Mistrust between conflict parties after civil war is a major hurdle to sustainable peace. However, existing research focuses on elite interactions and has not examined the trust relationship between government and rank-and-file members of armed groups, despite their importance for postconflict stability. We use the unexpected decision of the Colombian government to extradite top-level former paramilitary leaders to the United States in 2008 to identify how a peace deal reversal influences ex-combatants’ trust in government. In theory, they may lose trust for instrumental reasons, if they suffer personal costs, or for normative reasons, if they think the government is failing its commitments. Using quasi-experimental survey evidence, we find that extradition decreases trust substantially among ex-paramilitaries, but not in a comparison group of ex-guerrillas not part of the same peace deal. Even though paramilitaries are seen as particularly opportunistic, our evidence suggests that normative rather than instrumentalist considerations led to trust erosion.

Introduction

A major hurdle to peace after civil war is the lack of trust between conflict parties. That is why peace negotiations need mediators (Clayton 2013; Duursma 2014), peace agreements contain power-sharing provisions (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007), and agreement implementation requires the oversight and support of third parties (Walter 2001; Wantchekon 2004) including peacekeeping forces (Fortna 2010; Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen 2013). However, literature on bargaining and postconflict stability tends to look at conflict parties as unitary actors or at their elites (Walter 2010; Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen 2013). Moreover, literature on bargaining and postconflict stability tends to look at conflict parties as unitary actors or at their elites (Walter 2009). Rank-and-file members, assumed to be a skilled labor force for renewed violence (Walter 2004; Nussio 2018), have received less attention. In this article, we spotlight low-ranking ex-combatants from nonstate armed groups and analyze how they revise their trust in government after demobilization.

During their personal transition from war to peace, former war participants are expected to disconnect from wartime trust networks (Tilly 1978, 2005) and instead accept official governance institutions as the legitimate and reliable sources of rule, dispute settlement, and economic redistribution (Humphreys and Weinstein 2007; Gilligan, Mvukiyehe, and Samii 2013; Kaplan and Nussio 2018; Kreutz 2018). In doing this, they constantly update their information about the government and determine whether it is to be trusted (Cook, Jacobs, and Kim 2010; Barnes, Feller, Haselswerdt 2018). Broader literature suggests that the experiences of election-related (Linke 2013) or conflict-related violence (De Juan and Pierskalla 2016) can hamper citizens’ views of the state and reduce their levels of trust, while an increased sense of protection (Bakke et al. 2017) and providing citizens with needed services (Wong 2016) can raise political trust in conflict-prone and transitional societies. In this article, we focus on the receiving end of the trusting relationship and argue that individuals’ trust in government is constructed or eroded based on two types of considerations. The first is instrumental: does government policy benefit individuals or not (Hardin 1998; Hutchison and Johnson 2011)? In line with this type of consideration, the level of trust in government may be revised based on whether changes in government policies generate costs or benefits to a given individual. The second is normative: does the government trust the others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm, if they can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is possible” (Newton 2007, 345). Trust in government is understood as a relational attitude that emerges from accumulated experiences with governmental organizations and their representatives. We refer to “political trust” and “trust in government” interchangeably. For a broader overview of political trust, see Zmerli and van der Meer (2017).
comply with agreed procedures and promises (Tyler 1990; Kim 2005; Wong 2016)? According to this consideration, the level of trust in government may be revised based on whether changes in government policies are seen as right or wrong, independent of whether they generate direct costs or benefits to an individual.

We focus on the dynamics of trust in government among rank-and-file ex-combatants during a short window of time—before and after the extradition of the top paramilitary commanders to the United States—that allows for a quasi-experimental setup. During negotiations between the Colombian government and progovernment paramilitary groups about demobilization starting in 2002, there was a tacit understanding that putting down arms would be rewarded by a lenient judicial process. This was particularly important for the top-level commanders, given that the United States requested their extradition due to involvement in drug-trafficking. A government press release in April 2004 indicated that extradition could be avoided for “those who ... demonstrate good faith and a will of involvement” (cited in Aronson 2005). Against this backdrop, more than thirty-one thousand members of the Colombian paramilitaries followed the orders of their leaders and demobilized between 2003 and 2006. However, on May 13, 2008, it was announced that, overnight, fourteen of the top former paramilitary leaders had been extradited to the United States on drug charges. This event dominated the news nationwide for several days. While the government claimed that the extradition was because of continued criminal activity, it was criticized by the public as a blow to victims’ rights in the transitional justice process and, importantly for our study, perceived by the paramilitary leaders as a betrayal of the peace pact. We use this unexpected event as an arbitrary cutoff point around which we can explore how such a policy reversal by the government affects ex-combatants’ trust in government.

From the broader theoretical framework about instrumentalist and normative considerations, we deduce observable implications for the case of the Colombian paramilitaries. The Colombian paramilitaries are regarded as a group of particularly opportunistic fighters, who were motivated largely by personal benefits and often joined the group as a means of getting a job (Ugarriza and Nussio 2015). Instrumentalist considerations should therefore be most important for them (Gutierrez and Wood 2014), implying that, if ex-paramilitaries’ trust in government depended exclusively on instrumentalist considerations, we should see little effect of the extradition. Only a few individuals in the leadership of the group suffered the personal costs of this decision. By 2008, most rank-and-file ex-combatants were not dependent on their patrons any more for personal security and economic income, as they were enrolled in an ambitious reintegration program. In contrast, if ex-combatants’ trust in government depended on normative considerations, whether the government behavior was deemed right or wrong, we should see decreased trust in government after the extradition.

We analyze these observable implications with data from a survey of 1,485 demobilized fighters distributed between February and the end of May 2008—thus both before and after the extradition announcement. In addition to ex-paramilitary members, the survey also includes former guerrilla fighters who were given incentives to defect and join the demobilization program individually. While we are primarily interested in the processes through which trust in government is affected among ex-paramilitary war participants, the inclusion of ex-guerrillas in our sample provides a useful comparison group. Demobilized guerrilla fighters were not part of the same pact as the collectively demobilized paramilitaries, since they deserted individually, while their respective groups continued to fight against the government (Oppenheim et al. 2015). The extradition of ex-paramilitary leaders should thus not affect ex-guerrilla fighters.

We find that the extradition reduces trust in the state with more than two steps on a seven-step scale among former paramilitaries—a substantial effect. The negative response to extradition holds regardless of whether they belonged to units under the command of the extradited leaders or belonged to other bloques. In contrast, ex-guerrilla fighters do not change their level of trust as a consequence of extradition. These results speak in favor of normative and against purely instrumentalist considerations.

Our study makes three contributions to a diverse set of scholarly literatures. First, we contribute to the literature on bargaining and postconflict stability by relaxing the monolithic understanding of conflict parties and by instead exploring trust dynamics among rank-and-file ex-combatants. Our findings suggest that postconflict bargaining is not just between the government and elites of armed groups, but essentially a bargaining process with each individual ex-combatant. This is important as the risk of sliding into pervasive low-intensity nonconflict violence after peace is a common scenario for today’s postconflict countries (Boyle 2014, Deglow 2016; Gartner and Kennedy 2018). Destroying trust in government among ex-combatants likely contributes to such dynamics (Kaplan and Nussio 2018). In fact, the demobilization of paramilitaries in Colombia was followed by an increase in criminal violence in several paramilitary-dominated regions.

Second, we contribute to the literature on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). This literature has often focused on material provisions and specific programming elements (Gilligan et al. 2013). As in other studies (Kilroy and Basini 2018), our survey indicates that careful reintegration programming can foster increased trust among ex-combatants. Before the extradition, the reintegration agency was the most trusted Colombian institution among former war participants. However, our study also shows that high-level government action can easily destroy the slowly growing dividends of a reintegration program.

Third, we contribute to the broader literature about trust creation and erosion, and our findings may resound in studies on economic development, state formation, and good governance (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993; Muller and Seligson 1994; Askvik, Jamil, and Nath Dhakal 2011; Hutchison and Johnson 2011). Political trust is usually studied cross-sectionally rather than in a longitudinal setting, making it difficult to establish the mechanisms behind the correlation between institutional performance and trust in government (Tilly 2005; Lewicki, Tomlinson, and Gillespie 2006). Not only do we present data with a longitudinal character, it is from a setting of still-ongoing civil conflict—arguably one of the most challenging contexts for establishing trust in government (Widner 2004; Linke 2013; De Juan and Pierskalla 2016). The sudden reversal of government behavior analyzed in our study provides a rare window into a case of trust destruction. Consistent with broader literature on trust in government and legitimacy, we find that a merely instrumental understanding of trust is inadequate (Tyler 1990) even for former members of nonstate armed groups.

In the next section, we outline our theoretical expectations in greater detail and deduce observable implications for how the “shock” of extradition could be expected to affect ex-combatants in Colombia. This is followed by a qualitative account of the Colombian civil conflict, the issue of
extradition, and the trajectories of violence after paramilitary demobilization. We then present the empirical strategy and the main quantitative results, followed by a discussion of our findings.

Theory

By its very nature, civil conflict reveals that citizens are not fully trusting the state to rule or accepting its legitimacy. In the Colombian case, discontent with how the state was organized led to the mobilization of left-wing guerrillas in the 1960s, while disapproval of how the state handled this threat facilitated the subsequent formation of right-wing paramilitaries. Scholars have identified that the biggest challenge after a peace accord consists of managing the security concerns between former opponents who must share the postconflict society (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Huntington 2006). Without the intervention of a third party, as in the case of Colombia, the only actor with capacity for this is the government. But why should members of armed groups trust the government to succeed where it has failed before?

In states that experience contentious politics manifested as large-scale protests or civil war, trust in government is not static but should be understood as a process of constant renegotiation of the state-citizen contract. The presence of alternative de facto sources of protection and governance (Migdal 1988; Mampilly 2012; Arjona 2017) means that citizens can choose to what extent government institutions constitute a reliable partner for regulating their living situation and thus form part of their trust networks. These trust networks do not necessarily include political and state institutions. According to Tilly (2005, 44), trust networks are “named, bounded, internally communicating sets of relations entailing mutual obligations,” which—if they include state institutions—provide the “contingent consent” that make citizens comply with costly demands made by government and thus facilitate improved institutional performance (Levi 1997). Importantly, trust networks are made up of flexible, primarily interpersonal, relations rather than formal structures of governance, and it is by no means certain that they are linked to state institutions or political life. Networks can for example be established alongside kinship lines, along geographic spaces (neighborhood communities), or around religious or other shared identities (such as support for sports teams), without any political purpose or role. However, these networks can also effectively undermine the ability of the state to govern by offering alternative governance structures that citizens deem as “more reliable and effective” than official institutions. The demand for such nonstate institutions is typically greater when citizens perceive a weak capacity or willingness of the state to provide security, justice, or economic development for a community (García-Sánchez 2014; Matanock and García-Sánchez 2018).

Scholars have identified that trust networks in civil conflict societies are to a large extent linked to nonstate governance institutions, creating a challenge for a transition to peace. This is a consequence of both local absence of state presence and deliberate choices from nonstate actors to create “rebel governance” (Mampilly 2012). As summarized by Kreutz (2018, 224), “a central objective of most armed actors is to co-opt or create social, political, and economic networks to bolster their legitimacy and base of support. At the end of the conflict, the challenge for the state becomes persuading citizens (both ex-combatants and others) to place greater trust in public institutions than in what remains of these conflict networks.” For the case of ex-combatants, we suspect that trust in government is particularly volatile and sensitive to even slight changes of policy, since they have individual-level experience of rejecting state institutions as the sole legitimate source of justice, security, and economic provision.

Recent scholarship has often focused on how state capacity and performance has important consequences for the formation of trust (Hutchison and Johnson 2011, 2017; Godefroidt, Langer, and Meuleman 2017), especially if services provided by the state meet the needs of citizens (Wong 2016). Additionally, studies have focused on the impact of violence (related to civil wars, elections, and crime) on trust in government since violent events reveal the capacity of governments to protect their citizens (Bakke et al. 2014). In contrast to the rallying-around-the-flag effects of threats from the outside that often increase trust (Hetherington and Nelson 2003), such internal violence has largely negative consequences for political trust (Linke 2013; Corbacho, Philipp, and Ruiz-Vega 2015; De Juan and Pierskalla 2016; Gates and Justesen 2016). Studies on the dynamics of trust are less common than cross-national comparisons, and they have mostly examined the United States or Western European countries. This literature has shown that citizens’ trust in government largely responds to changes in government performance (Keele 2007; Van Erkel and Van der Meer 2016), but there is no consistent negative effect after high-profile political scandals (Citrin and Stoker 2018).

In our theorizing, we contribute to this latter field by focusing on the receiving end of the trusting relationship: the citizens and their interpretation of government decisions. We argue that instrumentalist and normative considerations are decisive for building or destroying their trust in government in a given situation.

According to the instrumentalist view, citizens primarily evaluate their individual economic and social conditions as an effect of state performance, and trust is essentially determined by the payoffs a certain policy or regime offers for the individual (Cheibub et al. 1996; Hardin 1998; Van de Walle and Bourkaert 2003, Hutchison and Johnson 2011). Citizens thus weigh the costs and benefits emerging from government policy. While collective goods might be more important than personal benefits for the general public (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979), personal costs and benefits might be particularly important for our target population, ex-combatants, who may hold individual level grievances and high levels of initial distrust toward the state (Oppenheim and Söderström 2018). Key concerns for former war participants include their physical and economic security. Violence has featured prominently in their lives, and threats from the past may persist in the present particularly if some, but not all, warring sides demobilize at the same time as was the case in Colombia (Nussio and Howe 2016). Further, ex-combatants tend to become unemployed after demobilization, making their economic situation a salient issue (Blattman and Annan 2016). This is particularly important if they had joined the conflict as a means for getting a job, such as was the case for the Colombian ex-paramilitaries (Ugarriza and Nussio 2015).

Normative considerations about government-citizen interactions are a second source of trust formation and erosion (Tilly 2005) (i.e., are government decisions considered right or wrong?). Key to normative considerations is whether governments follow fair procedures, independent of citizens’ personal interests. This includes the perceptions of procedural justice in the interaction with state officials as an important source of legitimacy, which in turn favors law-abiding behavior (Tyler 1990). Related research on accountability, honesty, and moral leadership points to a similar source of trust as Tyler’s procedural justice theory and...
highlights the importance of maintaining earlier commitments (Raiser 2003; Kim 2005). Citizens are attentive to the responsiveness of institutions and evaluate the quality of government in the form of the difference between the expected and actual performance of the institution (Nussio et al. 2019).

While it is difficult to clearly separate instrumentalist and normative considerations (see below), we can deduce two observable implications from this broader theoretical reasoning for Colombian ex-combatants and how their trust in the state could be affected by the 2008 extradition of former paramilitary leaders. First, given that the risk of extradition was constrained to those individuals that the United States had officially requested, most of the rank-and-file were not personally affected. In accordance with instrumentalist considerations, the extradition should thus not lead to decreased trust in government. Second, if ex-combatants behave in line with normative considerations, the policy decision of the government to extradite former leaders should be perceived as a break with the peace deal and thus considered wrong. This should only apply for those who consider themselves included in the peace accord as a means of regulating the postconflict government-citizen relations. Consequently, this provides a second observable implication: that trust in government would be reduced among ex-paramilitaries but not ex-guerrillas.

The above can be summarized in the following two hypotheses:

\[ H_1: \text{If trust in government is based on instrumental considerations, then rank-and-file ex-combatants should not have decreased trust after extradition.} \]

\[ H_2: \text{If trust in government is based on normative considerations, then only those rank-and-file ex-combatants that are parties to an agreement (i.e., ex-paramilitaries) should have decreased trust after extradition.} \]

Finally, we are aware that instrumentalist and normative considerations can easily be confused. If the government does not stick to a commitment that does not generate direct costs to rank-and-file ex-combatants (like extradition), this might still signal to them that, in the future, the government might also not live up to a commitment that affects them directly (their personal juridical situation). However, we take this uncertainty about the future to be grounded in a normative rather than instrumental perspective, as any unfair government behavior today may at some point later come back and generate costs in the future.

The Colombian Context

The Colombian armed conflict has involved left-wing insurgents, founded throughout the 1960s and 1970s (FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia); ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, National Liberation Army); M-19 (Movimiento 19 de Abril, The April 19th movement); EPL (Ejército Popular de Liberación; Popular Liberation Army), and other smaller groups), fighting against government forces and right-wing antiguerilla paramilitaries. Paramilitary groups emerged in the 1980s in several regions of Colombia mostly in response to the expansion of guerrilla groups and siding with the government forces, thus classifying as a progovernment militia. They were initially financed by large landowners and drug-traffickers and supported by elements of the armed forces (Duncan 2006).

In the 1990s, a national expansion plan of the paramilitary groups led to the 1997 establishment of an umbrella organization called AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia—United Self-Defense of Colombia). Around the year 2000, the AUC was the armed actor responsible for the most severe human rights violations, most importantly forced displacement and massacres of civilian population as a strategy to undercut support to guerrillas (CNMH 2013).

Negotiations, Demobilization, and Extradition

In 2002, the newly elected government of Álvaro Uribe began negotiations with the AUC with the stated aim of restoring a monopoly of force in the hands of the state. This initiative was well received as the paramilitaries largely supported Uribe and his “heavy-handed approach against the guerrilla” (El Universal 2009). Carlos Castaño, the foremost leader of the AUC, said that Uribe was convenient for the country, because he was the closest to the AUC’s ideology (Aranguren 2001), and rank-and-file combatants agreed, “Uribe is wonderful. … He could relate to the commanders, he has the same ideology, he’s against the FARC.” The AUC leadership declared a unilateral ceasefire in late 2002 (which was violated repeatedly) and signed a peace agreement with the government in 2003, outlining the disarmament and collective demobilization of thirty-one thousand troops between 2003 and 2006. At the same time, guerrilla members who individually demobilized (i.e., defected) from their groups were given access to similar reintegration assistance and legal protection. More than twenty thousand did so between 2003 and 2016 and usually moved to larger cities to distance themselves from their former comrades and in search for jobs.

During negotiations, the AUC leadership were particularly keen on striking a deal regarding extradition. Many of them were requested by the United States for trial on drug-trafficking charges and some might even have joined the AUC specifically to conceal their drug-trafficking role, be recognized as conflict actors, and thereby avoid extradition. In Colombia at the time, extradition requests were received by the Foreign Ministry and examined by the Supreme Court, but it was the president who had the final say. With Uribe in power, AUC leaders perceived an opportunity to negotiate a deal to avoid extradition to the United States and receive a favorable legal treatment for acts of violence in exchange for demobilization (Semana 2002). The topic of extradition was never explicitly included in any of the agreements, but the government announced repeatedly that those who participated in the peace process (the AUC members) would not be extradited to the United States (Arnson 2005, 5).

After demobilization, paramilitary leaders responsible for war crimes had to comply with the transitional justice law “Ley de Justicia y Paz,” which mandated telling the “truth” about wrongdoings and repairing victims to be eligible for reduced prison sentences (five to eight years). This led

3Interview with ex-paramilitary from Héroes de Granada block in Medellín, February 2009.

4Extradition is a politically loaded question in Colombia, as the drug cartels fought a bloody war against the government to avoid extradition during the 1980s (CNMH 2013). This violent confrontation even led to a prohibition of extradition for Colombian nationals between 1991 and 1997.
to the 2007 “parapolítica” scandal, as witness statements revealed that a large number of politicians had collaborated with or received funds from the paramilitaries. Sixty members of congress were sentenced to jail until 2013 (Verdad Abierta 2013). At the same time, rumours emerged about AUC leaders continuing to be involved in illegal businesses from their prison cells (CNRR 2007; International Crisis Group 2008). Also, informed observers were aware that the government prepared evidence to justify a possible extradition of paramilitary leaders. Eventually, the government extradited thirteen well-known top AUC leaders in the early morning of May 13, 2008. While the government had threatened to extradite leaders who committed crimes, news came as a shock to the Colombian population, the extradited leaders themselves (El Universal 2009), and their former subordinates.

Officially, extradition was in response to their continued involvement in illegal activities, but critical observers argued that it was intended to silence paramilitary leaders and protect members of the government from the parapolítica scandal. Just weeks earlier had the investigation led to the arrest of President Uribe’s cousin (and senator) Mario, and the actual extradition was ordered after the closure of the Supreme Court for the day and completed before it opened the next morning (Sontag 2016). When the news broke, the extradition was heavily criticized as undermining victims’ rights to truth and justice as the truth-telling process of the extradited leaders came to a halt (CNMH 2015). Most importantly for us, the extradition came as a surprise to the former AUC members and as a “betrayal” of their agreements: a word famously called out by one of the extradited leaders—Rodrigo “Jorge 40” Tovar—as he boarded the plane to the United States called out by one of the extradited leaders—Rodrigo “Jorge 40” Tovar—as he boarded the plane to the United States (Noticias24 2008; Verdad Abierta 2009). A similar view was held by nonextradited former members of the AUC, including a former midlevel commander of the Bloque Norte who said that Uribe played his leaders and betrayed them when he was strong enough. Several of the most powerful and well-known paramilitaries were extradited, including Salvatore Mancuso, Ramiro “Cuco” Vanyo, Diego “Don Berna” Murillo, and Rodrigo “Jorge 40” Tovar. These four leaders were strongmen in their respectively controlled areas and led about eleven thousand troops belonging to the Córdoba, Catatumbo, Mineros, Heroes of Tolová, and Norte blocks of the AUC.

Dynamics of Violence after Demobilization and Extradition

Our primary interest in this article are the effects of extradition on trust in government. However, a short overview of the violence patterns before and after extradition provides us with the necessary context to situate the relevance of our research question. While the fighting between guerrillas and the government continued during and after the paramilitary demobilization, the overall level of violence in Colombia decreased which, at least partially, particularly for the homicide rate, can be attributed to the AUC demobilization (Bello 2009; Restrepo and Muggah 2009). The trajectories of violence varied, however, greatly across regions.

Figure 1 shows the average homicide rates in municipalities where ex-paramilitary groups concentrated to surrender their weapons and the rest of the country. Consistent with qualitative evidence, the municipalities where paramilitary demobilization occurred (usually former stronghold areas) experienced on average higher homicide rates throughout the period, but it was also in these areas that the demobilization correlated with a substantial initial decline in violence. In absolute numbers, from a high of 92.4 average homicides per one hundred thousand inhabitants in 2003, municipalities with paramilitary demobilization decreased to 47.2 homicides by the end of the demobilization process in 2006. Violence escalation somewhat in these areas in 2007–2008, with a substantial increase after extradition in 2009–2012, in contrast to the continued declining trend in the rest of the country.

Previous studies on violence in Colombia have established that the high probability of violence in these formerly paramilitary dominated regions is influenced by the legacy of conflict and lack of government presence (Daly 2016; Steele 2017), but those factors cannot account for the timing of the upsurge in violence after demobilization. In contrast, qualitative accounts show that the extradition of top leaders led to in-fighting between second-tier criminal leaders in areas like Medellín and Córdoba, even as leaders were able to control criminal activities from their prison cells (Massé 2011; CNMH 2015, 2017). For example, the extradition of “Don Berna” led to in-fights not only in his hometown Medellín and the associated Oficina de Enfagado criminal organization, but also in the Córdoba department where the more ruraly oriented Paisas organization operated (McGovern 2016). Medellín experienced higher homicide rates in 2008 and 2009 after a period of relatively low levels of violence. In Córdoba, killings that increased overall already in 2007 increased further in 2008. Among the victims were eighty demobilized ex-combatants in that year, compared to thirteen in 2006 and thirty-two in 2007 (Munévar and Nussio 2009, 104). A representative of the reintegration program (ACR) described that after the...
extradition of “Don Berna,” his former soldiers left the reintegration program as they had only participated because of his orders.10

A move away from engagement with the reintegration program does not necessarily mean that ex-combatants turn to violence. However, the betrayal discourse was used to explain the remobilization into neoparamilitary organizations (often referred to as Bandas Criminales or BACRIM), according to a representative of the reintegration program (Howe 2012). Even though such organizations started to form immediately after the DDR process concluded in 2006 (MAPP-OEA 2006), they multiplied and motivated their presence through the betrayal discourse in public statements and threat letters after 2008. One example of such a threat letter sent to a social activist in Córdoba stated, “[w]e are going to charge the Colombian state for the betrayal of this government of our chiefs.”11

To conclude, the extradition was accompanied by an increase in localized violence, provided follower organizations of the demobilized paramilitaries with discursive ammunition, moved paramilitary networks further away from government oversight, and accelerated the process of violent criminal renewal. Our analysis cannot establish a causal link between distrust in government and violent remobilization. However, qualitative evidence indicates a plausible link between the extradition and the subsequent escalation of violence in 2008 and 2009 in the form of increased in-fighting and dissatisfaction among ex-combatants.

Empirical Strategy

To assess the observable implications of how government policy affects trust among rank-and-file, we employ a quasi-experimental setup where the extraditions of ex-paramilitary leaders to the United States constitute a “shock” in an otherwise comparable sample. We use data from a 2008 ex-combatant survey administered by the Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), a Colombian foundation with a long history of working on conflict issues, in collaboration with the High Advisory for Reintegration (ACR) and funded by the Canadian government.12 The survey was administered by various regional teams between February 5, 2008, and May 31, 2008, and covered a sample of 1,485 ex-combatants from different armed groups, including 846 mostly rank-and-file ex-combatants of the AUC.13 Approximately 1,362 respondents (91.7 percent) were surveyed before May 13 and 98 respondents from May 13 onward.14

The main independent variable for our analysis is based on the timing of the interview and whether it occurred before or after the extradition “shock.” As all individuals interviewed are drawn from the same underlying sampling procedure, the subsamples of respondents before and after this date are in expectation not systematically different.15 As with most research on former war participants, it is challenging to adequately draw a sample of the relevant population since ex-combatants may choose to live in anonymity after demobilization, may choose to abstain from DDR activities, or may have resumed illegal and violent activity in other armed groups or criminal organizations. To address this challenge, FIP implemented two different procedures to adequately sample various subpopulations of interest.

First, a completely random sample of 944 ex-combatants (64 percent of the sample) was drawn from the ACR’s database that contains information about everyone who demobilized through any of their programs. These were directly contacted and surveyed by ACR officials from regional reintegration centers.16 Second, to increase the subsamples among undersampled ex-combatants who either were under- age at the time of demobilization or had participated in more comprehensive reintegration programs, a second stratified sample was identified from ex-combatants who settled in Colombia’s major cities. This included 132 ex-combatants who had participated in joint microenterprise projects, 197 participants in microbusiness projects, and 212 underage ex-combatants who were not selected under perfectly random conditions. Our total sample is 232 female and 1,253 male ex-combatants in seventy-three different municipalities in nineteen departments.17 To connect ex-paramilitaries with one of the thirty-seven different AUC subgroups (bloque) they had belonged to, we matched their (self-reported) month and location of demobilization with information about the demobilization process from the Alto Comisionado Para La Paz (Kline 2012).

Dependent Variables

We use as dependent variables, on a 1 (no) to 7 (much) scale, three measures of ex-combatant’s trust in government, the reintegration agency (ACR), and government institutions. The first two consist of their answers to direct questions about their confidence in the state and the reintegration program, while we measure trust in institutions with an index made up equally by their answers regarding confidence in the national government, the justice system, Congress, the Constitutional Court, and the political parties.18 This provides us with the respondents’ overall view of the state that is comparable with survey findings from other postconflict settings, their opinion toward the practic- ies of the reintegration program, and their view on the institutions responsible for the extradition decision. Similar to other indicators of trust, it is not possible to distinguish whether ex-combatants think of the respective institution or the officials representing those institutions when answering those survey questions (Marien 2017). However, we believe that, in the setup of this quasi-experimental study based on one country and one specific set of respondents, resulting biases are minimized. As an additional indicator of whether extradition had a negative effect on respondents’ trust in government, we explore information about their view on the government’s performance on a series of different policy issues.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these variables before extradition, which indicates that ex-paramilitaries had greater trust in government—as well as in the armed forces and the police—than ex-guerrillas. Compared with the national average (Rodriguez and Seligson 2008),19 ex-paramilitaries have lower trust in a series of specific government institutions but higher trust in the national government and the government’s ability to implement policies. Ex-guerrillas have the lowest levels of trust and government capability perceptions in all variables. Both ex-paramilitaries and ex-guerrillas have the most trust in the reintegration agency. This is likely a result of close and continued engagement with this specific government branch, as one ex-combatant noted about his own process in an interview: “If they’d wanted to put you in prison, they would have done it long ago. And why would they have paid all of these courses and studies? They wouldn’t have invested money in that. But at first, we were kind of distrustful.” 20

We control for several possible confounding variables that may influence individuals’ political trust, taken from the survey instrument. First, we control for individual-level characteristics in the form of age, gender (female = 1), and whether respondents reside in urban or rural areas, mainly to check for potential sample composition disparities. Second, many studies on trust in postconflict settings explore individuals’ prior exposure to violence (Linke 2013), but we expect that this is a feature for everyone in our ex-combatant sample. However, their responsibility for the perpetration of violence may matter, so we include variables for whether having troops under their command during the conflict leads to lower trust. We also control for whether they received ideological training by their group, as such socialization into the group has been found in earlier research with lower trust in government (Nussio and Oppenheim 2014; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015). Third, we control for ex-combatants’ education (a scale from 1 [no education] to 11 [postgraduate studies]) and their current economic situation. The latter is self-reported on whether they consider their economic situation as much worse (1) to much better (5) to their situation during the conflict. We expect that respondents with an easier transition to civilian life will have greater trust in government (Phayal, Khadka, and Thyne 2015). Fourth, we control for respondents links to former comrades by a variable indicating whether they have moved to another department after demobilization and a variable that captures whether they remain in contact with former comrades-in-arms.21

Control Variables

To explore the effect of the extradition on ex-war participants’ trust, we employ multiple estimation techniques moving from a basic model that only explores the quasi-experimental nature of our pre- and postdesign to increasingly disaggregated models. The advantage of our data is that we can compare the levels of trust in government before and after extradition and, using mild continuity assumptions, isolate the effect of this “shock” on largely similar respondents without adding a battery of control variables. We first identify the change in trust among all ex-participants following the extradition of paramilitary leaders. For this, we estimate a sharp regression discontinuity design as follows:

\[
\bar{T}_d = \alpha + \rho E_d + \gamma d + X_d + \varepsilon_d
\]

where \(\bar{T}_d\) is the average trust level at day of interview \(d\), the intervention dummy for extradition \(E_d\), the parameter \(\rho\) captures the immediate effect at extradition, and a linear control for time captured by \(d\). To identify the functional forms of pre-and postextradition trust trends, we use data-driven optimization of fit using the rdrobust package (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014). This effectively controls for the possibility that trust was declining across all of the sample over time rather than as an effect of the extradition policy. While our data was collected prior and post the extradition cutoff, the distribution of interviews is not even across the temporal duration of the survey period. This means that data-driven optimization is not possible due to a limited sample when analyzing only guerrillas or only paramilitaries. For these analyses—and when we add covariates, \(X_d\)—we estimate the change in trust levels across the complete period. As our dependent variable is a seven-step scale, a suitable technique is ordered logit regression.22

In addition to interpreting split samples and interaction effects in the regression discontinuity setup, we also estimate difference-in-difference models to identify the change in perceptions after extradition between ex-paramilitaries (the treated group) and the ex-guerrillas (the control group) who did not participate in the peace pact (Athey and Imbens 2006). In extending the analysis, we also investigate whether ex-paramilitaries who have served under the extradited

---

19 Data from the 2008 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey in Colombia can be found here: www.obsdemocracia.org
20 Interview with anonymous ex-combatant in Tierralta, April 29, 2009.
21 This variable differs substantially between ex-paramilitaries and ex-guerrillas due to different demobilization modalities. Most ex-paramilitaries resettled where they came from (more than 79% in total according to) even though that may not have been where they had been fighting, while ex-guerrillas had to go into hiding to avoid punishment from their former group.
22 All presented results are robust when estimated with OLS regression instead, see online appendix.
Institutions − form: extradition to students that are ex-paramilitary as opposed to ex-guerrilla, interpreted directly. Given that the pre-extradition trust level in Asia is estimated using local linear regressions, they can be interpreted at the 0.05 level. The coefficients indicate the size of the effect. Decreased trust in government and in particular in the reintegration agency, and political discontinuity design using the combined sample of both ex-paramilitary and ex-guerrilla members. Table 2 provides the results of a fully data-driven regression including both ex-paramilitary and ex-guerrilla members. This analysis tells us that the effect occurs primarily in the lower part of the sample range, meaning that extradition changed ex-paramilitary trust in government from being higher than the national average to below the opinion of both ex-guerrillas and the public. Our findings of a shift are thus not overly influenced by a few outlier observations that were extremely positive before or negative after extradition. Comparing this output to the sample consisting of ex-guerrillas (Models 2, 5, 8), in which coefficients for government trust are positive after extradition, although not statistically significant, indicates that the overall decrease in trust identified by the above regression discontinuity analysis is driven by the effect extradition had on the opinions of ex-paramilitary combatants. This variation based on the identity of the respondents explains why, in the analysis of the full dataset (Models 3, 6, 9), extradition is followed by increased trust in government. However, the interaction between ex-paramilitary and postextradition, the difference-in-difference estimator, is negative throughout. Extradition thus had a negative effect on trust in government but only for the subsample of former paramilitaries. This is in line with normative considerations by which individuals judge government action in light of earlier commitments (Hypothesis 2) rather than solely based on instrumentalist considerations about personal costs and benefits (Hypothesis 1). Ex-guerrillas did not suffer individually from the extradition of ex-paramilitary leaders but had

leaders are more affected than those demobilized from other bloques.

The difference-in-difference model takes the following form:

\[ Y_{gi} = \alpha + \beta \text{actor}_{gi} + \gamma \text{extradition}_{gi} + \delta_{iDD} (\text{actor}_{gi} \times \text{extradition}_{gi}) + X_{gi} + \varepsilon_{gi} \]  

(2)

where \( \text{actor}_{gi} \) is a dummy variable indicating respondents that are ex-paramilitary as opposed to ex-guerrilla, \( \text{extradition}_{gi} \) is a dummy indicating interviews conducted after extradition, and the interaction of these two. The coefficient of the interaction term of \( \text{actor}_{gi} \) and \( \text{extradition}_{gi} \), \( \delta_{iDD} \), represents the difference-in-difference estimator (our main interest in this setup), which captures the effect of extradition on trust across groups. \( X_{gi} \) is a set of control variables.

### Results

Regression Discontinuity Analysis

Our first hypothesis states that, if trust in government was purely a function of instrumental considerations, then the extradition of jailed ex-paramilitary leaders should not decrease the trust among ex-combatants. We first examine this aspect using data on all former war participants including both ex-paramilitary and ex-guerrilla members. Table 2 provides the results of a fully data-driven regression discontinuity design using the combined sample of both ex-paramilitaries and ex-guerrillas for the effect of extradition on trust in the state, the reintegration agency, and political institutions.

As can be observed, there are robust and consistent findings across all model specifications that extradition led to decreased trust in government and in particular in the "state" for which the relationship is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The coefficients indicate the size of the effect. As estimations are local linear regressions, they can be interpreted directly. Given that the pre-extradition trust level in the state as reported in Table 1 was 4.08 for ex-guerrillas and 4.78 for ex-paramilitaries, an effect of the size of −2.42 steps on a seven-step scale is very substantial. Table 2 reports the results from three different models, presenting the standard errors calculated according to the conventional ("undersmoothing") and bias-corrected conventional standard errors that perform reliably when comparing such a narrow bandwidth—the temporal windows for the local regression are 3.38 to 5.41 days prior/post extradition (Calonico et al. 2014). However, Table 2 also reports the output using bias-corrected robust standard errors that consider the asymptotic variance of the bias-corrected estimator, which shows that our main finding remains robust.

Figures 2a–c illustrate the regression discontinuity analysis and visualize both the level and the trend changes after extradition. The temporal trend line for ex-participants’ trust in state is almost identical prior- and postextradition, but there is a substantial immediate drop in trust in the days after extradition. It is worth noting that the data-driven optimization fits the results on the minimum bandwidth required to establish a clear trend, meaning that these are the respondents interviewed in a window of the nine days around extradition (4.48 days prior/post the event). Extradition had none or only marginal effects on ex-participants’ trust in the reintegration program, while the trust in institutions seemed to be slightly decreasing already in the days prior to extradition. This may be influenced by the extradition of alias "Macaco" a week earlier or at other events, with the consequence that trust in institutions drops suddenly after extradition, but that the trend thereafter becomes positive.

### Difference-in-Difference Analysis

Hypothesis 2 states that, if trust in government was determined by normative considerations, then we would only expect ex-combatants who are parties to an agreement (ex-paramilitaries) to have decreased trust after extradition. To examine that proposition, we disaggregate our analysis between ex-paramilitaries and ex-guerrillas who had little to lose by the extradition of their former enemies. Table 3 presents the results of split-sample estimations and models that contain an interactive term for the combination of ex-paramilitaries and postextradition. The findings are in line with our theorized relationship. For the subsample of ex-paramilitaries only, extradition leads to decreased trust in the state (Model 1), the reintegration program (Model 4), as well as in institutions (Model 7) but the latter is not statistically significant. Information from the ordered logit (not shown in Table 3) tells us that the difference is statistically significant in four of the six different steps (on the 1 to 7 scale) in Model 1 and for three of six steps in Model 4. This information also tells us that the effect occurs primarily in the lower part of the sample range, meaning that extradition changed ex-paramilitary trust in government from being higher than the national average to below the opinion of both ex-guerrillas and the public. Our findings of a shift are thus not overly influenced by a few outlier observations that were extremely positive before or negative after extradition.
Figure 2. Regression discontinuity plots.

also not demobilized under the negotiated agreement of leniency for committed crimes. Thus, they had no reason to perceive it as unfair.

Figure 3 presents additional information that support our contention that this relationship is not spurious in the form of substantive effects on respondents’ beliefs that the government is capable of successfully addressing eight different policy areas, using the same model specifications as in Table 3, Model 3. We see a negative effect after extradition on perceptions of the government’s ability to solve the conflict, provide security and human rights, and address corruption. Since these constitute the policy areas closest to the peace deal, we take these findings as support for our interpretation that the trust erosion was due to normative considerations regarding a broken pact. For other aspects of government policy that are less closely related to the peace deal (democracy, economy, unemployment, poverty), the shift in opinion is not statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Further, a similar view of the extradition effect we find among rank-and-file ex-combatants was mirrored by the paramilitary leaders themselves (in particular the extradited Salvatore Mancuso and Jorge 40). Extradition
Effects of a Broken Pact among Colombian Ex-Combatants

Table 3. Multivariate analysis of trust in government after extradition

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Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at department where resettled. (2) Statistical significant levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 level. (3) Model 1–6 ordered logit; 7–9 OLS, constant not reported.

Figure 3. Ex-combatants trust in government

Figure 4. Trust in government and policies across different paramilitary groups

Changes their view of Uribe from “a great honest president to a fraud, a liar, and a murderer” (Angarita Cañas et al. 2015, 242).

Difference-in-Difference Analysis of Ex-paramilitary Sample

One possible criticism of our test of Hypothesis 1 is that the relevant test for whether instrumental considerations are important should explore the possible variation in trust between those ex-paramilitaries with a personal link to the extradited leaders and those who had belonged to other units. If ex-paramilitaries continued to rely on their former patrons after demobilization, those ex-paramilitaries having belonged to a unit (a bloque) whose leader was extradited should perceive this as direct cost to their economic and security conditions and thus lose trust for instrumental reasons. Figure 4 presents findings from a series of difference-in-difference estimations comparing ex-paramilitaries with extradited leaders to those where ex-leaders remained in Colombia. These estimations should be interpreted with some caution because of the limited number of observations
leaders, if they did not suffer the costs of extradition themselves in their relationship to the state. Why should the expected to primarily draw on instrumental cost-benefit rea-

the same peace deal.

demobilized left-wing guerrillas who did not participate in

in trust in government among their former rank-and-file.

The decrease in trust affects ex-paramilitary fighters but not in trust in government following extradition. This includes all analyses. 23

Further, to control for the possibility of unobserved selection bias with regards to the timing of respondent interviews, we preprocessed the sample on predemobiliz-

ization individual traits in the form of age, gender, commander background, and education using Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) (Blackwell et al. 2009) and reestim-

ate all analyses. 23

Conclusions

In this article, we have expanded the literature on trust in postconflict societies by spotlighting rank-and-file ex-

combatants rather than understanding conflict parties as unitary actors or focusing merely on their leaders. Specifi-

cally, we analyze the effect of a peace deal reversal in Colombia on ex-combatants’ trust in government. We find that the government’s decision to deviate from earlier promises of political inclusion and benefits for Sunni tribes after, first, the US invasion 2003 and, second, after the “surge” in 2007–2008 provided fertile recruitment grounds for the different iterations of what became the Islamic State (Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012; Clayton and Thomson 2016; Greene 2017).

Second, the longitudinal approach used here, different from mostly cross-sectional studies on trust, allows us to identify the transactional nature of trust where repeated interactions with political institutions shift citizens’ expectations regarding how the state will behave in the future. This may relate to the puzzling finding in previous studies reporting a positive relationship between war exposure and trust (Bauer et al. 2016). Most of the explanations for this phenomenon have focused on the wartime experiences that are unique for war participants, with less attention paid to postwar experiences. Individuals may engage in rebellion par-

tially because the government has a very limited role in their trust network. A positive interaction with the government during the demobilization process can boost their view of institutions relative to their prior expectations. This is reflected in the perception of ex-combatants, for whom the reintegration agency was the most trusted government institution. We find, however, that even when reintegration programming is carried out very carefully, wider contextual dynamics can easily destroy its slowly created trust and undermine the small steps taken into the direction of reinte-

gration (Kramer 1999). While DDR programming may contribute to higher levels of trust in government in general, it is also conditioned by broader politics, as the Colombian case demonstrates.

Third, our article speaks to the difficulties of building peace at the end of civil conflict. This includes, among other things, the debate about whether amnesties or some level of punishment is the best option for postconflict sta-

bility (Dancy 2018). Yet, little is known about the exact

23 See online appendix.
context where transitional justice measures can be disruptive rather than help establish accountability and deter new challengers. The demobilization of paramilitaries is considered as a partial failure in Colombia. These experiences seemed to avert the political debates during the peace talks with the guerrillas, as the public rejected the peace agreement negotiated with the FARC in a referendum in 2016. Two of the main gripes of the “no” campaign were the concern that former guerrillas would be given amnesty for atrocities and that the demobilization would lead to a surge in criminality. This is a warning sign for other cases of demobilizing nonstate actors, in Colombia and beyond. In countries like Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Afghanistan, broken promises and destroyed support networks have produced generalized dissatisfaction (Jennings 2007), participation in crime (Human Rights Watch 2014), and outright re-mobilization (Zyck 2009). In Colombia, the implementation of the peace accord with the FARC guerrilla has had many setbacks. Lacking political will and capacity on the side of the government have contributed to increased frustration among the demobilized fighters (La Silla Vacia 2017). Also, ten years after the extradition of ex-paramilitary leaders, Jesús Santrich, one of the members of the secretariat of the demobilized FARC guerrilla, was arrested on drug charges and may be extradited. His arrest was seen as a betrayal of the peace deal by leaders and rank-and-file members of the FARC (León 2018) and contributes to another tense peace with a demobilized nonstate armed group in Colombia.

Supplementary Information
Supplementary information is available at the International Studies Quarterly data archive.

References


Effects of a Broken Pact among Colombian Ex-Combatants


