Immigration, Social Cohesion, and the Welfare State
Studies on Ethnic Diversity in Germany and Sweden

Tina Goldschmidt

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Abstract
Can social cohesion and solidarity persist in the face of large-scale migration? One particularly contentious hypothesis states that native majorities will be unwilling to support the provision of government-funded welfare to those whom they do not consider to be part of their own sociocultural ingroup, especially when sociocultural or ethnic otherness and socioeconomic disadvantage overlap. Consequently, majorities’ willingness to accept disadvantaged immigrant groups as legitimate and trusted members of the welfare community is central to the social cohesion of societies diversifying through migration.

The dissertation consists of a comprehensive summary, followed by four original studies addressing the interplay between migration-induced diversity and social cohesion through the lens of majority attitudes and the micro and macro contexts within which they are embedded. The studies focus on Sweden and Germany, two European societies that host strong welfare states and large immigrant populations. Together, they seek to answer two central questions:

First, does social distance between native-born citizens and immigrants lead the former to withdraw support from all redistributive policies, or are some types of welfare more affected than others? Second, how does the migration-induced diversification of societies come to matter for majority attitudes toward the welfare state and, as they are closely related, for majority attitudes toward the trustworthiness of others?

Looking at the case of Germany, Study 1 shows that the conflict between diversity and welfare solidarity is not expressed in a general majority opposition to welfare, but rather in an opposition to government assistance benefiting immigrants – a phenomenon sometimes referred to as welfare chauvinism.

Study 2 turns to the case of Sweden and investigates three pathways into welfare chauvinism: via the first-hand experience of immigrant unemployment and putative welfare receipt in the neighborhood context; via exposure to immigrant competition at the workplace; and via negative prejudice against immigrants. We find that the direct observation of immigrant unemployment in the neighborhood increases natives’ preference for spending on other Swedes over spending on immigrants, while competition with immigrants at the workplace does not.

Using the same Swedish data, Study 3 hypothesizes that ethnically diverse workplaces imply trust-fostering intergroup contact. Yet, like in Study 2, we find a negative relationship between majority Swedes’ exposure to certain immigrant groups in the neighborhood and their trust in neighbors, while diverse workplaces neither seem to increase trust nor to affect the negative neighborhood-level association.

Both Studies 2 and 3 show that negative attitudes toward immigrants increase welfare chauvinism and lower trust, even disregarding majority Swedes’ actual experience of immigrant presence or unemployment. Study 4 thus turns to a social force outside the realm of first-hand experience and explores German online news media debates on the welfare deservingness of various sociodemographic groups – among them, immigrants (as refugees in particular). However, rather than observing the persistent and particular stigmatization of immigrants as undeserving recipients or untrustworthy abusers of welfare, we find much more nuanced descriptions in our vast corpus of news stories.

Keywords: welfare state, attitudes, intergroup relations, prejudice, deservingness, diversity, immigration, integration, unemployment, Sweden, Germany.

Stockholm University

Department of Sociology

Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm
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Tina Goldschmidt
To RJG
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Tina Goldschmidt
*European Societies* 17(5): 620–652.
DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2015.1088959

STUDY II  Social Distance, Immigrant Integration, and Welfare Chauvinism in Sweden
Tina Goldschmidt and Jens Rydgren
*Manuscript under review*

STUDY III  Are They Hunkering Down? Revisiting the Relationship between Exposure to Ethnic Diversity, Intergroup Contact, and Group Trust
Tina Goldschmidt, Martin Hällsten, and Jens Rydgren
*Manuscript under review*

Tina Goldschmidt and R. Janis Goldschmidt
*Manuscript in preparation*
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Sammanfattning


Avhandlingen består av en uttömmande sammanfattning. Den följs av fyra självständiga undersökningar som redogör för samspellet mellan migrationsrelaterad mångfald och social sammanhållning genom att belysa majoritetens attityder och de mikro– och makrokontexter inom vilka dessa formas. Forskningen som presenteras fokuserar på Sverige och Tyskland, två europeiska stater med starka välfärdssamhällen och stora andelar invandrare bland befolkningen, och skapar en syntes mellan teorier och analytiska metoder från sociologi, socialpsykologi, statsvetenskap och korpuslingvistik för att besvara två centrala frågor:

För det första, får det sociala avståndet mellan invandrare och infödda medborgare de senare att dra tillbaka stödet för generell omfördelningspolitik eller påverkas vissa aspekter på välfärdsstaten mer än andra?

**Studie 2** använder Sverige som utgångspunkt för att utforska konceptet välfärdschauvinism mera detaljerat och går också vidare till den andra centrala frågan i avhandlingen: Hur påverkar samhällets invandringsrelaterade mångfald majoritetens attityder till välfärdstaten och, eftersom de är nära besläktade med varandra, attityderna när det gäller tilliten till andra?


Men både studie 2 och 3 visar också att negativa attityder mot invandrare ökar välfärdschauvinismen och minskar tilliten, även om majoritetssvenskarnas faktiska upplevelser av invandrades närvaro eller arbetslöshet utesluts. Detta antyder att sociala krafter utanför förstahandsupplevelsernas värld också i väsentlig grad påverkar preferensererna för välfärden. De krafterna är, slutligen, ämnet för **Studie 4**, som återvänder till fallet med Tyskland och utforskar debatter i nätbaserade nyhetsmedia om hur förtjänade av välfärd olika sociodemografska grupper är, bland dem invandrare (i det här fallet främst flyktingar). Men istället för att observera den ständiga och särskilda stigmatiseringen av invandrare som oförtjänade mottagare, eller till och med opålitliga missbrukare, av välfärd har vi funnit en betydligt mer nyanserad tillskrivning av fel och ansvar i vår omfattande samling med tyska nyhetsartiklar.

*Translation from English by Proper English AB*
1. Introduction

This dissertation investigates the consequences of immigration and diversification for social cohesion in two European societies—Sweden and Germany. Over the course of four studies, I address the interplay between diversity and cohesion through the lens of majority attitudes. In particular, the research presented here focuses on attitudes toward redistribution within the welfare state and the trustworthiness of others, both of which are important indicators of social solidarity and cohesion among groups in society.

Since the Second World War, international migration has transformed many European nation states into ethnically stratified societies in which “the poor are mostly minorities and minorities are mostly poor” (Alesina and Glaesner, 2004). Their welfare states thus provide at least some forms of assistance to economically disadvantaged non–citizens. Yet, academics and political actors alike have raised doubts about the support of majority populations for this extended notion of the welfare community, often arguing that including immigrants among the pool of beneficiaries will erode majority support for the welfare state at large. The four studies included in the dissertation at hand seek to empirically dissect this claim, and do so by asking two critical questions:

First, are all types of welfare equally affected?

This question is motivated by its social relevance and by a problematic tendency of existing studies to disregard the multidimensionality of welfare. Most studies addressing majority attitudes toward welfare ask, for instance, whether survey respondents think that the government should alleviate income disparities. Based on findings from Study I, the dissertation contributes to the academic debate by showing that the generalist approach to operationalizing welfare state support masks important differences across policy types. Indeed, it hides the fact that what is at stake is not majority support for the welfare state at large, but a rise in welfare chauvinism (a term coined by Andersen and Bjorklund, 1990), that is, opposition to the inclusion of immigrants as beneficiaries of government spending (also see Study II).

Second, how—that is, through which channels—does the presence of immigrants come to matter for majority attitudes? I address this question at the micro level of individual attitudes (Studies II and III), and at the macro level of public discourses (Study IV). Despite a growing academic literature on the so–called welfare–immigration nexus (a term coined by Brochmann and Hagelund, 2011), and much theorizing on why the purportedly negative
association between a heightened presence of immigrants and waning majority support for redistribution may come about, few of the theoretical pathways have been studied empirically. This is where the dissertation seeks to make its second contribution.

The comprehensive summary (Kappa) at hand begins by motivating the dissertation’s focus on majority attitudes in the national contexts of Sweden and Germany. Section 2 briefly defines the most central concepts used throughout the four dissertation studies. Section 3 introduces and comments upon the dissertation’s data sources and analytical approaches. Section 4 concludes.

1.1 Why Study Attitudes? —Definition and Motivation

Attitudes are and have for a long time been among the most central objects of study in social psychology and sociology alike (Allport, 1935; Banaji and Heiphetz, 2010). On the one hand, attitudes are properties of individuals. However, on the other hand, people also tend to share attitudes such that they come to form “broad patterns of culture” or *public opinion* (Allport, 1935: 789). This is why Allport once argued that “psychologists and sociologists find [in attitudes] a meeting point for discussion and research” (1935: 789).

Given that attitudes have been such long-standing subjects of sociological and social psychological investigation, there is a myriad of definitions to be found. One of the most classic and widely accepted ones was issued by Allport in his 1935 entry to the *Handbook of Social Psychology*:

> An attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual’s response to all objects and situations with which it is related.

Allport’s canonical definition has been interpreted to imply three main messages. First, humans are “creatures of preferences,” and attitudes encode their “fundamental orientation to evaluate” (Banaji and Heiphetz, 2010: 348, 354; also see Jarvis and Petty, 1996). In this context, evaluation means assessing an *attitude object* (a person, thing, or idea toward which the attitude is directed) as either positive or negative, favorable or unfavorable, as something one is for or against (cf. Allport, 1935). Consequently, the notion that attitudes are expressed as degrees of favoring or opposing an attitude object is enshrined in all standard measurement scales used in attitudinal research.

Second, attitudes are learned through experience (also see Doob, 1947), where learning is inspired by a range of sources. Socioeconomic conditions, such as education and income, have been recognized as important factors in attitude formation at the individual level (see, e.g., Carvacho et al., 2013; Wardle and Steptoe, 2003). However, attitude learning is also a highly social
process, with environmental factors playing important roles (Banaji and Heiphetz, 2010: 365). Among the most widely studied sources of social learning are mere exposure to (Zajonc, 1968) and actual contact with (Allport, 1954) attitude objects. Other important sources of attitude learning are peers and family members within personal networks (cf. Poteat, 2007; Sinclair et al., 2005), as well as cultural norms and political ideologies transmitted in public debates (e.g., in news media reports; Nelson et al., 1997; Slothuus, 2007).

Third, attitudes imply the readiness to act. However, the degree to which the attitude–behavior link exists is an issue of dispute and most likely dependent on the type of attitude in question. Generally, theory distinguishes between explicit and implicit attitudes (cf. Payne et al., 2008). Implicit attitudes are unconscious and thus much harder to measure by an external observer (though experimental methods exist; cf. Banaji and Heiphetz, 2010: 358). Explicit attitudes are consciously formed and can thus be actively expressed by the attitude holder and captured by asking direct questions (e.g., in the context of a survey). They are the type of attitudes addressed in this dissertation. Importantly, the link between explicit attitudes and behavior seems to be quite direct. To give just one, perhaps unsurprising, example: past research has shown that explicit attitudes toward political parties and politicians are reliable predictors of electoral choice, especially when evaluation occurs along an affective (liking vs. disliking) dimension rather than a cognitive one (Lavine et al., 1998). In the same vein, people with negative attitudes toward immigrants can reasonably be expected to align their political preferences with these unfavorable views, for example, choosing to vote for parties that promise to exclude immigrants from the welfare community.

Sociology mainly focuses on the study of explicit attitudes toward social attitude objects (Luther, 1930: 305). A social object is anything outside the self, any specific thing, type, or idea that is visible to more than just one person and thus part of human group relations or society. What makes such attitudes interesting to sociologists is that they are “so strongly interconditioned by collective contact that they become highly standardized and uniform within the group,” ultimately forming what is commonly called public opinion (Luther, 1930: 305).

The reason I chose to study the implications of migration–induced diversification for redistributive welfare politics, and social cohesion more broadly, through the lens of attitudes is threefold:

First, waning levels of popular support for redistribution and declining intergroup trust provide earlier indicators of welfare state erosion and waning social solidarity than more easily quantifiable and widely used macro–level measures. Measures such as spending cuts (cf. Alesina et al., 1999; Böheim and Mayr, 2005; Cutler et al., 1993) have to pass a long cycle of legislation before coming into effect. Yet, since the democratic process transforms so-
cial attitudes into politics, early shifts in public opinion may predict future policy (cf. Brooks and Manza, 2007; van Oorschot, 2010).

Second, populist, right–wing, anti–immigration movements across Europe are largely fueled by the putative consequences of migration for the welfare of native–born majorities, in particular (Eger and Valdez, 2015). As migration and diversity are here to stay, and the politics of welfare chauvinism is indicative of societies’ failing to extend solidarity to their non–native members, it is important to understand what motivates majorities to embrace exclusivist appeals.

Last, Ford (2006) and others have argued that attitudes serve as important intermediaries in transforming the increased presence of ethnoculturally distinct immigrants into majority opposition to redistribution. Past research has shown that shared nationality and culture are two of the main criteria according to which individuals distinguish between the deserving and the undeserving poor. This is why immigrants and ethnic minorities tend to find themselves farthest down the ladder of legitimate claimants (Appelbaum, 2002; van Oorschot, 2006). A contentiously debated hypothesis thus states that increasing diversity serves to activate majority prejudice against immigrant “outsiders,” which then leads majorities to oppose especially those kinds of welfare likely to benefit immigrants.

1.2. Why Sweden and Germany?

It shall not be denied that there were some practical considerations that rendered Sweden and Germany convenient test cases. Among them were issues of data availability as well as knowledge on my part of the historical and political contexts and national languages (which is of the utmost importance to Study IV, in particular). More importantly, however, Sweden and Germany are very telling case studies for a number of conceptual reasons, too.

When I first started thinking about where to study the consequences of large–scale migration for social cohesion in general and for the welfare–immigration nexus in particular, two criteria came to mind. First, the country in question should have experienced increasing levels of migration over time. Second, the country should also have a spending–intensive welfare state, which allows immigrants to benefit from a variety of its provisions, such as to create a situation in which immigrants’ welfare receipt might even become a social attitude object and, as such, a subject of public debate. The following two sections outline how Sweden and Germany fulfill both criteria.
1.2.1 Sweden and Germany as High-Migration Countries

Since the Second World War, Sweden and Germany have both experienced rising levels of international immigration, turning them from formerly homogeneous into multiethnic migration societies. In the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s, both countries’ implemented extensive guest worker regimes, inviting migration from Southern Europe and Turkey, in particular. Even though these policies were intended to be temporary, many former guest workers and their families stayed permanently. Throughout the 1990s and increasingly since the summer of 2015, war and humanitarian crises have led to another period of large-scale immigration to Sweden and Germany, first from the former Yugoslavia, but increasingly also from Latin America (mainly to Sweden), and the Middle East. Today, 13.2% of all residents in Germany and 16.5% of all residents in Sweden were born abroad (OECD, 2016). As of 2014, Sweden hosts the fifth highest number of foreign-born nationals per capita in Europe (exceeded only by Luxemburg, Malta, Ireland, and Austria; Eurostat, 2016). In both Sweden and Germany, the population share of residents with a so-called migration background, is, of course, much higher. 31% of Sweden’s population were either born abroad themselves or have at least one foreign-born parent (own calculations based on Statistics Sweden, 2017). The same is true for 20.5% of Germany’s population (DEStatis, 2014). Recently, both countries have been discussed as the EU 28’s leading recipients of asylum applications, with 1 in 10 going to Sweden and as many as one third of all applications being received by Germany (OECD, 2016). This rise in asylum applications has been accompanied by a general shift from work-related and intra-European immigration to a rising share of humanitarian migrants among all new entries (OECD, 2016).

Needless to say, asylum seekers usually hail from non-Western, non-European countries of origin. Studies have shown that these particular immigrant groups tend to face especially challenging hurdles on their way to economic integration, causing them to be overrepresented among the recipients of government-funded welfare (see, e.g., Engels et al., 2011; Fritzell et al., 2012; Gustafsson, 2011). With the exception of Study IV, the data used in the dissertation papers was exclusively gathered before the onset of the so-called refugee crisis in 2014. Since then, public debates about welfare provisions made to refugees in particular and immigrants more broadly certainly seem to have intensified (cf. Study IV for tentative evidence), rendering the findings presented in Studies I, II, and III rather conservative.

1.2.2 Welfare Regimes and Social Policy Types

However, the strength of immigration flows aside, there is also an institutional component to the degree to which immigration and welfare receipt
come to be linked in the popular mind. Recent comparative research suggests that welfare states that are generally more generous tend to be more inclusive toward immigrants as well. For instance, Sweden has traditionally been among the biggest social spenders in Europe, currently investing about 27% of its annual GDP in social expenditures, with little variation over time (OECD, 2017). Using data from the *Immigration Policies in Comparison Project* (IMPIC), which ranks immigration policies and immigrant rights across affluent democracies and time, Römer (forthcoming) shows that Sweden has persistently granted immigrants access to virtually all of its welfare provisions, even throughout times of economic recession and general welfare retrenchment in the 1990s (also see Sainsbury, 2012). Sweden’s egalitarian approach to inclusionary social policy is firmly enshrined in its welfare regime, which mainly consists of so-called *universal benefits*, which can be accessed by any legal resident, regardless of prior contribution (cf. Esping-Andersen, 1990).

Since 2005, Germany has invested about 25% of its annual GDP in social expenditures, making it also one of the largest welfare spenders in Europe (Adema et al., 2012). However, hosting a welfare regime that ties most of its benefits to prior contribution (cf. Esping-Andersen, 1990), Germany has been classified as exclusive toward immigrants, who often do not have a long work and contribution history in Germany (Sainsbury, 2006).

What makes Sweden and Germany interesting case studies is that they represent two of the three archetypical types of welfare regime commonly distinguished in the literature (Esping-Andersen 1990), and hypothesized to shape discourses and attitudes about who should get what and why. Posing my research questions in both contexts allowed me to see how migration and majority support for welfare intersect across two very different institutional settings.

While the Swedish welfare state has been labeled *social democratic*, being almost exclusively made up of universal programs where nearly everybody pays and benefits simultaneously, the German social system has been labeled *conservative*, being structured around *contributory welfare* where benefits depend on level and duration of prior input (Esping-Andersen 1990). The difference between contributory and universal welfare is central to understanding majority attitudes.

Universal welfare programs of the Swedish regime type, which are financed by taxpayer contributions, make it “difficult to stigmatize receivers of government support,” since “almost everybody contributes and receives” (Crepaz and Damron, 2009: 449). Similarly, welfare benefits that are tied to prior contribution—as most of the German ones are—are connected to a strong sense of entitlement and unlikely to raise questions about recipients’ deservingness (Crepaz and Damron, 2009: 449). Contributory benefits also have the advantage that they do not make a clear-cut distinction between welfare providers and welfare receivers, as everybody, more or less, pays
their own way. Under conditions in which most of the working-age population has a taxable income, the same can be said about universal types of welfare—everyone contributes and nearly everyone benefits at some point. However, while those who do not pay in the contributory setting are kept from benefitting, universal benefits are—by definition—virtually free from exclusion criteria, apart from legal residence. Prior research by Finseraas (2008), Burgoon et al. (2012), and others provides some evidence that exclusionary attitudes toward immigrants are more pronounced in Nordic welfare states compared to continental European ones, as the influx of economically disadvantaged immigrants, in particular, implies that an increasing number of people benefit more than they contribute to the universal welfare pool.

This might lead us to expect that immigration and welfare might not be perceived as conflictual within the German welfare regime. However, this expectation misses the fact that, albeit mainly offering contributory benefits, the German welfare state is internally diverse. In fact, the country’s public health insurance is quasi-universal, with people contributing at different rates depending on their financial ability (those without an income do not pay at all), but everybody receiving the same care. Moreover, since 2005, an extensive reform package has transformed a large part of the German unemployment insurance into a new type of aid for the long-term unemployed (known as ALG II or Hartz IV). The program offers means-tested transfer payments redeemable by legal working-age residents (including non-citizens) without an alternative source of income. Means-tested schemes like Hartz IV have been shown to be inherently divisive, as they create a sharp dividing line between a self-sufficient, working ingroup that finances the livelihood of and an inactive outgroup that enjoys “the ‘hammock’ of the welfare state” (Crepaz and Damron, 2009: 446).

Indeed, qualitative analyses of political debates and media content suggest that Hartz IV (and its predecessor, Sozialhilfe) is probably the most contentiously discussed type of welfare in Germany, with debates (Oschmiansky et al., 2003; Sielschott, 2010; Truniger, 1990) and public opinion (Zick, 2010) often stigmatizing recipients as lazy. Consequently, many Germans may well be thinking of means-tested welfare for the unemployed, rather than the broad host of contributory programs, when thinking of welfare. Research by Schmidt–Catran and Spies (2016) suggests that this may indeed be the case, though much more investigation is necessary:

Looking at Germany only, they find that the regional share of immigrants is significantly negatively associated with generalized majority support for redistribution over time. This is not what the welfare regime literature would have suggested, as the German focus on contributory welfare should make immigrant integration a non-issue. However, Schmidt–Catran and Spies conclude that the national welfare regime does not seem to matter as much as expected. Instead, they suggest that the negative association may, in fact, be driven by Germans’ disliking of certain welfare programs, such as an
opposition to means–tested aid for the unemployed rather than the welfare state at large—a proposition Study I seeks to substantiate.

Even though the dissertation studies two structurally dissimilar welfare states, it suggests that migration–induced diversity may challenge social cohesion and majority support for welfare in both settings, albeit through different channels. In their dissimilarity and internal diversity, Sweden and Germany also represent the whole spectrum of welfare types, which invites the reader to think about implications for other national contexts.
2. Central Concepts

2.1 Social Cohesion

Merriam–Webster’s dictionary defines cohesion as the “act or state of sticking together tightly” or as the “union between … parts or organs” (Merriam–Webster.com, n.d.). With humans acting as the constituting parts of society, Chan et al. (2006: 289) argue that cohesion or “sticking together” among them can only be achieved if three criteria are met:

1. People trust others within their society,
2. people “share a common identity,” and
3. people’s “subjective feelings” of trust and shared identity “are manifested in objective behavior,” such as cooperation or at least peaceful coexistence.

Put differently, trust and shared identity enable inclusion in society, while their absence may lead to exclusion (a notion also developed in the edited volume by Gough and Olofsson, 1999). In the face of large–scale migration into Europe, questions of integration and exclusion are recast in a variety of ways, especially when immigrants hail from ethnoculturally distinct, non–Western countries of origin (see Section 2.2.1). Indeed, psychological theory and research on intergroup relations suggests that humans find it more difficult to trust or be concerned with the well–being of members of discernable ethnic outgroups, compared to members of their own ingroup (cf. Blalock, 1967; Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982; Turner et al., 1979).

This dissertation investigates social cohesion in two high–migration countries, with reference to its three constituting parts, represented by group trust, social distance or ethnic prejudice (which may be considered the opposite of shared identity), and support for the inclusion of immigrants in the system of collective welfare. While trust and social distance represent the kinds of “subjective feelings” to which Chan et al.’s (2006) definition refers, support for specific kinds of government policies serves as proxy for the definition’s behavioral component.
2.1.1 Trust

Turning to yet another standard dictionary definition, trust is defined as the belief in and “reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something” (Merriam–Webster.com, n.d.). In the context of human societies, trust between individuals and groups of individuals serves a number of important functions. Most importantly, it minimizes transaction costs (cf. Axelrod, 1984) and enables cooperation (cf. Fukuyama, 1996). To provide an example from the world of welfare (as described in Miller, 1995: 90): If I trust that my fellow members of society are fundamentally honest and willing to make their tax–based contributions to the welfare state, I will likely be more inclined to contribute myself. However, if I assume that most people are trying to cheat the system, I will feel less inclined to cooperate. At the same time, I will, of course, also have to trust that the political institutions responsible for collecting and redistributing welfare contributions are not corrupt and can be relied upon to follow predefined rules (Rothstein, 2010; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). In this sense, trust is an essential component of any functioning welfare system (Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011).

In ethnically diverse settings, differences in culture and respective rules of engagement (norms) may make it more difficult to simply base actions on trust, which raises what Axelrod and others have described as interaction costs. Such costs may take the form of lengthy negotiations, misunderstandings, and, ultimately, mistrust and unwillingness to contribute to common goods. However, existing evidence on whether ethnic diversity does indeed erode trust has been mixed, mostly revealing that—if at all traceable—the negative relationship is limited to trust within very proximate environments (e.g., trust in neighbors), but not within broader social circles (cf. Meer and Tolsma, 2014; Portes and Vickstrom, 2011; Schaeffer, 2013). It is thus questionable whether the potentially negative relationship between migration–induced diversity and majority support for the welfare state is indeed explained by a lack of group trust.

2.1.2 Welfare Attitudes and Welfare Chauvinism

Studies addressing the welfare–immigration nexus focus on the relevance of either objective variables (capturing the actual presence of immigrants in various environments; cf. Eger, 2010; Schmidt–Catran and Spies, 2016) or subjective variables (e.g., ethnic prejudice; cf. Ford, 2006; Gorodzeisky, 2013; Senik et al., 2008) related to immigration. So far, the literature has produced a myriad of mixed results (for a detailed review, see Stichnoth and Straeten, 2013). One reason for this inconclusiveness may lie in the fact that most studies focus on generalized measures of welfare support (cf. Schmidt–Catran and Spies, 2016), asking, for instance, whether the government...
should intervene to reduce inequality. This focus on generalized welfarism is problematic, as it is not what theory and a look at actual political debates suggest should be at stake in diversifying settings.

National majorities may be concerned that immigrants “overburden” the welfare state, taking up more than they contribute (Crepaz and Damron, 2009: 439). Alternatively, or at the same time, majorities may simply dislike (harbor negative prejudices against) immigrants and hence feel little inclination to share resources with them (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1970). Either way, majority members concerned with the consequences of migration for the welfare state often benefit from its provisions themselves, making it unlikely for them to oppose its provisions at large (cf. Crepaz, 2008). Instead, it seems more reasonable to assume that they would advocate the exclusion of immigrants from the receipt of welfare and hence oppose programs or, more generally, types of government spending targeting immigrants, in particular.

What may be at stake then in high-migration environments is the proliferation of welfare chauvinism—a term first introduced by Andersen and Bjørklund, (1990). In essence, welfare chauvinism has two central components. It, first, implies a desire to exclude immigrants from receiving welfare or from being the target of government spending more broadly (cf. Reeskens and Oorschot, 2012; Waal et al., 2010). Second, this inclination to exclude is motivated by an imagined zero-sum tradeoff between spending on natives and spending on immigrants, with one always coming at the cost of the other. While the zero-sum criterion is very apparent in political debates and party claims, it is much less prevalent in academic debates on welfare chauvinism—an issue Study II seeks to remedy.

2.1.3 Social Distance and Ingroup Bias

As an individual-level attitude, social distance describes the desire to be near or far from another individual or, more importantly, from a group or type of person. The kind of social distance central to this dissertation is the one based on affect, that is, on mere liking or disliking (cf. Bogardus, 1933, 1947). This conceptual focus is rooted in the literature on intergroup relations:

As mentioned before, theory and empirical research in social psychology suggest that affective ingroup biases render natives inclined to feel less solidarity and more social distance toward ethnoculturally distinct, non-Western immigrants, in particular. Ingroup bias is defined as the preferential treatment of those who are similar to oneself on one or more salient dimensions (such as race, religion, or language) and has been shown to be an important determinant of how individuals choose to allocate resources (Bowles and Gintis, 2000; Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1970). The formation of dividing lines between groups does not seem to be an entirely rational process, occurring
along markers as arbitrary as team colors and hence leaving much room for mere affect as a driving force (cf. Brewer, 1979). Ethnic dividing lines may rise to particular salience in activating ingroup biases and social distancing from ethnic outgroups when the share of the latter among the total population increases (but see Section 2.2).

In line with the ingroup/outgroup argument, comparative studies have revealed that most European societies share a common deservingness culture, according to which majorities consider the (native) elderly to be most deserving of government assistance, followed by the sick, with immigrants at the very bottom of the entitlement scale (van Oorschot, 2006). Van Oorschot (2000) argues that individuals rationalize this ranking by explaining welfare receipt in different ways for different groups (also see Lepianka et al., 2009)—an issue taken up in Study IV.

2.2 Migration–Induced Diversity

When talking about migration–induced diversity, research usually refers not only to people’s national origins and cultural heritage, but also to accompanying economic cleavages. Indeed, the divide between “natives” and “non–natives” often overlaps with the divide between the rich and the poor (Engels et al., 2011; Fritzell et al., 2012; Gustafsson, 2011). The increased presence of ethnically diverse, often economically disadvantaged immigrant groups has been hypothesized to erode interpersonal trust and support for redistribution through at least two channels (cf. Koopmans and Veit, 2014: 93).

First, diversity may introduce a perceived lack of social control and sanctioning, as immigrants are expected not to know the rules of engagement customary in their new host societies, leading them to violate important norms (cf. Bernhard et al., 2006; also see Section 2.1.1).

Second—as discussed in the previous section (2.1.3)—diversity may activate ethnic ingroup preferences with adverse effects for social cohesion in the form of trust and support for the welfare state (cf. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Gorodzeisky, 2013; Putnam, 2007). Because of ingroup biases, ethnically diverse contexts may increase perceptions of group threat and hence also the potential for conflict (cf. Hornsey, 2008; Blumer, 1958; Quillian, 1995; Sherif, 1966), especially once a critical outgroup size is reached (cf. Blalock, 1967).

However, it has also been argued that ethnically diverse environments may increase the possibility for intergroup contact, which may allow for the revision of negative assumptions and reduce social distance and prejudice, on the whole, increasing empathy and understanding (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew et al., 2011).
2.2.1 Who Is an Immigrant?

A widely made assumption states that the more readily observable the difference of a given immigrant group with respect to the respective native majority, the stronger the outgroup categorization (cf. Heath et al., 2007). Looking at Sweden and Germany, non–European, non–Western immigrants, and, though to a lesser extent, Eastern European immigrants would fall into this highly visible outgroup category for reasons of language, skin color, religion, and culture, more broadly. The categorization into Western/non–Western is a very crude one, of course. But the present research argues based on the role of majority perceptions, which are very likely a lot less fine–grained than actual empirical realities. For instance, while I am by no means advocating that the experiences of a Syrian and an Iraqi refugee, or a Romanian and a Bulgarian labor migrant do not differ in important ways, members of the majority public are likely to regard them as members of much more homogeneous groups than is empirically warranted.

Moreover, which kind of immigrant group and immigration type (e.g., refugee vs. labor migration) matters for majority attitudes is very context specific. Following this assumption, Study II discusses how group interest as well as self–interest in government–provided welfare may be more challenged by the presence of the highly visible immigrant outgroups described, while self–interest in jobs and wages may be more easily triggered by the presence of competing, similarly qualified European or other Western immigrants.
3. Data and Analytical Strategies

Most sociological research concerned with the measurement of attitudes makes use of survey data, which usually seeks to represent a general public (e.g., consisting of all citizens or residents of a given country) beyond the actual survey sample. Following in this tradition, three of the studies included in this dissertation draw on survey data representative of the German (Study I) and Swedish (Studies II and III) resident populations.

However, rather than measuring attitudes directly, at the individual level, in the fourth and final study in this collection I take an entirely different approach and seek to understand the kinds of public debates believed to both reflect and shape public opinion. To do so, I collaborate with a data scientist to gather and analyze a vast collection of digitalized news contents.

The following sections present the dissertation’s main methodological approaches and data sources, and discuss some of their central caveats and avenues for future research.

3.1 Survey–Based Research

In his work on the history of the social survey, Bulmer attests to a close affinity between the development of survey methodologies and the development of sociology as a “distinctive subject matter” and academic disciple in its own right, concerned with tracing and explaining social developments (Bulmer, 2009; Bulmer et al., 1991: 91). Nevertheless, survey tools are also used in a wide variety disciplines outside sociology, finding application in economic, psychological, public health, and, of course, entirely non–academic investigations alike.

A standard definition provided by Snyder in a recent version of the *Concise Encyclopedia of Sociology* summarized survey research as

> systematic investigations designed to gather information from populations or samples [thereof] for the purposes of describing, comparing, or explaining [social] phenomena. (2011: 634)

Among the first examples of systematic social surveying are two well–known studies conducted by Charles Booth in London (1898–1903) and Seebohm Rowntree in York (1897–1898). While focused on a pressing social problem, the conditions of working class life in the late 19th century,
neither of the two studies were yet concerned with issues of systematic sampling and representativeness, which are at the heart of social survey efforts today. Indeed, it was outside the realm of sociology or the social sciences more broadly that both issues first took center stage, with the first nationally representative probability samples being drawn by market research firms such as Gallup in the United States (Bulmer, 2009).

From the very beginning, it has been the declared aim of survey research to quantify social phenomena to make them measurable. Stevens classically defined measurement as “the assignment of numbers to objects or events according to rules” (1951: 22). In his efforts to provide a quantitative measure of relational poverty, Booth is considered “one of the founding fathers of social science” (Bulmer et al., 1991: 20). His relative measure set the incomes of his surveyed working-class households in relation to a pre-defined poverty line, thus creating a benchmark for what it means to be poor in quantitative terms. Certainly, what it means to be poor varies a lot across time, regions, and societies. Moreover, many of the phenomena that sociologists and social scientists more broadly seek to measure are not only highly context dependent but also subject to varying interpretations. Indeed, they are often neither “objects or events” in Stevens’s terms (cf. Carmines and Zeller, 1979: 9), but rather complex concepts, such as trust, solidarity, life satisfaction, and so on. It is thus not surprising that, while survey research has become extremely widespread in sociology, skepticism toward its attempts at quantification has been quite pervasive, too. Central to these criticisms are debates about the validity and reliability of survey instruments (measures). Carmines and Zeller (1979) define the two terms as follows:

A survey instrument is valid if it measures the theoretical object it is supposed to measure. This is, of course, difficult to assess, especially if the object of measurement is a subjective state (such as trust) without an objective equivalent. Especially when it comes to subjective, for example, attitudinal, objects of measurement, the assessment of validity is intricately linked with careful theorizing and contextualization (cf. Carmines and Zeller, 1979: 21). To stay with the example of trust, Rosenberg (1956, 1957) developed a by now canonical faith in people scale. The Rosenberg scale consists of five single items which—using factor analysis—have been repeatedly shown to converge into one underlying dimension across societies (see, e.g., Zmerli and Newton, 2008), allegedly capturing generalized social trust. Three of the five Rosenberg questions ask respondents to assess the expected behavior of “most people” (e.g., “Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”). One problem here is that it is unclear whom respondents think of when summoning an image of most people. Indeed, Delhey et al. (2011) analyze World Values Survey (WVS) data from 51 countries and find that in 41 of them respondents’ assessment of the trustworthiness of most people correlates positively with their perceived trustworthiness of outgroups. However, in 10 Asian coun-
tries, people seem to think of their family members and much closer social relations when answering Rosenberg questions.

The Rosenberg example illustrates well how the validity of even the most established survey measure is highly context dependent and in need of careful theoretical review. I discuss issues of measurement validity in each of my three survey–based studies (also see Section 2), for instance, criticizing the use of survey items asking about generalized support for the welfare state, when theory tells us that this should not actually be at stake due to migration–induced diversity. Nonetheless, there is much to be done to improve the quality and detail of survey measurements relating to the immigration–social cohesion nexus.

Turning to the issue of reliability, a survey instrument is reliable if it is consistent, that is, if one and the same survey question delivers the same answer if posed to the same person at various points in time. Viewing the concept of reliability more broadly, survey research has been criticized for lacking reliability due to its lack of standardized measurement (see, e.g., Heath and Martin, 1997), with researchers inventing ever new items rather than converging around universal definitions. However, modern, large–scale national and international survey projects include a range of tried and tested survey instruments to measure concepts of sociological relevance, and newly invented survey items tend to undergo a rigorous process of cognitive pre–testing before entering the field (this is, e.g., true for the German General Social Survey used in Study I and presented below). Importantly, cognitive pretests ensure that questions are understood in the same way across respondents and, in the case of cross–national studies, across country or language boundaries, allowing them to be answered consistently (cf. Campanelli, 2008; Krosnick, 1999). In this way, existing survey projects largely rely on very similar, and often the same, sets of items, allowing for comparability even across different questionnaires and samples, and fostering the implementation of standardized social measurement. The above–mentioned Rosenberg scale is one such example, as is the Bogardus social distance scale (Bogardus, 1933), which is widely used to measure negative affect against ethnic outgroups (cf. Studies I and II). Even though Delhey et al.’s (2011) study has just cautioned us that even such established survey measures as Roseberg’s or, potentially, Bogardus’s can lead us astray, it should also be noted that measurement equivalence in 41 out of 51 countries is quite an achievement.

The following two sections describe the surveys used in this dissertation—one new, but using well–established questions, and one that is part of a long–standing effort at capturing social change over time, while also fostering the development of survey research methodology (cf. Blohm, 2005: 44).
3.1.1 The German General Social Survey (ALLBUS)

The German General Social Survey, abbreviated as ALLBUS (in German: Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften), is a national survey program that has been fielded biennially, among representative crosssections of the German population since 1980. While at first limited to the voter population of what used to be West Germany, the survey has since 1991 extended its sampling frame to include former East Germany and all residents aged 18 years or older. While the survey’s nationally representative sample thus includes individuals residing in Germany without holding German citizenship, persons without sufficient language skills are still excluded, as the questionnaire is provided in German only (Wasmer et al., 2007: 53). As my analyses of ALLBUS data are limited to respondents with two German parents, the language requirement should not be considered a limitation. However, this might be different for researchers interested in respondents with a so-called migration background.

Since 1994 (with the exception of the 1998 survey) ALLBUS has utilized a two-stage sampling procedure, which first draws a random sample of municipalities (103 in West and 45 in East Germany) and thereafter randomly samples specific addresses from the national resident register (in German: Einwohnermelderegister; Wasmer et al., 2007: 52; also see Koch, 1997, on the advantages of this two-stage method). Respondents are thus clustered within municipalities (so-called primary sampling units), which I account for in my statistical analyses of the ALLBUS 2006 dataset.

It is the survey’s declared goal to enable the measurement of social change at the societal level over time, both in terms of sociostructural variables and in terms of public opinion on a wide range of issues (Blohm, 2005: 43; Wasmer et al., 2007: 4). To facilitate this goal, each ALLBUS wave contains one core module asking for basic socioeconomic and demographic information, and one set of rotating questions, which are re-fielded every 4 to 10 years. One of these rotating modules is concerned with attitudes toward ethnic groups in Germany (fielded in 1996, 2006, and, most recently, in 2016). Study I makes use of this part of the 2006 questionnaire in particular. The reason for this choice of year and of the ALLBUS more broadly is a very practical one: ALLBUS 2006 is the only German dataset providing information both on various expressions of anti-immigrant sentiment and on attitudes toward specific types of welfare. The welfare-related items used in Study I all come from the German version of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) questionnaire, which has been fielded with every ALLBUS incarnation since 1996, albeit always only on a split subsample of the total ALLBUS sample. Consequently, for each survey year, the ISSP sample is equal to a smaller
subset, but never to the total of ALLBUS respondents (in 2006, about half of the 3421 ALLBUS respondents; Terwey and Baltzer, 2011: 660).

Like ALLBUS, the ISSP survey also fields a variety of regularly rotating modules. Incidentally, the 2006 edition was concerned with attitudes toward the state and the government, including detailed questions about respondent preferences for government intervention to assist different kinds of socially vulnerable groups. In this way, the joint fielding of ALLBUS and ISSP in 2006 provided an ideal database for my first dissertation project, investigating the relationship between both affective and subjectively rational expressions of anti-immigrant sentiment and specific types of welfare (see section 4.1 for a summary and Study I, p. 11, for further notes on the dataset).

In 2006, the response rate for the joint ALLBUS/ISSP survey was 40.2% in the former West Germany and 42.8% in the former East Germany, with interviewers citing a lack of cooperation on the part of sampled households as the main reason for non-participation (Wasmer et al., 2007: 66). Even though the 2006 fielding achieved the lowest response rate since ALLBUS was first fielded (Wasmer et al., 2007: 66), the share of sampled households agreeing to take the survey has been falling even further since then (see, e.g., (Wasmer et al., 2014: 58–59). Like virtually all large-scale survey projects, ALLBUS is thus facing issues of declining response rates, which are widely attributed to an increasing wariness of surveys among general and expert populations (cf. Baruch and Holtom, 2008: 1142; de Leeuw and de Heer, 2002). However, researchers at the GESIS Leibnitz Institute for the Social Sciences, responsible for supervising and documenting ALLBUS, carefully cross-validate sample distributions for their representativeness of the general population using the German micro census. For 2006, cross-validation showed that people with only basic mandatory education are somewhat underrepresented, while the distribution of respondents across occupation types (employed, self-employed, unemployed, etc.) matches that of the general population (for further details, see Wasmer et al., 2007: 73). Due to a purposive oversampling of East German households, those are technically overrepresented too, but the 2006 ALLBUS dataset contains weights to make appropriate adjustments. Overall, it seems reasonable to assume that the survey represents its underlying population, despite the arguably low response rate.

Lastly, it should be mentioned that all ALLBUS questions have been administered in the form of computer-assisted personal (face-to-face) interviews (CAPI) since 2000. In the CAPI setting, the interviewer reads out questions from a computer screen and inputs answers directly, which allows for the saving of costs and time (no major post-interview data entry required; Nicholls et al., 1997). The ISSP questionnaire is completed in a so-called computer-assisted self-interview, whereby the respondent simply fills in the survey on a computer, rather than by answering the interviewer. In their extensive review of studies on the advantages of CAPI and CAPI inter-
views over traditional phone or face–to–face interviews using the pen–and–paper method, Nicholls et al. (1997) find that computer–assisted interviewing leads to notable improvements in data quality. These are due to “major reductions in item nonresponse” (fewer respondents skip or forget to answer questions) and “post interview edit failures” (Nicholls et al., 1997: 241).

3.1.2 The XENO Survey

Studies II and III are based on Swedish survey data from the 2013 Social Networks and Immigration–Negative Attitudes Survey Project (“XENO” for short). The one–time cross–sectional survey was funded by the Swedish Research Council for Health, Working Life and Welfare (FORTE), with Jens Rydgren (co–author on both studies using the data) as principal investigator. The survey primarily aimed to capture Swedish majority attitudes toward immigrants. However, additional thematic foci were social cohesion, captured by various items on social trust and attitudes toward the welfare state, as well as political preferences and engagement, and social behavior within personal networks.

While I did not make extensive use of the survey’s network components, it did lend itself as a valuable data source for my analyses of majority welfare preferences and trust in relation to both social distance and ethnic prejudice and, importantly, the contextual presence of immigrants. Part of my dissertation research (Studies II and III) sought to understand how immigrants’ actual presence in everyday living spaces relates to majority attitudes toward redistributive welfare beyond majority prejudice (as demonstrated in Study I). To facilitate this kind of analysis, the XENO survey was supplemented with demographic, neighborhood, and workplace information from national registers for each respondent. The fact that this kind of extensive data linking was possible is entirely due to Sweden’s highly developed register research infrastructure, which makes much of the data that is collected for tax and other administrative purposes available to ethically vetted research projects.

Albeit designed and supervised by Jens Rydgren, sampling and fieldwork were conducted by Statistics Sweden (SCB)—a public agency providing data collection and presentation services to the public sector. SCB drew a Sweden–wide random sample of registered residents, including non–citizens, aged 18 to 79 years, and contacted them for computer–assisted telephone (CATI) interviews. As with the earlier mentioned CAPI method, CATI interviewing has been linked to better data quality due to the elimination of various error sources, given that interviewers record responses directly by inputting them into a standardized data frame on their computers (cf. Nicholls et al., 1997).
The net sample comprises 2,282 individuals; the response rate was 46%. As was the case for the ALLBUS survey discussed in the previous section, this response rate is, of course, rather low in absolute terms, but falls within the general range of currently achievable survey participation (cf. de Leeuw and de Heer, 2002). I used external statistics from SCB to cross-validate the representativeness of our sample with reference to the general population by comparing distributions of basic sociodemographic characteristics as well as political party preferences. The share of respondents indicating that they would vote for Sweden’s anti-immigration, populist, right-wing party Sweden Democrats (SD) was around 5%, about 3 percentage points lower than among the general population in mid-2013 (cf. Eklund and Vilkénas, 2016). However, within the sample, support for more mainstream parties, such as the Social Democrats or the liberal-conservative Moderaterna party, was very much in line with that among the general population (Eklund and Vilkénas, 2016). While the sex ratio within our sample is mirrored in that of the total Swedish population, the percentage of gainfully employed respondents exceeds that of the general population in 2012/2013 by nearly 10 percentage points (69% vs. 58%). Overall, the XENO sample does not appear to be a perfect mirror image of the general Swedish population, although it approximates it quite well. More importantly, a report provided to us by SCB confirms that respondents did not differ significantly from non-respondents along a range of sociodemographic attitudes, which makes us confident that related sampling biases should be limited.

Prior to beginning the telephone interview, respondents were asked to permit SCB to supplement their interview files with basic sociodemographic information (e.g., year of birth, gender, marital status, employment status, household income, etc.) from administrative registers. This led to a significant reduction in interview durations, as much information did not have to be obtained from respondents themselves. Similarly, respondents also permitted SCB to retrieve basic information on their current workplaces (namely workplace size/density, the proportion of foreign-born coworkers from inside and outside of the EU, and the proportion of female coworkers). This stage of register linking was conducted by SCB alone to avoid respondent identification by the XENO research team. The team never saw the relevant personal identifiers and only received anonymized data. However, respondents agreed that we could get access to municipality and neighborhood identifiers, which allowed us to add register information on those levels ourselves.

For municipalities and neighborhoods, we linked register information on both ethnic and more general sociodemographic characteristics, such as the proportion of residents born in various world regions outside the Nordic states, average levels of education and household income, the proportion of unemployed residents, and more. For detailed definitions of the variables used, please refer to Studies II and III in this dissertation.
3.2 Caveats of the Survey–Based Studies

Writing the studies presented in this dissertation, I attempted to include as much discussion of methodological caveats as was permitted by the target journals’ word limits (e.g., pertaining to the cross-sectional nature of my survey data sources and the issue of endogeneity). Nonetheless, some things necessarily remained unsaid and shall be briefly summarized in the following two subsections, while also outlining some avenues for future research.

It should also be noted that all survey–based studies included in this dissertation analyze their datasets by fitting various types of regression models. These models are powerful, by now also very canonical, quantitative research tools with wide applications throughout the social sciences. While a thorough review of their basic assumptions and limitations with regard to the kinds of knowledge they can and cannot generate is certainly fundamental to any study applying them, it would go beyond the scope of these framing chapters. I thus ask the kind reader to refer to some of the more classic sources on these issues, such as Achen (1982).

Section 3.1 already states that much skepticism toward survey–based research hails from concerns with measurement validity and reliability, especially in terms of coherent, standardized operationalizations. Picking up this thread once more, the present section comments on the measurement of two particular concepts central to the dissertation: first, welfare chauvinism (as an outcome in Study II), and second, contact (as a central independent variable in Study III).

3.2.1 Measuring Welfare Chauvinism

Despite its frequent and increasing use in academic publications, welfare chauvinism is certainly one of the examples Heath and Martin (1997) could have added to their list of theoretical concepts lacking one coherent definition and standardized measurement (also see Section 2.1.2). In Study II, I attempt to improve upon the fit between theory, public debate, and actual measurement by suggesting a measure of welfare chauvinism that directly gets at the (perceived) tradeoff between spending on immigrants and spending on native citizens’ welfare (cf. Figure 3, Study II). However, what may be problematic about this measure is that even native citizens may care more about natives “like themselves” than about other natives in general. In my operationalization, survey respondents who agree that “too little is spent on the elderly,” while also stating that “too much is spent on immigrants,” are classified as harboring a welfare chauvinistic attitude.

My analyses focus on native–born Swedes who work and thus presumably have no immediate self–interest in government assistance. Controlling for a range of potentially confounding factors, I find that even members of
this group are more likely to display welfare chauvinism the higher the share of unemployed immigrants, who putatively benefit from government social spending, in their residential neighborhood. I argue that this signifies the importance of group interest, rather than self–interest, as a motivator for welfare chauvinism. However, in a second set of analyses, I seek to investigate the competing importance of self–interest in risk–insuring government spending, by looking at the same working respondents’ workplace conditions. The so–called compensation hypothesis predicts that competition with immigrants for jobs and wages should lead natives to become self–interested in more government insurance (cf. Brady and Finnigan, 2014; Finseraas, 2008) or, by the same logic, more welfare chauvinistic.

However, I do not find any statistically significant relationship between my outcome and the proportion of European immigrants, with presumably competitive qualifications, or non–European, non–Western immigrants, at respondents’ workplaces. Perhaps this is so because working Swedes care more about their own social risks at the moment rather than the risks (old age) they may face in the future. To check this, future surveys might benefit from including a variety of more group–specific spending items, asking, for instance, whether “too little is spent to guarantee jobs for natives/provide for families/etc.” In this way, the role of self–interest could be investigated with much more direct relevance and reference to the group of respondents in question.

3.2.2 Measuring Intergroup Contact

The contact hypothesis predicts that, under certain conditions, direct encounters between members of the native majority and of ethnic minorities may lead to the revision and reduction of negative prejudice in natives (cf. Allport, 1954). One issue faced by many studies seeking to understand the attitudinal relevance of contact and exposure to the presence of ethnic diversity more broadly is that both are rarely exogenous to preferences for ethnic composition. In other words, people who do not mind diversity choose to, for example, live in ethnically diverse neighborhoods, befriend immigrants, and so on. To circumvent this problem as far as possible, the XENO survey chose to focus on contact in an interaction space that primarily selects on factors other than ethnicity or ethnic preferences—the workplace. For future research on the nexus between diversity and social cohesion, alternative interaction spaces of interest might be prisons (though they may be low trust, high–conflict environments for reasons other than ethnic composition); schools (where school assignment is based on place of residence, though parents may—in most cases—of course, choose where they live based on their preferences for both neighborhood composition and school quality); or the military (especially in countries with mandatory conscription).
The contact hypothesis is central to my analyses in Study III, which serves as proxy for actual intergroup encounters of the kind Allport (1954, ch. 16) envisioned to be attitudinally relevant—recurring, especially among individuals of about equal status “within the given situation” (i.e., not necessarily in society at large), directly toward a common goal (e.g., a given project on the job).

Despite the endogeneity–related advantages of our contact proxy, at least one important problem remains. While we can be fairly confident that contact will occur at the workplace, we do not know anything about its valence, that is, whether it is experienced as positive, neutral, or negative. Past research has shown that negative encounters between in– and outgroups (e.g., instances of rudeness or conflict) may serve to increase a sense of threat and competition, rather than alleviate prejudice and mistrust (see, e.g., Koopmans and Veit, 2014: 93; Pettigrew et al., 2011). Indeed, negative contact may actually be even more attitudinally relevant than positive contact, since negative encounters tend to be attributed to groups (e.g., “all immigrants”), while positive ones are more likely to be remembered with reference to individuals (Paolini et al., 2010; also see Barlow et al., 2012, and Phan, 2008).

To overcome this limitation, a future iteration of the XENO survey might ask working respondents to rate the nature of their workplace encounters with immigrants. While this would increase the time it takes to complete our questionnaire and hence potentially increase non–response, too (something we currently avoid by importing workplace characteristics from administrative registers), it might contribute to our better understanding of the contact mechanism.

3.3 Media Content Analysis

Studies II and III focus on the relationship between majorities’ experience of ethnic diversity (either via mere exposure to, actual contact with, or competition with certain immigrant groups; see Section 4). However, both studies show that negative attitudes toward immigrants increase welfare chauvinism and lower trust, even disregarding majority Swedes’ actual experience of immigrant presence or unemployment. This suggests that social forces outside the realm of first–hand experience also have a significant impact on individuals’ views on the extent to which immigrants do and should benefit from government–provided welfare. These extra–experiential forces are the subject of Study IV, which turns back to the case of Germany and explores online news media debates on the welfare deservingness of various socio–demographic groups, among them, immigrants (here, as refugees in particular).
Theorizing and empirical research in social psychology stresses the importance of social norms as guides of personal attitudes and behaviors (cf. Newcomb, 1943, 1963). Individuals learn about social norms primarily by observing what other group members do, but when groups are very large, third-party information becomes important. When the group in question is as large as to comprise a country’s majority population, news stories are arguably among the most important providers of normative cues (Paluck and Green, 2009). While first-hand experience may still be attitudinally important in addition to third-party accounts, it is more easily accessible to some than to others. Importantly, even though the presence of immigrants is quite rapidly increasing across the wealthy democracies of Europe and North America, it is mainly focused in urban centers (Ottaviano and Peri, 2013). Consequently, large parts of the majority population may not come to meet immigrants where they live. Earlier research suggests that it is especially in regions where low immigrant presence makes meaningful encounters unlikely that negative attitudes toward immigrants (see, e.g., Wagner et al., 1989) and support for populist and radical right-wing parties promising the exclusion of immigrants (Norris, 2005) are most pronounced. It seems likely that it is especially in these contexts that contents of mass media, such as news stories, act as important socializing agents, providing attitudinal and behavioral cues on issues that are outside the sphere of personal experience.

News articles are, of course, not neutral accounts of events. They are stories expressing their authors’ viewpoints and values by means of word choice, style, structure, and ordering of information. They are also samples of natural language, that is, of language that is used and heard or read on a daily basis by large groups of people. In consistently using specific kinds of words to talk about specific kinds of topics, natural language defines objects and creates meaning. In this sense, news stories are important in terms of what they “reveal about and … contribute to the character of society,” as they are both reflections and likely shapers of public sentiments (Bell, 1998). To understand individual differences in attitudes toward immigrants, including welfare chauvinism and group trust, it is thus important to detect systematic patterns in the language news stories use to define the meaning of migration and the persona of “the immigrant.” Even though Study IV does not allow us to observe the direct effect of news content on, or its origin in, public opinion, we seek to make a contribution by identifying how norms about what one might call “deserving” or “justified” unemployment are defined in German mainstream news stories.
3.3.1 Mixing Methods

While samples of media contents have been qualitatively and quantitatively dissected by many social scientists (see, e.g., Golding, 1984), it is only thanks to recent advances in technology that we can begin to take stock of long–term trends in news coverage. However, small–N, qualitative research strategies are still greatly valued for their capacity to uncover latent content, such as connotations of words in context (positive/negative, irony, etc.). Manifest content of digitalized text (such as author name or date of publication), on the other hand, is already being reliably identified by automated natural language processing scripts (Sjøvaag and Stavelin, 2012). This is why studies in journalism and mass communication with a central interest in manifest characteristics of texts are already able to tackle big data, such as many years’ worth of online news contents or social media feeds. While natural language processing techniques become more and more sophisticated, their ability to uncover connotations and subtleties of language in use continue to be limited and thus far unable to replace human reading (Conway, 2006; Lewis et al., 2013). Yet, it is this kind of latent, subtle content that is of greatest sociological interest. With this issue in mind, we propose an analytical strategy that mixes computational methods from machine learning and corpus linguistics with manual qualitative coding techniques that are more widely used in sociology.

This mixed–methods approach is taken by the fourth and final study in this dissertation. It is based on a web–scraped corpus of all news stories published by one of the most widely read German–language news sites, Spiegel Online. The study first uses count-based methods to describe a comprehensive textual database (a so–called corpus). It then uses the distilled quantitative corpus characteristics to sample text passages that are representative of the overall corpus but lend themselves to more in–depth qualitative coding. This methodological approach is inspired by Baker’s (2006) guide book Using Corpora in Discourse Analysis, where he provides much insight into the sociological meaning of standard concepts and units of measurement in linguistics, such as word frequencies, co–occurrences, concordances, and keyness. Using the concepts described by Baker as building blocks, we assemble them to create our own analytical approach, seeking to provide a representative, in–depth analysis of our very large news corpus, while still automating as many research steps as possible.

The three-stage research process is described in greater detail in Study IV. In research stages one and two, we provide a descriptive analysis of predominant language patterns. Foucault (1972) famously argued that natural language creates intersubjective meaning by referring to the same things in the same way over and over again. In other words, meaning or, in Foucault’s term, discourse, is established by frequent mention. Our definition of
keyness by frequency is based on the assumption that frequency distributions of content words are unlikely to be random. Content words are defined as having their own independent meaning and are distinct from function words that merely denote grammatical relationships. That is, the more frequent the occurrence of a given content word, the greater the importance of the concept it transports. This is why our analysis sets out by taking stock of the 50 most frequent content words for each year of observation, thus extracting critical quantitative discourse markers in the Foucauldian sense.

It should be noted that because frequency counts determine which parts of the text are “key”, we minimize researcher biases. These include human readers’ inclination to regard information that appears earlier in a text to be more important than what comes later (primacy bias) or to read texts with a sub–conscious agenda (confirmation bias).

However, to make sociological sense of what these high–frequency words imply, we need to contextualize them within their textual environment. Wittgenstein (2009) famously noted that we can only understand the meaning of a word if we understand how it is used (2009 [1953]: 43), or, as Firth put it, “by the company it keeps” (1957: 11). Following this notion, it has become common practice in textual analysis to count the words that co–occur most frequently along with the content words under study. The analysis of co–occurrences is thus also an integral part of our mixed–methods approach to corpus analysis.

We fully acknowledge that this purely quantitative mode of analysis is limited in what it can teach us about welfare deservingness as a multidimensional concept in German news stories. “Big data hubris” or the assumption that in–depth meaning can be glanced from rather superficial data screening, simply because the underlying data structure is very large, has been one of the main criticisms levied against large–scale media content analyses produced outside of sociology (Lazer et al., 2014: 1203). Given that the algorithmic classification of latent content remains rather limited (Conway, 2006; Lewis et al., 2013), we randomly sample short text passages around the most frequently occurring words and word co–occurrences in stage three of our analytical approach. In subjecting these purposive, replicable samples of text to qualitative coding, we hope to come to a detailed understanding of word meaning.

3.3.2 Creating a News Corpus

As Manovich summarizes, “a web page is a sequential list of separate elements—text blocks, images, digital video clips, and links to other pages” (2001: 220). On most major news sites, URLs provide additional information, such as the publication date and thematic category. All of these elements can be automatically recorded and stored in a database to establish a
corpus of website text and characteristics. We created our news corpus using the open-source Python framework Scrapy, and the SQL database SQLite. Using these tools, it was our task to identify the URL patterns that allow the scraper to find articles, to detect HTML patterns that classify the article text, and to write the pipeline that stores the scraped content in the database.

Starting from an initial URL pointing to the online news archive of interest, the scraper recursively extracts and follows links matching a so-called regular expression (in our case, generalizing the pattern of links that lead to articles that were published on a certain date). The target HTML document is then parsed—a process by which separate text elements contained in the HTML code are identified—and the relevant text elements extracted. These include, for example, the article title, date, and body. Finally, the text is sent into a data pipeline, where it is transformed (marshalled) and stored in a database that structures the data as presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Database post–parsing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Intro</th>
<th>Body</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/mehmets-tod-freund-der-mutter-teilgestandnis-ab-a-442809.html">http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/mehmets-tod-freund-der-mutter-teilgestandnis-ab-a-442809.html</a></td>
<td>16100</td>
<td>Mehmet’s death: Mother’s partner makes partial confession</td>
<td>Four-year-old Mehmet from Zwickau supposedly died because … admitted …</td>
<td>Now in detention, the unemployed man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Own translation from German

We collected 5 GB of plain text, which represent all 400,000 articles published between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2015 on the widely read German–language news website Spiegel Online. It should be noted that a corpus of this size does not actually constitute big data, as it can be processed on an up-to-date personal computer.

For our analyses of manifest, countable content, we mainly relied on the Natural Language Processing Toolkit (NLTK) for Python. Words are the units of analysis when performing programming tasks on corpora, such that each corpus is read as a list of word frequencies. To ensure that our program would recognize and separate individual words (a process called tokenization) we used the NLTK Plain Text Corpus Reader. For our analyses, we retained only those articles containing at least one instance of any one of 497 search words (all referring to unemployment), whose definition I describe in Study IV. This left us with about 16,400 articles, amounting to 4% of the total Spiegel Online corpus.
3.3.3 Spiegel Online

Our analyses are based on a news corpus containing all articles published on the website of one of Germany’s most widely read news magazines, Spiegel Online, between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2015. The study period was selected to begin just before a series of fundamental reforms to the German unemployment assistance and insurance systems (the Hartz Reforms) and end with the last full year of news coverage available when we embarked upon our project. Spiegel started out as a weekly print magazine but has been expanding its online presence in the face of waning circulations over the past twenty years.

Founded immediately after the Second World War, in 1947, Spiegel remained the only and most widely read weekly news magazine in Germany, until its competitor Focus was first published in 1993 (Kaltenhäuser, 2005). Locating itself politically left–of–center, Spiegel has been known to provide critical commentary on politics and society. The magazine has even been reprimanded for the use of putatively negative, even derisive language that openly attempts to instill opinions in its readership (Stockmann, 1999: 18).

We decided to study online rather than print contents to allow for automated data collection. Not all articles published in the print versions of Spiegel, are also posted online, but where they are available we collect them as well. Studying printed contents only would have required us to obtain scans of all editions published since January 2003 and to facilitate character recognition to transfer raw, computer–readable text into a database. Practical obstacles aside, the fact that Spiegel, like virtually all other printed news publications, has been facing rapidly declining circulation rates while reaching many more people online, we think there is a substantive interest in analyzing web contents in their own right.

3.4 Caveats of the Media Content Analysis

Study IV is just the beginning of a larger research project analyzing news contents across countries. This work will be part of the research program The Evolution of Prejudice, which seeks to address a number of the methodological caveats left open by the study presented here. Two of them are the linking of news contents and individual attitudes, as well as the establishment of the external validity of our initial findings, at least within the German context.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Active since</th>
<th>Unique users (Mio.)</th>
<th>Age groups (% of uu)</th>
<th>Education (% of uu)</th>
<th>Occupation (% of uu)</th>
<th>Gender (% of uu)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20–39</td>
<td>40+</td>
<td>≤10yrs</td>
<td>Working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spiegel</strong></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>11.95</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stern</strong></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FOCUS</strong></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>13.38</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bild</strong></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>17.59</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Table shows averages over 3 months (November 2014–January 2015). “uu” refers to unique users. “≤10 years of education” are the equivalent of no formal school degree or one of Germany’s two junior high school leaving diplomas (Mittlere Reife or Hauptschulabschluss), both of which qualify for professional training, but not for university entrance. “Student” refers to those enrolled in school, professional training, or university. Source: Arbeitsgemeinschaft Online Forschung e.V. (2015)*
3.4.1 External Validity

Study IV investigates a very large collection of digitalized news contents, however, all stemming from merely one news site—Spiegel Online. As we note in our conclusion to Study IV, we cannot hope to provide results of external validity (within the German context) based on a single source. Future research will have to show whether the rather multifaceted depictions of unemployment and welfare deservingness offered in Spiegel Online news stories is replicated in other news outlets as well.

Of particular interest may be Spiegel’s main competitors Focus Online and Stern.de—the web versions of two other widely circulated weekly magazines with presumably different political leanings (cf. Kaltenhäuser, 2005; Stockmann, 1999). Aside from analyzing Spiegel’s direct competitors, it also seems worth taking stock of BILD—Zeitung—the most widely read news source (in print and online) and “prototypical representative of tabloid journalism in Germany” (Klein, 1998). Self-advertising with the slogan “BILD dir deine Meinung” (figuratively: “Let BILD make up your mind”), BILD—Zeitung actively promotes an image of opinion making, which clearly sets it apart from outlets like Spiegel. Unfortunately, Bild.de does not have an online news archive, which made it impossible for us to presently use it as a test case. However, alternative modes of article collection or archive access should be explored to provide insights into this surely highly instructive case of comparison.

Table 2 provides a comparative overview of basic news site and readership characteristics for Spiegel Online, Stern.de, FOCUS Online, and Bild.de. It is worth noting that all four news sites have surprisingly socio-demographically similar readerships. While the print versions of Spiegel and Focus may still be bought by different types of readers than the less serious lifestyle magazine Stern or the tabloid Bild, news outlet choice has been shown to be much less intentional online, where many people simply follow page suggestions provided by news aggregators, such as Google News (Athey and Mobius, 2012). Despite their highly similar online readerships, the Spiegel, Focus, Stern, and Bild articles are still likely to differ in their reporting styles and thematic foci, suggesting varying portrayals of unemployment and welfare deservingness. In fact, we already scraped full Focus and Stern corpora (2003–2015) and find our intuition reflected in our preliminary analyses (not included here).

3.4.2 Linking Media Contents to Attitudes and Behaviors

At its current stage, our research provides information on a significant part of the news information environment within which attitudes toward different groups among the unemployed as important recipients of welfare are em-
bedded. However, as we noted before, we cannot comment on whether the widely hypothesized link between news or media contents more broadly (see, e.g., Iyengar and Kinder, 2010; Kellstedt, 2000; Paluck and Green, 2009) and individual attitudes exists.

In fact, that political debates, news reports, and other kinds of media contents have an impact upon majority attitudes toward the welfare state and various groups of welfare recipients within it has more often been assumed than shown (see, e.g., Gilens, 2000; Golding, 1984). One notable exception is a study by Schmidt and Spies (2014). Analyzing survey data from 14 European countries, the authors find that that majority citizens who believe that immigrants benefit more from the welfare state than they contribute are only less supportive of redistribution if political parties emphasize such claims. To supplement their survey data with information on political party positions, Schmidt and Spies (2014) make use of the Manifesto Project Database, which “provides the scientific community with parties’ policy positions derived from a content analysis of parties’ electoral manifestos” (MARPOR, 2017; for examples of studies using the Manifesto data to study other yet related outcomes, see, e.g., Bohman, 2014).

Using content analysis to first code news stories or manifestos and then make them usable as quantitative variables is becoming an increasingly used approach in sociology and political science. This is also what we hope to do as our research project progresses. However, in addition to quantifying the frames and figurative images raised in our news corpora, we hope to have an upcoming survey ask respondents to state and rank their favored news sources by type (national/local broadsheet newspapers, tabloid newspapers, online news aggregators, blogs, ...), and to also give some indication as to what guides their ranking (perceived objectivity, regional focus, etc.). Lubbers and colleagues chose a similar approach when they first analyzed what they call ethnic reporting in three Dutch newspapers (Lubbers et al., 1998) and then asked survey respondents to indicate which of the three papers they were most likely to read. In this way, they were able to establish a simple measure of news exposure, whose impact on attitudes toward immigrants could be analyzed (Lubbers et al., 2000).

What we hope to do is establish and code corpora that correspond to the news types we let our respondents choose from (national/local broadsheet newspapers, tabloid newspapers, etc.) to link our survey–based exposure indicators to actual contents. Prior research has shown that target characteristics, that is, respondent attributes, such as education and self-esteem (Rhodes and Wood, 1992), and source characteristics, like the perceived trustworthiness and expertize of a given source (Maddux and Rogers, 1980; Ziegler et al., 2002), interact to shape the persuasiveness of a message. By recording relevant respondent characteristics and asking them to motivate why they favor a certain kind of news source, we hope to learn more about
mechanisms of persuasion, which are central in research on attitude acquisition and change (see Wood [2000] for a review).
4. The Studies

4.1 Study I: Anti–Immigrant Sentiment and Support for Three Types of Welfare—The Case of Germany

As has been outlined in Section 2.1.2, most studies addressing the welfare–immigration nexus ask, for instance, whether survey respondents think that the government should alleviate income disparities. In Study I, I show that this approach masks important differences in support patterns across welfare policy types.

Research in social psychology has shown that ethnicity, language, and religion—all salient markers of non–Western immigrant status in particular—serve to activate ingroup/outgroup boundaries which have important consequences for how individuals choose to allocate resources (cf. Bowles and Gintis, 2000). Members of the native majority ingroup are thought to become less concerned with the welfare of immigrant outgroup members, the more socially distant they feel from them. Moreover, means–tested welfare has been shown to give rise to much more pronounced struggles over entitlement and inclusion than universal or contribution–based benefits (cf. Crepaz and Damron, 2009).

In line with this theoretical framework, my statistical analyses of ALLBUS/ISSP data show that native–born respondents’ support for unemployment assistance declines with their desire for social distance from immigrants, while support for old–age and sickness assistance is not affected at all. The results thus suggest that those with negative affect are more likely to oppose aid that is predominantly means–tested and that benefits a large number of non–natives.

Study I thus shows how the conflict between welfare solidarity and immigration is expressed, namely as majority opposition to government assistance benefiting immigrants (also known as welfare chauvinism, cf. Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990).
4.2 Study II: Social Distance, Immigrant Integration, and Welfare Chauvinism

Study II is co-authored with Jens Rydgren. Following conceptually upon Study I, but moving to the case of Sweden, Study II outlines and investigates three hypothetical pathways into welfare chauvinism as an individual attitude:

via the first-hand experience of immigrant unemployment and putative welfare receipt in the neighborhood context; via direct exposure to immigrant competition at the workplace; and via negative affect, again operationalized as a desire for social distance.

Existing research on the topic of our study address either how immigrants’ economic integration (labor market competition) or lack thereof (immigrant unemployment) relate to majority attitudes toward redistribution (Burgoon et al., 2012; Finseraas, 2012; Spies and Schmidt–Catran, 2015). Yet, because it considers both variables separately, prior research cannot answer the question of how majorities’ simultaneous experience of immigrant unemployment (and putative take-up of welfare) and immigrants’ sharing (and competing for) wages and positions at the workplace interact to shape welfare attitudes. Due to data limitations, prior studies were also unable to consider exposure to immigrant competition or non–integration within very immediate, socially relevant contexts, such as respondents’ neighborhoods of residence and actual workplaces. Instead, studies tended to focus on higher levels of aggregation, such as countries, municipalities, and sectors of employment, for which the link between context and attitude seems much less intuitive.

With the issue of conceptually appropriate measurement in mind, we present an innovative operationalization of welfare chauvinism, which contrasts majority opposition to spending on immigrants with support for spending on the (putative native) elderly and sick. Our empirical analyses are based on new Swedish survey data from the 2013 XENO Survey. The survey data was linked to administrative register information to derive detailed and highly accurate information on neighborhood and workplace contexts.

Past research has well established that social solidarity and large–scale immigration are conflictual. This paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of how this conflict comes about. Based on our sample of native–born Swedes, we find that the direct observation of immigrant unemployment in the neighborhood increases natives’ preference for spending on other Swedes over spending on immigrants. This provides support for concerns that a lack in economic integration among immigrants activates ingroup favoritism in national majorities (Burgoon, 2014; Finseraas, 2012). Since we do not find that competition with immigrants at the workplace fosters welfare chauvinism, policies that seek to enhance solidarity by improving immi-
grants’ labor market prospects and decrease welfare dependency seem promising. Importantly, our analyses also show that a desire for social distance from immigrants provides an independent route into welfare chauvinism, disregarding exposure to immigrant unemployment or competition.

4.3 Study III: Are They Hunkering Down? Revisiting the Relationship between Exposure to Ethnic Diversity, Intergroup Contact, and Group Trust

Study III is based on joint work with Martin Hällsten and Jens Rydgren. It utilizes the same data as Study II, but turns to a different aspect of social cohesion, namely group trust. Like much of the existing literature on the topic, the study situates itself in direct response to Putnam’s (2007) gloomy prediction that an increased ethnic diversification of everyday living spaces will cause individuals across ethnic groups to “hunker down,” that is, withdraw from social life and become generally distrustful. The reasoning here is that people who belong to the same ethno-cultural group tend to share common behaviors, traditions, and values—to name just a few examples—all of which make it easier to trust (Stolle, 2002). By extension, diversity is thought to induce uncertainty in everyday transactions, making it harder for people to base their actions on trust rather than case-by-case assessments.

Sociological and social psychological theories explaining how ethnic diversity might come to relate to trust distinguish between effects based on mere exposure and actual contact. When it comes to mere exposure, the assumption is that diversity matters even in the absence of one-on-one interactions, as observing the unknown from afar will serve to activate negative outgroup sentiment and hence lower trust (cf. Hamilton and Bishop, 1976). Alternatively, diverse environments may provide opportunities for positive intergroup contact that lead individuals to revise their prejudicial distrust (cf. Allport, 1954).

Due to data limitations, prior research remained largely unable to model both types of association simultaneously or struggled with issues of endogeneity, as contact in particular was often measured in settings highly subject to self-selection (e.g., friendship networks; see e.g., Dinesen and Sønder-skov, 2015; Laurence et al., 2017). Improving upon existing studies, we investigate the association between different forms of group trust and diversity via both mere exposure in the neighborhood setting and actual intergroup contact at the workplace, relying on administrative register data rather than self-reporting in both cases. Workers’ preferences for ethnic composition are much less likely to drive workplace composition, than, for example, skills and qualifications, which lessens the problem of endogeneity for the purposes of our research interest. We also know from Allport’s definition of “meaningful contact” (1954, ch. 16), and from prior research on workplace
networks, that work sites are very likely to enforce direct contact among coworkers of different ethnic backgrounds, especially in small and medium sized workplaces (Feld, 1982; Marsden, 1990; Mutz and Mondak, 2006). This is contrary to neighborhoods, which are less structurally constraining and hence less likely to lead to cross-ethnic contacts (Feld 1982), at least in countries such as Sweden, where sociability with neighbors is not a strongly socially sanctioned norm (Edling and Rydgren, 2012). In this way, neighborhoods are likely sites of mere exposure to ethnic diversity, rather than places of actual contact.

We also improve upon the static exposure indicators used in earlier studies and utilize the longitudinal structure of the Swedish household registration system to measure exposure to ethnically diverse neighborhoods as a cumulative variable. Crisp et al., (2009) were among the first to suggest that the effect of exposure to ethnic diversity on trust is likely to develop incrementally, with the effect becoming more negative as the duration of exposure lengthens, but since then, data limitations have made an extensive exploration of this hypothesis impossible.

We find that trust in neighbors disregarding their region of origin or ethnicity is significantly negatively associated with cumulative exposure to the presence of Eastern European and non-European, non-Western immigrants, while current exposure shows no effect. There is little evidence of discontinuities or threshold effects, which suggests that underlying negative trend is linear. It is worth noting that neighborhood exposure to diversity does not appear to be relevant for outgroup trust (here, native-born Swedes’ trust in Eastern European and Non-European, Non-Western immigrants), but that the negative association seems to be limited to more generalized trust in neighbors. Contrary to our expectations, workplace diversity—our proxy for contact—neither has an independently statistically significant association with trust in neighbors, nor does it mediate the negative association between neighborhood exposure and trust. We thus find some support for Putnam’s hunkering down hypothesis, but also find that it takes much more precise measures of exposure to establish this effect than commonly used. Most importantly, the mistrust-inducing effect of diversity seems to accumulate in individuals over time and does not occur as a short-term, direct neighborhood effect.

Study IV moves to the macro level of media discourses, within which the attitudinal patterns I observe in my survey–based studies are embedded. Co–authored with R. Janis Goldschmidt, a data scientist and computational physicist, Study IV analyses a longitudinal corpus of German online news articles that contain joint mentions of unemployment and various socio–demographic groups. This data choice is rooted in the fact that past research has shown that popular solidarity with the unemployed, as one major group among the recipients of state–funded welfare, is closely tied to expectations of who they are. It has been shown that native majorities in Germany and elsewhere feel little solidarity toward immigrants (Appelbaum, 2001; Gorodzeisky, 2013) and individuals making non–normative health and lifestyle choices (Skinner et al., 2007), while the elderly as well as the sick and disabled are viewed much more favorably (Lepianka, 2015; van Oorschot, 2006). At the same time, popular support for unemployment assistance is considerably lower and declining compared to support for any other kind of welfare program (Mau, 2001; Roller, 1999). One reason why unemployment assistance is unpopular with many Germans may be that mentions of joblessness and disliked groups, such as immigrants, tend to coincide in news stories (cf. Faist, 1994, 1995; Goldschmidt, 2015).

According to Foucault (1972), natural language creates intersubjective meaning by referring to the same things in the same way over and over again. It is this patterned, object–creating property of speech Foucault calls discourse. If unemployment and membership in a disliked group become part of one and the same discourse, the association is established as a social fact (cf. Durkheim, 1982) with attitudinal relevance. Foucault’s notion of discourse is closely related to the concept of media frames. Framing theory originates in the work of Goffman (1974) and acknowledges that news authors have to choose a certain lens through which to report the subject of their stories. To stick with our example, news stories may frame unemployed immigrants as victims of discrimination, which keeps them from finding paid work, as normative outsiders whose cultural difference makes them prefer welfare over employment, and as many other stereotypes in–between.

While we cannot observe how the language patterns we find reflect or impact upon public opinion in Germany, our contribution lies in a representative description of central discursive associations and media frames within which public opinion has been embedded over time.
Study IV first provides a quantitative description of a large corpus of German online news texts from one of the most–widely read German–language news sites, *Spiegel Online*. The corpus spans 12 years and shows that news stories mentioning unemployment tend to also mention a number of specific sociodemographic groups, namely women, children, the old/young, and, since 2015, refugees (as one particular sub–groups among Germany’s immigrant population). We then utilize computational, count–based modes of manifest content analysis to derive a manageable sample of short text passages that represents the nature of our large corpus but lends itself to in–depth qualitative analysis of more subtle, latent content. Focusing on this sample of text passages, we investigate whether there are notable differences in how unemployment is explained for each of the identified sociodemographic groups.

Our mixed–methods approach reveals a surprising degree of ambivalence between the portrayal of unemployment as an issue of individual responsibility and self–infliction, as opposed to a matter of circumstance, brought about by forces outside anyone’s personal control within each of the investigated sociodemographic groups. This is not in line with much prior research, which often suggests a considerably more homogenous attribution of responsibility within presumably more and less deserving groups.
5. Discussion—Public Opinion and the Future of the Welfare State

The unifying concern inspiring research on the interplay between immigration, social cohesion, and the welfare state is that migration–induced diversification will lead to welfare state retrenchment, even in countries that traditionally hosted generous social security systems (see, e.g., Alesina and Glaesner, 2004; Banting, 2000; Crepaz, 2008). With its focus on Sweden and Germany, this dissertation studies two representatives of such traditionally generous welfare states. The concluding section now seeks to summarize how the findings presented here speak to the ongoing debate about the future of the welfare state.

It has been recognized that social cohesion—as expressed in the willingness of the majority population to trust their fellow members of society and feel solidarity with those in need—is a crucial prerequisite for welfare state persistence. While the studies presented here do not directly set majority attitudes in relation to welfare state performance (e.g., in terms of social spending), they still make a contribution by furthering our knowledge of the attitudinal basis of welfare politics. That this attitudinal basis is of great political relevance has been quite firmly established by prior research.

In their book Why Welfare States Persist Brooks and Manza argue that “factors associated with mass opinion [as a key source of political pressure] represent an important source of welfare state persistence” (2007: 80). Using public opinion data from the ISSP, Brooks and Manza show that across high–income democracies, aggregate welfare preferences have been highly stable over time—despite repeated attacks against costly social spending from the political right. However, conducting simulations of the potential effects of shifts in aggregate preferences on measures of government social spending and benefit generosity, the authors demonstrate that ideological change would indeed have a significant effect on welfare trajectories. For instance, if support for redistributive policies among the Norwegian public had declined to levels as low as those observed in the US in the period from 1990 to 2000, Norway’s welfare state would indeed have experienced considerable retrenchment (Brooks and Manza, 2007: 81). Brooks and Manza thus conclude that high, largely unchanging levels of welfare support in Europe and equally stable preferences for much lower levels of social provisions in the US, Canada, Japan and elsewhere “contribute to a degree of
stability and inertia within specific countries and ideal–typical regimes” (2007: 81). While their findings also imply that this inertia may well be broken by shifts in public opinion, there is little evidence to suggest that such shifts have occurred so far:

Overall, the welfare state enjoys persistently and comparatively high levels of support among majorities, at least in Sweden (Svallfors, 2011) and Germany (especially in former East Germany; Lippl, 2001; Mau, 2001). However, parties of the political left, which traditionally stood for the maintenance and expansion of welfare provisions, do not. This is certainly surprising, as some scholars assumed that the old politics of merely class–specific demands for welfare would be supplanted by the new politics of universal, class–transcending claims for social insurance (cf. Garret, 1990; Huber et al., 2001; Pierson, 2001), giving a boost to leftist parties. The globalization of markets and the increasingly free movement of labor fosters competition, causing citizens across social classes to fear for their employment and career perspectives, which unites them in their desire for government protection with those already benefiting from the welfare state (e.g., the long–term unemployed), the argument goes.

Yet, instead of being met by a surge in left–wing party support, the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 and the subsequent escalation of the European foreign debt and currency crises seem to have coincided with many Western voter populations turning to the right, with new center–right governments coming into power and parties of the populist or radical right further consolidating their electoral support (BBC News, 2016; Nardelli and Arnett, 2015). But does that mean that majorities are no longer interested in extensive welfare provisions, despite increasing risks?

An affirmative answer to this question would wrongly assume that conservative or even radical right–wing parties propose the dismantling of the welfare state at large. Instead, majority voters are indeed attached to their established rights, but they are at the same time not inclined to solely rely on leftist governments to ensure these rights are maintained (cf. Korpi’s [1983] explanation of how the Swedish Social Democrats lost popular support throughout the 1970s because they failed to protect the welfare state). Part of what seems to make parties of the conservative center–right as well as those on the far right successful are their welfare chauvinistic promises to provide “welfare for us, not them” (Eger and Valdez, 2015; Rydgren, 2008). This is the kind of political promise and attitude we should be watching out for as we contemplate the future of European welfare states.

As is stands, native majorities benefit from generous welfare provisions in many ways, but also seem susceptible to political forces raising fears about a zero–sum tradeoff between social spending on the majority and spending to help immigrants. In Sweden, this idea of irreconcilability is primarily purport­ed by the Sweden Democrats, an increasingly successful radical right–wing party (cf. Mulinari and Neergaard, 2014). But the zero–sum assump-
tion has also been expressed by the conservative Moderaterna party, which became evident when former Prime Minister Reinfeldt told Swedish voters that the need to financially prioritize helping poor immigrants (refugees) would make it impossible to make any other electoral promises. viii

Similar lines of argumentation can be found in the German public debate. Until the late 1990s, the federal government denied the reality of immigration, even though net–migration rates into Germany already exceeded those of traditional migration countries like the US since the end of the Second World War. In this environment of denial, immigration was turned into what Faist (1994) calls a meta issue—an anomaly blamed for issues ranging from unemployment to the fiscal crisis of the welfare state. Rather than debating how to facilitate the long–term social and economic integration of present and coming immigrants, actors across the political spectrum diverted their attention to whether immigrants should be part of the welfare state. Doing so, they focused on immigrants’ cultural difference and their asserted abuse of means–tested welfare in particular (see Sarrazin [2010] for an example of such claims). The fear that immigrants—from political refugees to European free movers—will come to Germany to take advantage of and hence over–burden the welfare state has repeatedly become apparent in political decision making. It was this concern that had Germany negotiate a special agreement to delay the right to visa–free movement for citizens of the EU Member States Romania and Bulgaria until January 2014. It also led to Germany being tried by the European Court of Justice for attempting to withhold means–tested assistance from Romanian and Bulgarian job seekers (Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union, 2014). And it was the same concern that started a political debate about whether the state should limit assistance for refugees to in–kind benefits (food and clothing vouchers) instead of providing assistance as presumably migration–incentivizing cash payments in August 2015 (Bundesregierung, 2015; Meisner, 2015).

In the light of these political developments and the attitudinal patterns described in this dissertation, it seems unlikely that either the Swedish or the German welfare states will be dismantled. They may, however, change by becoming much less inclusive to non–citizens. As the above–mentioned court case against Germany suggests, this poses a serious threat to the European Union’s social integration, which is a necessary step on the path to making the joint market not only beneficial to corporations but also to individuals. While companies benefit from their ability to hire the most competitively qualified workers from anywhere within the EU, workers still face substantial challenges in transferring their social rights from one Member State to another. This situation is unlikely to improve as politicians and constituencies tend toward protecting the national boundaries of their welfare systems, rather than making them more fluid.

The question that remains to be answered is how a possible trend toward exclusivist welfare politics can be counteracted. Whether it should be is, at
least in part, a normative question. For instance, Study III suggests that prolonged exposure to the presence of certain immigrant groups in the neighborhood is associated with lower trust in native-born Swedes. We also argue that those who stay in neighborhoods with many immigrants often do so because they have little other choice (due to housing shortages and individual economic constraints). So if people prefer homogeneity or at least segregation to diversity, should we simply give in to it? Should immigration as well as immigrants’ access to the welfare state be limited by governments seeking to please their constituencies? After all, giving a voice to the people’s will is what representative democracy is all about, is it not?

In Study III, we argue that we should not, because our findings of lowered trust are limited to trust in neighbors only, making it unclear whether the adverse consequences of migration–induced diversity really are as far reaching as is often suggested. Another point that speaks against limiting immigration to please native majorities is that at least labor migration is something the increasing integration of global markets necessitates. I briefly addressed this before: It simply seems unfair to first force workers to compete internationally, seeking employment wherever their skill set is most needed, but to pay for their move by giving up social security. In this way, limiting migration and welfare access is not merely a normative choice on the part of national voters; it is something that is normatively misaligned with current labor market practices, going against the interests of those affected without giving them the right to cast a vote.

At the same time, it is not merely or even primarily labor migration that raises concerns about immigrants over–burdening the welfare state. When German Chancellor Merkel pronounced in September 2015 that all those seeking refugee status could come to Germany, many wondered how the state would be able to provide for those it had just invited. This is probably why Merkel also stated: “to whomever comes for purely economic reasons, I have to say, you cannot stay.” In the context of German public debate, “purely economic reasons” did not primarily refer to refugees’ hope for better work and wages, but also attempts to take advantage of generous welfare benefits. However, if welfare reliance is something a host society is concerned about, it should seek to actively create opportunities for economic integration. In other words, if welfare reliance is deemed undesirable, immigrants need to be allowed and enabled to work and earn a living. In the case of asylum seekers, long processing times necessitate a period of unemployment. Yet, even among those successful in their applications for asylum or residence, as well as among those having an immediate right to stay and work (primarily, citizens of other EU Member States) unemployment rates are usually much higher compared to those among native majorities. The literature on why that may be the case is extensive. Explanations range from lacking qualifications on the part of immigrants (cf. Duvander, 2001) to problems in the accreditation of foreign credentials (cf. Oreopoulosa, 2011)
and employer discrimination (cf. Bursell, 2014). While employer discrimi-
ination may be hard to tackle by the state, governments can certainly do some-
thing to improve the ease with which professional and academic degrees
acquired abroad can be translated to their domestic equivalents, and special
training schemes could make immigrants fit to satisfy labor market demands.
But this is where the true difficulty lies: Is there really a demand for addi-
tional labor that could be met by immigration? Or is not the shortage of paid
work something with which many European economies struggle already, as
automation is making workers redundant across sectors of the economy (cf.
Rifkin, 2004)?

In this sense, the debate about immigration, social cohesion, and the wel-
fare state is lacking an honest discussion about paid work as the primary path
to economic independence and integration. Policy makers need to challenge
their assumptions about people’s ability to work if they only want or try hard
enough. It is only after a thorough assessment of whether this possibility is
truly given that we can actually talk about who should be legitimately in-
cluded in the system of government–provided welfare.
6. References


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7. Notes

i  The extensive guest worker policy to which I refer here was limited to former West Germany, though the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had similar contracts with Vietnam and various Eastern European and African countries.

ii  Among these hurdles are skill and language deficits (Duvander, 2001; Prokic–Breuer and McManus, 2016) and difficulties in the recognition of foreign degrees and diplomas (Speckesser, 2013), as well as ethnic discrimination in hiring processes (Bursell, 2014; Carlsson and Rooth, 2007).

iii  But see Soroka et al. (2004), who find that living in ethnically diverse environments actually increases intergroup trust, which is then associated with increased support for redistribution in Canada.

iv  The German Federal Statistical Office (DEStatis) defines individuals with a migration background as those who were born abroad, born in Germany as foreign nationals, or born in Germany as German citizens with at least one foreign–born parent. The category of foreign nationals born in Germany arises from the fact that German citizenship is granted primarily on the basis of parental citizenship (*jus sanguinis*).

v  While a team of researchers at the GESIS Leibnitz Institutes in Cologne and Mannheim are responsible for supervising, documenting, and distributing ALLBUS data, the actual fieldwork is commissioned to external providers, such as TNS Infratest (now Kantar TNS), a private survey research company, in 2006 (Wasmer et al., 2007: 52).

vi  For more information, please visit [http://simsam.nu/](http://simsam.nu/).

vii  The *Evolution of Prejudice Research Program* is funded by the Swedish Research Council for Health Working Life and Welfare (FORTE); PI: Mikael Hjerm, Grant Number: 2016–07177.

viii  It should be noted that prior research in social psychology has also analyzed the attitude shaping or framing power of media contents experimentally. In the context of laboratory experiments, participants were confronted with slightly varied news stories and changes in reported attitudes were recorded (cf. Nelson et al., 1997; Slothuus, 2007). There have also
been extensive field experiments, in which modified news contents were broadcast to actual audiences and attitudinal responses were recorded over time (cf. Paluck, 2009; Paluck and Green, 2009). However, to the best of my knowledge, few of these experiments were actually concerned with the attitudinally relevance of news contents for attitudes related to welfare (but see Slothuus, 2007), leaving much left to be explored.

In his speech on August 16, 2014, Reinfeldt stated: “I can already say that there will be substantial costs to accommodate these people [asylum seekers]. In fact, the costs are so extensive that it will put further restrictions on what we can do within the limits of our public finances. Therefore, we promise almost nothing in this election; there will be no room for it” (own translation from Swedish as cited in Pettersson Normark, 2014).

Own translation from German as cited in Blume et al. (2016): „Wer aus rein wirtschaftlichen Gründen herkommt, dem muss man sagen, dass er nicht bleiben kann.“