Democracy by Force:
The Impact of US Military Intervention on Democracy in Post-Cold War Haiti

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Abstract

This paper contributes to the current debate on the democratic impact of US military intervention in the post-Cold War era through a comparative study of two interventions in Haiti in 1994 and 2004. Due to a lack of significant academic work on Haitian democratisation, theory could not be found to sufficiently define Haiti as a political entity. Therefore, the state is defined through the concept of plutocratic democracy; a form of sub-tier democracy. Using this concept, an analytical framework is created to measure the impact of US military intervention in the 1994 and 2004 cases studies. Through a comparison of both cases, it is deduced that US military intervention stunts Haitian democratisation because a large proportion of US political actors support the informal plutocracy in Haiti at the behest of democracy. The claims of this study are supported by an extensive literature review, as well as media sources, official reports and communications from relevant actors.

Keywords
Haitian Democracy, US Intervention, Political History, Geopolitics.
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1.0: Introduction

On 10 January 2019, Nicolás Maduro was sworn into office after winning a 67.7% strong majority in elections the previous year (Phillips, 2018). US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo responded to the inauguration by stating that Maduro's Chavista government would be opposed by "the full weight of US economic and diplomatic power to press for the restoration of Venezuelan democracy" (Phillips, 2019). The following day, a North Carolina air-based freight company suspected to be a CIA front company started making routine trips to Venezuela and Colombia despite previously only being used for internal US flights. One month later, after nearly 40 flights had been made, the Venezuelan government discovered arms smuggled onboard one of the planes arriving in Valencia and condemned the US government of trying to instigate a coup against his government (Democracy Now, 2019).

Nearly two months later, on 30 April, Juan Guiadó attempted a coup against Maduro's government by assaulting Caracas with heavily armed paramilitaries and other opposition forces. Immediately prior to the assault, Guiadó formally broadcast his intent online in order to gain popular support; claiming it was being done 'in order to achieve democracy' (Phillips and Torres, 2019). Immediately after this declaration, Pompeo tweeted: "The U.S. Government fully supports the Venezuelan people in their quest for freedom and democracy. Democracy cannot be defeated" (Pompeo, 2019).

US foreign intervention is still prominent within the Americas in the contemporary era. Despite the threat of communism ending with the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the US lost its most significant casus belli: preventing the spread of Soviet influence in the Americas. However, as the above-mentioned case suggests, even a government that is formally democratic can be targeted for intervention under pretence of upholding democracy. How is this pretence justified? Has US justification for military intervention changed since the Cold War? How does US military intervention impact democracy in targeted states during the contemporary era?

Although limited studies exist analysing the impact of military intervention on democracy, they frequently yield wildly different results: for instance Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs suggests it negative impacts democracy (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006, p.627-649), Jan Teorell suggests the impact is sometimes positive, sometimes negative (Teorell 2010, p.99) and James Meernik suggests that the impact is somewhat positive (Meernik 1996, p.391-402). Which is it?

This paper therefore proposes to analyse the impact of recent US military intervention on democracy to contribute to this academic debate. This will be done by comparing two case studies from the only state in the Americas to have had two clear examples of US military intervention in the post-Cold War era; Haiti. Most curiously, the first of these interventions (in 1994) was to reinstate President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide after a coup, whilst the second intervention (in 2004) was to remove the same man from power a decade later- why would the US go through such great lengths to remove a leader they themselves had restored to power ten years earlier? Had Aristide turned from hero to tyrant or was there more at play?

Furthermore, Haiti makes an excellent candidate for study as it falls in a relative loophole of research; being on the fringe of many university studies, notably Latin American Studies and African American Studies. Although Caribbean Studies does exist, at the time of writing it can only be studied in English at a single university globally: New College, Toronto. This absence of research on Haiti can be summarised effectively by the title Christophe Wargny's book about the nation: Haïti n'existe pas; Haiti does not exist.

Consequently, in Haiti there are typically less research gaps and more research chasms, making it a highly lucrative target for academic study.

Haitian democracy is a prime example of a significantly under-researched subject, with academic opinion normatively built around speculation and assumptions. For instance, Larry Diamond considered Haiti to have never made the transition to democracy at all (as of his time of writing in 2008), reasoning that Haiti has competitive elections but not democracy (Diamond 2008, p.176). However, Haiti still manages to frequently elect Presidents on popular mandate which work against the state's elite (Dupuy 2005, p.190). How is this possible if Haiti is entirely undemocratic?

This paper therefore proposes to answer the question: what is the impact of US military intervention on Haitian democracy in the post-Cold War era?
2.0: US Military Intervention

In order to answer the above-mentioned research question, observations on US military intervention must be understood, relating to democracy and the case study country, Haiti. Therefore, this chapter will start with an analysis into the impact of military intervention on democracy in theory. Next, a historic background analysis that lead to the first US military intervention from 1915-1934 will be made, and finally an analysis of why the US chooses to intervene in Haiti.

2.1: The Impact of Military Intervention on Democratisation in Theory

Academic research on military intervention's impact on democracy will now be analysed to discover whether military intervention is considered to have a positive or negative impact on democracy in theory.

Academic viewpoints on military intervention vary somewhat. For instance, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs suggest military intervention is inherently damaging to democracy. They argue that intervention by democratic states may be even worse for democracy than intervention by autocratic states because the former tends to demand an unnatural change in foreign policy within the state. The misalignment between the policies of the intervener and internal state actors can result in difficulties that cause the former to rig elections or support autocracy (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006, p.627-649). Jan Teorell on the other hand seems to suggest that military intervention is beneficial to democracy around half the time, as intervention cases have had mixed results (Teorell 2010, p.99).

A study by James Meernik suggests the outcome of US military intervention is actually marginally positive: nations that underwent military foreign intervention improved their democracy by 15% over nations that did not over a three-year period. However, Meernik also states that intervention does not seem to impact upon democratisation on a long-term basis, suggesting that the overall impact of intervention is meaningless (Meernik 1996, p.391-402). A 2016 study by Matias Olsen looking at US foreign intervention across Latin America from 1898 to 2010 yielded similar results; post-intervention states had a slight increase in democratisation that dissipated in the long term. However, Olsen also stressed that relating to covert operations (intervention that can be denied by the instigator), the impact was considerably negative (Olsen 2016, p.14, 74).

Thus, despite wildly contrasting viewpoints between researchers, the most consistent theme is that military intervention has no significant long-term impact on democracy. This however contrasts with Bueno De Mesquita and Downs, who suggest that long-term damage can be done by promoting
autocracy. This analysis will therefore be referred to in the conclusion of this paper to see which research best corroborates with the findings of this study.

2.2: Historical Background: US Occupation of Haiti (1915-1934)
Observations will now be made into the first significant US intervention in Haiti in 1915 to analyse its impact on Haiti's socio-political history.

In 1915 Haiti was suffering from significant political instability due to economic hardship and plutocratic factionalism with new governments normatively gaining power through coups every several years. In July that year, after four months in office, President Jean Vilbrun Guillaume Sam was killed by an angry mob in retaliation to similar killings a few days prior (Girard 2006, p.81). Several days later US marines were transported to Haiti and rapidly conquered the factionally divided and economically ruined state with ease; suffering just two deaths.
The reasons for the intervention were considered primarily defensive: World War I had recently broken out in Europe and considering the US had withdrew from Cuba six years earlier, Haiti was an ideal replacement foothold between Florida and the Panama Canal.

During this occupation Haiti still had a Haitian head of state. The US however had a firm control over Haitian policy making and was able to consolidate their occupation through popular support from the Haitian elite, who felt the US brought stability and promoted their well-being (Castor 1971, p.60-61). A substantial proportion of US marines who occupied the island (coming mostly from the southernmost states) had a tendency towards discrimination and thus reinforced Haitian ethnic tensions between blacks, mulattos and whites. For instance, only the lightest skinned mulattos were given bureaucratic positions but were still prohibited from socialising with the US marines due to skin colour.

Following the end of WW1, the US decided to remain in Haiti with the objective of modernising the state in the American image. In 1922 a US proconsul was established to oversee the state and went about developing Haiti: building infrastructure such as roads, ports and airstrips. Schools were created and enforced further segregation: one type of school for the mulatto elite and another manned by French priests for the rest, despite not speaking their native Kreyòl Ayisyen and condemning their popular voodoo beliefs as satanic. Despite US attempts at modernisation, most Haitians felt humiliated by the US occupation and anti-American sentiment soared. Haiti was gradually granted more autonomy, and by 1930 Haitians were able to elect their own national assembly. In 1934, under mounting pressures and the economic hardships of the great depression, President Franklin Roosevelt withdrew US forces from Haiti under his 'good neighbour policy'.
To summarise, the US occupation of Haiti was a nineteen-year colonisation during the early 20th century. Formally the US invested substantially in Haiti in efforts to modernise the nation, however their colonial occupation likewise regressed Haitian society through ethnic segregation and reinforcement of inequalities. However, in defence of the occupation, the period of Haitian politics immediately after US occupation was far calmer than before it: presidents got elected by the national assembly as opposed to the prior method of gaining power through coups. Ultimately, despite stabilising the state, the US reinforced the power of Haiti’s traditional mulatto elite at the behest of the majority of Haitians. Likewise, in combination with animosities caused by racial and financial segregation, the elite domination of Haitian politics that stems from this period became a catalyst for the rise of the noiriste counter movement that brought François Duvalier to power some twenty years after the US occupation in 1957.

2.3: Why Does the US Choose to Intervene in Haiti?

The US heralds the odd contradiction of promoting democracy and supporting foreign intervention (Hermann and Kegley, 1998). Due to a long tradition of US foreign policy of based on a development of the Monroe Doctrine, foreign intervention has been particularly prevalent in the Americas, most notably in small states of Central America and the Caribbean. Haiti's first military intervention and occupation in 1915 was considered primarily strategic to deny potential German occupation in WW1, however the US clearly had other interests in the state and thus decided to remain in Haiti long after the war had ended up until 1931. Due to the impoverished nature of Haiti, their exports were nominal by US standards and thus economic interests would only be secondary at best. Therefore, what was the primary reason to intervene in Haiti?

The 1915-1931 occupation can be categorised as what Richard Haass cites as a nation-building intervention; the most demanding and resource intensive form of military intervention (Haass 1994, p.28). Nation-building is done with the objective of developing the target state and its economy to promote sovereignty, thus can be somewhat ironic as a justification for foreign intervention. Writing just prior to US intervention in Haiti in 1994, Haass argued that the US had a strong case to intervene in Haiti again for the very same reason: nation-building. For Haass in 1994, nation-building was imperative in Haiti for the following reasons: to promote humanitarian aid, the promotion of democracy, the prevention of further Haitian refugees coming to the US and the facility of the intervention (Haass 1994, p.31).

Haass seems to contradict himself: how can he claim to promote humanitarian aid whilst wanting to prevent refugees from coming to the US? Likewise, Haass literally states the facility of intervention in
Haiti as a legitimate reason to intervene; does a state being poor or weak *de facto* justify US intervention? Under Haass’ classifications, the 2004 military intervention would also be considered a third example of *nation-building*, this time with a considerable occupation by the UN's *MINUSTAH* (*Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti*) from 2004-2017 that mirrors the US 1915-1934 occupation somewhat alarmingly. *Nation-building* has now been attempted three times by the US in a 100-year period; this strategy of intervention must be considered at least somewhat flawed; otherwise why would further attempts to *nation-build* be needed?

But why does the US want to *nation-build* Haiti specifically? In the latter half of 1991, George Bush senior’s government was indifferent about the military coup that befell the Haitian government, until some 30,000 Haitian refugees started fleeing the country on small boats mostly towards Florida, after which the US formally committed itself to returning President Aristide to power. Two years later the new US government under Bill Clinton had remained passive, despite pledging an active approach towards Haiti’s military junta during the elections. Gradually as violence in Haiti worsened, rumours abound that some 3,000,000 Haitians were preparing to flee the country. Only then did Clinton's government act decide upon military intervention (Palmer 2006, p.46).

Thus, out of all the reasons for US intervention in Haiti, the most significant *casus belli* can be deduced as such: the prevention of Haitian refugees arriving in the US. This suggests that the US wishes to develop Haiti through *nation-building* to stabilise the nation as a means of Haitian refugee prevention. Through the case study comparison that will be carried out later in this paper, it is evident that there is another significant reason for US intervention. This will be addressed in the conclusion of this paper.
3.0: Democracy in Theory

In order to measure democracy, it must be first be deduced concisely what democracy is. Therefore this chapter will define democracy, then analyse four of the most significant democratic theories to deduce the best framework for a model democratic state. By selecting the most democratic framework, guidelines to promote (and likewise deter) democratisation can be found which may then be applied to a democracy measure. This framework may then be used in reference to Haiti.

3.1: Defining Democracy

The term democracy derives from the ancient Greek etymology dēmokratia; a composite of two words, Dēmos meaning 'common people' and kratia meaning 'rule' or strength. Democracy can thus be interpreted as universal popular governance, and the antonym of autocracy; governance by one person with absolute power.

Guillermo O'Donnell cites a democratic regime as having "fair and institutionalized elections, jointly with some surrounding political freedoms" and that all definitions "presuppose the existence of some basic freedoms of guarantees if such elections are to exist" (O'Donnell 2007, p.14).

Despite differences in democratic thought, freedom and democracy are normatively considered two pillars of the same thought (Friedman 1962, p.15; Dahl 1989, p.84).

By this reasoning, a democracy means being ruled by the people then the state must 1: work in the interest of its people, 2: must not constrain or impede its people and 3: must work to prevent other elements from constraining its people.

In this sense a state cannot be democratic without its people also being free. Therefore, it can be deduced that the most democratic society is also the most free society.

3.2: Finding the Best Framework for Democracy: A Model for Democratic States

In the book Theories of Democracy, Ronald Terchek and Thomas Conte outline four principal theories acknowledged in contemporary democratic thought: protective democracy, pluralist democracy, performance democracy, and participatory democracy (Terchek and Conte, 2001).

These prominent theories will now be analysed in order to deduce which theory gives its citizens the most freedom. The theory which provides the most freedom to citizens within a nation can thusly be considered the best framework for a democratic state. Considering the utilitarian nature of democracy, this study will measure a free society using Benthamian standards; judging democratic theories in terms of the greatest freedom for the greatest number of citizens.
3.3: Protective Democracy

Milton Friedman argued that state paternalism came at the expense of public liberty (Friedman 1962, p.35). He argued that the focus of state freedom should be on the individual, not the collective; thus state paternalism constrains the individual. This meant that the state should not impose upon its citizens but rather act more like an umpire in tennis; a regulatory body that simply ensures the state and economy is running correctly (Friedman 1962, p.16, 27-30, 35-36).

Therefore, protective democracy considers the state to be an infringement to freedom as oppose to a means to promote it. This suggests an inherent weakness of the theory: if a state de facto impedes freedoms, then why have a state at all, unless the goal of the state is to promote oligarchy or plutocracy? Friedman also argues the need for policing to protect freedom, despite condemning state paternalism (Friedman 1962, p.35). Is policing not also a form paternalism? This seems somewhat contradictory.

Likewise, Protective democracy’s focus on the individual as opposed to the collective may promote the well-being of the most powerful in society at the behest of the majority; for Friedman it would be wrong for the state to infringe on any individuals. Therefore there is nothing to prevent society's most powerful from accumulating more power and nothing would facilitate social mobility of less-privileged citizens; promoting the polarisation of society. If citizens are born with unfair restrictions such as financial barriers blocking opportunity, how is this free?

Protective democracy must therefore be considered a flawed democratic framework: promoting the greatest freedom for the smallest number and thus the polarisation of society.

3.4: Pluralist Democracy

Contrary to Friedman, Robert Dahl argued that wealth dictates political influence at the behest of democracy (Dahl 1989, p.114-115). As a result, a democratic state should try to minimise the powerful upper and disenfranchised lower classes; swelling the middle classes to promote freedom by means of equity. From this, Dahl argued that a healthy polyarchy would emerge; rule by many through collective political competition (Dahl 1989, p.218). This polyarchy is an entity that directly compliments democracy, as opposed to being part of the democracy itself. This suggests that polyarchy is an informal dualistic part of the democratic state (Dahl 1989 p.221-222, 323).

Dahl's theory provides a strong state framework but is not without gaps: for instance, Dahl stated that some minimal level of polyarchy is a prerequisite to transition from autocracy to democracy but does little to explain the process other than suggesting that it is desired (Dahl 1989, p.222). To this extent Dahl does not clarify what comes prior to polyarchy: what does the absence of healthy polyarchy
imply? What is relinquished in the transition to polyarchal democracy? If democracy manifests within a state that does not have a healthy polyarchy, what is the nature of the state? These points will be addressed in Chapter 4.

Regardless, Dahl's pluralist democracy provides a strong framework for democracy thanks to the promotion of freedom through collective political competition. Pluralist democracy may therefore be deduced to promote the greatest freedom for the greatest number; at least in theory.

3.5: Performance Democracy
Unlike Dahl, Joseph Schumpeter was sceptical about the role of ordinary people in important decisions (Schumpeter, 2003). For Schumpeter, professional bureaucracy must be allowed to do its work unimpeded as efficient governmental stewardship is key to the democratic government operating correctly.

In democratic elections, he believed that the voter chooses between competing elites who sell their votes like consumer products, and each voter would normatively vote for short-term good above the greatest good (Schumpeter 2003, p.273-282).

Schumpeter was not only sceptical of voters but also political parties and politicians: believing that electoral candidates create policies based on what gains them votes, rather than working towards the greatest good. Common good therefore does not come from the policies of politicians, but rather an imitation of common good that is sold to voters in a similar vein to how a department store sells its products (Schumpeter 2003, p.283).

Performance democracy therefore constrains citizen freedom by considering their opinions negligible. As previously suggested, performance democracy seems to stem intellectual scepticism towards ordinary voters. Such scepticism would likely promote meritocracy and thus a political segregation between voters and experts. As such, performance democracy inherently flawed by design; promoting meritocracy at the behest of democracy.

3.6: Participatory Democracy
In sharp contrast to Schumpeter, Benjamin Barber believed that popular political engagement was essential for a democratic state (Barber, 2003). Barber therefore advocated for the creation of what he called 'strong' bottom-up democracy; a 'politics of amateurs' where citizen dialogue is promoted without the 'intermediary of expertise' (Barber 2003, p.150-152). For Barber, active political engagement was the means of citizenship: "At the moment when the "masses" start deliberating,
acting, sharing, and contributing, they cease to be masses and become citizens. Only then do they "participate." (Barber 2003, p.155). Therefore for Barber, active citizen participation defines the state, and its absence means an absence of democracy.

Participatory democracy thus draws its strength from a focus on the dēmos in democracy; in universal participation in the decision-making process. This is arguably incredibly empowering, particularly in more unequal societies where disenfranchised actors may have a very small political voice. However, by stressing the importance of citizens being active in democracy, participatory democracy limits citizen's freedom by denying them the freedom to abstain politically: even if the government does not state that active participation is obligatory, it does not mean that a citizen is truly free to choose; citizen agency may become restricted by pressures to engage politically.

Participatory democracy therefore provides a strong framework for democracy, promoting citizen freedom through universal political engagement that empowers those at the bottom of society. However in doing so, the freedom to abstain is restricted: after all, what is the freedom to choose, if the freedom to not choose does not exist?

3.7: Which Theory Provides the Best Framework for a Model Democratic State?

As previously mentioned, democratic theories will be measured by the greatest freedom for the greatest number of citizens in a state.

By this method, protective democracy and performance democracy can be eliminated; both have been deduced to restrict freedom for the majority of citizens within the democracy.

Theoretically, pluralist democracy must be considered the most free democratic of the stated ideologies because it does not impede the freedom to abstain, unlike participatory democracy. From this reasoning, pluralist democracy will be considered the best framework for a model democratic state.

However, it would be highly assumptious to deduce that all democracies as sufficiently similar and requiring the same model; does one size (or in this case, framework) truly fit all?

The state to be measured in this paper, Haiti has the 4th largest familial income disparity in the world according the CIA's World Factbook (CIA, 2019): would pluralist democracy still be the best framework for democracy in such an unequal state?

Participatory democracy has already been deduced to empower disenfranchised actors. To this extent, it is plausible that participatory democracy may actually grant the greatest freedom for the greatest number in reference to Haitian state. This notion will be tested in the following chapter.
4.0: Does One Size Fit All?
Understanding Haiti as a Political Entity

In this chapter, it will be deduced whether participatory or pluralist is the best (most free) democratic model for Haiti and thus the best theory for measuring Haitian democratisation. Therefore, this chapter will attempt to explore Haiti as a political entity: this will be done by analysing formal Haitian democracy, followed by observations on the most state's powerful political actor; the wealthy elite. Next, the relationship between poverty, extreme financial inequality and democracy in theory will be analysed. The following two sub-chapters will explore plutocratic democracy, a concept used to explain Haiti as a democratic state and look at the relationship between plutocracy and polyarchy. The chapter will be concluded by defining Haiti as a political entity.

4.1: Haitian Democracy: An Analysis
Haiti is a 3rd wave democratic country with a very weak tradition of democracy. Between 1946-1956 Haiti flirted with democracy; holding pseudo-democratic elections however lacking voter registration such ballots were highly illegitimate. Thus Haiti had its first openly democratic elections in 1990, following the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986 (Coupéau 2008, p.132).

Democratic datasets will now be used to display data on Haiti from 1985 (the final year of Jean-Claude Duvalier's autocratic regime, as a point of reference) until 2019, to demonstrate common perceptions of Haitian democratisation that can be used in reference to other academic sources and the findings of this paper. Only three democratic datasets cover this period: Polity, Freedom House Index (FHI) and V-Dem. The latter Dataset however, V-Dem remains incomplete due to its relative newness and complexity and therefore will not be used.

FHI and Polity IV (IV being the most recent version of Polity) annual data for Haiti will therefore be displayed from 1985 till the most recent year available in both datasets, 2017.

Note that Polity IV does not measure years with political transitions such as interregnum. Unmeasured scores and the reason given by Polity will also be stated in the unmeasured scores key on the figure 2 graph.
FHI data considers Haiti to be anywhere between partly free and not free (therefore denoting flawed democracy and autocracy respectively) for the almost the entire 1985-2017 period. Polity IV results follow similar trends but consider Haiti more democratic than FHI. Both datasets follow a narrative that Presidents René Préval and Jean-Bertrand Aristide became undemocratic rulers; evidenced by the rating dip between 1998 and 2005. This narrative will however be deduced as incorrect in this paper (see Chapter 7) and therefore demonstrates a flawed understanding of recent Haitian history.
This incorrect narrative was also used by Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán in their 2014 study, which considers the period 1999-2005 as Authoritarian (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2014, p.67).

Larry Diamond and John Peeler considered Haiti to have never made the transition to democracy at all (as of their times of writing, their books being published in 2008 and 2009 respectively). Diamond reasoned that Haiti has competitive elections but not democracy (Diamond 2008, p.176; Peeler, 2009). For Peeler, Haiti's undemocratic nature is due to political agency being limited by the external actors that have continually moderated over Haitian elections ever since 1994. Peeler likewise remarks that Haiti has had the most extreme political tradition of coups and dictatorships of all Latin America, suggesting this has also stunted democratic growth (Peeler 2009, p.90, 94, 166-167).

Although the viewpoint of the two academics is understandable if it is based on the premise that a state is only democratic if it has a healthy polyarchy. However, this notion begs the question: how democratic does a state need to be to be considered democratic?

In reference to Diamond's reasoning, how is it plausible that a state has openly democratic elections and may elect popular leaders that works for the majority at the behest of the elite, and yet is in no way democratic?

For example, Jean-Bertrand Aristide won the 2000 elections, becoming President in 2001. Aristide immediately met fierce resistance from the Haitian elite who rallied against him under a rival party, Coalition Démocratique (CD). Furthermore, an unreleased USAID opinion poll in 2002 gives us an idea of the collectives who voted Aristide into power two years earlier: despite economic hardships due to sanctions, Aristide still had 50% popular support, stemming mostly from the poor and women. CD however only had 9% popular support, stemming mostly from the middle and upper classes (Dupuy 2005, p.190). This was Aristide's second term and presidency; and likewise his former Prime Minister, ex-baker René Préval, also served two terms as President. Even if their political agency was limited, how did such figures gain so much political power if not through democracy?

This notion demonstrates the flaws in Diamond's reasoning.

Regarding Peeler's argument, this paper acknowledges that external actors may mar competitive elections. However, as this paper will also demonstrate external actors are just one of many actors that mar elections, a notable example being Haiti's elite; why doesn't Peeler acknowledge this? Although it is improbable Haiti has ever had an entirely free election it does not mean Haiti does not have any democracy. A flawed democracy is a democracy nevertheless; at least to some extent.

Finally, following a case study analysing the 2004 US intervention, Neil Burron argues that Haitian polyarchy remains fragile, unconsolidated and riddled with contradictions (Burron 2012, p.96).
To conclude, Haiti’s democratic tradition is very young and academic study of Haiti is typically very meagre. This results in many flawed academic perspectives on Haitian democracy, when qualitative studies have not been undertaken. Thus academic opinion on Haitian democracy mostly suggests that Haiti is undemocratic, however, this paper wholeheartedly disagrees with this notion. A democracy that can elect popular candidates in competitive elections must be somewhat democratic, even if it is not wholly democratic and limits many freedoms.

The notion that Haiti is simply undemocratic is likewise a very dangerous one; as this paper will demonstrate it facilitates foreign intervention and the indirectly creates a narrative that Haitians are inept in self-governance.

Neil Burron's argument that Haitian polyarchy is marred suggests significant actors are stunting it. Therefore, Haiti's most powerful political actor; its elite will be analysed in detail to deduce its impact on Haitian polyarchy and thus its democracy.

4.2: The Haitian Elite

The nature of the Haitian elite will now be analysed in order to understand their impact on Haitian polyarchy.

In *The Haiti Files: Decoding the Crisis* James Ridgeway describes Haiti's elite as a 'mostly mulatto oligarchy' made of families who 'run their businesses the old fashioned way', by means of fighting for mercantilist-style economic monopolies against other powerful families (Ridgeway 1995, p.27, 31). Port-au-Prince's mayor, Ralph Chevry, describes them as 'the top of the 5 per cent of the population who control, I would say, at least 80 per cent of the wealth.' (Adams, 2010).

Haiti has always had a powerful elite: the 1791-1804 revolution saw the French colonial elite being replaced by a mulatto elite, and slavery being replaced with forced labour (Girard 2006, p.57). The tradition of unequal social, financial and political power has continued ever since, and have caused significant racial animosities.

As a result, Noiriste movements have frequently arose in Haitian history, attempting to alter the racial balance of power; however successful movements of this type have seemingly changed the racial make-up of the elite as opposed to actually tackling inequalities. The is evidenced most notably under the rule of Faustin Solouque (1847-1859), and François Duvalier (1957-1971).

Thus the Haitian elite dominates the country economically, socially and politically; to the point where it seems logical to deduce that Haiti's polyarchy is marred by something of a chaotic informal plutocracy: with powerful families scrambling for financial dominance over each other using any means necessary.
Therefore, if Haiti is deduced to have an *informal plutocracy*, then what is the impact of the extreme social, political and economic inequality this entails on democracy? This will be analysed in depth in the following sub-chapter.

### 4.3: What is the Relationship between Poverty, Extreme Inequality and Democracy?

Jan Teorell suggests that economic growth does not correlate with democratic growth, citing Carles Boix's argument that financial inequality can actually bolster democracy (Teorell 2010, p.59-60). Teorell however allows the term 'financial inequality' to remain ambiguous; is all financial inequality to be considered beneficial? If not, what degree of financial inequality can be considered beneficial? In Boix's study that Teorell references, cases of extreme inequality, popular revolution, uprising or civil war are considered more likely; particularly in authoritarian regimes (Boix 2003, p.19, 26). Likewise, Boix argues that greater financial inequality results in greater unrest, and therefore repression consumes more resources and thus creates more strain on the state (Boix 2003, p.63). This theory correlates with the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti in 1986, where the sheer level of unrest and economic strain made it impossible for the state to quell all riots. However, Boix's theories are incredibly focused on developed nations and a significant absence of research on impoverished states. Regardless, Boix states that democracy is sparse in Africa due to repression and suggests foreign intervention as a possible solution to the status quo; to force the elite of such countries to give up their economic monopolies and promote competitive growth (Boix 2003, p.237).

Although Boix's suggestion may seem tangible, the findings of this paper will demonstrate how implausible this suggestion actually is: after all, in a world of *realpolitik*, why would an intervening state fight against the target states most powerful actors instead of working with them if possible? Likewise, even if a state's elite was removed through foreign intervention, how will this prevent a new elite from emerging to fill the vacuum of power?

Thus, despite failing to propose a plausible solution to combat extreme inequalities, Boix's study suggests that although financial inequality can be healthy for democracy, extreme financial inequality certainly is not.

In *Democracy and Development*, Adam Przeworski et al. state that despite impoverished countries occasionally transitioning to democracy, they will not stabilise politically as long as poverty remains an issue within the country. As a result, an impoverished nation will normatively be a dictatorship, suggesting that void of external influences, an underdeveloped democratic nation would naturally transition back to authoritarianism (Przeworski et al. 2000, p.269).
Hennie Lötter makes a very strong and compelling case why poverty is completely at odds with democracy. For Lötter, the existence of poverty within a state contradict democratic principles: violating human dignity and choice (Lötter 2008, p.179).

Lötter also argues that poverty inherently damages a democracy, as it creates unequal political participation and destabilises the regime (Lötter 2008, p.182-184). On the latter point, Lötter states that those in moderate poverty (poverty that grants actors limited agency, as opposed to extreme poverty), feel cheated in life as others seem to have an unfair advantage. In a constitutional democracy, the demand for universal norms are intensified; thus creates animosity towards the democratic government and the privileged elite, thus increasing the desire for alternative governance.

If moderate poverty persists and is sufficiently widespread, violent unrest will ensue and target the country's political and social elite. Therefore, in order to stabilise a democracy, poverty and extreme financial inequality must be eliminated; and likewise it should be moral priority of a democratic government in order to uphold democratic principles (Lötter 2008, p.190-195).

A study by Kristobal Miguel Meléndez Aguilar found similar results and therefore also concluded that combatting poverty is key for stabilising a democracy (Aguilar 2016, p.498).

Finally, in a study on political participation and poverty, Michael Bratton argues that there is no correlation between poverty and preference towards democratic moral values, but rather poverty negatively affects commitment towards democracy, as Lötter also suggested (Bratton, 2006). Therefore, Bratton deduces that although impoverished actors are less likely to have a positive opinion about a democratic government, this does not necessarily mean that they do not want democracy but rather that they want to feel represented.

Finally, Bratton also suggests that poverty may be positive to voter participation. This likewise corroborates with his statement that impoverished citizens want to feel represented by their governments, suggesting that a significant lack of equity makes citizens more politically active (Bratton 2006, p.21-22).

Thus, despite the small amount of research available on effects of poverty and extreme inequality on democracy, the evidence above suggests they are both considerably negative towards democratisation. As a result, in order to support democracy in an underdeveloped country, action must undermine the target state's elite, as Boix suggests.

Impoverished citizens will feel less likely to feel represented by their government and are more likely to look towards alternative government types in order to feel that the government works for them. However, as Bratton suggests, the poor may also actively try to promote democracy in order to gain representation.

It can therefore be concluded that the eradication of poverty should be the top concern of any elected government to maximise citizen freedom, and thus promote democracy.
4.4: Plutocratic Democracy as a Concept

If it is acknowledged that Haiti has an informal *plutocracy*, then it can be deduced that Haiti's *plutocracy* acts as an entity that polarises power within the state. As suggested previously, this *plutocratic* entity creates extreme inequality that negatively impacts democracy and may prevent a political entity from consolidating its democracy.

Formally, contradictions prevent a democracy from also being *plutocratic*, however informally it is entirely plausible. For instance, *plutocracy* will make itself apparent through the safeguarding of financial and economic monopolies. In a democratic state however, a government that does not support such monopolies may be elected, giving the *plutocratic elite* incentive to dabble in formal politics to retain power, as has been common in history. However, in a democratic state this will result in the *plutocratic elite* using its power as resources to undermine democracy, because citizen political agency may be used to threaten *plutocracy*: this is evidenced in Haiti by the elections of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and René Préval.

When the *plutocracy* becomes threatened, it will use its extensive powers to remove the offending government (electoral fraud, propaganda, the military and external actors, for example), in order to protect their *status quo*. Thus, such a state must be *plutocratic*: regardless of who the formally controls the government, it is the wealthy elite that actually controls the state, albeit informally. However, because the state is also formally democratic, holding elections (which cannot always be controlled by the ruling class), the elite must frequently fight offending governments in order to safeguard their *status quo*; marking the dualist political nature of a *plutocratic democracy*.

A democracy which is also *plutocratic* will thus have significant corruption, extreme financial inequality and significant poverty. An autocracy with an informal *plutocracy* may transition to democracy due to external factors but is unable to consolidate its democracy due to a *plutocratic* preference towards autocracy; the normative government type for an informally *plutocratic* state. Therefore, a democratic state with considerable poverty, polarised economics, and extreme financial inequality may be categorised as a *plutocratic democracy*.

A *plutocratic democracy* is thus a sub-tier democracy, due to the contradiction of democratic and *plutocratic* duality; a state in which the people and the wealthy ruling class fight for control.

4.5: The Relationship between Plutocracy and Polyarchy

Due to the democratic element of a *plutocratic democracy*, it must be acknowledged that some small amount of *polyarchy* exists in such states, as Dahl suggests (Dahl 1989, p.221-222).

Dahl however fails to explain *polyarchal* development: what comes prior to a healthy *polyarchy*?
Likewise, how strong must a polyarchy be in order to be considered polyarchal? To this extent, an informal plutocracy may be considered part of a highly flawed polyarchy; due to the balance of power between collectives being heavily skewed. This paper therefore proposes plutocracy to be an informal entity that works upon the state. Coming prior to the transition to a healthy, competitive polyarchy it works twofold: as part of the polyarchy in the form of powerful collectives, and as a counterweight directly marring the polyarchy through an extremely unequal balance of power. Therefore, due to the contradictory nature of the two forms, a stronger plutocracy means a more marred polyarchy and vice versa.

Thus, a democratic state where weaker collectives within the polyarchy have become strong enough to compete with the plutocratic collectives may thus be categorised as a polyarchal democracy. It must be stressed that this does not mean weaker collectives having as much power as plutocratic collectives, but rather that collective coalitions can be formed that may overpower a plutocratic coalition. Such a state would be marked by many changes: notably a transition from economic polarised monopolies to competitive markets, a considerable increase in the quality of the state's democracy, lower corruption, fairer elections, an increase in humanist action by the government that targets disenfranchised citizens, greater citizen contentment and thus a potential reduction in citizen participation in politics. Due to the state not having a plutocratic and democratic duality, a polyarchal democracy is able to consolidate its democracy; causing the threat of autocratic regression to dissipate. A polyarchal democracy is therefore a higher-tier democracy, because it has freed itself from significant democratic contradiction.

4.6: Defining the Haitian State as a Political Entity: Finding the Best Democratic Framework for Analysis

As an impoverished state with extreme financial inequality, the Haitian state will thusly be defined as a plutocratic democracy. This is evidenced by plutocratic collectives’ capability to overpower all other collectives within the Haitian polyarchy, marring it and thus marring Haitian democracy.

Participatory democracy provides a strong model for democracy in a plutocratic state: a participatory democracy government's priority would be the empowerment of its citizens, not collectives; thus bypassing the issue of unequal polyarchal collectives within the state through the promotion of citizen representation: something a pluralist democracy may struggle to address. As such, participatory democracy will be considered the democratic theory which grants the most freedom within Haiti state.
The aforementioned notion thusly grants understanding into what impacts Haitian democratisation: most notably extreme inequalities. This will be used to create an effective method to measure impacts on Haitian democracy in the following chapter of this paper.
5.0: Methodology

This study proposes to analyse the recent impact of US intervention on Haitian democracy in order to answer the question: *what is the impact of US military intervention on Haitian democracy in the post-Cold War era?*

This will be done through a qualitative comparative analysis of two case studies of US military intervention in Haiti after the Cold War: the 1994 reinstatement of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the 2004 ousting of the same President. Both case studies will be compiled based on secondary data through an extensive literature review.

To give the best understanding of both cases and their potential impact on Haitian democracy, events prior to military intervention will be contextualised, as well as political history post-intervention. As a result, both case studies will begin with events that led directly to the US military intervention: the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the subsequent coup in 1991, and the 2000 parliamentary elections respectively. Post-intervention events, the periods from 1994-2000 and 2004-2019 will be analysed for each case respectively to better understand potential short- and long-term repercussions. The former case is limited to a six-year post event period due to the latter case starting that year. The latter, the 2004 case will look at political history up until the time of writing in 2019 because as this study will stress, the repercussions of the 2004 intervention may continue to shape Haitian politics until the time of writing and is therefore deemed relevant.

By extensively analysing these two cases of recent US military intervention in Haiti, both cases can be compared to find corroborative evidence demonstrating the nature of US intervention in the contemporary era.

Therefore, both comparative case studies will be presented individually in chronological order: starting with events immediately preceding the intervention, followed by the intervention itself, then political history following each event in order to deduce the potential short and long-term impact.

5.1: Data Collection

Research will be collected qualitatively through an extensive literature review in a deductive investigatory manner. Due to the investigatory nature of the research, the most credible sources available will be used; most notably academic literature and peer-reviewed articles. Other sources will also be used such as media, surveys, reports and official communication when they can be found. Due to the biased nature of most (if not all) sources, reasoning, corroboration and cross-referencing will be used to separate what is credible from what is not. This method will make itself apparent in the
2004 case where two contradictory historical narratives are frequently told. To this extent, it must be stressed that all information presented in both cases has been analysed with the highest degree of scepticism.

5.2: Analytical Framework

The findings of this paper thus far will now be used to create an analytical framework to measure Haitian democracy. It is considered apt to create original measures due to the lack of credible research defining Haiti as a political entity, which resulted in Haiti being defined by the concept of a *plutocratic democracy*.

Determinants will be created from two of the most credible quantitative studies on democritisation: Jan Teorell's *Determinants in Democratization* (2010), and Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán's *Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America* (2014). However as suggested in Chapter 4, many findings from quantitative studies simply aren't relevant to Haiti therefore a qualitative study must also be referred to.

This will be rectified through Irwin Stotzky's *Silencing the Guns in Haiti* (1997), which offers suggestions to consolidate Haitian democracy through case study analysis. These suggestions will therefore also therefore be used as a means to address the Haitian state specifically as a *plutocratic democracy*.

Thus based on the above, an analytical framework of five original determinants will be used to measure democracy in Haiti:

1) **Legitimacy of Despotism and Coups in Haiti.**

Teorell suggests that states with a strong one-party tradition have the most difficulty democratising (Teorell 2010, p.142), and Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán suggests that normative pro-authoritarian actors increase the chance of democratic regime breakdown (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2014, p.39). Haiti has a long political tradition of despotism and coups.

Therefore, it can be deduced that the level of despotic legitimacy directly affects Haitian democratisation; higher despotic legitimacy is detrimental to Haitian democracy and vice versa. Likewise, if a democratic state has higher despotic legitimacy then it must also have higher coup legitimacy. Thus, high coup legitimacy must be considered detrimental to Haitian democracy and vice versa and may work in tandem with despotic legitimacy.
2) **Quantity and Power of Radical Actors, such as Militia or Former Military.**

Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán argue that radical actors increase the risk of a democratic regime breakdown (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2014, p.36). Radical actors can be an ambiguous term; in this study they will be considered as internal actors that support a democratic regime breakdown. This would encompass a wide array of actors, but most notably militia or military groups. State actors (such as police) who are disloyal to their government may also be considered radical. These actors must be present in Haiti and acting directly upon the state. Therefore, a higher quantity of radical actors will be considered detrimental to Haitian democracy. The Haitian elite may also be considered radical, however due to the significance of actor it has been categorised separately.

3) **Frequency and Levels of Unrest.**

Teorell argues that peaceful unrest increases democratisation and violent unrest decreases democratisation (Teorell 2010, p.142). Therefore, peaceful unrest will be considered positive to Haitian democracy and violent unrest will be considered negative. In Haiti, violent unrest is common, thus in scenarios where it is not clear whether a mobilisation is mostly peaceful or violent, it will be treated as violent, thus detrimental to democracy.

4) **The Level of Power and Privilege of the Haitian Elite.**

As established in Chapter 4, the elite are Haiti's most powerful political actors; giving the state its dualistic contradictory nature that defines it as a *plutocratic democracy*. Thus the power of the elite will be measured by the political balance of power between pro-*plutocratic* and anti-*plutocratic* political actors. Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán suggest that powerful political actors will push the state towards democracy or authoritarianism, dependant on their normative preference (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2014, p.39). Also as stated in Chapter 4, the elite typically have a normative preference towards *autocracy* in order to safeguard privileges and monopolies. Therefore, a preference towards authoritarianism will be considered the normative stance of the elite. Based on this reasoning, a less powerful elite will thus be considered to positive Haitian democratisation and vice versa.

5) **Levels of Financial Inequality, Poverty, Stability and the Economic Power of the State.**

As established in Chapter 4, extreme financial inequality and poverty were found to be inherently damaging to democracy. This corroborates with Stotzky's research which suggests Haiti's soaring
levels of regional inequality, poverty, instability and a lack of opportunity all delegitimise its democracy (Stotzky 1997, p.82-84). Haiti has a very unstable economy that is offset by significant national/regional disequilibrium as well as dependency on imports and aid. In Haiti’s rural communities in particular, (which encompasses some 40% of the population as of 2016, access to basic needs are almost non-existent (Trading Economics, 2019; UNICEF, 2019).

Therefore, high levels of financial inequality, poverty and state instability will be considered inherently damaging to Haitian democracy and vice versa.

Determinants 1: Despotism and Coups, 2: Radical Actors, and 3: Unrest are sociological, 5: Inequalities and Poverty relates to socio-economic disequilibrium, and 4: Haitian Elite relates to both. These determinants will be used after both case studies respectively to measure the impact of US military intervention, using a counterfactual analysis based on the question: how would democratisation in Haitian state have differed if the US had not intervened in 1994/2004?

The overall impact of the respective case study’s US military intervention will then be deduced based on the ratings received by all five determinants combined with anything other factors deemed relevant that the determinants did not cover.

After both case studies have been presented, Chapter 8 will compare them both for correlations and disparities. This will be used as a means of deducing the impact of US military intervention on Haitian democracy in the post-cold war era, answering the research question.

Because sanctions are a normative prelude to US intervention, they will be considered part of the intervention and therefore also considered in the determinant analysis.

Likewise, many variables such as length of impact may be ambiguous. When such variables are significantly ambiguous, they will thusly be considered minor.

A points system will not be used, because the weight of each determinant in comparison to one another is not usually apparent. Instead at the end of each case, each determinant will be rated using one of the following key words: very positive, positive, marginally positive, neutral, marginally negative, negative, very negative.

As previously suggested, it must be stressed that two determinants receiving the same rating (positive, for example) does not mean both determinants have strengthened Haitian democratisation equally, but rather that both determinants can be considered reasonably beneficial to Haitian democratisation.
The case studies will now be presented in chronological order.
6.0: Case Study One: 1994 US Military Intervention in Haiti

This chapter will analyse the first of the two US interventions involving Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1994. The period leading to US intervention (1990-1994) will be contextualised, followed by the post-intervention period that saw the end of Aristide's first presidency (1994-1996). The subsequent period during Préval's first term in office will then be analysed (1996-2000). Finally, the criteria discussed in the methodology will be used to determine the impact of the 1994 intervention on Haitian democratisation.

6.1: Historical Context of 1994 US Military Intervention in Haiti

16 December 1990 was marked by the first open and competitive democratic elections in Haitian history (Coupeau 2008, p.132). In the months leading up to the election, droves of elite-backed and/or neo-duvalierist candidates were put forward as powerful actors from that epoch were trying to rebrand themselves in a new Haiti, and the US supported World Bank official Marc Bazin. Although Jean-Bertrand Aristide, (a liberation theology priest) was known for his part in the fall of the Duvalier regime, he had little funding and thus the notion of standing for election seemed challenging. Regardless, Aristide decided to stand at the last moment and won a landslide; gaining 67% of the vote with high voter turnout. The US-backed candidate, Marc Bazin came second with just 14% of the vote (Chomsky 1994, p.15; Sprague 2012, p.52-53).

Aristide, described as an 'idealistic' politician (Preeg 1995, p.6) denounced duvalierism and promoted reformist policies such as taxation brackets that worked against the wealthy elite and the military, thus putting him at odds with the informal plutocracy, which had been used to considerable affluence under the Duvalier regime. For instance, to address his proposed revocation of elite wealth, Aristide stated publicly there were two bourgeoisie: 'patriotic' (willing to make concessions) and 'patripocket' (pro-plutocratic (Aristide 1993, p.139).

Thus on the 29 September 1991 after less than eight months from his inauguration, President Aristide was forcibly removed from power. A military Junta headed by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras, supported by many powerful Haitian families and the remnants of Duvalier's Ton Ton Macoutes, ousted the new president in a coup. In the words of Aristide: "We leave the palace as prisoners, headed for the army general headquarters. Cédras is there; he hid his cards very well. Smart and sprightly in the uniform of his high rank, he is smiling, calm, even
cheerful and condescending. He tells me plainly, with a growing countenance: ‘From now on, I am the president.” (Aristide 1993, p.143)

Popular protests ensued almost immediately; during one prominent example in Port-au-Prince, several buses dropped off soldiers within the crowds, which was met with cheers as it was thought they had come to fight the coup instigators. Instead, demonstrators were mowed down by machine guns in their hundreds (Sprague 2012, p.62-63). Such acts of terror demonstrated the nature of the new regime; in the following days, an estimated 2,000 Haitians were purged as a means of consolidating Cédras’ power, causing 30,000 to flee the country, mostly to the US (Palmer 2006, p.47).

During a period that had recently seen mass-democratisation throughout the Americas, Haiti’s return to autocracy shocked the international community. Sanctions were immediately imposed on Haiti, causing limited effect to Cédras regime, due to the facility of contraband trade, most notably with the Dominican Republic. Nevertheless, the sanctions were indeed impactful to Haitian citizens: according to the World Bank GDP dropped by 40%, inflation increased from 7% to 52% and businesses reliant on import/export and agriculture declined dramatically causing mass unemployment (Catanese 1999, p.62-63; Maingot and Lozano 2005, p.59).

As well as embargosing the state, the newly fledged Organisation of American States (OAS) threatened to revoke Haiti’s OAS membership, a move which was completely ignored by Cédras. The US under George Bush senior openly condemned Cédras’ government but likewise chose a non-intervention policy, a move that was met with reasonable criticism. As a result, opposition leader Bill Clinton used the platform of intervention to reinstate Aristide as campaign promise that helped him gain his presidency in 1993, however Clinton was indecisive on keeping this promise and the push towards intervention was slow; it was evident that many powerful US political actors were strongly against the idea. The most notable and evident example was the CIA, who were described by a UN delegation having played a ‘double-game’, by formally supporting the US government and international community whilst still cooperating with the Haitian military (Sprague 2012, p.73-74).

Regardless, there many reasons for US intervention that started to push the initiative; support for Aristide was high amongst Haitians and activists in the US and abroad, and likewise the consensus to uphold democracy and for Clinton to fulfil his campaign pledge. Likewise, many conservative voices were sated on the premise that a lack of intervention made the US look weak, and the Haiti crisis was significantly damaging to Miami: as the main centre of US/Haitian trade, sanctions were damaging the local economy, and the influx of Haitian refugees to the city was causing a crisis and creating animosity (Maingot and Lozano 2005, p.60).

Thus by June 1993 the UN orchestrated a meeting in New York between major parties: Cédras, Aristide, the US and OAS to find a diplomatic solution to return Aristide to power. Talks were tenuous
and slow; both Aristide and Cédras were highly mistrusting of each other and the US. Likewise the CIA was trying to discredit Aristide, even going as far as describing him as mentally unstable and unfit for office (Palmer 2006, p.48).

Eventually a consensus was reached that would see a transition of power by 15 October 1993; on the grounds that US troops could arrive in Haiti, but only with side-arms. This move was widely criticised by conservative US actors, and thus under pressure on 10 October, the secretary of defence made a faux-pas on live television by stating that the US contingent would also have M-16 rifles. Cédras, infuriated ceased active communication with the US.

The ship carrying the US contingent with Aristide, USS Harlan County arrived at Port-au-Prince on 11 October, however found the port to be closed and occupied by a Cuban ship. Whilst waiting to dock, orchestrated demonstrators on small boats surrounded the USS Harlan County to protest its arrival. The Clinton administration ordered the ship return to the US, which it did the following day followed by the cheers of the successful protestors, which had reportedly been organised in part by the most senior CIA actor operating in Haiti, John Kambourian (Sprague 2012, p.76). The repercussions of this US blunder reinvigorated Cédras and his supporters, strengthening their resolve and hold over Haiti, whilst humiliating the Clinton administration.

Despite the embarrassing setback, the US government was determined to remove Cédras, under the threat of the ever-expanding stream of refugees; the situation in Haiti was worsening due to economic devastation and increased violence. For instance, a Macoutesque militia called FRAPH (homonym for 'hit' in Haitian Creole) had formed in support of Cédras was using violence to suppress his critics. The US Navy encircled Haiti and the UN imposed further sanctions, and Clinton's cabinet tried to restart Aristide/Cédras negotiations but were given the cold shoulder by the latter. Under increasing pressures to find a solution, Bill Clinton made a televised broadcast demanding Cédras stand down by 15 October 1994 or be ousted by force.

Likewise, US diplomats enticed the military by granting armistice, including to Cédras. With the economic situation making the military control of Haiti less tenable and Clinton evidently refusing to back-down, Cédras agreed to the demands. Thus Cédras left office on 10 October and went into exile in Panama, being replaced by Aristide who returned three days later on 13 October.

During the transition the military armistice caused difficulties; as it allowed actors of the previous regime to remain at large; for instance, an Aristide supporter was even murdered in front of tentative US soldiers, who were unable to react (Stotzky 1997, p.40).

The US sent 20,000 soldiers to Haiti post-intervention, and most were gradually replaced by UN soldiers under UNMIH (United Nations Mission in Haiti), which had some 6,000 soldiers in Haiti at its peak in 1995, with their mission formally ending one year later in 1996. The US frequently worked directly with many Haitian elite's most powerful families during this period. For instance, the affluent Mev and Madsen families rented land and holdings for the US army to use during their two year stay; undoubtedly making them substantial profits in the process (Freed, 1994). This decision was made instead of using the Haitian government; which would have produced a means of much needed revenue to consolidate the post-intervention state.

The country Aristide returned to was very different to the one he had left: the embargo had had a ruinous effect on the Haitian economy, infrastructure was largely gone due to military looting, and the country had devolved into lawlessness and corruption. The police were likewise hesitant to penalise paramilitaries; 70% of the Haitian police deserted just two weeks after Aristide's return to office, refusing to persecute their former superiors (Stotzky 1997, p.43). Likewise, Aristide had to concede a great deal to the US to pay for their intervention: most notably forming a more centrist and 'elite friendly' (thus plutocratic) government, accepting a pro-US neo-liberal economic agenda and being forced to leave office in 1996 as opposed to serving a five-year term (Dupuy 1997, p.138).

Furthermore, Aristide was now obliged to placate powerful US actors (many of which, particularly the CIA were staunchly anti-Aristide) as well as the still powerful paramilitaries. Relating to the former, Aristide noted that US/UN/OAS embargoes that had been largely unenforced until 1994 seemed more targeted at him than at Cédras before him. Of the paramilitaries that remained in Haiti, most blended into the Haitian population and became indistinguishable from other citizens; however, many did acts of random crime to delegitimise Aristide's new government in favour of the plutocracy, in particular as significant numbers of foreign troops started leaving in 1995.


Constitutionally barred from re-election, Aristide peacefully stepped down in 1996, marking the first peaceful transfer from one democratically elected leader to another in Haitian history (Girard 2010, p.177). His previous prime minister, René Préval became President and continued Aristide's trend of dominating the polls. However, a deadlock formed between the new President and parliament. Parliament, heavily controlled by the Haitian elite refused every attempt Préval made at assigning a prime minister. To break this deadlock, Préval was forced to dissolve parliament according to the Haitian constitution (Fleurimond 2009, p.31-32).

This move was met with widespread international scepticism, due to Haiti's history of despotism. For
instance, this is evidenced in both the *FHI* and *Polity IV* datasets demonstrated in Sub-Chapter 4.1 with a sharp decline in democracy from 1998. This dissolution of parliament may also be observed as a clash between predominately popular *polyarchal* coalition against a predominately *plutocratic* *polyarchal* coalition. The latter refused to work with the former as it would undermine their power: thus a clash resulted in a failing of democracy as a result of *plutocracy*; evidencing the contradictory dualistic nature of the Haitian state as a *plutocratic democracy*.

However, despite international fears of a return to Haitian despotism, Préval honoured the constitution and created new presidential elections in late 2000, peacefully stepping down from power in early 2001.

### 6.4: Analysis of 1994 US Foreign Intervention

The 1994 US intervention can be summarised as highly indecisive. This was caused by two major factors: firstly, the 1994 case forced a rethinking of US foreign intervention and its justification for the post-Cold War era. The geopolitical landscape had changed significantly, and universal norms were developing in favour of democracy. In brief, the US found it could no longer openly support despotic regimes; foreign intervention now required a significant moral prerogative (Maingot and Lozano 2005, p.62).

For the US, openly working with Cédras' government would have been an unpopular move due to international pro-democracy sentiment internationally and within the Americas, where almost all states had recently progressed beyond authoritarianism in the democratic third wave. However, as Clinton's predecessor George Bush senior demonstrated, a passive US policy towards Cédras was plausible and would allow actors such as the CIA to informally continue their operations in Haiti unhindered.

Secondly, the 1994 intervention was indecisive due to US internal fighting between powerful political actors. The CIA's adamant support of Cédras and denouncement of Aristide makes it very difficult not to deduce their involvement in the 1991 coup. If we accept this premise; then likewise it is logical that Clinton's electoral victory in 1992 caused significant difficulties for the CIA; requiring them to openly condemn Cédras and directly undermine their own work. Naturally, the CIA would not have wanted this, and therefore informally it continued to support Cédras and undermine Aristide.
6.5: Analysis of 1994 Case Study Using Democratic Determinants

The 1994 foreign intervention will now be measured using the five determinants outlined in the methodology:

1) Legitimacy of Despotism and Coups in Haiti.

The US intervention punished the 1991 coup instigators by reinstating Aristide, thus delegitimising despotism and coups.

The 1994 intervention sent a clear message to other potential coup instigators: this method of legitimising a government and despotic rule would no longer be considered acceptable in Haiti, and the US would likely enforce this. Therefore, determinant 1: legitimacy of despotism and coups in Haiti is deduced as positive to Haitian democratisation.

2) Quantity and Power of Radical Actors, such as Militia or Former Military.

If the 1994 intervention had not happened, Cédras' government would have remained and thus radical actors such as FRAPH would have remained at large. The return of Aristide's government undermined these actors, albeit only slightly, due to the US policy of reconciliation: it allowed radical actors to blend into the Haitian population and thus remain at large, despite becoming somewhat disenfranchised.

Thus despite the number of radical actors reducing due to US intervention, the armistice meant the reduction in radical actors may be considered marginal. Thus determinant 2: quantity and power of radical actors, such as militia or former military in Haiti is deduced to be marginally positive to Haitian democratisation.

3) Frequency and Levels of Unrest.

This factor is difficult to deduce due to authoritarian nature of Cédras' regime: Although paramilitary violence from groups such as FRAPH may be considered as violent unrest, it will be considered as policing during the 1991-1994 period due to direct links to Cédras' government. Likewise, popular protests cannot be adequately gauged because they were heavily repressed. However, because the freedom to publicly protest had been revoked under Cédras, it can be deduced that US intervention caused the return of this freedom, and in this manner democratisation was very positive. However, this is also offset by the armistice which allowed militia groups to continue to operate in Haiti, which frequently caused violent unrest to undermine the government after Aristide's return to power, which is deduced as negative. Therefore, by combining the two given ratings, determinant 3: frequency and levels of unrest is deduced as marginally positive towards democratisation.
4) The Level of Power and Privilege of the Haitian Elite.
The 1991 coup was an example of *plutocracy* undermining Haitian democracy; it was instigated by an elite-driven *polyarchal* coalition comprising of powerful collectives and was undertaken primarily to protect their privileges against the popular coalition that brought Aristide into office. By accepting this premise, the 1994 US intervention directly undermined Haitian elite efforts to maintain power. However, the Haitian elite were directly supported by the US post-intervention, which not only worked with the elite (as demonstrated, sometimes evidently prioritising them over the Haitian government itself) but also moderated Aristide to ensure he could not threaten the informal *plutocracy* again during his term. Thus by considering Haiti's elite as a single actor, it can be observed that a *duvalieresque plutocratic status quo* was maintained equally under Cédras and the post-intervention government. Therefore, determinant 4: *the level of power and privilege of the Haitian elite* is considered *neutral* to democratisation.

5) Levels of Financial Inequality, Poverty, Stability and the Economic Power of the State.
The post intervention economy was in tatters; however, there is significant ambiguity between what economic instability was caused by sanctions and actors under the military regime. As previously stated, if the power of the elite did not significantly change from the US intervention, then financial inequality would not have significantly changed either. Therefore, these factors will be considered *neutral* to Haitian democratisation and thus negated. However, relating to *stability*, economic turmoil would have created animosities against the government: this would have affected Aristide's government far more than Cédras' due to difference in government type; unlike *autocracy*, democracy does not facilitate the use of repression as a means of state control and thus Aristide's Haiti must be considered somewhat more unstable. Using this logic, it can be deduced that *democratisation was decreased* more by holding a democratic government in a significantly unstable state over the promotion of *democratisation* in Cédras' equally unstable *autocratic* state. Therefore determinant 5: *levels of financial inequality, poverty, stability and the economic power of the state*, is considered *marginally negative* to Haitian democratisation as a result of the 1994 US intervention.
6.6: What was the Impact of the 1994 Intervention on Haitian Democracy?

The ratings of the five determinants outlined in the methodology are as follows:

1: despotism and coups was considered positive,
2: radical actors was considered marginally positive,
3: unrest was considered marginally positive,
4: Haitian elite was considered neutral,
5: poverty, stability and the economic power, was considered marginally negative.

As previously suggested, the 1994 US intervention was the result of an internal political struggle within the US; a significant US polyarchal coalition wanted to reinstate Aristide, whereas another significant US polyarchal coalition that wanted to protect Haiti's plutocracy that had been made vulnerable by Haitian democracy. This resulted in an indecisive and contradictory intervention by the US; Aristide was thus restored to power by the US who also seemingly punished him for their intervention; and likewise the intervention worked against the Haitian plutocracy, which was then protected by the US.

Regardless, an autocratic regime was undermined to return a democratically elected leader to power; an action which outweighs all other determinants: how long would Cédras have remained in power if this intervention had not occurred? How much more damage would have been done to Haitian state, society and economy without the 1994 US intervention?

As a result, the impact of foreign intervention in 1994 must be deemed as beneficial to Haitian democratisation; autocratic rule typically promotes societal regression and thus also democratic regression.

However, the flawed nature of the US intervention significantly counteracts the promotion of democracy and thus much of this democratisation was undone. Thus, based on the five determinants and the above analysis, the overall impact of the 1994 US intervention is deduced to be marginally positive to Haitian democracy.
7.0: Case Study Two: 2004 US Military Intervention in Haiti

This chapter will analyse the second of the two US interventions involving Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004. The impact of the US intervention on Haitian democracy will then be measured using the five determinants set out in the methodology.

Unlike the 1994 case, there are two significant contrasting narratives of events surrounding President Aristide’s removal of power; one that is pro-US and critical of Aristide, and one that is critical of the US and pro-Aristide. Therefore, the two perspectives will be analysed to deduce which is most credible.

The history leading to the intervention will then be analysed, starting with the 2000 parliamentary elections (2000-2004). This will be followed by a post-intervention period focusing on Préval’s second presidency (2004-2011). Next, to gauge any significant long-term impact of the 2004 intervention, political history until the time of writing will be summarised (2011-2019). Finally, the determinants set out in the methodology will be used to analyse the impact of the 2004 military intervention on Haitian democracy.

7.1: Contrasting Narratives of the 2004 US Military Intervention: Finding which is most Credible

The two perspectives of events surrounding the 2004 military intervention will now be analysed: the first perspective criticises Aristide and his party, *Fanmi Lavalas*, therefore justifying the 2004 US military intervention. The second perspective does not criticise Aristide and *Fanmi Lavalas*, and therefore instead condemns the 2004 US military intervention. After both perspectives have been analysed, the most credible perspective will be deduced and then used for the subsequent 2004 case study.

7.1.1: Critics of Jean-Bertrand Aristide: Justifying the 2004 US Military Intervention in Haiti

The main academic voice critiquing Aristide is foreign affairs professor Robert Fatton. He suggests that Aristide became a highly corrupt politician by his second term in office and needed to be removed from power. For example, Fatton argues that Aristide’s former Prime Minister René Préval made a sham election in 2000 with the sole purpose of fraudulently handing power back to Aristide; Préval
being something of a political prisoner to Aristide who was only finally free to openly criticise him in 2006 after Aristide has firmly been removed from political power (Fatton 2002, p.143).

Fatton also accuses Aristide for creating a narco-state in Haiti during his second term in office as a corrupt means of funding, and Aristide's landslide victory in the 2000 elections was not healthy for democracy due to the structures of power within Haitian society. Likewise, he blames Aristide for destabilising Haiti: Aristide threatened Haiti's elite, causing the country's destabilisation (Fatton 2002, p.201-209).

According to Fatton Aristide 'abandoned his post as President' in 2004, leaving Haiti a broken mess for the US and the UN to clean up. Fatton however concedes that UN mission MINUSTAH (Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti) and the interim government that followed the coup was unpopular; but blames Aristide for using his militia from exile to undermine the new Haitian governance (Fatton 2007, p.212, 217).

Alex Dupuy shares the view that Aristide was fraudulently elected in 2000 but is also sceptical that Haiti was penalised when Peru wasn't under similar circumstances the same year (Dupuy 2007, p.141-142). For Dupuy, Aristide lost popular support by veering away from his liberation theologian roots; having to create a militia to consolidate power as a direct result. Unlike Fatton, Dupuy denies that Aristide had the capabilities of becoming a dictator due to his disbandment of the army in 1995 (Dupuy 2007, p.144-146). However, by 2003 with armed rebels entering Haiti from the Dominican Republic Dupuy felt that only foreign intervention could save the country from civil war (Dupuy 2007, p.169-171).

Gerard Le Chevallier, former chief of the political affairs and planning for the UN mission MINUSTAH and Deputy force commander Eduardo Aldunate both showed equal scepticism towards the former President. For Chevallier, Aristide abandoned his people and the UN had a duty to return the country to stability and 'prevent chaos' (Le Chevallier 2011, p.119). Both men described the many difficulties of the mission such as working with Haiti’s police force and gaining the trust of Haitians due to their distaste for foreign intervention. By 2006 Aldunate believed MINUSTAH had achieved one of its main goals: free and fair elections with the re-election of René Préval, and that UN soldiers had succeeded in gaining the respect of Haitians by being 'pro-people' (Chevallier 2011, p.117-124; Aldunate 2011, p.127, 131-135).

Finally, it must be noted that this is the normative viewpoint on events from most external actors. For instance, the Polity IV and FHI annual data (presented in part 2.4.3 of this paper) during Aristide's second presidency (2000-2004) clearly reflect a viewpoint similar to that of Fatton, showing a trend towards autocracy. Likewise, both ratings increased dramatically in 2006 following the MINUSTAH
supervised elections. NGOs also normatively take this anti-Aristide perspective:

"Using hundreds of millions of dollars of international humanitarian and development aid as a carrot, donor countries attempted to encourage improvements in democracy and the rule of law in Haiti. President Aristide, attempting an obvious analogy to the situation of Cuba, responded by repeatedly protesting the aid "embargo" (or even "economic blockade") imposed on the country."


"Amnesty International believes that an effective UN presence, supported by an international community committed to long-term sustainable reform in Haiti, can play a major role in helping to establish the secure and stable environment that has so long eluded the Haitian people. For this reason, we will be closely following the discussions around the mandate and structure of the forthcoming UN mission, that must include a strong human rights presence."

(Terlingen 2004, p.2): Extract from a letter from Amnesty International to the UN Security Council, demonstrating their support for foreign intervention in Haiti.

To summarise, this narrative suggests Aristide had become undemocratic and corrupt by his second term in office, thus US intervention was justified, and likewise, the UN mission MINUSTAH that replaced US soldiers in Haiti.

7.1.2: Critics of Foreign Intervention: Condemning the 2004 US Military Intervention in Haiti

Noam Chomsky, writing at the time of the 2004 intervention cited the events unfolding as 'awful, maybe beyond repair' (Chomsky 2004, p.9). For Chomsky the intervention in Haiti was a continuation of the US protecting their interests in Haiti at the expense of Haitians. Furthermore, Chomsky felt the 2004 US intervention against Aristide was 'eerily similar' to the 1991 military coup, with many of the same actors likely involved in both (Chomsky 2004, p.6-9).

Peter Hallward, author of Damning the Flood, arguably the most extensive academic writing criticising the 2004 intervention, paints a very oppressive and neo-colonial narrative to recent events in Haiti. He describes the year 2000 as pivotal in Haitian politics (Hallward, 2007). Aristide's landslide victory gave him the power to threaten the country's rich and powerful elite, and despite the OAS hailing the 2000 elections as a triumph for democracy with no irregularities, the US and France did not accept the results and instead chose to side with the anti-Aristide elite-backed political party, Coalition Democratique (CD). Hallward cites this as the moment the US immediately took action to strangle the
state economically; Haiti's absolute economic dependency made this strategy so successful that it caused mass destitution on a scale that would take more than 50 years to recover from (Hallward 2007, p.74-83).

Justin Podur took similar stance to Hallward. Relating to Aristide's downfall prior to the coup, Podur argues France, Canada and the United States all plotted against Aristide with the Haitian elite (Podur, 2012). Haitian private media (a key part of the coup infrastructure) was heavily biased against Aristide because it was controlled by the country's elite, who were trained to skew information in North America. For instance, just prior to the 2004 coup an unnamed US official falsely stated Aristide had resigned, something widely accepted as fact by most press thus delegitimising Aristide's government. Although this was quickly debunked, the damage has already been done (Podur 2012, p.35-43).

For Podur, the 2004 coup and the subsequent interim government was an experiment in a new type of imperialism: the US and its allies removed a president who was reluctant to conform to their neoliberalist foreign policy, and likewise the US used the opportunity to directly undermine Haitian sovereignty through an aid mission that conceded transport links (airports, roads etc.) to direct US control, and Aristide's political party Fanmi Lavalas was barred from elections to ensure the grassroots movement would not return to power (Podur 2012, p.139).

Podur likewise describes MINUSTAH as a US proxy-occupying force; with UN soldiers frequently used unnecessary brutality to fight against potential Aristide's supporters who were considered bandits (Podur 2012, p.155-157).

To summarise, this perspective of events condemns the US, its allies and the Haitian elite for undermining Aristide's government and removing him from power. It criticises the perspective of events which were told by popular media and major international actors as heavily skewed through power politics and propaganda. Therefore in this narrative, the UN mission MINUSTAH is considered as a US-proxy occupying force used to ensure Haiti adhered to US policy.

7.1.3: Which Historic Perspective Surrounding the 2004 US Military Intervention is Most Credible?

The latter perspective (critical of intervention) seems more credible than the former (critical of Aristide): in the latter narrative, there is an significant absence of in depth analysis, particularly of the Haitian elite as an political actor despite their key role in Haitian politics: for instance Fatton blames Aristide for upsetting the actor but goes into little detail about why they were upset or how Aristide tried to placate them after his electoral landslide victory.
On the other hand, the latter perspective (critical of intervention), directly addresses events in a logical, investigatory and deductive manner which corroborates strongly with all previous findings of this paper.

This perspective will therefore be used for the subsequent analysis of the 2004 US intervention.

7.2: Historical Context of 2004 US Military Intervention in Haiti

The May 2000 Haitian parliamentary elections were a major upset for the traditional Haiti elite: Jean-Bertrand Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas (FL) won a landslide victory, causing the party to dominate the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. OAS monitors who oversaw the elections declared no voting irregularities, with a strong 65% voter turnout; after all, Aristide and his former Prime Minister René Préval had dominated elections for the last decade thus OAS monitors found Aristide's victory to be unsurprising and considered legitimate (Hallward 2007, p.76, 79).

This parliamentary election upset made it abundantly clear that Fanmi Lavalas was going to win a landslide in the November presidential elections too, thus tipping the political balance of power significantly away from the Haitian elite; forcing them to act drastically to protect the status quo.

On the 16 June, the US embassy in Haiti abruptly took an OAS monitor (June Leon Manus) out of the country for five days. Upon his return, he openly declared that he had counted the ballots incorrectly; evidencing previously undiscovered 'massive electoral fraud' in the May elections (Hallward 2007, p.80). This denouncement was wholeheartedly supported by Convergence Démocratique (CD), a political party orientated around a coalition of elite actors) that immediately started to condemn FL upon this premise. Haitian popular media, also largely controlled by the Haitian elite corroborated with CD and was made an outlet for anti-FL propaganda (Podur 2012, p.35). The US government formally supported Manus' allegation of electoral fraud, and as a direct response, all USAID to Haiti was revoked, as well as access to the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB); strangling the Haitian economy. This deadly mixture of outspoken CD political opposition, media condemnation, and US power politics became the catalyst for international normative opinion moving against FL.

In November as anticipated, FL won a landslide in the presidential elections. CD however boycotted the event and on the premise of fraud, and four months later when Aristide was being sworn into office, CD held their own ceremony inaugurating their own President (Fleurimond 2009, p.32; Hallward 2007, p.86). To placate the elite threat undermining his legitimacy, President Aristide immediately attempted power sharing agreements; all of which (more than 20 proposals) were flatly rejected. It became apparent that CD was not going to work with FL and instead were purely focused on the delegitimisation of Aristide's government.
Later that year in December 2001, 33 gunmen headed by former Haitian chief of police Guy Philippe attempted to assault the national penitentiary in Port-au-Prince but were repulsed. Later that evening after regrouping, the gunmen proceeded to assault the presidential palace; throwing a grenade through the window then charging into the building heavily armed and were reportedly heard communicating in a mixture of Haitian Creole, English and Spanish during the assault, suggesting some degree of international collaboration and networking (Fox News, 2001). However, the gunmen were once again repulsed, and Philippe returned to exile in the Dominican Republic.

Just over one year later, during a meeting in Meech Lake, Québec between 31 Jan 2003 and 1 February 2003, US, French and Canadian diplomats unanimously agreed that Aristide must not be allowed to finish his term as Haitian president (Podur 2012, p.42). Of those in the meeting, US foreign affairs minister Roger Noriega in particular had allegedly been dedicated to ousting Aristide for years, on the grounds that "people like him undid all the good work done in the 80's"; and would later state during a television interview "the crime is that the Clinton administration supported [Aristide] as long as it did" (Hallward 2007, p.90-91).

Facing a new wave of condemnations, international geopolitical and journalistic opinion rapidly turned against Aristide, who became frequently branded as a corrupt dictator, in the same vein as Baby Doc who he had helped to overthrow some 20 years earlier (Gumbel, 2004; Mouton, 2003; Le Monde, 2004). Accusations of fraud led to further international aid sanctions, which completely crashed the Haitian economy: GDP fell from $4 billion to $2.9 billion between 1999 and 2003. An NGO study by Christian Aid, Oxfam and others cited "at the close of 2003, Haiti is living in a crisis without precedent" (Hallward 2007, p.83). Disease, poverty and violence spiralled dangerously.

Haiti’s 200th birthday, 1 January 2004 was marred by violent uprisings (with many paramilitaries such as Guy Philippe returning to Haiti to create violent unrest) and soon after the US and French governments declared a formal loss of support towards Aristide.

With the blessing of the UN, during the night of the 28 February 2004 the US ambassador arrived at the presidential palace. With words backed by entourage of US paramilitaries, Aristide was given an ultimatum: to leave the country and resign or else he and many Haitians would be killed, and the country plunged into civil war. Given little choice, Aristide signed his resignation and was forced on a plane and taken to the Central African Republic and handed over to French jurisdiction (Podur 2012, p.53-55).

With Aristide removed from office, world powers went to action, creating an interim government and refinancing Haiti. By 30 April UN mission MINUSTAH was created to occupy and re-stabilise the country, with the bulk of the forces being Latin American, headed by Brazil. The aftermath, the ‘clean up’ of the unrest created by the economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, ensured Jean-Bertrand Aristide's Lavalas movement would remain quelled; therefore upholding the informal plutocratic status quo in what Aristide cited as ‘an act of neo-colonialism’ (CNN, 2004).

MINUSTAH thusly acted as a US proxy occupying force in Haiti: the Aristide supporters who actively fought against his ousting, dubbed Chimères (meaning both chimeras and impossible dreams/desires), fought against paramilitaries but were blown out of proportion by propaganda; being branded as bandits and terrorists by MINUSTAH. Although figures are hard to calculate, Hallward deduces that the most reliable sources suggest the number of political killings following US intervention to be around 4,000, on par with Pinochet's purges following the 1973 coup in Chile (Hallward 2007, p.285).

One of the primary goals of MISUSTAH was to set up what they describe as ‘free and fair elections’ which came in February 2006. UN officials declared this a success for Haitian democracy with the re-election of René Préval (Aldunate 2011, p.134). However, analysis from an international observer shows many oddities marring the elections: not only was the most popular party, Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas barred from participating, but allegedly Préval's new party LESPWA was considered to be the only party in the country to actually have the finances for an electoral campaign (Warsinski 2006, p.29-30).

Préval, perhaps partially thanks to a lack of significant competition garnered reasonable popular support.

However, whilst ballots were being counted, a dumpster full of burnt LESPWA marked ballots was found, to which UN spokesman David Wimhurst stated was "not necessarily evidence of fraud" (Podur 2012, p.119). Furthermore, a massive 7.5% of ballots were considered invalid and 4% of ballots completely vanished. The US and other international bodies tried to get Préval to form a coalition government, however popular protests supported by Préval ensued against the apparent electoral fraud in play. Préval was eventually awarded a slim majority of 50.15% thanks to MINUSTAH nations such as Brazil which wanted to recognise his electoral victory.

Despite winning the presidency, similarly to Aristide after being reinstated as president in 1994, Préval's 2006 government had very limited freedoms. Once again the economy was in tatters due to the previous sanctions and unrest under Aristide, and the MINUSTAH occupation meant that Préval had no option but to collaborate with both the UN and the US (Podur 2012, p.119-126).

For instance, in a cable to the US secretary of state and National Security Council, the US ambassador
for Haiti Janet Sanderson describes Préval as a sort of intermediary between MINUSTAH and 'gangs' (likely Chimères) in Cité Soleil (Port au Prince's largest slum), and thus is seen more like a diplomat or negotiator than an actual head of state. Sanderson ends her report complaining that Préval is not complicit enough in killing his own people: "[Préval's] reluctance to give public endorsement to forceful MINUSTAH action in Cité Soleil -- the heart of the gang problem -- suggests he has not yet mustered all the necessary fire in the belly" (Sanderson, 2006).

Likewise, economics also limited Préval's political agency, thanks to the devastation caused by the international sanctions used against Aristide. The damage was so significant that the state could barely function: for instance, in 2008 the government collapsed amid riots due to mass-inflation, with food becoming almost completely unaffordable for ordinary Haitians (Delva and Loney, 2008).

7.4: 2011-2019: Elections and Heads of State Following Préval's Presidency

Subsequent elections have shown poor trends for Haitian democracy. The 2011 elections were marred with irregularities: pre-election polls showed Préval's new party INITE dominating elections, however his candidate Jude Célestin did not make the second round of voting, despite officially having 0.6% more votes than his rival Michel 'Sweet Micky' Martelly. Economist David Rosnick heavily criticises the decision made by OAS monitors to favour Martelly over Célestin as an act of foreign intervention (Rosnick 2011, p.1-12).

Widespread protests against electoral fraud ensued, however Martelly became president after winning the second round some three months later (Carroll, 2011).

Martelly, a pop singer who had previously protested against the removal of Cédras in 1994 made his flagship project the recreation of the Haitian military for reasons of sovereignty and internal policing. He achieved this goal at great expense in 2013, despite Haiti still recovering from mass destitution caused by the 2010 earthquake (Edmonds, 2013).

By 2014 Martelly had become caught in a political deadlock with the senate, causing his government to expire due to a lack of new elections. Martelly resigned without a successor in February 2016 amid unrest, and increasing international pressures (BBC News, 2015; BBC News, 2016).

After seven days without a head of state, the senate assigned Aristide's former finance minister Jocelerme Privert to be provisional president whilst elections were being organised. Elections ensued in 2016, and Martelly's chosen successor, Jovenel Moïse was made president. However once again elections were incredibly marred; the first round of voting had a voter turnout of 21% and despite calls to re-do elections, Privert argued that there was simply no point until Haitians had regained confidence in the electoral system (Charles, 2016; BBC News, 2016).
Due to his pyrrhic electoral victory, Moïse has had difficulty legitimising his government. In February 2019 mass anti-corruption protests (most notably due to a $4 billion social development fund vanishing) called for Moïse to resign. In a report on the protests, Haitian Economist Etzer Emile summarised sentiment towards the state:

"People don't trust the government, people don't expect solutions from the government, they don't even believe in what they’re saying." (Al Jazeera, 2019).

7.5: Analysis of 2004 US Foreign Intervention
The 2004 intervention was a contemporary case of realpolitik in action; a military coup by one democratic nation against another. Ultimately, as an actor the US state decided that the Haitian people chose the incorrect candidate in the 2000 elections with sufficient conviction that the actor felt obliged to remove him from power; going directly against the will of the Haitian people. Likewise, on a state level it is an example of the plutocratic action undermining democracy in Haiti in order to maintain the power of the former.

The 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections almost doubtlessly contained some level of fraud; the notion of a Haitian ballot free of any fraud seems dubious. However, annual corruption data by country shows Haiti's ranked as 89th in 2002 during Aristide's presidency; by 2007 this number had plummeted to 177th out of 180 monitored countries (Trading Economics, 2019). Haiti's corruption ranking never really recovered; Haiti's 2018 ranking being 161st (Transparency International, 2019). This data suggests that electoral fraud may have been less prominent prior to the US intervention. This notion corroborates with findings in Chapter 3 evidencing the correlation between plutocratic power, corruption and democracy: democratic elections after the 2004 have all been considerably compromised, to the point where most people don't even see the point in voting anymore, evidenced by the 21% voter turnout in 2018.

Furthermore on moral grounds, if military intervention against Aristide was justified due to electoral fraud, why wasn't military intervention used to remove Michel Martelly, who was made president despite not actually having enough votes to make the second round of voting? Likewise why is there no talk of foreign intervention against Jovenel Moïse, despite winning a presidency where 79% of eligible voters abstained, and a corruption scandal have caused major protests for over four months, and are still ongoing at the time of writing in May 2019?

This reasoning suggests a lack of moral justification the true purpose of the 2004 US intervention; thus restoration of democracy used as a casus belli was ultimately a farce, and sadly the much of the world
believed it. Therefore the *true* justification for the 2004 intervention must lie elsewhere, with evidence suggests that it was to safeguard Haiti's *plutocratic* hierarchy in the 21st century, likely as a means of promoting the interests of powerful US political actors in Haiti.

**7.6: Analysis of 2004 Case Study Using Democratic Determinants**

The 2004 foreign intervention will now be measured using the five determinants outlined in the methodology:

1) **Legitimacy of Despotism and Coups in Haiti.**

By ousting Aristide in 2004, the US has given the Haitian elite a potential reusable means of removing an undesirable leader from power; using propaganda and power politics, thus legitimising further coups and negatively affecting democratisation. This paper does not find the legitimacy of Haitian despotism to be significantly affected; democracy was forced upon Haiti after the intervention and upheld by *MINUSTAH*.

This suggests that a return to despotism would have been met with strong resistance by George Bush Junior and Barack Obama's respective governments. Therefore, the actions of this intervention did not legitimise the return of the likes of Raoul Cèdras or François Duvalier; thus the legitimacy of despotism remained unchanged, however the legitimacy of coups was reinforced, decreasing Haitian democratisation. Therefore, determinant 1: *legitimacy of despotism and coups in Haiti* is deduced as **negative** to Haitian democratisation.

2) **Quantity and Power of Radical Actors, such as Militia or Former Military.**

The events prior to the US coup saw an increase in radical actors as former military returned to Haiti to create unrest to delegitimise the government. Likewise, media bias from the elite caused violence from many *FL* supporters. After the coup, *MINUSTAH* forces worked to quell these actors through planned killings and arrests. Thus radical actors greatly increased in the short-term and delegitimised in the medium-term whilst *MINUSTAH* was active. Therefore determinant 2: *quantity and power of radical actors, such as militia or former military* is deduced as **marginally negative** to Haitian democratisation.

3) **Frequency and Levels of Unrest.**

The international sanctions and the returning paramilitaries created significant unrest; bringing the nation to the brink of civil war. The fact that *MINUSTAH*, tasked with stabilising Haiti formally ended in October 2017, after over 13 years of occupation is testament to the level of destabilisation and
unrest caused by 2004 intervention; although this is offset by the devastating 2010 earthquake making this determinant difficult to gauge and thus unrest after 2010 must be considered negligible. However, evidence of unrest between 2004 and 2010 permits reasonable deduction:

Firstly the targets of MINUSTAH policing must be accounted for: most notably paramilitary militias and Aristide’s Chimère supporters which remained active in the country for many years following the 2004 intervention; both of which must be considered as examples of violent unrest. Likewise, economic collapse in 2008 (stemming from the damage done by sanctions) provoked riots that caused Préval’s government to collapse altogether.

Therefore, based on this evidence it can be stated with conviction; the impact of the 2004 military intervention from determinant 3: frequency and levels of unrest is deduced as very negative for Haitian democratisation.

4) The Level of Power and Privilege of the Haitian Elite.

Aristide’s re-election in 2000 threatened the political power of the elite. Since the 2004 military intervention the plutocratic status quo in Haitian politics has not been significantly threatened since (the only reasonable example being the deadlock between President Martelly and the senate that lead to his 2016 resignation).

Préval had very limited freedom to act outside of US jurisdiction during his 2006-2011 term, which was informally supporting Haitian plutocracy. Following Préval (ignoring the 2016-2017 interregnum President Jocelerme Privert), both heads of state have been elite sponsored candidates, both of which were elected in highly flawed elections. This marks a shift in the balance of power towards plutocracy and the behest of democracy; causing a total loss in faith of ordinary Haitians towards the electoral process and the government.

By accepting the premise that the US engaged in the 2004 intervention to support Haitian plutocracy, it is plausible that the intervention’s success had a significant part in this shift of power towards the elite.

Regardless of whether the 2004 intervention was wholly or partially to blame, it undeniably succeeded in undermining President Aristide and FL; perhaps the greatest political threat to Haitian plutocracy of the modern era. Therefore determinant 4: the level of power and privilege of the Haitian elite is deduced as very negative.

5) Levels of Financial Inequality, Poverty, Stability and the Economic Power of the State.

The modern Haitian economy is highly dependent on external actors, thus the international sanctions imposed on the country leading to the intervention had a hugely significant economic impact, which was felt most by the poorest in Haitian society, suggesting a negative effect of financial inequality.
Likewise, it must be stressed that the destitution and economic turmoil caused by the sanctions had a lasting impact long after they were gone. For instance, the 2008 food riots that lead to the collapse of Préval's government was a direct consequence of the international sanctions imposed by the US and its allies and must be considered a significant factor working against Haitian stability. Even in the year prior to the 2010 earthquake and after five years of renewed international funding and MINUSTAH efforts to stabilise the nation, Haitian GDP per capita stood at roughly 711 USD, down from approximately 767 USD during the year 2000 (Trading Economics, 2019). Thus even though the 2010 earthquake has made long-term damage difficult to analyse, it can be deduced that the 2004 US intervention has caused a significant damage to levels of poverty due to economic destitution, that likely continues to impact Haitian citizens even today. It is therefore deduced that determinant 5: levels of financial inequality, poverty, stability and the economic power of the state was very negative to Haitian democratisation.

7.7: What was the Impact of the 2004 Intervention on Haitian Democracy?
The ratings of the five determinants outlined in the methodology are as follows:

1: despotism and coups was considered negative,
2: radical actors was considered marginally negative,
3: unrest was considered very negative,
4: Haitian elite was considered very negative,
5: poverty, stability and the economic power was considered very negative.

All determinants received negative ratings, and the majority of determinants received the lowest rating 'very negative'; suggesting that the impact of the 2004 intervention to Haitian democracy was so significant that it’s repercussions likely continue to affect Haitian democracy today.

Thus, based on the five determinants and the above analysis, the impact of the 2004 US intervention is deduced to be very negative to Haitian democracy.
8.0: Comparison of 1994 and 2004 Case Studies

In this Chapter the 1994 and 2004 intervention case studies will be compared to gauge their impact on Haitian democracy. This will be done by analysing the correlations between both cases, followed by disparities. Every relevant correlation or disparity that is found will be summarised then followed by an analysis. For ease of reference, a tag will be given to each number: correlations will be marked $C$ followed by a number ($C1, C2$ etc.) and disparities will be marked $D$ followed by a number ($D1, D2$ etc.).

Finally, these analyses will then be used to answer the following: what does this evidence suggest about the impact of US military intervention on Haitian democracy?

8.1: Correlation Between 1994 and 2004 Intervention Cases

$C1$) Both cases started with international sanctions, and both times these sanctions had a crippling effect on the formal economy.

In both cases, the military intervention is preluded by international sanctions, in order to weaken the target regime. Both times this had a crippling effect on the formal economy (due to the dependant nature of the Haitian state) and put considerable pressure on the head of state. However, the sanctions leading to the 2004 case may be considered more devastating, evidenced by the food riots and collapse of Préval’s government in 2008.

Likewise, in both cases the post-intervention economy was in tatters, although in the 1994 case the considerable looting done by paramilitaries would have also played a significant role. In both cases the devastation upon the economy greatly weakened the political power of the post intervention regimes, making them unstable, highly dependent on external aid and extremely limited in political agency.

$C2$) Both cases saw increased violent unrest after the intervention.

The foreign intervention had a crippling effect on Haitian stability in both cases. This resulted in increased violent unrest due to armed groups, a lack of basic needs, and a lack of law enforcement.
C3) In both cases militant groups worked with the Haitian elite against Aristide's government.

Militias used the tactic of violent unrest in both cases to delegitimise Aristide's regime. Military/militias are evidenced as significant actors to delegitimising a government that threatens the *plutocracy*: in both cases armed groups are used in conjunction with the elite to attempt to oust Aristide from power. However, the 1991 coup attempt succeeded whereas the 2001 coup attempt failed, which forced the Haitian elite to find ulterior means to oust Aristide from power. Likewise, in both cases post-intervention paramilitary/militia groups continued to cause violent unrest, delegitimising the new government.

C4) In both cases the Haitian elite were protected by the US.

Both cases yield evidence that regardless of the political party in control of the US government, the US will not intervene in a manner that is considerably detrimental to the Haitian elite. In the 2004 case this is exemplified by the US using the intervention to tip the balance of power between *Fanmi Lavalas* and the Haitian elite strongly in favour of the latter, even using UN forces to quell *Lavalas* supporters by force. However, in the 1994 case it is more complex: as stated in Chapter 6, evidence strongly suggests that the CIA had a part in the 1991 coup thus worked with powerful families like the Brandts directly. This action goes far to explain the indecisiveness of the Clinton administration in reinstating Aristide in 1994; it completely undid efforts by a US body years earlier, thus creating a political power struggle within the US. Likewise, by demonstrating a clear alignment between a significant US body and members of the Haitian elite, it becomes apparent that it must be in the direct interest of many powerful US actors to maintain good relations with Haiti's most powerful families and thus maintain the *plutocratic status quo*.

C5) In both examples the casus belli was to uphold Haitian democracy.

The notion of promoting and upholding democracy is core to American values thus consequently this *casus belli* is very common in US intervention. In the 1994 case upholding democracy is very easy to justify: a democratically elected leader was ousted by the military in a coup. Therefore, President Aristide was returned to power through US intervention to uphold Haitian democracy. The 2004 case is far more curious however: Aristide was democratically re-elected for a second term, thus a vast tapestry of anti-Aristide propaganda had to be woven to paint him as corrupt, illegitimately elected or as a dictator. By promoting a negative image of Aristide internationally the US was able to get international backing to remove Aristide from power; what is most frightening about this tactic
however is that it worked; demonstrating the facility of powerful actors creating a believable false narrative to gain international support.

C6) In both cases democratic elections were ensured after the intervention.

In both cases, post-intervention Haiti was very unstable and external sources were required (most notably the UN and OAS) to oversee new elections. In the 1996 elections Aristide still had huge popular support so the election victory of his former prime minister Préval was unsurprising. The 2006 elections however were very close, and Préval seems to have gained the presidency due to pink-tide nations like Brazil within MINUSTAH tipping balance in his favour. Therefore, despite the UN forces acting as a proxy-agent for the US after intervention, it doesn't mean they are perfectly aligned with the US government and thus have some independent political agency.

C7) In both cases UN soldiers and police quickly replaced US soldiers post-intervention.

In both scenarios the UN directly collaborated with US forces, showing that the two bodies are strongly aligned. In the 1994 case, UNMIH was created to oversee the rebuilding of the country and to protect democracy. In the 2004 case, MINUSTAH was established with identical goals and justification; despite ironically quelling supporters of Haiti's democratically elected president. These parallels support the notion that it was in the interest of UN prominent actors to conform to US foreign policy. Thus the UN considered Aristide in 2004 like they considered Cédras ten years prior: as a corrupt tyrant.

C8) In both cases the post-intervention government was weak and dependant on external actors.

In both cases, post-intervention the Haitian president was considerably restricted in political agency; due to external pressures (mostly US and UN) and economic turmoil. On both occasions the President had to do the balancing act of keeping both the Haitian people and external actors happy, despite frequent contradictions.
8.2: Disparities Between 1994 and 2004 Intervention Cases

D1) The 1994 case reinstated Aristide, whereas the 2004 case ousted Aristide.

It seems quite odd that a government would go through the great effort to reinstate a head of state just to remove the same leader from power ten years later. The primary variable here does not seem to stem from Haitian politics but rather the US government: if a Democratic Party government had been in power during Aristide's 2000-2006 term, it would seem far less likely that the 2004 intervention would have occurred. The previously suggested viewpoint that the CIA is supportive of Haitian plutocracy is shared with many powerful US actors. Most notably, as demonstrated by the 2004 case, this viewpoint is favourable by many actors in the Republican Party and it seems plausible that this is the normative viewpoint of a substantial proportion of powerful US actors, such as the Senate or the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This is evidenced by the 1994 case; politically speaking, Bill Clinton's government had great difficulty making Aristide's reinstatement actually happen.

D2) Accounts of the 1994 case largely correlate, whereas accounts of the 2004 case commonly contradict.

The 1994 case was criticised almost universally due to US indecisiveness surrounding the coup and compromise: the political right wanted rid of Aristide and the political left wanted to curb the power of the elite, neither of which happened. As a result, reports on the 1994 case are largely correlate and thus it facilitates finding credible information surrounding the event. On the other hand, the 2004 case is incredibly controversial. This huge split in opinion on the events between those who condemn the US intervention and those who condemn Aristide has led to two contradictory perspectives on events, making a credible historical overview far more challenging than the 1994 case.

D3) The 1994 foreign intervention was very indecisive whereas the 2004 was very decisive.

As previously mentioned, Bill Clinton's government had to surpass many powerful US political entities to make the 1994 intervention happen, making the 1994 case very indecisive. For instance, the USS Harlan County incident was a huge blunder for Clinton's government, however the CIA evidently worked against the US government to undermine the operation. However, the 2004 case didn't create any significant controversy from powerful US political actors thus was enacted swiftly and decisively.
D4) The 1994 intervention formally worked against elite interest, whereas the 2004 intervention directly aided the elite.

The 2004 intervention was evidently a collaborative effort between the US government and Haitian elite, whereas the 1994 intervention undid a coup that worked largely in their favour. This does not necessarily mean the Haitian elite lost power during the 1994 case but rather that the event altered the plutocratic hierarchy of power.

D5) The 1991 coup against Aristide succeeded, whereas the 2001 coup against Aristide failed.

The failure of the 2001 coup forced the elite to rethink their strategy to remove Aristide from power. Likewise, it is plausible that both the 1991 and 2001 coups were sponsored by a powerful US actor.

D6) Minor actors that supported the pre-intervention government were granted amnesty in the 1994 case but not in the 2004 case.

In the 1994 case, the US granted amnesty to paramilitaries who worked for Cédras. In the 2004 case Aristide's armed supporters, the Chimères were considered hostile by MINUSTAH, which hunted them and other paramilitaries indiscriminately.

8.3: Comparison Findings

Two of the above analyses do not directly involve the US intervention but rather events indirectly related to the intervention; notably C3 (militants working with the Haitian elite) and D5 (military coups) which both focus on internal Haitian actors. These analyses can therefore be ignored.

Despite obvious contrasts between the two cases such as D1 (reinstating and ousting Aristide) and D5 (1991 and 2001 coup attempts), it is apparent that the 1994 and 2004 cases have far more similarities than differences. Both follow the same sequence of events: International sanctions, then intervention, then UN stabilisation mission and democratic elections. On both occasions, sanctions caused economic hardships that had a long-term detrimental effect on Haitian democracy by worsening financial inequality, poverty and access to basic needs. Finally, both cases Haiti had a UN-proxy occupying force that would largely follow US mandate.

The short-term effects of the military intervention on democratisation are largely detrimental, with the exception of ousting an authoritarian ruler (Cédras) in favour of the democratically elected leader
(Aristide). However, post-intervention heads of state (Aristide in 1994, Préval in 2006) had very limited agency due to foreign actors, and economic hardship.

*C4 (Haitian elite backed by the US) and D4 (working for/against elite interest)* both relate to the relationship between Haitian *plutocracy* and US actors. The 1994 and 2004 cases demonstrate that US military intervention in Haiti is unlikely to damage the power of the elite and may empower them. Although the 1994 case undid a regime that was in the normative interest of the elite, the actor was still placated by US forced power-sharing agreements with Aristide.

*C5 (casus belli)* demonstrates that the *casus belli* of upholding democracy is plausible against a democratic government, providing international actors can be convinced otherwise. *C6 (democratic elections)* demonstrates the US will ensure that democratic elections continue, making a regression to despotism in Haiti challenging. This notion therefore directly contradicts the US policy stated in *C4 (Haitian elite backed by the US)* because the Haitian elite will make push towards autocracy if left unattended by external actors; after all, it is strongly in their interest to do so for the sake of *plutocratic* stability. Thus the US supports the Haitian elite's political power, but in doing so promotes fraudulent elections (elite-backed candidates do not fare as well as reformist candidates in Haiti thus democratic practices cannot be used to maintain political power).

Therefore, as a result of the above-mentioned factors, it is apparent that the US as an actor has an inherently detrimental influence on Haitian democracy; which is only counteracted by the strong normative international preferences towards democracy. As a result, it seems apparent that if Haiti remains impoverished and the external preference towards democracy dissipates, Haiti would rapidly return to an elite or military controlled despotic regime.

To conclude, the 1994 and 2004 cases demonstrate that US military intervention is mostly *negative* to Haitian democratisation. This is primarily because of the substantial amount of powerful US political actors that want to support Haitian elite. Without a major reshuffle of powerful US political actors it seems almost impossible for US intervention to have a *positive* impact on Haitian democratisation, as evidenced by limited positive impact of the 1994 case. On the other hand, it is possible for the US intervention to have a *catastrophically negative* impact on Haitian democratisation; as evidenced by the 2004 case. However, if the military intervention is to usurp and *autocratic* regime it may be the lesser of two evils, as was the case in 1994.
9.0: Conclusion

What is the Impact of US military Intervention on Haitian Democracy in the Post-Cold War Era?

As suggested in the conclusion of Chapter 8, the impact of US military intervention on Haitian democracy in the post-Cold War era must be considered primarily negative; because the evidence suggests the will US normatively promote plutocracy and in doing so, directly undermining and preventing the growth of healthy polyarchy and thus, healthy democracy. In Chapter 2, US intervention in theory was analysed and was found to frequently contradict. The findings of this paper therefore corroborate with the findings of Bueno De Mesquita and Downs, which suggest that US intervention is damaging and may promote autocracy (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006, p.627-649).

To a lesser extent, this paper’s findings also corroborate with Jan Teorell’s suggestion that not all military intervention is inherently negative, which is evidenced by the 1994 case in this paper (Teorell 2010, p.99.).

9.1: The Suggested Nature of Contemporary US Military Intervention in Haiti

As suggested in Chapter 6, the 1994 US intervention required new thinking for a new era. The Cold War had ended, and the previous decade had seen an unprecedented growth of democracy in the Americas. Democratic values had blossomed and consolidated in the region. For the US as the regional hegemony, this meant a passive stance towards a new despot in a nearby country was no longer acceptable; US polyarchy had spoken and it could no longer accept despotism. As a result, President George Bush senior was heavily criticised for his lack of action against Cédras in 1991, and his successor Bill Clinton promised a return to democracy in Haiti a major part of his electoral campaign.

This development in polyarchal pro-democratic sentiment thus proved challenging for many powerful US political actors like the CIA: how were they meant to retain their powerful established networks in a poor state like Haiti if plutocracy was not upheld? How could they even uphold plutocracy if US and international polyarchy was normatively condemning the autocratic governments that allowed plutocracy to thrive?

The solution was simple: if people want to support democracy, permitting they believe that US foreign intervention is also supporting democracy, then they can do as they please. Most frightening of all, as the 2004 case proves, this Orwellian strategy of creating false narratives is effective and can be implemented with relative ease.
Based on this information, the suggested nature of contemporary US military intervention in Haiti is reliant on creating the narrative that the target of intervention is undemocratic, regardless of whether this is true or not. Formal denouncements are followed by sanctions which work twofold, economically suffocating the people of the targeted country thus provoking animosity towards their government and acting as a show of US strength and dominance. During this process, the US will work covertly with powerful allies in the target country to undermine their government. Eventually, government legitimacy will drop due to a combination of the above factors, facilitating US intervention or sponsored coups.

A similar process may be seen occurring in Venezuela, in the 2019 example mentioned in the introduction, and seems to corroborate with this paper's findings; though it is beyond the scope of this research paper.

9.2: Contemporary US/Haitian Geopolitics: Why Future Intervention in Haiti is Likely

The findings of this paper suggest that future US intervention in Haiti seems very likely: most notably, if Haiti gains another president that threatens the plutocracy and a conservative US government is in power, foreign intervention must be considered highly plausible. For example, in a hypothetical scenario, if the current Haitian President (Jovenel Moïse) resigned or was overthrown in the current protests and was replaced by a new head of state which threatened Haitian plutocracy, it seems very plausible that Donald Trump's government would consider Haiti as a high priority candidate for future intervention.

Likewise, in the same hypothetical scenario, imagine instead that a despot became Haitian head of state. It seems very unlikely that the US could formally support Haiti regardless of the government. A more right-leaning government (such as the Trump administration) may consider a passive approach to a new despot in Haiti, like George Bush senior's government did in 1991. However, in a contemporary scenario this would prove difficult (as it did for George Bush senior) due to a strong US polyarchal pro-democracy sentiment and would thus likely cause political backlash.

Likewise, a more left-leaning US government would likely pledge intervention against a new despot in Haiti, just like Bill Clinton did during his electoral campaign in the early 90s; a move that would doubtless prove popular with the American public. Thus, pro-democracy sentiment continues to act as a Lynch-pin that deters despotism in Haiti, despite despotism being preferential to its most powerful actors. Therefore as demonstrated, both progressive and autocratic Haitian governments are deterred by the US due to the threat of intervention.

To this extent, the US/Haitian balance of power is so strongly in favour of the former that it is logical to deduce Haiti and an informal US protectorate state. Haitian political actors have limited agency as
they must conform to the standards of powerful US political actors. In this regard and considering how marred Haitian elections usually are, a US electoral vote is possibly more impactful to Haiti than a Haitian electoral vote: simply put, the Haitian geopolitical position is one of near-complete submission to its powerful northern neighbour.

9.3: Suggestions for Further Research: Plutocratic Democracy

The concept of *plutocratic democracy* was created due to the apparent lack of theories that could sufficiently define the contemporary Haitian state; there is ample theory defining 'strong' or 'ideal' democracies but few describing flawed democracy. Therefore, this concept holds great potential by rethinking the way democracy is perceived by looking at the most inherent flaw in *polyarchy*: the balance of power between collectives.

Therefore, *plutocratic democracy* must be further developed as the focus of its own study and established in more depth. Likewise, the concept should be tested on a variety of democratic states to analyse its relevance.

This concept must therefore be broadened and used in greater context as a new perspective on democracy and *polyarchy*. 
10.0: Bibliography


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