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Managing Common Ground with epistemic marking: 'Evidential' markers in Upper Napo Kichwa and their functions in interaction

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ABSTRACT

This article proposes that 'evidential' markers in Upper Napo Kichwa (Quechuan, Ecuador) are not in fact evidential, but mark epistemic distinctions related to ownership and distribution of knowledge in discourse. To demonstrate this, I analyse two Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic enclitics, *=mi* and *=tá*. I account for their distribution in the corpus, analysing the occurrences of the markers in situated language use. To provide a functional explanation for how the markers are used, I discuss the notion of 'epistemic Common Ground management'. I postulate that it is relevant to how epistemic discourse strategies and marking systems are used in a variety of languages. Subsequently, I illustrate this claim with a case study, showing how 'epistemic Common Ground management' allows to account for the distribution of the Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic markers. Finally, I propose that looking at the formally divergent strategies from a common functional perspective enhances our understanding of how epistemic marking is used cross-linguistically.

1. Introduction

Quechuan languages are traditionally considered as having grammaticalised, three-choice evidential systems (e.g. Aikhenvald, 2004, 2018) distinguishing between direct, inferential/conjectural and reportative evidentiality (e.g. Cole, 1982: 198; Floyd, 1997; Faller, 2002). Upper Napo Kichwa, a Quechuan language spoken in the Ecuadorian Amazon, diverges from this pattern. It has eight epistemic enclitics, including cognates of the direct and conjectural evidentials, but no reportative. Moreover, rather than 'source of evidence' (Aikhenvald, 2004), Upper Napo Kichwa evidentials express meanings related to epistemic authority (Heritage and Raymond, 2005; Stivers et al., 2011), engagement (Evans et al., 2018a, 2018b) or Complex Epistemic Perspective (e.g. Bergqvist, 2016).

If we consult the descriptive literature, the Upper Napo Kichwa set of epistemic markers proves not to be completely at odds with other descriptions of Quechuan evidentiality. Hintz and Hintz (2017) show that in some Peruvian varieties evidential marking systems surpass the three-way distinction between direct, conjectural and reported, also differentiating between shared, exclusive and common knowledge. Even in Cuzco Quechua, widely cited as a canonical example of a

Abbreviations: 1, 1st person; 2, 2nd person; 3, 3rd person; ACC, accusative; AG, agentive; ANT, anterior; ANTIC, anticausative; AUX, auxiliary; CIS, cislocative; COR, co-reference; CAUS, causative; COP, copula; D, distal; DAT, dative; DEM, demonstrative; EGO, primary epistemic authority; EGO+TU, shared epistemic authority; ERG, ergative; FUT, future; GEN, genitive; ID.REF, identity of reference; INCL, inclusive; INF, infinitive; INT, interrogative; LIM, limitative; LOC, locative; NEG, negation; NMLZ, nominaliser; OBJ, object; PL, plural; POSS, possesor; PROG, progressive; PST, past; Q, question; RESTR, restrictive marker ('just', 'only'); SEQ, sequential marker ('and then'); SG, singular; SWREF, switch-reference.

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Quechuan evidential system, the direct evidential is better analysed as marking 'best possible ground' (Faller, 2002), which includes personal experience and non-personal information based on reports from trusted sources, assimilated into the speaker's knowledge base (Faller, 2002: sec. 4.3.2). In spite of these accounts, cross-linguistic overviews still treat all Quechuan languages as having an obligatory, tri-partite system of marking source of evidence (e.g. Aikhenvald, 2014: 22).

The examples above show that evidential marking in some Quechuan languages expresses meanings related not only to source of evidence or mode of access to information. It also indicates whether knowledge is exclusive or shared, as in the case of the systems described by Hintz and Hintz (2017), or whether the speaker considers themselves an authority on the subject, as in the system described by Faller (2002: 135). In a similar vein, epistemic clitics in Upper Napo Kichwa do not encode mode of access to information. Rather, their use is related to ownership and distribution of knowledge. Consider the use of *=mi* and *=tá* in the examples below:

(1)
[Kan] *ushanguimi!*
[kan] usha-ngui=**mi**
[2SG] can -2 =**MI**
'[You] can!' (in response to my statement that I won't be able to make *chicha*[1]) [attested][2]

(2)
[Kan] *ushanguirá!*
[kan] usha-ngui=**tá**
[2SG] can -2 =**TÁ**
'[You] can!' (to a novice interlocutor making *chicha* for the first time) [elicited]

The two enclitics occur in morphosyntactically, semantically and prosodically identical utterances, based on the same mode of access to information. As I will show in this paper, the difference in their meaning is related to knowledge-related assumptions of the speaker, and the intended communicative function of the utterance. The marker *=mi* encodes the speaker's epistemic authority over knowledge, and serves the speaker to indicate their superior epistemic position with respect to the addressee. Conversely *=tá* encodes that epistemic authority lies with the speaker, but also includes the hearer, indicating that the information is to some extent shared. In this paper, I discuss this distinction and its implications, both in Upper Napo Kichwa and beyond.

1.1. Research aims

This article contributes to filling a gap in our knowledge of epistemic marking, both in lesser-spoken languages and more generally. To achieve this, I first show that the Upper Napo Kichwa 'evidential' system does not mark source of evidence (Aikhenvald, 2004) or mode of access to information (e.g. Cornillie, 2009), but rather encodes broader epistemic meanings. Markers with epistemic semantics similar to that of the Upper Napo Kichwa clitic are attested in a variety of languages (see Section 4.1). However, they are notoriously difficult to analyse due to their semantic complexity and context-sensitivity. Moreover, epistemic marking is often not required for the grammaticality of utterances, and is thus excluded from a research tradition that favours descriptions of grammatically obligatory evidential marking (Aikhenvald, 2004).

My second research goal consists of elucidating the epistemic parameters conditioning the use of Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic markers. I show that these parameters are authority over knowledge and its distribution among discourse participants. I focus on the enclitics *=mi* and *=tá*, as representative of the system and exhibiting an interesting contrast in epistemic authority distribution.

My third goal has a broader theoretical relevance. It consists of demonstrating that Upper Napo Kichwa is not an outlier in which evidential marking shifted towards unusual epistemic semantics. Rather, the Upper Napo epistemic markers fulfil a communicative function conventionalised in many languages around the world. I call this function 'epistemic Common Ground management' and use examples from several languages to show how it can be realised and why it is important for linguistic communication.

1.2. Data and methods

Upper Napo Kichwa belongs to the Amazonian Kichwa/Quichua[3] dialectal grouping pertaining to the QII branch of the Quechuan language family (Torero, 1964). Like all Quechuan languages, Upper Napo Kichwa is agglutinative and almost exclusively suffixing. Although Quechuan varieties are traditionally described as SOV, Upper Napo Kichwa data suggest that SVO is equally permissible, and other word orders are acceptable in different information-structural configurations. Like other Ecuadorian Quechuan varieties, Upper Napo lacks ejective consonants, characteristic of Peruvian and Bolivian varieties

[1] In Kichwa: *aswa*. Traditional drink made of mashed, fermented manioc.
[2] In all examples, I refer to the sources of the data. If the examples come from corpus recordings, these are referenced. I use 'elicited' if examples were elicited but not recorded, and 'attested' if I witnessed them in natural interaction.
[3] Both spellings are correct according to different orthographies used for Ecuadorian Quechua varieties.

belonging to the QII-C branch, and only has residual, non-obligatory object agreement on the verb (1SG *-wa*). The language is in contact with the neighbouring Amazonian languages, but its contact influences remain understudied. The culture and mythology of Upper Napo Kichwa speakers – the *Napo Runa* – is Amazonian, rather than Andean.

Upper Napo Kichwa has ca. 46,000 speakers (INEC, 2010). Though classified as vigorous (Eberhard et al., 2019), it is likely to become endangered in the near future (cf. Grzech, 2017; Grzech et al., 2019). In some villages children still learn the language, but in less secluded settlements the youngest speakers using it as their main language are ca. 30 years old.

The analysis presented here is based on a corpus collected during a collaborative documentation project in the Napo province in Ecuador, where I spent 10 months in 2013 and 2014. The corpus consists of two parts: 2 h of 'staged communicative events' (Himmelmann, 1998) and 11 h of naturalistic discourse from a variety of genres, with data from about 40 speakers. The 'staged communicative events' include retellings of the 'Pear Story' (Chafe, 1980), 2-participant tasks from QUIS (Skopeteas et al., 2006), and interactive stimuli I devised myself. This data was collected to control for speakers' knowledge states, which are much harder to keep track of in naturalistic speech (Kittilä et al., 2018: 291). All 13 h were transcribed and translated into Spanish by Kichwa native speakers, revised by me, and revised again with a native speaker. I compared the use of the markers in the two parts of the corpus, to check whether the conclusions based on staged communication, where it was clear who knew what and which information was shared, could account for the clitics' occurrences in naturalistic discourse (cf. Grzech, 2016a).

My approach to the data is inspired by conversation analysis, which has thus far only been applied in a few instances to endangered and minority language data (e.g. Blass, 1990; Gipper, 2011, 2015). I account for the Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic enclitics in line with Levinson (1983: 319), who states that

> '(…) for each conversational device we should like, by way of explanation, to elucidate the interactional problems that it is specifically designed to resolve - that is, to provide *functional* explanations, or expositions of rational design, for the existence of the device in question' (cited in Couper-Kuhlen and Selting, 2017: 6).

1.3. Relevant theoretical notions

In the analysis developed in this paper, I define the Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic markers in terms of *epistemic authority* and ownership of knowledge. Other notions relevant to the analysis are 'territories of information' (Kamio, 1997) and *epistemic responsibility*. I define these notions in the present section.

Epistemic authority has been defined as the 'primary right to evaluate the matter assessed' (Heritage and Raymond, 2005: 16) or '(…) relative rights to know about some state of affairs as well as (…) to tell, inform, assert or assess' (Stivers et al., 2011: 13). The relative nature of epistemic authority, pointed out in the latter definition, suggest that epistemic authority is not a given, but depends on who we are talking to, and on what subject. However, framed in such a way, the notion fails to capture that speakers do posess certain amount of knowledge and resulting authority, irrespective of a given speech situation. To disambiguate, let us introduce a distinction between epistemic authority, which can be derived from one's knowledge irrespective of the context, and *epistemic primacy* which arises when, in a given situation, we know more than our interlocutors. The epistemic authority - epistemic primacy distinction is akin to the notions of *epistemic status* and *epistemic stance* (Heritage, 2012), where *status* is more constant, and can be related to e.g. one's professional expertise, and *stance* is an epistemic position one adopts to a given situation. For example, someone who has a PhD in linguistics generally has a knowing (or K+) epistemic status when it comes to language-related matters. However, in a particular situation, e.g. when talking to a senior colleague, the same person can take an unknowing (K-) epistemic stance, assuming that it is the colleague who has superior epistemic authority (or epistemic primacy) over a linguistics-related matter they are discussing. The notions of epistemic authority, primacy, stance and status are well-established in conversation analysis (e.g. Heritage and Raymond, 2005; Stivers et al., 2011; Heritage, 2012; Mondada, 2013), but have only recently started to be considered in descriptive linguistics (cf. Gipper, 2015; Grzech, 2016a; Schultze-Berndt, 2017). Related the above are the notions of epistemic rights and responsibilities. These different dimensions of knowledge are summarised in Fig. 1 below:

Epistemic access	Knowing vs. not knowing Types of evidence/mode of access Degree of certainty (Grounded in experience/evidence)
Epistemic authority	Relative right to know or claim/ Authority of knowledge (Can be based on experience/socially constructed/discursively constructed)
Epistemic responsibility	Obligations/rights to have information (Related to experience or social/professional status)

Fig. 1. Dimensions of knowledge (adapted from Stivers et al., 2011: 13).

Useful generalisations regarding the distribution of epistemic authority, rights and responsibilities are provided by the theory of 'territories of information' (henceforth ToI, Kamio, 1997). Each of us has our own ToI, over which we have more

epistemic rights than anyone else. The types of information within one's default ToI are (i) internal direct experience, (ii) information within professional expertise, (iii) reliable information obtained through external direct experience including verbal reports, (iv) information about persons, objects, events and facts in one's close environment, (v) information about oneself (Kamio, 1997: 18). Other types of information can become part of ToI when integrated into one's system of knowledge and beliefs (Kamio, 1997: 11–12), with more personal information integrating more quickly. While this is akin to 'best possible ground' (see Section 2.2), ToI arises not only by virtue of the most direct path of information acquisition, but also relates to socially constructed rights to know, associated with one's professional position or social role.

2. Epistemic marking in Upper Napo Kichwa

The paradigm of Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic clitics is shown in Table 1. The epistemic clitics attested in Upper Napo Kichwa have their cognates across the Quechuan language family. However, the markers have been analysed differently in different varieties. Table 1, while by no means exhaustive, illustrates this diversity of analyses, and introduces my analysis of the Upper Napo Kichwa markers.

Table 1
Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic enclitics.

Clitic	Analyses in other Quechuan varieties	Analysis in Upper Napo Kichwa
mi	Direct evidential (e.g. Huallaga Quechua: Weber, 1996; Wanka Quechua: Floyd, 1997); Direct evidential/'best possible ground' (Cuzco Quechua: Faller, 2002); Attested (Cuzco/Collao Quechua: Cusihuamán, 1976/2001) Direct evidential/assertion of individual knowledge (South Conchucos Quechua/Sihuas Quechua: Hintz and Hintz, 2017); First-hand information (Imbabura Quechua: Cole, 1982: 164); Speaker perspective (Pastaza Quichua[a]: Nuckolls, 2012).	Exclusive epistemic authority of the speaker/origo.
ma	Emphatic first-hand information (Imbabura Quechua: Cole, 1982: 164); Direct experience/mutual knowledge (Sihuas Quechua: Hintz and Hintz, 2017); Impressive (Cuzco/Collao Quechua: Cusihuamán, 1976/2001); Surprise (Cuzco Quechua: Faller, 2002).	Meaning similar to that of *=mi*; Further work needed.
mari	Emphatic *=mi* (e.g. Wanka Quechua: Jake and Chuqín, 1979, cited in Floyd, 1997: 85; Huallaga Quechua: Weber, 1996: 595).	Epistemic authority of the speaker/origo. Information known to addressee, but not activated.
chu	Negation/polar question (e.g. Huallaga Quechua: Weber, 1996; Imbabura Quechua: Cole, 1982: 164; Cuzco Quechua: Faller, 2002; Negation/interrogative (Cuzco/Collao Quechua Cusihuamán, 1976/2001); Negative (Wanka Quechua: Floyd, 1997; Pastaza Quichua: Nuckolls, 1993).	Negation/polar question marker.[b]
cha	Inferential evidential (e.g. Huallga Quechua: Weber, 1996; Wanka Quechua: Floyd, 1997); Inferential evidential and epistemic modal (e.g. Cuzco Quechua: Faller, 2002); Supposition/speculation/anticipation (Cuzco/Collao Quechua: Cusihuamán, 1976/2001: 233); Doubt (Imbabura Quechua: Cole, 1982: 164); Individual conjecture (South Conchucos Quechua: Hintz and Hintz, 2017: 93).	Disclaimer of speaker's epistemic authority, potentially shared knowledge (Grzech, n.d., 2016a; Grzech, forthcoming).
chari	Emphatic equivalent of certainty marker *-chaq* (Huallaga Quechua: Weber, 1996: 595); Equivalent of *-cha* (Imbabura Quechua: Cole, 1982: 164).	Meaning similar to that of *=cha*; Further work needed.
ta	Possibly cognate of *-taq* (interrogative marker in Huallaga Quechua: Weber, 1996; contrastive marker in Cuzco/Collao Quechua: Cusihuamán, 1976/2001).	Content question marker.
tá	Not attested in other varieties.[c] Functionally similar to emotive *-ya* in Quechua II-C (e.g. Cusihumán, 1976/2001).	Epistemic authority of the speaker, activated knowledge shared with addressee. Distributional similar to 'verum focus' marking.

[a] Orthographic conventions for language names and whether the markers are preceded by hyphen / = sign follow the cited sources.
[b] Boye (2012: 67) argues that the analysis of this marker as indicating 'neutral epistemic support' is compatible with its use in negation and questions. It is possible that this claim could be applied to the Upper Napo Kichwa data, but I have not examined it in detail. Thus, for the sake of this paper, I keep using the question/negation marker label established within Quechuan studies.
[c] Note that *=tá* carries inherent stress, which shifts word stress pattern of its hosts from the default penultimate to the last syllable. Such a stress shift pattern was described for Ayacucho Quechua (Parker, 1969; Soto Ruiz, 2016). In Upper Napo Kichwa, a communicative effect similar to the one achieved through using *=tá* can also be achieved through word stress shift alone (Grzech, 2016a: 288), but this is yet to be studied in detail.

The enclitics listed in Table 1 form a paradigm in Upper Napo Kichwa – they occur in the same morphosyntactic slot, attach to phrasal heads, cannot co-occur on the same host, and tend to occur on focal constituents (see Section 3). The language also exhibits the marker *=ga*, which is a cognate of topic markers in other Quechuan varieties (see Section 3), and shares the

morphosyntactic properties with the clitics listed in Table 1. The remaining enclitics attested in the corpus are the limitative *=lla*, the additive *=pas*, the emphatic *=ri*,[5] as well as *=y* and *=guti*, which require further analysis (cf. Grzech, 2016a: ch.3).

This article focuses on the markers *=mi* and *=tá*. The contrast between them is illustrative of the semantic and pragmatic complexity of the paradigm.

2.1. Not quite a direct evidential: the analysis of *=mi*

As mentioned above, the Quechuan language family is traditionally considered to have a direct, a conjectural/inferential, and a reportative evidential. In Fig. 2 these distinctions, marked in grey, are situated in the context of the evidential choices postulated as possible for the evidential domain in general. The more general distinctions are to the left, and the more fine-grained ones to the right.



Fig. 2. The evidential domain (adapted from Willett, 1988; Aikhenvald, 2004).

Although Quechuan evidential enclitics exhibit semantic differences across varieties, they are quite uniform morphosyntactically: not fused with TAM categories, showing few co-occurrence restrictions with TAM morphology, and non-obligatory for grammaticality (though not necessarily felicity, see Section 3) of utterances. These properties allow for analysing them as epistemic discourse markers (cf. Grzech, 2016a), that is, as 'sequentially dependent elements that bracket units of talk' (Schiffrin, 1987: 31), used to negotiate or index the roles of the interlocutors with respect to the information conveyed (cf. Maschler and Schiffrin, 2015).

The most widely cited Quechuan evidential system is that of Cuzco Quechua (Faller, 2002), where direct evidence/best possible ground is marked by *=mi*, inference/conjecture by *=chá*, and reportative evidence by *=si*. Other Quechuan varieties are widely assumed to replicate these distinctions using near-homophonous cognates. However, this is not always the case: Imbabura Quechua (Cole, 1982) and Upper Napo Kichwa do not have the reportative (Grzech, 2016a). Some Peruvian varieties exhibit evidential systems of five or six markers, signalling the source of evidence and whether knowledge is exclusive or shared (Howard, 2012; Hintz and Hintz, 2017). Pastaza Quichua, adjacent to Upper Napo, uses evidentials to mark not source of evidence, but 'speaker perspective' (Nuckolls, 2012, 2018).

If the Upper Napo Kichwa *=mi* was a direct evidential, it should occur in statements based on direct evidence (sensory or based on internal states), but not in statements based on inference or conjecture. However, in the Upper Napo data *=mi* occurs in utterances based on both direct and indirect evidence.

(3)

Ukuma	*tiaj*	*chundzulligunandi*	*shamukpi,*	*yapa**mi***	*ismun.*
uku-ma	tia-k	chundzulli-guna-ndi	shamu-kpi	yapa=**mi**	ismu-n
inside-DAT	be-AG.NMLZ	intestines-PL-INCL	come-SWREF	much=**MI**	rot-3

'[if one] brings [the kill from the hunt] with the intestines, it will rot quickly'
[KICHB07AGOPEDROCHIMBO1 446]

[5] Many descriptions of Quechuan languages consider *=mari* and *=chari* to be the evidentials occurring together with emphatic *=ari* (Weber, 1996; Floyd, 1997). At present, there is not enough data on Upper Napo Kichwa to prove or disprove this analysis, so I consider *=mari* and *=chari* as separate markers.

Example (3) is a prototypical direct evidential use: =*mi* marks information based on direct experience of the speaker, a skilled hunter. This does not obtain in (4):

(4)

Chi	*rumira*	*payna**mi***	*churasha,*	*chapanushka*	*chibi...*
Chi	rumi-ta	payguna=**mi**	chura-sha	chapa-nu-shka	chi-pi
D.DEM	stone-ACC	3PL =**MI**	put -COR	wait -3PL-ANT[6]	D.DEM-LOC

'They have placed this stone...they've waited [having put it there]' [el_25092014_03 048]

This example comes from a retelling of the 'Pear Story' (Chafe, 1980). The speaker saw the main character crash his bicycle into a stone and conjectured that it was the three boys, shown before in the video, who placed the stone on the road. The context makes clear that (4) cannot be based on any prior evidence and is purely conjectural. In Cuzco (Faller, 2002) or Junín/Wanka Quechua (Floyd, 1997) such a statement would receive inferential/conjectural marking. The use of Upper Napo Kichwa =*mi* is also possible in statements which are ambiguous between being based on an inference from results, and on a conjecture based on world knowledge and prior experience:

(5)

[Cesar]	*minganama**mi***	*rishka.*
[Cesar]	minga -ma =**mi**	ri -shka.
[NAME]	collective.work-DAT=**MI**	go -ANT

'[Cesar] went to the *minga*.' [speaker arrives at C.'s home. C is not there, it's the day of the *minga*, and C. is known for always attending collective work.] [el_18092014_01 051]

Without further specification, we do not know if (5) is based purely on a thought process, or inference from observed results. However, we do know that it is not based on visual evidence – the speaker did not see Cesar going anywhere. The Upper Napo =*mi* can also be used in statements based on guesswork, where evaluating the nature of the evidence for the claim is ambiguous between conjecture and partial direct evidence. Example (6) comes from an elicitation session in which I have shown two consultants several three-shell games, and asked them to indicate the location of the ball under one of the three cups, before showing them on video where it actually went. I was expecting that the speakers would mark their guesses with =*cha* (see Table 1), but that did not happen. Rather, they marked some of their guesses with =*mi*:

(6)

Lluki	*purama**mi***	*rin,*	*lluki*	*purama.*
lluki	pura-ma=**mi**	ri-n,	lluki	pura-ma
left	side-DAT=**MI**	go -3	left	side-DAT

'[the seed] goes to the left, to the left…' [el_03102014_01 076]

In (6), the speaker has good grounds to think their perception could be mistaken. He has already watched several tricks and made several guesses, but never guessed correctly. This use of =*mi* also shows that in Upper Napo Kichwa the marker cannot be analysed as a direct evidential marking 'best possible ground'. This analysis was proposed by Faller (2002) for Cuzco Quechua. 'Best possible ground' subsumes direct evidence for 'personal information' and reportative evidence from trustworthy sources for 'encyclopaedic information'. In order to use =*mi* in Cuzco Quechua, one has to be certain of having 'best possible ground'. As soon as the speaker 'has reason to doubt that what (s)he perceives does not correspond to reality, (s)he can no longer use -*mi*' (Faller, 2002: 154). In (6), the speaker does have a reason to doubt his perception – he only made wrong guesses so far. This shows that Upper Napo Kichwa =*mi* should not be analysed as marking 'best possible ground'.

Upper Napo Kichwa does not exhibit a reportative evidential, nor does it have a strategy for marking indirect speech. Reports are direct speech complements, embedded under the verb *ni-* ('say') and frequently marked with =*mi*:

(7)

Paylla,	*pay*	*lugar*	*sakirisha,*	*"pay**mi***	*apashkanga"*		*ninguti*
pay=lla	pay	lugar	saki-ri-sha	pay =**mi**	apa -shka	a-nga	ni -n=guti
3SG=LIM	3SG	free	let-ANTIC-IPFV	3SG =**MI**	bring-ANT	AUX-FUT	say-3=GUTI[7]

'Just him, he stayed [there] unsupervised, "it's him who would have taken (the watch)", [my client] says' [el_05122014_02 026]

The example comes from a role play based on the 'Stolen watch' videos (Skopeteas et al., 2006). Two speakers separately watched versions of the same video in which different people stole a watch. After establishing how the videos differed, speakers enacted a scene between the lawyers of the two accused (to minimise the directness of face-threatening acts). One speaker uttered (7) as a presumed direct report of what her client had said. The 'client's' statement is based on inference – she saw her colleague stay in the room alone, but did not see him take the watch. Hence, =*mi* in (7) cannot be analysed as marking direct evidence available to the reported speaker. Given that (7) is used as an accusation, it could be argued that =*mi* is

[6] The suffix -*shka* is analysed differently in different Quechuan varieties. For discussion of the semantics of the Upper Napo Kichwa -*shka*, see Grzech, 2016a: 90–91 and examples throughout).

[7] Some clitics are not glossed, because more research on them is still needed.

manipulated here to achieve pragmatic/stance effects (cf. Aikhenvald, 2004; Heritage, 2012), increasing the argumentative force of the utterance and to give the accusation more gravity. However, the use of =*mi* in (4), which is merely a description, shows that it occurs in other inferential contexts.

Thus far, I have shown that the Upper Napo Kichwa =*mi* cannot be analysed as a direct evidential or 'best possible ground' marker. While the use of =*mi* in Upper Napo Kichwa does not depend on whether or not the speaker has direct evidence or 'best possible ground', data suggest that it is linked to the speaker – or the reported speaker – having, or wanting to project, a certain degree of authority over the conveyed information. An alternative would be to analyse =*mi* as marking both direct and inferential/conjectural evidence. However, this analysis would force us to see the marker as polysemous, and would fail to account for its routine occurrence in statements of religious belief, where evidence is not relevant:

(8)

Yaya	*dios*	*kawsan**mi**.*
yaya	{dios}[8]	kawsa-n=**mi**
father	god	live -3=MI

'Father God lives/exists.' [el_18092014_01 025]

In what follows, I analyse =*mi* as a marker of epistemic authority, also serving to present the information as exclusive to the speaker. In terms introduced in Section 1.3, this means that the use of =*mi* serves Upper Napo Kichwa speakers to indicate their knowing epistemic stance (K+), while relegating the interlocutor to an unknowing (K-) epistemic position. This analysis becomes particularly apparent if =*mi* is contrasted with =*tá*, marking speaker authority and shared knowledge.

2.2. Authority and ownership of knowledge: the contrast between =mi and =tá

In the previous section, I have shown that the occurrences of =*mi* in Upper Napo Kichwa are not compatible with its analyses as a direct evidential or a marker of 'best possible ground'. Rather, I proposed that the Upper Napo Kichwa =*mi* marks epistemic authority/primacy, that is, 'the relative right to know or claim' (see Section 1.3).

The notion of epistemic authority is more subjective than that of evidentiality. Evidential marking reflects a relationship between the speaker and the text-external world, as it specifies the mode of access the speaker has to the information they express (e.g. Cornillie, 2009). Direct evidence or personal experience underlies the use of direct evidentials, and also – as proposed by Kamio (1997) in the theory of Territories of Information (Section 1.3) – can give rise to epistemic authority. However, one can also feel entitled to epistemic authority despite not having direct evidence. How we use epistemic markers varies depending on our personal communicative style (Gipper, 2015), or the epistemic stance we wish to adopt in a given situation (cf. Heritage, 2012). Thus, using epistemic authority marking can, but does not have to, depend on the type of evidence we have for our claims. It depends on whether we perceive ourselves – or want to project ourselves – as knowing more than our interlocutors (cf. Nuckolls, 2012 analysis of Pastaza Quichua =*mi* as a marking 'speaker perspective'). If we assume that the Upper Napo Kichwa =*mi* marks epistemic authority, all the examples given so far can be accounted for. This analysis can be applied to example (3), based on direct evidence, which gives rise to epistemic authority. In (4), (5) and (6), the use of =*mi* can be motivated by the speakers' desire to assert the validity of their reasoning. In (7), =*mi* occurs on the reported statement, marking the authority of the reported speaker, from whom the quoted claim originated. In (8), it marks a deep religious conviction, underlying the entire value system of the speaker.

However, the analysis of Upper Napo Kichwa =*mi* as an epistemic authority marker is not sufficient to account for the differences between examples (1) and (2) which show the contrast between =*mi* and another Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic marker, =*tá*. The difference between these two markers is illustrated again with examples (9) and (10):

(9)

A:	*Mikuna*	*tiandzu?*
	miku-na	tia-n=chu
	eat-OBJ.NMLZ	exist-3=Q/NEG
	'Is there food?'	

B:	*Tiandá.*
	tia-n=**tá**
	exist-3=**TÁ**
	'There is.' [attested]

[8] {} mark Spanish words, in line with the convention proposed by Nikolaeva (2014).

(10)

A:	*Mikuna*	*tiandzu*	*chara?*
	miku-na	tia-n=chu	chara
	eat-OBJ.NMLZ	exist-3=Q/NEG	still
	'Is there still food?'		

B: *Tukurin**mi**.*
tuku-ri-n=**mi**
end-ANTIC-3=**MI**
'It's finished.' [attested, 24/05/2018]

The above conversations took place in the same context: between myself (A) and the canteen owner (B) in the village. I often had lunch too late for any food to be left, but always approached the canteen, assuming there was a chance some food might be left. In both (9) and (10) epistemic authority lies with B – she cooks and sells the food. Thus, analysing *=mi* only as a marker of epistemic authority does not help explain the difference between (9) and (10). The contrast lies in the assumptions held by the interlocutors, or, more specifically, in B's evaluation of the assumptions held by A. Since A approaches the canteen, it is evident that she assumes food might be available. In (9), B confirms this assumption, reflected in A's behaviour, by using *=tá*. Conversely, in (10), B has to counter A's assumption, and thus uses *=mi*. Both markers encode epistemic authority, but while *=tá* indicates that the proposition is to some extent shared by both interlocutors, *=mi* marks the proposition as unknown or unexpected to the hearer.

In line with its analysis as a marker indicating sharedness of knowledge, *=tá* can only occur in propositions mentioned in, or activated by, prior discourse, and not in 'out of the blue' utterances (Lambrecht, 1994). No such requirement exists for *=mi*:

(11)

a. A:

Kamba	*warmi*	*maybira?*
kan-pa	warmi	may-pi=ta
2SG-GEN	woman	where-LOC=INT

'Where [is] your wife?'

b. B:

*Wasiy**mi**.*	*/ #Wasiyr**á***
wasi-pi=**mi**	/ wasi-y=**tá**
house-LOC=**MI**	/ house-LOC=**TÁ**

'At home.'

c. A:

Wasiycha?
wasi-pi=cha
house-LOC=CHA
'At home?'

d. B:

Wasiy**rá**!
wasi-y=**rá** !
house-LOC=**TÁ**
'At home!' [eI_28112014_05]

The conversation concerns B's wife, a person who belongs to his 'personal sphere' (Kamio, 1997, see Section 1.3). The 'primary right' to know about matters concerning B's wife thus resides with B. Again, the contrast between *=mi* and *=tá* frames the information conveyed as exclusive or shared. In B's utterance (11b), *=mi*, but not *=tá* is felicitous. Nothing in the prior conversation, or in the situational context, suggests where B's wife might be. By using *=mi* in (11b), B indicates that the knowledge of his wife whereabouts is exclusive to him. When the proposition that B's wife is at home is introduced in (11b) and A asks for confirmation in (11c), B responds with *=tá* in (11d). At this stage, B can assume that A has some notion that B's wife is at home. Consequently, B uses *=tá* to index shared knowledge.

An important issue arises when assumptions made by the interlocutors are considered as a parameter influencing linguistic choices. In (9) and (10), expectations of discourse participants are easily recoverable from the situational context. This is not always the case. In contexts such as (11), the assumptions of speakers are not evident just from the situational context, and the analysis is valid if we assume B's wife's whereabouts are not recoverable from the context, or have not been discussed previously. The need to evaluate the speaker's assumptions is difficult to address analytically: as researchers we have limited access to speakers' internal states and thought processes. Often, we only know as much as can be retrieved from the context,

since epistemic judgements are notoriously difficult to target in both metalinguistic intuitions and elicitation (Kittilä et al., 2018). Consider:

(12)
Q: *Rikunguicha?*
riku-ngui=cha?
see-2 =CHA
'Do you see [them]?'

A: *Ari, rikuni**mi*** / *Ari, rikuni**rá***
ari riku-ni=**mi** / Ari, riku-ni=**rá**
yes see-1=MI / yes see-1=TÁ
'Yes, I see.' [el_28112014_05]

The elicited exchange in (12) could occur between two people watching the road, one seeing an approaching motorbike. The question here is not a confirmation one, as in (9), (10) and (11c), but a genuine request for information. Both =*mi* and =*tá*-marked responses were judged felicitous, presumably depending on how the speaker evaluated the assumptions of the hearer – it is ultimately up to the speaker to evaluate their interlocutors' state of mind. In certain (if not most) cases, this evaluation cannot be predicted on the basis of situational and/or discourse context. In the following section, I focus on the contexts where such predictions can be made, to shed more light on the clitics' meaning and through the lens of their use in discourse.

3. Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic marking and information structure

In the previous section I discussed the semantics of =*mi* and =*tá*, showing that they can both be analysed as markers of epistemic authority, but that they contrast in terms of whether the proposition they mark is presented as known exclusively to the speaker, or as knowledge shared between the speaker and the addressee. These two parameters – authority and (non) sharedness of knowledge – allow us to analyse the tokens of the markers in the corpus. However, they are insufficient to explain why the markers occur where they do.

As already mentioned, Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic clitics are not obligatory for the grammaticality of utterances. In fact, the markers with which this article is concerned are relatively infrequent – in the sample of 1537 transcription units (2 h of 'staged communicative events') =*mi* occurred 92 times (ca. 6% of units), and =*tá* – only 4 times (0.02%). Epistemic marking is possibly used less in 'staged' than in natural discourse (cf. Grzech, 2016a). If all eight epistemic clitics in the paradigm are included (cf. Table 1), ca. 36% of all transcription units in the Upper Napo corpus are epistemically marked. In Junín/Wanka Quechua data (Floyd, 1997: 59), evidentials occur in 66% of utterances where they are grammatically possible, in the South Conchucos Quechua corpus evidentials occur in 33% of utterances (Hintz, 2007: 74).

The frequencies cited above contradict the assumptions present in much comparative literature on evidentiality, which treats Quechuan languages as a textbook example of grammatical evidentiality. This assumption is made evident in the following claim:

> (…) [evidential] meanings (…) MUST be expressed grammatically in languages like Quechua, Tariana, Matses, Western Apache and Shipibo-Konibo (where they form an obligatory closed system). (Aikhenvald, 2014: 22, original emphasis).

For obligatory evidential marking systems, it has been suggested that even if the markers are not present in every clause, the evidential value can be recovered from the context (e.g. Aikhenvald, 2004). This does not hold for Upper Napo, and is questionable for other Quechuan varieties. However, the evidential/epistemic marking systems attested in Quechuan languages still constitute 'closed systems of grammatical forms' (Aikhenvald, 2018: 4) dedicated primarily to encoding epistemic distinctions (see Section 2.1). As such, they should be treated as fully-fledged epistemic systems, on a par with grammatically obligatory evidential marking, and not dismissed as evidential or epistemic 'strategies' (Aikhenvald, 2004, 2018).

Given the optionality of Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic marking, a thorough analysis of the system requires establishing what factors condition the occurrence of the markers. In the previous section, I have shown that the use of =*mi* and =*tá* is influenced by the speaker's perception of their own authority and knowledge relative to that of the addressee. However, speakers constantly make assumptions about their interlocutors' knowledge, and yet both =*mi* and =*tá* are fairly infrequent in discourse. In previous research, evidentials in many Quechuan varieties have also been analysed as focus markers (e.g. Muysken, 1995; Sánchez, 2010, 2015). Consequently, this line of analysis should be examined for Upper Napo Kichwa, to determine whether the enclitics' distribution can be accounted for by considerations related to information structure.

In Section 2.1, I mentioned that eight epistemic clitics attested in Upper Napo (see Table 1) – among them =*mi* and =*tá* – tend to occur on focal constituents. In that, they contrast with =*ga*, a cognate of the topic marker -*ka*/-*qa* found in other varieties. A detailed description of Upper Napo Kichwa =*ga* is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it should be stated that the Upper Napo =*ga* is 'associated with topichood' (cf. Grzech, 2016b), rather than being a topic marker. It is not obligatory on topical constituents, and can also occur on certain non-referential expressions.

Similarly, previous research on the 'focus' clitics in Upper Napo and other varieties shows that they should be analysed as sensitive to focus, rather than marking it (e.g. Grzech, 2016a: ch. 4; Faller, 2019). It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage

in an exhaustive discussion of focus-related properties of Quechuan epistemic clitics (cf. e.g. Grzech, 2016a; Kwon, 2012; Manley and Muntendam, 2015; Muysken, 1995; Sánchez, 2010; Tellings, 2014: ch.4). Therefore I limit the discussion to the focus-related properties of *=mi* and *=tá* relevant to the argument developed in this paper.

In line with their interpretation as focus-sensitive clitics, both *=mi* and *=tá* can, but do not have to, surface in particular focus structures:

(13)

Q:	*Pita*	*apamuwn*	*shu*	*sillara?*
	pi=ta	apa-mu-u-n	shu	{silla}-ta
	who=INT	bring-CIS-PROG-3	one	chair-ACC
	'Who is bringing the chair?'			

A:	*Shu*	*ichilla*	*warmi*	*wawa**mi***	/	*wawa*	/	*#wawa**rá**.*
	shu	ichilla	warmi	wawa=**mi**	/	wawa	/	child=**tá**
	one	small	woman	child=**MI**	/	child	/	child=**TÁ**
	'A little girl [is bringing the chair]' [el_04122014_01 010-11]							

Example (13), like (11), shows that information questions can be answered without an epistemic enclitic or with *=mi* on the focal constituent, but not with *=tá*. The same obtains for the information question in (14). The scope of focus is sentential, hence *=mi* occurs on the verb.[9]

(14)

A:	*Imara*	*tukuka?*
	ima=ta	tuku-ka
	what=INT	become-PST
	'What happened?'	

B:	*Ñuka*	*yaya*	*wañushka**mi***	/	*wañushka*	/	*#wañushka**rá***
	ñuka	yaya	wañu-shka=**mi**	/	wañu-shka	/	wañu-shka=**tá**
	1SG	father	die-ANT=**MI**	/	die -ANT	/	die -ANT=**TÁ**
	'My father died' [elicited]						

Both (13) and (14) also allow for an epistemically unmarked answer, showing the optionality of the focus-related *=mi*. This is in line with the analysis of *=mi* presented in the previous section. The marker expresses the speaker's epistemic authority, as well as knowledge exclusive to the speaker. Still, the above examples also show that even if both these epistemic factors obtain, the use of the marker remains optional.

However, the use of *=mi* is not optional in (15):

(15)

Mana	*ñuka*	*ushichu,*	*ñuka*	*warmi**mi***	*/#warmi*	*/#warmi**rá***
mana	ñuka	ushi=chu,	ñuka	warmi=**mi**	/ warmi	/ warmi=**TÁ**
NEG	1SG	daughter=Q/NEG	1SG	woman=**MI**	/ woman	/ woman=**TÁ**

'She's not my daughter, she's my wife.' [el_28112014_05]

The context for the elicited utterance above is a village celebration: a man attending it with a much younger woman utters (15) when asked about his daughter's name. Here, the consultants were more hesitant to accept the unmarked variant. They told me that although the utterance would be possible without *=mi*, it would sound like the speaker does not have a good mastery of the language (hence marking it as infelicitous, not ungrammatical). Moreover, when spontaneously producing corrective constructions of this kind, speakers always use *=mi*.

In (15), just as in the previous examples, the speaker has the epistemic authority and exclusive knowledge. What, then, sets the example apart from the previous ones, making the use of *=mi* required for a felicitous utterance? In contrast to previous examples, in (15) *=mi* occurs in an overtly contrastive, corrective context, where the mistaken assumption of the hearer is made obvious by the utterance prior to (15). The speaker reacts to a mistaken assumption of the addressee and corrects it, with *=mi* occurring on the constituent in the scope of contrastive, corrective focus (cf. Zimmermann, 2008). Thus, in (15), the *=mi*-marked information is not only within the speaker's epistemic authority, and known exclusively to the speaker. It is also unexpected to the hearer, who assumed the contrary proposition ('she is your daughter') to be true.

Expectation, or expected value, can be defined in a probability-theoretical sense, as the predicted value of a variable, calculated as the sum of all its possible values, each multiplied by the probability of its occurrence (cf. Merin and Nikolaeva, 2008). By analogy, a discourse participant's expectation as to how communication will develop is tantamount to the development they judge the most probable in a given situation, considering information they have, and their general

[9] In Quechuan literature it is generally assumed the focus domain corresponds to the constituent on which the marker occurs. As Faller (2019) shows, this is the case for selective, contrastive or corrective foci. However, for new information, the focus domain may be larger than the constituent on which the marker occurs. Conversely, the evidential/epistemic value of the marker has sentential scope (Muysken, 1995: 385).

knowledge. In the literature, expectation has been considered relevant to the marking of (contrastive) foci (cf. Zimmermann, 2008; Matić, 2015). Zimmermann (2008: 348) defines contrastivity as related to information being 'unexpected for the hearer from the speaker's perspective'. The more unexpected the content is judged to be for the hearer, the more likely the speaker is to use special marking. This is precisely the case for the Upper Napo Kichwa *=mi*. It can be used when the speaker has epistemic authority and exclusive knowledge, but it is only required when, in addition to the two other factors, the information is judged as unexpected to the hearer. In corrective focus examples such as (15), this 'unexpectedness' is made evident in by the previous, mistaken statement, which a *=mi*-marked utterance is used to correct.

Let us now consider a context in which *=mi* is not accepted, and the use of *=tá* is required for the felicity of an utterance. Example (16) comes from an interview with a midwife. Prior to the exchange in (16), the midwife mentions that after the child is born, the midwife should bury the placenta. The interviewer enquires further:

(16)

A:	*Apachijllara*	*pambana*?
	apa-chi-k=llara	pamba-na
	bring-CAUS-AG.NMLZ=ID.REF	bury-INF
	'[So] the midwife herself has to bury [the placenta]?'	

B:	*Apachijllara*	*pambana**rá**.*	/ ***#**pambana*	/	*#pambana**mi***
	apa-chi-k=llara	pamba-na=**tá**	/ pamba-na	/	pamba-na=**mi**
	bring-CAUS-AG.NMLZ=ID.REF	bury-INF =**TÁ**	/ bury-INF	/	bury-INF =**MI**
	'Yes, the midwife DOES have to bury [it] herself.' [in_08102014_02 164-165/elicited]				

The interviewer (A) requests a confirmation which the midwife (B) provides by repeating the utterance verbatim with the added *=tá*. The midwife's utterance is a confirmation, but it is her, and not the interviewer, who holds epistemic authority. The midwife's utterance could be analysed as a 'verum focus' construction, where the focus falls not on any particular information, but on the truth value of the proposition (cf. Höhle, 1992). The verum operator is defined in different ways in the literature (see Lohnstein, 2016 for an overview). Here, I only discuss the properties of verum foci relevant to the analysis of the Upper Napo Kichwa *=tá*.

Verum-focused clauses are the opposite of all-new clauses, since the only new part of the clause is the focus on its assertive component (Büring, 2006, cited in Lohnstein, 2016: 297). It follows that verum-focused clauses are not felicitous in discourse-initial utterances (Gutzmann and Castroviejo Miró, 2011: 160; Lohnstein, 2016: 303–4) – which I argue to be the case for *=tá* in Section 2.2. If the focus of verum constructions is on the polarity of the clause, it follows that the verum focus marker should always attach to the predicate. This is the case for *=tá,* which attaches to non-verbal hosts only in non-verbal predicates, if the copula is elided, as in (11d) and in (17):

(17)

A:	*Ishki*	*Venecia*	*tian?*
	ishki	Venecia	tia-n
	two	NAME	COP-3
	'Are there two [villages called] Venecia?'		

B:	Ishki**rá**.
	ishki=**tá**
	two =**TÁ**
	'[Yes, there are] two.' [in_25052013_01 248-49]

The verum focus analysis[10] accounts for the use of *=tá* in all contexts where it is required. However, as shown in (12), the marker can also occur in other contexts, such as replies to polar questions. This inconsistency can be resolved if – like in the case of *=mi* – expectation is included in the analysis. The marker *=tá* is used if the speaker judges the proposition to be shared (see Section 2.2) and expected by the addressee. This always obtains in verum focus constructions, like (16) and (17), where the proposition in question is introduced in immediate prior discourse. However, information can be conceptualised as shared and expected also in other contexts, such as (12). In that case, the use of *=tá* is optional, as it depends on the speaker's mental construal of the situation.

In this section, I discussed the association of *=mi* and *=tá* with the information-structural category of focus. I have shown that while *=mi* can mark both information and corrective foci, it is only required in the latter case. Conversely, *=tá* is used in contexts where only the truth value of the proposition is in focus. To account for this, I introduced the parameter of expectation. I suggested that *=mi* is only required if the proposition is judged as unexpected to the addressee. In the contrary case, the required marker is *=tá*. This analysis, showing the relation of the markers to contrastive (*=mi*) and verum focus (*=tá*) is complementary to their analysis as epistemic authority and exclusive/shared knowledge markers (see Section 2.2).

[10] Verum focus construction described for other languages differ from *=tá* in that, in languages like German, verum focalisation is attested in all major clause types (cf. e.g. Höhle, 1992). The data collected so far suggest that in Upper Napo *=tá* only occurs in declarative clauses (see Section 2.2). This remains to be accounted for in future research.

4. Epistemic marking and Common Ground management

In the previous section, I discussed the occurrences of *=mi* and *=tá* in terms of their association with focus, and suggested expectation as an additional factor conditioning the markers' occurrence in discourse. However, this analysis does not elucidate the 'interactional problems' the Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic clitics are 'specifically designed to resolve' (Couper-Kuhlen and Selting, 2017: 6). Namely, the discussion so far falls short of a *functional* explanation, which I develop below. I propose that the Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic markers are used to manage epistemic Common Ground. First, I discuss the concept of Common Ground management. I consider the difference between the structural and epistemic aspects of Common Ground management, and briefly discuss instances where the latter could be analytically relevant (Section 4.1). Following on from that, I show that epistemic Common Ground management can help account for how and why *=mi* and *=tá* are used in Upper Napo Kichwa (Section 4.2).

4.1. Different aspects of Common Ground management

To communicate, we continually align with our interlocutors in terms of information we exchange, its prominence, and the stance we adopt both towards the information and towards each other (e.g. Lambrecht, 1994; DuBois, 2007; Krifka, 2008). In short, we constantly adjust our Common Ground. Common Ground (henceforth CG) consists of information which is mutually known to be shared by the discourse participants (cf. Stalnaker, 1974). This includes discourse referents interlocutors are familiar with, and 'a set of propositions which the participants (…) mutually agree to treat as true for the purpose of the exchange' (Stalnaker and Cole, 1978). Establishing what counts as CG requires making multiple assumptions about the mental states of one's addressees (cf. e.g. Lambrecht, 1994). In his work on information structure, (Krifka, 2008) postulates two aspects of CG: *CG content*, including all the truth-conditional information within the CG, and *CG management*, indicating how the CG content should develop. The aspects of information structure that have truth-conditional impact are associated with *CG content*, and those relating to the 'pragmatic use of expressions' – with *CG management* (Krifka, 2008: 18). The concept of CG management has to date been used to discuss e.g. modal particles in German (Repp, 2013; Döring, 2016).

Under Krifka's view, CG management indicates possible developments of CG via the use of information-structural devices that assign prominence to propositions. In simplified terms, focal constituents are new, or 'newsworthy' (Lambrecht, 1994), and topics are considered 'given', or less prominent. It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage with definitional problems related to notions such as focus (cf. Matić and Wedgwood, 2013). What matters for the current argument is whether CG management, as defined to date, can account for all aspects of how 'CG should develop'. In previous work (Grzech, n.d., 2016a), I proposed that the notion of CG management should be extended beyond information-structural devices assigning 'relative status to certain bits of information' (Matić and Wedgwood, 2013: 134). I develop this line of thought below.

In order to know how CG content should develop, we keep track of how the newly added propositions and entities relate to one another, and what information is already shared. This is achieved by Information Structure, which organises the CG content. However, the addition of newly uttered propositions to the CG is not automatic: they need to be accepted by the hearer as part of CG (cf. e.g. Repp, 2013; Matić, 2015). CG management, as understood by Krifka (2008) signals how the newly introduced propositions relate to the current CG content, and thus indicates the possible and desired development of CG. For example, framing a proposition as a question, or using a discourse connective to relate a proposition to prior discourse can be an instance of CG management (e.g. Krifka, 2008; Repp, 2013; Döring, 2016). For the purpose of this paper, I propose analysing the devices 'indicating how CG should develop' as responsible for *structural CG management*, conceptually distinct from *epistemic CG management*, which I define below.

In the course of a linguistic exchange, we constantly keep track not only of what knowledge is shared and not shared, but also of our respective epistemic rights. We constantly situate both ourselves and our interlocutors with respect to the linguistic content of the interaction. Who contributed what to CG content, and whose Territory of Information a given proposition belongs to affects how we structure utterances. This is the aspect of communication that I propose to call *epistemic CG management*.

Epistemic CG management becomes manifest when we make linguistic choices – such as whether to use an epistemic marker – on the basis of considerations regarding not only the distribution of knowledge in discourse, but also epistemic rights and responsibilities of discourse participants (see Section 1.3). Epistemic CG management facilitates grounding the information (Clark and Brennan, 1991) by providing epistemic cues for utterance interpretation. Explicit coding of rights to know is an effective way of minimising the collaborative effort (Clark and Brennan, 1991: 135). If interlocutors discursively construct themselves as an authority on a given topic, we know that it might be more efficient to accept the information they propose for CG without challenging it. The definition of CG states that it consists of propositions which discourse participants 'mutually agree to treat as true' (Stalnaker and Cole, 1978). Epistemic cues can accelerate the reaching of such an agreement. The faster an agreement regarding the content of CG is achieved, the more effective the communication (e.g. Clark and Brennan, 1991).

If both *structural* and *epistemic* CG management are communicatively relevant, it follows that strategies used to convey them can be conventionalised (and possibly grammaticalised) to maximise communicative efficiency (cf. Boye and Harder, 2012: 9). There is ample evidence for conventionalisation of devices dealing with structural CG management: a native

speaker of a standard European language picks up information-structural cues from word order, prosody, or the use of modal particles (e.g. Repp, 2013; Döring, 2016).

Many languages have specialised forms which, although not previously described in such terms, could potentially be analysed as epistemic CG management devices. Danish and Swedish have the particle *jo*/*ju* (respectively), indicating – among other things – that the interlocutor should already be familiar with the information conveyed by the speaker (e.g. Heinemann et al., 2011). The German *ja* also has a similar function (Repp, 2013). This is different from just signalling that the information is shared, which could potentially be a matter of structural CG management. The use of *jo*/*ju*/*ja* frames an utterance also in terms of the hearer's epistemic responsibility (see Section 1.3). For Japanese, Hayano (e.g. 2011) analyses the clause-final particles *ne* and *yo* as marking a distinction between shared and exclusive knowledge, intersecting with Kamio's (1997) territories of information. Yurakaré (isolate, Bolivia; Gipper, 2011, 2015) exhibits a set of epistemic modal clitics encoding distinctions related to 'epistemic stance' – or to how participants perceive the relative distribution of knowledge (Heritage, 2012, cited in Gipper, 2015: 227). In Yurakaré conversations, 'agreement takes place on at least two levels: first on the content level (…) and second, on the epistemic stance level' (Gipper, 2015: 227), which shows that Yurakaré epistemic marking is crucial to communicative competence.

Jaminjung/Ngaliwurru (Mirndi, Australia) marks an epistemic contrast between individual and shared knowledge. This contrast arises not only by virtue of the speaker's access to the event, but is also related to socially constructed rights to know (Schultze-Berndt, 2017: 180):

(18)

ngarrgina-ni=biya	jayiny	yirr	gan-anthama	trailer-mij	warnda=**ngarndi**
1SG:POSS-ERG=SEQ	daughter's.child	pull	3SG>3SG-BRING.IPFV	trailer-with	grass=**EGO**

'my granddaughter was pulling along grass with a trailer (I can tell you since I was there, while you were not)' (Schultze-Berndt, 2017: 179)

(19)

digirrij=jung	ga-rdba-ny=**mindi**
die=REST	3SG-fall-PST=**EGO**+**TU**

'(The owl frightened the boy), and he fell down as if dead (or so it appears – you have access to the same evidence as me, so correct me if I am wrong)' (Schultze-Berndt, 2017: 179)

The Jaminjung epistemic clitics are not obligatory, and more research is needed to determine the contexts of their use.

In the case of all the epistemic systems mentioned above, the analyses so far have focused on explaining what meanings the markers contribute to the utterance, rather than on accounting for the speakers' motivations to use them. It is not implausible to assume that in studying the markers from the perspective of *why* speakers choose to use them, epistemic CG management could help explain why the markers surface in some contexts, and not others. In the following section, I substantiate this claim by showing how the concept of epistemic CG management helps to account for the occurrence of *=mi* and *=tá* in Upper Napo Kichwa.

4.2. Epistemic CG management in Upper Napo Kichwa

Thus far, I have shown that in Upper Napo Kichwa *=mi* and *=tá* encode epistemic authority and ownership of knowledge (Section 2.2). I discussed their interaction with focus, conditioning their position in the clause, and argued that the notion of expectation is crucial for explaining why certain utterances are not felicitous without a given marker (Section 3). However, all of the above is insufficient to explain the markers' distribution in the corpus. To account for it, I use the notion of epistemic CG management, introduced in the previous section.

To explain how such an analysis would work, let us consider a corrective focus example akin to (15):

(20)

Mana	*atarikachu,*	*tianukalla**mi**.*
mana	atari -ka =chu	tia -nuka =lla =**mi**
NEG	get.up-PST=Q/NEG	be -3PL.PST=LIM=**MI**

'[S/he] didn't stand up, they just sat [there].' [el_24112014_01 041]

Examples like (15) and (20), where a mistaken assumption is corrected, are the default context for the use of *=mi*. The marker encodes epistemic authority and presents the information as only known to the speaker. Thus, it obligatorily surfaces in contexts where the information is unexpected to the hearer. The semantics of the marker is clear by now, but what is its communicative function? The Cuzco Quechua *=mi* tends to be used when speakers anticipate being challenged (Faller, 2002: 54). An analogous explanation can be applied to Upper Napo Kichwa. In epistemic CG management terms, Upper Napo speakers use *=mi* to invoke authority and urge the interlocutor to integrate a proposition into the CG, despite the interlocutors' potential misgivings. In (20) or (15) the cause of such misgivings might be a contrary proposition uttered in prior discourse, or the hearer's erroneous assessment of the talked-about situation. The speaker can assume that the new,

contrasting proposition might be rejected, and uses =*mi* to invoke epistemic authority and encourage integrating the proposition into the CG without further questioning. This explanation also accounts for the use of =*mi* in non-corrective contexts:[11]

(21)
*Shamuwn**mi**!*
shamu-u-n=**mi**
come-PROG-3=**MI**
'(S)he is coming!'(while watching an action film where the villain is approaching the unaware main character.) [attested, 25/05/18]

(22)
Pantalonda *likingui**mi**!*
{pantalón}-ta liki-ngui=**mi**
trousers-ACC rip-2=**MI**
'You [will] rip [your] trousers!' (parent to a child climbing a tree) [el_31052013_1 388]

Both examples are illocutionary acts of warning. No contrary proposition is present in previous discourse. However, the use of =*mi* here is motivated by the same considerations as in (15) or (20): the speaker wants to evoke their epistemic authority, signalling that the interlocutor should integrate the =*mi*-marked proposition into their knowledge base without challenging it. It follows from the fact that an assertion is stated in the first place that the speaker wants it to be integrated into the CG (cf. Portner, 2006), but the marker adds a sense of urgency. The hearer must proceed quickly to avoid an imminent, undesired situation.

The examples above show that Upper Napo Kichwa speakers use =*mi* in anticipation of problems with their assertion being integrated into the CG. The hearer's integration of the proposition is meant to be aided by the use of the marker: explicit invocation of the speaker's exclusive authority over knowledge. Thus, the use of =*mi* can be explained in terms of epistemic CG management: providing the hearer with explicit epistemic cues to enhance the efficiency of communication.

The use of =*tá* can be explained analogously. Consider example (16), cited below as (23):

(23)
A: *Apachijllara* *pambana*?
apa-chi-k=llara pamba-na
bring-CAUS-AG.NMLZ=ID.REF bury-INF
'[So] the midwife herself has to bury [the placenta]?'

B: Apachijllara pambana**rá**.
apa-chi-k=llara pamba-na=**tá**
bring-CAUS-AG.NMLZ=ID.REF bury-INF =**TÁ**
'Yes, the midwife DOES have to bury [it] herself.' [in_08102014_02 164-165]

In (23), and in all other examples, =*tá* occurs when the proposition is already familiar. It has been introduced into discourse, but, not yet adopted as part of the CG (cf. Repp, 2013: 236). The fact that it is not yet part of the CG is made evident by the interviewee (A) asking the midwife (B) a confirmation question. While =*mi* neutralises objections, =*tá* facilitates the integration of the proposition into the CG by making explicit that the information it encodes is shared (see Section 2.2). Thus, =*tá* facilitates successful integration into the CG in case of propositions whose integration has proven problematic thus far.

In this section, I brought together the semantic, information-structural, and CG-management-related aspects of =*mi* and =*tá* to put forward a functional analysis of these Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic markers. I aimed to show that the CG management-related analysis allows to account for the markers' distribution in discourse to a greater extent than the mere analysis of their semantics, or their association with information structure. As observed by Kittilä et al. (2018: 291), in the context of natural language use we can never access the intentions of the speaker, and hence may never be sure if our interpretation of a given utterance is correct. However, I hope to have demonstrated that the notion of epistemic CG management can help us make better predictions about the communicative intentions of speakers, both in Upper Napo Kichwa and beyond.

5. Conclusions

In this article, I have examined some common assumptions about Quechuan evidentiality, showing that the meanings encoded, and functions realised by, markers labelled as evidentials in this language family are more complex than commonly assumed. I substantiated this claim with the analysis of Upper Napo Kichwa enclitics =*mi* and =*tá*. I have demonstrated that these markers encode epistemic authority, as well as exclusive (=*mi*) and shared knowledge (=*tá*). I have also shown how the markers relate to information structure, and how the notion of expectation is relevant to their distribution. Consequently, I

[11] An alternative explanation could be that epistemic marking becomes more important when a proposition is corrected. However, this would fail to account for the non-corrective use of =*mi*.

proposed that the markers' occurrence in discourse can be explained if they are analysed as fulfilling the communicative function of *epistemic Common Ground management*.

To be useful to linguistic analysis, a concept should be both methodologically useful, and cross-linguistically sufficient (Matić and Wedgwood, 2013: 130). By developing the analysis of Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic marking in terms of epistemic CG management, I demonstrated that the concept itself is analytically useful. By discussing epistemic systems in other languages, which could potentially also be analysed as dedicated to epistemic CG management, I aimed to show that the notion could also be 'cross-linguistically sufficient', and serve as an umbrella under which to consider a range of epistemic marking systems and strategies, sharing a broad communicative function despite their formal and semantic differences.

Epistemic CG management can be particularly useful in the analysis of epistemic markers which, like the Upper Napo Kichwa clitics, are not grammatically obligatory. In such cases, their semantic description is only a partial analysis. The use of optional epistemic marking is not fully accounted for unless we know *why* speakers choose to use them at given points in discourse, and this is where epistemic CG management becomes analytically relevant.

The languages I discussed all employ some linguistic strategy to attend to the ownership and distribution of knowledge in conversation, but these strategies have to date been studied in separate terms, within separate research traditions. Descriptive linguistics, within which lesser-known languages, such as Upper Napo Kichwa, Yurakaré and Jaminjung/Ngalliwuru tend to be studied, considered non-obligatory epistemic marking systems less worthy of attention than grammatically obligatory 'evidentiality proper'. In better-studied languages, such as Japanese or Danish, epistemic marking was considered as an instance of discourse marking, dissociated from the research on evidential/epistemic systems. In languages such as English, where epistemic rights are managed by means of turn structure (cf. Heritage; Raymond, 2005), non-obligatory epistemic marking was mainly dealt with in conversation-analytical research.

Such divergent approaches obscure a common functional motivation for the use of epistemic systems. Analysing them jointly could be a potentially fruitful approach to research into linguistic systems and strategies whose meaning and function relate to knowledge. In fact, such developments seem to already be under way. In recent years, epistemic marking systems have increasingly been treated as scattered parts of the same notional domain. Although this domain is not yet well defined, categories such as engagement (Evans et al., 2018a, 2018b), grammar of knowledge (Aikhenvald, 2014), Complex Epistemic Perspective (Bergqvist, 2016), egophoricity (Floyd et al., 2018) and evidentiality are being described in similar terms.

Developing a research agenda concerned with exploring the points of convergence between the aforementioned categories, in particular evidentiality and egophoricity, has already been proposed (Tournadre and LaPolla, 2014; Aikhenvald, 2018). The argument developed in this article suggests that epistemic research could benefit from combining the approaches and methodologies used to study epistemic strategies in familiar languages on the one hand, and in less-described ones on the other. In practical terms, this could mean paying greater attention to turn structure and discourse marking in descriptive linguistic work, or incorporating lesser-known languages into handbooks of conversation analysis, pragmatics and interactional linguistics.

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