Bringing Light into the Heart of Darkness?
A study of United Nation Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld’s role as a mediator during the Congo crisis 1960-1961

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Chapter 1. Introduction

The Congo crisis could easily have provoked armed conflicts in other parts of Africa, even led to a world war. It was Dag Hammarskjöld and no one else who prevented that. And it is certain that for a suffering people he came to be seen as a model; he brought light into the heart of darkness.¹

Sture Linnér 15/10 2007

So stated Sture Linnér regarding Dag Hammarskjöld’s actions during the Congo crisis. Linnér was a UN colleague who was Hammarskjöld’s foremost representative during the peacekeeping mission in Congo from May 1961 until the death of Hammarskjöld in September 1961 in a plane crash outside current day Zambia.² The former director of the Hammarskjöld Foundation Henning Melber used this quote in his account of Hammarskjöld during the Congo crisis, and is an example of the idealizing discourse surrounding Hammarskjöld.³ A continued interest in Hammarskjöld indicates that the memory of him is still alive in Swedish popular understanding of the UN and the post-war time period. Biographies such as historian Henrik Berggren’s have kept Hammarskjöld positioned as one of the great 20th century great Swedish political figures together with Olof Palme, Hjalmar Branting, Raoul Wallenberg,⁴ and Per-Albin Hansson.⁵ Sweden’s self-image after World War II has been as a neutral alternative to the two blocs of the Cold War, as “the good conscience of the world”,⁶ and in many ways Hammarskjöld has come

² Regarding naming practice, I use the names of people and places as they were on June 30 1960, as that is how they are presented in the source material in order to avoid confusion in case of quotations. It is, however, important to remember that that the names of places like Léopoldville were colonial names that were later changed, Léopoldville to Kinshasa; For the death of Hammarskjöld, see Susan Williams, Who Killed Hammarskjöld? the UN, the Cold War and white supremacy in Africa (London: Hurst & Company, 2011).
⁴ See for example Paul Levine “Over the decades this public adulation has resulted in the construction of a number of myths around Wallenberg, myths which continue to distort the general public’s understanding of both his actual historic deeds as well as, ironically, his genuine importance as a moral symbol from humankind’s very darkest hours.” “Raoul Wallenberg and Swedish humanitarian policy in Budapest” in Mikael Byström & Pär Frohnert (eds.) Reaching a State of Hope: refugees, immigrants and the Swedish welfare state, 1930-2000, (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2013), p. 131 Hammarskjöld has achieved a similar status, and the fact that they both died during their diplomatic work helped solidify this.
⁵ Henrik Berggren, Dag Hammarskjöld: att bära världen (Stockholm: Max Ström, 2016); See also Roger Lipsey, Hammarskjöld: a life (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013) as the most academic and empirical of the biographies, as compared to the likes of Mats Svegflors, Dag Hammarskjöld: den första modern svenska (Stockholm: Norstedt, 2005); Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld (New York: Norton, 1995) remains the standard biography.
⁶ Aryo Makko, Ambassadors of realpolitik: Sweden, the CSCE and the Cold War (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), p. 247; See also Andreas Tullberg ‘We are in the Congo now’: Sweden and the trinity of peacekeeping during the Congo crisis 1960-1964 (Lund: Lund University, 2012), p. 42-43, 75.
to mirror this image posthumously. Despite Hammarskjöld’s prominent position, no empirically detailed study of his diplomatic actions has been done. As a part of diplomatic history, the aim of this thesis is to analyse Hammarskjöld’s mediation and diplomatic actions during the Congo crisis 1960-1961. In this thesis UN telegrams will be used to analyse Hammarskjöld’s diplomacy. This thesis will contribute to a broadened understanding of UN Secretariat diplomacy, while at the same time contrasting the popular image of Hammarskjöld with a critical analysis of his diplomatic actions during the Congo crisis.

1.1 Background

1.1.1 Dag Hammarskjöld

Dag Hammarskjöld was born in 1905, the son of Hjalmar Hammarskjöld (Swedish prime minister 1914-1917) and part of a noble family. A Ph.D. in economics in 1934 was followed by twenty years in the Swedish civil service, including being a minister without portfolio in the Erlander government 1951-1953 before being nominated for the role of the Secretary-General of the newly established United Nations. The first Secretary-General of the UN, the Norwegian Trygve Lie, resigned in 1952 after his support of the Korean War made the situation untenable with the Soviet Union. An approval of a new Secretary-General required the full support of the Security Council as the vote could be vetoed. Hammarskjöld was recommended and passed both the Security Council and the General Assembly. In 1957 he was re-elected for a second term of office. As Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld was the premier international civil servant between 1953-1961. After Lie resigned, Hammarskjöld presided over a period of uncertainty in the history of the United Nations, with international crisis’ such as the Suez crisis and the beginnings of the conflict in Vietnam (French Indochina). Yet no conflict was as challenging as the Congo crisis 1960-1961, a conflict which defined the last two years of Hammarskjöld’s life.

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1.1.2 United Nations and peacekeeping

The institutional foundation of the United Nations is the interwar League of Nations, and with the creation of the UN in 1945 there was an awareness and a wish for an intergovernmental organization with the possibility to prevent the kind of inter-state conflict that had plagued the world. The fifty-one founding member states drafted the UN charter to preserve world peace. By 1956 there were eighty members, and in 1960 it reached 100, one of which was Congo. As of 2017 there are 193.

The two principal organs of the UN are the Security Council and the General Assembly. It is through these that UN policy is made, and executed by the office of the Secretariat and the Secretary-General. Hammarskjöld and his UN colleague Lester Pearson were the ones who institutionalized peacekeeping in 1956 in connection to the Suez crisis. Peacekeeping is not present in the UN charter, but has developed as a way for the UN to respond to threats against international peace and security.

1.1.3 Congo, decolonisation and the Congo crisis

The process of African colonial areas transitioning into independent nation states after World War II is crucial in understanding modern African history. Congo was part of the so called ‘new imperialism’ in late 19th century under the rule of the Belgian king Leopold II. The Congo Free State was established in 1885 and extraction of natural resources left millions dead. At the beginning of the colonial era census’ reports suggested a population between 20 and 30 million; in 1911 it was estimated at 8.5 million. International outcry led the Belgian state to take over administration of the colony. Congolese historian Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja has noted how domestic resistance to colonial rule was always present. Resistance towards colonialism after World War II meant that, as historian Frederick Cooper has described it, “[b]y the 1960’s, a normative transformation had taken place on a worldwide level; the colonial empire was no

9 Ove Bring, “Dag Hammarskjöld’s approach to the United Nations and international law”, Estudios Internacionales, 44 (2011), p. 159-172; Tullberg, We are in, p. 11.
10 Bring “Dag Hammarskjöld’s’, p. 163.
longer a legitimate or viable form of political organisation.” The emergence of newly independent states on the international arena also changed the nature of the United Nations. The increased deadlock of the Security Council during the Cold War led to an increase in power for the General Assembly – a General Assembly in which Afro-Asian states became the majority. It became crucial to take into account the interests of former colonial states, yet it also lead to Cold War interests effecting decolonisation. Congo’s specific decolonization is characterized by these processes and needs to be seen in a national, regional and global scale in order to understand why Congo’s history developed the way it did.

Hammarskjöld’s diplomatic career was intertwined with the geopolitical realities of the Cold War, most clearly during the Congo crisis, with both USA and Soviet Union having a vested interest in the outcome. Just weeks after independence of the former Belgian colony, the situation became critical and the United Nations was asked to help, and one of the first peacekeeping forces was formed. The UN peacekeeping mission Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (hereafter shortened ONUC) was the largest peacekeeping mission during the Cold War, with between 10 000 and 20 000 troops stationed in Congo between 1960-1964. At the same time, internal conflicts in Congo left the UN in a position where its principles of neutrality and impartiality were tested. A constitutional crisis in September 1960 forced the UN to negotiate between Congo’s president and its prime minister as well as their respective factions. How Dag Hammarskjöld diplomatically engaged with these different actors and powers has as of yet not been thoroughly studied.

A more detailed chronology of the events of the Congo crisis is presented on page 24.

1.2 Prior Research

The first histories of the Congo crisis were written during the late 1960’s, which either were memoirs written by the involved actor’s themselves or American historians and social scientists who analysed the Congo crisis as a part of the ongoing Cold War. This has influenced the

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14 Cooper, Colonialism, p. 54.
16 Connor Cruise O’Brien, To Katanga and Back (London: Hutchinson 1962); Schachter, Oscar. “Dag Hammarskjold and the Relation of Law to Politics”, The American Journal of International Law, 56 (1962);
historiography, and much of the same narratives that were developed in the 1960’s has been reproduced later. This is also true of the historiography of Dag Hammarskjöld, with UN diplomat Brian Urquhart’s 1972 biography of Hammarskjöld having influenced all later biographies.\(^\text{17}\) The chronological events of the Congo crisis are well established and described by historians,\(^\text{18}\) yet there has been a remarkable lack of empirically driven studies about the event. The Congo crisis has been analysed in two different, although sometimes overlapping, perspectives; the Cold War and through a postcolonial lens. Hammarskjöld’s role it primarily been idealised in biographies, and the few scholars that have written about his diplomacy have often done so without a thorough use of the available source material.

1.2.1 Traditional historiographical narratives – The (Global) Cold War and postcolonial critique

With the emergence of former colonial states on the international arena, both superpowers sought to expand their influence, moving the Cold War into a global context. Instead of seeing the Cold War as being simply a battle between the two blocs, there has been a development that studies the relational role that the Cold War and decolonisation had on each other. This has taken the form of the term the Global Cold War.\(^\text{19}\) Literary scholar Andrew Hammond has written that

> Underlying the ideological struggle between the US and Soviet Union was a territorial competition for control of decolonised regions in the wake of European imperial retreat. This entailed military interventions, covert operations and economic pressures across Asia, Africa and Latin America that exacerbated – or were exacerbated by – local conflicts whose origins were marginal or unrelated to the US-Soviet stand-off.\(^\text{20}\)

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\(^\text{17}\) Per-Axel Frielingsdorf, *Machiavelli of Peace*: Dag Hammarskjöld and the Political Role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, (unpublished PhD, Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2016), p. 9, 11.


The reason that the Cold War has had such a hegemonic position within the Congo crisis historiography is in large part due to several of the central actors having interpreted the events in Cold War terms. When later historians have used Western sources the same tendency to elevate this perspective has led to the Cold War being the dominant way to interpret the events of 1960-1965.\(^{21}\)

Both the US and the USSR saw the newly independent Congo as a potential battleground,\(^{22}\) and although there has been little research of Soviet archives in relation to the Congo crisis, historians Lise Namikas and Sergei Mazov has done so and concludes that while US policy makers often overestimated the threat of Soviet intervention, there was a clear interest on the behalf of Soviet that Africa in general, and Congo specifically, become left-leaning.\(^{23}\) The US main priority was containing the Congo crisis and avoiding ceding influence to the Soviets. Whether this was through promoting a moderate, pro-western Congolese government or through supporting coups, dictators or assassinations, US policy makers saw intervention as defensive.\(^{24}\)

With the end of the Cold War the historiography of the Congo crisis has since the 1990’s been characterised by a postcolonial perspective. Later Cold War narratives has shown an increased awareness regarding the impact of a Cold War perspective on understanding the Congo crisis.\(^{25}\) In historian Frank Gerits’ 2015 article he has argued against analysing African history through Cold War terms where the ability of Africans to act are limited and that they are “only able to resist or utilise Cold War pressures.”.\(^{26}\) This has been mirrored in the research of the Congo crisis where Congolese politicians are mostly analysed in relation to other countries or the UN. This is problematic because it leads to explanations where actor’s motives and actions always has an external rather than internal cause. Cooper has written that “historians can at times be faulted for treating own engagement with sources from the place and time in question as unproblematic, as if sources spoke on their own.”\(^{27}\)

\(^{21}\) See in particular Hoskyns, *The Congo Since* and Kalb, *The Congo cables*. Their books are still referenced today.

\(^{22}\) Namikas, *Battleground*.

\(^{23}\) Namikas, *Battleground*, p. 5, 11, 27-32; Sergei Mazov, “Soviet Aid to the Gizenga Government in the Former Belgian Congo (1960-61) as Reflected in Russian Archives”, *Cold War History*, Vol. 7, No. 3, August 2007, p. 425-434. It is also worth noting that the Cold War was a term that was not used by Soviets until the 1980’s, but that it is a worthwhile analytical term: Westad, *Global Cold*, p. 2.


\(^{25}\) Such as Namikas, *Battleground* and Kent, *America, the UN*.


\(^{27}\) Cooper, *Colonialism*, p. 13.
interpretations of the sources are often biased and need to be properly analysed and contextualised. Especially considering that most sources regarding the Congo crisis are from western archives. In both of these historiographical traditions, detailed studies of Hammarskjöld’s role have been neglected. In conclusion, awareness of these two traditions brings the discussions to the source material used for any analysis of the Congo crisis. For example, using only American sources can only provide specific answers relating to that specific context. The sources used by researches regarding the Congo crisis affect the results, and with little to no consideration regarding the claims that can be, there are risks for overinterpretation and exaggeration.

1.2.2 Idealizing Hammarskjöld

During the Congo crisis Hammarskjöld was seen as a servant of peace “who strove and eventually sacrificed his life, in pursuing the ideals of the United Nations, in protecting the vulnerable, the weak, from the strongest.”28 Even academic writers have this tendency, as both Manuel Fröhlich and Ove Bring have concluded that Hammarskjöld was a figure worth idealising.29 International relations scholar Per-Axel Frielingsdorf has noted a similar trend, in which most of the narratives about Hammarskjöld tend to idealise him, “sometimes even verging on the hagiographic.”30

In large part because the source material surrounding Hammarskjöld is so extensive, it is easy to pick and choose examples that prove, paradoxically, that Hammarskjöld was both pro- and anti-decolonization, that he both stood up against the big powers, as well as being subservient to them.31 This means that a critical outlook is necessary, both when reading previous research as well as the source material. Because Hammarskjöld has such a central part in the self-image

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28 Francis Deng, “Idealism and realism - Negotiating sovereignty in divided nations”, The 2010 Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture, Development Dialogue, 55, (2011), p. 99. It should be noted that this was a lecture, and that although the biographies are in the same spirit, the language used is often less dramatic.


30 Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 15.

of Sweden during the Cold War, it is even more important to be aware of the usage of history and to reflect on assumptions and interpretations. By selectively ignoring aspects of Hammarskjöld that is less flattering than the traditional narrative, biographers contribute to an idealised historical memory of Hammarskjöld.\textsuperscript{32} However, when almost all historical studies about Hammarskjöld are based on Hammarskjöld’s interpretations (together with the a priori idealization) there is a great risk in failing to differentiate Hammarskjöld’s biases from ‘fact’. The problem with the idealised tendencies in prior research is that it risks confirmation bias when reading and interpreting the UN source material. An example of this is Henning Melber, who consistently and without fail has argued against any sort of critical analysis of Hammarskjöld’s actions during the Congo crisis.\textsuperscript{33} I would argue that it is not the role of the historian to uncritically reproduce idealizing narratives that are not based on the available source material.

1.2.3 The diplomacy of Dag Hammarskjöld

As Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld was the premier international civil servant between 1953-1961. Yet few historians have studied his diplomatic career in a critical or empirical way. Often times biographies have had to fill the gaps narratively and descriptively rather than analytically. When Hammarskjöld’s diplomacy is brought up, it is often limited to analysing Hammarskjöld’s public interpretation of the Secretary-General role.\textsuperscript{34} Diplomatically it has mostly been stated that Hammarskjöld used ‘quiet diplomacy’ and ‘preventative diplomacy’, broad terms with little analytical meaning used by Hammarskjöld himself.\textsuperscript{35} How these terms were implemented or whether these terms are the best analytical terms has not been studied empirically. For example, Ove Bring, professor of international law, has written about Hammarskjöld’s conception of his office and the UN. In the article Bring has discussed


\textsuperscript{33} Melber, “Dag Hammarskjöld”, p. 264-276.

\textsuperscript{34} Fröhlich, \textit{Political ethics}; Most biographies also show how Hammarskjöld interpreted events, either through his speeches or through official UN documents, see for example Lipsey, \textit{Hammarskjöld}, p. 411, 446-447 and Urquhart, \textit{Hammarskjöld}, p. 452-456, 474, 478.

Hammarskjöld’s views on diplomacy and peacekeeping, notably using terms that Hammarskjöld himself used. However, Bring has not critically engaged with the empirical source material to study to what degree concepts such as quiet diplomacy were acted upon. This is also a general trend of the biographies which for the most part reproduces the events from the view of Hammarskjöld and the UN. Adding to this, most biographies reproduce the same descriptive chronology of Hammarskjöld’s life as the first biography by Brian Urquhart. I would argue that they have not critically engaged with the question of whether there was a difference between what was stated publicly and what was done policy-wise with thorough empirical research. Since the traditional narrative has rarely been challenged, this thesis strives to achieve a more nuanced analysis.

The historian Maria Stella Rogoni has noted how the UN source material has been underused, having stated that “[s]ignificantly, even the most recent works on the topic are based on American and European sources” and that the Dag Hammarskjöld Collection at the Swedish National Library “does not often appear among the sources used by researchers have given their attention to the Congolese crisis”. However, while Rogoni’s text makes use of these sources to study Hammarskjöld and the UN during the Congo crisis, she does so in a limited way. She has only discussed the events of July to September 1960, leaving out an entire year’s worth of source material and diplomatic events. So while she has claimed to study “the decision-making process at the apex of the Secretariat” to interpret Hammarskjöld’s diplomacy, the analysis is both fragmented and lacking in depth.

The most extensive and empirical study of Hammarskjöld is Per-Axel Frielingsdorf’s dissertation from 2016 where he has challenged the traditional, idealized view of Hammarskjöld. His main argument is that Hammarskjöld expanded the political role of the

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36 Bring "Dag Hammarskjöld's", p. 159, 162-163.
37 See especially Lipsey, Hammarskjöld.
38 Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 11.
42 Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli.
Secretary-General, and that instead of a diplomatic actor Hammarskjöld should be seen as a political actor.\(^{43}\) Frielingsdorf has primarily studied Hammarskjöld’s relationship with the Security Council, especially the US and the USSR and while he has discussed the main diplomatic events and missions, he has not studied how Hammarskjöld acted diplomatically during the Congo crisis. Frielingsdorf has echoed historian Alanna O’Malley’s argument that Hammarskjöld came to depend on the Afro-Asian nations during the Congo crisis and that he actively changed his policy because of this relationship.\(^{44}\) However, since no detailed study has been done regarding Hammarskjöld’s diplomatic policy, this statement can and will be challenged in this thesis.

The primary issue with Frielingsdorf’s study is his overreliance on Anglo-American second-hand sources to study Hammarskjöld’s motives on (both American and British UN ambassador’s communication with their respective foreign offices). All too often Frielingsdorf’s conclusions are exactly the same as the Anglo-American interpretation of the events.\(^{45}\) While these sources are important for understanding the Congo crisis, it is important to recognize the possibility that Anglo-American interpretations are not without bias. It is the difference between ‘this is how Hammarskjöld was’ and ‘this is how the US ambassador to the UN thought Hammarskjöld was’. Frielingsdorf has not accounted for how the Anglo-American bias can impact and influence the understanding of Hammarskjöld in the source material, and he does not make this analytical difference. This lack of source criticism can be explained due to the fact that Frielingsdorf is not a historian, instead his thesis was written from an international relations perspective.

Despite the fact that the second Secretary-General is Sweden’s most premier diplomat and international civil servant there has been no detailed empirical study regarding Hammarskjöld’s diplomacy. The fact that the popular understanding of Hammarskjöld is based on outdated biographies that rely on an idealizing perspective shows the need for further research. While the biographies have successfully described the ‘what’ of Hammarskjöld during the Congo crisis, they have left the question of ‘how’ unanswered.\(^{46}\) The question of how is important to

\(^{43}\) Frielingsdorf, *Machiavelli*, p. 102-104 for Hammarskjöld’s mediation during the Suez crisis. He does not use the phrase during the Congo crisis, instead arguing that he was strictly a political actor during the crisis.


\(^{46}\) See following examples of descriptive statements regarding Hammarskjöld’s diplomacy: Lipsey, *Hammarskjöld*, p. 495, 508; Urquhart, *Hammarskoljd*, p. 547, 549, 553.
understand the actions of Dag Hammarskjöld and not only reproduce the same traditional narrative.

1.3 Research aim and research questions

The aim of this thesis is to analyse Dag Hammarskjöld’s mediation and diplomatic actions during the Congo crisis 1960-1961. Through this aim a broader understanding of UN diplomacy during peacekeeping missions can be reached. As the premier international civil servant during the Cold War’s largest peacekeeping mission an analysis of Dag Hammarskjöld’s role in the Congo crisis has the potential to contribute to research on diplomacy. A study of Hammarskjöld’s mediation during the Congo crisis can also provide a deeper understanding of the effects that UN diplomatic efforts had on the political situation in Congo. Studying the consequences of diplomatic decisions is especially fruitful during the Congo crisis, since the country was clearly divided into different political factions. Consequently, the impartial position of the UN peacekeeping mission was constantly challenged which means that studies of mediation is made more relevant. This study positions itself in relation to the general historiography of the Congo crisis and diplomatic theory by providing new insights of UN diplomacy. By studying diplomacy during the Congo crisis this thesis will provide a deepened understanding of mediation through the analysis of the most important Swedish international civil servant, Dag Hammarskjöld.

- How did Dag Hammarskjöld act diplomatically during the Congo crisis?
  - How did Dag Hammarskjöld mediate between the two major Congolese political factions - Léopoldville and Stanleyville?
  - How did Dag Hammarskjöld’s diplomatic policy towards the Léopoldville and Stanleyville factions compare to how he communicated policies with the UN Advisory Committee?
  - How did Dag Hammarskjöld’s diplomatic actions relate to the ideal type of the mediator?
1.4 Primary sources

As part of Hammarskjöld’s will, all documents gathered from Hammarskjöld’s office and his apartment were sent to the National Library of Sweden. The Hammarskjöld Collection is an archival collection that consists of thousands of official UN documents, letters, UN diplomatic telegrams as well as Hammarskjöld’s personal notes and belongings. In total, there are 31 archival boxes that directly concern the Congo crisis. The communication between Hammarskjöld in New York and his representatives in Congo were in the form of telegrams which were encrypted and have been through a so called ‘cable editor’ who then wrote them down.

An estimate of 4000 telegrams have been read as part of this study, as well as 2500 pages of meeting protocols of the ‘Advisory Committee On The Congo’, which was the body that advised Hammarskjöld on matters pertaining to the Congo crisis, and consisted of UN ambassadors from countries participating in ONUC – mainly Afro-Asian countries. Hammarskjöld was the chairman of these meetings. Telegrams marked ‘outgoing’ were sent from Hammarskjöld and often contained instructions from Hammarskjöld to his representatives. In general, there are more ‘incoming’ telegrams as Hammarskjöld was kept informed daily regarding most aspects of ONUC, and not every telegram required a response.

The UN diplomatic telegrams have been the primary source material, while the meeting protocols mainly have been used in comparison with the telegrams, thus allowing an analysis of the difference of what was done (telegrams) and what was said (meeting protocols). Supplementary documents such as reports, statements and UN resolutions have also been read when relevant for the study of the diplomatic events. UN diplomatic telegrams have been underutilized in research, which is unfortunate since they highlight the daily communication between Hammarskjöld and his representatives.

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48 Not every telegram concerned diplomatic events, for example matters of UN personnel are irrelevant for this thesis.
There is primarily one problem regarding validity and reliability of the source material: there are no other documents such as diaries to compare what was reported by the UN representatives in Congo. As such, it is difficult to ascertain whether what was reported in the telegram reflect the ‘truth’. However, other studies of mediation, and of Hammarskjöld, have not themselves always used their sources in a critical way.\textsuperscript{51} In many ways the source material that I have used is better as I am not limited by the recollections of a mediator, instead the UN telegrams allow me to study the behind the scenes of the mediation. I am not limited to public statements as the telegrams show diplomatic policy in the making. There is still a need for a critical awareness regarding what can and cannot be said; there is still the problem that the source material is biased and that the information that Hammarskjöld receives is filtered through the experience and interpretation of his representatives.

\textit{1.5 Theory - Intermediary Mediation}

For this study I will use a theory from political science in order to study the actual mediation of Dag Hammarskjöld since it enables an analysis of the diplomatic events of the Congo crisis. During the 1990’s professor of political government Thomas Princen developed a theory of the diplomacy of intermediary mediators the conditions of inter-state conflict resolution. Using Princen’s theory of intermediary mediation enables the use of several key concepts which allows for an analysis of how Hammarskjöld acted diplomatically during the Congo crisis. Although mediation can be defined in various ways, it is “generally an extension and continuation of peaceful conflict management” often by an outsider, whether by an individual, a group, an organization.\textsuperscript{52} Mediation could be said to be either a formal or informal process where a mediator attempts to resolve a conflict between two (or more) disputants. The negotiations between parties are an integral part of international relations. What the dispute concerns differs and it affects the proposed solutions and the role of the mediator. Hammarskjöld and the UN were the main mediator during the Congo crisis and will be the focus of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{51} Beyond the lack of analytical and empirical studies of Hammarskjöld as previously discussed, see how Thomas Princen in his work uses a diary as his only source material: Thomas Princen, \textit{Intermediaries in international conflict} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 69-106.
Princen has constructed two ideal types of mediators; the principal and neutral mediator (see Figure 1). This is a distinction between the two ways that mediators can position themselves, Princen has argued that neither is better than the other but that they each have their own advantages.\textsuperscript{53} The primary distinction between the two ideal types are whether they have a self-interest in the mediation (principal), such as the outcome of the mediation having consequences for the mediator’s prestige, or whether they are without any such self-interest (neutral). For example, according to Princen’s theory a neutral mediator cannot bargain between disputants while a principal mediator can have difficulty convincing the disputant parties that he/she is acting only in their interests.\textsuperscript{54} Historian Knut Kjeldstadli has argued that ideal types can help extract the essential from what is being studied. They do not exist but rather have been constructed to analyse phenomenon. The similarities and discrepancies between the ideal types and the empirical results can provide a basis for analysis.\textsuperscript{55}

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\textsuperscript{53} Princen, *Intermediaries*, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{54} Princen, *Intermediaries*, p. 25.

Adapting Princen’s theory mostly takes the form of partly studying to what degree and in which way these key concepts were used by Hammarskjöld in Congo, but I will also analyse how his mediation relate to Princen’s ideal types. The role of the mediator is dependent on the changing circumstances and can change over time, such as domestic developments within a nation. In his theory, Princen has shown an awareness that a mediator is not always simply a mediator and that it is not a constant role but one that is created and reproduced in relation to the disputing parties. This enables an analysis of how Hammarskjöld related to his diplomatic role as theoretically founded in the ideal type of the mediator.

Princen has argued that neutral mediators have no need to prove anything to domestic interests, whereas principal mediators who have a self-interested motive in mediation more often have a need to show constituents that “it is protecting or advancing such interests.”\textsuperscript{56} External variables may affect the mediation. In this thesis, the external variables of the UN (as an intergovernmental organization) is understood to consist of various interests which might influence mediation, such as the Security Council or the General Assembly. In general, the external interests stem from the member states that make up these UN organs.

The ideal types are the theoretical framework constructed by Princen, whereas the concepts described below are the analytical tools that allow me to study Hammarskjöld’s diplomacy. In general, the ideal types signify the motives of the mediator, whether it is out of self interest or not. The analytical concepts signify the how of the mediator - their tactics. Since the aim of this thesis is to study how Hammarskjöld mediated, Princen’s theory is applicable.

\textit{1.6 Method}

In this thesis, \textit{diplomacy} is defined as “the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations.”\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Mediation} is a part of diplomacy, but there also exists other diplomatic acts that are not strictly mediation, such as bilateral negotiations between nations. \textit{Diplomatic policy} in this sense will be understood as the instructions and overall goals that Hammarskjöld sent to his representatives that executed said policy. The concept of \textit{reconciliation} is central in mediation studies, as it pertains to bringing two or more disputant parties together in an attempt to get

\textsuperscript{56} Princen, \textit{Intermediaries}, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{57} https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diplomacy (24.3.17).
them to come to an agreement. Disputants are defined as the parties between which a conflict occurs.

Through the study of the telegrams that the UN diplomatic policy will be analysed. I have analysed how policy was formed and communicated by categorizing Hammarskjöld’s statements concerning instructions, opinions and feedback. Furthermore, my analysis convey how views and interpretations were created and how information was conveyed. Given that the UN telegrams were not written with awareness of posterity, they were not curated and hence allow historians to study the day-to-day diplomatic workings and policy of the UN team. As historian John Tosh has written, these types of sources allow a historian to analyse communication that was not meant for anybody but the recipient and the sender.58 Outgoing telegrams shows the policy and how Hammarskjöld acted, for example what instructions he gave his representatives, whereas incoming telegrams paint a picture of what information Hammarskjöld received such as reporting on meetings. An example of this is how one of Hammarskjöld’s representative stated that

As I report to you every interview I have with KasaVubu or send you a copy of every letter or note that I send to him, I felt sure that you were fully aware that I had done nothing as far as Tshombe was concerned and your silence confirmed me in the belief that you supported my attitude.59

Hammarskjöld’s instructions can take the form of statements like “[p]lease see Kasavubu personally on his return and transmit to him our reactions as set out in memo with which this instruction ends.”60 From this, I would argue that one can study the what and the how regarding Hammarskjöld’s mediation.

When studying the protocols of the Advisory Committee it can show how the policy formulated by Hammarskjöld was communicated to the ambassadors of the troop contingent countries. This can help answer the question of what information Hammarskjöld gave them, and by comparing the committee meetings with the telegrams one can study what policy Hammarskjöld enacted and how he then communicated it. If there are discrepancies, then that

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59 Abbas to D.H. 11/5-61, A-1194, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
60 D.H. to Abbas, 27/3-61, L 179: 135, DHC, NL.
can tell us how Hammarskjöld used the Advisory Committee. This is important since it provides an insight to the day-to-day UN Congo policy. The meeting protocols can also provide an insight to what degree Hammarskjöld listened to the advice of the member states, as historian Alanna O’Malley has claimed that their support was important for Hammarskjöld during the Congo crisis.\footnote{O’Malley, “Ghana, India”, p. 970, 975, 978, 980-82.}

1.6.1 Levels of analysis

To study Hammarskjöld’s mediation, the source material has been read with a specific focus on the diplomatic policy regarding reconciliation, specifically to answer the how and the tactics used. In this essay, there are four levels of analysis: cross-referencing, diplomatic events, concepts and abstract analysis.

First, a majority of the UN telegrams start with the phrase ‘reur #’, meaning ‘regarding your’ followed by a number specifying what telegram the sender is referencing. This provides the possibility to compare and analyse the UN diplomatic efforts and policy by cross-referencing telegrams. Most sources are in conversation with other telegrams and documents, and with a clear referencing system it is possible to read them as conversations. They rarely exist in isolation. The final part of the cross-referencing analysis of a diplomatic event consists of comparing the diplomatic telegrams with the Advisory Committee meeting protocols in order to analyse the similarities and differences between the actual diplomatic policy and what was said about the diplomatic policy, as previously discussed.

Second, together the contents of the telegrams and documents can be used to study what I call diplomatic events. For example, negotiations between Hammarskjöld and the disputant parties could take place over several days, weeks or even months and over several telegrams who all need to be read and analysed in connection to each other. The diplomatic events that I have studied form the structure of the thesis (see 1.7 for selection of events).

Third, with the help of Princen’s concepts I have analysed the tactics used in Hammarskjöld’s mediation. With the concepts in mind I have located times when they were present in the source material. Comparisons have been made, but have not been the primary purpose. For example, I
am not interested in answering ‘this is how many times Hammarskjöld bargained’ or ‘this is how many parties trusted Hammarskjöld’. Rather, Princen’s concepts have been tools that allow me to study the overarching diplomatic efforts. They help to point out why it is interesting that Hammarskjöld acted the way he did, they help contextualize and analyse the diplomatic events. To add to this, I’ve also compared the results with the ideal types of Princen. For example, if Hammarskjöld proposed a solution that would be beneficial to the UN, I have argued that it shows Hammarskjöld as a principal mediator – especially if he resonated in a way that showed that he was aware of the impact of the solution, i.e. by arguing that this solution was preferable because of the pro-UN implications. Additionally, if he acted in a way that shows he preferred one side over the other, that is a sign of Hammarskjöld as a principal mediator, as a neutral would not be favouring one side over the other.

Fourth, I have related diplomatic events to each other enabling a context for the diplomatic policy and actions, as well as discussing the results in relation to previous research, the historical context and discussing the theoretical implications. These factors combine to form an abstract analysis.

In summary, the method’s four levels of analysis are: cross-referencing the source material, identifying diplomatic events, analysing the empirical result with Princen’s concepts and finally comparing the results with other diplomatic events, previous research, historical context and the theoretical implications. They are relational, for example I construct the events from the cross-referencing.

Cross-referencing → diplomatic event ← analytical concepts = abstract analysis.

1.6.2 Princen’s analytical concepts

Princen has identified some key concepts that show the tactics used by mediators and these will be used to analyse how Hammarskjöld mediated. Not all of Princen’s analytical and methodological concepts will be used as some are not relevant for Hammarskjöld’s mediation, and the concepts used have been analytically adapted according to the source material. The concepts used in this thesis are: acceptance, trust, exit, pooling information, agenda setting, arranging travel and establishing norms of behaviour. Together, they form the basis of analysing the mediation tactics used by Hammarskjöld during the Congo crisis.
Acceptance. A mediator cannot mediate without the acceptance of the disputing parties. This means that a mediator cannot unilaterally get involved in a conflict and expect to have success; if the disputants do not recognize the mediator they are unlikely to be effective. With this term I will analyse whether Hammarskjöld had the disputant’s acceptance as a mediator, and how he acted to attempt to get acceptance if he did not have it. Did he give concessions or bargains in order to make them accept him?

Trust. The goal of a mediator is to reconcile two or more disputant parties. In order to do this, the parties must trust each other, otherwise they are unlikely to come to an agreement. A mediator may then attempt to promote trust between the disputants in order to make them more amiable. With this term I will study how Hammarskjöld attempted to promote trust between the disputants. How did he attempt to make them trust each other in order to come to a reconciliation?

Exit. Princen has argued that one of the way that mediators can influence and effect the disputants is by threatening to leave the dispute. By giving an ultimatum the mediator may hope to force the disputants to comply, but there is also a risk of the disputing parties not acquiescing with the mediator’s demand, of calling their bluff. If the mediator has a stake in the mediations they may be hesitant to use this strategy, as there is a risk of losing their position. Princen has also highlighted how the ultimatum often clashes with the self-image of the mediator’s role, and as such may not be all that common. With this term I will analyse how Hammarskjöld used the possibility to exit the conflict as a bargaining tool.

Pooling of information. By pooling information the mediator ensures that they have leverage over the disputant parties, allowing them to use the information efficiently. With this term I will study how Hammarskjöld acted with the information available to him. Did he use information differently depending on what disputant party he was communicating with? Did he share the information with the Advisory Committee? What were the discrepancies?

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63 Princen, Intermediaries, p. 9, 26.
64 Princen, Intermediaries, p. 54-59.
65 Princen, Intermediaries, p. 55-57.
66 Princen, Intermediaries, p. 42.
Agenda setting. Princen has used this term literally - what the mediator sets on the agenda. It can also mean the general attempt by a mediator to promote a specific set of issues, by highlighting a topic a mediator makes the focus of the mediation about said topic or issue. With this term I will be able to analyse what issues Hammarskjöld attempted to promote in his mediation.

Arranging travel. A mediator may bring disputing parties together by arranging travel to, for example, a neutral place for a meeting. This can be a tactic in which a mediator can promote negotiations that may otherwise have been hindered. With this term I will be study when Hammarskjöld used this tactic, and when he did not, as a way to promote reconciliation.

Establishing norms of behaviour. By this a mediator may, through their actions and their words, try to change the behavioural dynamics between disputants for example by trying to change the perception of issues or by connecting the mediation with a normative ‘theme’. To exemplify, if a mediator would mention that failure to come to an agreement would potentially lead to a nuclear war, then the mediator would be establishing norms of behaviour with a nuclear ‘theme’ in an attempt to influence disputant behaviour. It does not mean societal norms. With this term I will be able to analyse how Hammarskjöld attempted to influence the behaviour of the disputants.

In conclusion, these concepts are useful since they provide a framework from which Hammarskjöld’s diplomatic actions can be analysed. Together, the concepts show the tactics that characterise Hammarskjöld’s mediation during the Congo crisis.

1.7 Outline of study & selection of diplomatic events

Between September 1960 and August 1961 there were several different factions in Congo all claiming to be the legitimate government. These also had various international support and were recognized by different states and blocs. This study will focus on the UN conciliation efforts between the so called Léopoldville and Stanleyville groups, two major Congolese political

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67 Princen, Intermediaries, p. 40.
68 Princen, Intermediaries, p. 40.
69 Princen, Intermediaries, p. 40.
70 Princen, Intermediaries, p. 40.
factions both claiming to be the legitimate government of Congo - with Léopoldville being the central government under President Joseph Kasavubu with support from western states, and Stanleyville claiming legitimacy as being the government of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and his successor, Antoine Gizenga, with support from the eastern bloc. Afro-Asian support was divided between them. The “secessionist” states of Katanga and South Kasai were mainly supported by Belgium, and will not be covered in this thesis. The reason for the selection of Léopoldville and Stanleyville is that it provides the most clear case of Hammarskjöld as a mediator during the Congo crisis, and that these factions were those that reconciled at parliament in July 1961.

The thesis follows a general chronological disposition structured around the diplomatic events. To study Hammarskjöld as a mediator, this thesis focus is on diplomatic events about how Hammarskjöld attempted to reconcile the two major factions: the Léopoldville and Stanleyville factions (their official names being Republic of the Congo and Free Republic of the Congo respectively) in 1960 and 1961. Reconciliation is one of the clearest goals a mediator may attempt to accomplish. These diplomatic events should not be seen as isolated events, rather they are a long chain of diplomatic efforts leading up to the reconvention of the Congolese parliament in July 1961 where a new prime minister and government was elected. The study of these events can answer how Hammarskjöld acted as a mediator and what his mediating tactics were. They can also provide the opportunity to analyse Hammarskjöld in relation to both Princen’s ideal types as well as to the concepts developed.

1.8 Chronology of the Congo Crisis

With the Congo crisis being a multifaceted and complex event, with many different actors and process’, it is easy to be bogged down by details. The most important background information to understand Hammarskjöld’s diplomacy during the Congo crisis are as follows:

- As a former Belgian colony, Congo’s independence was for the most part less prepared than their British or French counterparts. In the 1950’s Belgium prepared a 30-year plan until independence, but resistance to colonial rule led to independence being set for the summer of 1960.\footnote{Kent, America, the UN, p. 6-7; Namikas, Battleground, p. 34-35.}
• A week after Congolese independence a mutiny spread in the Congolese army, leading to an exodus of Belgians. Belgium responded by landing paratroopers to restore ‘law & order’. Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba argued that this was violating Congo’s sovereignty and together with President Joseph Kasavubu called for UN assistance.72

• For the first and only time in UN history, article 99 of the UN charter was activated allowing the Secretary-General to bring a matter to the Security Council. The peacekeeping mission ONUC was formed and within a week 10 000 lightly armed infantry were in Congo.73

• On July 11 1960, less than two weeks after independence, the richest region Katanga declared independence with Belgian support. Less than a month later, the region South Kasai also declared independence. World opinion was divided, with some calling them secessionist states.74

• The Cold War enveloped Congo, as both USA and the USSR attempted to influence the country. USSR provided arms and transports to Lumumba to crush Katanga and CIA Director Allen Dulles called Prime Minister Lumumba “a Castro or worse”.75 Hammarskjöld saw the role of the UN as ‘keeping the Cold War out of Congo’.76

• Prime Minister Lumumba was dismissed by President Kasavubu on September 5 1960. Lumumba in turn dismissed the president. Parliament declared both dismissals illegal but the constitutional crisis was a fact and Lumumba was left in a weaker position, being placed under effective house arrest.77

• Less than two weeks later army chief of staff colonel Joseph Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko) effectively dismissed both Kasavubu and Lumumba. The UN refused to recognise Mobutu.78

• Various political factions all claiming to be the legitimate government of Congo characterised this period of constitutional uncertainty. In November 1960 the UN

72 Kent, America, the UN, p. 15-18.
73 Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 145; Kent, America, the UN, p. 20-21.
75 Namikas, Battleground, p. 79, 85-87, 89-96.
76 Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 148.
78 Kent, America, the UN, p. 32-33, 38; Namikas, Battleground, p. 104-107; Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 189, 197, 199.
General Assembly voted to seat Kasavubu’s delegation to the Assembly rather than Lumumba’s, effectively declaring Kasavubu’s faction as the legitimate government.79

- A few days later, Lumumba successfully fled from the capital Léopoldville in an attempt to go to Stanleyville, where **Vice Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga** had set up a rival government. Lumumba was captured by government forces in early December.80

- Lumumba was taken to Katanga in January 1961 and was executed. The international outcry led to the UN adapting Security Council Resolution 161 giving ONUC the mandate to use force in order to prevent civil war.81

- A continued period of constitutional uncertainty lasted between March and June 1961 until parliament was reconvened in July 1961 with the end result being a moderate, pro-western government led by Kasavubu as president and **Cyrille Adoula as prime minister**.82

- UN forces in Katanga launched two military operations in September 1961 in order to arrest and deport foreign personnel and mercenaries. Fighting bogged down and Hammarskjöld flew to Ndola in order to negotiate a ceasefire. On September 18 1961, the second Secretary-General died in a plane crash.83

- Over the next few years, the UN under Secretary-General U Thant militarily stopped the Katangese secession before leaving Congo in June 1964.84

- During 1964-1965 Congo neared a civil war with the Simba rebellion leaving many civilians dead.85

- Mobutu took power directly in a military coup in 1965 by calling for a state of emergency for five years. He consolidated power and opposition was suppressed in Congo (renamed Zaire). Mobutu remained as dictator until 1997.86

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81 Kent, *America, the UN*, p. 47-49.
82 Kent, *America, the UN*, p. 50-59.
Chapter 2. Dag Hammarskjöld, Congo and Secretariat diplomacy

Naturally it is impossible for the Secretary-General, even indirectly, to become party to personality questions in the internal Congolese maneuvering and I must therefore stand completely aloof in relation to views expressed of that character. You will appreciate reasons for this and have it in mind in forthcoming private talks with Kasa-Vubu.\(^{87}\)

Dag Hammarskjöld 19/7 1961

This was Hammarskjöld’s response to a telegram where his UN representative in Congo had talked with President Kasavubu and even suggested whom the president should try and convince parliament should be prime minister. Even though both Hammarskjöld and his representative recognized this as ‘interference’ they justified talking to the president in such a way as being simply ‘man to man’.\(^{88}\) Hammarskjöld and his team of UN diplomats were in a situation where they had to both act as mediators trying to reconcile various political factions, while at the same time being expressly aware of the need for impartiality and non-interference. As the telegram above shows, this was not always an easy line to walk and there were times where the UN diplomats seemed aware that their intermediary actions may be considered interference, as they often attempted to justify it not being interference.\(^{89}\) Should the UN actions still be seen as mediation, or should Hammarskjöld’s actions be described in a more critical way? Should Hammarskjöld be described as a “servant of peace” or a “Machiavelli of peace”?\(^{90}\)

Following September 1960 the constitutional situation was unclear, with several different factions and leaders claiming legitimacy over Congo. Between September and November 1960 the UN was in a position of treating all the factions on a de facto basis, at least publicly. After the conflict between Hammarskjöld and Prime Minister Lumumba in August 1960, it has been argued that the UN actively intervened in internal matters, citing among others Hammarskjöld himself when saying that “Lumumba must ‘broken.’”\(^{91}\) Parliament had declared both dismissals illegal and urged the leaders to reconcile their differences. This political stand-off lasted until the end of November 1960 when the UN seated Kasavubu’s delegation at the General

\(^{87}\) D.H. to Linnér, 19/7-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
\(^{88}\) D.H. to Linnér, 19/7-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
\(^{89}\) D.H. to Linnér, 19/7-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL; D.H. to Abbas, 22/3-61, 1981, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; D.H. to Abbas, 26/4-61, 2959 L 179: 158, DHC, NL; Linnér to D.H. 29/5-61, 1340-1341, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; D.H. to Linnér, 24/8-61, 5878; L 179: 160, DHC, NL.
\(^{90}\) The servant of peace: a selection of the speeches and statements of Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1953-1961, Foote & Wilder, (London 1962); Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 3.
\(^{91}\) As quoted in Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 169.
Assembly, something that Frielingsdorf has argued that Hammarskjöld worked behind the scenes in order for it to pass.  

The conflict between the Stanleyville and Léopoldville factions lasted until the reconvention of parliament in the summer of 1961, with UN providing security and mediation efforts. The reconvention of parliament has academically been seen as officially ending the constitutional crisis which began on September 5 1960. It was the first time parliament had met for almost a year and was seen by the UN as a necessity for Congo to come to a political solution between the disputants. Between late April and August 1961 there were twelve Advisory Committee meetings. During these meetings, the word ‘parliament’ was mentioned a total of 510 times. This highlights the importance that the UN placed on parliament during this period, with its reconvention being mentioned in several resolutions as well. The result of the parliamentary meeting at Lovanium was a new government under Cyrille Adoula as prime minister under a continued Joseph Kasavubu presidency.  

Previous research regarding parliament has especially highlighted the American influence in getting Adoula elected. Scholars John Kent and William Mountz have even argued that the CIA infiltrated the parliament area and helped bribe parliamentarians in order to bring about a moderate, pro-western government. Mountz has argued the US “employed bribery, blackmail, and threats in order to have Adoula elected as prime minister.” Some, like Frielingsdorf, have argued that the UN were complicit in this, and that they actively and consciously intervened to produce a favourable government (i.e., pro-Western). However, he has not systematically examined how they did this. Biographies of Hammarskjöld have simply mentioned that there may have been interference, but have never mentioned Hammarskjöld’s involvement or studied

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92 Frielingsdorf, _Machiavelli_, p. 195-196, 198-199. However, he uses only second-hand sources in order to back up this claim.
95 The current day University of Kinshasa.
96 Namikas, _Battleground_, p. 146-148.
100 Frielingsdorf, _Machiavelli_, p. 225-227.
the UN source material. Likewise, even academic works of the Congo crisis (the books of scholars Lise Namikas, John Kent and Madelaine Kalb respectively) have only spent around five pages each discussing the political developments during the summer, and they are mostly descriptive of US policy. What has not been done in regards to the reconvening of parliament and UN policy of reconciliation is to study the diplomatic process leading up to the parliamentary meeting in the summer of 1961.

2.1 Early attempts at reconciliation and the Conciliation Commission: September 1960 – March 1961

The constitutional crisis in September 1960 began as a personal conflict between Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu. A reunion between Kasavubu and Lumumba seemed unlikely, and Frielingsdorf has argued that Hammarskjöld was not interested in facilitating a reconciliation between them. In fact, he has stated that Hammarskjöld actively delayed attempts of reconciliation in order to prevent Lumumba’s return to the political stage. However, he only uses second-hand sources to support this claim, and does not compare this with UN primary sources.

In December, this personal conflict was escalated when Vice Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga declared a rival government (Stanleyville) following the arrest of Lumumba. Parliament was suspended following the crisis and only President Kasavubu as head of state could convene parliament. The UN tried to provide a situation in which parliament could be reconvened. These sections will study the UN diplomatic efforts following the constitutional crisis and the beginnings of the Léopoldville-Stanleyville frictions.

2.1.1 The political situation and reconciliation attempts following coups in September 1960

Initially, it is important to understand how Dag Hammarskjöld envisioned the UN’s role in Congo: namely to protect Congo from the intervention and interference of foreign major powers.
(most likely meaning the USSR\textsuperscript{106}), stating that “[t]he moment we let go, the downfall would be irreparably accelerated.”\textsuperscript{107} Hammarskjöld saw the UN’s purpose in Congo as a way to keep the conflict from escalating into a Korea-esque armed Cold War conflict.\textsuperscript{108} Yet instead of being seen by Congo’s leaders as a protector or ally against the major powers, Hammarskjöld had a difficult relationship with both Congo’s prime minister and the president. They both threatened to request, or actually requested, the withdrawal of the UN force, in August 1960 and March 1961 respectively.\textsuperscript{109} During peacekeeping missions the concept of host country consent is crucial regarding the stationing of troops inside a member state.\textsuperscript{110} Ove Bring has written that the principle of host country consent was one of the three central concepts developed by Hammarskjöld and Pearson during the Suez crisis and the first UN peacekeeping mission, UNEF.\textsuperscript{111} This meant that “UNEF could not stay or operate in Egypt unless Egypt continued its consent.”\textsuperscript{112} No academic research has until this point been done concerning how consent was handled in practice during the Congo crisis in response to the request for withdrawals, despite it being modeled on UNEF precedence.\textsuperscript{113} There are two reasons why this is important to understand Hammarskjöld’s mediation, first of which is that it can provide insights to the way Hammarskjöld acted diplomatically. His response to this diplomatic matter is interesting as the UN peacekeeping mission did not withdraw from Congo until 1964. Second is that a study of Hammarskjöld’s response to the request contextualizes his relationship with the relevant disputant party, which might later effect the mediation efforts. President Kasavubu’s request in March 1961 will be discussed later in section 2.2.

The first request came from Prime Minister Lumumba, in August 1960. Lumumba demanded that the UN withdraw from Congo since he disagreed with the UN policy vis-à-vis Katanga’s ‘secession’. Following this, previous research has established that their relationship was

\textsuperscript{106} Frielingsdorf, \textit{Machiavelli}, p. 148.
\textsuperscript{107} D.H to Dayal, 9/10-60, unnumbered, L 179: 156, DHC, NL.
\textsuperscript{108} See also the analysis where the risk of “coming of Russian troops here would likely provoke nuclear war” in Bunche to D.H. 18/7-60, 111, L 179 155, DHC, NL; “It remains, however, a fact that but for the presence and work of the United Nations in the Congo, your country might have become involved in a war which might have set off another world war” in an untitled and undated speech that was probably broadcasted in Congo in March 1961, p.2, L 179: 152, DHC, NL; D.H. to Cordier, 15/8-60, B-472, L 179: 155, DHC, NL.
\textsuperscript{109} O’Malley, “Ghana, India,” p. 976-978; Kasavubu to D.H., 14/3-61, L 179: 152, DHC, NL.
\textsuperscript{111} Bring, “Dag Hammarskjöld’s”, p. 164.
\textsuperscript{113} D.H. to Dayal, 22/10-60, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL; D.H. to Abbas, 27/3-61, 2068-2072, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; D.H. to Linnér, 22/5-61, 3031, L 179: 158.
strained.\textsuperscript{114} This should also be seen as Lumumba withdrawing his acceptance of Dag Hammarskjöld himself. In a confidential interoffice memorandum in late August 1960 drafted by Oscar Schachter, Hammarskjöld’s legal advisor,\textsuperscript{115} the conclusion stated that the question of consent on the part of Congo was not of key concern. Schachter’s argument was that once Congo had given its consent to ONUC in July 1960 with the request for UN assistance, Congo could not in ‘good faith’ request UN withdrawal.\textsuperscript{116} The concluding point of the memo stated that “[s]uch a determination that the threat has ceased, or that the measures should end, rests, in the first place, with the Secretary-General as the agent of the Council, and should his determination be questioned, with the Council itself.”\textsuperscript{117} With the phrase ‘in the first place’ Hammarskjöld got precedence over the Security Council regarding geopolitical policy interpretations. UN policy in Congo was in large part determined by Hammarskjöld himself\textsuperscript{118} and this document should be seen as a response to the Lumumba request for withdrawal. The importance of this for understanding Hammarskjöld’s diplomatic role in Congo is that he placed the needs of the UN above Congo’s political leaders. I would argue that this also meant that Hammarskjöld was compromised as a mediator during the autumn of 1960, as Lumumba did not perceive Hammarskjöld as independent or credible. He had lost the acceptance of Lumumba.

On numerous occasions Hammarskjöld referenced to the need to base ONUC on the precedent of UNEF.\textsuperscript{119} Yet this was a stark divergence from the UNEF principle of consent, basically denying the host country the right to withdraw consent. The legal argument surrounding host country consent was linked to the Security Council resolution 145 which connected the situation in Congo with the phrase ‘threat to international peace and security’.\textsuperscript{120} Hammarskjöld used this as the key argument for a continued ONUC presence never mind the attitude of the host

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{115} Fröhlich, \textit{Political Ethics}, p. 131; Freilingsdorf, \textit{Machiavelli}, p. 234.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Schachter to D.H. United Nations interoffice memorandum 30/8-60, p. 2-3, L 179: 154, DHC, NL.
\item \textsuperscript{117} Schachter to D.H. United Nations interoffice memorandum 30/8-60, p. 4, L 179: 154, DHC, NL.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Freilingsdorf, \textit{Machiavelli}, p. 146.
\item \textsuperscript{119} D.H. to Dayal, 22/10-60, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL; D.H. to Abbas, 27/3-61, 2068-2072, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; D.H. to Linnér, 22/5-61, 3031, L 179: 158.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Security Council resolution 145, RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 873RD MEETING ON 13 JULY 1960, S/4405 (22 July 1960), available from http://undocs.org/S/4405; Meeting with African countries' representatives in D.H.'s office 17/8-60, p. 9-10, L 179: 152, DHC, NL. There is also another aspect that is important to understand this diplomatic event. Freilingsdorf has argued that Hammarskjöld was actively involved in the phrasing of the Security Council resolutions, often using an Afro-Asian member to appear neutral. For said resolution, which Tunisia proposed, it is possible that it was Hammarskjöld himself who helped draft this argument into existence, Freilingsdorf, \textit{Machiavelli}, p. 146.
\end{itemize}
\end{flushright}
country, lest Congo would be opened up for military intervention (meaning USSR).\textsuperscript{121} However, historians Lise Namikas and Sergei Mazov have studied Soviet archives and have convincingly argued that a military intervention was never something that was present in USSR foreign policy in Congo.\textsuperscript{122} By connecting the situation in Congo to the global aspect, Hammarskjöld established clear norms of behaviour under a Cold War umbrella. Hammarskjöld used the threat of the Cold War as a way to prevent Prime Minister Lumumba’s request for withdrawal. Not only is this important to understand Dag Hammarskjöld’s diplomatic role in Congo, it can also provide an insight about the mediator role itself and its possibilities and restrictions.

During the autumn of 1960 attempts were made to get a round-table conference between the disputing parties, but it did not take place.\textsuperscript{123} Member nations of the Advisory Committee, such as Ghana, Guinea and the United Arab Republic [Egypt & Syria], attempted to reconcile President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba, but to no avail.\textsuperscript{124} Hammarskjöld called such reconciliation attempts “dangerous”.\textsuperscript{125} During these months there are few examples of Hammarskjöld actively encouraging conciliation, unlike in 1961 as will be presented. On October 17 1960 Hammarskjöld received a telegram from his representative Rajeshwar Dayal who had been asked, on Prime Minister Lumumba’s behalf, that the UN assist in solving the political crisis. Dayal reported that “[i]n view of common danger to all shades of politicians which Mobutu’s ambitions represent, I have suggested that he try to get the warring politicians together. He is trying to see Kasavubu and Mobutu tomorrow.”\textsuperscript{126} There is one telegram where Hammarskjöld urged his representative that “we should in discreet manner exercise moral pressure on political leaders to cooperate in getting full Parliament session together.”\textsuperscript{127} This was one of few times where he actively encourages his representatives to reconcile the parties during the autumn and winter of 1960.

However, Hammarskjöld also stated that the Congolese “[p]arliament should be kept in its proper place”\textsuperscript{128}. This was primarily in response to the immediate votes following the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{note1} D.H to Dayal, 7/3-61, 1619, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; D.H to Abbas, 20/3-61, 1922, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; Regarding USSR, Frielingsdorf, \textit{Machiavelli}, p. 148.
\bibitem{note3} UNAC 5, p. 26; UNAC 11, p. 12/15.
\bibitem{note4} Frielingsdorf, \textit{Machiavelli}, p. 189.
\bibitem{note5} UNAC 5, p. 86.
\bibitem{note6} Dayal to D.H. 17/10-60, B-1266, L 179: 156, DHC, NL.
\bibitem{note7} D.H. to Dayal, 2/10-60, p.2, unnumbered, L 179: 156, DHC, NL.
\bibitem{note8} UNAC 5, p. 86.
\end{thebibliography}
constitutional crisis, where parliament nullified Kasavubu’s and Lumumba’s dismissals of each other. In the source material, there are several times where Hammarskjöld noted the fact that the pro-Lumumba vote was not legitimate, as insufficient parliamentarians were present for a quorum to be established.\textsuperscript{129} He does not use this line of reasoning to discredit the Kasavubu votes. For example, it should be noted that the senate vote on Kasavubu’s dismissal of government received two votes in favour, forty-one against, six abstention and twenty-nine absent.\textsuperscript{130} By only referencing one of the parliamentary votes, Hammarskjöld selectively used the parliamentary record to argue that it was not convened in a ‘proper’ way. This ties in to Hammarskjöld’s later statements regarding the legitimacy of President Kasavubu, as will be presented later. Following the constitutional crisis, Hammarskjöld argued that the UN’s role should be aloof and that they should attempt to create a situation where parliament could function properly (i.e. suggesting that it did not do so at that time). The role of the UN was to create law and order, stating that “[i]t is not for us to tell people to go there; it is not for us to take them there”.\textsuperscript{131} This statement and the policy suggested contrasts to the role of the UN at the parliamentary meeting in July 1961, as will be presented.

The primary issue for the reconciliation between the different political factions was that neither Kasavubu nor Lumumba trusted each other. There are no times in the source material where Hammarskjöld attempted to bridge this gap. He did not attempt to build trust or arranged travel to organise a face-to-face meeting with the disputants with a clear purpose of reconciliation. I would argue that given the strained relationship between Hammarskjöld and Prime Minister Lumumba in August 1960, that it also directly affected the mediation efforts of the Secretary-General following the constitutional crisis.\textsuperscript{132} Hammarskjöld did not actively attempt to reconcile Lumumba and Kasavubu. As such, the actions of Hammarskjöld during September and October 1960 were similar to Frielingsdorf who has argued that Hammarskjöld did little during the autumn, a “do nothing impartiality”.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{129} UNAC 5, p. 86; D.H. to Dayal, 2/10-60, p. 1-2, unnumbered, L 179: 156, DHC, NL. See also Dayal to D.H. 13/9-60, B-952, L 179: 155, DHC, NL; Dayal to D.H. 14/9-60, B-959, L 179: 155, DHC, NL.
\textsuperscript{130} Dayal to D.H. 8/9-60, p. 1, B-861, L 179: 155, DHC, NL.
\textsuperscript{131} UNAC 5, p. 87/90.
\textsuperscript{132} At the same time Lumumba might not have accepted Hammarskjöld as a mediator. Princen has noted how a mediator cannot be effective if they lack the acceptance of the disputants. Princen, Intermediaries, p. 10, 20, 60-63.
\textsuperscript{133} Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 195.
To add to this, there was only one meeting of the Advisory Committee during the month of September and that was on September 2 1960. Although a meeting had been scheduled for the following week it was cancelled, presumably due to the September 5 constitutional crisis.\footnote{134} Evidently Hammarskjöld either did not want, or at least did not actively seek, the advice of the committee.\footnote{135} The UN diplomatic policy was centred around Hammarskjöld and his representatives, especially immediately following September 5. The lack of meetings in September 1960 and the pooling of information centred around Hammarskjöld ensured that the Advisory Committee member nations had no way to effect UN diplomatic policy. I would argue that Hammarskjöld’s inactivity regarding conciliation efforts in September and October 1960 shows that his mediation following the constitutional crisis was practically non-existent.

During the General Assembly meeting in September 1960, the assembly passed resolution 1474 in which the Advisory Committee, as a subsidiary of the General Assembly, was mandated to send a Conciliation Commission to Congo, a UN sponsored commission with the objective of providing reconciliation efforts with the different factions.\footnote{136} In the first Advisory Committee meeting after the constitutional crisis, on October 1, Hammarskjöld referenced the General Assembly resolution and in his opening statement said that “I think that that is the only matter which requires active consideration.”\footnote{137} By literally setting the agenda to focus on the future, not the past, Hammarskjöld made the point that there would be no discussion regarding the constitutional crisis other than what should be done about it with a Conciliation Commission.

At first, this may appear to be the best way to reconcile the different factions. However, Frielingsdorf has stated that Hammarskjöld attempted to delay the departure of the commission, and using a second-hand US source has quoted Hammarskjöld as calling the commission “idiotic”.\footnote{138}

In the following two sections, Hammarskjöld’s words and actions regarding the Conciliation Commission will be analysed, starting with how the political conflict between Kasavubu and Lumumba entered the UN sphere directly.

\footnote{134} UNAC 4, p. 56-57.  
\footnote{135} However, it should also be noted that between September 17-19, the General Assembly met to discuss the Congo crisis and could be said to have served the role of committee by providing the views of the member states.  
\footnote{136} UNAC 5, p. 3-5; General Assembly Resolution 1474 (ES-IV), Question considered by the Security Council at its 906th meeting on 16 September 1960, (20 September 1960), available from http://undocs.org/A/Res/1474(ES-IV).  
\footnote{137} UNAC 5, p. 3-5  
\footnote{138} Frielingsdorf, *Machiavelli*, p. 196, 199.
2.1.2 The Credential Vote and its implications for reconciliation – November 1960

The conflict between Kasavubu and Lumumba was taken to the UN arena when both sent separate delegations to the General Assembly, the implication being that both claimed to be the legitimate political leader of Congo. The Assembly mandated a credential report regarding whose delegation would be seated, and Kasavubu won the vote in the General Assembly in November 1960. Kasavubu’s government did not get the same recognition by the Congolese parliament. In effect this meant that officially the UN recognized Kasavubu as the legitimate political leader, which Hammarskjöld himself later acknowledged. Historian Namikas has written that Hammarskjöld was ‘appalled’ by this and biographer Urquhart has argued that he disapproved of the US campaign, with Namikas citing UN representative Rajeshwar Dayal, and Urquhart without citing a specific source. Likewise, in his biography Roger Lipsey has implied that Hammarskjöld worked against the US anti-Lumumba sentiment in November, rather than working with them. On the other hand, Frielingsdorf has argued that Hammarskjöld instructed the US to influence as many nations as possible when the time came to voting for Kasavubu. He has also written that Hammarskjöld tried to delay the departure of the Conciliation Commission until after Kasavubu’s delegation had been seated. According to Frielingsdorf and US source material, Hammarskjöld was one of the architects of this scheme. Frielingsdorf has cited the meeting between Hammarskjöld and western UN ambassadors where Hammarskjöld immediately replied that it would be most useful if the Americans could “put some ‘fire’ into Kasavubu” so long as they did it “delicately” and not “visibly”, adding that they should “put nothing in his pocket” and “keep [their] skirts from showing.”

Hammarskjöld did not mention his contacts with the western UN ambassadors to the Advisory Committee, and previous research has generally not highlighted Hammarskjöld’s involvement.

140 UNAC 26, p. 31-32; UNAC 30, p. 32; Abbas to D.H. 26/4-61, A-1059, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
141 Namikas, Battleground, p. 117; Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 477.
142 Lipsey, Hammarskjöld, p. 454; No acknowledgement of Hammarskjöld’s involvement even though the American sources are readily available which mention Hammarskjöld, see especially Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli.
143 Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 195-199.
144 Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 195-199.
145 Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 196.
This is an example of how the historiography of Hammarskjöld is not up to date with the source materials available.

Although no UN source materials directly support Frielingsdorf’s argument, I concur with his thesis that Hammarskjöld did attempt to delay the departure. For example, during the Advisory Committee meetings regarding the Conciliation Commission, Hammarskjöld argued that they should not leave for Congo until the question of the delegation was decided, otherwise “we doom this Commission to failure”. In effect, with the vote the UN had declared Kasavubu the legitimate constitutional party in Congo, and this made the Conciliation Commission’s task of reconciling Kasavubu and Lumumba difficult, as noted by several members of the Advisory Committee.

Leading up to the vote, the Advisory Committee meetings took a long time in getting the Commission going, something that Hammarskjöld may have intended as this would leave room for Kasavubu to officially become recognized by the UN. With statements like “I do not believe it is going too far to say that this can easily be delayed a couple of days” and “I do not feel that we should take here and now a firm decision on the departure” Hammarskjöld managed to delay the departure until a credentials vote had been called. I would argue that by delaying the departure Hammarskjöld was trying to shape the Congolese political landscape. This contradicts Hammarskjöld’s position when he refuted accusations of ever interfering in domestic affairs. There is an interesting moment which appears to prove Frielingsdorf correct. When discussing the time plan for the Commission’s departure for Congo, Hammarskjöld suggested that they should wait until November 19, a Saturday, but a few days after this suggestion the president of the General Assembly called for a vote for Friday November 18 regarding the seating of the delegation. The Advisory Committee met after this announcement, and Hammarskjöld acted as if he did not know that the vote would be due. For example, the statement

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146 UNAC 11, p. 126, 197/200-201, 206-207 are all occasions in which Hammarskjöld proposed delaying.
147 UNAC 12, p. 32/35; UNAC 13, p. 31.
148 This is the argument of Frielingsdorf, who has written “[t]o the Americans Hammarskjöld noted laconically that he ‘doubted group could ever agree on anything’”. Frielingsdorf, *Machiavelli*, p. 196.
149 UNAC 11, 201.
150 UNAC 11, 201.
151 D.H. to Abbas, 22/3-61, 1981, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; D.H. to Abbas, 26/4-61, 2959 L 179: 158, DHC, NL; Linnér to D.H. 29/5-61, 1340-1341, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; D.H. to Linnér, 19/7-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL; D.H. to Linnér, 24/8-61, 5878; L 179: 160, DHC, NL.
152 UNAC 12, p. 2/5.
For those reasons I ask myself if this Committee is not facing a situation where it must, for the time being, adjourn with a decision to meet immediately after the end of the deliberations of the General Assembly, to take appropriate decisions concerning its responsibilities.\textsuperscript{153}

has entirely different connotations if Hammarskjöld himself had a part in getting a vote declared. Hammarskjöld then suggested that the commission should wait until after the vote as this would mean that “the line to be taken by this Committee may be quite different.”\textsuperscript{154} Several member states of the Committee urged that the vote not take place, and suggested trying to convince the president of the General Assembly to prevent such a meeting.\textsuperscript{155} Hammarskjöld replied that the Committee could not do it as a group, but that member states were free to voice any complaint they wished.\textsuperscript{156} India’s ambassador summarised why the credential vote was important by stating that the “the entire world knows” that the result of the vote would be the seating of Kasavubu’s delegation, and that once a delegation is seated it is very hard to get them to leave.\textsuperscript{157} Hammarskjöld did not reply to this, nor when Egypt stated that it was not a question of procedure, but a political matter.\textsuperscript{158} Not only were the member states aware of the political implications this vote would have, they knew the implications it would have on the work of the conciliation commission with Nigeria stating that this vote would in effect nullify the General Assembly resolution and the efforts of the Conciliation Commission, as well as noting how this decision has been pressured by “one of the big powers”.\textsuperscript{159}

What the meeting protocols and Frielingsdorf’s analysis of American source material show is that Hammarskjöld was not interested in reconciling President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba in November 1960. By delaying the departure of the Conciliation Commission and by getting Kasavubu’s delegation seated, Hammarskjöld successfully (at times even literally in regards to the Advisory Committee meetings) set an agenda where Kasavubu was legitimized as the recognized leader of Congo. However, this was not uncontested as Antoine Gizenga set up a government in Stanleyville in December 1960, with international support from pan-African

\textsuperscript{153} UNAC 12, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{154} UNAC 12, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{155} UNAC 12, p. 16/17-20, 27/30, 36.
\textsuperscript{156} UNAC 12, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{157} UNAC 12, p. 26-36. Probably referencing the situation with the Chinese delegation and the question of the People’s Republic of China or the Republic of China, with the Taiwanese based government being seated as the Chinese delegation until 1971.
\textsuperscript{158} UNAC 12, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{159} UNAC 12, p. 26, 57/60.
nations such as Ghana and Guinea as well as the USSR. Hammarskjöld later stated that the UN had to deal with Kasavubu since he had been acknowledged by the General Assembly and that “this has not been a question of liking or of [sic] choice, but a question of following what emerged from a UN decision.”\(^{160}\) This statement has very different connotations if Hammarskjöld manoeuvred the credentials vote without the awareness of the committee members. Hammarskjöld would later deny ever interfering in domestic affairs.\(^{161}\)

There is also the interesting friction between what Hammarskjöld said and what he did, where the way he presents himself and his views of the Commission in the Advisory Committee differs from other source materials. Historian Alanna O’Malley has argued that Hammarskjöld dependence on the Afro-Asian countries increased during the Congo crisis, but does not account the uneasy footing this relationship was built on.\(^{162}\) All information regarding ONUC was centred around the Secretariat, meaning that Hammarskjöld pooled information regarding UN diplomatic policy. The Advisory Committee did not have access to the telegrams between Hammarskjöld and his representatives, and Frielingsdorf’s study of Anglo-American source material show that Hammarskjöld compartmentalised vital information regarding UN policy in Congo. There were times when Hammarskjöld provided telegrams and other documents to the committee,\(^{163}\) but this was heavily curated and filtered through the Secretariat. Hammarskjöld could selectively decide what information the committee would be privy to.

### 2.1.3 The Conciliation Commission’s report – January - March 1961

Despite not getting parliamentary approval, Kasavubu declared himself the right to announce a government with Joseph Iléo as prime minister in February 1961.\(^{164}\) The Conciliation Commission’s work was getting concluded at the time of Lumumba’s death in January 1961.\(^{165}\) There was an initial summary of the conclusion of the commission at one of the Advisory Committee’s meetings in February 1961, which included support for “a reconvention of political leaders at a neutral place.”\(^{166}\) However, a reconvention between Congolese leaders

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\(^{160}\) UNAC 30, p. 32.


\(^{162}\) O’Malley, ”Ghana, India”, p. 970, 975, 978, 980-82.

\(^{163}\) See for example the entirety of L 179: 152, DHC, NL.

\(^{164}\) Kent, America, the UN, p. 47.

\(^{165}\) Lumumba’s death was announced to the world in February, but he died the 17th of January 1961.

\(^{166}\) Chairman of the Conciliation Commission in the Congo to D.H., 17/2-61, L 179: 152, DHC, NL.
without UN oversight and influence was not something that Hammarskjöld was interested in, as will be evident later.

Besides an appeal for the reopening of parliament there was in the summery a controversial and much debated point that essentially endorsed the provisional government of Prime Minister Iléo. The member states that had supported a pro-Lumumba stance, such as Ghana and Guinea, reacted against this statement. They quoted from the Congolese constitution which stated that only parliament can approve of a government – not the president. A few days later there was another telegram from the Conciliation Commission clarifying that the point had been misinterpreted and that it did not at all mean recognition of the Iléo government. Despite not attempting to reconcile President Kasavubu and Patrice Lumumba, Hammarskjöld called it a “victory for realism” that Lumumba would be unavoidable in a government just prior to the announcement of his death. It was likely easier to state that Lumumba was necessary in any government after he was imprisoned.

On February 6 1961 Hammarskjöld received an outline of the Commissions’ report from Dragon Protitch, the secretary of the Conciliation Commission and a member of Hammarskjöld’s team. Hammarskjöld did not share this information with the Advisory Committee or even mentioned his prior knowledge of the report. This telegram, marked confidential, began by stating that

I am sending you this copy by letter, for reasons of discretion, and would appreciate very much receiving by cable any useful comments and suggestion you may wish to make, as we are going to discuss this matter first with the rapporteur and then at the appropriate moment with the Commission itself.

When comparing the Protitch draft with the final report there is a significant difference: one of the conclusions of the initial report was removed. It suggested a change of executive personnel in Congo, with the footnote comment by Protitch that this is something that the rapporteur

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167 Message from the chairman of the UN Conciliation Commission in the Congo to D.H., 17/2-61, p. 3, L 179: 152, DHC, NL; Protitch to D.H., 25/2-61, L 179: 152, DHC, NL.
168 UNAC 21, p. 11-12, 16, 22-23.
169 Protitch to D.H., 18/2-61, D-459, L 179: 152, DHC, NL.
170 D.H. to Dayal, 4/2-61, 831, L 179: 157, DHC, NL.
171 A Yugoslav with the title of Under-Secretary for Political and Security Council Affairs (FRUS), Fröhlich, Political Ethics, p. 128.
172 Protitch to D.H. 6/2-61, unnumbered, L 179, 152, DHC, NL.
wants, “but we are trying to persuade him not to insist.”173 This comes at a time when the highest UN official in Congo, representative Rajeshwar Dayal, was being criticized by the Kasavubu camp for being pro-Lumumba.174 Hammarskjöld’s reply to the telegram is fascinating in that he managed to state that he would not get himself involved in the decision of the autonomous commission, while he maintained that the commission could not concern themselves with matters “which are exclusively within the domain of ONUC”175 – meaning that the commission should not concern itself with Dayal. Protitch replied that

Rapporteur had fully agreed to eliminate proposal 5 under D in conclusion of draft outline. On our part everything has been and will be done to keep these conclusions in strictest conformity with Commissions mandate.176

Neither of these documents were submitted to the Advisory Committee a week later nor in the final report was this ever stated.177 It appears that they were successful in changing some of the conclusions of the Commission. Despite the Conciliation Commission being an organ of the Advisory Committee, Hammarskjöld pooled information from Protitch that he did not share with the member nations.

This shows that Hammarskjöld used his influence to change aspects of the final draft, despite claiming that the report should be “without the slightest indication that there has been any consultation with the Secretary-General.”178 After the presentation of the final report to the Advisory Committee in March 1961, Hammarskjöld stated that “[f]or me, then, to come into the picture would, I think, be ultra vires and an interference with the work of the members of this Committee.”179 In a February telegram Hammarskjöld stated that “I am not at this moment giving any advice”180 to Protitch, suggesting that the fact of him giving advice was not a matter of if, but of when. A month earlier Hammarskjöld had thanked him for being a “watchdog of and for our conciliation boys.”181 This suggestion of Secretariat oversight of the Conciliation

173 Protitch to D.H., 6/2-61, p. 4, unnumbered, L 179: 152, DHC, NL.
175 D.H. to Dayal for Protitch, 11/2-61, 998, L 179: 157, DHC, NL.
176 Dayal to D.H. 13/2-61, D-372, L 179: 157, DHC, NL.
177 The Advisory Committee was not given insight in the day-to-day workings with access to the telegrams where UN policy was formulated to the people executing it in Congo.
178 D.H. to Dayal for Protitch, 11/2-61, 998, L 179: 157, DHC, NL.
179 UNAC 39, p. 12.
180 D.H. to Dayal, 5/2-61, 837, L 179: 157, DHC, NL.
181 D.H. to Protitch, 24/1-61, unnumbered, L 179: 152, DHC, NL.
Commission, a commission that got its mandate from the Advisory Committee which in turn answered to the General Assembly, shows that the Conciliation Commission was not an entirely independent body. What Hammarskjöld said to the member states and what he did were different, despite O’Malley’s research that shows that Hammarskjöld depended on the Afro-Asian nations during this period. This indicates that Hammarskjöld presented himself as neutral to the member states, while my analysis of the telegrams shows a more active policy making and participation.

2.1.4 Conclusion

Hammarskjöld had shown a clear preference towards President Kasavubu vis-à-vis Patrice Lumumba. After the constitutional crisis in September 1960, Hammarskjöld did not use his position to attempt to reconcile the two disputant parties. Hammarskjöld’s policy was that the UN should remain neutral and passive while simultaneously he supported Kasavubu by getting his delegation seated. Even when the Conciliation Commission was in Congo, Hammarskjöld’s actions interfered in the final report. Using Princen’s concept of setting an agenda, I would argue that this way of influencing the Conciliation Commission should be seen as Hammarskjöld using his position to shift the focus towards future UN policy in line with Hammarskjöld’s own policy. This would suggest that Hammarskjöld fulfilled the role of a principal mediator while at the same time performing limited mediating. As long as Lumumba would be prime minister, he would pose a threat to the UN operation after having withdrawn his acceptance of Hammarskjöld. It was only after he had been imprisoned that Hammarskjöld’s attitude towards the prime minister warmed, and following his death that Hammarskjöld’s mediation became more prevalent, as will be presented in the following sections.

Hammarskjöld also pooled information within his own team of diplomats. He did not share all information with the member nations of the Advisory Committee, and he used this monopoly of information in order enact the policy he felt was most proper, as will be presented. There is also the aspect that Hammarskjöld’s hands-on approach would be to legitimize himself and his representatives as the third party, rather than the Conciliation Commission. As will be presented in the following sections, the period of March to August 1961 were characterised by Hammarskjöld and his representatives as the UN mediators. Neither the Conciliation

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Commission nor its report were to have a prominent effect on UN policy. I would argue that Hammarskjöld thus managed to set an agenda in which the Conciliation Commission’s influence was limited and Hammarskjöld’s own representatives became the exclusive UN mediators. Having called the commission “idiotic”, Hammarskjöld later sent a telegram marked top secret to his representative where he stated that “[i]t is not repeat not with satisfaction that I see Wachuku [the chairman of the Conciliation Commission] on the stage at this moment with too fresh memory of his role during the winter.” This was sent during the summer of 1961 and at this time the Advisory Committee had been completely excluded in regards to diplomatic UN policy, as will be presented.

One of the preliminary conclusions of the Commission’s report was that they wanted a “summit meeting of political leaders at a neutral place”. Less than one month after the Advisory Committee met to discuss the preliminary conclusions of the Commission, such a summit meeting did take place at Tananarive in the Malagasy Republic. Yet, as will be presented, this was not welcomed as a step towards reconciliation, instead the UN denounced the resolution stemming from the meeting, with Hammarskjöld declaring it constitutionally without “official standing”. How did this come about, and why did the UN not support such a “summit meeting of political leaders at a neutral place”?

2.2 Intra-state conferences and solutions and the role of the UN: March – April 1961

Following the Security Council resolution in February 1961, ”[r]elations between the United Nations and the Léopoldville government had gone from bad to worse”. The Security Council resolution gave the UN the mandate the use of force to prevent civil war. As a response, President Kasavubu met with the leader of the secessionist state of Katanga, Moïse Tshombe, between March 8 and March 12 1961 at Tananarive “to negotiate an alliance against the twin enemies of ‘communist tyranny and United Nations tutelage’.” Despite Hammarskjöld’s

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183 Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 196, 199.
184 D.H. to Linnér, 18/6-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
185 Message from the chairman of the UN Conciliation Commission in the Congo to D.H., 17/2-61, p. 3, L 179: 152, DHC, NL.
186 Antananarivo, current day Madagascar.
187 UNAC 35, p. 4; See also D.H. to Abbas, 21/3-61, 1928-29, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
190 Namikas, Battleground, p. 144.
active involvement in getting Kasavubu’s delegation seated at the General Assembly, their relationship had deteriorated to a critical point. Kent has written that the Tananarive conference resulted in an agreement between Tshombe and Kasavubu that Congo would be a federal state, and that following the conference Kasavubu tried to back out of the agreement, leading instead to a reconciliation effort with the Stanleyville faction with a pro-UN attitude from Kasavubu. However, this narrative has been disconnected from the UN diplomatic efforts during the spring of 1961.

2.2.1 Hammarskjöld attempts to discourage an intrastate solution excluding the UN – Tananarive Conference

The overarching goal for a mediator is to facilitate an end to the conflict. And yet what is interesting about the Tananarive conference was that Hammarskjöld was actively working against the solution proposed by the conference. He argued that the result of the conference was not legitimate as it was not a constitutional body sanctioned by parliament, and that only the latter could legitimize a new government of Congo. Instead, Hammarskjöld talked about ‘de facto’ authorities, but that Kasavubu was the only constitutionally legitimate political leader. Something that he had been a part of ensuring. The preliminary conclusion from the Conciliation Commission in February 1961 were open to a federal solution, although this was apparently not something that Hammarskjöld saw as a good agreement and subsequently attempted to influence Kasavubu away from a reconciliation with Katanga. Interestingly, Kent has claimed that Hammarskjöld supported a federal solution during the spring of 1961. However, as will be presented, Hammarskjöld used his position to try to prevent Kasavubu’s reconciliation with Katanga following Tananarive conference. The primary analytical concept used here is that of exit, how Hammarskjöld negotiated with President Kasavubu regarding the existence of the UN mission while at the same time attempting to influence the political solution proposed at Tananarive in a way that raises questions about his role as a mediator.

191 Kent, America, the UN, p. 50; Namikas, Battleground, p. 143-146.
192 Bercovitch, Theory and Practice, p. 5.
193 UNAC 35, p. 4; Hammarskjöld was supported by some Afro-Asian countries in this regard, such as India and Ghana.
194 See for example UNAC 27, p. 32; UNAC 30, p. 32; UNAC 35, p. 6; Abbas to D.H. 26/4-61, A-1059, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
195 Kent, America, the UN, p. 44.
Following the Tananarive conference Kasavubu telegraphed Hammarskjöld and threatened to request a UN withdrawal. In a draft note regarding a response to the president on March 24 1961, Hammarskjöld wrote that if it is the

intention of the president to bring about the termination that position should be brought directly to the attention of the Security Council and the General Assembly through the appropriate channels.

This at first appears remarkably different from his approach to Prime Minister Lumumba, where he categorically rejected Lumumba’s demand for a different mandate or withdrawal with the Schachter memorandum. Three days later, Hammarskjöld telegraphed a draft of an agreement to Kasavubu and stated that

Those provisions relating generally to the United Nations or officials serving under the United Nations in the Congo shall remain in effect until this agreement has been superseded or until such earlier date as shall be determined by a common accord between parties.

This ‘common accord’ is different from the requirement of the host country’s consent as it places equal weight on the UN’s position and prevents any unilateral withdrawal of consent. Similarly to the Lumumba request, regarding the role of the Security Council, Hammarskjöld here wrote that

the interpretation given in para two can be part of an agreement only if formally approved by Secco [the Security Council] and raises the question of the ‘central government’ in a way which (in spite of reference to President) certainly at present would exclude such approval.

Only if the Security Council agreed to the withdrawal request would Hammarskjöld acquiesce. Here Hammarskjöld was aware that the deadlock in the Security Council (given the fact that the USSR and the US and their respective allies respectively supported Stanleyville and Léopoldville) would have prevented Kasavubu’s request for withdrawal. What followed were two weeks of negotiations between President Kasavubu (and his Léopoldville faction) with UN diplomats Francis Nwokedi and Robert Gardiner about the relationship between Congo and the

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196 Kasavubu to D.H., 14/3-61, L 179: 152, DHC, NL.
197 Draft note verbale, 24/3-61, p. 4, L 179: 152, DHC, NL.
198 DRAFT TO BE CONSIDERED AS BASIS OF DISCUSSION OF MEMORANDUM EMBODYING AGREEMENT ON STATUS OF UNITED NATIONS IN THE CONGO, 27/3-61, p. 13, L 179: 154, DHC, NL.
199 D.H. to Abbas, 13/4-61, unnumbered, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
These negotiations led to the signature of an agreement between Hammarskjöld and Kasavubu on April 17, 1961, which, although short of the standard Status of Force agreement, was explicitly interpreted as Kasavubu not wanting the UN operation to leave.\footnote{See for example Abbas to D.H, 10/4-61, A-930, L 179: 157, DHC, NL; Abbas to D.H, 12/4-61, A-947-49, L 179: 157, DHC, NL; Abbas to D.H, 13/4-61, A-962, L 179: 157, DHC, NL; Abbas to D.H, 13/4-61, A-965, L 179: 157, DHC, NL.} Hammarskjöld provided an argument why Kasavubu would want to sign the agreement that “through status agreement Kasavubu would, in relation to us, manifest himself as chief of state for whole of the Republic and as on terms of constructive cooperation with UN.”\footnote{ACCORD DE PRINCIPE entre le President de la République du Congo et le Secrétaire Géneral des Nationes Unies, L 179: 154, DHC, NL; D.H. to Kasavubu, 5/5-61, L 179: 152, DHC, NL as compared to the proposed agreement DRAFT TO BE CONSIDERED AS BASIS OF DISCUSSION OF MEMORANDUM EMBODYING AGREEMENT ON STATUS OF UNITED NATIONS IN THE CONGO, 27/3-61, L 179: 152, DHC, NL; For interpretation of intent, see draft note verbale, 24/3-61, p. 5-6, L 179: 152, DHC, NL.} In return for signing the agreement, the UN made some key concessions to Kasavubu, including respite on foreign advisors despite the Security Council resolutions that they should exit Congo,\footnote{UNAC 44, p. 2-3; Even those nations critical of the agreement agreed that they could not retract it, UNAC 44, p. 16-17, 19/20, 27, 63/64.} and in general promoting “reconciliation with him [Kasavubu] as key figure and unifying element.”\footnote{D.H. to Abbas, 8/4-61, p. 2, 2403, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.} By arguing that the agreement signed between Hammarskjöld and Kasavubu were representative of both of their constituencies, Hammarskjöld made the legal and political point that the UN recognized only Kasavubu as the constitutionally legitimate leader. Throwing his weight behind the president, Hammarskjöld took a unilateral stand regarding whom the UN supported during a time of constitutional ambiguity. Undoubtedly this effected the UN as a mediator when the time came for parliament to be reconvened in July 1961, as well as influenced President Kasavubu’s attitude whether the Tananarive solution was preferable. And yet Hammarskjöld had no difficulty making statements like UN “must avoid political appraisals and involvements”\footnote{D.H. to Abbas, 22/3-61, 1981, L 179: 152, DHC, NL; See also D.H. to Abbas 26/4-61, 2959 L 179, 158, DHC, NL.} and “[w]e cannot compromise our indispensable position of non-interference in internal political affairs.”\footnote{D.H. to Abbas, 16/4-61, 2524-2525, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.} He also signed the agreement before the Advisory Committee had gotten the opportunity to study the final agreement, and successfully argued that they could not go back on the agreement once it had been signed.\footnote{D.H. to Abbas, 16/4-61, 2524-2525, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.} I would argue that by presenting himself as a neutral figure without an agenda, Hammarskjöld managed to manipulate the members of the Advisory Committee into endorsing his policy at the same time as he
disregarded their feedback. O’Malley has argued that Hammarskjöld came to depend on the Afro-Asian bloc in 1961. However, I would on the contrary state that the relationship between Hammarskjöld and the Afro-Asian bloc was uneasy since Hammarskjöld attempted to circumvent them in order to pursue his own agenda.

One day prior to the signature of the agreement, Hammarskjöld telegrammed his representatives telling them about using western diplomats, i.e. American and British, in order to pressure Kasavubu

about our absolute seriousness and sincerity when working towards speediest possible reconciliation with him as key figure and unifying element. It should thus be impressed on him that in this respect he has his best support in UN.

Frielingsdorf has noted how the newly inaugurated John F. Kennedy administration worked through the UN to promote its African foreign policy. American and British diplomats and ambassadors were active in Congo. Through Hammarskjöld’s representative, the UK and US ambassadors in Congo were urged to use “any diplomatic pressure” on Kasavubu in order to dissuade him of his anti-UN attitude. Frielingsdorf has written that US foreign policy as regards to Congo was to promote a moderate, pro-western government through the UN. As such, their interests coincided in trying to promote moderation in Kasavubu.

In the Advisory Committee meetings Hammarskjöld had argued that that a meeting between leaders was not a constitutional and legal body. By insisting on the need for parliament Hammarskjöld ensured that the UN would be involved in any intrastate solution. Since no disputant faction trusted the others to provide security, they looked to the UN as being impartial during parliament. As will be presented, the UN was active in promoting their desired outcome

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208 UNAC 38, 16; UNAC 54, p. 13, 16, 22, 33, 54/55, 66. It should however also be noted that Hammarskjöld listened to their feedback at times, but often times only regarding details of a letter, not whether the letter should be sent or that policy be formulated. See for example, UNAC 27, p. 31, 34/35, UNAC 36, p. 52-66 and UNAC 48, p. 3/5. I would argue that this is more a case of Hammarskjöld paying lip service to the members, rather than listening to them and formulating policy from their advice.
210 D.H to Abbas, 16/4-61, 2524-2525, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
211 Frielingsdorf, _Machiavelli_, p. 204-206, 225-226.
212 Frielingsdorf, _Machiavelli_, p. 171, 190, 196-197, 225-226; Kent, _America, the UN_, p. 34, 50, 54.
213 Abbas to D.H. 9/4-61, A-922, L 179: 157, DHC, NL.
214 Frielingsdorf, _Machiavelli_, p. 204-209, 225-228.
215 UNAC 35, p. 4.
when parliament did convene in July 1961. The insistence of parliament was popular among the Afro-Asian bloc whom Hammarskjöld relied on following the February 21 resolution, which itself pressed the need for parliamentary reconvention.\(^{216}\) By referencing parliament as an argument against the Tananarive solution, Hammarskjöld adopted a paradoxical attitude towards the Congolese parliament. In autumn of 1960, parliament was inconvenient yet the April 17 agreement was signed without parliamentary approval on a man-to-man basis that still applied to the entirety of these men’s jurisdictions: Congo and the UN.\(^{217}\) Additionally, Hammarskjöld saw no trouble with recognising the legality of Kasavubu after his delegation was seated, despite not getting the parliamentary support that would make such a position uncontroversial.\(^{218}\) Another aspect of this paradox may be that Hammarskjöld felt that any agreement had to be facilitated via UN auspices in order to be legitimate. With his strong belief in the need for the UN to be the organisation through which decolonisation should occur, Hammarskjöld felt that Congo represented an opportunity for the new organisation to put this policy to the test.\(^{219}\)

This meant that Hammarskjöld felt himself to be in a position in which he could ignore traditional concepts of sovereignty and host country consent in order to attempt to fulfil his own vision of the UN mission in Congo. Ove Bring has noted that Hammarskjöld often allowed principles preference over strict legality,\(^ {220}\) with the famous quote “[y]ou try to save a drowning man without prior authorization.”\(^ {221}\) This idealized picture of a selfless servant of peace can be challenged. Hammarskjöld’s statements and actions following the Tananarive conference demonstrate a clear preference for President Kasavubu over Katanga or Stanleyville. However, when Kasavubu threatened the ONUC operation, Hammarskjöld reacted. In the following section this point will be further developed due to its importance to this thesis.


\(^ {217}\) In a May 6 draft aide memoire to the Belgian Government, they noted that the April 17 agreement was “concluded between the President of the Republic of the Congo and the Secretary-General of the United Nations”, L 179: 158 DHC, NL; D.H. to Abbas, 2/5-61, 3112, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; D.H to Linnér, 14/6-61, p. 3, 4273-4274, L 179: 159, DHC, NL.

\(^ {218}\) UNAC 26, p. 31-32; UNAC 30, p. 32; Abbas to D.H. 26/4-61, A-1059, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 198.

\(^ {219}\) Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 131, 158-159; Melber, "Dag Hammarskjöld", p. 255.

\(^ {220}\) Bring, "Dag Hammarskjöld’s”, p. 159, 162-168.

\(^ {221}\) Bring, "Dag Hammarskjöld’s”, p. 170.
2.2.2 Hammarskjöld’s threat and the financial aspects of ONUC

The most effective way in which Hammarskjöld opposed the Tananarive conference was by way of threat and coercion. Following the conference, President Kasavubu telegrammed Hammarskjöld that “[a]s you may notice, union among various regions of ex-Belgian Congo has been res-established and danger of generalized civil war is thus averted. Conference therefore requests that Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961 be revoked.”

As a response, Hammarskjöld effectively threatened President Kasavubu. What Kasavubu had objected against was the military aspects of the ONUC operation, i.e. the peacekeeping troops. He did not want the UN technical (administrative) and financial assistance to disappear. Hammarskjöld replied that those aspects could not exist without the protection of UN troops, that they were interrelated. If Kasavubu proceeded with requesting UN withdrawal, Hammarskjöld stated that he would withdraw all UN personnel. All financial and technical assistance would disappear. According to Hammarskjöld, it was only the UN troops that prevented the situation in Congo developing into a full scale war, as evidenced by a radio broadcast to the Congolese people a few days later. Hammarskjöld stated that ”[i]t remains, however, a fact that but for the presence and work of the UN in the Congo, your country might have become involved in a war which might have set off another world war.” The timing of this broadcast was surely no coincidence considering Kasavubu’s request.

On March 20 1961, Hammarskjöld asked his representatives in Congo to provide arguments “on which scaling down of civilian operation presents reasonable and effective counter-argument to efforts to torpedo ONUC”. Interestingly, their response was critical of the implied threat, including that it would only prove those critical of the UN correct. Hammarskjöld did not take heed of this criticism, and he presented his suggested response to the Advisory Committee on March 24 with the threat still present. The committee members also recognized the threat and criticised Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjöld acquiesced and said that he would send an oral instruction to his representative who would leave a memo to the

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222 Kasavubu to D.H., 14/3-61, L 179: 152, DHC, NL.
223 Draft note verbale, 24/3-61, p. 4, L 179: 152, DHC, NL.
224 An untitled and undated speech that was probably broadcasted in Congo in March 1961, p.2, L 179: 152, DHC, NL.
225 D.H to Abbas & Linnér, 20/3-61, 1921, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
226 Abbas & Linnér to D.H. 21/3-61, A-757, L 179: 157, DHC, NL.
This might give the impression that he listened to the member states and avoided the threatening implications, but in the telegram sent to his representative he still used the same argument.

Orally, you should make it clear that our civilian experts are not likely to stay without continued presence of ONUC, and that therefore realistically the question of military assistance cannot be raised without also question of civilian assistance coming up for debate.

Perhaps rather surprisingly, Hammarskjöld showed this telegram to the Advisory Committee a day before it was sent, but it did not get changed from its draft state. He justified the continued presence of the threat in that it was drafted in a vague matter, “to avoid any impression of, shall we say, blackmail”. On April 10 1961, Hammarskjöld instructed his representative that were Kasavubu and his team to reject the negotiations regarding the Status of Force agreement, his representative should inform them that the matter should be brought to the Security Council. “You need not introduce last point as an open threat or in an ultimative way, but they should not be led to believe that they can set the tune.” Some members of the Advisory Committee were critical of Hammarskjöld referencing the Security Council’s precedence over Congo’s sovereign rights. Ghana was critical of the “right of the Security Council to oppose a decision which may be made by the authorities in the Congo that there should be a withdrawal of United Nations troops.”

Although there are no documents that show how President Kasavubu responded to the threat, his insistence of UN withdrawal stopped. I would argue that this was in large part due to the threat, and that this, as will be presented, also effected the Congolese reconciliation situation – prior to the threat Kasavubu had attempted to reconcile with the Katangese faction whereas following the threat Kasavubu attempted to reconcile with the Stanleyville faction under Antoine Gizenga. Kasavubu’s relationship also improved with Hammarskjöld and the UN over the following months and I would argue that Kasavubu’s anti-UN attitude surrounding the

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228 UNAC 40, p. 68.
229 D.H to Abbas, 27/3-61, 2068-2072, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; This threat is also present in the following telegrams; D.H. to Abbas, 20/3-61, 1924 L 179: 158, DHC, NL; D.H. to Abbas, 21/3-61, 1928-1929 L 179: 158, DHC, NL; D.H. to Abbas, 9/5-61, 3315 L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
230 D.H to Abbas, 1/4-61, 2444, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
231 UNAC 41, p. 6.
232 UNAC 40, p. 144-145.
233 Kent, America, the UN, p. 50, 52-54; Kalb, The Congo cables, p. 236, 242, 262; Namikas, Battleground, p. 144-145.
Security Council resolution in February and the Tananarive conference in March was the cause of Hammarskjöld’s threat. Previous research has highlighted Kasavubu’s volte-face from being anti-UN to pro-UN, and from favouring a reconciliation with Stanleyville rather than Katanga, as being only in his self-interests, but the potential impact of the UN has not been discussed. UN diplomats Nwokedi and Gardiner wrote that “[t]heir [Léopoldville] willingness to break with Tshombe [Katanga], apart from their own calculated interests, presage an attempt to trust and co-operate with the UN.” By way of threats, Hammarskjöld’s instructions influenced the intermediary relationship between the disputant parties and the UN, and allowed him to play a more active mediation role during the coming months.

To properly contextualise the threat there is the matter of Congo’s financial situation. The colonial economic structure left Congo vulnerable following independence in the summer of 1960. With a monthly deficit of 600-800 million francs the UN stepped in with technical and financial assistance. In June 1961 the UN announced an 18 million dollar aid program to Congo, 10 million of which was provided by the US. This aid program was signed between Hammarskjöld’s representative and President Kasavubu (thereby also legitimizing him and his faction as being the rightful government) and that it should have “no express reference to requirement of parliamentary ratification”. The Congolese parliament was in this telegram reduced to a bystander status. Much like in the autumn of 1960, parliament could serve as a useful rhetorical device to block things that went against Hammarskjöld’s interests, but he would not let it get in the way of what he perceived as necessary in the interests of Congo. Hammarskjöld successfully established norms of behaviour regarding parliament where he would use it as an argument when it suited him, while bypassing parliament when they could interfere with Hammarskjöld’s diplomatic policy.

234 Kent, America, the UN, p. 50, 52, 54; Kalb, The Congo cables, p. 236, 242, 262; Namikas, Battleground, p. 144-145.
235 Abbas to D.H. 15/4-61, A-980-981, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
236 For the economic situation in Congo prior to independence, see Nzongola Ntalaja, The Congo p. 77; Jean-Claude Williame, Patrimonialism and political change in the Congo (California: Stanford University Press, 1972).
237 UNAC 37, p. 12.
238 Regarding UN technical assistance, see L 179: 145, DHC, NL; Security Council resolution 143, RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 873RD MEETING ON 13 JULY 1960, S/4387 (13/14 July 1960), available from http://undocs.org/S/4387; Frielingsdorf has argued that financial aid to Congo was channelled exclusively through the UN, Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 131-135, 146-147, 153-154.
239 1$ in 1961 was worth around 8$ in 2017.
240 United Nations Economic and financial assistance to the Congo (Léopoldville), 8/6-61, L 179: 136, DHC, NL; List of Pledges to the UN fund for the Congo, L 179: 136, DHC, NL.
241 D.H. to Linnér, 14/6-61, p.3, 4273-4274, L 179: 159, DHC, NL.
242 D.H. to Kasavubu, 10/3-61, L 179: 135, DHC, NL; UNAC 1, p. 58; UNAC 5, p. 2; UNAC 11, p. 126; UNAC 27, p. 22.
It is not unusual for a mediator to provide agreements of this nature to reach a solution, such as when Henry Kissinger provided Israel with a financial incentive when mediating between them and Syria in 1974. However, Princen has argued that bargaining is unusual for a neutral mediator, as they are not in a position to enforce their will. This shows that Hammarskjöld’s fulfilled the role of a principal mediator. However, even a principal mediator most often procures bargains between the disputant parties rather than between the mediator and a disputant. Most mediators do not have the capacity to bargain, but Hammarskjöld’s position allowed him the discretion to do so. As such, Hammarskjöld’s intermediary role was not simply just a principal mediator, here Hammarskjöld acted more as a direct disputant.

By providing a massive influx of money, Hammarskjöld could probably use this as a pressure point to coerce Kasavubu. As there are no records of the verbatim negotiations between Hammarskjöld’s representatives in Congo and Kasavubu, it is difficult to ascertain the political aspects of the aid program. However, coupled with the threat of withdrawing the UN’s civilian program in March and April 1961, I would argue that the aid program may have been a concession to Kasavubu. As Kasavubu and his government was in daily contact with UN diplomats Nwokedi and Gardiner all through that spring and into the summer, it is likely that their continued “informal ‘chats’” were influential. With Western support, Hammarskjöld had managed to appease Kasavubu’s critical stance against the UN, meaning that the threat and the financial deal had the effect of changing the president’s relationship with the UN - he now accepted Hammarskjöld and the UN as intermediary mediators (as well as accepting the peacekeeping mission ONUC).

Interestingly, the threat to withdraw financial assistance to Congo appeared once before, nearly four months before Hammarskjöld threatened Kasavubu in March 1961. Following the credentials vote in November 1960, Hammarskjöld sent a telegram to his representative urging him to create a working relationship with Kasavubu. Hammarskjöld urged his representative Dayal to talk with Kasavubu and persuade the president to use the seating to convince nations

244 Princen, Intermediaries, p. 25.
245 D.H. to Abbas, 2/5-61, 3112, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
246 Dayal to D.H. 26/11-60, p. 3, B-1517, L 179: 156, DHC, NL.
of his sincerity and legitimacy, lest it become a “Pyrrhic victory” and “an empty manoeuver with foreign big power support.” Hammarskjöld then referenced letters from which Dayal should base his conversations with President Kasavubu. Interestingly, he wrote that Dayal should leave out entirely the possibility that we as kind of sanctions might stop assistance to the Congo. My reason against using this latter argument is that this would be an empty threat as I am not entitled on my own to stop such assistance and for international reasons would not recommend it even in case of continued bad relations.

Besides having already prepared an argument for stopping the financial aid to Congo and despite recognizing that he himself did not have the unilateral power to do so, Hammarskjöld had in November 1960 already analyzed the possibility to threaten to withdraw UN financial aid in order to maneuver Congolese political leaders in a way that was preferable to the UN mission. It was not until March 1961 that Hammarskjöld used this threat, but it was not a spur of the moment reaction towards Kasavubu’s request for the withdrawal of UN troops, although that was the cause of the threat. In March 1961, there were no qualms about whether Hammarskjöld was entitled to threaten to withdraw UN aid; he threatened to do so anyway. Princen has written that “[v]iewed as a threat, then, the intermediary faces the same problem any parent, oligopolist, or military strategist faces: how to make the threat credible.” Princen has argued that while an intermediary may threaten to leave the conflict, they rarely do so as it is often “incongruous with the intermediary's image of its role”. However, unlike most mediators who have “no authority over the disputants”, Hammarskjöld’s threat to exit the conflict would have consequences beyond the usual intermediary tactic, and as such needs to be seen in the context of being both a mediator and as a disputant. By threatening President Kasavubu, Hammarskjöld established norms of behaviour that connected the need for reconciliation and financial matters. Hammarskjöld stated that

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247 D.H. to Dayal, 28/11-60, 3798, L 179: 156, DHC, NL.
248 D.H. to Dayal, 28/11-60, 3798, L 179: 156, DHC, NL.
251 Princen, *Intermediaries*, p. 56.
The sooner the stamp of constitutionality in that way is put on a central government, we could get under way with various urgent steps for example in financial field and do so with unreserved cooperation with authorities.\footnote{252}

Hammarskjöld’s actions towards Kasavubu following the Tananarive conference enabled Hammarskjöld to play an active role as a mediator during parliament in July 1961. There, as will be presented, President Kasavubu actively listened to UN advice. However, while this pro-UN stance of Kasavubu may have ensured the acceptance of the UN during parliament, Hammarskjöld compromised the principle of being an impartial mediator. Looking at Princen’s figure of intermediary mediation (see Figure 1), I would argue that there is room for Hammarskjöld to be seen not only as a mediator, but also as a direct disputant. The relationship is interlinked, for example Hammarskjöld’s actions as a disputant (namely the threat and his attempt to change Kasavubu’s attitude towards the UN) directly influenced Hammarskjöld’s role as a mediator.

2.2.3 Hammarskjöld attempts to encourage an intrastate solution including the UN – Coquilhatville Conference

In April and May 1961, less than two months after the Tananarive conference, Congolese leaders met in Coquilhatville for a similar intra-state conference. This time it was Kasavubu and Gizenga, Lumumba’s successor, that were close to reconciling. Meanwhile, Tshombe was arrested by Kasavubu and Mobutu.\footnote{253} Coquilhatville and the consequent Léopoldville-Stanleyville alliance had the support of the UN, and UN representatives were present at Coquilhatville. Hammarskjöld was able to send telegrams to his representatives where he encouraged them to promote a reconciliatory policy towards Léopoldville and Stanleyville.\footnote{254} Unlike the Tananarive conference, the UN played a more active role and supported the conference.\footnote{255} By being more actively involved during the Coquilhatville conference than the Tananarive conference, I would argue that the UN endorsed a Léopoldville-Stanleyville

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item D.H to Abbas, 2/5-61, 3112, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
\item Kent, America, the UN, p. 53.
\item See following from L 179: 158, DHC, NL: D.H. to Abbas, 13/5-61, 3431; D.H. to Linnér, 24/5-61, 3694; D.H. to Linnér 27/5-61, 3785; D.H. to Linnér 29/5-61, 3811; Abbas to D.H. 13/5-61, A-1226; Linnér to D.H. 22/5-61, A-1284; Linnér to D.H. 29/5-61, A-1337.
\item In connection to the Tananarive conference Hammarskjöld and his representative discussed the possibility of gaining access to the conference. As neither Kasavubu nor Tshombe was particularly trustful of the UN at the time, they were unlikely to accept UN’s presence. Dayal to D.H 1/3-61, D-574, L 179: 157, DHC, NL; D.H. to Dayal, 1/3-61, 1441, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
\end{itemize}}
reconciliation instead of a Léopoldville-Katanga reconciliation. The result of the conference was that a move towards reconvening parliament was closer than ever, and the relationship between Kasavubu and the UN was solidified with the negotiations regarding UN financial aid taking place parallelly, as well as the newly signed status agreement.

Regarding the UN’s role during Coquilhatville, it was primarily arranging travel. Princen has written that arranging travel is part of the mediator’s role.²⁵⁶ By bringing disputing parties together and encouraging face-to-face meetings it is clear that Hammarskjöld acted as a mediator, trying to promote a situation where a solution to the conflict could be found. It was primarily for the Stanleyville faction that the UN provided their support in this regard.²⁵⁷ The UN representatives were however also aware of the problems that this could entail, such as when six military officers from Stanleyville asked to travel to Coquilhatville which was denied as travel was exclusively provided for politicians.²⁵⁸ Hammarskjöld and his representatives nudged and attempted to effect these meetings but this should not necessarily be understood as “gamesmanship”, as Frielingsdorf has argued of Hammarskjöld’s role during the Congo crisis.²⁵⁹ Rather I would argue that it should be seen as a way in which Hammarskjöld attempted to promote an intra-state solution that was compatible with his analysis of a preferable solution. Unlike during the Tananarive conference, during the Coquilhatville conference the UN acted more akin to the classic mediator type as envisioned by Princen.

In conclusion, Hammarskjöld’s approach to intra-state conferences and solutions seem to have been subjugated to the impact they would have on the UN. The Tananarive conference’s anti-UN message was described by Hammarskjöld as “suicidal” and would lead to “chaos develops in the country”²⁶⁰, while the Coquilhatville conference was described in if not positive, then at least not negative terms where Hammarskjöld stated that the UN “will always stand ready to render assistance and protection to participants” to such conferences.²⁶¹ With the Tananarive conference’s hostile reaction to the Security Council resolution, Hammarskjöld successfully

²⁵⁶ Princen, Intermediaries, p. 40.
²⁵⁷ D.H. to Linnér, 12/6-61, 4170, L 179: 159, DHC, NL; D.H. to Linnér. 21/6-61, 4412, L 179: 159, DHC, NL; UNAC 50, p. 17; UNAC 52, p. 3/5; UNAC 53, p. 6.
²⁵⁸ Abbas to D.H. 26/4-61, A-1057, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
²⁶⁰ D.H. to Abbas, 23/3-61, 1986, L 179: 158, DHC, NL. Probably referencing the possibility of a major power intervention, see also D.H to Dayal, 9/10-60, unnumbered, L 179: 156, DHC, NL; D.H. to Kasavubu 12/3-61, L 179: 152, DHC, NL; D.H. to Dayal, 7/3-61, 1619, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; D.H. to Abbas, 20/3-61, 1922, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
²⁶¹ D.H. to Abbas, 3/5-61, 3159, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
attempted to dissuade President Kasavubu – his awareness of the impact on the peacekeeping operation would suggest that Hammarskjöld acted not only as a principal mediator, but also as a disputant. This enabled him to threaten the president to withdraw financial support that Congo needed and also to discourage Léopoldville reconciliation with Katanga and promote reconciliation with Stanleyville instead.

2.2.4 Conclusion

Bring has argued that Hammarskjöld placed importance of host country during peacekeeping missions, but the UN telegrams tell another story. Despite himself arguing for the need to base ONUC on the precedent of the UNEF operation, the policy that Hammarskjöld pursued regarding the question of UN withdrawal shows that the principle of host country consent was secondary to the goal of ONUC. The threat to withdraw financial and administrative aid to Congo proved effective, and allowed Hammarskjöld to maintain the UN operation.

In a telegram to his representative in March 1961 Hammarskjöld wrote that the withdrawal of UN troops would “create situation in which, through the actions of Leo [sic] politicians, the country will be laid wide open to big power military intervention.”262 This was also a way to justify the continued UN presence in Congo, and Hammarskjöld often used such dramatic language when he or the UN operation was criticized.263 By linking the Congo crisis to ‘international peace and security’ Hammarskjöld positioned the UN as a protector of Congo, but issues of host country consent was not pertinent for Hammarskjöld during the Congo crisis. This period was characterised by Hammarskjöld’s role changing to a disputant with threats, bilateral negotiations and bargaining, while then returning to the classic mediator role during the Colquihatville conference.

There is little evidence that Hammarskjöld used his influence to promote trust between the disputants (Stanleyville-Léopoldville) prior to April 1961. This may be because the relationship between Hammarskjöld and the disputants, most notably President Kasavubu, was not firmly established - that he lacked their acceptance. It may also be because he did not approve of the

262 D.H. to Abbas, 20/3-61, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; See also D.H. to Dayal, 7/3-61, 1619, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
263 Untitled and undated speech that was probably broadcasted in Congo in March 1961, p.2, L 179: 152, DHC, NL; D.H. to Cordier, 15/8-60, B-472, L 179: 155, DHC, NL; "Statement on UN operations in Congo before the General Assembly", 17/10-60, Cordier & Foote, Public Papers, p. 154
Tananarive solution, and, as a principal mediator, attempted to promote a specific solution that was preferable to him. Whether this was out of self-interest or if he thought the Léopoldville-Stanleyville reconciliation had the only hope of achieving political stability is difficult to ascertain, there is no direct piece of evidence to answer why. What is certain is that Hammarskjöld did not actively pursue reconciliation until a later date than previously assumed: his attitude towards the Conciliation Commission and his lack of diplomatic actions prior to the spring of 1961 is proof of this. For example, Hammarskjöld actively argued against parliament when its decisions did not suit him, and his relatively passive role between September 1960 and February 1961, as shown here and as argued by Frielingsdorf, with few if any attempts to promote trust between the disputant parties.

I would argue that the actions of Hammarskjöld should be seen as attempting to (re)establish the trust between the various disputant parties, as well as ensuring that there was wide acceptance of his own role as mediator. Kasavubu had been critical of Hammarskjöld’s foremost representative since September 1960, Rajeshwar Dayal, whom the president accused of working with a pro-Lumumba tendency. In January 1961 Kasavubu demanded that Dayal be withdrawn. 264 This can be seen as the moment when Hammarskjöld was no longer was acceptable as mediator. As such, I would argue that the actions of Hammarskjöld during and after the Tananarive conference should be seen not in terms of realpolitik or gamesmanship, as Frielingsdorf has argued, but rather as a continuous attempt to (re)establish the relationship with the head of state. With Congo’s dependency on foreign aid it is likely that President Kasavubu would have felt the need to placate Hammarskjöld lest he either threaten to cut Congo off, or try to make his threat a reality. If that meant accepting the UN as mediators during parliament, then that might have been a small price to pay.

2.3 The convening of parliament at Lovanium: June – August 1961

To be a focus of conciliation it is, of course, necessary that we enter into contact in a discreet way, a fruitful way, with all the parties concerned. We have devoted our attention here mainly to Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Gizenga. 265

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264 Cordier & Foote, Public Papers, p. 313-316; Dayal was officially withdrawn as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in May 1961.
265 UNAC 50, p. 56.
After Coquilhatville, the major obstacle for reconciliation was that parliament would be required for a new government to be formed. There was a consensus among the Advisory Committee on the need for parliament to meet, and for it to solve the constitutional uncertainty.\textsuperscript{266} The months of June and July of 1961 were the culmination of the gradual shift from a Léopoldville-Elizabethville alliance endorsed at Tananarive in March, to a Léopoldville-Stanleyville reconciliation culminating in the convening of parliament in late July 1961.\textsuperscript{267} Frielingsdorf has argued that Hammarskjöld was “actively working behind the scenes to achieve the desired political outcomes that the UN wanted”.\textsuperscript{268} In this section the UN mediation efforts leading up to, and during, parliament will be analysed.

2.3.1 The role of the UN prior to parliament

Hammarskjöld explicitly mentioned the need for quiet diplomacy prior to parliament in order to get the different parties together.\textsuperscript{269} The role of the UN should be a “focus of conciliation for the convening of Parliament”\textsuperscript{270}, comparing the role to that of a midwife.\textsuperscript{271} Frielingsdorf has argued that the UN took an interventionist role during these months, with the ambition of electing a moderate, pro-western government.\textsuperscript{272} However, I would argue that the sources used for this argument are not dealt with critically enough.\textsuperscript{273} On May 27 1961 Hammarskjöld said that “[i]t is for the Congolese to decide what they want.”\textsuperscript{274} However, as has been previously established, what Hammarskjöld said was not always what Hammarskjöld did. Did the UN allow the Congolese to decide for themselves, or did they throw “all semblance of non-intervention to the winds”?\textsuperscript{275}

On behalf of Hammarskjöld, the diplomatic team of Linnér, Nwokedi, Gardiner and Mahmoud Khiari had held regular meetings with the Léopoldville leaders, such as President Kasavubu,

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{266} UNAC 43, p. 7, 11; UNAC 44, p. 19/20, 61; UNAC 46, p. 47, 53-54/55; UNAC 48, p. 18, 26; UNAC 50, p. 47.
  \item \textsuperscript{267} See for example D.H. to Linnér, 13/6-61, p. 2, 4204, L 179: 159, DHC, NL; UNAC 40, p. 23, D.H. to Abbas, 26/4-61, 2959, L 179: 158, DHC, NL, D.H. to Abbas, 2/5-61, 3112, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
  \item \textsuperscript{268} Frielingsdorf, \textit{Machiavelli}, p. 225.
  \item \textsuperscript{269} UNAC 50, p. 59/60.
  \item \textsuperscript{270} UNAC 50, p. 53/55.
  \item \textsuperscript{271} UNAC 50, p. 59/60.
  \item \textsuperscript{272} Frielingsdorf, \textit{Machiavelli}, p. 225-228.
  \item \textsuperscript{273} For example, it is often based on second-hand sources, such as UN diplomat O’Brien who was not in that part of Congo during parliament, as well as US sources.
  \item \textsuperscript{274} UNAC 50, p. 59/60.
  \item \textsuperscript{275} Connor Cruise O’Brien quoted in Frielingsdorf, \textit{Machiavelli}, p. 227.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Interior Minister Cyrille Adoula and Foreign Minister Justin Marie Bomboko. The UN diplomats gave them advice and met with them daily. These meetings seem to have enabled the politicians to accept the UN and to allowed the UN to oversee the ensuing parliamentary proceedings. After Coquilhatville, the beginning of June was characterised by ‘pre-meetings’ between three delegates from Stanleyville who talked with the Léopoldville leaders about parliament. The UN was present for most of these meetings.

By facilitating face-to-face meetings between the two disputant groups, Hammarskjöld played the role of a classic mediator, with his representatives stepping in at appropriate times to prevent an escalation of the conflict, see for example where Hammarskjöld stated “[n]ote with great appreciation Khiari’s good intervention”. There was also the aspect of Hammarskjöld promoting 'unofficial chatter' of the kind most commonly associated with quiet diplomacy, with his representatives talking with the disputing parties and trying to promote conciliation. An example of this was when UN diplomat Gardiner talked with the Stanleyville faction and reported that if Gizenga were to be given a ministerial post in the new government (which he was given) then they would have an easier time to accept and recognize Kasavubu as head of state. This type of negotiation and bargaining were easier to provide when the UN was facilitating face-to-face meetings, where the UN might easier try and influence the setting of an agenda, which required that the UN had gained the acceptance of both disputant factions.

The major issue prior to parliament was where it would be held. Gizenga did not want to have the parliamentary meeting in the capital Léopoldville as it would not be adequate in matters of security and impartiality, instead his Stanleyville factions preferred Kamina, the military base controlled by the UN. Kasavubu insisted on Léopoldville, as it was their centre of power as well as being the capital. The UN representatives noticed this disagreement and tried to solve

276 See Linnér to D.H., 12/6-61, A-1423, L 179: 159, DHC, NL.
277 See for example the following telegrams from L 179: 159, DHC, NL: Linnér to D.H. 12/6-61, A-1423; Linnér to D.H. 14/6-61, A-1445; Linnér to D.H. 15/6-61, A-1461; Linnér to D.H. 17/6-61, A-1490-92; Linnér to D.H. 24/6-61, A-1546; Linnér to D.H. 29/6-61 A-1574-75.
278 D.H. to Linnér, 21/6-61, 4412, L 179: 159, DHC, NL; see also Linnér to D.H. 14/6-61, A-1445, L 179: 159, DHC, NL. See also 24/7-61, A-1775, L 179: 159, DHC, NL with statements such as “we have suggested”.
279 See for example Abbas to D.H., 24/4-51, A-1048, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; D.H. to Abbas, 2/5-61, 3112, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; D.H. to Linnér 29/5-61, 3811, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; D.H. to Linnér, 27/5-61, 3784 L 179: 136, DHC, NL.
280 Linnér to D.H., 22/6-61, A-1513, L 179: 159, DHC, NL.
281 D.H. to Linnér, 27/5-61, 3785, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; Linnér to D.H. 1/6-61, A-1357, L 179: 159, DHC, NL; D.H. to Linnér, 2/6-61, 3933. L 179: 159, DHC, NL.
282 Linnér to D.H. 2/6-61, A-1359, L 179: 159, DHC, NL; D.H. to Linnér, 2/6-61, 3933, L 179: 159, DHC, NL.
this problem, lest they let “questions of prestige block progress at this highly critical juncture.” Hammarskjöld and his representatives in Congo tried to have Kasavubu and his group compromise over this matter. Interestingly, the UN were keenly aware of appearances. Mentioning the need to save face and allowing matters of prestige is something that occurred several times when Hammarskjöld tried to mediate. Lipsey has written that this was part of Hammarskjöld’s diplomacy as a way to allow the other party to ‘stand down’ on a problem or a conflict without being afraid of losing status over it. For example, despite Hammarskjöld’s preference shown for the Léopoldville faction, he praised the flexibility of the Stanleyville group on this matter, probably being aware that if both parties insisted on the matter, compromise would be difficult. By trying to broker a compromise between the disputing parties, Hammarskjöld acted as a mediator during the meetings prior to parliament. He helped built trust between the factions, as well as being acceptable to them as an intermediary. The UN also pooled information regarding where parliament would meet, and used this information to try and get to an agreeable solution for all involved. Using their position as acceptable mediators, the UN diplomats followed the instructions of Hammarskjöld in order to avoid disagreements that would risk the reconciliation efforts.

During these months, the UN ensured the parties that they would provide the security arrangement, meaning that only UN armed troops would be allowed near parliament. Hammarskjöld’s executive officer stated that “[t]hese troops [UN], besides guaranteeing security, would also provide a propitious atmosphere for debate amongst the Congolese leaders free from outside interference.” Many nations in the Advisory Committee saw the role of the UN as only providing the security measures that would allow the Congolese parliamentarians to meet and then themselves decide the future of their country. However, as will be presented, the UN played a more active part than was disclosed to the Advisory Committee. In Lipsey’s biography of Hammarskjöld he has cited a story of how the CIA gained access to the parliamentary area via a sewer pipe and that once there the US agency bribed parliamentarians

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283 Linnér to D.H. 2/6-61, p. 2, A-1359, L 179: 159, DHC, NL.
284 D.H to Linnér, 8/6-61, 4073, L 179: 159, DHC, NL; D.H to Linnér, 2/6-61, 3933, L 179: 159, DHC, NL.
285 See also D.H. to Abbas, 20/3-61, 1922, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; D.H. to Abbas, 9/4-61, 2409, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; D.H. to Linnér, 27/5-61, 3784, L 179: 136, DHC, NL.
286 Lipsey, Hammarskjöld, p. 486.
287 See for example the description of “Stanleyville menace.” Linnér to D.H. 21/7-61, A-1757, L 179: 159, DHC, NL.
288 D.H to Linnér, 13/6-61, 4204, L 179: 159, DHC, NL.
289 UNAC 51, p. 8/10.
290 See for example UNAC 50, p. 41, with Hammarskjöld agreeing and stating that “It is for the Congolese to decide what they want”, UNAC 50, p. 59/60.
in order to get Adoula elected as prime minister. However, the reliability of this source is questionable at best, and there are no primary sources that support this argument. In August 1961 Nwokedi reported to the Advisory Committee that “no unauthorized persons are [sic] allowed to enter the place”. Following the conclusion of parliament, the Mali ambassador questioned whether parliament met under normal conditions, to which Hammarskjöld quoted the president of the House of Representatives that “debates had taken place and that the decision had been adopted in an atmosphere of absolute security, free from threat or coercion”. The Advisory Committee lamented that they had not been given enough information, and the official UN report to the Security Council that Hammarskjöld presented regarding parliament omitted any mention of the active mediation that the UN representatives did perform prior to and during parliament, it only stated that parliament met with the assistance and under the protection of the UN.

Princen has stated that arranging travel can be one of the ways a mediator may actively bring disputing parties together, because by arranging travel a mediator may help prevent negotiations stalling or suspending. There were two times that Hammarskjöld actively encouraged and helped provide travel arrangements while attempting to reconcile the differences between the disputants: First, by assisting the three-man Stanleyville delegation to come to Léopoldville for parliamentary pre-meetings. Second, by providing travel arrangements to all parliamentarians for them to come to Lovanium and participate. In October 1960 Hammarskjöld stated “[i]t is not for us to tell people to go there; it is not for us to take them there”, yet his views on the UN’s role had changed drastically regarding parliament. These pre-meetings were characterised by an effort by the UN to promote trust between the two factions. By arranging travel and by encouraging the UN diplomats to promote a feeling of reconciliation with a clear goal (the reconvention of parliament) Hammarskjöld clearly attempted to increase the trust

291 Lipsey, *Hammarskjöld*, p. 511. He based this on CIA officer Devlin’s and UN diplomat Dayal’s autobiographies, but both should be used with a grain of salt. There are no primary sources that would indicate that this happened.
293 UNAC 54, p. 22, 51.
294 UNAC 54, p. 23.
295 UNAC 54, p. 22, 33, 51.
299 UNAC 5, p. 87/90.
between the Stanleyville and Léopoldville factions. With parliament to be reconvened in a month, the UN diplomatic efforts as mediators were showing signs of working.

Prior to parliament, I would argue that Hammarskjöld clearly acted as a mediator and encouraged face-to-face meetings between the disputants as a way to provide a solution to the political conflict. As a mediator, he nudged and attempted to affect these meetings via his diplomatic representatives, but this should not necessarily be seen as “gamesmanship”. Rather it should be seen as a way in which Hammarskjöld used his position as an acceptable mediator to facilitate a resolution to the conflict between the Léopoldville and Stanleyville factions.

2.3.2 Interfering in domestic affairs or classic mediation at parliament?

The phrase ‘interfering in domestic affairs’ has been attributed to Hammarskjöld and the UN by some historians and scholars. Previous research regarding parliament has mostly focused on the fact that the Adoula government was elected with the aid of the US, with Kent highlighting the moderate, pro-western stance of Adoula. Frielingsdorf has argued that the UN and the US co-operated in trying to ensure a government that was friendlier to the west than to the Soviet bloc. Frielingsdorf has quoted UN diplomat Connor Cruise O’Brien that the UN Khiari and Gardiner threw “all semblance of non-intervention to the wind” regarding parliament. However, Frielingsdorf does not actually compare this statement to the source material or treat O’Brien critically, as he was not present at parliament or among the diplomats mediating between Léopoldville and Stanleyville. Regarding the question of non-intervention, O’Brien claimed that he was shown a list by Khiari beforehand about the ministers the UN preferred and that all but one of the ministers were later elected. O’Brien used this as proof that the UN interfered in parliamentary proceedings, and Frielingsdorf has reproduced this argument. However, it is also possible that the list was an analysis of the probable outcome, given the inside information the UN did have based on the pre-meetings, and not necessarily

300 Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 175-176, 225.
302 Kent, America, the UN, p. 44-47, 54-55, 58.
303 Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 225-228.
304 As quoted in Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 227.
305 Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 227
that the UN attempted to promote certain politicians. That source alone is not sufficient to support Frielingsdorf’s claim.

On June 27 1961, UN representative Sture Linnér informed Hammarskjöld that “Bomboko [the Congolese foreign minister] wanted suggestions from [sic] UN regarding names of future ministers but we have refused to entertain this request indicating this was purely Congolese problem.”306 First, contrary to Frielingsdorf and O’Brien this shows that there are no sources that indicate that they gave a list of names to the Congolese. Second, it is also interesting that Bomboko even asked the UN, as this might indicate that the Léopoldville-bloc perceived UN interference as being positive. As will be seen, walking a tightrope between interference and non-interference, the UN attempted to establish some norms of behaviour that for the most part was that of a classic mediator.

However, there are examples of UN action not conforming to a strict intermediary role. For example, in July 1961 in a telegram that was supposed to be marked top secret,307 Linnér reported of a two-hour meeting with just him and President Kasavubu. Just a few days before parliament was set to meet, Linnérs report consisted of how he gave advice and suggestions to Kasavubu. There were eight suggestions regarding parliament, and Linnér wrote that Kasavubu agreed with the UN. The most significant suggestion was when Linnér “told him that he should do everything in his might to make Adoula prime minister, he being a moderate man, respected everywhere. Kasavubu agreed.”308 For example, he recommended that Kasavubu go to Lovanium to be an active participant, meeting people and that he should “use his influence as the only legal authority in the country”.309 Agreeing that they would remain in daily contact, Linnér wrote that he was conscious that this “might very well be considered as an interference in Congolese affairs” but that it was not the case.310 Despite previously arguing that “[i]t is for the Congolese to decide what they want”311 Hammarskjöld did not reprimand Linnér for interfering, but agreed with his conclusion, stating that

306 Linnér to D.H. 27/6-61, A-1564-1565, L 179: 159, DHC, NL.
307 Hammarskjöld reprimanded Linnér in his response stating that it should’ve been marked top secret. D.H. to Linnér, 19/7-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
308 Linnér to D.H. 19/7-61, A-1736-1737, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
309 Linnér to D.H. 19/7-61, A-1736-1737, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
310 Linnér to D.H. 19/7-61, A-1736-1737, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
311 UNAC 50, p. 59/60.
As regards your talk, it was of course, from your side ‘interference in Congolese affairs’ I am sure you are fully aware of the fact that you must try to maintain a sharp distinction what you may consider yourself morally entitled to say as a private person and ‘on a man to man basis’ and, on the other side, what can be said by you as officer-in-charge. Naturally it is impossible for the Secretary-General, even indirectly, to become party to personality questions in the internal Congolese manoeuvring and I must therefore stand completely aloof in relation to view expressed of that character. You will appreciate reasons for this and have it in mind in forthcoming private talks with Kasa-Vubu.  

He is not upset at Linnér for interfering, only that “[i]nformation in this cable should preferably have been top secret.” This way of giving instructions or formulating policy while saying that he cannot do so is remarkably similar to the way Hammarskjöld informed Protitch what the Conciliation Commission’s mandate was. Linnér’s reply to this telegram expresses remorse for not sending the report as top secret, and he ensured Hammarskjöld that he had “always been scrupulously careful not to involve the Secretary-General’s name or office in any conversation of this kind.” Frielingsdorf has interpreted this as meaning that the UN diplomatic efforts were interference.

While the actions of the UN diplomats during parliament have been decried as interference by Frielingsdorf they need to be properly contextualised. The UN diplomatic efforts could be seen as a continuation of the mediation of the past few months. The role of a mediator is to facilitate an agreement, and conciliation between disputing party is one of the most important parts a mediator can perform. Having gained the acceptance of both the Stanleyville and Léopoldville groups it may have been strange for the UN to be completely aloof. This acceptance allowed the UN to play the role of a mediator to ensure that a political reconciliation was met.

On the same day as the telegram regarding Linnér’s meeting with Kasavubu, July 19 1961, Hammarskjöld sent a telegram to Linnér informing him of Hammarskjöld’s progress after having received information from the Stanleyville faction. First he addressed some of the differences between the Stanleyville and the Léopoldville and informed Linnér of the wishes

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312 D.H. to Linnér, 19/7-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
313 D.H. to Linnér, 19/7-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
314 Linnér to D.H. 20/7-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
315 Frielingsdorf, *Machiavelli*, p. 227. He has only analysed the reply, not Linnér’s original telegram other than establishing that it was ‘interference’.
316 It is unclear how this information came to Hammarskjöld, he simply stated that “I have received information concerning the conditions which the Gizenga group may wish to make in regard to the establishment of a Government resulting from Parliament meeting.” D.H. to Linnér, 19/7-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
of Gizenga. Hammarskjöld wrote that “Gizenga is, as a last resort, willing to accept Adoula as Prime Minister, although it is understood that Adoula himself, for many political reasons, is most unwilling to become Prime Minister.”317 Gizenga proposed that he and two others would hold the position of vice prime minister. Two weeks later Adoula was prime minister and two of the three proposed vice prime minister were the same as in this telegram, including Gizenga.318 The third proposed vice prime minister was Jean Bolikango, whom Linnér attempted to keep in the background during parliament.319 He did not become vice prime minister. Hammarskjöld ended the telegram by saying that Linnér may use this information “in the manner which would be best in the circumstances prevailing there.”320 Previous research has perceived the parliament as being anti-Gizenga,321 yet several of the points mentioned in this telegram came to pass including a prominent position for General Lundula, Gizenga’s right hand man. Hammarskjöld was in communication the Stanleyville faction and listened to their requests and desires. He then transmitted these to his representative in Congo who could use this information to negotiate a compromise between the disputants – which would not be possible if the disputants did not trust each other or accept the UN as mediators.

On the matter of Cyrille Adoula as Prime Minister, Kent has argued that USA had attempted to get him elected since February 1961.322 In the UN telegrams, there was a clear tendency of pro-Adoula statements going back to the spring months of 1961.323 In June 1961, after Adoula considered resigning as minister of the interior, the UN noted the possibility of him becoming prime minister, at the same time as they note that the Americans were also supporting Adoula financially “through a diamond deal”.324

Another classic aspect regarding mediation is how Hammarskjöld wrote about the need for Adoula to be the formateur325 and not Kasavubu, as Gizenga felt unable to recognize Kasavubu
more than he already had, given the president’s history with Patrice Lumumba starting in September 1960 (Gizenga was his right hand man). By acknowledging that if the request would not be possible Gizenga would likely withdraw his delegation from parliament, Hammarskjöld stressed the importance of this point and Linnér would be aware of this when talking to Kasavubu. This is another time when Hammarskjöld attempted to ‘save face’ for a disputant, lest it get in the way of a compromise. Princen has written that a mediator can “help parties save face by avoiding the appearance of conceding to the other party’s demands.”

In June and July 1961, the UN representatives in Congo facilitated face-to-face meetings between the Stanleyville and Léopoldville factions. On July 11 Linnér reported that

Frictions are decreasing day by day. We are concentrating our efforts on eliminating the last obstacles to a reconciliation. Gardiner is leaving for Stanleyville tomorrow while Khiari and others continue to press on Kasavubu and his ministers. We feel that direct contacts between Kasavubu and Gizenga will undoubtedly be a major element in possible success.

This kind of mediation tactic was an example of the UN providing the opportunity for disputing parties to communicate for the first time since their conflict had started, which was also aided by the UN arranging travel for members of parliament.

In late July 1961 Linnér reported a rumour that if Gizenga were to become prime minister, army officer and later dictator Joseph-Désiré Mobutu would overthrow Gizenga’s government in a coup. Hammarskjöld replied that “[n]aturally everything within our powers must be done to counter and forestall such manoeuvres.” A mediator may usually only use their ‘soft power’ to try and influence and persuade matters, but there is also the aspect that Hammarskjöld commanded thousands of peacekeeping troops. In a top secret telegram on August 1, Hammarskjöld ordered more UN troops to Léopoldville. Hammarskjöld said that Linnér

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326 D.H. to Linnér, 19/7, p. 1-2, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
327 Princen, Intermediaries, p. 40.
328 Linnér to D.H. 11/7-61, GE-1, L 179: 159, DHC, NL.
330 Linnér to D.H. 21/7-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL; See also where if Gizenga would become prime minister, there result would be a ‘popular uprising’ according to Kasavubu. Linnér to D.H. 26/7-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
331 D.H. to Linnér, 21/7-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
332 D.H. to Linnér, 1/8-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL; D.H. to Linnér, 4/8-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
should talk with the US ambassador Godley and ask him to calm Mobutu. This is an example of Hammarskjöld using ‘soft power’ while managing disputing parties. The Mobutu threat may have propelled the UN to act further to ensure the result of an Adoula government. Since we have no documents about the events inside parliament, it is impossible to know whether this had any effect on the parliamentary procedures or how the UN acted upon this matter.

Frielingsdorf has argued that Hammarskjöld was “[a]ctively working behind the scenes to achieve the desired political outcomes that the UN wanted”. While it is likely true that Hammarskjöld had a preferred solution, and acted in a manner to promote said solution, it is disingenuous to not highlight the role of Hammarskjöld as a mediator. Frielingsdorf has extrapolated his argument from a select few sources without contextualising the diplomatic efforts leading up to parliament. However, although the mediation was effective, it was also characterised by a lack of transparency in regards to the Advisory Committee and the UN member nations. The historiographical failure to challenge the narrative of Hammarskjöld as a neutral servant of peace needs to be contrasted with the available source material. Regarding the UN’s role at parliament historian Lipsey has only stated that Linnér was “said to have persuaded Kasavubu to take various measures”. Likewise, neither Berggren nor Svegfors have mentioned parliament at all.

2.3.3 Advisory Committee received no insights of UN mediation

During the month of June 1961 there were only two Advisory Committee meetings, and in July none. Part of the reason is that Hammarskjöld was in Genève in July, and in late July was busy with the so called Bizerte-crisis in Tunisia. It was not until after parliament had met that the Advisory Committee convened. One of the most interesting phrases during the first meeting on August 3 1961 was when Hammarskjöld stated that “I say ‘around Parliament’ as we ourselves, as Secretariat, have had no line of communication directly to Parliament.” While it is technically correct that they had no direct line of communication, it seems disingenuous given the telegrams to and from Hammarskjöld and Linnér, as well as the presence of Gardiner and Khiari at Lovanium. However, Nwokedi later mentioned that “[t]wo senior United Nations

333 D.H. to Linnér, 21/7-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
334 Frielingsdorf, Machiavelli, p. 225.
335 Lipsey, Hammarskjöld, p. 511-512.
337 UNAC 53, p. 2.
personnel were similarly invited for consultation”. Hammarskjöld then later states that they have not given the Secretariat any inside information, but seemed adamant in ensuring the committee that they did not interfere in the parliamentary proceedings. Compared to the telegrams where Linnér reported on the proceedings of parliament this is a remarkable statement. As the Advisory Committee members did not have access to the telegrams, many of which were marked top secret, this statement is fascinating in that while it technically was not a lie, it implies something very different to the members than Hammarskjöld’s actions during parliament. This was a similar way of phrasing to the Advisory Committee as in November 1960 regarding the credential vote. Mali’s representative stated that “[i]f the Parliament deliberated with troops surrounding it and threatening the parliamentarians, if it voted under those conditions, could you say that the decision coming from that Parliament was a legal decision?” and criticized Hammarskjöld by saying that he “has not been able to give us all the information.” Hammarskjöld defended himself by stating that parliament met in “an atmosphere of absolute security, free from threat or coercion.”

Compared to the UN telegrams that statement is fascinating. For example, a few days before Adoula was elected prime minister, Linnér reported that

In view of the strong pro-Gizengist trend at Lovanium during these last few days I considered it advisable to have a long talk with Kasavubu today.

1. I impressed on him again the disastrous consequences a military coup would [sic] have and stressed as you said in your top secret message of 21 July that he has everything to fear and that he is the one who wields influence to cut out such plan at its personal source.

Because of the pro-Gizenga tendencies, Linnér felt he had to talk with the president and urged him to go to parliament and attempt to prevent Gizenga becoming prime minister. The pretext

338 UNAC 53, p. 6.
339 UNAC 53, p. 16.
341 Linnér to D.H. 26/7-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL; Linnér to D.H. 31/7, A-1842, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
342 UNAC 54, p. 23.
343 UNAC 54, p. 23, quoting the President of the House of Representatives.
344 Linnér to D.H. 26/7-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
for this was that were Gizenga to become prime minister, Mobutu would overthrow it in a
military coup and take power himself. Linnér

warned him that I did not feel his assurances were strong enough for us to feel in any way secure as
to a military coup and that we were taking the necessary steps to forestall any such attempt from
whatever side it might come.345

This does not exactly match up to the phrase ‘free from threat or coercion’ as the UN did attempt
to influence the parliamentary outcome. Lack of committee insight meant that the narrative that
Hammarskjöld presented to the member states were different from the narrative that emerges
from the telegrams.

In the second Advisory Committee meeting after parliament had met, on August 11 1961, Hammarskjöld was surprised at the criticism that some members directed towards the Adoula
government, and by extension how he had run the mediation efforts. They were upset about not
having been consulted during the process. This was a similar reaction as when Hammarskjöld
had his representative sign the April 17 agreement, with Pakistan then saying that “in a
multitude of cases we have given advice and you have taken a decision. But our advice has not
been the first.”346 Much like in September 1960, Hammarskjöld did not call a committee
meeting during a critical time period instead waiting until after the developments had been
‘solved’ to call a meeting. This allowed Hammarskjöld to himself create the UN policy
regarding parliament and ensured that the Advisory Committee could not affect the diplomatic
policy as Hammarskjöld did not provide insight into the mediation tactics used. In October
1960, Hammarskjöld had stated to the Advisory Committee that “[i]t is not for me or my
Ambassador, Dayal, to decide an issue which has serious political overtones”.347 Then, Hammarskjöld had excused himself from attempting to reconcile the two major disputants, but
less than a year later Hammarskjöld’s policy had evolved – but the role and influence of the
Advisory Committee had not.

As seen throughout this study, Hammarskjöld compartmentalised vital parts of the diplomatic
efforts, whether that was by not giving access to information via the telegrams (pooling of

345 Linnér to D.H. 26/7-61, p. 1-2, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
346 UNAC 38, p. 16.
347 UNAC 7, p. 102.
information), or through not asking or listening to the advice of the member states.\textsuperscript{348} The diplomatic policy of the UN in regards to Congolese reconciliation was exclusively created by Hammarskjöld and executed by his representatives, as highlighted by his dismissive notions of the Conciliation Commission in February 1961 and their non-prevalent role in the mediation efforts. This goes against the conventional picture of the relationship between Hammarskjöld and the Afro-Asian bloc proposed by O’Malley and Frielingsdorf as they have both argued that Hammarskjöld actively changed his policy to gain their support.\textsuperscript{349} The criticisms directed at Hammarskjöld by several member nations following parliament show that he had failed to create a consensus about Congolese reconciliation.

The Advisory Committee were also critical of a draft letter from Hammarskjöld to Adoula that he presented to them. With the letter, Hammarskjöld reserved the right for himself to unilaterally decide that the UN as an organization recognizes the Adoula government.\textsuperscript{350} Some member states questioned the circumstances surrounding parliament and wanted to wait until more clarity was shed on the new government.\textsuperscript{351} It should also be noted that not all members of the committee were critical.\textsuperscript{352} In the months leading up to parliament, Hammarskjöld often noted the need for practicality over legality.\textsuperscript{353} Here, he uses ‘legality’ as the main argument for recognizing Adoula.\textsuperscript{354} Hammarskjöld’s argument was that parliament were the only ones who could decide the government (disregarding his own previous efforts at effecting the political situation), and that now that parliament had met and decided there was nothing more to discuss in the matter. However, parliament did not necessarily meet in a normal way, as shown by the attempt to coerce President Kasavubu, which means that the matter was not as straight forward as Hammarskjöld presented it. A year earlier he had dismissed parliamentary support for Lumumba using the argument that it met under abnormal circumstances.\textsuperscript{355} Now the circumstances were inconsequential. By referencing parliament, Hammarskjöld changed the

\textsuperscript{348} Although there are occasions where Hammarskjöld listened to advice, it was often in more formal areas than actual policy as seen by UNAC 27, p. 31, 34/35. UNAC 36, p. 52-66 and UNAC 48, p. 3/5.
\textsuperscript{349} O’Malley, “Ghana, India,” p. 970, 975, 978, 980-82; Frielingsdorf, 
\textsuperscript{350} Hammarskjöld himself says that it is an interpretation for the SG, UNAC 54, p. 53-54, 55.
\textsuperscript{351} UNAC 53, p. 22; UNAC 54, p. 22, 33, 51.
\textsuperscript{352} For example, Liberia, Pakistan, Sudan, Senegal & Nigeria supported Hammarskjöld’s interpretation, UNAC 54, p. 17, 18, 26-27.
\textsuperscript{353} See for example where Hammarskjöld states in a top secret telegram that “we shall be sailing close to the wind from legal point of view, but on strictly practical grounds, our reactions are positive. Of course, great discretion should be employed in carrying out the suggestions.” 18/5-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
\textsuperscript{354} UNAC 54, p. 22, 48/50, 66.
\textsuperscript{355} UNAC 5, p. 86; D.H. to Dayal, 2/10-60, p. 1-2, unnumbered, L 179: 156, DHC, NL.
perception of the issues to focus on reconciliation when the UN were in a position to influence the outcome of parliament.

2.3.4 Conclusion

Using Princen’s mediation concepts, it is clear that Hammarskjöld fulfilled several of them regarding the Lovanium parliament. First, he managed to establish trust between Kasavubu’s faction and the Stanleyville bloc. Both disputant factions were willing to listen to UN advice and the UN representatives were present and active at meetings. These representatives attempted to make both factions trust each other prior to parliament. Second, the fact that the UN were allowed to be the providers of security and under whose supervision parliament left, meant that they had the acceptance as mediators. The fact that Hammarskjöld’s representatives were invited to Lovanium also shows this acceptance. However, after the Adoula government had been sanctioned by parliament, Gizenga was critical of the result and did not take part in the new government.356 During the Advisory Committee meeting following parliament Mali’s representative references letters from Gizenga “complaining that the security guarantees were not respected.”357 This could be seen as a withdrawal of acceptance over the UN as mediators. Previously Gizenga had acknowledged and worked through the UN but after parliament this cooperative spirit seems to have been disappeared. The third mediation concept was that the UN arranged travel for parliamentarians to and from Léopoldville, and provided their personal security. Fourth, as already seen, the UN were active as the intermediaries in the pre-meetings between the Stanleyville and Léopoldville groups. During the pre-meetings the pooling of information under UN auspices with Hammarskjöld’s representatives acting as the go-between, making suggestions, trying to broker compromises and overall acting as the medium through which the meetings between the two disputant factions took place.

In conclusion, since Hammarskjöld successfully fulfilled many of Princen’s concepts, Hammarskjöld should be seen as a mediator – unlike what Frielingsdorf has argued. Hammarskjöld managed to set an agenda in which parliament succeeded in meeting and in which a government was invested. The result of parliament was a compromise between the two disputant factions. Even though Antoine Gizenga later disavowed support of the new government, the fact that he became vice prime minister should be seen as an attempt by

357 UNAC 53, p. 22. The letter is not part of the available UN source material.
Hammarskjöld to negotiate a solution preferable to all disputants. The way to parliament was also filled with threats and promises of deals. While Hammarskjöld attempted to reconcile both factions, he used the position that the UN was in at Lovanium, being the providers of security and having the acceptance of the disputant parties, to influence the parliamentary meeting to a specific conclusion that showed preference to one disputant party – the Léopoldville faction.

By attempting to get Adoula elected as prime minister, Hammarskjöld successfully managed to use his position and role in order to promote a specific outcome that was preferred by the UN. As such, Hammarskjöld fulfilled the role of a principal mediator during parliament.

Hammarskjöld was a mediator while at the same time being constricted by the principle of non-interference. Thus there were times when the UN diplomatic efforts compromised the mediator role over the principle of non-interference, and vice-versa. In the case of Linnér meeting with Kasavubu the result of the mediation was more important than the principle of non-interference. By attempting to prevent a Léopoldville-Katanga reconciliation in March 1961 following the Tananarive conference, and by promoting Adoula as prime minister during parliament, I would argue that Hammarskjöld’s intermediary actions should be seen as that of a kingmaker. His active involvement at parliament in July 1961 show that he was not satisfied with simply standing by allowing parliament to act independently. Hammarskjöld views regarding Congo’s sovereignty is made clear in a telegram to his representatives in April 1961. He stated “[p]erhaps they prefer to be servants to the Belgians before being masters in their own house in cooperation with us.”

This makes statements like doing what “is necessary not only in order to save the poor Congo” that much more interesting, as Hammarskjöld used his position to play the role of kingmaker in getting Adoula elected. During a meeting in May 1961 Sture Linnér met with President Kasavubu and Foreign Minister Bomboko and “asked them bluntly where they thought they would be without UN in the picture and Bomboko immediately answered in ‘utter chaos’, with the President nodding assent.” Just a few months earlier, Kasavubu had publicly been anti-UN and demanded that they withdraw from Congo. And now they, whom Linnér called “the hypersensitive and largely immature and insecure Congolese”, were praising

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358 D.H to Abbas, 11/4-61, p. 2, 2485, L 179: 158, DHC, NL.
359 D.H to Dayal, 24/2-61, p. 3, 1334/35, L 179: 157, DHC, NL; See also UNAC 25, p. 7; See also statements were Hammarskjöld positions the UN as ’the giving party’ in D.H. to Linnér, 22/5-61, 3615, L 179: 158, DHC, NL; UNAC 27, p. 22.
360 Linnér to D.H. 24/5-61, p. 2, A-1294, L 179: 162, DHC, NL.
361 Namikas, Battleground, p. 145; Kasavubu to D.H., 14/3-61, L 179: 152, DHC, NL.
362 Linnér to D.H. 25/5-61, unnumbered, L 179: 162, DHC, NL. It is unlikely that UN officials would describe a western head of state in a similar way.
ONUC. This was the culmination of the work of Hammarskjöld and his representatives in ensuring that President Kasavubu maintained a friendly and workable attitude with the UN and allowed Hammarskjöld to play an active role as a mediator during parliament 1961.
Chapter 3. Conclusion

3.1 Summary

This study has focused on the diplomatic role of Dag Hammarskjöld during the Congo crisis. The aim of this thesis has been to analyse Dag Hammarskjöld’s mediation and diplomatic actions during the Congo crisis 1960-1961. Biographies and the idealized picture of Hammarskjöld have all too often been based on Hammarskjöld’s own narrative. The source material used for this study provides a different perspective than the traditional account. This study has focused on Hammarskjöld’s role as a mediator during the Congo crisis, while at the same time indicating that this role was more nuanced than previously assumed. As a mediator, Hammarskjöld used his representatives to manoeuvre the Congolese politicians to promote an intrastate solution that was favourable to Hammarskjöld’s understanding of the crisis. This analysis consisted of utilizing Thomas Princen’s theory regarding mediator ideal types and mediation concepts, with tactics such as establishing trust, arranging travel and the pooling of information under UN auspices. Hammarskjöld also used various ways to pressure parties in order to influence the political situation. For example, he convinced Anglo-American diplomats to persuade President Kasavubu that a reconciliation with Gizenga (Stanleyville) was preferable to a reconciliation with Tshombe (Katanga). Hammarskjöld’s diplomacy and mediation was effective in curtailing unwanted solutions and promoting a pro-UN policy. This is most clearly seen in the mediation regarding the Tananarive conference in March 1961, but also shown by UN action during parliament in July 1961. As a result, Hammarskjöld should be seen as a principal mediator who had an interest in a specific kind of solution. However, Hammarskjöld failed to create a consensus about Congolese reconciliation as the Advisory Committee were disappointed in the lack of input and insight into UN mediation efforts. The diplomatic operation was largely a closed affair around Hammarskjöld and he was not as open and honest towards the Afro-Asian member states as previous research has indicated.

3.2 The diplomacy of Dag Hammarskjöld

Hammarskjöld fulfilled the role of a principal mediator, with him having explicit self-interests as a mediator, as well as trying to influence the conflict to specific outcomes. This is clearest during parliament in July 1961, with Hammarskjöld attempting to use the trust and acceptance
of the disputant parties in order to influence who would become prime minister, settling on Cyrille Adoula who was preferable to Western interests. As a disputant, Hammarskjöld used both threats and financial incentives in order to influence President Kasavubu to not request the withdrawal of UN troops, as he argued this would open Congo up to military intervention. A result of this study is that Hammarskjöld tried to manoeuvre the Advisory Committee to give him the mandate to pursue his own desired policy in Congo without interference. He did this by compartmentalizing the information given to the committee and by concealing his own active role. Both O’Malley and Frielingsdorf have argued that Hammarskjöld actively changed his policy to gain the support of the Afro-Asian bloc. I would argue that Hammarskjöld was paying lip service rather than actually changing his policy, as shown by the lack of insight he gave to the Advisory Committee and the way he pursued policy that ran contrary to the wishes of many of the member nations.

The comprehensive use of the UN empirical sources have allowed me to generalize about Hammarskjöld’s diplomacy during the Congo crisis. The telegrams have been analysed to answer the question of how Hammarskjöld acted diplomatically, as they provide an insight to the day-to-day communication. As they were not public documents, it meant that the Hammarskjöld and his representatives could communicate with the knowledge of the documents not becoming public. This allows a study of a source material that has not been as curated as many other diplomatic sources such as letters or public communications.

Even though there exists a lack of verbatim records between UN diplomats and their Congolese counterparts, I would still argue that this source material can show how Hammarskjöld acted diplomatically since they show the instructions, reactions and dialogue surrounding the diplomatic events studied. As I have argued throughout this thesis, Hammarskjöld’s mediation did not always conform with the image presented by historians and biographers – the diplomatic actions taken by Hammarskjöld and his representatives showed a clear preference to one disputant party. His actions towards the Advisory Committee allowed him the freedom to create the UN diplomatic policy and to pursue mediation with this preference as policy. Ultimately, this meant that during parliament Hammarskjöld played the role of kingmaker in getting Adoula elected prime minister. The contrast between the lack of reconciliation efforts early in the conflict with Hammarskjöld’s actions from Tananarive and forward show that, as a principal mediator and as a disputant, Hammarskjöld’s diplomacy changed over time during the Congo crisis.
More research is needed to properly understand Secretariat diplomacy during peacekeeping missions. To do this, the UN source material are useful to analyse the behind the scenes machinery of Secretariat decision making. There is also the possibility for a comparative study with a large range of source material: US, Belgian, Congolese, Soviet, and UN all provide different perspectives when analysing the Congo crisis. This study has also shown that comparing different types of UN source material can show the difference between the enacted policy and the communicated policy. Further historical studies of diplomatic crisis’ and events where the UN Secretary-General acted as the mediator (such as the Suez crisis) can broaden the understanding of how the role of the Secretary-General can affect the diplomatic and political conflicts.

3.3 Theoretical considerations

Returning to Princen’s figure, I would like to address Hammarskjöld’s mediation to provide a nuanced explanation regarding Hammarskjöld’s role and actions during the Congo crisis.

Taking inspiration from the dichotomy that Princen has presented, that of the principal or neutral mediator, I have extended the dichotomy to include the relationship between a mediator and a disputant. In the source material, there were occasions when Hammarskjöld did not act as a strict mediator, instead at times being more of a direct disputant than a mediator. For example, Hammarskjöld’s way of bargaining financially and threatening the withdrawal of ONUC cannot simply be understood through the statement that Hammarskjöld was a principal mediator with a self-interest. The conclusion drawn might be that Hammarskjöld used whatever means possible in order to get a preferable solution. Another conclusion may be that the role of a mediator is not as strict as envisioned as by Princen, but rather that it is a fluid role dependent on several factors, including the power dynamic between the mediator and the disputants.

Looking at Princen’s figure again, I would suggest that there is the possibility of nuancing Hammarskjöld’s diplomatic role and to study him not only as a mediator, *but also as a disputant*. Princen has not discussed the possibility of a mediator becoming a disputant party, or of a disputant becoming a mediator. He does, however, discuss the possibility and likelihood of a mediator’s role changing during the process but often within the constraints of ‘mediator’. As I have shown in this study, the mediator role appears to be more fluid than previously assumed. During the Congo crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld embodied this complex diplomatic duality.

3.4 A re-evaluation of Dag Hammarskjöld and UN secretariat diplomacy

The ONUC peacekeeping mission struggled with how to properly engage with the different Congolese factions - which one was the legal government? Since the various factions had different support, not least within the Security Council, guidance would not be found there. Problems of impartiality, neutrality and use of force still characterise UN peacekeeping missions, see for example the peacekeeping missions in Rwanda (1993-1996), Democratic Republic of the Congo (1999-) and in the Balkans (1992-1995). This study has shown how these issues affected the diplomatic mission as well, with the political factions having to consider the attitude of Dag Hammarskjöld. As this thesis has shown, diplomatic history is a complex and nuanced field, in particular Secretariat mediation which is constricted not only by

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the constraints of the mediator role, but also of the importance of taking into consideration the attitude of the UN member nations. Despite Hammarskjöld’s involvement in the Congo crisis being cut short by his death in September 1961, his impact on the crisis was considerate.

As I have argued throughout this study there have been discrepancies between what Hammarskjöld said publicly or to the Advisory Committee and what the telegrams show. Yet prior research, especially biographies of Hammarskjöld, have been content with reproducing Hammarskjöld’s own interpretation of events, and have not contrasted this with, for example, the UN telegrams. Ultimately, Hammarskjöld’s statements need to be challenged and contextualised in order to understand his decisions, actions and behaviour. As one of the key international actors during the Congo crisis, the discrepancy between the public image of Hammarskjöld and the picture presented herein shows the importance to critically engage with the available source material and with how previous research has analysed the Secretary-General. This may indicate that diplomats are not as neutral as they may present themselves, thus proving the importance of critically studying the diplomatic actions in order to understand complex events such as the Congo crisis.

Dag Hammarskjöld’s prominent position allowed him the freedom to form and create UN policy in Congo. He used this freedom to institutionalise peacekeeping in a way that influences international relations to this day, but in so doing he infringed on Congo’s sovereign host country consent while at the same time failed to keep the Advisory Committee well informed. The member nations of the committee were the ones who contributed troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in Congo. For the most part they were newly independent nations who looked to the UN as an alternative way to the Cold War blocs. This essay began with the Sture Linnér quote that

The Congo crisis could easily have provoked armed conflicts in other parts of Africa, even led to a world war. It was Dag Hammarskjöld and no one else who prevented that. And it is certain that for a suffering people he came to be seen as a model; he brought light into the heart of darkness.\footnote{Linnér & Åström “UN Secretary-General”, p. 31.}

Dag Hammarskjöld’s diplomatic actions during the Congo crisis should not be ascribed this level of glorification. Rather, he actively engaged in and influenced the Congolese political

\footnotetext{364 Linnér & Åström “UN Secretary-General”, p. 31.}
situation. Part of this was as a mediator, albeit a principal mediator, but also as a disputant. This thesis has challenged the idealised narrative of Hammarskjöld during the Congo crisis and has shown the importance of critically re-engaging with the available source material, lest descriptions like ‘bringing light into the heart of darkness’ dictate the narrative of Dag Hammarskjöld.

3.5 Sammanfattning


Utöver uppsatsens syfte har fyra frågeställningarna ställts för att fördjupa förståelsen av Hammarskjölds diplomati.

- Hur agerade Dag Hammarskjöld diplomatiskt under Kongokrisen?
  o Hur medlade Dag Hammarskjöld mellan de två största politiska kongolesiska faktionerna – Léopoldville och Stanleyville?
  o Hur skiljde sig Dag Hammarskjölds diplomatiska policy gentemot Léopoldville och Stanleyville från hur han kommunicerade policys med FN:s rådgivande kommitté?
  o Hur relateras Dag Hammarskjölds diplomatiska handlingar med idealtypen för medlare?

Källmaterialet har främst bestått av diplomatiska telegram mellan Dag Hammarskjöld och hans FN representanter i Kongo. Mötesprotokoll med en rådgivande kommitté bestående av Afroasiatiska länder har använts för att studera vad Hammarskjöld sade om sin diplomatiska policy.
I undersökningen studeras olika tillfällen där Hammarskjöld medlande, eller ibland även icke-medlande, analyserats. En kategorisering av olika diplomatiska händelser har identifierats och varit grunden till analysen.


För att utläsa detta från källmaterialet har fyra analysnivåer konstruerats. Till att börja med korsrefererades telegrammen med varandra (samt med mötesprotokollen) för att identifiera diplomatiska händelser. Dessa analyserades med hjälp av Princens begrepp (utgång, tillit, acceptans, informationsinsamling, sättande av agendan, anordna resa, fastställande av beteendenormer). Slutligen en abstrakt analys i form av jämförelse med andra diplomatiska händelser, tidigare forskning, historisk kontext och teoretiska implikationer.

I undersökningen kontrasteras den bild av Hammarskjöld som getts av tidigare forskning med den bild som presenteras via de primärkällor som analyseras. Att mycket av uppfattningen om Hammarskjöld bygger på idealiserande biografier, samt att mycket av FN:s källmaterial är otillräckligt utnyttjat, gör att det går att utmana tidigare hållna antaganden om Dag Hammarskjöld.
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