

# Naming and Shaming

## The politics and effectiveness of social pressure in the ILO

Faradj Koliev

Academic dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science at Stockholm University to be publicly defended on Friday 14 December 2018 at 13.00 in William-Olssonsalen, Geovetenskapens hus, Svante Arrhenius väg 14.

### Abstract

In the current international system, the use of centralized, hard enforcement mechanisms is often deemed either politically impossible or too costly. As a consequence, many international organizations (IOs) rely on so-called naming and shaming strategies as tools of political influence. Naming and shaming is the public exposure and condemnation of states that violate international rules and norms. It is not designed to simply renege violators, but to produce compliance through reputational and status concerns. But how does naming and shaming work and what impact does it have on state behavior? In this dissertation, I adopt a comprehensive approach to the study of naming and shaming by examining its underlying politics and determinants as well as its impact on state behavior. In search for answers, I focus on the naming and shaming strategies employed in the International Labour Organization (ILO) during the period 1989-2011. Drawing on the theories of international politics, I develop a set of hypotheses that are tested by means of statistical as well as process tracing techniques. The overall conclusions of the dissertation are fourfold. *First*, the results indicate that ILO naming and shaming is used to punish violators of international labor standards. This implies that IOs, under the right conditions, can thwart the politicization of naming and shaming that has been observed in other IOs. *Second*, I find support for my argument that the decision to engage in naming and shaming primarily is determined by the democratic character of states. This enhances our understanding of when states participate in pressuring targets and the patterns of inter-state shaming. *Third*, the dissertation finds that ILO naming and shaming can improve international labor standards. The impact of ILO naming and shaming is stronger when target states are democratic and resourceful. This implies that IOs can overcome international collective problems without hard enforcement mechanisms and that IO naming and shaming, under certain propitious conditions, can produce compliance. *Fourth*, while democracies are more likely to respond to international criticism, not all democracies do. This dissertation demonstrates that ILO naming and shaming is a powerful tool among democracies that have strong and united labor unions. This implies that IO naming and shaming of democratic states is likely to work through domestic pressure mechanisms.

**Keywords:** *labor rights, naming and shaming, ILO, democracy, social pressure, international organizations, inter-state shaming.*

Stockholm 2018

<http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-161438>

ISBN 978-91-7797-460-4  
ISBN 978-91-7797-461-1  
ISSN 0346-6620

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Stockholm  
University



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ISBN print 978-91-7797-460-4

ISBN PDF 978-91-7797-461-1

ISSN 0346-6620

Cover art: Ida Brogren, [www.vres.se](http://www.vres.se)

Printed in Sweden by Universitetservice US-AB, Stockholm 2018

Distributor: Department of Political Science, Stockholm University

To Helena, Naila, Günel,  
Gülshen and Gabil





# Abstracts of the articles

This dissertation consists of one introductory chapter – “Kappa” – and four individual, but interlinked articles.

**Article 1\*:** *Selecting for Shame: The Monitoring of Workers' Rights by the International Labour Organization, 1989 to 2011*

In this paper, co-authored with James H. Lebovic, we examine the ILO's naming and shaming strategies. Studies focusing on the impact of naming and shaming have devoted little attention to the questions of how these strategies are used, and why. We pose two main questions. First, are naming and shaming by IOs used for political purposes, or to actually expose states that have violated international norms? Second, we ask whether naming and shaming are effectively two distinct processes. Drawing on IR theories, we generate several hypotheses that help us understand the processes surrounding the exposure strategies of IOs. We test these hypotheses using a novel dataset on the naming and shaming strategies used by the ILO in relation to seven fundamental conventions. Our main findings can be summarized in three points. First, we find considerable evidence for the hypothesis that the ILO's naming and shaming activities target states with severely restricted labor rights protection, suggesting that the ILO's decisions about which states to target are not politically motivated, a finding that lends credibility and integrity to the organization. Second, contrary to realist assumptions that IOs are disinclined to name and shame powerful states, we find that the ILO is more likely to target politically and economically powerful states. However, we also find that leftist governments are less likely to be targeted compared to other states. Moreover, our findings indicate that institutionally designed political bodies pursue a narrow agenda in targeting, focusing on a smaller set of conventions covering basic labor rights. Third, we find that naming and shaming are two distinct processes in which different targeting criteria is applied.

**Article 2:** *Is State Shaming in International Organizations a Democratic Phenomenon? The Determinants of State Shaming in the ILO, 1991–2011*

This article explores the determinants of state shaming by IOs. While the literature assumes that states play a crucial role in pressuring violators to correct their behavior, few studies explain why states engage in naming and shaming in international politics. In this study, I propose a regime-type explanation for inter-state shaming in international politics. I pose two inter-related questions: (1) are democratic countries more prone to condemn norm violations than nondemocratic countries? and (2) are democracies likely to shame each other in cases of norm violations? To answer these questions, I use a unique dataset on inter-state shaming in the ILO for the period 1991–2011. In line with my main argument, the results suggest that democracies are more likely to engage in the shaming of norm violators than non-democracies. I find no evidence for special relations between democracies. Unlike in non-democracies, domestic liberal groups within democracies can exert influence on their government’s foreign policy decisions. In addition, this study unpacks other factors influencing the patterns of inter-state shaming. For example, states are generally less likely to criticize their trading partners, which suggests that naming and shaming decisions are also determined by strategic considerations. In addition, the results indicate that naming and shaming is used more frequently by less powerful states to influence the policies of powerful states. These findings have implications for how we understand inter-state interactions in international politics.

**Article 3\*:** *Compliance Without Enforcement: Effects of Reporting on Respect for International Labor Rights*

In this article, co-authored with Thomas Sommerer and Jonas Tallberg, we examine the effects of naming and shaming in the ILO on states’ labor rights behavior. More specifically, we focus on the impact of the CEACR and CAS exposure strategies. We argue that IO exposure may affect state behavior through social pressure and reputational concerns, even in the absence of direct enforcement mechanisms. Drawing on IR theories of social pressure, we develop a set of hypotheses concerning the impact of reporting (naming): first as a stand-alone strategy, and then coupled with shaming. To test our hypotheses, we use a unique dataset on ILO naming and shaming covering 156 countries for the period 1989–2011. The main findings of this article can be summarized in three points. The first of these is that IO exposure matters. The ILO’s performance assessments have a positive and long-lasting effect on states’ respect for international labor standards. The impacts are fairly immediate, and the improvements may be long-lasting. Importantly, the effects are particularly salient in cases of severe violations of labor rights. Moreover, our results also suggest that the repeated exposure of a state’s

misconduct over a longer period leads to improvements in labor rights. Second, reporting need not involve shaming in order to be effective; under some conditions, however, employing naming and shaming together as two sequential processes may be necessary to generate improvements. Finally, and most importantly, public exposure is not effective in influencing the behavior of all states. The results of our analysis suggest that wealthier and democratic states are more likely to be susceptible to exposure than non-democratic and poorer states.

**Article 4:** *The Impact of ILO Naming and Shaming on Democratic States: A Comparative Case Study of Labor Rights Violations in Greece and Hungary*

Previous studies have established that naming and shaming is more likely to produce compliance in democratic states; but what explains the variation among democracies? The literature does not provide clear answers to this question. In this paper, I ask how and when IO naming and shaming influences the behavior of democratic governments. To explore these questions, I conduct a comparative case study of two “most-similar” cases—Greece and Hungary—that have responded differently after being targeted by the ILO. Whereas ILO naming and shaming produced compliance in the case of Greece, it failed to do so in the case of Hungary. Drawing on theories on social pressure and international politics, I outline three mechanisms of influence: elite response, domestic politics, and transnational politics. In addition, I theorize the conditions under which IO naming and shaming is most likely to be a powerful tool in democratic states. Using process tracing, I systematically analyze these mechanisms and conditions in order to explain the variation in outcomes. There are two principal findings in this study: (1) the elite response channel is not a necessary condition for inducing change in democratic states, and (2) ILO naming and shaming produced compliance in Greece’s case due to the country’s powerful and united domestic interest groups. The lack of such groups explains the negative outcome in the case of Hungary. The findings provide new insights into how IO naming and shaming may work in democratic states, and lend support to previous quantitative studies that stress the presence and capabilities of domestic interest groups for successful naming and shaming.

\* Article 1, co-authored with James H. Lebovic, has been published in *International Studies Quarterly*. I was invited to revise and resubmit Article 2, and article 3, co-authored with Jonas Tallberg and Thomas Sommerer, is currently under review. A different version of article 3 was accepted after a peer review process in a Cambridge University Press volume edited by Judith Kelley and Beth Simmons. Article 4 has not yet been submitted to a journal. I am the principal and corresponding author of the co-authored articles, have had the exclusive responsibility for collecting the data, been the

main contributor to the development of research problems and questions, and have contributed to writing the literature review and the research design sections. I was also responsible for portions of the articles pertaining to the functioning of the ILO, and the positing of hypotheses that reflected the ILO's structure and practices. While my co-authors and I mostly shared the responsibility for the remaining parts of the articles, my main contribution was the empirical analysis, while my co-authors developed the theoretical arguments, conducted additional empirical analyses, and streamlined the overall academic presentation of the papers. We shared the responsibility for writing the conclusions and addressing reviewer comments. In summary, my contributions to articles 1 and 3 form approximately 50 to 55% of the total work.

# Sammanfattning på svenska

I ett internationellt system där traditionella sanktioner är sällsynta eftersom stater ofta är oförmögna att komma överens om dessa så faller sista hoppet på sociala sanktioner. Förekomsten av sociala sanktioner, eller så kallade ”naming and shaming”-strategier, har ökat kraftigt i internationell politik. Naming and shaming går ut på att blotta länders uppförande och kränkningar av internationella konventioner. När länders kränkningar uppdagas av olika internationella aktörer så förs dessa frågor upp på den internationella agendan. Detta kan, i sin tur, utlösa mekanismer genom vilka andra stater, inhemska organisationer, såsom politiska partier och civilsamhällesorganisationer, samt transnationella aktörer mobiliserar sig gentemot specifika praktiker eller policies. Exempel på aktuella globala överenskommelser som bygger sociala sanktioner är Parisavtalet och FN:s globala utvecklingsmål. Det är rimligt att anta att sociala sanktioner kommer att spela en allt större roll för olika globala frågor i framtiden.

Men hur fungerar naming and shaming och är det en effektiv påverkansstrategi? Vilka länder blir egentligen kritiserade – de som betar sig värst eller de som är politisk ”impopulära”? Israel brukar oftast nämnas som ett land som får oproportionerligt mycket kritik. Vad för slags politik ligger bakom vilka länder som blir kritiserade och är det möjligt att neutralisera politiseringen av naming and shaming-strategier? Kanske ännu viktigare: hur fungerar dessa påverkansstrategier och har de någon effekt på länders beteenden?

I den här avhandlingen adresserar jag dessa frågor genom att studera naming and shaming inom den Internationella arbetsorganisationen (engelska International Labour Organization, ILO) från 1989 till 2011. Genom statistiska och kvalitativa metoder så kommer avhandlingen fram till följande fyra övergripande slutsatser. För det första så riktas naming and shaming-strategier inom ILO oftast mot länder som bryter mot ILOs konventioner. Även om det finns risk för och spår av politisering så dämpas detta genom ILO:s institutionella design med opolitiska kommittéer. För det andra så visar analysen att den demokratiska karaktären hos stater påverkar besluten

att kritisera länder som bryter mot konventionerna. Demokratier är mer benägna att använda naming och shaming-strategier än icke-demokratier. För det tredje så är ILO:s naming and shaming-strategier effektiva medel för att få länder att respektera ILO:s konventioner. De är särskilt effektiva när de riktas mot demokratier och resursstarka länder. Sist men inte minst så visar jag att inte alla demokratier ändrar sitt beteende efter ILO-kritik. De demokratier som har svaga fackföreningar är mindre benägna att fullfölja sina internationella åtaganden, medan de som har starka föreningar gör det i större utsträckning. Dessa slutsatser bidrar till en mer balanserad bild av sociala sanktioner i internationell politik och föreslår ett antal faktorer som kan göra dessa påverkanstrategier mer effektiva.

# Acknowledgements

The work towards completing this project has been a long journey. Looking back, I proudly realize how much I have learnt – and keep learning – since the day I enrolled in the PhD program. This is the simplest and purely selfish satisfaction fruited by this period. But the winds of this journey would have lied heavily on me had it not been for all the people that have supported me. People who purposely or unpurposely have given me the inspiration, assistance and strength to carry on with the project. There are plenty of people that I should mention and thank. Evidently, one of the most important persons in a PhD student's life is his or her supervisors, and I had the privilege of having three of them.

Jonas Tallberg was the first person at Stockholm University to encourage me to apply for the PhD program. The truth is, I neither expected this nor had ever considered a career as a researcher. It simply did not seem appealing. After having seen some of department staff walking around in flip-flops and ill-fitting jackets (not Jonas, of course), I was discouraged. But the inception was carefully carried out by Jonas, and later on, I could have been caught wearing flip-flops in the corridors myself. I was lucky to have Jonas as my supervisor while writing my master's thesis. And I am lucky to have had him by my side since then. Jonas not only taught me how to carry out respectable research, he also advised me on all other kinds of imaginable and unimaginable issues that I brought up. No matter what the subject was, he was always there and had a piece of advice for every problem. He almost literally held my hand when I took the steps towards various special issue projects and workshops. As a junior scholar, I simply could not have wished for more. During these years, he has given me a great deal of inspiration, which has shaped me in so many ways. I always admired Jonas for his professionalism and kindness – an unbeatable combination in my opinion.

Thomas Sommerer has been another important person by my side. I recall clearly how I, in the beginning of my PhD program, ran into Thomas' room, without a heads-up, panicked by the challenges of numbers and equations. He would smile politely, then say a few words to calm me down. I always left the room with more knowledge and confidence. Having Thomas by my side has provided me with a great source of confidence. I may not run into his office as often now, but there sure will be times when I am in the dark, needing his advice. And I know that he would never make me hesitate to reach out to him. His support has been invaluable to me.

At my first international conference in New Orleans, I met my third supervisor, James Lebovic. I never thought he would answer my e-mail (because very few actually reply to strangers' requests). James not only agreed to meet with me, he was one of the few persons at the conference (if not the only one) who actually read my paper. The truth is that James, along with scholars such as Amanda Murdie, Frank Schimmelfennig, Emelie Hafner-Burton, Erik Voeten, and Rebecca Adler-Nissen, did some of the early work that inspired me to study social pressure in international politics. At that first meeting I realized that James and I shared many interests. James was also kind enough to invite me to George Washington University, well-situated between the White House and various international organizations. He and his wife Holly have been enormously generous, taking care of me in some wonderful U.S. cities during conference trips. To date, our e-mail correspondence could easily fill three books, even excluding all the pictures of statistical tables, cats, dogs, and picturesque landscapes. These exchanges have been indispensable for me as a junior scholar, but also more generally. James has been – and still is – a great source of inspiration for my academic work and a true friend.

This dissertation would have been much poorer, maybe non-existent, without the help of Keth Tapper at LO, whom I met while writing my master's thesis. Keth introduced me to Ulf Edström, with whom I spent many hours at bars talking about the ILO. Through Keth and Ulf, I met Kari Tapiola, former deputy general of the ILO. Kari has been tremendously kind to me, helping and assisting me with all kinds of requests and questions regarding the ILO. When in the dark, I could always rely on Kari to sort things out for me, with detailed explanations of the ILOs quite complicated structure and system, which cannot be found in textbooks. This meant the world to me and I am greatly indebted to Kari for all his support. I also want to thank other ILO officials (most of them introduced to me by Kari) who kindly took their time during the hectic period of the ILC to talk to me: Kamran Fannizadeh, Karen Curtis, Lee Sweptson, David Kucera and many others from the ITUC and delegates from several countries. I would also like to thank Oscar Ernerot, who represents Swedish workers (LO) at the ILO, for the comments and insights that he shared with me.



There are also several people that I would like to thank for intellectual exchange and support for my project. Hans Agné, Maria Jansson and Andreas Duit guided me in the right direction during my first year as a PhD student. Hans Agné has on numerous occasions during these years been helpful and given me new ideas and insights. His support has meant a lot to me. My greatest thanks go also to Joakim Kreutz, who selflessly has spent hours in my office and elsewhere, explaining various modelling strategies to me. Joakim is by no means flawless (his choice of football club reveals that), but to me his support has mattered greatly and his curiosity for others projects represents an ideal in academia. I am also in debt to Tarek Oraby for his very useful suggestions and discussions regarding my research. On so many occasions, I have also received help from Jonathan Kuyper, who gradually has become one of my favorite Australians and a good mate. I am also immensely grateful to Tyra Hertz for her kindness and thoughtful comments on different parts of my dissertation, Karin Sundström for her help with various Stata-related questions, and Gustav Ramström for so many laughs. Without Gustav, this period would have been so much duller. I want to thank Michele Michelletti for supporting my ideas for the special issue and inviting me to take part in other cool projects, Tua Sandman for her helpfulness, Ulrika Mörth, Björn Jerdén, Ian Higham, Magnus Lundgren, Kjell Engelbrekt, Lisa Dellmuth, Naghmeh Nasiritousi, and Karin Bäckstrand for reading and providing useful comments on different parts of my dissertation. I want to especially thank to Karin Bäckstrand for her patience and useful comments at the final stages of completing my dissertation.

Outside of the department, there are a number of people who have been very generous in reading and commenting on early and late versions of my papers: Robert Keohane, Judith Kelley, Beth Simmons, Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Joshua Busby, Carlotta Minnella, Amanda Murdie and Frank Schimmelfennig. I am also grateful to Forskraftsstiftelsen Theodor Adelswårds Minne, and the Siamon Foundation, for funding my research trips to Geneva. I have also benefited from my affiliation with the Stockholm University Graduate School of International Studies (SIS) through many useful workshops and conferences as well as great comments from Mark Rhinard and Thomas Jonter. I am also indebted to several people at the department who have helped with teaching duties and various other things: Pernilla Nordahl, Agneta Sundman Claesson, Emma Bergström, Petter Zirath, Lenita Freidenval, Per-Anders Svård, Magnus Reitberger, Maritta Soinen, Merrick Tabor, Schauki Karim, Anneli Lindén, Sofie Trosell, Aline Rojas Österlind, Christian Möllerop and many others.

Last but not least, I want to thank Helena Hede Skagerlind for her generous support. Helena has read this dissertation more than anyone, perhaps except for me. Without her support, suggestions and conversations, this project

would have been much poorer, if at all. This dissertation is first and foremost dedicated to Helena. She is my core inspiration through everyday life.

Solna, November 12, 2018

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# Abbreviations

AI	Amnesty International
CAS	Conference Committee on the Application of Standards
CEACR	Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
EU	European Union
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
HRO	Human Rights Organization
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ILC	International Labour Conference
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International non-governmental organization
IO	International organization
IR	International relations
NGO	Non-governmental organization
UN	United Nations
UNCHR	United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNCTC	United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations
UNHCR	United Nations Human Rights Council
UPR	United Nation's Universal Periodic Review
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

# Introduction

In June 1998, the International Labour Organization (ILO) publicly criticized Sudan for violating one of the organization's fundamental conventions: the abolition of forced labor. The ILO asserted that there was strong evidence of the practice of slavery and slave trading in the country. After being exposed as a norm violator to the international community, and subsequently criticized by other members of the ILO, the Sudanese representative called the allegations unreasonable and dishonest. The government representative declared that the allegations constituted a "slap in her face" and that she "felt embarrassed" by the accusations (ILO, 1998). While the government of Sudan denied the existence of slavery practices, the ILO's criticism put pressure on the government to introduce new reforms intended to abolish forced labor. In a similar vein, the Australian government was publicly named and shamed by the ILO for the Workplace Act, which gave preference to individual agreements on the labor market, violating the ILO's fundamental convention on the right to organize and collective bargaining. The Australian workers' representative stated that it was "no pleasure to represent the Australian workers," and regrettably noted that the new law had a detrimental impact on collective bargaining and Australian workers (ILO, 2001). The Australian government replied, unenthusiastically, that the particular issue was neither sufficiently important to "warrant immediate consideration" at the international level, nor was Australia a country with poor enough labor rights protections to deserve negative exposure by the ILO. In fact, Australia fancied itself a protector of international labor standards. Despite the reluctance of the Australian government to be publicly criticized, the ILO continued the criticism until the act was repealed. Similarly, when Belarus was targeted by the ILO as one of the worst violators of international standards, the Belarusian government not only rejected the allegations, but found it unacceptable to be compared to countries like Qatar and Ethiopia.

These anecdotal cases demonstrate the fundamental dynamics that lie at the heart of this dissertation. States are averse to—or even fear—being publicly exposed and criticized by the international community, and may even feel a sense of shame or embarrassment about their wrongdoings. While governments facilitate and contribute to the creation of international organizations (IOs), they may also be dissatisfied if their own wrongdoings are exposed internationally. Paradoxically, the governments that facilitate IO monitoring

of certain conventions may also be the ones that are most dissatisfied when IOs “do their job.” For instance, Brazil and the US were, despite their central roles in the organization, among the leading states opposing the use of naming and shaming strategies by the World Health Organization (WHO) due to their own poor performance.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, states may react to selective targeting. For example, in June 2018, the US government withdrew from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), accusing the organization of political bias.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, some states will accept these circumstances, while others will attempt to avoid and manipulate IO naming and shaming strategies. What are the implications of this for IO naming and shaming? Could it lead to naming and shaming practices being reflections of the preferences of powerful states, such as the US, or can IOs rely on their formal mandate to punish actual violators? Perhaps most importantly, what is the impact of IO naming and shaming on state behavior in the absence of centralized material sanctions? Does it generate compliance with international conventions? These are the general puzzles I attempt to answer in this dissertation.

The reluctance to be exposed to the international community for wrongdoing is not a simple emotional reaction to criticism; states know that public exposure may be consequential. Naming and shaming may, through different pathways and under particular conditions, produce compliance. It incurs reputational and social costs by mobilizing various reform-minded groups and transnational actors. We know, for example, that IO naming and shaming has a negative impact on citizens’ perceptions about the human rights conditions in their countries (Ausderan, 2014). This makes naming and shaming an important influence strategy in international politics. Traditionally, scholars and policymakers have had a high degree of trust in direct enforcement mechanisms, such as economic sanctions or military interventions. The mere exposure of a state’s misconduct has not been viewed as a viable influence mechanism. Yet, in an international system in which the use of centralized enforcement mechanisms is often deemed either politically impossible, impractical, too costly, or ineffective, influence tactics designed to generate social pressure, such as naming and shaming, have become increasingly attractive. In recent decades, naming and shaming strategies have emerged as viable influence tools employed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), IOs, and states (Murdie and Davis, 2012; Friman, 2015a; Kelley and Simmons, 2016). An increasing number of global issues are now governed by institutional arrangements based on naming and shaming. For example, the Paris Agreement, the UN’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR), the European Parliament, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and the

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<sup>1</sup><https://www.ft.com/content/6bde30d4-e01e-11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c>

<sup>2</sup><https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/withdraws-human-rights-council-180619173311272.html>

WHO all rely—partly or entirely—on naming and shaming strategies to ensure or improve compliance with international norms.

Naming and shaming is a strategy used to publicly expose and condemn states that violate international rules and norms (Schimmelfennig, 2001:64; Hafner-Burton, 2008). It is not designed to simply censure violators, but to produce compliance by introducing reputational and status concerns. Beyond the consequences of naming and shaming strategies for individuals around the world, the study of these tools ultimately aids our understanding of the global world order. Nevertheless, to date, questions of when, how, and with what consequences IO naming and shaming works in international politics are still being debated.

### *Aim and contributions*

My overarching aim in this dissertation is to enhance our understanding of naming and shaming in international politics by addressing two different sets of questions. First, I address the questions of how and why the ILO and its member states employ naming and shaming strategies. Second, I address the questions of whether, to what extent, and under what conditions naming and shaming strategies are effective in altering state behavior and bringing it into compliance with international rules and norms.

The comprehensive approach to the issue, addressing not only the question of the impact of naming and shaming, but also how and why IOs and member states name and shame alleged norm violators, makes this dissertation unique. While IO and inter-state naming and shaming are somewhat interrelated, they involve two distinct types of actors. Because of this, we gain additional insights by studying their respective naming and shaming practices. Moreover, I go a step further in this dissertation by linking the literature on the politics of naming and shaming with the literature on the impact of naming and shaming strategies. The combined results of this study allow for a broader and more complete understanding of naming and shaming in world politics.

Previous research on why and how naming and shaming is employed has reached mixed conclusions. In some studies, it is argued that naming and shaming is a political tool used by powerful states to punish their rivals and reward their allies, whereas in other studies it is asserted that naming and shaming is used against actual violators (Donnelly, 1988; Ron et al., 2005; Lebovic and Voeten, 2006; Murdie and Urpelainen, 2015; Hug, 2016). Some observers are optimistic about the potential of IO naming and shaming as a tool for solving international collective problems. Others are less optimistic, concluding that IO naming and shaming can be used “by clubs of powerful

states in a self-interested fashion to further entrench existing inequalities by marginalizing small, vulnerable states” (Sharman, 2009:594). This debate, and the significance of IO naming and shaming in the current international system, provide considerable motives for more scholarly attention to the naming and shaming phenomenon. Researchers have also failed to explain the determinants of inter-state naming and shaming. Why, for example, do some states publicly criticize violators, while others abstain from doing so? Given the central role of states in the international system, and their role in the naming and shaming processes (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), it is essential to address these questions.

Perhaps an even more pressing question is whether IO naming and shaming induces targeted states to introduce reforms. If so, how and under what conditions are these changes carried out? To date, the effectiveness of IO naming and shaming strategies has been a subject of debate in the international relations (IR) literature. Yet, few studies have systematically analyzed its impact on state behavior. Arguably, to examine the impact of naming and shaming, one would also need to account for the strategic selection of targets for international criticism. However, the lion’s share of existing studies on naming and shaming is centered on physical integrity rights, typically focusing on Amnesty International (AI) and the UNHRC.<sup>3</sup> These studies typically explore the use and impact of naming and shaming separately, overlooking the link between the two processes.

Most interestingly, previous studies on IO naming and shaming have generated four inter-linked debates in the IR literature. First, some scholars argue that naming and shaming is an inherently political phenomenon, while others contend that its employment is based on impartial assessments of performance. The skeptics underline the traditional arguments of realists, asserting that (powerful) states use naming and shaming in their own strategic interests. IOs, in this context, are established to serve the interests of influential states. The advocates, on the other hand, view IOs as independent institutions that serve the interests of all member states by punishing norm violators through naming and shaming. Second, while states are described as crucial actors in pressuring violators into compliance, few studies have examined the determinants of inter-state naming and shaming in international politics. The predominant view in the existing literature is that inter-state shaming is explained by the realist notion that powerful states praise their friends and shame their rivals. Third, whereas some researchers argue that naming and shaming is effective in producing compliance, others argue that naming and shaming, as a stand-alone strategy, has little or no impact on

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<sup>3</sup>The UNHRC was established in 2006, replacing the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). Most studies were based on the naming and shaming activities of the UNCHR.



states' respect for international agreements. In this view, compliance is instead conditioned by certain factors, such as the characteristics of states and the power of international and domestic interest groups like labor unions and political parties. Fourth, while it is argued in many studies that democratic states are more likely to be susceptible to naming and shaming, few have explained why democracies respond differently to international criticism.


My dissertation contributes to the literature by addressing the current debates and gaps in the literature described above. It moves beyond the focus on NGOs and physical integrity rights by examining the ILO and inter-state naming and shaming within the realm of labor rights. In terms of theory, the dissertation contributes by theorizing why and how IOs and states name and shame alleged violators, and when and how it is likely to produce compliance. Empirically, I present several unique data sets on ILO and inter-state naming and shaming. Methodologically, I apply traditional, yet innovative approaches to the data in order to develop nuanced hypotheses. My findings in this dissertation enhance the understanding of IO and state naming and shaming, and of when such strategies are likely to make states comply with their obligations.

As mentioned above, this dissertation probes these questions through a focus on the ILO. The ILO is one of the oldest existing intergovernmental organizations, and the only organization focused on monitoring the large number of conventions that govern international labor rights. I specifically focus on two ILO supervisory bodies that routinely target states for violating international conventions: the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), and the Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CAS) (Koliev and Lebovic, 2018; Weisband, 2000). Whereas the CEACR is the ILO's expert committee, consisting of independent and prominent lawyers from all regions of the world, the CAS is a political body that includes ILO members (Bartolomei et al., 1999). The supervision process is conducted in two steps, as seen in Figure 1. First, the CEACR assesses the reports submitted by states—worker and employer organizations may comment on these reports—and names states (mainly through “observations”)<sup>4</sup> that perform poorly or violate ratified conventions. Second, the CAS shortlists states based on the CEACR's observations and so-called “double footnotes.”<sup>5</sup> Once the CAS targets a state, the representative of that government may be shamed by other ILO members for not respecting international labor standards.

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<sup>4</sup>The difference between observations and direct requests is that the latter addresses more technical issues and is not public in the same way as observations.

<sup>5</sup>Double footnotes indicate that the CEACR wishes these states to be targeted by the CAS.



**Figure 1.** The Supervisory System of the ILO

The ILO offers a rare opportunity to study all-important aspects of the naming and shaming phenomenon, including how and why IOs and states utilize exposure strategies in international politics, as well as their impact. Its lack of enforcement mechanisms, structure, and monitoring system allows us to probe various hypotheses drawn from the theories of international politics. While I focus on the ILO, the basic logics of international theories probed in this dissertation can be applied to many other IOs. However, the ILO is considered to be a unique IO, and generalizations based on this case should be made with caution. I will return to this issue in more detail in the research design section.

### *Arguments and findings*

The central and overarching arguments and findings of this dissertation are fourfold. First, ILO naming and shaming is not a tool of powerful states, but is primarily used to expose actual norm violators. The existence of multiple political interests—on the part of the targeting as well as the targeted actors—is likely to have an impact on the processes surrounding naming and

shaming, which may undermine the legitimacy of these strategies. For example, the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR, now defunct) was viewed as a politicized IO whose naming and shaming strategy was based on political considerations rather than states' actual human rights records. For IOs that lack traditional enforcement mechanisms, naming and shaming constitutes the flagship strategy of influence, a source of legitimacy and credibility. In order to preserve their credibility and integrity, IOs need to overcome tendencies toward politicization by leaning about their formal mandate. In the case of the ILO, the findings suggest that the impartial body of the ILO, the CEACR, hindered the politicization of naming and shaming. One viable broader implication of this result is that IOs with independent bodies may be better equipped to thwart the politicization of naming and shaming.

Second, I argue that regime type matters for understanding inter-state naming and shaming in international politics. More specifically, the findings show that democracies are the principal instigators of naming and shaming in the ILO. This result supports the idea that regime type matters for understanding why and how governments engage in naming and shaming. The domestic structures and norms of democratic states make them more sensitive to the international exposure of violations. Unlike non-democracies, various domestic interest groups within democratic states can put pressure on the government to condemn violators. Moreover, since democratic states are motivated by humanitarian principles, their leaders may feel obligated to condemn violations that restrict the right to organize and unionize. In fact, the decision to condemn transgressors may constitute appropriate behavior for democratic leaders.

Third, I argue that social pressure matters in international politics. States are not only reluctant to being exposed by the ILO, they are also susceptible to social pressure and may correct their behavior accordingly. In line with the dominant theories of compliance in the political science literature, the ILO is often viewed as "toothless," since it lacks centralized enforcement mechanisms to produce compliance. My research in this dissertation demonstrates that traditional sanctions are not the exclusive path to compliance in international politics. The results imply that IOs may successfully address problems of non-compliance even in the absence of hard enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, my results imply that IO naming and shaming triggers reputational and status concerns through three mechanisms of influence: elite responses, domestic politics, and transnational politics. These three mechanisms may be combined to generate social pressure on target states. However, the most salient of these three is the domestic politics mechanism, since ILO criticism is more powerful when aimed at democratic and resourceful states. The implication of these results is that IO naming and shaming is a powerful tool predominantly when targeting democratic and wealthy states.

By contrast, nondemocratic and poor states lack the domestic pressure and resources that would spur or enable a response to international criticism.

The fourth and final argument in this dissertation is that IO naming and shaming is less likely to produce compliance in democracies that lack strong domestic interest groups. While democracies in general may be more susceptible to IO naming and shaming than non-democracies, not all democracies respond positively to IO criticism. A case comparison of two democratic states suggests that the ILO's criticism was more successful in bringing about compliance in the state in which labor unions were united and more powerful. By contrast, in the other state, the weaker and more divided unions enfeebled the pressure on the government, maintaining its non-compliance. Moreover, the analysis suggests that the presence of elite as well as transnational mechanisms of influence is insufficient to explain why democracies respond differently to IO criticism. Overall, the findings imply that naming and shaming may not work as intended if domestic interest groups lack the capacity to mobilize against the government and put pressure on other reform-minded groups. The fact that governments are sufficiently resourceful to introduce reforms in line with international conventions does not imply that domestic interest groups possess the same capacity to influence the government.

In sum, this dissertation makes substantial contributions to the international relations literature. Based on the systematic analysis of ILO naming and shaming, our research offers important insights into why and how naming and shaming is utilized by IOs and states, as well as how and when naming and shaming is likely to produce compliance with international agreements.

The remainder of this introduction ("Kappa") proceeds as follows. First, I outline the main research questions addressed in the dissertation. Second, I review the previous literature on naming and shaming. Third, I present the overall theoretical framework. Fourth, I discuss the research design and, fifth, I briefly summarize the individual articles, stressing their respective central findings. Finally, I discuss some broader conclusions, implications and ideas for further research.

### *Research questions*

The dissertation addresses four interrelated research questions. The first two questions address how and why IOs and states employ naming and shaming strategies. Research questions three and four concern the impact of IO naming and shaming. In other words, the first two research questions deal with the politics of ILO and inter-state naming and shaming, whereas the latter two deal with the effectiveness of ILO naming and shaming.

The first research question addresses the use of naming and shaming strategies by IOs. Why and how do IOs use naming and shaming? Is it a tool of the powerful/rich against the less powerful/poor? Or do IOs target states that actually violate international rules and norms? While some studies find that IO naming and shaming is politically biased, others conclude that IOs increasingly target states that “deserve” exposure. Although no systematic studies have explored the ILO, many observers suspect a political bias in the organization. On a related point, I ask whether naming is equal to shaming. In other words, is naming conceptually similar or different from shaming?

The second research question asks why states in international politics decide to name and shame norm violators. What determines a state’s decision to engage in naming and shaming? Studies have shown that states’ efforts to name and shame can be crucial in inducing reforms. However, there are few systematic studies of why and when states name and shame norm violators in international politics.

The third research question addresses the impact of IO naming and shaming. How, and under what conditions does IO naming and shaming bring states in compliance with their international obligations? The effectiveness of naming and shaming strategies is still a subject of debate among researchers. Whereas some studies have found that shaming is an effective stand-alone strategy, others have found that its impact is conditioned on various factors.

The fourth research question—informed by the specific results with regard to the third research question—addresses how and when naming and shaming induces compliance in democratic states. Theories of social pressure in international politics assert that democratic states are more likely to respond to international criticism. However, not all democracies respond positively to naming and shaming strategies. In fact, some democratic states, despite being capable of correcting their behavior, do nothing or very little to bring their legislation into conformance with international agreements.

## The state of the art: naming and shaming literature

The theories and empirical findings related to naming and shaming strategies contribute valuable insights into the politics of these strategies and their impact on state behavior. Drawing on the findings and theoretical reasoning of previous research, I go a step further in this dissertation by linking the literature on the politics of shaming with the literature on the impact of naming and shaming strategies.

### *The politics of naming and shaming strategies*

Within the NGO naming and shaming literature, there is a debate concerning whether the altruistic need to expose actual violations of fundamental human rights (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) is the main driving force behind NGO naming and shaming, or whether strategic considerations play a bigger role (Cooley and Ron, 2002). For example, in a study of AI's naming and shaming activities, Ron et al. (2005) found that targeting does in fact reflect states' human rights conditions. However, they also revealed that AI targets states with bigger media profiles. Murdie and Urpelainen's study (2015) showed that international environmental NGOs are more likely to target autocratic states and states that lack environmental ministries, suggesting that they do not target "easy" cases.

Within the IO naming and shaming literature, researchers have either simply assumed that IOs are normatively driven to expose violators, or they have been unconcerned with the selection issue in the targeting process (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Sharman, 2009; Nance, 2015). The few studies that examine the targeting behavior of IOs focus entirely on the UNHRC, and produce mixed results.<sup>6</sup> For example, Donnelly (1988) and Wheeler (1999) find that the UNHRC names and shames particular countries for political reasons rather than for their human rights abuses. In contrast, Lebovic and Voeten (2006) suggest that the UNHRC has increasingly targeted states with actual human rights violations that have publicly committed themselves to international treaties. In the context of the ILO, many scholars have pointed to potential political targeting, similar in nature to that of the UNHRC (Ghebali et al., 1988; Thomann, 2011).

On a related point, the naming and shaming strategies employed by states have been ignored in the literature. While many studies assume that pressure from other states is important in bringing states in compliance with their international obligations (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Murdie and Davis, 2012), few studies have explored what factors shape state decisions to engage in shaming in the first place.<sup>7</sup> Only two empirical studies provide valuable insights into this subject. Lebovic and Voeten's study focuses on voting behavior in the UNHRC, and finds that human rights records and domestic partisanship are the main factors behind decisions to condemn violators (Lebovic and Voeten, 2006:880–881). A recent study by Terman and Voeten (2017) finds that strategic relations between states leads to less criticism in the UPR, lending some support to the beliefs of realist scholars.

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<sup>6</sup>See Squatrito et al. (forthcoming) for a comparative examination of IOs' condemnations.

<sup>7</sup>See, for example, Cox and Drury (2006) on what causes states to impose economic sanctions.

This dissertation moves beyond by focusing on the ILO's and states' naming and shaming behavior within the realm of labor rights. To be clear, the focus on inter-state shaming within the ILO is not only justified for theoretical reasons; empirical studies on labor rights have also shown that bilateral relations between states may produce compliance with international labor standards, and that inter-state naming and shaming can be an important exercise of influence (Kim, 2012; Terman and Voeten, 2017).<sup>8</sup> These patterns provide additional motives to unpack inter-state naming and shaming in IOs.

### *The effectiveness of naming and shaming*

A considerable number of studies have explored the impact of naming and shaming strategies within various fields—such as psychology (Tangney et al., 1996), criminal and corporate law (Braithwaite, 1989; Kahan, 1996; Skeel, 2001) and media studies (Petley, 2013)—suggesting that they constitute important means of shaping the behavior of individuals, states, and organizations.

Departing from Keck and Sikkink's influential study (1998); see also the follow-up work by Risse et al., 1999 and 2013), the extensive literature on NGO naming and shaming has grown and become an integral part of the IR literature. Based on the rich theoretical and empirical work of Keck and Sikkink (1998), IR scholars simply asked whether mere exposure and condemnation by NGOs such as AI made states reconsider their actions. The findings of these studies, however, devolved into a debate among IR scholars. More specifically, some studies have found that naming and shaming has no or only a minor impact on states' human rights practices (Kuperman, 2001; Bob, 2005). Most notably, Hafner-Burton's (2008) study analyzed naming and shaming by NGOs from 1975 to 2000. The results showed that while target states tend to improve their domestic conditions with regard to political rights, they rarely end the political terror after being shamed. In fact, publicly named and shamed states may even increase their level of political terror (Hafner-Burton, 2008:707).<sup>9</sup> More relevant for IOs, the empirical results of Hafner-Burton's study indicated that IO naming and shaming decreases the political rights abuses of target states, though the results were statistically insignificant. Franklin's (2008) study found that naming and shaming by NGOs reduced political repression in seven Latin American states between 1981 and 1995. In his research, Franklin found support for his argument that naming and shaming is more likely to be effective when states are "more closely tied to the outside world" (Franklin, 2008:206; see also,

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<sup>8</sup>See Keck and Sikkink (1998) on the role of states in naming and shaming campaigns.

<sup>9</sup>See also Kim 2015 for a similar impact on dictatorships.

Franklin, 2015). Whereas Hafner-Burton tested the boomerang model<sup>10</sup> and found that naming and shaming had a negative impact, Franklin's study found positive effects.

In another study, Murdie and Davis (2012) examined naming and shaming by international human rights non-governmental organizations (HROs) and found that HRO naming and shaming improves the human rights practices of target states. Most importantly, in contrast to Franklin (2008), they argued that the effects of naming and shaming are conditional on the presence of domestic NGOs, rather than on economic ties or regime type (Murdie and Davis, 2012:4). On the other hand, both DeMeritt (2012) and Krain (2012) found that naming and shaming by NGOs reduces the severity of ongoing genocides and politicides, suggesting that naming and shaming is a sufficient stand-alone influence strategy. Another noteworthy study carried out by Sharman (2009) examined the effects of the naming and shaming activities of the Financial Action Task Force (FAFT) on seven targeted states. The empirical results suggested that FATF naming and shaming is an effective tool in making states comply with their obligations by adopting prescribed policies. However, Sharman notes that this effect may be conditioned on the specific issue area (Sharman, 2009:594). Clark (2013) argues that IO naming and shaming is likely to be an effective tool when states have ratified international conventions, while it is ineffective for non-ratifying states.

In sum, while scholars largely agree that naming and shaming is likely to have a positive impact on state behavior, they debate its conditional effects and the pathways to norm compliance. It is worth noting, however, that a large portion of the literature deals with NGO naming and shaming and states' human rights practices (especially physical integrity rights). Moreover, few have tested how and when naming and shaming shapes the policies of democratic states. This dissertation extends the existing knowledge to IO naming and shaming, and to a somewhat different—or more specific—issue area: labor rights. The existing literature has overlooked areas in which media coverage is limited or absent, devoting little attention to other possible pathways to norm compliance. I also present unique data on ILO and interstate naming and shaming, and combine statistical methods with the comparative study of two democratic cases (Bennet and Elman, 2007; Lieberman, 2005) in order to assess the impact of ILO naming and shaming. Unlike previous studies, this dissertation theoretically and empirically examines the impact of naming (reporting) and shaming (condemnation) as two distinct

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<sup>10</sup>The boomerang model outlined by Keck and Sikkink (1998) underlines the role of international NGOs when domestic interest groups fail to influence governments. NGO naming and shaming efforts, then, mobilize third-party actors and put pressure on governments to comply.



processes. In the next section, I develop the reasons for distinguishing *naming* from *shaming* in more detail.

## Theory: social pressure and reputation in international politics

The overall theoretical framework applied in this dissertation, which is aimed at understanding the politics behind, and the impact of, naming and shaming strategies in international politics, centers around the most dominant IR theories: realist, rational/liberal institutionalist, and constructivist theories. While none of these established theories explicitly addresses naming and shaming strategies, I argue that they offer useful analytical tools and empirical expectations. The notions of social pressure, reputation, and status are fundamental to the understanding of how naming and shaming works.

The section below is structured according to the two overarching questions of this dissertation, and I review and present my arguments and offer alternative arguments and explanations as well. First, I start with the conceptualization of naming and shaming. Then, in the second sub-section, I theorize the determinants of IO and inter-state naming and shaming. In the following two sections, I briefly provide theoretical reasons for why states care about social pressure, and then theorize how and when naming and shaming may produce compliance with international norms. In the last section, I briefly outline and summarize the main empirical expectations of the dissertation.

### *What is naming and shaming?*

The literature on naming and shaming has devoted little attention to defining the phenomenon. As Saira Mohamed (2013) puts it: “indeed the use of the term has become so prevalent that authors and advocates seem to believe that the term is axiomatic and that its definition is unnecessary” (Mohamed, 2013:1200). According to the Cambridge Dictionary, “naming and shaming” is “the activity of saying publicly that a person, company, etc. has behaved in a bad or illegal way.”<sup>11</sup> It is by definition a public act that may comprise a wide range of tactics for exposing inappropriate behavior. Naming and shaming may include various more specific strategies—such as more direct condemnations or performance assessments of different kinds—as well as specific or loose indicators of performance or misconduct. The common feature in the entire range of naming and shaming strategies is that they are purposely designed to generate social pressure by exposing the misbehavior of an actor (Koliev and Lebovic, 2018). The concept of naming and shaming in itself may suggest that we are dealing with emotions such as shame, guilt,

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<sup>11</sup><https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/naming-and-shaming>

or embarrassment. The premise that states or state leaders in some instances may feel ashamed of their behavior has been put forth by a multitude of researchers (e.g., Scheff, 1994; Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 14; Checkel, 2001; Johnston, 2008; Zarakol, 2011; Adler-Nissen, 2014). However, naming and shaming is not necessarily conditioned on the psychological or emotional reactions of states or state leaders. The concept in the main parts of the IR literature relates to societal norms, status, image, reputation, or strategies in a broader sense (Johnston, 2008; Risse et al., 2013).

In general, the IR literature on naming and shaming is characterized by a lack of precision, and contains many overlapping concepts. The term “naming and shaming” is commonly used interchangeably with other terms such as “shaming” (Lebovic and Voeten, 2006), “public shaming” (Risse and Sikkink, 2013), “publicity” (Carnegie and Carson, 2014), the “mobilization of shame” (Joyce, 1978; Keck and Sikkink, 1998), “stigmatization” (Adler-Nissen, 2014; Friman, 2015b), and “blacklisting” or “shortlisting” (Sharman, 2009).

I adopt the perspective in this dissertation that naming and shaming should be understood as a strategic tactic that uses public exposure and condemnation to make states and the broader audience (i.e., other states, IOs, NGOs, individuals, etc.) aware of certain norm violations. More precisely, I define naming and shaming as a *strategy of publicly exposing an actor's wrongdoings and poor compliance with commonly agreed rules and norms* (for similar definitions, see Schimmelfennig, 2001:64, and Hafner-Burton, 2008). This somewhat broader definition of naming and shaming is helpful for several reasons. First, it acknowledges that multiple actors can use shaming, moving away from the NGO-centered definitions in the literature. Second, it recognizes different designs and forms of naming and shaming, not solely verbal condemnations. For example, naming and shaming strategies may be regular or irregular, and take the form of reports, rankings, or even ratings. Third, it emphasizes that these strategies are by nature public acts that require an audience made up of states, NGOs, IOs, and different kinds of non-state actors. Finally, it underlines that naming and shaming deals with a set of norms and rules that are recognized by the target. For instance, criticizing North Korea for violating the norms of human rights conventions does not qualify as naming and shaming according to my definition, since North Korea has not recognized or committed to international human rights norms. Moreover, this definition underlines the difference between naming and shaming and the broader idea of “soft power,” as the former may be employed by weaker actors toward the more powerful (Greenhill and Busby, 2015).

I make an analytical distinction between naming, as the public identification or assessment of performance, and shaming, a more severe form of public

punishment and direct condemnation (See Friman, 2015b, for a somewhat similar distinction). For example, naming strategies may take the form of a blacklist or a country report produced by organizations such as the FATF or AI. Shaming, on the other hand, may take the form of a resolution adopted by bodies such as the UN Security Council or the European Parliament. Shaming is generally less subtle, and is accompanied by verbal condemnations. While both naming and shaming are intended to induce compliance, equating these two processes in all instances is inappropriate, and may even limit our understanding of their uses and effects. While I use the term naming and shaming (strategies) throughout this dissertation when referring to both processes, I only discuss them separately when analytically relevant. The distinction between naming and shaming is made in the first and third articles. Since the distinction is less relevant in the second and fourth articles, I do not treat the concepts separately. In the third article, naming and shaming by design refers to shaming (condemnations). In the fourth article, the main focus is on the impact of CEACR reporting (naming).

### *The politics of naming and shaming*

Why and how do IOs employ naming and shaming strategies? Arguably, the most fundamental issue related to naming and shaming strategies is whether or not they are relevant tools for addressing international violations. The relevance of shaming strategies is ultimately dependent on their credibility and legitimacy in targeting states that violate international standards. Both the purpose and use of naming and shaming strategies, however, are disputed issues in the IR literature.

For realist scholars, IO naming and shaming is a tool wielded by powerful states and employed to promote their strategic interests. From this point of view, IOs are inclined to target politically and economically less powerful states (Lebovic and Voeten, 2006:871). According to realists, state leaders are essentially motivated by their strategic interests, especially within the area of security. It is assumed, then, that powerful states would use their assets to reward allies and punish rivals through IOs, in order to maintain their status and to protect their own interests. Indeed, recent studies have argued that naming and shaming is an inherently political exercise, rather than a formal way of monitoring non-compliance (Terman and Voeten, 2017; Boockman and Dreher, 2010; Hill et al., 2013).

For rational institutionalists, IOs design naming and shaming strategies to deter “free riding” by detecting non-compliance and enforcing compliance through reputational costs (Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Keohane, 1984). For constructivist scholars, IO naming and shaming is a strategy that targets norm violators by exposing their illegitimate behavior (Johnston, 2001; Weisband, 2000). In contrast to the realist view, rational institutionalists and constructivists converge in their belief that IO naming and shaming process-

es are more or less separate from the political interests of member states. Drawing on these two approaches, I argue that IOs are capable of overcoming political biases by relying on their formal principles. “Fair” and formal targeting processes are crucial for the survival and functioning of IOs, since naming and shaming is not only about singling out violators, but ultimately affects the legitimacy of IOs when it comes to enforcing collective agreements. To be sure, the political and strategic interests of member states are always present, and that these member states will try to influence the naming and shaming decisions of the IOs in accordance with their interests. But as constructivist and liberal institutionalists contend, the benefits emerging from “fair” naming and shaming practices exceed the benefits of “political” targeting. According to this point of view, states realize that IOs are there to right a wrong.

IR theorists also provide some answers regarding the politics of inter-state naming and shaming. Researchers working in the realist tradition view inter-state naming and shaming as a way to promote strategic interests. This gives us reason to suspect that state leaders target rival states in order to place them in a negative light, while avoiding targeting allies—even if those allies violate international norms (Terman and Voeten, 2017). Perhaps most importantly, the realist view concedes that democracies and non-democracies behave similarly. According to a strictly realist argument, states are driven by external constraints, not by their domestic structures and norms (Maoz, 1998:6). Indeed, much of the previous literature on inter-state shaming focuses on external constraints. I argue that rationalists and constructivists provide different, more compelling, explanations. Drawing on the literature from scholars working in these traditions, I propose that states’ engagement in naming and shaming can be attributed to their regime type. More explicitly, I argue that the condition of being a democratic state is conducive to engaging in naming and shaming. There are multiple reasons why democratic states are more motivated to name and shame violators. The two main explanations are based on two somewhat different logics. According to rational institutionalists, the existence of a free civil society and opposition groups makes governments more inclined to name and shame norm violators. If the (democratic) governments do not meet the demands of domestic interest groups to name and shame violators, they may lose their credibility and odds for retaining power, especially if the policies of the government do not line up with its promises. The constructivist logic, on the other hand, asserts that democratic leaders view naming and shaming as part of their duty to protect and promote democratic values (Doyle, 1996; Risse et al., 1999:23). But both logics concur in the belief that democracies, due to their structure and embraced principles, are more motivated to name and shame violators. By the same token, nondemocratic states are less motivated to engage in shaming, since they are less susceptible to the demands of domestic interest

groups. Autocratic states are also less likely to support liberal democratic principles such as the right to organization and freedom of association.

### *Why does naming and shaming induce compliance?*

There are several explanations as to why states are susceptible to social pressure generated by naming and shaming. Political leaders care about naming and shaming because it may have consequences for their professional reputation, the reputation of their government or department, and/or the international standing of the country they represent. Arguably, the impact of naming and shaming fundamentally relies on the existence of widely accepted international rules and norms, and the belief that non-compliance or poor performance in relation to these creates an impression of failure, both domestically and internationally.

For the rational institutional theorists, reputation means credibility, while for the constructivist theorists, reputation means status and image. Rational institutionalists have long stressed the role of reputation as a source of credibility and power in international politics (Schelling, 1966; Jervis, 1979; Keohane, 1984; Fearon, 1994; Downs and Jones, 2002; Sartori, 2002; Tomz, 2007; for an overview, see Brewster, 2013). Reputation is based on states' past behavior, and is thus vulnerable to negative information that indicates failure or irresponsibility. As such, public exposure of poor performance and non-compliance matters because states gain a negative reputation, or lose credibility in international cooperation (Keohane, 1984; Guzman, 2008). As Keohane notes: "Reputation is a crucial resource; and the most important aspect of an actor's reputation in world politics is the belief of others that it will keep its future commitments" (Keohane, 1984:116).<sup>12</sup> Following this logic, some scholars have argued that reputation is most important in relation to trade and security issues (Downs and Jones, 2002:112). If states are publicly named and shamed as norms violators, the subsequently invoked social pressure alters their behavior for instrumental reasons, such as loss of future gains. Constructivist theorists, however, highlight the elites' concerns with status, image, and identity, along with their moral responsibility. They suggest that social pressure generates social punishments that may damage the status of elites in the international community (Franck, 1990; Chayes and Chayes, 1995; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Wendt, 1999, 2004; Checkel, 2001; Johnston, 2008; Zarakol, 2011; Risse et al., 2013). In simple terms, the dividing line is that for rational institutionalists, the public exposure of a state's misconduct results in a loss of reputation in terms of credibility, while for constructivist theorists, it results in the loss of reputation in a moral

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<sup>12</sup> Reputation is also seen as an important resource in order to make credible threats in wartime (Erickson, 2015).


sense. Although rational institutionalist and constructivist theorists have different notions of what reputation may comprise, the strict empirical expectation of the use and impact of naming and shaming is similar, or at least possible to find a common ground for (Erickson, 2015:23; Koliev and Lebovic, 2018). States may value their reputation both in terms of being viewed as a trustworthy member of the global community, and for moral reasons, in order to facilitate future gains from cooperation. For example, a country may improve its human rights conditions in order to maintain its standing in international politics, and to secure current or future gains from international cooperation. While there has been a tendency in the IR literature to view rationalist and constructivist logics as broadly competing—with better arguments in some cases than others—I support prior contributions that emphasize their complementary nature and shared expectations (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Lebovic and Voeten, 2006; Erickson, 2015; Kelley, 2017). 2001; Lebovic and Voeten 2006; Erickson 2015; Kelley 2017).

### *How and when does naming and shaming work?*

In this dissertation, I argue that IO naming and shaming may be an effective strategy to produce compliance under certain circumstances. In a considerable portion of the NGO naming and shaming literature, IOs are viewed as third-party actors (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Cmiel, 1999). I adopt a more IO-centered approach, emphasizing the role of IOs in naming and shaming activities. The established IO literature within the IR field of research has shown that IOs, through monitoring and information generation, are able to enforce, prescribe, and persuade states into norm-conforming behavior independently of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and other transnational actors (Keohane, 1984; Chayes and Chayes, 1995; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Weisband, 2000; Wiseberg, 2003; Pevehouse, 2005; Dai, 2007). While states may ratify international conventions for reasons other than respect for their provisions, once a state has ratified a particular convention, it has made a public commitment (Elkins et al., 2013; Clark, 2013). Due to this commitment, the IO's monitoring systems have leverage over states in the form of the right and responsibility to expose potential norm-violating behavior and disseminate this information. The naming and shaming strategies of IOs, then, are central to punishing norm violators. The information made public by IOs about states' performance and violations does not constitute "neutral" information. Rather, the information generates knowledge and reinforces existing norms or creates new ones, enhancing the salience of particular issues. Most importantly, it puts a focus on specific countries that have failed to live up to their international commitments.

This dissertation contends that three possible mechanisms of influence—elite responses, domestic politics, and transnational politics—are triggered

when IOs name and shame countries, as illustrated in Figure 2 (Kelley and Simmons, 2016; see also, Keck and Sikkink, 1998).



**Figure 2.** IO naming and shaming mechanisms of influence

First, IOs’ capacity to generate social pressure through interaction with elites can promote norm compliance (Greenhill, 2010; Johnston, 2001; Weisband, 2000). The elite pathway underlines the role of individual decision-makers or political elites. As noted by other scholars, elites may respond positively to social pressure in order to save their professional careers, and avoid negative international criticism and its subsequent consequences (Checkel, 2001; Johnston, 2001; Kelley and Simmons, 2016). For instance, they may push for change internally by persuading colleagues in the government. Elites may also be better informed of the negative consequences of government policies than other groups, and may thus re-examine their positions. Note, however, that this particular mechanism is somewhat distinct from the capacity of IOs to socialize elites into a common framework of norms (Finnemore, 1993). The emphasis in this case is on the role of IOs as “judges” that impose reputational or status costs by exposing wrongdoing (Broome et al., 2017:517).

Second, IO naming and shaming mobilizes domestic interest groups. When a state is named and shamed by an IO, attention to the issue increases, enabling domestic actors—such as political parties, NGOs, and reform-minded groups in general—to pressure the government to introduce reforms (Clark,

2001; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). In this context, IO naming and shaming amplifies the criticism from domestic interest groups, and thus increases the odds of compliance (Murdie and Davis, 2012).

Third, IO naming and shaming mobilizes transnational criticism. By naming and shaming governments for violating international norms, IOs not only mobilize domestic interest groups, but also transnational actors (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Kelley and Simmons, 2016). Shaming by INGOs and states has been found to be effective in making targeted states comply with their international obligations (DeMeritt, 2012; Hendrix and Wong, 2013; Terman and Voeten, 2017). The engagement of INGOs and third-party states may lead to an even broader mobilization of actors against the norm-violating state, which is likely to increase the reputational and status concerns of its government (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).

The three mechanisms of influence just discussed may operate separately, or in a complementary fashion. The decision to target a violator may be based on information coming from domestic or international groups, or it may be based on governmental reports submitted to IOs. I view these three mechanisms as complementary in generating pressure on target states (Kelley and Simmons, 2016; see also Krain, 2012). Arguably, each mechanism of influence may be more relevant in certain cases, under particular conditions, and less so in others. While IO naming and shaming may induce compliance via elite, domestic, and transnational pathways, I contend that there are certain scope conditions under which it is likely to be a more powerful tool for inducing change. More precisely, I focus on country-level factors, and the factors pertaining to the nature of IO naming and shaming. At the elite level, for example, the violated policy area would need to be closely related to the particular elite(s) in order to trigger professional concerns (Checkel, 2001; Kelley and Simmons, 2016; Kijima and Lipcy, 2017). Elites in democracies may be particularly sensitive to IO naming and shaming, since they are more frequently scrutinized by opponents and domestic media.

At the transnational level, governments' international ambitions to be seen as trustworthy, and their dependence on aid and/or trade are likely to make them vulnerable to IO naming and shaming (Franklin, 2008). IO naming and shaming triggers transnational pressure from INGOs and third-party actors—such as states and multilateral organizations—and may affect aid, foreign investments and various (trade) agreements in target states (Lebovic and Voeten, 2009; Esarey and DeMeritt, 2017). As a consequence, state leaders have significant reasons to correct their behavior. As discussed, states also have norm-based reasons to comply. The critique coming from some domestic actors may be pushed aside more easily than when it comes from international actors, such as IOs. This is because the government's policies, are not



simply being criticized by opposition parties or NGOs, but are being negatively assessed by the international community.

At the domestic level, the regime type and the capacity of domestic interest groups to mobilize are likely to play significant roles in the likelihood that a state will comply (Risse and Ropp, 2013; Murdie and Davis, 2012). Democratic states are especially sensitive to naming and shaming due to their domestic structure (i.e., free elections and civil society), and the typical endorsement of humanitarian norms. Moreover, I expect the relative strength of domestic interest groups in democracies to be of significance. More tenacious domestic interest groups are more likely to succeed in pushing a government to correct its behavior. For example, when a government violates environmental agreements, it is reasonable to expect that the more powerful the environmental group, the more likely it is to achieve its goals when backed up by IOs. By contrast, democracies with weaker domestic interest groups would be less vulnerable to IO criticism.

The intensity of naming and shaming strategies may also play an important role in inducing change. Strong condemnations may lead to stronger reactions from domestic and international actors, pushing governments to introduce new reforms (Johnston, 2001; Weisband, 2000). The intensity of naming and shaming is likely to be more powerful in democratic societies with free and independent media. More intense and persistent naming and shaming may mobilize broader groups—even groups that do not normally mobilize. In contrast, nondemocratic regimes may have greater control over the dissemination of information and criticism from international actors. As established in previous studies, non-democracies carefully control which information reaches the domestic audience. In addition, more publicity does not necessarily imply greater mobilization of domestic actors in these cases, since such actions can be risky or impossible in non-democracies.

### *The empirical expectations*

Drawing mainly on rational institutionalist and constructivist theories of international politics, and the literature on naming and shaming, I propose a set of hypotheses and observable implications. The main empirical expectations of the dissertation—related to the research questions—can be summarized in four points.

First, if IOs are able to overcome multiple political interests, we should expect states that have violated international standards to be exposed more often by IOs than states that respect and obey their international commitments. Conversely, if IO naming and shaming is a tool of powerful states, the violation of international norms should be peripheral or less important in determining which states are punished. In addition, if powerful states have a

decisive influence on IO naming and shaming decisions, we would also expect to observe targeting patterns that reward the allies of powerful states, while punishing their adversaries.

Second, if states' decisions to name and shame can be explained by their democratic character, we should expect democracies to be more likely to target violators than non-democracies. Alternatively, if the decisions of states to name and shame norm violators are explained by their strategic interests, we should expect states to target their rivals and go easy on their allies.

Third, if IO naming and shaming is effective in bringing states into compliance, we should observe behavioral change in targeted states, and not in non-targeted states. The empirical expectation here is that norm-violating states will correct their behavior after being named and shamed through the mechanisms of influence outlined above. Arguably, not all states would respond positively to exposure; thus, we can expect the efficacy of IO naming and shaming to be conditioned on certain factors. If, as this dissertation contends, democracies are indeed more sensitive to IO exposure, then we should expect democracies to be particularly likely to introduce reforms.

Fourth, if IO naming and shaming works through the three suggested mechanisms of influence, we should observe qualitative evidence showing that the relevant mechanisms of influence have been at work. More precisely, I expect IOs' and other actors' efforts to reflect and relate to the decisions of targeted states to comply with international standards.

The hypotheses and empirical expectations described in this section are formulated in more detail and tested in separate articles that rely on various methodological techniques. Below, I elaborate further on why the ILO is an interesting case to test these theoretical insights, and describe the overall methodological approaches.

## Research Design

To address my research questions, I focus on the ILO. The absence of centralized enforcement mechanisms in the ILO provides a suitable environment for the examination of IO naming and shaming and its mechanisms of influence. The ILO's monitoring system has served as a prototype for other IOs (Chayes and Chayes, 1995:16; Haas, 1964), such as environmental and financial agreements, allowing for generalization to a broader population of IOs, (Chayes and Chayes, 1995:14, 20, and 71; Bartolomei et al., 1996). Ironically, perhaps, many of the ideas developed by Ernst Haas (1964) relat-

ing to neo-functionalism and European integration were originally based on the ILO, but later applied to the European Union (EU). Miriam Hartlapp's comparative assessment of the EU and ILO demonstrates that these organizations face similar non-compliance challenges, and adopt somewhat similar approaches—enforcement, management and persuasion—to stimulate compliance (Hartlapp, 2005) Although the EU constitutes a unique case in international politics due to its exceptional enforcement mechanism, it does, like many other IOs, use management and persuasion approaches to tackle collective problems.

Nevertheless, the issue of generalizability must be addressed in terms of two aspects: the policy area, and the institutional design. In terms of policy area, the ILO's particular focus on labor rights may imply limitations in terms of generalizability to other areas, such as trade, in which the mechanisms of reciprocity between states are more prominent than within the sphere of labor and human rights. This does not imply that IO naming and shaming is less effective in these cases. In fact, it may even be more powerful when reciprocity or interdependence is more salient, since there may be more at stake for a government targeted by an IO. For example, FATF naming and shaming implies direct material damage for the targeted state in terms of foreign investments (Sharman, 2009), while such effects are less prominent in the labor rights area. The nearly immediate reaction by the "market" leaves the target with few choices, and demands change. To some degree, labor rights violations, such as restricting the right to unionize or employ collective bargaining, are considered to be less severe, and thus less salient than grave human rights violations, which typically mobilize many powerful organizations and states. At the very least, violations of physical integrity rights attract more attention from the media and various resourceful transnational organizations. In this sense, one could view labor rights as a tougher test of the impact of IO naming and shaming on state behavior. I do not, however, make a general proposition that different types of violations generate different reactions from organizations such as AI and Human Rights Watch. In this dissertation, I focus on the core conventions of the ILO, which arguably represent those labor rights viewed as being most salient. In essence, the differences with regard to policy area may imply that IO naming and shaming is likely to work under somewhat different conditions. Importantly, one needs to distinguish the impact on IO naming and shaming depending on certain policy areas, on the one hand, and the politics of IO naming and shaming on the other hand. The question of policy area is more sensitive to the arguments regarding the impact of naming and shaming, while it is less relevant to the politics of targeting. Of course, the politics of targeting may also be sensitive to the policy areas in which targeting is applied, although to a lower degree, since the reluctance to be criticized should be the same.

Due to the distinct institutional design of the ILO, caution is called for when generalizing the findings of this dissertation. More broadly, generalizing from one IO to the population of IOs is problematic, regardless of their “similarities.” The ILO is in many ways similar to other IOs in terms of monitoring structure and the use of naming and shaming as a central mechanism of influence. However, it also differs from the majority of IOs in terms of the voting rights of non-state actors. While this particular tripartite structure is atypical, it is by no means unique to the ILO. The United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) has permanent representation from labor and business associations, and the World Conservation Union has granted voting rights to states, NGOs, and the scientific community. Nevertheless, one must acknowledge and evaluate how the particular features of an IO affect the results and their generalizability. The EU, for instance, is in many ways a unique IO due its institutional structure. Nevertheless, studies of the EU have contributed important insights that have broader implications for the functioning of IOs (see for instance, Tallberg, 2002). This has been possible because scholars have been able to account for the unique features of the studied IOs. With regard to the ILO, two features stand out. First, the voting rights of non-state actors are limited to the formulation of ratifications and recommendations. Governments are dependent on the support of non-state actors (and vice versa) in order to adopt certain international instruments, such as conventions and recommendations. Once adopted, it is up to states to ratify these conventions. The monitoring of ratified conventions is primarily handled by the experts in the CEACR. In this respect, the ILO is by no means different from IOs in which secretariats or compliance review panels and dispute settlement panels review state conformance to IO rules. In fact, these similarities to other IOs, combined with its long history, made Haas (1965) interested in studying the ILO (Haas, 1965:713–714). The CAS, however, is tripartite by design, although member states do not participate in the listing decisions. This gives non-state actors the power to target violators without the interference of member states. However, states engage in shaming once the list is determined, and the target states are obliged to attend the meeting in order to explain their behavior. While there are no comparable IO environments, NGOs have somewhat similar opportunities to target states in the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and the UNHRC. On the one hand, this exclusive privilege given to non-state actors to compile the list may be seen as more impartial than if the member states had been involved. Yet the power given to non-state actors is not a rule, but rather an established practice in which member states have outsourced these privileges in order to avoid targeting each other. As such, the practice may matter less for the target states, since the list does not necessarily reflect the preferences of the other member states, but is more likely to reflect the ideological and political preferences of non-state actors.

Second, the tripartite structure of the ILO might suggest that it should be viewed as a “most-likely case” for successful shaming, since the incorporation of unions and employers provides a good foundation for more sustainable agreements and socialization. While this is not a completely false assumption, it overlooks the traditional conflict of interests between employers and employees. Miriam Hartlapp notes, for example, that the ILO’s ability to achieve agreements is “constrained by political cleavages and the need for consensus in its decision-making bodies” (Hartlapp, 2008:31). These conflicting interests have led to stalemates in many cases. Perhaps the most salient case in this respect is the right-to-strike discussions in 2012, which paralyzed the entire organization due to disagreements between its members. Haas (1964) foresaw this 50 years ago, observing that the lack of a common set of ideological preferences constituted a major obstacle to the ILO’s ability to coordinate a meaningful interaction between these actors. Furthermore, the institutional capacity of IOs may also constitute an important factor in producing compliance through naming and shaming; in other words, the logic of management may matter in this equation (Chayes and Chayes, 1995). Like most other IOs, the ILO lacks traditional enforcement mechanisms. However, the ILO’s level of institutionalization does not appear excessive when compared to that of other IOs. According to Joachim et al. (2008), for instance, the ILO exhibits a moderate degree of institutionalization. On this scale, IOs such as the EU, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) are the most institutionalized and resourceful (Joachim et al., 2008:177–178). Based on this, it is reasonable to view the ILO as a harder test for IO naming and shaming, though perhaps not as a “least-likely case.” Its long history, and the nearly universal ratification of most of its conventions, indicates that the norms of “proper” behavior are relatively established in the ILO. This should, arguably, enhance the effectiveness of IO naming and shaming. On the whole, while generalizations to other IOs should be made cautiously, the theoretical arguments and empirical results of this dissertation may offer important insights on how IO naming and shaming may function.

A mixed-methods approach has been used in this dissertation, employing both qualitative and quantitative research methods. To address the first and second research questions, I primarily rely on various regression techniques. In answering the third and fourth research questions, I adopt a mixed-method design utilizing statistical models, as well as comparative case study analysis and process tracing. Due to the nature of the research questions—exploring the trends and patterns of IO naming and shaming—the dominant methodological approach is quantitative.

In the first and second article, ordered and logistic regression models are used to demonstrate the predictability of different theoretical considerations

and arguments. The two-stage models (Heckman models), along with other robustness tests, are used to test for possible selection bias. The third article also utilizes logistic regression analysis on directed dyad datasets. In the fourth paper, I employ comparative case study analysis and process tracing techniques (Bennet and Elman, 2007; Beach and Pedersen, 2016). Informed by the results of the third article (e.g., Koliev et al., 2017), two “most-similar-system” cases were carefully selected for the fourth article. Thus, the two cases are drawn from the population of cases analyzed in the third article (Lieberman, 2005). One case confirmed the general expectation of the quantitative analysis: Greece—a democratic country—corrected its behavior after being targeted by the ILO with regard to convention No. 98. The other case, Hungary, also confirmed the general expectation, but IO naming and shaming did not produce compliance. The central aim of comparing these two cases is to find out if the difference in the independent variables of interest might explain the differences in outcome (Bennet and Elman, 2007:175; see also Rohlfing, 2014). I use process tracing—specifically theory-testing process tracing—to identify the mechanisms and conditions that either broke down or operated as theorized, since my analytical focus is on deductively derived mechanisms and scope conditions, and whether and how they transmit causal forces to explain variation in the dependent variable (Beach and Pedersen, 2016:15).

## *Data*

The overall methodological strength of this dissertation lies in the underlying analytical sharpness of the collected data on naming and shaming acts. While most studies rely on general media shaming of norm-violating states (DeMeritt, 2012; Murdie and Davis, 2012; Krain, 2012), the data utilized in this dissertation captures public pressure more accurately. The definition and operationalization of naming and shaming are not always straightforward. Scholars have used different operationalizations, including different types of shortlists, public resolutions, and overall negative media publicity. The latter has been used most frequently, especially in the NGO shaming literature. In this dissertation, as already mentioned, the relevant sources of naming and shaming are the CEACR and the CAS. Lacking centralized enforcement mechanisms, these two bodies have consistently relied on naming and shaming by both reporting on the performance (naming/reporting) and explicitly condemning the “worst” offenders (shaming). This process is sequential, with naming preceding shaming (Koliev and Lebovic, 2018). Similar sequential processes can be found in other IOs, such as the International Narcotics Board (Friman, 2015b) and the WHO.

To address the questions of naming and shaming, novel time-series cross-sectional datasets on the ILO’s and states’ naming and shaming acts from 1989 to 2014 were collected. In collecting this data, I relied on official

CEACR and CAS documents from their annual meetings.<sup>13</sup> The shaming data has served as the dependent variable in the first article, and as the independent variable in the third article. For inter-state naming and shaming, I relied on the record of proceedings reports from the CAS (see Appendix 2 in the second article for the coding schedule). Structured in directed-dyad form, this data served as the dependent variable in the second paper. For ILO naming and shaming, I went through all the relevant documents and identified the states with “observations” (naming), and those included on the CAS shortlist (shaming). For inter-state naming and shaming, I identified instances of public condemnation based on established definitions (see Article 2 for coding schedule).

For the fourth article, I conducted semi-structured interviews with ILO officials, government representatives, national employer and union representatives, and international trade union organizations attending the International Labour Conference (ILC). In total, I conducted 15 interviews on two occasions during my visits to the ILC in Geneva, Switzerland. In addition, previous literature on Greece and Hungary was included in the analysis in the fourth article, as well as these countries’ direct communications with the ILO.

The population of countries included in the dataset varies slightly between the first and third articles due to the availability of other data sources. In the first and second articles, the data includes all naming and shaming acts with regard to all fundamental conventions of the ILO. The ILO’s fundamental conventions are its most important conventions, explicitly prioritized by its members. They deal with various fundamental and essential aspects of workers’ rights, as displayed in Figure 3.

- Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87)
- Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98)
- Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)
- Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105)
- Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138)
- Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182)
- Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100)
- Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1959 (No. 111)

**Figure 3.** The fundamental conventions of the ILO

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<sup>13</sup>All documents are available at the ILO’s website:  
<http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09616/>

In the third article, the focus is on naming and shaming acts with regard to the ILO's two fundamental conventions. This restriction is imposed due to the weighting logic of the dependent variable—the workers' rights score—in which freedom of association (ILO convention No. 87) and collective bargaining (ILO convention No. 98) is emphasized. These two conventions have been ratified by virtually all states in the world. The case studies are drawn from the same population of states, and cover the same study period. Note also that ILO naming and shaming is a subject of analysis in all articles except for the second article, in which the focus is on inter-state naming and shaming. Here, by design, the agent (or the “shamer”) is not the ILO, but state members of the ILO that decide whether or not to condemn the target.

While I collected all data on ILO naming and shaming acts, many other data sources were used for a large number of variables, including the “CIRI” workers' rights score (Cingranelli and Richards, 2014). The CIRI's workers' rights score is one of the most widely used datasets within the labor rights literature (Kim, 2012; Peksen and Blanton, 2016). Another widely utilized dataset on labor rights is that collected by Layna Mosley (2010). This dataset was not appropriate for the purposes of this dissertation, however, since its workers' rights score is based on reports produced by the ILO's CEACR. CIRI's workers' rights score, on the other hand, is based on the US State Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. These reports are prepared by embassy staff in each country on the basis of information from opposition parties, local human rights activists, academics, and various other sources.

The lack of available data on other important variables has restricted my analysis to the period from 1989 to 2011, though with some minor variations in the different articles. The existing studies on naming and shaming vary in terms of the chosen study period, covering both the Cold War period and the post-Cold War period, or focusing only on the post-Cold War period. This dissertation focuses mainly on the post-Cold War period, thus excluding the effects of the dominant *realpolitik* characterizing the Cold War period.

## Summary of the articles

The following short summary of the four articles highlights the findings of this dissertation. The first two articles deal with the questions of why and how IOs and states use naming and shaming, and the last two articles deal with the impact of IO naming and shaming on states' compliance with international conventions. The fourth article is informed by the results of the third



article, and utilizes qualitative methods, while quantitative methods are used in articles 1–3.

**Article 1:** *Selecting for Shame: The Monitoring of Workers' Rights by the International Labour Organization, 1989 to 2011*

In this paper, co-authored with James H. Lebovic, we examine the ILO's naming and shaming strategies. Studies focusing on the impact of naming and shaming have devoted little attention to the questions of how these strategies are used, and why. We pose two main questions. First, are naming and shaming by IOs used for political purposes, or to actually expose states that have violated international norms? Second, we ask whether naming and shaming are effectively two distinct processes. Drawing on IR theories, we generate several hypotheses that help us understand the processes surrounding the exposure strategies of IOs. We test these hypotheses using a novel dataset on the naming and shaming strategies used by the ILO in relation to seven fundamental conventions. Our main findings can be summarized in three points. First, we find considerable evidence for the hypothesis that the ILO's naming and shaming activities target states with severely restricted labor rights protection, suggesting that the ILO's decisions about which states to target are not politically motivated, a finding that lends credibility and integrity to the organization. Second, contrary to realist assumptions that IOs are disinclined to name and shame powerful states, we find that the ILO is more likely to target politically and economically powerful states. However, we also find that leftist governments are less likely to be targeted compared to other states. Moreover, our findings indicate that institutionally designed political bodies pursue a narrow agenda in targeting, focusing on a smaller set of conventions covering basic labor rights. Third, we find that naming and shaming are two distinct processes in which different targeting criteria is applied.

**Article 2:** *Is State Shaming in International Organizations a Democratic Phenomenon? The Determinants of State Shaming in the ILO, 1991–2011*

This article explores the determinants of state shaming by IOs. While the literature assumes that states play a crucial role in pressuring violators to correct their behavior, few studies explain why states engage in naming and shaming in international politics. In this study, I propose a regime-type explanation for inter-state shaming in international politics. I pose two inter-related questions: (1) are democratic countries more prone to condemn norm violations than nondemocratic countries? and (2) are democracies likely to shame each other in cases of norm violations? To answer these questions, I use a unique dataset on inter-state shaming in the ILO for the period 1991–2011. In line with my main argument, the results suggest that democracies are more likely to engage in the shaming of norm violators than non-

democracies. I find no evidence for special relations between democracies. Unlike in non-democracies, domestic liberal groups within democracies can exert influence on their government's foreign policy decisions. In addition, this study unpacks other factors influencing the patterns of inter-state shaming. For example, states are generally less likely to criticize their trading partners, which suggests that naming and shaming decisions are also determined by strategic considerations. In addition, the results indicate that naming and shaming is used more frequently by less powerful states to influence the policies of powerful states. These findings have implications for how we understand inter-state interactions in international politics.

**Article 3:** *Compliance Without Enforcement: Effects of Reporting on Respect for International Labor Rights*

In this article, co-authored with Thomas Sommerer and Jonas Tallberg, we examine the effects of naming and shaming in the ILO on states' labor rights behavior. More specifically, we focus on the impact of the CEACR and CAS exposure strategies. We argue that IO exposure may affect state behavior through social pressure and reputational concerns, even in the absence of direct enforcement mechanisms. Drawing on IR theories of social pressure, we develop a set of hypotheses concerning the impact of reporting (naming): first as a stand-alone strategy, and then coupled with shaming. To test our hypotheses, we use a unique dataset on ILO naming and shaming covering 156 countries for the period 1989–2011. The main findings of this article can be summarized in three points. The first of these is that IO exposure matters. The ILO's performance assessments have a positive and long-lasting effect on states' respect for international labor standards. The impacts are fairly immediate, and the improvements may be long-lasting. Importantly, the effects are particularly salient in cases of severe violations of labor rights. Moreover, our results also suggest that the repeated exposure of a state's misconduct over a longer period leads to improvements in labor rights. Second, reporting need not involve shaming in order to be effective; under some conditions, however, employing naming and shaming together as two sequential processes may be necessary to generate improvements. Finally, and most importantly, public exposure is not effective in influencing the behavior of all states. The results of our analysis suggest that wealthier and democratic states are more likely to be susceptible to exposure than non-democratic and poorer states.

**Article 4:** *The Impact of ILO Naming and Shaming on Democratic States: A Comparative Case Study of Labor Rights Violations in Greece and Hungary*

Previous studies have established that naming and shaming is more likely to produce compliance in democratic states; but what explains the variation among democracies? The literature does not provide clear answers to this

question. In this paper, I ask how and when IO naming and shaming influences the behavior of democratic governments. To explore these questions, I conduct a comparative case study of two “most-similar” cases—Greece and Hungary—that have responded differently after being targeted by the ILO. Whereas ILO naming and shaming produced compliance in the case of Greece, it failed to do so in the case of Hungary. Drawing on theories on social pressure and international politics, I outline three mechanisms of influence: elite response, domestic politics, and transnational politics. In addition, I theorize the conditions under which IO naming and shaming is most likely to be a powerful tool in democratic states. Using process tracing, I systematically analyze these mechanisms and conditions in order to explain the variation in outcomes. There are two principal findings in this study: (1) the elite response channel is not a necessary condition for inducing change in democratic states, and (2) ILO naming and shaming produced compliance in Greece’s case due to the country’s powerful and united domestic interest groups. The lack of such groups explains the negative outcome in the case of Hungary. The findings provide new insights into how IO naming and shaming may work in democratic states, and lend support to previous quantitative studies that stress the presence and capabilities of domestic interest groups for successful naming and shaming.

## Conclusions

In this section, I briefly present the key findings and discuss the broader implications of this dissertation.

### *Key findings and implications*

The overall conclusions of the dissertation are fourfold. First, in contrast to what many observers have argued, the odds of norm violators evading ILO exposure are low. This finding has substantive implications for researchers and policy makers. Theoretically, this is a significant contribution to the literature, since a majority of scholars have viewed naming and shaming as a strictly political exercise. By demonstrating that IOs are indeed capable of neutralizing the influence of self-interested states, the implication of this study is that neither scholars nor policy makers should assume that naming and shaming constitutes a politically-biased phenomenon. Evidently, not all IOs use naming and shaming in the same way, nor do they possess the same institutional set-up. However, the results of the dissertation suggest that naming and shaming is likely to be used in the “right way” in IOs with expert (independent) committees that carry out initial assessments, such as the FATF and the WHO. The likelihood of political bias may be greater when naming and shaming mechanisms are based solely on state-to-state shaming. In view of this, it is not surprising that scholars have found naming and

shaming in the UPR to be more politically motivated (Terman and Voeten, 2017) than in the ILO. Such political bias may jeopardize the system and credibility of IOs by creating possibilities for some states to evade naming and shaming, particularly the more powerful states and their allies. Recent reports revealing the corrupt practices employed by the government of Azerbaijan to avoid criticism in the Council of Europe provide an illustrative example of the problems that may arise in the absence of independent bodies able to assess and thwart the politicization of IOs.<sup>14</sup> These findings may have substantial implications for future naming and shaming strategies in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat, which reviews the climate change reports established under the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, the empirical analysis suggests that naming and shaming are two distinct processes in terms of the nature of exposure and the criteria for targeting—despite formally sharing the same goals and being empirically bound by a common set of principles. This challenges the predominant assumption that these two phenomena constitute one single strategy (for example, see: Hafner-Burton, 2008; Murdie and Davis, 2012; DeMeritt, 2012; for similar arguments, see Friman, 2015b). In fact, the analysis suggests that naming alone can produce compliance. While shaming alone generally seems insufficient in bringing about change, it may generate compliance when coupled with domestic presence of labor rights-oriented INGOs. This suggests that the effectiveness of shaming is dependent on the strength of the transnational community (see, for example, Murdie and Davis, 2012). To some degree, then, naming strategies may be more effective without shaming. These insights potentially open up new theoretical as well as methodological approaches to the study of the politics and impact of naming and shaming. Experimental studies that distinguish between these two strategies should be a priority for future research.

Second, the dissertation highlights regime type as a crucial factor in explaining the decisions of states to name and shame violators. The results imply that states engage to a greater extent in naming and shaming because of their democratic character. The implication of this result is that a focus on the characteristics of the targets, and on states' bilateral relations as determinants of naming and shaming, is insufficient. The evidence presented in this dissertation reinforces the latent view in the literature that the Western world and its associated values are the main driving forces behind exposure strategies. This suggests that the naming and shaming of human rights and labor rights abuses is ultimately based on moral pathos (Risse et al., 2013). Further research is needed across a range of issues, however, in order to establish this. Future research should thus account for and evaluate the impact of regime type on state compliance. For policy makers and labor rights scholars,

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<sup>14</sup><https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/05/azerbaijan-revelations-could-herald-shake-up-at-council-of-europe>

these findings nuance the conception of which states are likely to be the “guardians” of international labor standards, and why.

Third, social pressure in international politics matters, even in the absence of enforcement mechanisms and media exposure. In the case of the ILO, reporting on states’ violations leads to labor rights improvements. These improvements are not temporary, but long-lasting, indicating that the actions are not solely taken to evade further negative exposure. Moreover, the analysis points to additional paths to norm compliance, challenging the established notion that naming and shaming is dependent on media attention in order to generate sufficient pressure. There are plenty of reasons to believe that the role of media is important for naming and shaming campaigns (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Cmiel, 1999; Risse et al., 2013), but the evidence in this dissertation provides reasons to assume that naming and shaming strategies may be effectively employed even in situations that lack media attention. In consequence, I underline the multifaceted pathways to norm compliance through the means of social pressure.

The dissertation identifies three mechanisms of influence through which naming and shaming strategies may operate. In addition, it theorizes the conditions under which IO naming and shaming is likely to be most powerful. More importantly for our understanding of how naming and shaming works in international politics, the dissertation concludes that negative exposure is particularly effective when targeting democracies and wealthier countries. In other words, there are also clear limitations to the effectiveness of IO naming and shaming in non-democracies. One possible implication of this is that additional approaches are needed to address violations in non-democratic countries.

Fourth, the qualitative analysis of two cases of naming and shaming of democratic states in the ILO indicate that (a) IO naming and shaming works in the absence of the elite response mechanism in democratic states, and (b) the power of domestic interest groups within democracies is essential for producing compliance in democratic states. The former provides motives for further empirical as well as theoretical work probing why the elite response mechanism is less prominent in democratic states. The latter implies that democratic states do not automatically correct their behavior after being targeted. When domestic interest groups are divided and less capable of pushing for reforms, democratic states are not sufficiently pressured to comply. The implication is that scholars should pay considerably more attention to the power of (relevant) domestic interest groups within democracies, rather than measure the presence and number of domestic NGOs. For policy makers, this has substantial implications for the amount of assistance that should be allocated to non-compliant democracies. Democratic regimes with

weaker domestic interest groups and uninterested political elites are likely to need more assistance domestically, rather than more international pressure.

For ILO scholars and practitioners, this dissertation contributes new knowledge regarding the politics and impacts of naming and shaming. Ironically, the findings lend support to both the critics and advocates of ILO naming and shaming. For the advocates, the finding that the ILO targets violators is likely to further strengthen their belief in the system, especially in the work of the CEACR and the CAS. The critics' beliefs may be strengthened by the fact that the ILO "goes easy" on left-wing states, something that the employer organizations have suspected for a long time. However, those who have argued that ILO targeting reflects the same power relations as the UN General Assembly may be disappointed by my negative findings in this regard. The skeptics who have described the ILO as "toothless" or as a "bulldog that barks without bite" (Ishola, 2013:19) might benefit from taking note of the conclusions of this dissertation. The same goes for its advocates, since the impact of ILO naming and shaming is found to be primarily limited to wealthy and democratic countries, highlighting the limitations of these strategies.

In essence, my dissertation reinforces some findings of previous studies and, most importantly, introduces new datasets, evidence and theoretical reasonings that challenge and enhance the understanding of naming and shaming in IR. On the whole, the conclusions of my dissertation nuance the existing debate on influence strategies that rely on social pressure.

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