ancient city with a long history’ and as ‘a city of Asian tradition and dynamic spirit’, for example. Moreover, ‘Beijing Spirit’ was depicted as ‘passed down from the past, from people a long time ago’, and as depicting the future based on past history. Furthermore, during the Beijing Olympics, historical legacy was emphasized in the city’s branding.

The connection to the past when planning for China’s future can also be seen in the use of ancient texts, such as ‘Under Heaven’ (天下), ‘Great Harmony’ (大同), and the ‘Kingly Way’ (王道) (Callahan, 2013). The connections to the past, present and future moreover tie into the notion of ‘imaginaries’ and their adherence to existing terminology, narratives and categories, while at the same time introducing something new (Castoriadis, 1987; Johansson 2012). A possible outcome of visionary and aspirational place branding is the generation of new collective narratives about city futures, described by Delman (2014) as the aim of ‘imaginaries’. Following Charon (2004), centring on historical connections and the future can also be interpreted as a way to encourage people to see and integrate the past and the future, and to understand worlds they have never seen. Stories about the past can moreover come to reshape the future, in line with Sandercock’s (2003) reasoning.

Previous research has argued that the construction of an imagined Asia is characterized by no reference to a specific past, with a focus instead on the present and the future (Cayla & Eckhardt, 2008). This study supports the focus on the present and the future, but opposes the notion that there is no reference to the past, arguing that historical ties are largely evident in the branding of Chinese cities. In the cities studied here, aspirations in combination with history and past achievements are key components in the overarching city branding strategy, in line with Govers’ (2011) reasoning. Similar to findings in previous research (e.g. Lai & Ooi, 2015), the branding authorities of Chinese megacities accentuate the history of the city to assert uniqueness, and exploit imaginations of the past in the branding of the city.

Imagineering and the politics of memory
The way in which history has been used when imagining the future is open to question in some instances, for example the removal of historical elements and avoiding certain parts of history in the creation of city futures and city brands. For example, in preparations for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, entire
sections of hutongs or historic neighbourhoods, were demolished, along with the massive rebranding of Beijing and China (Berkowitz et al., 2007).

In the branding of the cities studied here, some historical periods and events are remembered and represented, whereas others are hidden and discarded, according to some respondents; for example a researcher at Shenzhen University (1109, 2014). This can be related to and interpreted as ‘politics of memory’, and thus the role of politics in shaping collective memory (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014). Emphasizing and presenting historical elements that fit with contemporary political interests also has similarities with Fjellman’s (1992) description of Disney’s clever, creative and techno-corporate ways of capturing narratives from history, and decontextualizing or reducing them via preferred forms of ‘distory’ (Hollinshead, 1998). Distory, or ‘pasteurized history’, contains a considerable amount of historical amnesia, where language and images are emploted and vacuum cleaned to remove nasty incidents, and where favoured events and values are promoted (Hollinshead, 1998). Consequently, and drawing on Riecer’s (1980) conceptualization of narratives, city branding in a Chinese context can be interpreted as a way in which past events are selectively appropriated and put into a narrative order, or ‘emplotment’, to provide a particular meaning to past, current and future events.

Coming back to the previous discussion, grand narratives have a central function in the branding and development of the five cities studied here for three main reasons. First, because grand narratives help to streamline the cities’ branding and ensure that the cities align to their assigned role and development path. Second, grand narratives and their focus on grand, future-oriented dreams sow seeds of hope in a grand, prosperous future – hope that is further elevated through selective storytelling about a glorious past and thus the shaping of memory. Third, grand narratives have a central function in the branding and development of the cities studied because they contribute to mobilization and reproduction of consent amongst dominated groups.

8.2.3 Bringing community, harmony and stability into being

The discussion of the imaginaries in Chapter 7 shows that the primary target groups of the city branding campaigns I have come across in my field studies are internal stakeholders, whether citizens, the business community or local government officials. Even though the cities studied all have international ambitions and target external audiences through mega-events, promotion to foreign investors and tourists, and so on, the main focus of city branding seems to be on internal audiences. Thus, in the cities studied here, city branding is very much geared towards internal target groups and local populations, and centred on the creation of social, cultural and environmental or ecological imaginaries. City branding in the context of mega-cities in China is moreover largely about dealing with domestic challenges and building community.
Explanations for this internal orientation of city branding can be found in China’s vast size and complexity, and its history as a nation that has relied on shared values to maintain social order. Another explanation of the internal orientation of city branding in the cities studied, is the vast domestic challenges China faces due to the dramatic changes that the nation has experienced over the past three decades; in terms of rapid economic development, but also when it comes to changes in social structures and in values. In this context, globalization and urbanization are two major forces that have shaped and continue shaping mega-cities in contemporary China. In the past decades, residents and social structures of Chinese mega-cities have experienced rapid and extreme changes, which has led to social inequality and tensions among different social groups, for example, immigrants versus natives. China’s focus on internal challenges is also expressed by Eklund (2011):

In the West, we like to believe that China’s leaders above all are occupied with issues concerning us: the yuan currency, trade deals, international diplomacy. This is hardly the case. The country is so big and faces such gigantic tasks at home, that China’s leaders have their hands full with domestic challenges (Eklund, 2011, p. 264–265, free translation from Swedish).

The third element of imagineering is here interpreted as a focus on local populations with the creation of stability and harmony as a central goal. In other words, city branding is in the cities studied used as a tool to deal with internal challenges, create stability in the nation, as a means to control the way things are imagined, and as a tool to avoid internal conflicts, disputes and disruptions. According to this study and the related fieldwork, this is done in three main ways: by enforcing harmony, confirming resident satisfaction and domesticating residents.

Creating harmony

Behind the branding of Chinese cities seems to be a desire to control the imaginative powers of the city branding process. In other words, a central desire seems to be to make sure that the city branding follows the ideological path drawn up by the CCP, and that possible conflicts between different stakeholder groups are avoided. A generic term for this is in China is the striving for a ‘Harmonious society’. The Harmonious society was part of China’s previous president Hu Jintao’s signature ideology, and was introduced as an ideological element from 2004 in the Hu and Wen administration. The Harmonious society concept has been described as the ideological keystone of the Hu era (Dyon, 2011). When Hu, in 2004, called for the creation of a socialist harmonious society, the central aims were to correctly handle inner contradictions within the people (ibid). To achieve a harmonious society was also emphasized as a key target of the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), which centred on dealing with social problems and on the promotion of more balanced, or scientific, development (Dyon, 2011).
A harmonious society incorporated elements of equity, sincerity, justice, friendship, vitality, democracy and rule of law (Dynon, 2011). Even though the concept has been used in international relations in connection with China’s ‘peaceful rise’, the Harmonious society has primarily focused on resolution of domestic contradictions, on balancing relationships and on creating an acceptance of the CCP (ibid). In terms of ideological underpinnings, the Harmonious society combines references to Confucian philosophy and post-Mao socialist thought. Hu’s Harmonious society is moreover closely tied to Jiang Zemin’s ‘three represents’ and Deng Xiaoping’s ‘material and spiritual civilization’ (Dynon, 2011). The Harmonious society has also been described as a ‘unifying narrative that seeks ideological synthesis between the otherwise disparate and previously inimical philosophical traditions of Confucianism and communism’ (ibid, p. 187–8). Amongst some groups of Chinese citizens, the Harmonious society concept has however been resisted, ironized, and reappropriated, and citizens have talked sarcastically about themselves as being ‘harmonized’, resulting in some hollowing out or disruption of the original official discourse (Nordin & Richaud, 2014, p. 61).

Following Aitken and Campelo’s (2011) reasoning that culture, in essence, is collectively owned, and contributes to creating meanings in each society and amongst all groups of people, in Chinese mega-cities, city branding can be interpreted as a governmental technology to create meaning and a sense of belonging, and essentially harmonize and unify people. Furthermore, analogous to Flowerdew’s (2004) description of ‘myth’, place branding can, by appealing to common features of a culture or group, provide a sense of individual and communal identity. This is not unique for China, however, but has also been discussed in a Western context as an important purpose of place branding. In the case of Chinese mega-cities, the collective identity is not only created at the district or city levels, but is also distinctly associated with national identity, nationalism and patriotism. The Harmonious society concept is here interpreted as one way to control and domesticate people in the cities, and to do so via a ‘harmony camouflage’. However, not everyone can be ‘domesticated’ easily, as discussed by Nordin and Richaud (2014), for example.

Confirming resident satisfaction

In this study and during its related fieldwork, I also noted a tendency to use city branding campaigns to confirm resident satisfaction in the big cities, i.e. a form of auto-communication (Christensen, 1997), where the cities were portrayed as fulfilling the needs of their inhabitants. In the context of this study, one illustrative example of city branding aimed at attaining resident satisfaction is the ‘Five Chongqing’ programme, which was launched by the government in 2008, to make the city safe, healthy, liveable, green and accessible for pedestrians and public transit. A central purpose was moreover to create fortune and well-being for all residents. Transport was improved, public spaces
where people could get together were created, the city was made greener through the planting of trees, and changes were made to the police force to make the city safer. In Chongqing, the city logo Renren, created in 2006, was also said to symbolize that the city had been created by everyone and should be enjoyed by everyone, as explained by one respondent, an official at the Information Office in Chongqing’s Municipal Government.

Another example communicating efforts to improve the city for its residents could be found in Shanghai’s Xuhui district in 2014, where a roll-up poster stated, ‘Civilization Xuhui’, along with six keywords originating from the character 美丽, meaning beautiful, and consequently, beautiful: corridor (楼道), street view (街景), citizens (市民), window (窗口), school gate (校门), and shops (商铺). The text at the top of the poster moreover stated, ‘Create a national civilized city, you are the backbone’, while the message at the bottom of the poster stated, ‘Create a national civilized city, build the beautiful Xuhui district’. The organization behind the poster was the Spiritual Civilization Construction Committee of Xuhui District.

*Picture 8.3: Promotion poster in Xuhui district, Shanghai (photo by author, 2014).*

**Inclusion/domestication of residents**

China is a big multi-ethnic country, and the problem of ‘inclusion’, i.e. to involve residents at all levels in the community-building process, is central in the attempts to maintain stability and harmony in society. This can also be seen in the images and language used in the city branding campaigns, emphasizing the inclusion of residents and their claims of unifying ‘city spirits’.

City spirits represent another example of city branding centring on residents. ‘Inclusiveness’ (包容), a keyword in Beijing’s city spirit, can be interpreted as a reinforcement and legitimization of all city residents. ‘Virtue’ (厚德), another keyword in Beijing Spirit, represents substantial or significant amounts.
of morale, indicating the internal character of the spirit and hinting at a desired effect of the Spirit, namely to influence cultural values amongst Beijing residents. One respondent, a government official at Beijing Publicity Department (I31, 2012), said that the Beijing Spirit should be the spirit of all Beijing residents, of their dreams and visions.

However, this inclusion is not unconditional, but is connected to the idea of residents being ‘civilized citizens’. In Chongqing, for example, narratives about the establishment of a civilized new city atmosphere with a focus on being a civilized citizen were posted around the cityscape (Picture 8.4). The text in the picture in the top reads, ‘Be a civilized citizen, establish a civilized new atmosphere, construct a civilized city district’. The banner in the middle picture states, ‘Striving for the national civilized city’ and ‘Speak civilization, then do civilization’. In the picture in the bottom, the text says, ‘Everybody is a messenger of civilization’.

Picture 8.4: Banners and posters in Chongqing (photos by author, 2014).

The city spirits and their relation to culture, correspond with the idea of ‘the spirit of a people’ and the notion of the imaginary as society’s imaginings and shared conceptions of a culture’s ethos (Castoriadis, 1987). The city spirits also tie into arguments presented in the place branding literature, stating that place brands should be built based on the identity of the local population and actors in the city (Govers, 2011). Culture, along with the local populations who live and create it, has moreover been described as the core of the place brand (Aitken & Campelo, 2011; Kavaratzis & Hatch, 2013). In a Chinese context, cultural spirit and local populations have been increasingly emphasized in recent years in city branding practices. In the cities studied here, there is even a certain office under the Publicity Department that promotes cultural
values and ‘spiritual civilization’, indicating that city branding in Chines cities, in its focus on cultivation, civilization and related notions, which stands out from depictions found in much of place branding literature.

8.3 City branding as a policy instrument

In this chapter, I have up to now discussed the concept of imagineering, and three main elements of it. I have conceptualized imagineering as interrelated with policies, plans, concepts and frameworks originating from the central government and the CCP, and illustrated how policies and concepts come to influence city branding. I have also theorized imagineering as future oriented but with strong historical ties, align with those arguing that history is adjusted, and tie this reasoning to the shaping of collective memory. I have moreover conceptualized imagineering as largely targeting internal audiences or local populations, with the aim deal with internal challenges, create stability and harmony, bring about a sense of community and ultimately enhance the power of the CCP.

However, what remains to be discussed is what this says about city branding as a policy instrument. To synthesize, what seems to characterize city branding in China is that it is simultaneously an open and innovative (or imaginative) process with a central aim being to create preconditions for creative, imaginative solutions. Yet it is also a highly controlled ideological process with clear limits regarding how, and in what direction, a certain city can and should develop. This can be interpreted as a form of policy instrument that has certain features, elaborated on next.

8.3.1 Central and local control

First, as a policy instrument, imagineering is both highly controlled by a political élite at the city level, and at the same time largely influenced by directives and the ideological apparatus originating from the central government, which means that city branding in the cities studies is a highly politicized activity deeply rooted at the central and the local levels. As such, the study of Chinese mega-cities and their branding can be regarded as contributing to research on the political nature of place branding (e.g. Lucarelli, 2015) by combining the focus on political practices and place branding tied to policy (e.g. Eshuis & Klijn, 2011; Eshuis & Edwards, 2012), with place branding as tied to issues of ideology, power and hegemony (e.g. Rose, 2010; Mehta-Karia, 2012), or studying political interests and underlying powerful logics at the city level, in combination with ideological and hegemonic dynamics at the national level.
This study has shown that, in line with previous research (e.g. Wu, 2000; Wu, 2003; Xu & Yeh, 2005), in the five cities studied, the urban government structure is characterized by strong leadership. The branding of Chinese mega-cities is moreover controlled by central and local governments. At the city level, in the cities studied, the Party secretary and the mayor enjoy most power, and have much influence over city branding, according to different respondents. One respondent, a researcher at Chongqing University (I73, 2012) spoke metaphorically about the Party secretary as the chairman of the board – responsible for the establishment of a strategic plan for the city – and the mayor as the CEO, carrying out the actions related to the strategy. In discussions on Chongqing’s city branding, the same respondent said:

The government is the boss, the city is the company, and the boss controls the company (Researcher, Chongqing University, I73, 2012).

The corporate analogy suggested here can be extended to similarities between city branding and corporate branding, and the branding of Chinese cities can be regarded as having more similarities with corporate branding as compared with their Western counterparts, partly because of the controlled style of city brand management. Van Maanen (1991) has stated that city branding cannot imitate the control and choreography exhibited in Disneyland, where management can exercise control over all the touch points between the Magic Kingdom and the consumers. However, in the branding of Chinese cities, leaders can exercise significant control over the city, its branding and its populations, and exert power in ways that have similarities with organizations, and, for example, the production of organizational obedience (Clegg, 1989).

The power of politicians with regards to city branding was emphasized by an official at Shanghai Municipal Government (I3, 2014), who said: ‘Government officials are like our parents; we have to listen to them’. The same person said that government officials and the political élite – no matter whether at the district level, city level, provincial or nation level – enjoy ample power in Chinese society. Other respondents similarly stated that the central government and the CCP have powerful positions, and lay out the overall principles that must be followed in all Chinese cities. This control from the central government and the CCP is however coupled with considerable power at the city level. In line with previous research (e.g. Berg & Björner, 2014), this study holds that city governments can lead and control the branding and development of Chinese mega-cities provided they stay within the CCP’s general guidelines.

This is in line with research proposing that, increasingly, Chinese mega-cities have developed entrepreneurial strategies, entrepreneurial methods and an entrepreneurial discourse, and begun moving away from top-down planning directives from the nation state (Tang, 2014). The control over city branding
enjoyed at city levels is nevertheless primarily associated with economic dimensions and economic power; and ideological and political power still remains with the central government (Chien, 2010), setting the Chinese case apart from those in many Western contexts. The CCP’s ideological and political power thus originates from the centre in Beijing and reaches out across China, offering institutional and ideological cohesiveness (Brown, 2013) and impacting the creation of imaginaries that support the ruling ideological profile. Following Morgan (2006), ideology can in this context be interpreted as a ‘management tool’, used to shape society and to reach specific ends.

City leaders, primarily the Party secretary and the mayor, have important roles in terms of supporting and legitimating the CCP’s ideological core values, and in creating city imaginaries that fit with these. People at the political top may also, however, pursue their own agendas and use city branding as a means to climb the political career ladder. One such case was the former Party secretary in Chongqing who, according to Callahan (2013), used his time in Chongqing to campaign for a seat in the Politburo Standing Committee of the CCP, using high-profile political campaigns to reach his goal. It came to a halt, however, not only because of elite corruption and power abuse but also, according to different respondents and as depicted in previous research (e.g. Callahan, 2013), because the communication and related city branding was too bold, exorbitant and aggressive, and included too many ties to the Mao area, revolution and communism. Even though communism continues as a ruling ideology in China (Li, Hu & Zhang, 2010), and city branding in a Chinese context can be interpreted as a political tool to sustain and disseminate communist ideology, certain periods and events from the past, such as the Mao era and revolution, are avoided in the creation of imaginaries and city futures, while other eras, values and ideological underpinnings are emphasized, such as Confucian values, and core socialist values. The outcome can be seen as an ideological production of certain meanings, signs and values (Eagleton, 2007).

The considerable power that resides with city leaders such as the Party secretary and the mayor implies that a change of leader can result in changes in terms of place imaginaries and city branding. In the case of Chongqing, the ‘Five Chongqing’ campaign was abandoned when the Party secretary stepped down in 2012, and was replaced by the fundamentally different ‘Five Functional Districts’ strategy. Even though the institutional and political context in China differs markedly from the West, for example, a change in political leadership here can have detrimental effects on city and place branding in much the same way that it would in a Western society. A change of political leadership can, for example, undermine long-term support for and a lasting approach to city branding, as also emphasized by for example Parkerson and Saunders (2005). Jørgensen (2016) has similarly described how changed political leadership resulted in alterations in place branding focus and place branding communication, in the context of nine Danish municipalities.
The powerful positions held by Chinese city leaders can moreover be seen as having a great influence on the place brand itself, similar to the Obama effect in the United States, as described by Govers (2011). The influence by President Xi Jinping, who has led China since March 2013, is apparent in this study and seen in the branding of the cities studied. In a recent news article, it was argued that China has become more closed under Xi Jinping (Wong, 2017). Along the same lines, Ringen (2016) has claimed that China under Xi’s leadership has returned to traditions of propaganda and political education, extended the role of the Party and increased societal control.

Towards the later parts of this study and related fieldwork, primarily from 2013 onwards, I noted a shift towards a more conservative, discreet and ‘politically safe’ city branding, which coincided with President Xi taking office and launching a huge anti-corruption campaign. Take Chengdu, for example, which in the early parts of this study was a city that actively engaged in branding for an international audience, contracting global PR firms and using international social media platforms. In 2013, Chengdu altered its branding approach, aligning more with national narratives and the central government’s path. In 2014, one respondent, a researcher with in-depth insights into city branding in China (I62, 2014), said:

City leaders tend to think from a political perspective. The central government’s path is the right path, meaning that there is no risk if taking that path (Researcher with in-depth insights into city branding in China, I62, 2014).

In the place branding literature, the use of polices in the context of places and governance, as well as marketing and branding, has been discussed by Bellini et al. (2010). These scholars maintain that marketing is no substitute for policy, but can be functional to policy. They refer to governance as a variety of guidance mechanisms, and state that appropriate governance processes can lead to amplified social and political cohesion (Anholt, 2007; Bellini et al., 2010). The way in which groups take possession of a place is moreover seen as contributing to a synthesis of ‘myths’ through a selective narration of social, economic and historical characteristics of a place.

In the context of Chinese mega-cities, city branding can also be regarded as functional to policy, by contributing aesthetic language and imagery and features of seduction in the creation of myths and imaginaries. In a Chinese context, governance and guidance mechanisms are closely intertwined with institutional and ideological cohesiveness communicated by the CCP to the Chinese society, originating from the centre but reaching out all over China (Brown, 2013). Consequently, this study can be regarded as an illustration of how the party-state power extends to the cities studied and influences the development and branding of Chinese cities, in line with the statement that party-state power extends to all spheres of the nation, including politics, economy,
culture and social life (Guo, 2013). Drawing on Bocock (1986), Chinese leaders provide a fundamental outlook for the whole society, while aiming to mobilize consent and to cope with any threats to its authority (Clegg, 1989).

8.3.2 Orchestrated participation

Second, imagineering as a policy instrument implies the involvement of different stakeholder groups and participatory features incorporating the views of for example residents and foreign experts. This can be interpreted as an attempt to create legitimacy, or a kind of social approval, with the purpose to stabilize power relations (Morgan, 2006). What seems to be the case is that the political élite carefully orchestrates the participatory elements, and fundamentally holds the power. As such, participatory elements can be seen as a way to cultivate beliefs in the legitimacy of those in power (Weber, 1986).

In the cities studied, various instances are responsible for city branding, in line with the directives and guidelines laid down by city leaders, the central government and the CCP. According to different respondents, in city governments, different departments and offices, focusing on publicity and information, tourism and culture, investment promotion, transportation, as well as housing and infrastructure, for example, are usually involved in city branding in various ways. Some respondents stated that other stakeholder groups – such as residents and local firms, representatives from research institutes and universities, communication firms and tourism bureaus – were also involved in city branding practices. Others, however, questioned the actual involvement of residents, for example, and the degree to which government officials actually took input from various stakeholder groups into consideration. Consequently, the participatory elements of city branding in the context of Chinese mega-cities is rather ambiguous.

Some of the empirical findings suggest that there are participatory elements in the branding of the Chinese mega-cities studied, examples being online voting in the case of Beijing Spirit, co-creation of brand experience in the case of Chengdu (e.g. Pambassadors’ and London Olympics), the involvement of research institutes and universities, and communication firms and international architect bureaus in envisioning, strategizing and place branding work. Lau and Leung (2011), in their study of Chongqing’s graphic design and city branding, also argue that the city engaged in a participatory city branding approach engaging public and private sectors. Participatory elements in the case of Chongqing consisted of a two-year process during which ten discussion sessions presenting 80 design concepts were held, as well as online polls in which 80,000 members of the public voted for their favourite design, resulting in a city logo.
In contrast, the empirical findings of this study also suggest a strong political leadership belonging to a political élite, possessing solid power over city branding in Chinese cities, allowing for a limited scope of participatory elements and practices. This is in line with Wu (2015), who maintains that public participation in China is limited, relating it to China’s weak civil society and providing examples from urban planning. Even though professional planners are asked to produce strategic plans in a seemingly participatory mode, the plans do not reflect an outcome of stakeholders’ negotiations, but rather the visions of the political leaders (ibid).

In the literature, the participatory place branding approach is often focused on as something positive, involving empowerment as well as democratic and people-led processes (Jernsand & Kraff, 2015). In some contexts, a survey about residents’ evaluations and views can be regarded as a participatory tool, or at least as a sign of good intentions (Braun et al., 2013). However, if practised with the wrong intentions or without caution, participatory place branding can lead to the opposite of empowerment and manipulation (Jernsand & Kraff, 2015). In this study, the extent to which city branding was perceived as empowering or manipulative differed amongst the various respondents and stakeholder groups. For example, the Beijing Spirit campaign was described by a government official in Beijing Publicity Department (I31, 2012) as people-led, democratic and empowering, but was also depicted by a researcher focusing on city branding and residing in Beijing (I58, 2012) as propagandistic, manipulative, and as ‘ideological pollution’. Following Möijer’s (1994) ideas on propaganda, the Beijing Spirit campaign can be regarded propagandistic in that the Publicity Department behind it tried to influence people through words and images, with the aim to incorporate something new into people’s thinking, and cause the receivers of the messages to think and act in certain ways.

8.3.3 Integration with urban governance

Third, in this study, city branding is interpreted as a policy instrument because of the close relations between city branding, city strategy and urban master plans, as described by different respondents and as illustrated in previous research (e.g. Berg & Björner, 2014; Wu, 2015). This also means that the branding of the cities studied is carried out at a strategic level, in line with arguments put forth by Berg and Björner (2014), implying that city branding is a highly political and powerful instrument in Chinese cities, as well as closely tied to urban governance and policy. This has similarities with some previous research conducted in a Western context, for example Eshuis et al. (2013), who view place branding as ‘a special governance strategy that explicitly includes the wider management of wider processes of urban development’ (p. 508). The findings in this study however also indicate that city branding in Chinese
mega-cities is used in ways that are uncommon in the West; to speed up city planning and legitimate other development plans.

Connections between city branding, strategy and planning were found in all five cities studied. In Shanghai, the city’s strategic plans to create ‘Four international centres’ and a ‘Metropolitan city’ were described as closely intertwined with city branding strategies and practices. However, city plans and strategies were described by some respondents as lacking detailed content. In this context, city branding appeared to be used to add details to city strategies and plans using ideological images and language together with written and oral storytelling, making city plans and strategies more engaging and expressive, while incorporating a language of emotions, in line with Sandercock’s (2003) reasoning.

In Shenzhen, planning was described by some respondents at the Planning department as the ‘dragonhead’ for the city’s development, while incorporating imagery and symbolic language to communicate Shenzhen, exhibiting connections between city planning and city branding. Moreover, the comprehensive planning to transform Shenzhen into a pioneering and world city can be seen both in planning documents and in city branding strategies and practices, indicating interconnectedness between these. In Chongqing, some respondents, when asked about the actors involved in city branding, said that the planning bureau has a central role in addition to the Information office. In Chengdu, an official at the Information office, Chengdu Municipal Government (I80, 2012) emphasized the centrality of the Information office in city branding and depicted city branding as a powerful tool when claiming that the Information office did not just give directions on how to do city branding, but was also largely involved in overall urban planning and city design.

The interconnectedness between urban master plans, city strategies and city branding, as well as the centrality of city branding in the context of Chinese cities, has also been emphasized by Wu (2015), who highlights the shift from urban master plans to strategic plans, and ties it to city branding. In the 2000s, Wu (2015) states, there was in China a sudden increase of strategic plans, reflecting ‘the shift of city planning from a resource allocation tool to a development instrument’ (p. 113), a change which has been interpreted as a result of the strengthened role of local government in reaching its development targets, and because local governments perceived the master planning approach as top-down and too restraining. The strategic plan was consequently invented, with the main purpose being place branding (ibid).

The creation of strategic plans includes international planning prize awards as well as various publicity events, attracting wide media attention, which raises local pride and confidence in the strategic plan, and is referred to by Wu (2015) as place branding more than city planning. In the five Chinese mega-
cities studied here, international advisers, companies and organizations have been consulted and hired in connection with city plans, strategies and branding practices. Shenzhen, for example, involved international planning and architecture firms when developing the city centre (Cartier, 2002); Beijing engaged international experts when organizing the 2008 Olympic Games; and Chengdu consulted international PR firms in its branding aimed at international audiences and target groups. Following Wu’s (2015) reasoning, engaging international organizations can be seen as a city branding tool to create publicity and create pride amongst local populations.

I concur with Wu’s (2015) claims that strategic planning brings about change, both with regards to city development and in terms of internal administrative structures. The production of strategic plans also provides the local leader with influence over development plans, and the city strategy can furthermore be used to influence the urban master plan (Wu, 2015). This reasoning also sheds light on the powers of city branding with regards to administrative and societal change. Furthermore, Wu (2015) suggests that the strategic plan in cities pays attention to governance, and at times suggests innovations and institutional changes needed to realize the vision. The strategic plan also proposes concrete ideas on adjustments of administrative structures (Wu, 2015). Planning, strategizing and the related city branding can, in China, consequently be regarded as camouflaging power interests, and as a force in changing power structures. This is interesting for the place branding domain in which power has, hitherto, only been incorporated to a limited degree, but where it has been emphasized that the concept of power is highly relevant to understand how the image of a place is created (Marzano & Scott, 2009).
9. Summing up

In this chapter, I provide a brief summary of this dissertation and discuss main theoretical contributions and key empirical and practical contributions. I also add some critical reflections on the concept of ‘imagineering’, bring up some limitations of this study, and elaborate on ideas for further research.

9.1 Summarizing the study

This dissertation analyses the internal-political aspects of place branding, by field studies of the imagery used in city branding in five Chinese mega-cities, namely Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chengdu and Chongqing. Three RQs have been outlined, centring on imagery used in the branding of the five cities; imaginaries (e.g. economic, social, cultural) used in the city branding; and key political aspects of the branding of Chinese mega-cities. The theoretical lens used in this study consists of concepts related to place imagery, place imaginaries, ideology and power. Place imaginary is defined as the sum of similar place imagery, while also drawing on the concept of imaginaries. Place imaginaries found in the cities studied include economic, international, cultural, social and environmental or ecological imaginaries.

In line with previous research (e.g. Berg & Björner, 2014), this study shows that city branding in China is branching out to deal with not only economic imaginaries and the commercial branding of places, but also, for example, cultural, environmental and social realities of city life. This study shows that social imaginaries are especially evident in the branding of Chinese mega-cities, with imagery centring on inclusiveness and cultivation, and targeting internal audiences such as residents, with the creation of stability and harmony as a key priority. All place imaginaries are also ideologically infused, or influenced by ideology originating from the central government and the CCP, and traditional historical values and beliefs; and communicated through, for example, concepts proposed by the president as well as national policies and plans.

In introducing and developing the concept of ‘imagineering’, this study also analyses key political aspects of the branding of Chinese mega-cities, centring on issues of ideology and power. Within the concept of imagineering, I have identified three main elements that are evident in the branding of Chinese
Imagineering is conceptualized as including: local adjustments, at the city level, of national directives, policies, plans and concepts; a strong future orientation while accentuating selected elements from the past; and a focus on local populations with the creation of stability and harmony as a key priority. Imagineering is also conceptualized as a policy instrument, exercised by a political élite, closely intertwined with urban governance, and used to influence people and city futures, and control society all the way down to people’s fantasy worlds. Imagineering is in this study seen as a framework of city branding which contains features that are particularly evident in the context of Chinese mega-cities, yet including elements that can also be found in smaller Chinese cities and elsewhere in the world.

9.2 Contribution

Place branding is still a relatively young research domain developed over a rather short period of time and characterized by multiple disciplinary compositions (Lucarelli & Berg, 2011). Place branding is also a domain in which a robust theory is still under construction, and critique has been directed towards the lack of theoretical contributions that could be used for further developments of the field (Gertner, 2011a). Furthermore, much of previous place branding research has either supplied empirical illustrations or strict conceptual contributions, more so than combining the two.

This study contributes to the growing domain of place branding by building on previous research, proposing a novel theoretical framework and adding new perspectives to existing descriptions and conceptualizations. This study also contributes to place branding research by combining a rich empirical study with conceptual contributions. As such, the findings and conceptualizations presented in this dissertation can be used as a foundation for further developments of the place branding research domain.

9.2.1 Theoretical contribution

This dissertation contributes to place branding research in three main ways, related to the three research questions and the concepts of place imagery, place imaginaries and imagineering, discussed next.

The first contribution of this study is that it offers an increased understanding of the use of images and language in the branding of Chinese mega-cities, with a certain focus on its underlying ideological and powerful features. As such, this study moves beyond research centring on the use of graphical imagery and visual representation of the place by means of pictures, logos and slogans (see Hospers, 2011; Berglund, 2013), and adds to research centring on discursive features of images and language (e.g. Koller, 2008), imagery and stories.
that connect people (Cayla & Eckhardt, 2008), and ideological features of images and langue in the branding of places (e.g. Dynon, 2011). This study also adds to research that has related imagery to city strategies and brand visions as a means of expressing what the city is now and where it will go in the future (e.g. Metzger & Rader Olsson, 2013; Vanolo, 2014).

The second contribution of this study is related to the analysis of place imaginaries in the cities studied. As such, this study aligns with place branding research that accounts for the more complex reality that the branding of places incorporates (e.g. Bianchini & Ghilardi, 2007; Chan & Marafa, 2013; Kavaratzis, 2008; Lucarelli & Berg, 2011; Mommaas, 2002; Therkelsen et al., 2010). This study’s focus on social imaginaries and local populations moreover adds to research centring on residents and inclusiveness (e.g. Fan, 2014b; Govers, 2011; Guhathakurta & Stimson, 2007; Insch, 2011; Insch & Florek, 2008; Jernsand & Kraff, 2015; Kavaratzis, 2008; Kavaratzis, Giovanardi & Lichrou, 2017). Consequently, through its focus on residents and inclusiveness, this study is a needed contribution since much place branding research still depicts residents as a neglected group in place branding practices with few empirical studies and related conceptualizations of place branding centring on local populations (Oguztimur &Akturan, 2016), especially in non-Western contexts.

The third, main contribution of this dissertation, is the conceptualization of imagineering, and thus shedding light on key political aspects of city branding in the five cities studied. Even if the concept of imagineering is not new in itself, and has been discussed earlier in relation to place branding, this is the first attempt to describe the very mechanisms through which imagineering operates. Through the imagineering concept, this study contributes to current place branding research with a further understanding of place branding as a policy instrument to influence places and people. Through the imagineering concept, this study also contributes to conceptualization of linkages between political interests at the national level with branding practices at the local, city level, embodied through, for example, policies, plans and governance strategy, and seen, for example, in the cities’ adaptation of national, ideological concepts such as the Chinese Dream into their branding practices.

Imagineering also incorporates conceptualizations of city branding aimed at internal audiences or local populations, yet allows for limited, or orchestrated, participation, where the interests of a powerful political élite influence and direct city branding. As such, this dissertation lends support to previous place branding research that recognizes that place branding is a highly politicized activity driven by political élites (e.g. Lucarelli, 2015; Molotch, 1976), and aligns with critical perspectives that have proposed that place branding can be interpreted as a form of social control (e.g. Harvey, 1989; Lucarelli & Brorström, 2013). This study also adds to research that has conceptualized place branding as urban governance strategy used to manage perceptions about
places (Eshuis & Edwards, 2012), and interpreted place branding as a powerful broadband instrument of policy (Lucarelli, 2015).

As depicted in this study, imagineering helps to spread, materialize and anchor political and ideological visions in the cities, and can as such be regarded as an explanation for the popularity of place branding practices. The popularity of place branding can also be explained by the changes that it can bring about, seen in the five cities studied in this thesis. Imagineering is in this study described as a policy instrument to influence and exercise control over people, values, places and city futures; in line with Callahan’s (2013) reasoning that, in China, the objective is not just to know the future, but also to control it. As such, this study adds to previous studies that have described place branding as being largely about change, and especially societal change (e.g. Sevin, 2011). The same researcher noted, in my view rightly, that societal change, politics and power are related phenomena in the sense that place branding can produce and reproduce social norms and values, change the physical and normative landscape, and thus profoundly alter the social context.

2.1.2 Empirical and practical contribution

In addition to the theoretical contribution, this dissertation, with its extensive empirical research carried out in five Chinese mega-cities, is an important empirical contribution to the place branding field, which has been dominated by research focusing on one place, and primarily centred on a Western context (e.g. Andersson, 2014; Lucarelli & Berg, 2011). The empirical phenomena of this study is also a valuable contribution at a point in time when China is gaining increasing influence in the world. The opportunities and challenges that China and Chinese cities face at a time of transition are of great scale, and of interest and relevance both for researchers and practitioners around the world.

Furthermore, some key practical contributions are outlined in this study. First, city branding in Chinese mega-cities is an integrated element in city strategies and urban master plans, and is consequently a fundamental element in the development of Chinese cities. One reason for this is that city branding in a Chinese context offers emotional and rational arguments presented through seductive place imagery, which in turn is reinforced by strategic and purposeful actions. As a powerful tool in place development, city branding is an important area to learn more about for anyone interested in the development of Chinese cities, and in places more generally, e.g. practitioners and decision makers.

Second, this study offers insights of relevance in both research and practice, with regards to both the external and the internal ambitions and challenges that Chinese cities and China face today. This study shows that Chinese cities are externally oriented, and agents of globalization, taking on positions in the global landscape, and as such influencing international norms about e.g. the
global city and what it is. At the same time, the cities studied are also, and even more internally oriented, and use city branding as a tool to deal with the many challenges that China’s rapid urbanization and globalization has brought about, and the dramatic changes that China has experienced over the past three decades. As such, this study contributes with additional perspectives not only with regards to the global or international ambitions in Chinese mega-cities, but also in terms of the internal challenges that many Chinese cities face today, and how this is dealt with. This would be of interest for various people around the world, including politicians, civil servants and business people.

Finally, the way Chinese mega-cities are dreamt up and envisioned, proactively and strategically planned, governed and communicated, is a hot topic today and will be for many years to come. I agree with Li (2013) that the study of contemporary China and its cities should not be seen as merely a supplement to the Western model, but rather as a way to give rise to more contemporary values and perspectives. Moreover, the great challenges and opportunities that China and Chinese mega-cities face today are of great scale, and can imply important lessons about China, but also be generalized to other contexts, and thus have relevance for and create interest amongst not only researchers but also practitioners around the world.

9.3 Final reflections

9.3.1 Reflections on imagineering

Imagineering can be seen as including advantages and disadvantages in relation to the intrinsic power of the imagineering mechanisms, which I reflect on next. Drawing on Zukin (1997), imagineering as depicted in this study implies a type of city branding that is driven by city officials and political élites as they impose their visions upon urban space. In the context of the Chinese mega-cities studied here, the inventive reality-making and creation of city realities through city branding can be related to a form of Orwellian control, and thus power exercises through manipulation of images and language, indoctrination and surveillance (Hollinshead, 1998). Following Foucault’s (1979) notion of governmentality and Kornberger’s (2010) reasoning of the same, the power of city branding in China does not necessarily determine behaviour, but it structures potential responses and possible actions; it conducts as it leads and motivates various actors in the cities to make certain choices in the creation of city realities.

Critical studies (e.g. Broudehoux, 2007; Gibson, 2005; Gotham, 2007; Koller, 2008) often view place branding as a radical, conflictual and highly politicized process, commonly discussing the branding of places as a politicized social
construct (e.g. narrative-critical discourse studies) grounded in a neo-liberal discourse (Lucarelli & Brorström, 2013). As in previous critical research, this study conceptualizes place branding and imagineering as a politicized activity, for example by shedding light on the use and power of official imagery, and hegemonic discourses orchestrated by an élite. In contrast to previous critical research, however, this study does not focus solely on highlighting problematic consequences of place branding related to the economic, social and cultural environment, but also conceptualizes city branding in China as an activity that purposefully creates safer, greener and more inclusive places, and that contributes to establishing common cultural values and communities.

Imagineering, and the branding of Chinese mega-cities, should thus not be disregarded as only a political project with malevolent intentions. Rather, it should be seen as an important instrument in handling globalization, urbanization and domestic challenges. It should also be regarded as a central tool in the engineering of a better place (Coeckelbergh, 2010) and in making places better (Zenker & Govers, 2016). This study concurs with previous work that has stated that place branding can affect society and bring about social change (Ooi, 2010). This dissertation also extends Kalandides’ (2011) claim regarding place branding’s usefulness for place development, holding that place branding is a prerequisite for, and fundamental element of, place development; intertwined with policymaking, city strategizing and urban planning; and incorporated into a broader conceptualization extending beyond a focus on competition, economic drivers and external audiences, focusing on internal audiences and multiple, co-existing city realities and place imaginaries.

9.2.1 Limitations of the study and further research

This dissertation includes various limitations, some of which are elaborated on next. The first limitation I would like to mention concerns the empirical object of study, namely the five Chinese mega-cities, all of which are huge, complex and dynamic and in the midst of rapid transformation. The confined time frame allowed for this study, along with the challenge of summarizing and analysing the most central findings from each city, together with the aim and theoretical perspectives chosen for this study, imply that the city descriptions, for example, are not all-encompassing, but rather focused on some specific characteristics while excluding others. Another limitation is that the fieldwork conducted for this study was carried out between 2010 and 2014. Even though I have consulted my Chinese supervisor and three Chinese colleagues to get their input on the relevance of my findings at the time of writing (March 2017), there is always the risk that the findings presented, discussed and analysed are not entirely up to date, especially considering the constant, rapid pace of development in China and Chinese cities.
Moreover, this study needs to be followed up by additional research, discussed next. The internal character of city branding in China became apparent during this study; and in a Chinese context, social inclusiveness has been described as a key pillar of place branding legitimacy (Fan, 2014b). Inclusiveness and social branding have moreover been depicted as interesting issues to explore further in connection with place branding, in China and more generally, especially as cities increasingly are regarded as ‘commons’, and residents come to play an increasing role in the creation, development and branding of places (ibid). In line with this development, further light could be shed on related queries such as ‘Who owns the city?’, and notions of ‘urban commons’ (Borch & Kornberger, 2015; Kalandides, Millington, Parker & Quin, 2016; Zapata & Zapata Campos, 2015) tied to place branding. Furthermore, additional research could focus on ideological appropriation (e.g. Lucarelli, 2015), and pay further attention to the role that citizens, artists, film-makers, dissidents and other stakeholders play in the branding and development of Chinese cities and city brands. Moreover, to facilitate theorizing across contexts, further studies could focus on cross-cultural comparisons between, for example, the branding of cities in China and the branding of cities in other parts of the world.

As indicated in the literature, a more holistic viewpoint combining marketing and planning-oriented approaches is needed in the context of place branding (Oguztimur & Akturan, 2016). Such a holistic view has, to some degree, been illustrated in this study, showing the intertwining of city branding and urban planning, and has also been elaborated on by Wu (2015), for example. Nevertheless, this is an area that calls for additional, in-depth inquiry to further elucidate connections and power dynamics. Furthermore, the focus of this research – very large cities – suited this particular study, partly due to megacities’ engagement in city branding activities and their important positions in a national and global context. But further research might profitably focus on smaller-sized Chinese cities, which represent the majority of cities around the world, and incorporate other challenges compared to very large cities. For example, while mega-cities are commonly overpopulated, smaller places are often undergoing depopulation.

As shown in this study, plans, policies and concepts play central roles in the branding of Chinese mega-cities. Further studies could focus on place branding in relation to development strategies and frameworks such as the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ and concepts like the ‘Chinese Dream’. Moreover, China’s 13th Five-Year Plan provides guidelines for the years 2016–2020, and will come to greatly influence the development of the nation and its cities. The Plan puts emphasis on sustainability and improvements of the environment, on creating better livelihoods for Chinese people and on cultivating a ‘positive culture’ online. As highlighted earlier in this thesis, these are themes that have been researched only to a limited degree in the place branding domain, espe-
cially in a Chinese context. These are also themes worthy of further investigation, and critical enquiries could, for example, investigate what it means to cultivate a positive online culture with regards to place branding.
10. References


Çınar, A. and Bender, T. (Eds.) (2007), Urban Imaginaries: Locating the Modern City, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.


Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. (2003), Metaphors We Live By, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.


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11. Appendices
Appendix 1: Interview guide

The following interview questions are examples of questions asked in interviews during the fieldwork in China. The questions were adjusted to fit the specific respondent and circumstance, as discussed in Chapter 4.

I. Vision and future
   a. Please tell me about the future role and development of CITY.
   b. What is CITY’s vision or strategy?
   c. Who decides on CITY’s vision and future role?
   d. Who works with realizing the vision/the strategy and how?

II. Use of imagery in the branding of CITY
   a. Please tell me about the branding of CITY.
   b. How and why does CITY communicate its brand/engage in city branding?
   c. What words, pictures and concepts are commonly used to brand CITY?
   d. Which organizations are involved in the branding of CITY?
   e. What are the target groups? Is CITY branded internationally? How?

III. Multi-dimensions
   a. What are the main reasons for branding CITY?
   b. (How) is CITY branded in order to boost the economy of the city?
   c. (How) is CITY branded when it comes to culture?
   d. (How) is CITY branded when it comes to social dimensions such as inclusiveness and well-being of CITY residents?
   e. (How) is CITY branded with a focus on other dimensions (environment, etc.)?

IV. Mode and governance
   a. To what extent is the branding and development of CITY dependent on the decisions made in Beijing (the central government)?
   b. What are the directives given and decisions made at a local/city level?
   c. What are the directives given and decisions made at a central/national level?
   d. To what degree, and in what ways, do central policies and plans (such as the Five-Year Plans) influence city branding in CITY?
   e. To what degree, and in what ways, do concepts such as the Harmonious society and the Chinese Dream influence the city branding of CITY?

V. Personal
   a. Can you please tell me about your background and current position?
   b. What is your experience of city branding?
   c. Is there anything you would like to add?
   d. Do you know other government officials, practitioners or researchers involved in the branding of CITY that I could get in touch with?
Appendix 2: Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Date &amp; Time</th>
<th>Topic</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>I1</td>
<td>Government official</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal Commission of Population and Family Planning</td>
<td>1 June, 2012 60 mins</td>
<td>Branding of Shanghai and Chinese mega-cities</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>Government official</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal Government, Pudong City Planning</td>
<td>23 Oct, 2014 60 mins</td>
<td>Development of Lujiazui district in Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>I4</td>
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<td>24 Nov, 2014 90 mins</td>
<td>Branding Shanghai as a destination; exhibitions, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>I5</td>
<td>Practitioner</td>
<td>Ogilvy, Guangzhou (PR firm)</td>
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<td>Shanghai World Expo, Branding Shanghai</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>I6</td>
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<td>21 Sep, 2010 60 mins</td>
<td>Shanghai World Expo, Branding Shanghai</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>I7</td>
<td>Practitioner</td>
<td>Fudan University, The Nordic Centre</td>
<td>21 Sep, 2010 50 mins</td>
<td>Branding Shanghai, World Expo 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>I8</td>
<td>Practitioner</td>
<td>The Swedish Trade Council in Shanghai</td>
<td>28 Sep, 2011 90 mins</td>
<td>Branding and historical development of Shanghai</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>I9</td>
<td>Practitioner</td>
<td>Fudan University, The Nordic Centre</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Researcher</td>
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<td>Shanghai World Expo, Branding Shanghai</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>I13</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>I14</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
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<td>I15</td>
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<td>Branding of Shanghai and Chinese mega-cities</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
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<td>21 Oct, 2014</td>
<td>90 mins</td>
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<td>Researcher</td>
<td>Shanghai Institutes for International Studies</td>
<td>24 Nov, 2014</td>
<td>70 mins</td>
<td>City branding, World Expo 2010</td>
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</table>

**Beijing**

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<th>Time</th>
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Appendix 3: Printed materials

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## Appendix 4: News articles

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<td>‘Chengdu on Track to Become an International Hub.’</td>
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<td>Xinhuanet (2015)</td>
<td>‘Quotes from President Xi Jinping about the Chinese Dream.’</td>
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**Appendix 5: Web pages**

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<td>Szday (2013)</td>
<td>‘Shenzhen Design Award for Young Talents.’</td>
<td><a href="http://www.szday.org/content/2013-06/08/content_8159635.htm">www.szday.org/content/2013-06/08/content_8159635.htm</a></td>
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<td>Fudan University, Shanghai</td>
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201 2015 Andreas Sundström  
Representing Performance | Performing Representation: Ontology in Accounting Practice.  
Stockholm Business School, Stockholm University.

200 2015 Dong Zhang  
Essays on Market Design and Market Quality.  
Stockholm Business School, Stockholm University.

199 2015 Niklas Wällstedt  
Managing Multiplicity: On Control, Care and the Individual.  
Stockholm Business School, Stockholm University.

198 2014 Goran Zafirov  
Essays on Balkan frontier stock markets.  
Stockholm Business School, Stockholm University.

197 2014 Christer Westermark  
Implementering av redovisning som styrmetod. Om hållbarhetsredovisningens effekter i statligt ägda företag.  
Stockholm Business School, Stockholm University.

196 2014 Anna Wettermark  
Tales of transformation: Expatriate encounters with local contexts. A postcolonial reading.  
Stockholm Business School, Stockholm University.

195 2014 Randy Ziya Shoai  
Stockholm Business School, Stockholm University.

194 2014 Christofer Laurell  
Commercialising social media. A study of fashion (blogo)spheres.  
Stockholm University School of Business.

193 2014 Fredrik Jörgensen  
The Law Businessman - Five Essays on Legal Self-efficacy and Business Risk.  
Stockholm University School of Business.

192 2013 Caihong Xu  
Essays on Derivatives and Liquidity.  
Stockholm University School of Business.

191 2013 Mikael Andehn  
Place-of-Origin Effects on Brand Equity. Explicating the evaluative pertinence of product categories and association strength.  
Stockholm University School of Business.
190 2013  Sabina Du Rietz  
Accounting in the field of governance. Stockholm University School of Business.

189 2013  Fernholm, Johanna  
Uppförandekoder som etisk varumärkning? Ansvar i företag med globala värdekedjor. Stockholm University School of Business.

188 2013  Svärdsten Nymans, Fredrik  
 Constituting performance: Case studies of performance auditing. Stockholm University School of Business.

187 2012  Kumar, Nishant  
Globalisation and Competitive Sustenance of Born Global. Evidence from Indian knowledge-intensive service industry. Stockholm University School of Business.

186 2012  Yngfalk, Carl  

185 2011  Fyrberg Yngfalk, Anna  

184 2011  Molander, Susanna  
Mat, kärlek och metapraktik. En studie i vardagsmiddagskonsumtion bland ensamstående mödrar. Stockholm University School of Business.

183 2011  Kylsberg, Gösta  
Kunglig kommunikation – körkonst och tradition. En autoetnografi om autenticitet i ett kungligt konstföretag. Stockholm University School of Business.

182 2011  Lindh, Kristina  
Reciprocal Engagement. A grounded theory of an interactive process of actions to establish, maintain, and develop an enterprise. Stockholm University School of Business.

181 2011  Schultz-Nybacka, Pamela  
Bookonomy. The Consumption Practice and Value of Book Reading. Stockholm University School of Business.

180 2011  Lund, Ragnar  
Leveraging cooperative strategy – cases of sports and arts sponsorship. Stockholm University School of Business.


175 2010 Radón, Anita The Rise of Luxury Brands Online: A study of how a sense of luxury brand is created in an online environment. Stockholm University School of Business.

174 2010 Martinsson, Irene Standardized Knowledge Transfer: A study of Project-Based Organizations in the Construction and IT Sectors. Stockholm University School of Business.

173 2009 Digerfeldt-Månsson, Theresa Formernas liv i designföretaget - om design och design management som konst. Stockholm University School of Business.


170 2009 Wittbom, Eva Att spränga normer - om målstyrningsprocesser för jämställhetsintegrering. Stockholm University School of Business.

169 2009 Wiesel, Fredrika Kundorientering och ekonomistyrning i offentlig sektor. Stockholm University School of Business.
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>Carrington, Thomas</td>
<td>Framing Audit Failure - Four studies on quality discomforts.</td>
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152 2006 Ferdfelt, Henrik Pop. Stockholm University School of Business.

151 2006 Sjödin, Ulrika Insiders' Outside/Outsiders' Inside - rethinking the insider regulation. Stockholm University School of Business.

150 2006 Skoglund, Wilhelm Lokala samhällsutvecklingsprocesser och entreprenörskap. Stockholm University School of Business.

149 2005 Bengtsson, Elias Shareholder activism of Swedish institutional investors. Stockholm University School of Business.

148 2005 Holmgren, Mikael A passage to organization. Stockholm University School of Business.


146 2004 Sjöstrand, Fredrik Nätverkskoordineringens dualiteter. Stockholm University School of Business.

145 2004 Khan, Jahangir Hossain Determinants of Small Enterprise Development of Bangladesh. Stockholm University School of Business.
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