This book compares and contrasts publicly espoused security concepts in the Nordic region, and explores the notion of ‘societal security’.

Outside observers often assume that Nordic countries take similar approaches to the security and safety of their citizens. This book challenges that assumption and traces the evolution of societal security, and its broadly equivalent concepts, in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland. The notion of societal security is deconstructed and analysed in terms of its different meanings and implications for each country, through both country- and issue-focused studies. Each chapter traces the evolution of key security concepts and related practices, allowing for a comparison of similarities and differences between these four countries. Using discourses and practices as evidence, this is the first book to explore how different Nordic nations have conceptualised domestic security over time. The findings will be valuable to scholars from across the geographical and theoretical spectrum, while highlighting how Nordic security discourses and practices may deviate from traditional assumptions about Nordic values.

This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, Nordic politics, and International Relations.

Sebastian Larsson is a Researcher and Teaching Fellow in International Relations at Stockholm University, Sweden.

Mark Rhinard is Professor of International Relations at Stockholm University and Senior Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
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Contributors


Minna Branders works in the Finnish Defence Forces (National Defence University) as a Senior Researcher on comprehensive security, development, strategic analysis, and foresight. She was previously a postdoctoral researcher, and earned her PhD at the University of Tampere.

J. Peter Burgess is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Chair in Geopolitics of Risk at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, and Research Professor in the Research Group on Law, Science, Technology and Society (LSTS) at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel.

Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Jyväskylä and a Research Fellow at the University of Verona. His research focuses on political theory and contemporary world politics, especially post-truth, resilience, and the Anthropocene. He has published in journals such as Political Theory, Resilience, European Journal of Social Theory, and New Perspectives.

Sissel H. Jore is Associate Professor in Societal Safety and Risk Management at the University of Stavanger. She has published widely on the topics of terrorism, counterterrorism, and security risk management, risk perception, conceptualisations of risk, discourse analysis, critical terrorism studies, terrorism emergency preparedness, and crisis management.

Tapio Juntunen is a University Instructor and pedagogical coordinator at Tampere University. His research focuses on Finnish foreign policy,
resilience politics, nuclear weapons politics and arms control, and has published in journals such as Resilience, New Perspectives, and Politiikka.

Sebastian Larsson is a Researcher and Teaching Fellow in International Relations at Stockholm University. During his PhD studies at King’s College London, he studied the transforming field of security and defence in post-Cold War Sweden. He was an associated researcher of the NordSTEVA and SOURCE (EU FP7) projects on the emergence of societal security in the EU and Nordic region. His current research explores security technologies, intelligence, and arms export. Among his recent publications are ‘The civil paradox: Swedish arms production and export and the role of emerging technologies’ (2020, International Journal of Migration and Border Studies).

Tobias Liebetrau is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for Military Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. His research interests include cybersecurity policy and governance, EU digital and cyber politics, and strategic studies.

Karen Lund Petersen is Professor (with special responsibilities) at the University of Copenhagen and Director of the Centre for Advanced Security Theory (CAST). Her primary research interests are security and risk governance, with a particular focus on political risk, corporate security management, and intelligence. As member of the so-called Copenhagen School within security studies, she has furthermore contributed to the debate on securitisation and widened concept of security. Among her most recent publications are Intelligence on the Frontier: Between State and Civil Society (2019, Routledge, co-edited with Kira Vrist Ronn) and ‘Private–public partnerships on cyber-security: a practice of loyalty?’ (2017, International Affairs).

Claudia Morsut is a postdoc fellow at the University of Stavanger. Her research focuses on the EU risk and crisis management policy and governance, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, and EU security policy.

Mark Rhinard is Professor of International Relations at Stockholm University, where his research focuses on cross-border security and safety questions including terrorism, disasters, and pandemics. His recent publications include ‘The Crisisification of Policy-Making in the European Union’ (2019, Journal of Common Market Studies) and ‘Assembling European Health Security’ (2019, Security Dialogue, with Louise Bengtsson and Stefan Borg).

Jonatan Stiglund is a PhD Candidate in International Relations at the Department of Economic History and International Relations, Stockholm University. He has been a member of the Nordic Centre of Excellence for Security Technologies and Societal Values (NordSTEVA). In his research, he is mainly interested in Nordic security, security constructions, and different logics of security.

Vesa Valtonen is a Secretary General at the Finnish Security Committee and Colonel (GS). He defended his PhD in Military Science in 2010.
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Putting together an edited volume is never the proverbial walk in the park, but this one developed in a pleasingly natural fashion, driven by a collective desire to pull together the various ways that broad security concerns are spoken and acted upon in the Nordic region. The importance of the Nordic notion of ‘societal security’, advanced by Nordforsk amongst many others, as a defining feature of our collective countries, received both nods and ‘nejs’ in our ongoing and sometimes intense discussions. Eventually the group, led skilfully in its early stages by Peter Burgess, decided to pursue the matter in a more systematic way and comparatively through contributions to an edited volume.

The authors of this volume deserve credit for staying close to that vision and gamely following the harangues of the editors, and all within an impressive time frame. For that we are grateful, with particular thanks to Karen Lund Petersen, who not only features in this volume but also guided the NordSTEVA consortium to its formal conclusion and continues to inspire its ongoing collaborations. We also thank the lead members of the consortium not featured in this volume, yet who nonetheless contributed to the vibrant and rich intellectual environment that characterised NordSTEVA: Odd Einar Olsen, Henrik Tehler, Sirpa Virta, Mareile Kaufmann, and
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We admit that a book about Nordic security, in a world that seems to be increasingly characterised by inequality, violence, and fear, may seem overly focused on a luxury problem. Nordic countries enjoy a high level of prosperity and security – however measured – in direct contradiction to the experience of many individuals around the world today. There is nevertheless value to be found in studying how security is spoken of and acted upon in all settings, including the Nordic region, so as to enhance our understanding of major security dynamics at play: the power structures reinforced by certain security definitions, the hypocrisies revealed when comparing words and action, and the slow-drip deterioration of shared, communal values when some security practices are performed. We hope this volume contributes, even in the smallest of ways, to a broader agenda of understanding the implications of how security is ‘performed’ across the world.
Part I

Introduction
1 Introduction

Comparing and conceptualising Nordic societal security

*Sebastian Larsson and Mark Rhinard*

**Introduction**

As in many regions of the world, Nordic conceptualisations of what ‘security’ means and how it should be practiced have transformed in recent decades. Traditional security strategies with a focus on geopolitics, concrete threat perceptions related to war, and territorial defence remain in place. But years of post-Cold War expansions of security thinking, conceptualisation, and practice have left an indelible and seemingly distinctive mark.

In the Nordic countries, as elsewhere in the Western world, security has come to be organised around a rather holistic conceptualisation of what constitutes a threat as well as the range of governmental responsibilities required to address them. In the Nordic region, we can observe a general shift in how discourses, practices, and technologies become related not to traditional defence or war-thinking, but to notions of ‘societal security’, ‘comprehensive security’, ‘resilience’, ‘risk’-, ‘crisis’-, or ‘emergency’ management, and ‘public safety and security’. These framings change what it means to provide security, presage a different kind of societal response, suggest different kinds of power hierarchies, and involve a wide range of actors from public to private and individual citizens. Nordic conceptions of security also wrest open a wider selection of threats to society, including terrorism and organised crime, infrastructure disruptions, IT breaches, disinformation campaigns, major accidents, environmental disasters, and even migration.

Similarly, the study of security has expanded considerably after the Cold War and into the 2000s, both in the field of International Relations and beyond. As much recent scholarship attests to (Burgess 2010), ‘new’ security studies feature a range of constructivist, reflexive, and interdisciplinary perspectives, and include empirical and theoretical studies of a range of issues. Extant and emerging agendas include processes of threat construction and securitisation, the expanding range of security-related discourses and practices, the interplay and mutual constitution of societal values and government action, security technologies and actor behaviours, and legitimate security governance – to name just a few. An increasing amount of critical security studies further explores the implications and effects of post-Cold
War security practices with regard to civil liberties, fundamental rights, and democratic life (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006; Shepherd 2013).

The Nordic region is a prime area where these trends converge. As shown in this book, Nordic governments have displayed an apparent willingness to adopt expanded security concepts at the same time that academics have roamed across the (thin) line dividing research and practice. A central theme running through this book is the intermingling of research and practice in the Nordic region, amongst actors subscribing to evolving sets of historically shaped ideas – all in a process of co-constitution. These dynamics are not new, of course (as the global evolution of notions such as ‘soft power’ or ‘resilience’ in policy circles confirms), nor are they unique to the Nordic region (Vouri and Stritzel 2016). But Nordic countries do offer an uncannily rich and revealing set of cases in which to study how and to what extent concepts travel over time, across borders, and between the research and public spheres.

This prompts the question: is there a Nordic way of thinking about and pursuing security, perhaps in line with the notion of ‘societal security’? For some outsiders, there appears to be vast similarities, rooted in seemingly common robust social welfare systems, supported by transnational conceptual learning, and manifested in Nordic cooperation and agreements like the Haga declarations (Dalgaard-Nielsen and Hamilton 2006; Hamilton 2005; Sandö and Bailes 2014; cf. NRF 2008). To be sure, there are clear connections. The welfare state, as we discuss below, underpins a particular perspective of society and portends a degree of shared values worth protecting. And the idea of ‘total defence’ giving way to ‘societal security’ – or some variant – echoes across multiple Nordic countries. Even the recent return to geopolitics in international security thinking can be found in Nordic governments’ calls to rethink societal security for a supposedly more militaristic threat environment. The chapters in this book clearly demonstrate family resemblances in how broad security concepts emerged, evolved, and transformed in the Nordics.

But this book points out that differences are as common as similarities, and methodologically speaking, understanding divergence provides important analytical purchase. Indeed, that motivation spurred the project behind this book. We take a critical perspective on the assumption of ‘Nordic convergence’, to investigate the extent to which differences rather than similarities characterise how a set of Nordic countries – Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland – speak of, frame, and act upon the security of their societies. The goal here is to add nuance to discussions of how Nordic countries address the question of security, and to consider the implications of similarities and differences. What makes this book broadly ‘critical’ is in its methods and approaches: it seeks to uncover evolving power constellations by examining who and what shape conceptual trends over time, while focusing on outcomes and implications in terms of the dominant discourses and practices of various Nordic ‘securities’.
Comparing Nordic societal security

We organise the book around the notion of ‘societal security’, a term proposed by some observers as a concept common to the Nordic region. The concept of societal security has both academic and practical connotations, with the academic community divided between identity-based approaches associated with the Copenhagen School of security studies and those with a more ‘functionalist’ and objective view of security (Rhinard, this volume). It is the latter version of societal security that we take up in this book, not because we advocate for it, but rather because it is often promoted as a common ‘Nordic’ approach by practitioners (FNF 2014; Nordic Council 2005, 2019; Stoltenberg 2009) and some funding bodies (NordForsk 2013; Research Council of Norway 2008). As generally articulated, a societal security approach aims to protect the core values of a society from a wide range of intentional and unintentional threats. It envisions a host of public and private responses to such threats, and promotes steering models that span policy sectors and governance levels. The concept has been taken up by transboundary policy communities in the Nordic region and is sometimes accompanied by the idea of ‘Nordic values’ worth protecting. As such, it is an intensely political question and critical reflection on Nordic societies.

We investigate how widespread the notions of societal security are in the Nordic region, and moreover, whether such patterns reveal genuine conceptual kinship or just superficial window-dressing. We also want to understand the implications of Nordic convergence and divergence on this question, including for governance, democracy, and values. Using the concept of ‘societal security’ as a departure point allows us to explore divergences from this particular approach, and to relate concepts with conceptual affiliations, including comprehensive security, resilience, and risk management.

The authors in this volume are experts in their security-related fields and have spent several years jointly examining the discourses, practices, and implications of Nordic countries’ approaches to securing their citizens, under a common research framework. The chapters take either a country-, thematic-, or comparative focus, examining in each case how security is conceptualised and practiced, and with what implications for Nordic societies. Our ontological approach is largely constructivist in orientation, concerned less with what security ‘is’ than with how certain approaches are ‘made possible’ as well as what they ‘do’. We are thus interpretivist in epistemological terms, allowing the empirical material to reveal patterns in unexpected ways.

Considerable conceptual overlaps are thereby revealed in the Nordic region related to the notion of societal security. Each country studied here has adopted some variant of the notion, and indeed there is evidence from each country that the precise term ‘societal security’ has been taken up by at least some corner of officialdom. However, the degree of institutionalisation differs dramatically, from a strong take-up in Sweden and Norway to a marginal adoption in Finland (in deference to the preferred notion of ‘comprehensive security’) to almost no formal adoption in Denmark. Whatever the
concepts used, all have been shaped by socio-historical trajectories rooted to traditional defence postures. New security concepts are thus, as we will see, less revolutionary and more evolutionary. The key difference for each country lies in whether new holistic concepts linked to societal security replace, or co-exist with, traditional territorial defence notions such as total defence, particularly as political attention, more recently, turns towards a perceived ‘return of geopolitics’ in the global security environment (Mead 2014). Security concepts in the Nordic region, as shown convincingly by the chapters in this book, follow particular trajectories, each shaped inter alia by historical experience, pushed by field-spanning actors, reproduced or uprooted by institutional change, and reconfigured through narrative contestation. These various trajectories are unique to each country, of course, but all represent shifts in ways to conceptualise and act upon security, with consequences for politics, power, and cohesion in the Nordic region. The chapters in this book shed light on these questions, providing not only a ‘state of play’ regarding security thinking and practice but also tackling questions of how security has been produced, enacted, and performed in different Nordic countries.

To capture diversity, we outlined an analytical framework that would allow authors, starting with the notion of societal security, to explore creatively how this concept – defined as such, or not – played out in the respective countries and sectors. First, we asked authors to characterise the dominant conceptual approach taken to the safety and security of societies in their respective country or policy area. Second, the authors were asked to trace the emergence of that approach, examining the social and transformational dynamics behind them. Third, the authors consider the implications of those approaches either in practical terms, in how security is done, or in normative terms, including what such concepts mean for power structures, societal values, and what new insecurities might emerge as a result.

This chapter unfolds as follows. The first two sections focus on ostensible similarities, one concerning the welfare state foundation for modern Nordic societies, and the second on the emergence of a supposedly region-wide approach to safety and security: societal security. The subsequent section considers potential lines of divergence, while the concluding section explains the organisation of the book and outlines the contributions.

**Nordic security and the welfare state**

One can hardly discuss common Nordic conceptions of security without first investigating the link between Nordic welfare apparatuses and Nordic security approaches. There is indeed much talk of a ‘Nordic Model’ in welfare and democracy studies focusing on, for instance, the region’s historical approach to public institutions and labour (Engelstad and Hagelund 2016), economic policy (Blomquist and Moene 2015), work organisation (Gustavsen 2011), education (Blossing et al. 2014), or even culture (Duelund 2003) and state media
Comparing Nordic societal security (Syvertsen et al. 2014). This broad range of scholarly attention undoubtedly points towards the existence of strong socio-political, cultural, and administrative similarities between the countries, but also suggests that these similarities have existed most tangibly in an area traditionally associated not with security and defence, but with the public provision of social welfare.

It would be safe to assume, however, that the region’s historical welfare model has conditioned its security discourses and practices to a large extent. How has this welfare model interplayed with, organised, and structured a potential Nordic approach to security? Relatedly, what are the links between the region’s modern reputation and international brand of ‘progressive’ politics (often constructed as ‘Nordic values’) and its current logic of framing and doing security? When associating traditional Nordic welfare commonalities with a potential shared security approach, at least three themes can be highlighted.

First, in some Nordic countries (most notably Sweden and Finland but also in Norway to some extent), the welfare system itself overlapped strongly with the logic of how to organise national defence during the Cold War. For example, the notion of ‘total defence’ – which existed varyingly in the region – was a political-bureaucratic ideal suggesting that virtually all aspects of societal planning and the peacetime provision of public services should be integrated into defence policy and aligned with the goals of war preparedness. Policies for public housing, healthcare, road construction, supply management, and so on all had a ‘war dimension’ and had to be designed not only for welfare purposes, but also with invasion scenarios in mind and with an eye towards how to best mobilise society and its citizens for defence purposes. As put by Lundin et al. (2010), in countries like Sweden, the logics of welfare and warfare became historically entangled and intertwined, and over time, seemingly inseparable. This has enabled a deeply rooted ‘defence-culture’ in certain Nordic countries, which, in turn, made it difficult for reformist bureaucrats and politicians to challenge and significantly alter total defence structures after the Cold War. In Sweden and Finland, for instance, the gradual transition from defence thinking to new and broadened security approaches was rather slow and fragmented (see also Larsson, and Hyvönen and Juntunen, respectively, this volume).

Second, and relatedly, similarities in security approaches may stem from shared traditions of comprehensive public administration structures. More specifically, the region’s history of strong social democratic parties has put public sector actors in generally strong positions vis-à-vis private companies. Security and defence was usually a rather state-owned operation during the Cold War, and thus tended to follow a top-down practical logic: from the government and parliament via civil and military agencies to regional county boards and local municipalities and companies. Much due to the peculiar intertwining of welfare and defence indicated earlier, the trust among citizens towards authorities and security agencies has also been traditionally strong in the Nordic region. In effect, the general public-private
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relationship in the Nordic security field has developed quite differently than in many other countries and regions. In the United States and United Kingdom, private firms like G4S, ADT, or DynCorp have a much larger role in the overall domestic operationalisation of security, and the outsourcing of policing and surveillance to private firms has become an almost standardised practice. In the Nordic countries, on the other hand, private security firms are typically smaller and have a more withdrawn role in security work. Rather than in competition with public agencies, private companies tend to be engaged by the government in so-called public-private partnerships (PPPs), and often in the areas of critical infrastructure and risk management (see also Berling and Petersen, and Liebetrau, respectively, this volume).

Finally, in most Nordic countries, post-Cold War security responses and responsibilities have devolved in terms of governance patterns. While central governments retain a strong degree of control, responsibilities have diffused downward and outward throughout societies, particularly since the 2000s. To take municipal government as an example, security thinking has become embedded into the everyday practices of governing local communities, organising local bureaucracies and infrastructures, and managing local vulnerabilities, risks, and threats. This has been formulated varyingly by Nordic governments as the ‘responsibility’-, ‘similarity’-, and ‘proximity’-principles for local security work, which, again, clearly resembles how welfare and defence models were organised historically. In countries like Norway, moreover, ‘security’ has come to be increasingly paralleled with the provision of social welfare itself, not least in the case of countering ‘radicalism’ and so-called ‘violent extremism’. In stark contrast to the more hands-on policing and surveillance approaches in the United States and United Kingdom that draw on exceptional logics and a politics of fear, security work in Nordic contexts tends to often be based on a politics of socialisation and integration. The historical qualities of the Nordic welfare state have, in some instances, transmuted security work into a form of ‘caretaking’, indeed, into a practice drawing peculiarly on both social capital and coercive measures (see also Jore and Burgess, respectively, this volume).

Whether or not there is a distinct ‘Nordic approach’ to societal security, it is certainly the case that such practices will have been strongly influenced by the region’s common social welfare traditions. Although far from an exhaustive account, the three historical traits mentioned here – war preparedness, welfare-state centralisation, and diffused security governance patterns – are at least some key indicators that post-Cold War security in the Nordic has been inevitably conditioned by the region’s social, political, and economic structures.

The emergence of ‘societal security’

It is typical – and deceptively simple – to link the concept of societal security to the Nordic region. Examining the origin of the concept allows us to get
a grasp of why outsiders, in particular, associate the terminology with the Nordic nations. The notion of doing security in the name of society, with its multiple meanings, can be traced to even before the end of the Cold War, when numerous conceptualisations of security emerged to challenge traditional territorial or state-centric versions of national security, each carrying its own ideational baggage and reflecting its own set of material interests.

When the notion of ‘societal security’ initially emerged, it came to embody two relatively independent versions: the first version was coined in the early 1990s by Ole Waever and Barry Buzan, and what would become known as the Copenhagen School of security studies. Departing from a constructivist tradition, it directed attention towards ‘the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats’ (Waever 1993, 23). A second version was introduced in Nordic functionalist security studies in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and is largely associated with the work of Bengt Sundelius (2005b, 2005c, 2006), Jan Hovden (2004), Alyson Bailes (Archer et al. 2014), US scholar Dan Hamilton (2005; Dalgaard-Nielsen and Hamilton 2006), and, albeit in a more critical fashion, Peter Burgess (2014).

This second version, which gained popularity in policy circles and via ‘pracademics’ – scholars moving between the academic-practitioner worlds (Larsson 2019) – stripped societal security of its identity-oriented original definition and emphasised security as the transnational protection of interdependent infrastructures. Indeed, ‘life-giving functions’ took analytical priority over time. This was apparent in writings by Hovden (2004) in Norway, in which attention was placed on conceptualising security in terms of ‘the survival and recovery of vital societal functions’, and in those by Sundelius in Sweden, which initially termed the concept ‘functional security’ (Sundelius 2005a, 2005b see also Larsson, this volume). The focus turned away from cultural referent objects and more on the kinds of functions that must be preserved (Hamilton et al. 2005). In essence, societal security referred to the ability of a society to function under duress, the embeddedness of societies in a transnational context, the interdependence of societal infrastructures, and the holistic or ‘all-hazards’ security mindset that was growing popular at the time. This version was promoted, and eventually started to spread, amongst Swedish and Norwegian scholars, practitioners, and policy development groups as it became introduced in new government propositions and agencies, and applied like an umbrella term for framing various security research programmes (see also Larsson, and Morsut, respectively, this volume).

There are certainly overlaps between the two variants of societal security, but their development took place mainly in parallel rather than intertwined or – as might have been predicted – with one version subsuming the other (see Rhinard, this volume). Each uses a different ontological and epistemological stance on the study of security. For this reason, the latter functionalist version of societal security had considerable crossover appeal:
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associated with objectivist ontologies of viewing the security landscape, it moved swiftly from academia into practice. Some saw societal security as the emerging Nordic – perhaps even European – counterpart to ‘homeland security’ that was being simultaneously established in the United States (Sundelius et al. 2006). It structured at least a generation of policymakers in Europe engaged in the analysis, pursuit, and funding of security.

In many ways, the concept lies at the heart of the struggle concerning how Nordic security was to be practiced, understood, and framed in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods. This can be illustrated by the various ways in which this terminology spread in the region, first, in different local and inter-bureaucratic contexts, and second, in different supranational and inter-ministerial contexts. As Larsson (this volume) shows, the early 2000s revealed evidence of cooperation and convergence between Nordic policy advisors and officials in the area of non-military security, not least in terms of the evolution of official discourse and agency structures. Particularly in Sweden and Norway, the design of agencies, institutions, and security policies came to mirror each other. Their respective ‘vulnerability investigations’ around 1999–2001 ran in tandem, and as the two advisory groups met and exchanged concrete ideas, their final reports subsequently came to employ very similar terminologies and organisational principles for crisis management and security work. Norwegian officials, moreover, almost immediately began using the label of societal security to make sense of these reforms in subsequent government bills and agency directives (e.g. Ministry of Justice Norway 2002, 2004; see also Morsut, this volume), whereas in Sweden it was taken up as well, albeit alongside other widened security concepts.

Although not necessarily referred to explicitly as ‘societal security’, the core concepts and strategies presented in the Swedish and Norwegian final reports and subsequent government bills all carried such traits, and also began to spread to the other Nordic countries. For example, in addition to the lengthy Swedish report ‘Security in a new era’ (SOU 2001) and the Norwegian ‘A vulnerable society’ (NOU 2000), the Finnish Ministry of Defence authored a similar national security strategy in 2003 for ‘protecting the critical functions of society’ (Ministry of Defence Finland 2003; see also 2006), and the Danish agency Beredskapsstyrelsen (2004) completed the ‘Danish Vulnerability Investigation’ the following year. In these texts, as well as related official writings, it became clear that Nordic policy investigators and advisors took some inspiration from each other. Certain terms and practical orientations continued to resonate throughout all of them, and they were all aligned at least to some extent with the functionalist definition of societal security that was being simultaneously developed (e.g. Sundelius 2005a). Within only a handful of years, the Nordic countries (except Iceland) made a general – seemingly orchestrated – move towards an updated and holistic-sounding security approach (from war preparedness to increased focus on peacetime crises and infrastructural protection), reformed governance and organisational standards for crisis management (e.g. the already mentioned ‘responsibility’-, ‘similarity’-, and ‘proximity’-principles), addressing
a much larger spectrum of threats (from military invasion to environmental hazards and human-induced disasters and terrorist attacks), and security actors (not only military, public sector, and governments but also civil, private sector, and citizens).

During the same years, national political representatives in the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers also started discussing and collaborating in the area of security for the first time. A Nordic Council member proposal in 2005, for instance, called for increased regional cooperation around societal security, acknowledging that while ‘[s]ecurity policy has traditionally been positioned beyond the spectrum of the Nordic Council’, it was now time to implement societal security as a dedicated work area in the Council since ‘new threats’ now supposedly faced the democratic state and rule of law in the Nordic region. This way, the member proposal reasoned, the Council could more effectively push Nordic governments to ‘re-evaluate the workload’ between ‘internal and external security’ as well as increase cooperation with ‘non-public actors’ (Nordic Council 2005). Explicitly addressing the notion of a ‘Nordic societal security’, this member proposal was followed up again in 2010 but now by representatives coming specifically from Iceland (Nordic Council 2010). Notably, Iceland’s security and defence approach had been largely underdeveloped – if at all existent – during large parts of the 20th century. Militarily, the Icelandic government had been deeply dependent on NATO and United States, for instance. However, with the emergence of new approaches related to crisis management and societal security, Icelandic decisionmakers saw ways to more substantially engage in a modern form of security work (see also Bailes and Gylfason 2008).

The so-called ‘Stoltenberg report’ (2009) continued to build on what seemed to emerge as a ‘Nordic security model’. Presented at an ‘extraordinary meeting of Nordic foreign ministers’ in Oslo in February 2009, this report consisted of 13 major proposals for strengthened security cooperation. Although the report consisted predominantly of high-policy proposals, three chapters concerned societal security specifically, and it concluded by introducing an informal Nordic declaration of solidarity in the event of a major disaster or attack in the region. In April the same year, the interministerial ‘Haga Process’ was initiated as a top-down effort to further orchestrate Nordic crisis management and societal security policies. This initiative led to two political declarations in which the five Nordic countries’ ministers of defence, justice, and interior, respectively, claimed to see

a great advantage in developing the existing Nordic cooperation in the area of societal security and preparedness. Shared values and a cultural and geographical proximity make up an important foundation for this cooperation. It is our conviction that a deepened and more focused collaboration benefits the entire Nordic, as well as our capability to act in different international contexts.

(Haga Declaration I 2009; see also Sandö and Bailes 2014)
Here, ‘Nordic societal security’ was used, on the one hand, as a way to frame a specifically ‘Nordic’ way of life, and on the other hand, as an instrument for gaining leverage or becoming more influential abroad. The follow-up declaration, ‘Haga II’, further promoted and enacted a shared Nordic approach to security work, suggesting that the Nordic countries face increasingly shared threats due to their ‘similar societal structures’, ‘interconnected infrastructures’, and ‘openness’ (Haga Declaration II 2013). Work has since continued in the Nordic Council, and in October 2019, an updated ‘Nordic Council strategy on societal security’ was formally adopted. Although containing no radically new ideas, the strategy proposes to give leaders ‘a clear mandate’ when it comes to ‘Nordic cooperation on foreign affairs and security policy, including Nordic cooperation on societal security and emergency planning’ (Nordic Council 2019).

There are several ways to explain why post-Cold War security approaches transformed – at least visibly – in similar ways in the Nordic countries, ways that do not suggest that it was down to some natural coalescence due to ‘similar structures’. Rather, this relative convergence was a socio-political and high-level, and to some extent conscious, attempt of trying to impose a particular way of framing ‘Nordic security’. For example, there are long traditions of informal dialogue between ministers and civil servants in the various Nordic cabinet offices, and of actively harmonising Nordic legislation to the fullest extent possible in certain areas, so that when laws, agencies, work terminologies, and organisational principles are to be designed in one country, legislators are more or less obliged to account for and draw on what is already in place in the others. Policy exchange of this kind traditionally occurs outside of the Nordic Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers, or other supranational spaces; indeed, the Nordic Council – far from possessing the legal imperative of the EU – tends to work more like an influential pressure group on national parliaments.

In fact, inter-ministerial and other bureaucratic forms of cooperation around security, in the Nordic Council and elsewhere, had historically been regarded ‘taboo’ since the 1950s. Due to the five countries’ different positions in security cooperation arrangements, mainly NATO membership for some, issues pertaining to security policy, the organisation of defence, or the role of the armed forces, had effectively been kept off the agenda in these regional settings. Some prominent Nordic security scholars during the Cold War even saw the heterogeneity among the countries as a positive factor, itself contributing to a sense of geopolitical ‘stability’ in the region. Arne Olav Brundtland, for instance, famously referred to the situation as the ‘Nordic balance’ (Brundtland 1966; see also 1981), thereby paradoxically suggesting a sense of harmony and commonness in difference itself. However, as geopolitical issues were toned down in the region after the Cold War, and when policies relating to civil and military defence came to be gradually replaced by ‘softer’ and less controversial policies like Nordic crisis management in the early 2000s, cooperation grew in the security area as well, as
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Semi-systematic policy dialogues concerning ‘best practice’ intensified and spread also to the ministries of defence and justice.

Another aspect which contributed to, and to an extent co-legitimated, these regional coordination initiatives was the role of functionalist or applied research in the area of security and crisis management. For instance, policy-oriented academic conferences and workshops were held in the Nordic countries during which practitioners, civil servants, policy advisors, and researchers convened to discuss themes like ‘shared security models’ (KBM, CRN, and ETH 2004; Research Council of Norway 2008). Sundelius, in particular, continued to push for societal security to become the central umbrella term for such a model, e.g. by publishing articles on themes such as ‘societal security in the globally embedded Nordic’ (Sundelius 2007), and moreover, by taking the lead to establish a specific societal security research programme within the region’s main research funding body, NordForsk (2013).

In short, there is some evidence of convergence suggesting a turn to a ‘Nordic model of societal security’ after the Cold War, both in national and regional contexts. However, as becomes obvious even in this brief overview, this convergence has been most visible at the supranational or inter-ministerial level, among high-level actors such as the Nordic Council, Council of Ministers, and top bureaucrats and commissioners, rather than among national parliamentary or agency settings.

One could argue that certain Nordic national representatives, ministers, and senior advisors had a specific vision in the late 1990s and early 2000s not to promote a Nordic model, to create at least the appearance of convergence, and of harmonisation around policies and practices related not to defence, but to ‘societal security’. Indeed, they may have had an implicit or even explicit idea to impose a sense of ‘community’, to conduct a kind of identity-building exercise, despite the fact that post-Cold War approaches towards security in the Nordic were heterogeneous, still in emergence, and at best, loosely related. In any case, what became constructed in the 2000s was, if not a concrete ‘model’, then at least a more or less coherent and powerful narrative and ‘imaginary’, or political vision, of what Nordic security should entail.

Patterns of divergence

Nordic societies thus share some systemic features which, when considered historically and alongside the rise of a societal security discourse as outlined earlier, suggest some degree of Nordic similarity. But how well does this narrative translate into activities ‘on the ground’, in the respective national contexts? What happens to the notion of Nordic societal security when we study how it has been operationalised and put to work in practice?

This question animates the contributions that follow in this volume. They ask, each with their own focus, how security discourses and practices evolved in the Nordic countries after the Cold War and into the 2000s, and
to what end. Indeed, even a cursory look into Nordic countries’ historical security arrangements, priorities, and strategies suggests possible lines of divergence since the start of the so-called ‘new security era’ in the 1990s (SOU 2001).

We can see even from a brief reading of the region’s security discourses and practices that the notion of societal security, for example, was interpreted rather differently in the five countries. In some countries, such as Sweden and Norway, the actual term ‘societal security’ was constructed and reconstructed, used to inform policy debates and frame policy questions. For government agencies like DSB in Norway, ‘societal security’ became a terminological backbone (DSB 2019), whereas in the Swedish agencies KBM and MSB, it appeared in various guidelines and reports but always alongside or in relation to other terms such as ‘crisis management’, ‘emergency preparedness’, or ‘civil protection’ (e.g. MSB 2011, 2013). In Finland, the general mindset behind societal security emerged in the early 2000s but was quickly translated in a series of national security strategies into related – but different – concepts such as ‘comprehensive security’, and later ‘resilience’, which arguably had a broader impact on actual security practice on the ground. In Denmark, the concept never took deep root, even though some kin-like concepts and practices eventually emerged in agencies like Beredskapsstyrelsen and the Danish Ministry of Defence (2019).

As the chapters herein demonstrate in detail, societal security worked as a narrative and imaginary, a political vision promoted by entrepreneurial administrators and some influential scholars. Some political bodies like the Nordic Council used societal security as an organising concept in lieu of seemingly outdated Cold War concepts. Parliaments, political committees, and defence commissions took up the concept, especially in Sweden and Norway. Societal security was also adopted by different, and at times only loosely related, Nordic research institutes and networks, and then institutionalised to a certain degree by research funders such as the EU and Nordforsk. However, whereas governments, ministers, and individual bureaucrats and advisors may have had a vision or an agenda, the situation became entirely different when these attractive terminologies and supposed pan-Nordic concepts were passed on by politicians towards administrators, operators, and security professionals to be implemented in practice. It is here, as we will see, that each Nordic country took diverging paths towards how societal security became acted upon.

This divide between political wills and agendas and the actual operationalisation of security has to do, at least in part, with the ways in which the Nordic countries have designed their public administration systems. Although largely similar, some key differences exist here. Certain countries like Sweden and Finland have a constitutional system which provides agencies with a comparatively strong and autonomous role. Rather than directly obeying whoever may be currently in charge of the ministries under which they are organised, agencies receive annual ‘directives’
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determined by the government as a whole, which they then themselves interpret and put into practice. Norway and most other Nordic and European states, in contrast, exercise more of a ‘ministerial rule’ in the agency field, meaning that individual ministers – like company executives – may directly and in much more detail intervene in and alter the current priorities and routines of their agencies (Lundin and Stenlås 2010, 16). This distinction may explain, for instance, why ‘societal security’ migrated, seemingly unhindered, from ministry white papers into the DSB agency in Norway, and why the same terminology did not move with the same ease or determination into the everyday practice of security agencies in Finland or Sweden.

Some of this divergence, stems not only from political-administrative divides but also from long-standing historical trajectories linked to defence planning and war readiness. Certainly, recent historical experiences of military invasion and the effects of war vary greatly in the region. Even after the world wars, Nordic security and foreign policy stances have been formulated very differently within the region, and accordingly, domestic defence became structured and practiced differently during and after the Cold War. As already noted, countries like Sweden and Finland invested heavily in war preparedness during the mid to late 1900s – including both civil defence and arms production – and as demonstrated in the chapters below, designed ‘total’ or ‘spiritual’ comprehensive defence models, respectively. Norway, too, organised its domestic defence apparatus rather comprehensively, whereas Denmark did so to a slightly lesser extent. These two latter countries, however, were early to commit to transatlantic military alliances like NATO, whereas Finland and Sweden still today remain outside of the alliance. The question of EU membership also divides the Nordic region, as Norway and Iceland are involved in parts of EU cooperation but are not formal member states, whereas Denmark, Finland, and Sweden have all joined the Union – including its many avenues for security cooperation. This fundamental heterogeneity and historical diversity in foreign and security policies in the region pose serious challenges when the question of how to secure Nordic societies is to be addressed.

Divergent approaches to the notion of Nordic societal security also boil down to what some might say are more ‘trivial’ issues of translation. Whereas the English language contains both the terms ‘security’ and ‘safety’, the Scandinavian languages are forced to capture both these meanings in one word (säkerhet/sikkerhet/sikkerhed). This adds confusion when certain terms like societal security (admittedly already vague and open-ended) are to be translated to local languages and situated within bureaucratic discourse. There are several examples of how this may lead to inconsistencies in translation. For instance, as shown in Morsut’s contribution to this volume, the term samfunnssikkerhet is used more or less consistently in Norwegian, but when translated to English, it suddenly takes on a range of meanings depending on context such as societal security, societal safety, public security, or
civil protection. In Sweden and its central civil security agency, MSB, *sannhållsskydd* is more or less arbitrarily translated to ‘civil contingencies’. In Denmark, *samfundets beredskab* somehow becomes ‘collective emergency preparedness’ according to the Ministry of Defence (2019). These inconsistencies in the translation and application of ‘societal security’ in various linguistic and national settings must be kept in mind when reading through the contributions in this book; however, they must not necessarily be seen as analytical flaws, since they can just as well be understood as an interesting finding itself. It is also justified to depart terminologically from ‘societal security’ in this volume (rather than ‘safety’, ‘emergency preparedness’, ‘civil protection’) since the topics examined predominantly concern the security of society in relation to intentionally harmful acts (human agents) protection against e.g. accidents or environmental disasters.

With some patterns of divergence now accounted for, we open up the volume for further empirical and critical analysis of the notion of Nordic societal security. As we have already seen, and will continue to explore in the coming chapters, societal security became interpreted, translated, and put to work rather differently and to different extents throughout the region. Still, the ways in which post-Cold War security transformed in various ways in these countries were all strongly related – both ideationally and discursively, as well as sociologically and in practice. Which ideas, concepts, and security logics emerged? Under which conditions, and with what implications? If discourses and practices were not framed in terms of ‘societal security’, then how? In the next section, and to conclude this introductory chapter, we will detail precisely what we asked our contributors to investigate, and then provide a brief description of what they found.

**Organisation of the book**

To better understand similarities and differences in Nordic security discourses, their origins, and related practices, we outlined an analytical framework for authors to explore how such discourses – whether defined precisely as ‘societal security’ or not – play out in the respective countries and sectors. Three questions comprised the framework.

First, we asked authors to study the ways security is ‘done’ in their respective area or country. This open-ended, empirical question encouraged analyses incorporating multiple ways of studying and constituting security: via discourses, practices, actors (public and private, civil and military), technologies (such as warning systems, algorithmic calculators), or, more traditionally, policies.

Second, we asked authors to consider the earlier dynamics in a historical perspective. We encouraged the study of how current security discourses and practices came to being. The social and transformative dynamics behind modern security approaches demands some degree of temporal perspective and understanding of the historical conditions for the current state of the field.
Third, we encouraged authors to explore the broader implications of how security is ‘done’ in different Nordic countries and issue areas. The study of how certain security approaches came into being is critical, but so is the analysis of what it means for essential theoretical concerns such as legitimacy, effectiveness, and societal cohesion – as well as more practical questions such as the generation of insecurities, the expansion of new networks, and the evolution of new policy paradigms. This question pushes beyond traditional studies of the construction of security, which do not always explicitly confront the ‘so what’ question.

The chapters offer revealing answers to these questions and detail how the region’s discourses and practices diverged – or not – from the general notion of societal security. We find differences in discourses and practices, at both sectoral and national levels, and varying political processes through which they emerge. We uncover the key actors and groups moving across different domains – from public to private, and academic to practice – to shape outcomes. And we contemplate the implications of those concepts, including what actors are legitimised, which insecurities are generated, and what visions of society are prioritised.

The book is organised into three main sections. The first section contains this introduction as well as an overview piece on ‘societal security’ by Mark Rhinard, which explores the theoretical origins of the term and traces how parallel academic versions emerged in the Nordic region and beyond. The second section contains four chapters focused on four Nordic countries. Sweden is covered by Sebastian Larsson, who traces the sociogenesis of societal security in the context of post-Cold War ‘total defence’ reforms in Sweden. Norway is the subject of the chapter by Claudia Morsut, who accounts for the Norwegian equivalent of societal security – namely *sammfunnssikkerhet* – to show how and where it emerged, and how it influenced security policy conceptualisations. Finland adapted a similar notion but termed it ‘comprehensive security’. As Minna Branders and Vesa Valtonen convincingly show, however, comprehensive security is conceptually part-and-parcel of the long Finnish history of preparing for and experiencing war. Denmark, finally, is the focus of Tobias Liebetrau’s chapter. While Denmark’s authorities never fully embraced the ‘societal security’ concept, ontologically similar conceptualisations of the Danish security environment bear some resemblance. Liebetrau shows how undertones of ‘uncertainty’ permeate Danish security planning and management, subtly changing traditional, objectivist visions of threat perceptions and security policies in Denmark.

The subsequent part of the book includes chapters on particular issues and comparative perspectives. Trine Villumsen Berling and Karen Lund Petersen, for instance, compare how the goal of ‘resilience’ has come to characterise expanded security conceptions in different Nordic countries, while showing that different – and contradictory – understandings of that term confound any expectations for strategic policymaking. Rather, resilience approaches lead to a predominance of reactive, ad hoc, and potentially undemocratic security
Sebastian Larsson and Mark Rhinard

policymaking. Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen and Tapio Juntunen examine the deep-seated foundations of contemporary security concepts like ‘resilience’ in Finland. Using a genealogical analysis, the authors analyse historical policies like Finnish ‘spiritual defence’ and how these have conditioned recent struggles to enhance comprehensive security by importing resilience logics. They suggest there is less conceptual change here than might appear, and note the power hierarchies implicitly preserved in the process. Sissel Haugdal Jore documents shifts in Norwegian counter-terrorism policy towards a focus on radicalisation. Such shifts have been facilitated by reconceptualising the causes and consequences of radicalisation as located at the individual level and within local communities. This approach, the author demonstrates, normalises terrorism policy, shifts it to local governance levels, links solutions closely with the apparent benefits of the Norwegian welfare state, and enables practices once seen as violations of civil liberties. Finally, Jonatan Stiglund writes on how expanded security concepts within Swedish security policymaking opened space for parallel, and at times contradictory, security logics. One such logic was based on a traditional threat-based approach, while the other prioritised the logic of risk. Each discourse can be clearly documented, and each has very different implications for who provides security in Sweden and which resources should be mobilised towards which ends. Importantly, Stiglund also notes the return to territorial security, militarisation, and threat-based security policies in recent years – a shift we may observe not only in Sweden but also throughout the Nordic region and Europe.

The last section of the book contains two closing chapters. The first is the proper conclusion by the present authors, summarising the main findings of the book, identifying common themes, and presenting avenues for future research. The second chapter of the section is by J. Peter Burgess. In this epilogue to the book, he draws on the events surrounding the 2011 terrorist attack in Norway, and provides a theoretically insightful meditation on the question of – or, rather, the absence of – ‘society’ in societal security.

Together these chapters provide one of the most in-depth, reflective, and comprehensive looks at Nordic security policymaking today. Our conceptual, historical approach is paired with a practical perspective on how today’s security concepts shape policymaking, practices, power relations, and the prospects for cooperation both within, between and amongst Nordic nations. We hope this book will benefit not only critically oriented approaches to conceptualising security but also practical efforts to make security more just, fair, and democratic.

Notes

1 We note that The Netherlands has also adopted the notion of ‘societal security’ in official discourse, albeit to an unknown extent and institutionalisation; see for example Opstelten (2014).

2 The common framework stems from joint participation in the ‘NordSTEVA’ Centre of Excellence for Security Technologies and Societal Values, funded by
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Nordforsk. Participants in NordSTEVA include University of Tampere (FI), University of Lund (SE), Stockholm University (SE), University of Stavanger (NO), Peace Research Institute Oslo (NO), and Copenhagen University (DK).

3 A recent Nordic Council strategy document maintains that this is still the case: ‘The Nordic region continues to be among the regions in the world with the highest level of trust in public authorities. This trust is part of the “Nordic gold” that we must protect’ (Nordic Council 2019, 4).

References


Comparing Nordic societal security


2 Societal security in theory and practice

Mark Rhinard

Introduction

Even before the end of the Cold War, numerous conceptualisations of security emerged to challenge traditional territorial versions of national security, each carrying its own philosophical baggage and reflecting its own set of material interests. Indeed, from the end of the Cold War, the focus of many security scholars narrowed to the concept itself: what is it, who does it, and who benefits and loses from its deployment. It is thus no wonder, to use that hackneyed expression, that ‘security is contested’ – and rightly so. Whether one is an objectivist, believing security threats are ‘out there’ and require a particular response toolkit that simply needs to be mobilised, or a subjectivist, believing that security threats are ‘what we make of them’ and that responses are the result of particular linguistic constructions and taken-for-granted practices, knowing what security is and how it is practiced is a core concern of security studies.

In this context, the increasingly popular – and yes, contested – notion of ‘societal security’ deserves close scrutiny. There are two variants of this version of security. The first variant emerged in the early 1990s by the Copenhagen School of security studies, which directed attention towards ‘the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats’ (Waever, 1993: 23). A second variant emerged in Swedish and Norwegian academia and practice, associated with a set of scholar-practitioners including Bengt Sundelius (2005b, 2006; see also Sundelius & Daléus, 2004), Jan Hovden (1998), Alyson Bailes (2014), Dan Hamilton (2005) and later, albeit in a more critical fashion, by the work of Didier Bigo (2006) and Peter Burgess (2014). There are overlaps between the two variants of societal security, but their development took place mainly in parallel rather than intertwined or – as might have been predicted – with one subsuming the other. Each uses a different ontological and epistemological stance on the study of security. Moreover, the latter version of societal security had considerable crossover appeal: it moved swiftly from academia into practice, became associated with objectivist ontologies of viewing the security landscape, and structured – it is now safe to say – at
least a generation of policymakers in Europe engaged in the analysis, pursuit, and funding of security. That said, the central argument of this chapter holds that associating the first variant with research and the second variant with practice is overly simplistic and ignores the contribution the latter has made to our scientific understanding of security.

In the light of this book’s comparative approach to publicly deployed security and safety concepts in the Nordic region, this chapter explores the concept of societal security, considers its bifurcated development and interconnections, and then narrows its focus to the second variant closely associated with the work of Sundelius, Hovden, Hamilton, and others. In the first section, the chapter argues that the two variants, while borne from the same intellectual seed, each grew along relatively isolated and narrow pathways. One turned to a focus on the security of cultural identities and employed constructivist methods to understand them. The other turned to the security of life-giving functions, using mainly objectivist methods to understand and their protection. In the second section, the chapter examines why the latter version was so successfully taken up by policymakers and research funders in the Nordic region, the European Union (EU), and beyond. In the third section, the chapter considers the strengths and weaknesses of this objectivist, ‘life-giving functions’ variant. The conclusion offers thoughts on how to address those weaknesses and, for the sake of scientific dialogue, how the two variants might be reconnected in the Nordic region and beyond.

Two societal securities

Society as identity

The concept of societal security originated in Barry Buzan’s classic *People, States and Fear* (1983) in which he set the tone of discussion for what security ‘is’ by attempting to distinguish security, in general, from state security. Traditional theoretical approaches to security focus on the state, defined as a legal and political unit enjoying sovereignty over a defined territory or population. The threat in focus was military-induced violence from other, sovereignty-protecting states. The proper means to protect the state and its circumscribed territory was thus often articulated in terms of military defence, and related concepts included alliance formation, band-wagoning, deterrence, and balance of power.

With the state firmly in focus, the traditional security agenda lost sight of what was inside and beyond states, namely ‘society’, which Buzan described broadly in terms of social, cultural, and psychological formations inside of the state (see Buzan, 1983: chapter 1). Although this initial definition aimed to shift the concerned referent object away from the state onto communities and culture inside the state, a careful reading of Buzan’s original formation shows a close alignment between a state and ‘its’ society, since the latter was seen as circumscribed by the former. The criticism therein was that societal
security could be viewed as a simple extension of state security and thus missing the target of its own methodological and theoretical aims (Theiler, 2009). Moreover, this initial work conceptualised ‘society’ in fairly objectivist ways; it was a ‘fact’ that could be measured by researchers if only the right indicators are found – a perspective that led to some degree of criticism from critically oriented security scholars (McSweeney, 1996).

In subsequent writings – notably Waever et al.’s *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda for Europe* (1993) – the societal security notion was further developed, partly in response to criticism and partly because it had become so empirically relevant. The Balkans, at the time of their research for the 1993 book, was experiencing ethnic conflict at an extraordinary scale. The desired preservation of certain ‘societies’ seemed to be at the root of most conflicts (Björkdahl & Gusic, 2013; Thiel, 2007).

Waever et al. (1993) first and foremost developed Buzan’s previous arguments by attempting to break the link between society and the state. The authors sought to develop society as an independent security object (no longer ontologically subordinated to the state) and societal actors as potential security players in their own right. ‘Society’ became the social unit for analysis, defined as the intersubjectively perceived nation, ethnic group, clan, tribe, or potentially any other form of community that provides a source of identity for its members. This articulation, in turn, signalled another shift in thinking about societal security by placing the spotlight on ‘identity’. In 1983, Buzan had left the definition fairly open, but with his collaborators in 1993 it was specified as ‘a clustering of institutions combined with a feeling of common identity’ (Waever et al., 1993: 21). Put another way:

> The key to society is that set of ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group. Society is about identity, about the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community.

(Waever et al. 1993: 24; see also 25)

Later, Waever himself was even more straightforward. For him, societal security is defined as ‘the defence of a community against a perceived threat to its identity’ (Waever, 2008: 581). The definition of ‘society’ was thus narrowed to equate with ‘identity’ – a focus that set the precedent for much subsequent research. As Theiler puts it,

> [f]or societal security theorists, what characterizes every identity community is that its members value its preservation as an end in itself rather than just a means to achieve other ends, given that it helps sustain those parts of the self-concept that are socially rooted

(2009: 106; see also Herd & Löfgren, 2009; Roe, 2016).

What about the ontologically objectivist leanings of Buzan’s original perspective on studying societal security? This question was not completely
addressed in the 1993 work. As McSweeney points out, the authors seem ‘to want to have a foot in each camp’ (1996: 82). At some points in their discussion, Waever et al. (1993) argue for objectivism, but at other points, a constructivist (even deconstructivist) agenda is argued for. In some respects, the issue was ‘settled’ later, in 1998. Buzan et al. (1998), in focusing an entire chapter on the ‘societal sector’, make it clear:

 Threats to identity are thus always a question of the construction of something as threatening some ‘we’ – and often thereby actually contributing to the construction or reproduction of ‘us’.

(1998: 120)

To study societal security, then, required not (necessarily) an objectivist perspective but rather an understanding of intersubjective processes amongst communities under examination. The door was thereby opened to constructivist perspectives regarding how identities are born, are moulded, are expressed, and – when undermined – become a security problem.

Societal security thus became synonymous with ‘identity security’ and opened up the possibility of two different (and ontologically varying) ways of studying it. Objectively, scholars could study the preservation of a society’s key features, including language and customs. Subjectively, scholars would explore the endurance of a community (embodied by shared set of meanings and identifications) as a locus of identification for its members.

In subsequent years, the study of societal security largely took this second track, as a cornerstone of the Copenhagen School perspective and against the backdrop of the growth of ‘securitization’ as a central point of inquiry in Copenhagen School-inspired studies. Indeed, this variant of societal security became closely aligned with securitisation as a focus of study. Securitisation derives from ‘speech acts’ with a ‘specific rhetorical structure’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 26). Van Munster writes about its three main components: ‘(a) existential threats to the survival of some kind of referent object, that (b) require exceptional measures to protect the threatened object, which (c) justify and legitimize the breaking free of normal [democratic] procedures’ (2005: 3). To securitise in the societal security context is thus:

[T]o identify a threat to the social and cultural survival of a community and a strategy to ward off that threat and thereby make society secure again… ‘Identity emergencies’ generate a corresponding willingness to support extraordinary emergency measures beyond ‘normal’ politics.

(Theiler, 2009: 107)

As Theiler (2009) shows in a review of research on securitisation in the societal security context, the debate on securitisation – how it happens, what is necessary for it to happen, what is sufficient for it to happen, who is the audience – became the main line of inquiry and exploration on societal security studies. The main empirical focus became the insecurities
of sub-national ‘nations’, sometimes within states, sometimes across state borders, and often vying for survival, recognition, and/or autonomy.

In sum, the evolution of the original version of societal security opened up conceptual space for the study of security within (and beyond) state borders and what might be worth protecting. From there, however, research evolved in a very specific way. The meaning of society was narrowed down to identity, to the exclusion other domestic, societal values (such as economic welfare). And the way it should be studied was shifted towards, for the most part, securitisation via constructivist analysis (cf. McSweeney, 1996). Those choices enabled another variant of societal security to emerge and prosper on a different pathway.

**Society as life-giving functions**

A different version of societal security emerged in the conceptual space provided by the initial ‘society as identity’ variant of societal security’s focus on referent objects inside the territories of states. Yet it bears more resemblance to the initial 1983 version of societal security than to its subsequent development into a focus on identity using constructivist analysis. In defining societal security, Bailes and Sandö wrote that it concerns ‘the protection of society as a whole – with its own complex mechanisms, values and culture – as its goal, rather than physical boundaries or, as in “human security”, the isolated individual’ (2014: 15). Sundelius wrote more specifically that ‘it is not the national territory that is primarily at stake, but the ability of the government and civil society to function, the necessity to maintain critical infrastructures, for democratic governance to manifest certain basic values, etc’. (Sundelius, 2006: 26). Hence, this version shared a focus on critical, life-giving functions, alongside societal values and their preservation.

A focus on values bears a family resemblance to the earlier version of societal security, although it also shares an affiliation with the concept of crisis as defined by crisis management scholars: a perceived threat to the core values or life-sustaining systems of a society that must be urgently averted or addressed under conditions of deep uncertainty (Rosenthal et al., 1989).

While values figure into the definition, it was the ‘life-giving functions’ that took analytical priority over time. This was apparent in writings by Hovden in Norway, in which attention was placed on conceptualising security in terms of ‘the survival and recovery of vital societal functions’ (Hovden, 1998), and in those by Sundelius in Sweden, initially titled ‘functional security’ (Sundelius, 2005a). The focus turned away from cultural referent objects and more on the kinds of functions that must be preserved (Hamilton et al., 2005). In essence, societal security referred to the ability of a society to function. From here, three corollaries were established, which help to explain the subsequent use – and abuse – of the term.

First, the nature of the threat to life-giving functions was bracketed. The nature of the threat was considered fairly unimportant, and not worth
analysts’ attention in an era when security threats could possibly represent the proverbial ‘black swan’. This planted the seed of the all-hazards approach which, as discussed below, won the favour of policymakers. Second, the nature of these functions was deconstructed to reveal their transnational character. Owing to the technological underpinnings of modern societies and flows of people, goods and services in an era of globalisation, states were no longer seen as in control of all the functions that give life to a society. Functions, it was argued, cross borders and are regulated and maintained by various kinds of (a) collective governance systems (Rhinard, 2007) and (b) private actors (Bailes, 2008). The pursuit of societal security, Sundelius pointed out in subsequent research, took place outside the national level but not entirely within the international context, either: the proposed term was ‘intermestic’ (Sundelius, 2006).

Third, focus was placed on the preservation of the life-giving functions. In other words, the methods, ways, and manners in which those functions were best protected became a focus of much analysis – and the emphasis by practitioners who invoked the term. The Norwegian Parliament’s 2001 inquiry into the topic adopted a language best translated as ‘societal safety’ and defined it in terms of ‘society’s ability to maintain critical social functions, to protect the life and health of the citizens, and to meet the citizens’ basic requirements in a variety of stress situations’ (quoted in Olsen et al., 2007: 71; see also Morsut, this volume).

This version of societal security is linked to several related concepts. The first is ‘resilience’. In rhetoric and practice, the two have become closely linked (see Berling and Petersen, this volume). Part of this stems from the policy implications of societal security: since deterring and preventing threats is just one part of security society, and most likely impossible, focus must be placed on preparedness. ‘Preparing for the inevitable’ becomes a key task of authorities – both public and private – and effort must be made on providing ‘bounce back’ (or ‘bounce forward’) capacity in the event of a security threat made manifest. Resilience as a study concept attracted greater attention after the London Transport bombings (2005) and Hurricane Katrina (2010) and thereby followed a slightly different research trajectory than societal security (Boin et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the two are based on a common set of assumption and share a conceptual family resemblance, as seen in Sundelius and Rhinard’s work on international cooperation as a source of resilience in the face of transnational threats (2010). The second related concept is ‘crisis’. Societal security is in some respects a descendent of the intellectual framework associated with studying ‘crisis management’ (Rosenthal et al., 2001). In that literature (see Boin et al., 2005), the notion of a crisis was a kind of ‘manifested threat’: an unexpected event requiring an urgent response under conditions of uncertainty. Societal responses required a full range of capacities ranging from prevention to recovery. Clearly the two were closely linked intellectually and that link became obvious in how societal security was used (’t Hart & Sundelius, 2013; see also Stiglund, this volume). Bigo et al. even argue
that these related concepts explain the bifurcation of research on societal security in general. They write that ‘Scandinavian actors’ have ‘contributed to shift the meaning of societal security from the identity of society in a context of migration to the resilience of the society in the context of crisis’ (Bigo et al., 2014: 12). The third related concept is ‘risk’, a phenomenon of interest to both scholars and practitioners ostensibly because of the increasing complexity of modern societies and the challenges of protecting it. Notions of risk and risk management often intermingle with conceptions of societal security, especially when the latter is used to encompass goals that span the civilian/military divide and which focus on societal vulnerabilities (Petersen, 2012).

This version of societal security was quickly adopted by policymakers. Since the subsequent section explains why this was the case, just a few words are required here to explain how policymakers took up the concept. In Nordic countries, as has been set out in this volume, societal security gained currency as the governing concept for the work of civil security agencies (Larsson, this volume; see also Bigo et al., 2014). Around the year 2000, the Norwegian government adopted *samfunnssikkerhet* as a doctrinal concept, guiding government policy especially as it was carried out by the Directorate for Civil Protection (Direktoratet for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap, DSB), a Norwegian government agency under the Minister of Justice and the Police (see Morsut, this volume; Burgess & Mouhleb, 2007; NOU 2000:24). The same holds for Sweden’s then-crisis management agency (Swedish Emergency Management Agency (Krisberedskapsmyndigheten, KBM)), which around 2006 began using (alongside other terms) societal security as both an operative concept and one intended to guide research funding agendas. On the operative side, KBM’s succeeding agency, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), used the concept in organising its seven, cross-governmental coordinating networks: each was focused on coordinating responses to preserving a core set of life-giving functions during crisis (transport, energy, communication, etc.). On the research funding side, MSB used the concept to suggest new research themes and it still features prominently to this day (see also Larsson, this volume). The latest MSB research strategy is aptly named ‘Research for a Safer Society: New Knowledge for Future Challenges 2014–2018’. The Norwegian Research Council also dedicated significant research funding in 2007 to many projects under the rubric of ‘SAMRISK’, or ‘Societal Security and Safety’ research programme, now in its second incarnation. As Bigo et al. put it, ‘civil security agencies of Scandinavian countries make up a dynamic environment where societal security can thrive’ (Bigo et al., 2014: 13). While Finnish and Danish discourses differed slightly, as shown in this volume, some essential conceptual similarities emerged in those settings too (see also Liebetrau, and Branders and Valtonen, respectively, this volume).

At the Nordic level, the use of societal security has been used to help shape cooperation and guide research agendas. In April 2009, Nordic ministers signed the Haga Declaration intended to boost cooperation on ‘societal
security’ issues – mainly defined in terms of civil security questions such as air safety, maritime security, energy security, and terrorism (Bailes & Sandö, 2014; see also Introduction, this volume). Within this declaration, the concept of Nordic solidarity was used to justify stronger and more in-depth cooperation on societal security. Nordic ministers gathered again in 2009 to endorse the ‘Stoltenberg Report’ on Nordic foreign and security cooperation, which included a set of proposals for greater cooperation across the field of security policy, prominently including ‘Samfunnssikkerhet’ (Stoltenberg, 2009). The Nordic Council of Ministers also tasked its funding body – NordForsk – to call for more research in the field of societal security. NordForsk initiated several multi-year funding streams, named ‘Nordic Research Programme for Societal Security’. Several major centres of excellence and research programs now exist to boost research and tie research findings and policy practitioner needs together. The Nordic Council, comprised of parliamentarians from various Nordic countries, recently praised growing Nordic cooperation on ‘societal security’ ranging from fires to terrorist attacks. But they chastised Nordic ministers for a lack of systematic follow-through of shared initiatives and called for greater institutionalisation of societal security cooperation (Nordic Council, 2019).

Societal security also gained traction at the international level. The idea of societal security was presented as a useful alternative to the ‘homeland security’ terminology used in the United States, and played to the strengths of the EU’s civilian (what some would call ‘softer’) capacities related to safety and security. In the post 9/11 world, particularly, the societal security terminology appealed to EU institutions attempting to demonstrate their relevance in an age of non-traditional security threats. It proved useful to practitioners emphasising the importance of ‘joining up’ the EU institutions’ sprawling capacities related to internal security and crisis management (Boin et al., 2007; see also Olsson, 2009). EU officials took up the issue in research funding strategies, too. The rise of societal security as a policy-relevant concept coincided with the EU’s adoption of a series of major ‘security research programmes’ embedded within the Framework Programmes. This took place initially in Framework Programme 6 and then Framework Programme 7 and Horizon 2020, both continuing the trend. In each programme, ‘security’ featured as a major thematic pillar alongside others such as ‘engineering’ and ‘arts and sciences’. In the Horizon 2020 research program, use of the concept has moved into titular form: a main theme is now called ‘Secure Societies’ (European Commission, 2014). We might also note the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which formed a High Level Risk Forum and developed international standards on the principles on ‘the governance of critical risks’ – using terminology associated with societal security to explain its ‘whole of government approach’ (OECD Council, 2014).

The societal security variant described earlier demanded a reconsideration by both practitioners and scholars of the protection of domestic...
populations. As Burgess argues, this variant required scholars to reconsider how changing societies, driven by new technical infrastructures, develop new values in relation (and sometimes opposed) to those infrastructures: ‘the concept remains geared towards describing the ability of a society to persist in its basic material infrastructure as well as in its core immaterial values’ (2014: 4). For practitioners, the concept draws attention to the fact that mobilising for societal security is a cross-sectoral, cross-border, and multi-level endeavour. In short, societal security offers a way of conceptualising what is happening in today’s (post-9/11) security practices and focuses on the mid-level referent object of the core, life-giving functions of society. It encourages research into the sectoral functions of society and how security is being organised to ensure their preservation in light of often unpredictable threats.

Thus, although the first variant of societal security served as a necessary precursor to the second, the two research tracks diverged significantly thereafter. Whereas the former turned sharply towards the study of the intersubjective construction and protection of identity, the latter developed in line with objectivist ontologies focused on inevitable threats ‘out there’ and the necessary protection of life-sustaining systems. This latter development may not have been the original intention of conceptual innovators like Sundelius, who in other writings maintain the subjective notion of ‘threats’ and ‘crises’ (Boin et al., 2005). And scholars like Bigo have recently moved towards a fully constructivist approach to studying this version of societal security. He observes its use by communities of practitioners (rather than what it is or how to achieve it) to understand what actors do in its name, according to particular interests (see Bigo & Martin-Maze, 2014). But objectivism became ingrained when public policymakers adopted the concept to guide policy reform – and by scholars intent on conducting policy-relevant research that might help to improve ‘real life’ security.

The policy utility of societal security

As made clear earlier, one of the distinctive features of the second variant of societal security was its crossover appeal. Practitioners and research funders at multiple levels of governance employed the term as a signalling and cohering device. Societal security signalled a distinctive approach to conceptualising and acting upon security in practical terms. It also offered the promise of a more coherent sounding conceptual framework for what would prove to be a wide array of different security initiatives. More specifically, there were five factors explaining why societal security gained such traction amongst practitioners.

Conceptual appeal

Societal security took root in a Scandinavian – especially Norwegian and Swedish – context because it was conceptually consistent with
long-standing norms regarding societal solidarity, generally, and Cold War principles concerning how society and government should prepare and respond to a major conflagration, specifically. On the latter point, Sweden adopted the concept of ‘total defence’ during the Cold War to illustrate the societal-wide need to contribute to territorial defence, at multiple levels of government and across sectoral agencies (Sundelius, 2005b). Total defence suggested that all of society had rights and responsibilities when it came to defending the territory from invasion. The years following the end of the Cold War revealed a need to update that concept. In effect, a window of opportunity arose to reconceptualise Sweden’s guiding defence and security principles, and societal security offered linguistic and conceptual continuity (Bailes, 2014).

Societal security was conceptually appealing because it offered a softer and broader vision of security at a time when concerns were turning beyond territorial defence. 9/11 brought home the point of new forms of security threats and the apparent need for a broad-based societal response. The US presidential administration of George W. Bush invested in the concept of ‘homeland security’ following 2001, which, following the invasion of Iraq and a series of new laws seen to restrict civil liberties (the ‘Patriot Act’), quickly became sullied in the eyes of European observers. Europe needed a similar but different sounding concept to frame its own efforts, and societal security helped to signal a useful distinction from the United States.

The latter point was particularly true in the EU, where practitioners were keen to be seen as doing something in line with US efforts but needed to employ a different rhetoric. As Bailes puts it,

while zeal for “homeland security” can demonstrably lead to curbs on popular rights and freedoms, in societal security the “normal”, peaceful functioning of society becomes an end to itself. A societal approach thus includes the fine-tuning of protective measures to avoid damaging the social fabric more than strengthening it.

(2014: 67)

The concept of societal security also played to the EU’s competences, including its wide span of legal competences (all of which could be related to ‘security’ in some way – including, for instance, pandemic control, transport safety, or import/export regulation), and reflected the EU’s self-impression as a cross-sectoral governance system allowing for a wide societal participation (NGOs, private actors) in the provision of security (Boin & Rhinard, 2008). The concept also allowed the EU to approach security without arousing national-level sensitivities. In the research area, for instance, using the societal security concept to frame EU research funding agendas allowed the EU to claim many goals, including providing research funding, enhancing economic competitiveness, and building a security industry.
Post-Westphalian affinities

Societal security gained traction in a European context because it appealed to commentators and practitioners predisposed to thinking in post-Westphalian terms. A key implication of societal security’s emphasis on the importance of life-giving systems was that such systems were no longer purely national in origin, scope, or breadth. Transport, communication, and food supply systems crossed national boundaries and thus international cooperation was critical (Rhinard & Sundelius, 2010). Clearly this argument had resonance for European policymakers who were seeking to emphasise the importance of collective governance in providing security. Similarly, the emphasis of societal security on the broad range of governance tools required to provide security – from investments in flood prevention to food safety regulations to police cooperation – fits well with the EU’s policy toolbox (which could be smugly contrasted with the fairly narrow security toolbox of NATO).

For practitioners prone to view governance in post-Westphalian terms, with authority draining from the nation-state towards the supranational, societal security could be seen as part of a natural progression of governance. According to this (partly neo-functionalist) logic, the internal market provided the baseline for cooperation; as integration deepened, a number of negative externalities required responsive action. A single energy market is regulated at the European level, but who is responsible for cross-border breakdowns in the electricity grid? Financial services are similarly governed through European cooperation, but national governments retain control when a major financial crisis strikes. The free movement of people and goods brought considerable benefits but also drawbacks in increased security risks. EU officials keen to point out these seeming anomalies could use the security of individuals and key societal systems to justify new initiatives.

Self interest

As the earlier discussion suggests, self-interest lurks just below the surface of most explanations for why societal security was so easily adopted by practitioners. There were several ways in which societal security could be used by practitioners to gain personal or professional advantage. One was by policymakers at national levels seeking leverage in their calls for security policy reform. The notion of societal security clearly opened up the sense of responsibility for a wider number of governmental actors. To be more specific, the end of the Cold War ushered in a tremendous tussle between different parts of government seeking control over security policy – once the monopoly of defence ministries. For actors seeking to wrench policy authority away from traditional actors, in addition to those genuinely of the belief that security was an ‘all of society’ responsibility, the term proved quite useful. The Scandinavian countries – or perhaps more accurately,
Sweden – were predisposed towards adopting this reasoning partly because of its experience with ‘total defence’ as discussed earlier. Societal security was discursively linked to this concept as a kind of natural successor to the total defence concept – and its corollary call for reform of the government apparatus.

Much of this self-interest, of course, is concerned with resources. Societal security created space for an increasing number of governmental and non-governmental actors seeking a slice of the security funding pie at a time when resources flows were rampant. For instance, the defence community – commercial and public officials – were keen to capture security policy in the post-9/11 era (as they did, to a great extent, in Washington, DC). In security research funding, new opportunities arose to wrest control of research and development away from the historically insulated defence industry. In the EU, defence was a policymaking domain dominated by intergovernmentalism. The opportunity to reframe action in terms of security – not least ‘societal security’ – afforded new legal and financial opportunities for EU actors.

Proscriptive guidance

Societal security would appear to provide policy-relevant guidance, through illuminating how the forces of globalisation and regional integration demand a rethink of how security is provided. Drawing on existing literature, policy documents, and the results of high-level discussions in Brussels, Rhinard (2007: 11–12) outlined the various policy relevant, normative implications of societal security:

- Societal security focuses on protecting society’s key functions; thus, practitioners should seek to protect sites where critical systems intersect. It would require resources in the design and operation of everyday systems, from food production processes to guarding airport perimeters and monitoring sea-going cargo. It would identify vulnerabilities that hide quietly amongst the technologically complex systems that drive our societies. The goal is to prevent a ‘cascading effect’, where disturbances in one sector trigger breakdowns in another.
- Societal security must be pursued on a multi-level and international basis. From their ‘total defence’ experience during the Cold War, the Scandinavians know that most security capacities are found at the local level. Security is as much bottom-up as top-down (a philosophy that fits well with the EU’s subsidiarity principle).
- Cooperation in military and civilian security matters becomes critical in a societal security approach, as do close links between the public and private sectors. Societal security emphasises the international sources and effects of major disturbances. Given the massive economic and
information links between Europe and the United States, for example, transatlantic cooperation would seem to be critical to societal security in an age of globalisation.

• Finally, the societal security approach includes principles of evaluation. Adopting it as a guiding principle for action does not mean that a new sector with new policies has to be created. Instead, this approach encourages all sectors to play their part in protecting citizens and critical systems. Capacity building in such areas as prevention, response, and repair – for both known and unknown hazards – should become part of everyday policy management (in EU parlance, this would amount to ‘mainstreaming’).

These practical implications of societal security seem plausible in terms of policy advice, but serve to blend and even erase boundaries that traditionally divide different activities and forms of societal steering, including civilian versus military preparations, public versus private responsibility, and external versus internal operations. We return to the negative impact of this ‘blending’ below.

**Entrepreneurialism**

As the literature reminds us, conceptually attractive ideas ‘do not float freely’ and ‘windows of opportunity’ do not generate change without entrepreneurial effort (Risse-Kappen, 1994). Here, attention can be placed on the efforts of entrepreneurial actors striving to translate academic ideas into policy change. Bengt Sundelius is one such actor, a ‘crossover’ academic with strong links to policymakers. As the section ‘Two societal securities’, above, showed, Sundelius’ early writings on functional security provided the conceptual basis for the latter version of societal security. From there, Sundelius occupied a series of positions in government which allowed him to deploy the societal security concept with great effect (see also Larsson, this volume). In policy terms, KBM and its successor, MSB, used the concept to shape its policy activities, with Sundelius employed as ‘special scientific advisor’, providing the intellectual arguments to both guide policy development and to motivate implementation. In research terms, Sundelius used societal security to shape funding agendas at the Swedish level (as research director for KBM, for instance), the Nordic level (as board member of Nordforsk), and the EU level. Regarding the EU, Sundelius was active, early on, in the research agenda formation process of FP7 (taking an outsized role in the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB)). Namely, it was the conceptual ideas put forward by Sundelius and others in ways that appealed to policymakers’ ambitions – including the fleshing out of the societal security concept – that explains much of the take-up of the concept in policy circles. Other actors helped to pave the way for the public take-up of this version of societal security but Sundelius stands out in a Nordic context (see also Larsson, this volume).
The promises and pitfalls of societal security

The earlier section hinted at the promises and pitfalls of the second version of societal security discussed in this chapter. Here we speak directly to that question. We are particularly interested in highlighting avenues for progress and warnings for future researchers.

Democracy versus security

An advantage of societal security, as a concept, is its commodious conception of what security means, who is responsible for providing it, and who is allowed to define its contours. Narrow interests once dominated security policy and succeeded, to a great extent, in building a closed network of vested interests to defend a particular definition of security (the military-industrial complex). In many respects the advantage of societal security was to ‘democratize’ security – it allowed different actors to penetrate closed networks. Those actors included private actors along with NGOs and government actors once excluded from engagement in security policy. And yet this inclusion and commodiousness comes with its share of risks, namely oversecuritisation. In the late 1990s and early 2000s it suddenly became vogue amongst governmental agencies to define ‘their’ particular issue in security terms: climate change, disaster response, energy provision, transport efficiency, and information technology are just some examples. The goal of these definitional moves, of course, was to gain agenda traction and justify larger budgets, but there were – and continue to be – two downside risks. First, and most relevant from an objectivist perspective, the overstretching of the security concept meant that security meant everything, and therefore meant nothing. The actual practice of keeping societies secure could, one might argue, become distracted by the cacophony of new actors claiming ownership. Second, and more relevant from a subjectivist perspective, oversecuritisation could lead to the increasing shift of public policies off the normal agenda and onto the security agenda – with all the negative aspects that entails according to the Copenhagen and Paris (Bigo, 2016) schools of thought.

There is thus a fine line, one can plainly see from the earlier discussion, of ‘democratizing’ security versus ‘oversecuritizing’ society. Most evidence suggests that securitisation of a great swathe of public policymaking has, in fact, not taken place (Huysmans, 2011). The extraordinary security agenda has not welcomed on board many new issues; what may in fact have taken place is the securitisation of the normal public policymaking agenda instead (for more on this, see Boswell, 2007 and Rhinard, 2019). The conclusion to this chapter revisits this question and offers suggestions for further research.

State versus society

The objectivist version of societal security achieved what the subjectivist version initially could not: to break the conceptual relationship between
the state and security. As discussed earlier, the initial version of societal security opened the black box of territorial security to see other referent objects – namely national identities – rather than the state itself. However, in preserving the state as an analytical concept whilst looking inside it, early versions in fact reified the state. The objectivist version of societal security explicitly focused on critical, life-giving systems which, although partially located within states, are by their modern nature transboundary. This definitional detail directed our attention immediately outside of the state. However, this promising dimension carries some caveats. For instance, in shifting attention from the state, the concept refocused attention to collective governance – much of which is state dominated (Sperling & Webber, 2016). Moreover, the policy implications of societal security, as discussed earlier, tended to speak to governmental authorities in terms of implementation responsibility. Thus, states remain strong actors in the conceptualisation of security, even if the importance of the state is usefully diluted in the objectivist approach to understanding societal security.

**Intellectual linkages**

The objectivist version of societal security clearly overlaps, often in intriguing ways, with a number of other concepts. One is ‘crisis’, a term that is, as discussed earlier, dear to the crisis management theory community. For most scholars in that community, a crisis is important in as much as it sheds light on a society’s ability to withstand a handful of generic management challenges: detection, sense-making, meaning-making, decision-making, and recovery. As explained earlier, the source of the crisis is less interesting (intellectually speaking) than the effects of the crisis. In this regard, societal security and crisis management both focus on the likely effects of a crisis or manifest threat to security objects within a society; namely, values, democratic institutions, and other fundamental societal features. Indeed, through a variety of research-driven initiatives undertaken in EU policy circles, the concept of ‘crisis’ has gained a foothold as a close relative of societal security. This is evident in a number of Horizon 2020 calls for research funding, in which effective crisis management is closely linked to the notion of ‘secure societies’. And more broadly speaking, crisis terminology has been adopted across an increasing range of policy measures, from health to critical infrastructure protection, and from transport to regional policy (Boin et al., 2013), with arguably dubious effects (Bigo & Martin-Maze, 2014). The ‘crisisification’ of European cooperation demands decision-making modes and coordination routines which are largely foreign to traditional EU policymaking. The results can be insulated policy decisions that do not have a wide political backing and which stretch the boundaries of solidarity (Rhinard, 2019).

Another related concept is ‘resilience’. In some respects, ‘the idea of resilience…was already encapsulated in the academic conceptualization of societal security’ (Bigo et al., 2014: 8). In reality, resilience is a closer descendent
of crisis management, in the sense that the latter created the intellectual possibility that not all threats can be prevented. As such, preparatory action must be taken in order for society ‘to withstand, recover from, and mitigate for the impacts of extreme natural and human-induced hazards’ (Coaffee, 2013: 326). Resilience has become a popular term amongst practitioners as well as scholars and has spawned a cottage industry of specialised research (Boin et al., 2010). The obvious danger is a tendency to extend security-oriented thinking into ever-further areas of normal public policymaking, as securitisation theorists would warn against. Resilience becomes a subtle security tactic which draws on the ‘inevitability’ of an attack or an accident and ‘designs in’ security mechanisms in everything from organisational structures to urban landscape design.

Another concept related to societal security stems from an approach often used to study it: organisational theory. Especially as counselled by Sundelius, societal security is usefully studied in terms of ‘how to organize for societal security’ (Boin et al., 2007). Organisational studies, associated with the fields of public administration and/or business management, examine the norms, rules, actors, and ‘cultures’ within organisations and, for those interested in more functional-objectivist approaches, how well the organisation handles a variety of challenges from coordination to decision-making to preserving legitimacy. From these perspectives, it is a short step towards the concern for ‘good governance’. Sundelius has written that good crisis management is a form of good governance (Lindberg & Sundelius, 2012) although this connection has not been systematically explored.

Conclusion

The two versions of societal security used in academic analysis agree on a basic principle – an analytical focus on societies rather than territories – but diverge beyond that agreement. One turned to inductive, subjectivist oriented studies of identities as a key referent object. The other turned to more positivist, objective oriented analysis of society preservation as symbolised by life-giving systems as the referent object. The latter through its conceptual appeal, prescriptive character, and entrepreneurship from public academics gained traction in policy circles and has shaped a generation of policymakers and research funders. It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that the former societal security is an ‘academic’ concept while the latter is a ‘practitioner’ concept. Both have inspired a host of scientifically robust analyses that have made an impact on security studies scholarship.

That said, more research is needed to further develop the objectivist-oriented version of societal security and to avoid some of the pitfalls described earlier. One pressing need is to explore the securitisation effects of the widespread use of ‘societal security’. As clearly demonstrated by the socio-historical perspective taken in this volume, research on securitisation has moved beyond the focus on a particular ‘speech act’ as a sign of
securitisation (Bigo, 2006; Huysmans, 2011). Studies now include the role of the audience in accepting or rejecting a securitisation effort, and it is increasingly looking at cases of desecuritisation: the depolitisation of security questions into ‘normal’ public policy question (Balzacq, 2016; Boswell, 2007). Further work should continue in the critical security studies vein partly demonstrated in this volume (see Larsson, and Stiglund, respectively, this volume).

Similarly, synergies between the two societal security approaches could be found by probing the question of securitisation versus desecuritisation. The objectivist version of societal security reveals, through its empirical acuity, the many different parts of society in which security aims, rhetoric, and orientations have taken root. At the same time, it is clear that some parts of society and public policy, including those that were clear candidates for securitisation, have, in fact, not been securitised in the traditional sense (the lack of traction of European ‘homeland security’ after 9/11 is one example; the ‘normalization’ of health security is another, arguably). These questions can be usefully explored by twinning the two variants of societal security and asking some new questions: has the use of societal security in practice led to a type of desecuritisation, i.e. a return of current security issues to ‘normal’ politics? Can this be explained by the EU’s traditional role in merging a nation’s foreign/security policy into an extended form of domestic policies? In a comparative fashion, can we see the EU’s use of societal security as opposed to the use of homeland security in the United States, in which a wide swath of normal policymaking appears to have become securitised? This relates to the earlier discussion regarding securitisation versus democracy: the fact that a great many interests and voices (including critical voices) are engaged in societal security in Europe, across sectors and governance levels, may very well have a positive effect. But this hypothesised effect requires closer analysis.

The two variants of societal security may come together in another sense, considering recent geopolitical developments since 2014. As discussed earlier, the original ‘identity’ version of societal security was borne out of the tragic examples of the Second World War and the Balkans ethnic conflicts, when armed conflicts emerged from cultural discrimination and identity insecurity. The ‘return of geopolitics’ (Mead, 2014), symbolised but not limited to the Russian invasion of Crimea, sabre-rattling in the South China Sea, violent conflict in North Africa and the Middle East, and disinformation campaigns and election meddling, reminds us of the persistence of cultural conflicts and identity politics as unfortunate features of our modern security landscape. As the relevance of the Copenhagen School’s version of societal security regains prominence and utility, may the opposite become true of the functionalist, ‘objectivist’ version? The chapters of this book suggest a growing trend in the Nordic region, by which traditional security concepts rooted in territorial integrity and military threats are on the rebound in policy circles. It remains to be seen whether a societal security concept
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emphasising civilian responses to a broad range of threats and risks from across government will prove its relevance or obsolesce in the years ahead.

Notes

1 That is not to say threats were not discussed. A general overview usually accompanied most societal security studies, and examples were provided: ‘nebulous terror networks, unpredictable flu outbreaks and rapidly escalating infrastructure failures. These threats know no borders and deterrence is not always possible’ (Rhinard, 2007a).

2 KBM was reformed, and combined with two other agencies, in 2008, as the ‘Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (MSB)’, or in English, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency.

References


Part II

Nordic cases
3 Swedish total defence and the emergence of societal security

Sebastian Larsson

Introduction

Over the past few decades, the notion of “societal security” has emerged as a way to conceptualise Nordic and European security beyond the traditional framework of territorial security and military defence. The terminology has been utilised by Swedish and Norwegian governments and security agencies, for example, to describe their “all-hazards” approach towards crisis management and counterterrorism (DSB 2019; FOI 2013; MSB 2011); it has been introduced in the context of Nordic inter-ministerial and Nordic Council cooperation as a way to propose a Nordic “model” for security (Sandö and Bailes 2014; Stoltenberg 2009; see also Introduction, this volume); it has been used as the overarching theme for security-related research and development (R&D) at the EU level (Bigo and Martin-Mazé 2014; European Commission 2018); and recently, it has even been subject to commercial and organisational standardisation by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO/TC 223 2016; ISO/TC 292 2016).

Closely associated with the post-Cold War generation of security practitioners and scholars, societal security makes the bold assumption that society is under attack, and that security has to be done either in its name, or somehow by society itself (Larsson 2019; SOURCE 2016). Through the logic of societal security, it is not the sovereign state but a fabric of functions and values underpinning a certain way of life that is assumed to be the target. The antagonist is assumed to be not an invading army, but some internal or “asymmetrical” threat such as a terrorist or a criminal. The threat is, more generally, reconfigured from known and certain to increasingly uncertain and insidious, and related to transgressive human-induced or environmental disasters. The practice of security must therefore also be reframed and conceived of holistically, involving a range of new actors, strategies, and technologies, and offered for – or even by – society itself. In brief, it is safe to say that the notion of societal security – both in practice and theory – matters for how security is conceived of and acted upon. However, we know less about its origin and evolution over time.

Departing from the two first chapters of this volume, this contribution asks not what societal security “is” or “means”, but more specifically where it comes from by studying the underlying social and historical conditions for
its emergence. Indeed, most questions regarding what can be called the “sociogenesis” of societal security have been left unanswered thus far. Among which organisations and individuals did it emerge? From which ideational heritage has it developed? To what extent does it signify a “new” way of doing and thinking security? As discussed in the introduction of this volume, as well as in a report from 2014 (Bigo and Martin-Mazé 2014, 8–14), the functionalist understanding and concept of societal security was formulated by actors from the Nordic region, and in Sweden quite prominently. By analysing the transformations of the Swedish defence sector after the Cold War, this chapter locates the origins of societal security in this particular environment, illustrating how its emergence was in fact not the result of some wider democratic push for demilitarisation, nor some intellectual debate on how to radically redefine societal issues and security work. Rather, it was connected to a group of high-level bureaucrats and politicians who were working to reform Sweden’s model of so-called “total defence” after the end of the Cold War, and in particular, how to modernise its “civil defence” branch. From as early as 1986, certain agency officials, public investigators, policy advisors, and scholars began assembling new security knowledge and imposing threats and risks beyond war-thinking – including strategies for managing “asymmetric” forms of antagonism and introducing this as the new “security problem” in official discourse – while at the same time seeking to create a shift in practice by establishing new institutions, agency structures, and research environments in the areas of crisis management and counterterrorism. The notion of societal security, it will be argued, emerged not necessarily on its own merit, but as a by-product of this far wider struggle to produce a new “enemy” in Sweden and address the conceptual gap created by the end of the Cold War. Consequently, the notion of societal security is not radically new, but bears significant ideational and practical resemblance to the idea of total defence.

Tracing the sociogenesis of societal security in the renegotiation of Swedish total defence, this chapter draws mainly on archival sources and a series of research interviews, and proceeds in two sections. The following section discusses how total defence was conceived during Cold War Sweden, how the entire welfare system and civil population was mobilised in war preparedness, and how society – much like in current times – was perceived as at once the asset to be protected and the resource from which to draw. The final section traces, at length and in two chronological steps, key developments in the bureaucratic-political transformation of total defence after the Cold War, beginning with the construction of new threat discourses and security knowledge in the 1990s, followed by the substantial reformations of research and agency structures in the 2000s.

Society and defence in Cold War Sweden

Today’s common claim that the distinction between the external and internal dimensions of security has become blurred was in fact acknowledged already in the 1940s in Sweden. When a commission was appointed to draft a
new civil defence law in 1943, it concluded in its final report a year later that the “boundaries between the military and the civil, as well as between theatres of war and the previously preserved homeland, have to a large extent been erased. War has become total” (SOU 1944, 47). “Total warfare against the homeland, where civil life is the primary target”, it further declared, “needs to be countered with total defence, including both a military and civil side” (48). Here, in the midst of the Second World War, the idea of “total defence” began to emerge in the Swedish defence sector. Gradually substantialised over the following Cold War decades, this model came to signify not a specific agency nor a fixed institutional structure, but an ideal model for the security of society wherein military defence became intertwined with the civil population, everyday life, and virtually all functions of the public welfare apparatus (Artéus and Fältström 2011, 9, 19–20).

More specifically, total defence came to be categorised and administered as four different branches, (a) military defence, including the army, navy, air force, and reserves, as well as a comprehensive domestic arms industry; (b) economic defence, including storage and supply of fuel, medicine, food, armaments, and other key provisions; (c) psychological defence, including public broadcasting media and counter-disinformation campaigns; and (d) civil defence, including air raid shelters and bunkers, rescue services, evacuation planning, and more (Ministry of Defence Sweden 1995a; Von Konow 1961, 15). The “totality” of these elements was always stressed; in other words, the various forms of defence only worked if assembled together.

The branch with the largest role in peacetime society was arguably that of civil defence. During the Cold War, the government sought to promote a “collective mindset” and “culture” of voluntary civilian participation in extensive war preparedness. This narrative was backed up with the law of “civil defence duty” (tjänsteplikt), obliging every civilian between 16 and 70 years of age, every registered household, and even private property such as buses or trucks to fulfil a specific function in the fortification of Sweden. In addition to civil defence, the military was based on the conscription of all abled-bodied males between 18 and 47 years of age, mobilising up to 850,000 individuals (Total Defence Information Committee 1980, 12; see also Kronsell and Svedberg 2006). Taken together, the defence organisation was to be conceived of as an “enterprise with 4.5 million shareholders in national security”. Anthropologists have likened the widespread sociopsychological and infrastructural effect of total defence – and particularly civil defence and the mass-construction of civil and military fortifications during the Cold War – to that of the christening of Sweden and the spreading of churches around the 12th century (Palmblad 2005, 10–11).

The central justification behind these policies was the government’s intention of wartime “neutrality” and peacetime “non-alignment”. Instead of joining alliances like NATO after the wars, the government and parliament chose the political line of “make do by yourself” and the strategy of self-preservation in terms of national security. Maintaining a “credible” neutrality not only necessitated mass-conscription and a deeply embedded
civil defence, it was assumed, but also a near-autonomous domestic arms industry which, instead of importing certain weapon systems, could facilitate R&D in all categories of military supply.

As noted already in the 1960s, the total defence effort came to systematically securitise everything from Sweden’s “governance and administration structure [to] its businesses, factories, and industries, its mines, shipyards, and production facilities, its communications, its cities and countryside – in short, everything that constitutes the societal organism” (Von Konow 1961, 23). Just like an “environmental”- or “sustainability”-dimension tends to be present in most societal planning today, Cold War Sweden was as a whole designed around a “war dimension”, and different invasion scenarios were present in the early stages of virtually all forms of peacetime planning. Indeed, at the time, “[p]lanning became the fashion of the day and the modus operandi of the state” when it came to national security (Lundin and Stenlås 2010, 15). This was eventually formulated in terms of the “BIS-model”, or the “preparedness model for societal planning”. The BIS-model strived for “robustness” (akin to today’s idea of resilience) across infrastructural sectors: in logistics, construction, commerce, healthcare, transport, roads, telecommunications, energy and water supply, public and private housing, urban landscaping, and so on. With this pan-sectoral logic, public administration and coordination for defence purposes had to be largely centralised, something which was made possible at the time since most infrastructures, as different from today, were owned and operated as state agencies.6

However, total defence proponents realised that for extensive war preparedness to work, it must not only involve actors in and around the state but also had to include the private sector. This can be illustrated by the role of the Institute for Higher Total Defence Education (IHT). A training institution founded in 1952 and responsible for educating the societal elite in the organisation and operation of total defence, IHT was supposedly “more or less unique in the world” in how it managed to gather agency directors, senior state officials, and military staff from across the country as well as high-level civilians from the corporate world for several weeks of wargaming and networking – like a “playhouse” for defence professionals in the early stages of the Cold War. A central goal behind this rather Millsian structure of interlinked civil-military, public-private elites (Mills 1956) was to bind together an influential “network across private businesses, public agencies, and the military organisation” that would be able to ensure “impact and acceptance in the political field” from the 1950s and onwards.8

Despite its centralised, top-down structuration, total defence was at the same time designed for embedding defence practices “organically” into everyday life, so that they would become part and parcel of the welfare system, of society, or what Foucault (2007, 30) calls the “milieu of life, existence, and work” itself (see also Lundin, Stenlås, and Gribbe 2010). As put in the government’s national security declaration from 1976,
… future wars and crises may to an increasing extent and in other ways impact the entire society and its population. Total defence shall therefore be perceived as part of society and the societal development.

(Government of Sweden 1976 [emphasis added]).

The public investigation report preceding this government bill even stated that in the 1970s, total defence was no longer to be seen as an exceptional governmental practice, organised exclusively for the protection of territory. Rather, “relations within states” were to be “given far more consideration in security policy assessments”, since

[i]n a situation when people do not perceive the threat of war as impending … eyes are turned towards domestic issues. Citizens’ loyalty tends to change from a territorial orientation, with the own state as means to defend against external threats, towards a more functional orientation towards one’s work, environment, physical surroundings, etc. … It is obvious that even if physical security in the form of defence against invasion still plays an important role in the perception of security, it now also contains different elements of economic and social security. … [F]aith in society … is a primary condition for the will to protect that society. It is important that fundamental values about societal concerns are shared.

(SOU 1976, 184–85 [emphasis added]; see also Ministry of Defence Sweden 1976)

Indeed, defence professionals at the time saw society as constituting at once “the ‘asset’ which total defence must be able to protect against external threats, and the ‘resource’ from which to draw in order to produce such a defence” (Pettersson 1977, 8, 21).

By giving such prominence to the societal “organism”, Swedish total defence architects created (at least the appearance of) a kind of proto-societal security. Despite this appearance, however, security policies during the Cold War never de facto broadened the scope of threats towards society as such, and never explicitly moved beyond the strict peace-to-war scale and the capacity to respond to an “external attacker” (Ministry of Defence Sweden 1981). Even though official discourse had made occasional reference to the potentiality of “surprise acts of terror bombings” in the past (SOU 1944; Von Konow 1961, 159), this had been done strictly with reference to military air raids against civilians, and the military threat was typically classified as either (a) mass attack or multi-front invasion, (b) limited attack or single-front invasion, or (c) surprise attack.9

Towards the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, defence analysts and security advisors began suggesting that society’s openness and rapid technological development heightened sensitivity to disruptions, had increased
vulnerabilities, and made infrastructures an increasingly attractive target for aggressors. Putting society at risk of being “wiped out by smaller attacks”, antagonists were increasingly prepared, it was argued, to “threaten or extort without needing to resort to military power instruments”, for instance, by means of “sabotage and terrorism” (Pettersson 1977, 70; see also Sondén 1984). From the mid-1980s and onwards, actors from the civil- and economic-defence branches started converging around claims such as these, including the perceived need to fundamentally alter the official threat and risk spectrum and shift focus from external invasion to various threats “in our midst”. Total defence, or more accurately, civil defence and its central scope and aim concerning what to counter, was about to become reconfigured during a period of significant bureaucratic and political reform.

Total defence in transformation

What follows is a detailed analysis of the transformation of Swedish total defence after the Cold War, that is, of how and when the first organised attempts were made at reconfiguring security practices away from the military organisation to a more fragmented system for crisis management and counterterrorism, and how this was done first and foremost by imposing new and other forms of threats and risks towards society. In particular, this section illustrates how such a process took place in the context of civil defence, not merely through formal political and legal reforms in this area, but also through intra-agency and ministerial struggles aimed at challenging the established logic of total defence. Gradually, new threat discourses and security practices were introduced, often in tandem with new platforms for academic research and knowledge production in these areas.

Specifically, this section explores the following questions: when and where were discourses and practices related to “crises” and “terror” officially (and non-officially) introduced for the first time? By whom, and under which political and bureaucratic conditions? What was said to necessitate a reconfiguration and rebranding of total defence? Departing from the socio-historical context of total defence and war preparedness, two general phases can be identified in the Swedish security and defence sector after the Cold War: one of rethinking (late-1980s to mid-1990s), followed by one of restructuring (mid-1990s to early-2000s).

1986–1998 – challenging the logic of civil defence

In 1985, a government bill was adopted by the parliament which proposed the establishment of the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (ÖCB) the following year. This meant that, for the first time, Sweden would have an independent agency singularly responsible for coordinating the many
non-military functions of the defence apparatus, with particular emphasis on aspects related to civil protection and economic planning (Artéus and Fältström 2011, 64; Government of Sweden 1985). ÖCB was supposed to serve total defence in a role of overseeing, planning, training, and evaluation of relevant actors, and thereby, it was hoped, make cooperation between its civil and military parts more organised and cost-efficient. After extensive debate between bureaucrats, lawyers, and politicians, it was decided that despite its role as central coordinating agency, ÖCB should not be led by a “civil supreme commander” equivalent to that of the armed forces. Rather, the so-called “responsibility principle” should continue to be in effect, which meant that whoever was operationally responsible for a certain societal function in peacetime should be prepared to be so also in times of war.

As a newcomer in the field, ÖCB and its first director Gunnar Nordbeck began asking far-reaching and, according to some, uncomfortable questions whether civil defence should be only about “war rationing and misery” or if it should also include other forms of peacetime incidents (ÖCB 2002, 10). Ideas of vulnerability in societal infrastructures (which were not new, but had been present in defence policies for decades) were now brought to the fore as a way to place emphasis on security issues beyond invasion. An ÖCB “perspective study” from 1989 with the task of outlining the future of civil defence was one of the earliest official texts to genuinely consider “non-military threats” such as “sabotage against vital nodes in society” (ÖCB 1989, 8–9). It claimed that the preparedness measures currently in place, in a period of international disarmament, were “far too schematic and in need of nuance”. The text further stated that “military and non-military threats were bound to become interlaced” (11).

ÖCB was a young and untested agency, and also lacked the legal mandate to force change upon other actors. It was to act as the central conductor and coordinating agency, but still, according to the constitutional system in Sweden, remain hierarchically equal with all other government agencies. Therefore, in their everyday interactions with other civil defence actors, ÖCB’s director and so-called “BIS-ambassadors” were obliged to work through “intelligence and charm” and with “social rather than coercive methods” when pushing for increased attention to new threats and risks (ÖCB 1989, 33). “We wanted the agency to be primus inter pares [‘first among equals’] … so the difficult challenge was to simultaneously lead and not lead”, as put by a former ÖCB official.10 Sweden’s constitutional system of strong and autonomous agencies still exists; indeed, all of the ÖCB’s institutional successors have been obliged to similarly draw on social and political forms of capital, instead of explicit legal or constitutional powers.

In 1992, the second ÖCB director Gunilla André began imposing a more modern11 take on the “terrorism threat” in a string of newspaper debate pieces, as well as internally in the agency. “Everything suggests that the risk of direct warfare against Sweden should be minimal while the risks of crises
are large”, she wrote, and so “[t]hreats such as nuclear accidents, large-scale migration, and acts of terrorism are part of the picture” (André 1992a; see also 1992b; and Eneberg 1992). She has commented retrospectively that:

Suggestions to widen the threat-scale did not resonate with the ministry of defence at the time, however. We were supposed to plan for a war situation, nothing else. Even if I, a loyal servant to the state, respected this policy stance, I could not help but bring up societal threats in a wider perspective during the politician meetings that ÖCB arranged. It just so happened that many members of parliament shared my thoughts, which eventually resulted in several parliamentary motions on this theme.

(ÖCB 2002, 38)

After a series of efforts by ÖCB to influence key decision makers – itself an unorthodox move for a state agency – a committee initiative in parliament finally pushed the government to appoint the so-called “Threat and Risk Investigation” which ran between 1992 and 1995 (SOU 1995). Its final report sketched an image of society under threat by new and emerging phenomena such as mass migration and asylum seekers, severe disruptions in power and water supply, major urban accidents or attacks, and other threats perceived to be in a “grey area” between war and crime. Its head investigator, Eric Krönmark, a former defence minister and member of the Conservative Party, had the explicit vision of merging the areas of internal policing and external defence which in his opinion were far too disjointed and should rather share resources and equipment. Controversially at the time, his investigation team “looked into options of designing a kind of ‘national guard’, which were not received favourably”.12 This was voted down since the domestic use of the army had been regarded as a “politically untouchable” question in Sweden ever since the 1930s, when a clash between union protesters and the army left five civilians dead and caused major public protests, especially from the working classes.

“When [Krönmark’s] investigation report was handed over to the then-recently appointed defence minister Thage G. Peterson, who had held several cabinet positions for many years, he explained that this was the most important report he had ever received”, the former ÖCB director recalls (ÖCB 2002, 38). Peterson himself makes clear, however, that he “had no support” for politically implementing these ideas in the 1990s, and “regrets not picking a fight”:

Time was not ripe for changing the view on what constituted threats and risks in society. When I began talking about the necessity of terrorism preparedness … these issues were not taken seriously. Many shook their heads and argued that national defence should not meddle with these issues … Developments in recent years seem to have proven me right, though, so perhaps I was ahead of my time.

(ÖCB 2002, 56)
Indeed, to propose changes of the Swedish national security strategy tends to be a slow process, and again, largely due to reasons of constitutional design. The “defence resolutions” presented by the government every fifth year are supposed to dictate the overall direction of defence priorities for the next half a decade, thereby virtually framing what should be at all thinkable and doable in the area of security. Based on a 10–15 year “planning horizon”, these resolutions are far from revolutionary, mainly for two reasons. First, resolutions are required to draw on the recommendations of all security-related government agencies. As mentioned, the constitution gives Swedish agencies authority and elbowroom, as well as relative autonomy and independence from the ministries under which they are sorted. Second, resolutions must also draw on the recommendations of the defence commissions. Constituted by representatives from all parties of parliament, the defence commissions formulate policy suggestions that are more or less ensured to gain broad political support, and their reports tend to largely reflect what eventually becomes voted into legislation (Lundin and Stenlås 2010, 16). Therefore, if one were to suggest a radical redirection of security policy, one would need to convince at once the government, multiple agencies, and the parliament (as represented in the current defence commission).

Reformists during the early 1990s were thus unsurprised that it took almost a decade for their thoughts and ideas to be considered in actual policies and legislation. Although ÖCB officials had observed and anticipated societal and international developments for some time, they understood that “making changes is like altering the course of a steamer: it takes a long time and the room for manoeuvre is limited”. The agency system is usually slow to react, a key reformist has noted: “the [Berlin] wall fell already in 1989, but ÖCB survived all the way up until 2002”. Similarly, the defence commission had also assessed changes in the “international security environment” during the mid- to late-1990s, and anticipated its “widening” effect on security discourse (Ministry of Defence Sweden 1996a, 1998), but without any immediate effect on practice.

It is interesting to note how many of the new threat constructions and reform ideas during this period came not from professional politicians, but to a large extent from the everyday settings of bureaucrats operating in the civil defence area. Here, the challenge for agency staff was about pushing bureaucratic knowledge into political processes and state commissions. For political defenders, on the other hand, the challenge was about blocking such moves by insisting on the continued policy relevance of conventional geopolitical threats. From a long-term perspective, ÖCB’s peculiar lobby efforts as well as the Threat and Risk Investigation’s final report were arguably of key importance, however, since they effectively opened up avenues for the state, and particularly the ministry of defence and parliament, to think, talk, and write about new (in)securities.

Indeed, parts of the arguments presented initially in the Threat and Risk Investigation were picked up and inserted into the subsequent defence resolutions and government bills around 1995, namely, the two interlinked
propositions on “renewing total defence” (Government of Sweden 1995; 1996a; see also Ministry of Defence Sweden 1995c), and another one on the “readiness against severe strains on society in peacetime” (Government of Sweden 1996b; see also Ministry of Defence Sweden 1996b). When passed, these reforms led to the discontinuation of large parts of the military organisation as well as a shift of budget priorities according to the new security policy organised not around war, but “peacetime strains”. Although the logic and scope of total defence was challenged by ÖCB as early as 1989, it is not until the 1995–1996 propositions that we can see the so-called “widened security definition” become declared as government policy.

Alongside the above-mentioned reforms, the ministry of defence was further occupied with carrying out the mandatory EU adaptations of domestic policy since Sweden had just become a full member state in 1995 (Ministry of Defence Sweden 1995b, 1999). This meant responding to the so-called “Petersberg tasks” and the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (later to formalise into the EU Common Security and Defence Policy) which, among other things, broadened the practical military scope to include crisis management in peacetime. Sweden had also recently joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, and the ministry of defence focused initially not on military-to-military training, but rather on policy discussions on disaster planning and response. Reformists from within the Swedish defence sector working with the PfP and EU adaptations in the 1990s saw these engagements with international institutions as windows of opportunity for further shifting professional mindsets at home towards a “beyond-military” disposition. Indeed, they saw the demand for necessarily new forms of thinking and doing security – ways which were not fixed along a war-to-peace scale, but which recognised that whatever laid beyond territorial defence was not simply peacetime emergency planning or uniformed blue-light personnel, but something radically different concerning an evolved form of antagonism aimed directly at citizens, democracy, and rule of law (KKrVA 1998, 15). Overall, it can be concluded that the acquisition of EU-level (or otherwise “international”) forms of knowledge, authority, and expertise by Swedish bureaucrats had an accelerating and legitimating effect on the ongoing reforms at home (see also Kauppi and Madsen 2013; Bigo 2016).

During the implementation of the 1990s reforms, bureaucrats, legislators, as well as academics became increasingly aware of the need for an updated conceptual and terminological toolbox. As new agency guidelines, policy proposals, and legal drafts had to be written, new explanation models and threat descriptions were in demand. In order to fill the “knowledge gap” created to a large extent by the end of the Cold War, ÖCB was mandated to identify emerging Swedish scholars in the area of defence and security studies, and to distribute around SEK 25 million annually to fund their research environments (ÖCB 2002, 35). ÖCB targeted scholars in their vicinity who they hoped could produce concepts and models “that would describe the new threats”. At this stage, two persons outside of ÖCB played key roles.
First, Christina Weglert, a former agency executive who had moved to head of department at the Swedish Defence University (FHS) was early to notice the demand for “new ways of thinking about the training and exercising of military personnel”. Seeking to offer practitioners “a different perspective” from the intersection of the civil and military knowledge domains, she strongly supported the creation of a new research team at her department (ÖCB 2002, 58). Second, security and crisis management scholar Bengt Sundelius – already a familiar face to many Nordic defence practitioners in the 1990s – came to be the central figure around which new forms of functionalist security research was to be mobilised. Dissatisfied with the general stagnancy and inflexibility of his former employer (Swedish Defence Research Institute (FOI)), and seeking closer proximity to practitioners than what could be offered by his current employer (Uppsala University), Sundelius searched for a different environment somewhere in-between research and practice where he could gather his network of young crisis management scholars. “Simply put, Bengt had the scientific bits, Christina had the facilities and administration, and I sat on the money”, as described by a former ÖCB official.16 The Center for Crisis Management Research and Training (CRISMART) was founded in the end of the 1990s and emerged as the leading research hub for crisis studies in Sweden. Their primary goal, according to Sundelius, was to “produce a cadre of competent co-workers” in this growing area of practice. Responding directly to ÖCB’s call for new applicable security models, they conducted “problem-oriented” and “policy-relevant” studies at the intersection of research and practice, and offered tailored exercises and training courses for state officials and agency personnel. Over the coming years, this team of self-proclaimed “pracademics” in and around CRISMART managed to establish close relationships with the new generation of security practitioners as well as with officials in the upper segments of the state. These relations enabled some scholars to take up key positions as “experts” also outside of academia, in both public and private organisations, while others remained multi-positioned and moved between various roles and responsibilities in and beyond universities.

This process is a prime example of how academic and political discourses of (in)security, in certain times and places in recent history, have been able to emerge in parallel, co-informing and reinforcing one another into a distinct category of knowledge. One may compare, for instance, Swedish security scholars during the 1990s with the early years of the RAND Corporation, when a small group of researchers set out to explain the logics of nuclear war in the 1950s and 1960s:

With no empirical evidence to support their findings (no nuclear war had been fought!), the group developed a thought-provoking and immensely influential view of how nuclear strategy should be performed. From the models it developed, policy advice was deducted and policy formed. … The RAND people not only were good at producing
scientific knowledge, but also had efficient channels for transmission of their ideas to practitioners – including politicians … Many in the US government felt that ‘it added scientific legitimacy’ … to listen.

(Berling 2011, 391)

ÖCB presumably had similar ideas about the research activities they funded, hoping that it would “close down controversies in the political realm” and that the scientific products, facts, models, and approaches that were generated could be “mobilised strategically … as ‘weapons’ in political struggles” (393) in their efforts to secure their particular version of post-Cold War security as the most legitimate one.

Not only can security research close down controversies for bureaucrats and politicians that may have particular goals in mind, but, at times, researchers may also themselves be opportunistic and tailor their theoretical work to make it “practical” for government. As Bonditti and Olsson (2016, 244) show, this was the case in the early days of terrorism research when some scholars linked their “theories on terrorism developed in the context of ‘scientific publications’ or other ‘academic settings’ to the particular interests of security professionals”. In Sweden, certain scholars similarly “reorganised security knowledge” around new threats or crises, thereby “opening up a space of indeterminacy” between defence and policing, between crime and war (242), a space in which they automatically became the new generation of “experts” (see also Stampnitzky 2013; Herman and O’Sullivan 1990).

1998–2008 – agency reforms for crisis management and counterterrorism

Around the turn of the millennium, major reforms were again planned. This time, however, they would come to have a more substantial effect on the agency system. A carefully drafted ÖCB report in 1998 entitled “The new security” again helped entice government officials to appoint a commission, this time the so-called “Vulnerability and Security Investigation”. Former Centre Party cabinet minister and Nordic Council secretary Åke Pettersson was selected as head investigator by the ministry of defence in 1999, and his team consisted of key figures from across the civil defence sector, among them Sundelius and leading reformists from within ÖCB. For two years, they conducted over 50 case studies on critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, and in May 2001, Pettersson presented their final report called “Security in a new era” (SOU 2001). In it, they effectively managed to incorporate the plethora of bureaucratic struggles and political decisions from the past 15 years, leading to the major proposal to discontinue ÖCB, along with the idea of civil defence altogether, and replace it with a new crisis management agency.

More fundamentally, this investigation – together with the defence commission reports written alongside it which produced similar conclusions
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(Ministry of Defence Sweden 2001b, 2001a) – meant that the threat of invasion was effectively written off in favour of not just “peacetime strains”, but crises related to asymmetrical attacks, major accidents, natural disasters, and other incidents to be captured by the proposed “all-hazards” approach. This marked the beginning of a “strategic timeout” for the traditional total defence model. As put by Pettersson, “this was a time when we did not experience that many threats, but we did however feel the need to guard ourselves against what has come to be called terror attacks”.17 Co-investigator Bo Riddarström from ÖCB claimed that they wanted to give asymmetrical threats just as much, if not more, attention as external threats: “Indeed, anyone with merely a hunting rifle, knowing where to go, could shut down Sweden’s power supply for at least three months”.18 This investigation report in other words signified a key moment in the transformation of Swedish security, as suspicions began to shift from extraterritorial enemies to internal antagonists, and as a wider range of threats and risks shifted from being a peripheral priority at ÖCB to becoming the very core of the new agency’s assignments.

The new crisis management agency was to continue like ÖCB in a non-interfering, overseeing, and coordinative role. This required new ways of “exploiting society’s collective resources” for security purposes, it was argued, and so the responsibility principle already present in total defence planning was complemented by the similarity19 and proximity20 crisis management principles (SOU 2001, 18, 25). The agency was also to focus on so-called public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the area of security and infrastructure protection, since critical infrastructures had become increasingly outsourced in the early 2000s (not only in Sweden but also in most Western societies). Disaster planning and crisis management was thus to be seen not as an exclusive government matter, but – just as per old defence ideals – as concerns also involving local, regional, and private actors, making it into a project driven by and for the totality of society. Here, the SOU report hinted at a kind of “reversal”: it suggested that the (now much smaller) armed forces were to aid public and private organisations in managing disruptions in IT, communications, water and power supply, flooding and dam failures, mass migration of refugees and asylum seekers, pandemics, and terrorist attacks – rather than the reverse situation of civilians aiding the defence establishment, which had been the case during the Cold War era (252).

Despite being well received upon its publication in May 2001, when the subsequent government bill for the “continued renewal of total defence” was to be drafted later that summer (Government of Sweden 2001), the SOU report was surprisingly underutilised in the early versions of the bill. However, when the final proposition was eventually presented to parliament on September 26 (that is, only a few weeks after the 11 September 2001 terror attacks in the United States), it suddenly contained large chunks of text pasted in from the SOU report.21 In other words, despite stemming from a long and careful process during the late 1990s of preparing the discontinuation
of civil defence in favour of a new crisis management agency, the first major step in 2001 to carry out these reforms was in fact more or less reactionary to the events in the United States. “9/11 ‘saved’, if you will, Åke Pettersson’s vision”, according to Sundelius, who had followed these reforms closely, as the terrorist attacks pushed decision makers to reconsider their positions, thereby speeding up the turn towards crisis management and counterterrorism practices in Sweden.

Indeed, in anticipation of the reforms to come out of the SOU report, ÖCB officials and their new allies from academia began intensifying discussions regarding how to relabel total defence. However, since a more or less established operational definition of total defence was already in place in up to 150 different statutes and legislative acts at the time, this was no easy task, and many practitioners were explicitly against a reformulation of the defence discourse. Nevertheless, Sundelius was one of those who tried to rework the existing definition, namely by writing a report for the then-defence commission in which he suggested the terminology “societal defence”. What he described as “societal defence”, however, still seemed more or less identical to the total defence model of the past, but now with a stronger emphasis on Swedish society’s embeddedness in an international and transboundary context, and more importantly, it encompassed how to counter the new threats and vulnerabilities supposedly stemming across borders (Sundelius 2001a, 8–9).

Later that year, following violent protests during the EU Summit in Gothenburg in June 2001, that policy paper was rewritten into a debate article for Sweden’s largest newspaper Dagens Nyheter in which it was phrased, more bluntly this time, that Sweden was in need of a “societal defence against terrorists”. In passing, it was suggested – just as had been done by Krönmark a decade earlier – that for such a revamped non-territorial defence to work, the police and military organisations should be able to cooperate more closely and share equipment to counter non-state antagonists (Sundelius 2001b). “Societal defence” was received with mild indifference politically and never took off in official discourse. Instead, Sundelius and his colleagues developed and further specified their idea of “functional” (as different from “territorial”) security by starting to name it “societal security”. Incidentally, their Danish colleagues of the so-called Copenhagen School of security studies (or more precisely, Ole Wæver at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute) had already in 1993 written on the “concept of societal security” (see also Rhinard, this volume). After some debate between the two in the late 1990s, Wæver supposedly had “handed over” this concept to Sundelius and allowed him to keep developing it around a functionalist rather than identity-centred definition.22 In the early 2000s, Sundelius and others scholars around the CRISMART team thus came to appropriate and rework the notion of societal security, strip it of Wæver’s original definition, and promote it as a more open-ended practical concept and work terminology to be used by agencies and policymakers and even industry. After the
events of 9/11, advocates of societal security envisioned it as the new Nordic—perhaps even European—sibling-concept to “homeland security” which was being simultaneously developed and put to work in the United States around 2001–2003.

Another key detail from the 1999 to 2001 reform period was the two study trips organised between the Swedish SOU team and a Norwegian team working in parallel on reforming practically the same policy area. The purpose of the trips between Stockholm and Oslo was to exchange and acquire ideas, specialist knowledge, and policy blueprints from both civil and military organisations concerning how to modernise, and eventually move away from, the total defence heritage they both shared (NOU 2000, 22, 242, 321). The final publication by the Norwegian investigation team—“A vulnerable society: Recommendations for the security and readiness of society”, published in July 2000 after only ten months in the pipeline—therefore had several similarities with the Swedish report, not least in how they both saw the increased openness and technological evolution of post-Cold War Nordic societies as producing a wider threat spectrum, ranging from natural hazards to terrorist attacks (6–7). The Norwegians also agreed generally on how to organise against such threats, namely, by establishing a new co-ordinated crisis management agency (DSB), and by implementing the same organisational principles (responsibility, similarity, and proximity). Notably, however, Norway decided to organise this area under the ministry of justice rather than defence, and also chose from the very outset to refer to this kind of work as “societal security”, or samfunnssikkerhet (see Morsut, this volume). In Sweden, the equivalent term of samhällssäkerhet in fact never cemented itself as the main umbrella term in the same way, and the new crisis management agency was to remain under the ministry of defence instead of migrating to ministries of interior or justice.

In 2002, a second government proposition building on the previous year’s Vulnerability and Security Investigation was passed in parliament, leading to the discontinuation of ÖCB, and the establishment of the new and slimmer Swedish Emergency Management Agency (KBM) (Government of Sweden 2002, 43–44). In addition to the recommendations of Pettersson’s SOU team, KBM was to continue identifying emerging security scholars and administer its own research funding scheme (now with a more than doubled budget of SEK 60 million per annum). Although KBM wanted to link up security practitioners with private industries and emerging technological producers, it was beyond the agency’s scope to directly fund private actors since recipients had to be based at academic institutions. They therefore retained focus on setting up and funding new research environments from which a supply of future professionals could be generated. Sundelius was now leading this enterprise himself from within KBM, as he had acquired the position of agency research director, and continued to fund research in line with the CRISMART credo of linking together academia (and academics) with practice (and practitioners) (51, 65–66; KBM 2008, 36–37).
Hence, KBM funds went into establishing the new Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) at the Defence University in 2004, making it Sweden’s first “government think-tank” dedicated to the field of terrorism studies. Like CRISMART, CATS produced classified policy papers for cabinet offices and arranged exercises with civil servants and the government. Their scholars also engaged with mainstream and social media as self-proclaimed “terrorism experts”, with a tendency to express particularly opinionated views when it came to so-called “Islamic terrorism” (Flyghed 2005, 175–177). The precursor to CATS, called the Center for Information Operational Studies (CIOS), had in fact been an analytical team working under the government since 1998 with intelligence and information warfare. However, after the events of 9/11, KBM’s research department viewed terrorism studies as a top priority and decided to reconfigure CIOS, transfer it to the Defence University, and provide it with an annual “research environment support grant” to ensure its permanence and its capacity to attract leading national and international terrorism scholars. “[KBM] had the mandate to fund research, but not the experience”, Sundelius has claimed, not denying that he was able to allocate funding rather freely to his colleagues in Sweden. Research directors of this kind might be compared to an impresario in the theatre world, i.e. a director-figure who finances, facilitates, and organises plays and concerts – those who “by their decisions [could] mould the taste of an age” (Bourdieu 1969, 91). Similarly, Mills saw this type of entrepreneur figure as increasingly common in social scientific research environments: those who are discontent with the old-fashioned professor roles and “ordinary” academic careers, and those who instead “set up on the campus a respectably financed research and teaching institution, which brings the academic community into live contact with men of affairs” (Mills 2000, 98, 103).

Alongside the establishment of CATS, Sweden’s counterterrorism policies and strategies also began to crystallise. Between 2004 and 2006, the defence commission authored a long-term security strategy which not only oriented priorities around the new agency structure but also implicitly positioned Sweden as an ally in the so-called “global war on terror”, thereby breaking with the notion of “non-alignment” from the total defence era: “Shared vulnerabilities and transgressive threats means that Swedish and international interests coincide to an increasing extent … In today’s world, it is just as important to secure flows [of things and people] as it previously was to protect territorial borders” (Ministry of Defence Sweden 2006, 11). Domestically, a state investigation sparked by the 9/11 events resulted in a report in 2003 on Sweden’s “preparedness against terrorism” (SOU 2003). The report proposed far-reaching policy ideas such as new terrorism legislation, a radical hybridisation of military and police organisations, and a substantially expanded mandate for the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO) – the actor with central operational responsibility in the area of counterterrorism.
Few of these suggestions became reality when government bills were subsequently drafted, however. Instead, since around 2005, SÄPO has been responsible for convening the Swedish Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Council (SÄPO 2019b) which gathers 15 different agencies, including the armed forces, coastguard, and migration agency. Within this council, moreover, the National Centre for Terrorist Threat Assessment (NCT) is a permanent working group staffed by personnel from SÄPO, the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA), and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST). The NCT “produces long and short-term strategic assessments of the terrorist threat against Sweden and Swedish interests” and presents strategic reports to various government offices (SÄPO 2019a).

Similar to the US Department of Homeland Security’s “National Terrorism Advisory System”, the NCT produces an annual “threat level scale” with regard to terrorism, with an arbitrary range of “No threat (1), Low threat (2), Elevated threat (3), High threat (4) and Very high threat (5)” (SÄPO 2018).

Finally, following yet another public investigation between 2006 and 2007 (SOU 2007), KBM was eventually merged in 2008 (after only six years in existence) with the Rescue Services Agency (SRV) and the Psychological Defence Board (SPF) into the currently operational Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). The MSB agency continued to promote an “all-hazards” and “whole-of-society” approach to security to targeting the full spectrum of environmental and human-induced threats, risks, and disasters (Lindberg and Sundelius 2012), and remained centrally responsible for all things security-related, including actor coordination, training, evaluation, and research funding (again with a doubled budget of SEK 120–140 million per year) as well as international cooperation with the EU and DHS.

Notably, however, even after the creation of MSB, societal security was not established as the official terminology or dominant discourse in the Swedish field – despite being proposed as such by Sundelius in 2004 (SOU 2004), who had now advanced in rank again to become senior agency advisor. Rather, societal security came to be used interchangeably, depending on actor and context, with terms like civil contingencies, crisis management, emergency preparedness, and civil security.

**Conclusion**

In retrospect, it perhaps comes as little surprise that the notion of “societal security” in Sweden emerged in the historical context of Swedish total defence, and in the bureaucratic and political structures associated with that conceptual approach. The *modus operandi* of total defence was arguably always about the *security of society* (perhaps even more so than *of territory*, since Sweden had insisted that its “total defence” was purely “defensive”, i.e. designed for deterrence rather than actual combat). With its emphasis on societal values, citizen participation, holistic logics, and the fundamental interdependence of infrastructure and security-related functions, total
defence laid the organisational and cultural groundworks for post-Cold War approaches to security. Then, just as now, central coordination and planning of security practice had to be balanced against a logic of mass-participation and responsibilisation. Then, as now, “society” became acted upon and perceived as at once the “asset” to protect and “resource” from which to draw.

What changed drastically after the Cold War was rather the socio-political and technological makeup of that society, as well as its general position in a broader transnational context. In fact, debates and reforms during the 1990s came to largely concern what threatened the notion of a Swedish society, and how such threats should be countered. This chapter thus centred its analysis on how authority was mobilised by bureaucratic, political, and academic actors to help construct a new post-Cold War “enemy”, and determined how, by whom, and with what effects certain emerging “asymmetrical”, “internal” and “transgressive” threats and risks became uttered, imposed, and negotiated into practice.

Indeed, a key moment in this struggle was the mid- to late-1990s. During these years, the perspectives of total defence traditionalists in the Swedish parliament, government, and ministries were replaced by those of civil defence reformists and emerging security experts who together managed to co-produce and co-legitimate new forms of security knowledge and authority. As agency officials were granted the mandate to establish and fund new research environments, these platforms came to produce research(ers) that, in turn, supported their worldview and dampened any major political controversies. A different (but perhaps not entirely new) kind of professional cadre with regard to defence, security, crisis management, and counterterrorism began to emerge around the turn of the millennium. The Swedish post-Cold War period is thus a pertinent and revealing example of the familiar phenomenon of academic and policy interests and forms of “security expertise” intermingling, feeding into each other, and influencing the transformation of certain vital state practices.

Notes

1 Societal security, as it is commonly referred to by practitioners today, is in other words not the same product as the theoretical concept with the same name coined initially by the Copenhagen School (Wæver 1993) from which various attempts at “broadening” the meaning of security in IR have departed (Ilgit and Klotz 2014; Roe 2005; Saleh 2010; Theiler 2003; see also Rhinard, this volume).

2 All interviews conducted between March 2017 and January 2018. Translations of transcripts and other primary sources from Swedish to English have been undertaken by the author.

3 The analysis focuses on the restructuration of the Swedish agency system since the constitutional design in Sweden (as similar to Finland, but different from most other Nordic and European states) provides agencies with a strong and autonomous role, relatively independent from the government ministries/ministers under which they are sorted (Lundin and Stenlås 2010, 16).
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4 Interview with Jan Lundberg, strategic analyst at ÖCB, KBM, and MSB.
5 Interview with Peter Lagerblad, former director of the Defence Commission and agency official at ÖCB.
6 Interviews with Bo Richard Lundgren, former agency official at ÖCB and KBM, and Bo Riddarström, former agency official at ÖCB and co-investigator of SOU 2001:41.
7 The private sector was further engaged in war planning through the notion of K-företag. During the so-called “Swedish Boom Years” of “public-private cooperative ventures” in several infrastructural areas (Lundin and Stenlås 2010, 10–15), legislation was drafted that would come to eventually classify tens of thousands of private infrastructure companies, banks, insurance firms, and arms producers, as “war companies”, giving them special status as crucial actors for the Swedish defence effort.
8 Interviews Lundberg, Riddarström, and Lundgren.
9 Interview with Gunnar Holmgren, former agency official at ÖCB and co-investigator of SOU 1995:19.
10 Interview Lagerblad.
11 A temporary “terrorism law” had been introduced in 1973 as a response to the attacks at the 1972 Munich Olympics. This law then became transferred between different legal statutes, gradually redefined and phased out, and eventually removed in the late 80s.
12 Interview Holmgren.
13 However, both the Left Party and the far-right Sweden Democrats have previously been excluded from the defence commission.
14 Interview Lundgren.
15 Interview Riddarström.
16 Interview Lundgren.
17 Interview with Åke Pettersson, head investigator of SOU 2001:41.
18 Interview Riddarström.
19 Organisational routines and structures during crises should to the largest extent possible resemble those in a normal situation.
20 Any attack, accident, or incident should be managed as close to its source as possible.
21 Interview with Bengt Sundelius, senior agency adviser at MSB and founder of CRISMART.
22 Interview Sundelius.
23 On the cross-over notion of “European homeland security”, see the works of Rhinard and Boin (2009), Cross (2007), and Kaunert et al. (2012).
24 Interview with Lars Nicander, director of CATS.
25 Interview Sundelius.

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Introduction

The Norwegian word *samfunnssikkerhet* brings together two terms, *samfunn* (society) and *sikkerhet* (security or, as it is sometimes translated, safety). Traditionally, the provision of security has been the prerogative of states and governments, pursued through the use of military force against external enemies. Society, in a broad sense, includes individuals and groups sharing a common territory and culture, usually subject to that same government. Looking closely at the linguistic construction of the Norwegian term, it is notable that the Saxon Genitive link ‘s’ binds together the two words – an indication that society includes security and safety as its own intrinsic characteristics. Besides being a central term used in the Norwegian public discourse, this word has been applied since the end of the Cold War to define both a Norwegian national policy and a higher education and research field, each addressing issues concerning what makes the Norwegian society less secure in terms of threats, risks, and crises and which actors should be in charge of guaranteeing society’s security, whether that be civil protection authorities, the Armed Forces, or the private sector. When translated into English, *samfunnssikkerhet* has assumed different wordings: societal safety (Juhl and Olsen, 2006; Olsen et al., 2007), societal security (Burgess and Mouhleb, 2007a, 2007b; DSB, 2017; Lægreid and Rykkja, 2019), internal security and safety (Lango et al., 2011), and public security (NMD, 2018; White Paper 10, 2016). These English terms are attempts to find a matching word for the Norwegian version, testifying to the conceptual and practical complexities involved, since the word is peculiarly Norwegian and its definition and application were developed in a certain cultural and political context. For those reasons, the original Norwegian version of the term will be used throughout this chapter.

This chapter follows the previous chapter on Sweden (Larsson, this volume) by raising similar questions in the Norwegian setting. What are the Norwegian historical and political conditions that explain the concept and use of *samfunnssikkerhet*? Who was involved in the elaboration and application of *samfunnssikkerhet*? This chapter shows that we can draw some
similarities with Sweden. Samfunns sikkerhet emerged as a concept around at the same time as a similar version (samhällssäkerhet) appeared in Sweden, at the end of the Cold War, when national security concerns significantly changed in both countries due to the new geopolitical landscape. In addition, similarly to Sweden, in Norway samfunns sikkerhet developed independently from the Copenhagen School’s societal security concept (see Wæver et al., 1993). Finally, in Norway, as in Sweden, we can track parallel processes by which changes in the traditional approach to total defence intersected with the emergence of samfunns sikkerhet as a policy goal, thus raising questions: how and when did these processes cross and eventually influence each other? What implications does samfunns sikkerhet bring in the civilian and military sectors and in their respective roles and responsibilities to protect the Norwegian society?

To address these questions, this chapter traces the genesis of the term and how it has advanced, in the light of external and internal security events and societal changes, both within national security policy and the higher education and research field. Empirically, the chapter draws on official documents and internal university proceedings, in addition to interviews with two key academics involved since the start of the development of the term. White Papers (Stortingsmelding – St. Meld.), Propositions to the Parliament (St. Prp.), and Official Reports (Norges offentlige utredninger – NOU) are the three types of official documents considered. The use of primary sources provides a unique window into the formative political and academic thinking during the period under study, from the end of the Cold War until nowadays.

Changes in Norwegian total defence after the Cold War

Total defence represents the conceptual precursor to samfunns sikkerhet in Norway. Just after the end of the Second World War, the Norwegian Defence Commission in 1946 outlined the substance of a Norwegian total defence approach consisting of two pillars – military defence and civilian preparedness – with the goal to mobilise the whole of society in case of crises or war. As such, total defence assumed that peacetime was to be used to establish plans and strategies for the mobilisation of human and material resources when or if a war occurred. Military defence involved the armed forces (Army, Navy, and Air Force) in defence of Norway and of the integrity of its territory, while civilian preparedness included the civilian authorities (central, regional, and local administrations, Civil Defence authorities, Police, health, fire and rescue services) in charge of preparing Norwegian society and mobilising the necessary resources, both in peace and war time. Strong civilian preparedness was meant to assist the military defence, which could then use its resources for purely military purposes. In this sense, the defence of Norway was ‘total’ and aimed to avoid the tragic consequences of the Second World War by planning ahead, by protecting
the civilian population and requisite Norwegian values, and by preventing societal functions from collapsing. This approach was pursued until the end of the Cold War, when new global geopolitics required the Norwegian government to reflect on the meaning and pursuit of security and to consider consequent changes. From that point, which dates to the year 1993, an intertwined process took hold as one historical concept gave way to new thinking. On the one side, there was an attempt to align total defence to new times. On the other side, the notion of samfunnssikkerhet was taking early root as a way to break with the previous architecture of total defence, while accommodating several aspects of the total defence approach. In the year 1993 alone, the Norwegian government produced three White Papers on how total defence needed to change to be able to cope with new international and national challenges. The first White Paper 14 (St. Meld. 14, 1993), Preparedness for peace. On Norway’s future military UN involvement and the UN’s role in conflict-resolution, focused on the international setting, after the United Nations launched their Agenda for Peace in June 1992. The second White Paper 16 (St. Meld. 16, 1993), Main guidelines for the Armed Forces’ activities and development in the period 1994–1998, demonstrated how a still unstable European geopolitical landscape (the Soviet Union’s collapse and Eastern European countries’ uncertain future) and new developments within NATO could impact the Norwegian national defence. White Paper 16 underlined that Norway was no longer facing direct military threats, but rather new global and European challenges that might develop into threats against Norwegian security interests. Here, total defence was still described in Cold War terms, which assumes that civilian resources must contribute to military defence, and is considered the only credible framework for the development of the future Norwegian defence. However, White Paper 16 recognised that economic and societal structural changes would reduce the opportunities for the Norwegian defence to rely upon civilian resources. Thus, this White Paper pointed out that the Armed Forces should start to progressively disengage from civilian resources and count only on their own in case of war. White Paper 16 proposed a series of reductions and restructuring of the Armed Forces in terms of personnel and equipment and called for new cooperation and coordination regarding civilian preparedness.

The third White Paper 24 (St. Meld. 24, 1993), The future of civilian preparedness, focused on the second pillar of total defence. It built on the assessment set out in White Paper 16, but introduced a new risk assessment for Norway, with more emphasis on accidents, crises, and catastrophes in peacetime and less space for more traditional risks related to war and external enemies attacking Norwegian territory. In this document, civilian preparedness is the pillar of total defence, which

[…] shall, in case of crises and wars, ensure that society continues to function as normally as possible, provide the population with security
for life, health and welfare, as well as provide support within the framework of the Norwegian total defence.

(St. Meld. 24, 1993: 41)

This White Paper called for better clarity in responsibility-sharing between military and civilian authorities. In particular, it recommended a reorganisation of the Ministry of Justice and Police by including the Civil Defence under the Directorate for Civilian Preparedness\(^5\) and by giving the Ministry the overarching coordination of civilian preparedness.

In 1994, a fourth White Paper 48 (St. Meld. 48, 1994), *Long term plan for the civilian preparedness 1995–1998*, was issued as a follow-up to White Paper 24. This White Paper promoted a further development and an adaptation of total defence through an active and targeted cooperation among all the national and local emergency agencies, the Armed Forces, the business community and voluntary organisations. Here, White Paper 48 promoted four main areas of intervention for the civilian preparedness: reduction of the vulnerability of infrastructures, including vital and war-related business activities; mitigation of the consequences of crises or wars and protection of the population’s life, health, and welfare; contribution to meet the needs (in terms of goods and services) of the civilian population and the Armed Forces during crises and wars; and effective utilisation of emergency resources in peacetime. These four areas of intervention covered tasks fulfilled both in war and in peacetime, but White Paper 48 emphasised tasks in peacetime through a civilian preparedness planning more inclusive of an array of risks and threats in peacetime. As a consequence of White Papers 24 and 48, the Ministry of Justice and Police was formally assigned the task of coordinating civilian preparedness across sectors in 1994.

**Total defence meets samfunnssikkerhet**

This section follows the emergence of *samfunnssikkerhet* as Norwegian national policy and how it intertwined with total defence’s developments. It offers an overview of the main official documents and how Norwegian national authorities attempted to shape *samfunnssikkerhet* as policy to build a robust Norwegian society.

**The Vulnerability Commission and its follow-up**

1999, when NATO intervened in the Kosovo War, represented a new phase for the post-Cold War total defence approach in Norway. From that year, the Ministry of Defence started to prioritise military operations in Kosovo and later, in 2001, in Afghanistan, while the defence establishment went through ongoing structural and organisational changes (see Thomstad, 2019). The diminished focus on the second pillar of total defence, civilian preparedness
from a defence perspective, opened up a vacuum progressively filled by *sam-funnssikkerhet*. At the same time, a series of accidents and natural crises with dramatic consequences for the Norwegian population initiated a political reflection about the level of the state's preparation and response capacities. Internal events, such as the Scandinavian Star ferry fire in 1990, the hurricane in Western Norway in 1992, the flood in Eastern Norway in 1995, the MS Sleipner shipwreck in 1999, and the train collision in Åsta in 2000, showed that Norway was not well prepared to properly face neither natural or man-made crises. At the same time, the country was facing a wider range of external challenges than before such as globalisation, international terrorism, and IT developments. A profound reconsideration of the national crisis management system was needed.

In August 1999, the Minister of Justice and Police Odd Einar Dørum received from the Prime Minister the mandate to establish a commission to report on how to improve the preparedness and security of Norway. This commission, known as the Vulnerability Commission, was led by the former prime minister and county governor Kåre Willoch and included representatives with diversified competences from civil protection, industry, Armed Forces, policy-making, and academia. Professor Jan Hovden, from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim, represented academia. He was, at that time, a prominent scholar in safety science and was very knowledgeable about American scholars such as Charles Perrow, who introduced the theory of ‘normal accidents’ (1984), and Enrico Quarantelli, the pioneer of the sociology of disasters (1998). He had studied the American political approach to safety and security issues and several reflections of the Commission’s eventual report were based on the 1997 American report on critical infrastructures protection (*CIP*, 1997; Hovden, 2004a). Hovden had professional contacts with Karlstad University, but, as a member of the Commission, he had little direct contact with Swedish public authorities in Stockholm or other academic environments (Hovden Interview, 2019). It is, however, probable that other members of the Vulnerability Commission were in contact with their Swedish commission counterparts working on the same issues (Hovden Interview, 2019), since the reports provided by the two commissions almost at the same time display similarities.

The diversified competences of the members of the Vulnerability Commission were meant to offer a comprehensive description of risks threatening Norwegian society, both in war and peacetime. However, differences emerged on a narrow or broad approach to security (Hovden Interview, 2019). For instance, the representatives of the Armed Forces supported a narrow approach and wished to exclude recommendations on national security in the final report. On the other side, the Director of the Directorate for Civilian Preparedness promoted a broad and inclusive approach (Hovden Interview, 2019). The Vulnerability Commission delivered its report, titled *A Vulnerable society. Challenges for security and preparedness efforts* (*NOU* 2000:24, 2000) in June 2000. The report offered a detailed description of
what risk, vulnerability, preparedness, crises, and catastrophes are, following Perrow and Quarantelli’s literature. There was a strong focus on a series of accidents, natural and man-made crises that could affect the newly introduced term *samfunnssikkerhet* in its societal values such as life, public health and welfare, environment, the democratic system and its legal institutions, national governance and sovereignty, the country’s territorial integrity, along with its material and financial security, and culture (NOU 2000:24, 2000:8). *Samfunnssikkerhet* is not explicitly defined in this report, but it is applied as a blanket term impacted by a wide range of unwanted events that occur as a result of one or more coincidences, thus affecting the *safety* of the Norwegian society, and of deliberation and planning, thus having implications for its *security* (as Appendix 1 explains: see NOU 2000:24, 2000: 307). In the report, a set of measures to strengthen *samfunnssikkerhet* included increased cooperation between Police and Armed Forces, along with improvements to prevention and rescue services on the one side and intelligence and surveillance services on the other side. In addition, concrete measures for a better coordination between national and local levels were suggested, along with support to research. The Commission pointed out that the responsibility for crisis management was scattered among too many actors within different levels of governance, causing fragmentation, ad hoc responses, and a lack of prioritisation. To overcome this challenge, the Commission put forward three main recommendations: (a) a reorganisation of the political and administrative structures responsible for safety and security (for instance, a new Ministry of Security and Preparedness, separated from the Ministry of Justice, with coordination and executive functions, risk assessment capacities, and a central administration able to detect and follow all types of crises); (b) a strategy to merge relevant safety and security authorities to decrease the number of bodies and ministries; and (c) a new commission to work with major accidents and crises (Hovden, 2004b).

In the report, Professor Hovden provided a heuristic figure – the so-called ‘cross of thought’ – which attempts to show what *samfunnssikkerhet* is and includes (see NOU 2000:24, 2000: 287). The figure illustrates the two dimensions of *samfunnssikkerhet* by distinguishing between the English terms ‘safety’ and ‘security’. The horizontal axis lists unintended events (under the category of safety) and intended events (under the category of security). In the vertical axis are vulnerabilities, from the micro level (individual safety) to the macro one (national security). *Samfunnssikkerhet*, it is proposed, includes all this. Vulnerability in this approach touches upon macro values (national security) as much as micro values (individual safety). Indeed, the centrality of preserving central societal values was a recurrent theme throughout the report. The two axes are intertwined and raise challenges for *samfunnssikkerhet* in terms of how to make the society more robust. This approach underlines a significant shift of focus: from risk and probability that an event occurs to vulnerabilities and the macro and micro values therein.
By the time the Commission delivered its conclusions in June 2000, there was a new Norwegian government, this time led by the Labour Party. The Minister of Justice assigned the Ministry of Labour and Administration the task of following the recommendation about a new Ministry, showing the importance of establishing a distinctive political apparatus dealing with *samfunnssikkerhet* (Hovden Interview, 2019). However, with Mr Dørum again as Minister of Justice in 2001, that recommendation was only partially fulfilled through the establishment of the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning in 2003, under the Ministry of Justice. This Directorate was the result of the merging of the Directorate for Civilian Preparedness (established in 1970) and the Directorate for Fire and Electrical Safety (established in 2001).

According to Hovden (Hovden Interview, 2019), the report did not receive the deserved media attention mainly due to these governmental shifts. However, the attacks of 11 September 2001 triggered media interest around it and Professor Hovden was soon involved in a series of meetings all over Norway to talk about its content (Hovden Interview, 2019). The attacks of 11 September 2001, together with the millennium bug, the outbreak of the foot-and-mouth disease in Europe, and some national transport accidents, were mentioned several times as new security challenges that needed to be handled with new measures in the follow-up of the report, White Paper 17 (2001–2002), *Samfunnssikkerhet. The road to a less vulnerable society* (St. Meld. 17, 2002). Professor Hovden was informally invited to several meetings with state officials and helped them to elaborate the definition of *samfunnssikkerhet* (Hovden Interview, 2019) as:

> the ability of a society has to maintain important societal functions and to safeguard citizens’ lives, health and basic needs under various forms of stress. The concept of *samfunnssikkerhet* is widely used and covers security against a full range of challenges, from limited, natural events, to major crises that represent an extensive danger to life, health, environment and material values, to security challenges that threaten the nation’s independence or existence.

(St. Meld. 17, 2002: 4)

In this definition, according to the document, there are key concepts that need explanation. For instance ability (*evne*) is the quality to cope with extraordinary events. To maintain (*opprettholde*) means to resist against negative events. Societal functions (*samfunnsfunksjoner*) encompass transport, health, and energy, but also manpower, leadership, and Police, thus covering both the sectors and the systems that help a society perform. The challenges to security were of any type and scale (from limited to major), as the report had pointed out. White Paper 17 emphasised, in particular, major threats like international terrorism, organised crime, technological failures, and climate change that emerged at that time. As such, *samfunnssikkerhet*
dealt with all the types of events in peacetime, during a crisis and in war, no matter if they impacted individual safety or national security, in terms of the independence and existence of the Norwegian state.

With such broad definition, one might ask, which security challenges are left to the traditional notion of total defence? White Paper 17 did not address the issue and kept the definition of total defence within the traditional approach, although recognising that the distinction between external and internal threats was blurred:

The total defence concept includes civilian support to the military defence of the Norwegian territory. The term civilian preparedness will preferably be used for those preparations which take place at a civilian side with the aim of supporting the defence of the Norwegian territory or securing civil society and civilian functions in crisis and war.

(St. Meld. 17, 2002: 92)

The new total defence approach

Two Norwegian parliamentary committees, Defence and Justice, jointly discussed White Paper 17. The involvement of two committees was quite unusual, but understandable when a governmental document touched upon military and civilian issues at the same time. The committees called for an adequate definition of total defence, which, according to them, was too vague in White Paper 17 (Innst. S. nr. 9 (2002–2003), 2003; Endregard, 2019).


White Paper 39 described a new total defence in these terms:

A comprehensive and modern total defence concept consists of mutual support and cooperation and optimal use of resources between the Armed Forces and civil society for prevention, contingency planning and operational matters. The new concept of total defence gives greater importance to the military support to civil society. In its work with *samfunnssikkerhet*, the government will give priority to the development of civilian and military reinforcement resources that can support the emergency services’ handling of more seldom and serious events as well.

(St. Meld. 39, 2004: 8)

The definition introduces some novelties. For instance, there is no mention of civilian preparedness, but civil society seems to become the second pillar of total defence now. In addition, Armed Forces and civil society are at the same conceptual level, since the support is mutual and intertwined.
However, the focus is shifted from societal support to the Armed Forces to the Armed Forces’ support to the society. In this way, total defence contributes to *samfunnssikkerhet*. Throughout White Paper 39, indeed, there are recurrent references to the work needed to strengthen *samfunnssikkerhet* through closer military and civilian cooperation. Some examples are the National Security Authority (NSM), jointly administrated by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defence, and military rescue services available for civilian operations. All this work aims at “preventing unwanted events from occurring and to minimise the consequences when such situations occur” (St. Meld. 39, 2004: 6) and “the protection of civilians and vital societal interests in a time when a military threat is not prominent” (St. Meld. 39, 2004: 7). So, prevention and protection are the core of *samfunnssikkerhet* work, as much as of total defence. The scope of total defence was widened to those events placed in a so-called grey zone, which did not affect the security of the state in military terms, but rather the security of civil society such as terrorism and international crime. This widening of total defence in Norway does not find a corresponding conceptual expansion in Sweden, where the Swedish total defence is reserved for preparing Sweden for war (see also Larsson, this volume).

The long-term plan (St. Prp. 42, 2004) consisted of a timely description of the organisational changes within the Armed Forces since 2001 and the future plans to make them adhere to the new total defence approach described in White Paper 39. It should not come as a surprise, considering that the Ministry of Defence is behind this document, that the definition of *samfunnssikkerhet* used here is not as inclusive as in White Paper 17:

*Samfunnssikkerhet* concerns safeguarding the security of the civilian population and the protection of key societal functions and important infrastructures against attacks and other harmful situations where the state’s existence as such is not threatened.

(St. Prp. 42, 2004: 19)

This definition implied that the preservation of Norway’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty was primarily a task for total defence. At the same time, the document underlined several times that it is not easy to draw a line between state security, guaranteed by total defence, and *samfunnssikkerhet*, guaranteed by close military and civilian cooperation, due to the growing complexity of Norwegian society and the world as such. Therefore, the subsequent reforms of the Armed Forces needed to consider that threats and crises would not fall merely under military or civilian responsibility. One of the tasks of the Armed Forces was, nonetheless, to contribute to strengthening *samfunnssikkerhet* by supporting Police and civilian authorities, according to the new total defence approach.

The follow-up of White Paper 39 and the long-term plan was White Paper 22 (2007–2008) *Samfunnssikkerhet – Collaboration and coordination*
Emergence of samfunnssikkerhet in Norway

(St. Meld. 22, 2008). In this document, the definition of samfunnssikkerhet was taken from the earlier White Paper 17. The introduction explicitly stated that samfunnssikkerhet has a broad meaning, since it covers minor and major events, intentional and unintentional: natural disasters, fires, terrorist attacks, sabotage, espionage and international crime threatening life, health, environment, values, and the nation’s independence or existence. The document presented the holistic approach of the Norwegian security policy, which could guarantee samfunnssikkerhet only through local, regional, national, international collaboration and coordination. In White Paper 22, the Norwegian government launched a series of initiatives: reinforcement of the Ministry of Justice’s coordination role, minimum requirements to be followed by municipalities in emergency preparedness, investments to involve volunteers in rescue services, and the strengthening of security measures to protect critical infrastructures. As the title of White Paper 22 suggests, the government aimed at involving agencies and ministries at all levels of governance and from all sectors in a cooperative and coordinated effort to guarantee the protection of Norwegian society, also through the strengthening of the security international cooperation, both at European Union level (the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism and the EU Programme for the protection of critical infrastructures) and United National level.

These collaborative and coordination efforts were directed also towards total defence. The relationship between total defence and samfunnssikkerhet was described as follows:

Its core [total defence] is the mutual support between the Armed Forces and civil society within prevention, preparedness and crisis management across the entire crisis spectrum from peace to crises and war impacting security. The Armed Forces’ contribution to samfunnssikkerhet requires that the Armed Forces can only contribute based on their available capacities, expertise and the resources to fulfil the primary task of defence... All civilian crises should be handled with civilian resources. Nevertheless, the total defence concept is relevant for the work on samfunnssikkerhet about reinforcement and collaboration.

(St. Meld. 22, 2008:71)

The development of samfunnssikkerhet since 2006

The preservation of societal functions is a recurrent term in all the above-mentioned documents. However, none of them clearly described what societal functions are. A partial attempt is traceable in White Paper 17, where societal functions include a wide range of sectors, such as health, energy, and transport, and the systems that make these sectors and, thus, the entire society operate properly. Any disruption of these societal functions, due to crises and disasters, makes society more vulnerable and exposed to
serious consequences. In 2006, the Ministry of Justice and Police established another commission to help identify and analyse societal functions that are vital for the well-functioning of the Norwegian state and society, in addition to suggesting a series of measures to protect them. The so-called Infrastructure Commission provided a report, *When security is the most important. Protection of the country’s critical infrastructures and critical societal functions* (NOU 2006:6, 2006), which, right from the title, made a clear distinction between critical infrastructures and societal functions. Critical infrastructures, in that document, are regarded as facilities and systems necessary to maintain societal critical functions such as electric power grids, IT systems for communication, water supply, transport, oil and gas. Societal functions cover the basic societal needs and the population’s perception to be safe and are, for instance, health and social services, Police, emergency and rescue services, as well as the parliament, the government, the Armed Forces, and the judicial system (NOU 2006:6, 2006: 16). According to the report, security challenges, such as climate change, natural disasters, terrorism, organised crime, ageing infrastructures, deregulation, affect critical infrastructures and societal functions due to their mutual dependencies. Thus, within the work in *samfunnssikkerhet*, various legislative, organisational, and financial measures at all levels of governance need to be taken into account to protect Norwegian society. This work echoes, to some extent, the Finnish Concept for Comprehensive Security (see also Valtonen and Branders, this volume, for similarly encompassing objects of security).

In addition to this clarification, the report sheds light on certain challenges resulting from the development of *samfunnssikkerhet* in the previous White Papers. The Infrastructure Commission argued that the term was ambiguous and distinguished amongst a broad, narrow, and political approach. In the broad approach, *samfunnssikkerhet* included extraordinary, along with every day and minor, events. Every day and minor events such as fires or traffic accidents were included since they might cause harm to society if they were not properly prevented and handled. This broad definition has, however, a weakness: by including such as wide range of threats and risk, it ends up being imprecise and difficult to use. The narrow approach considers only extraordinary events as the focus of *samfunnssikkerhet*, since they have the potential to harm large parts of the society. Extraordinary means are required to cope with these events. Finally, the political approach was the result of three White Papers. The first one was White Paper 17. The second was White Paper 39, which, as much as White Paper 17, treated *samfunnssikkerhet* as a blanket word. The third was White Paper 37 (2004–2005), *South Asia tsunami disaster and centralised crisis management* (St. Meld. 37, 2005), which was launched by the Ministry of Justice and Police few months after the 2004 Tsunami in Southeast Asia, where 84 Norwegian citizens lost their life. Here, *samfunnssikkerhet* is described as the goal of:

safeguarding the security of the civilian population and the protection of key societal functions and important infrastructure against attacks
and other harmful situations where the state’s basic interests are not threatened.

(St. Meld. 37, 2005: 50)

This definition is almost identical to the one from the Ministry of Defence’s long-term plan. It is the first time that terms like attacks, usually belonging to military lexicon, were used in a White Paper by the Ministry of Justice.

Based on these texts, one might perceive a predominant political approach deriving from official policy documents provided by the Ministry of Justice and Police and reflected in statements from the Ministry of Defence. Within this political approach, it is possible to make a distinction based on (1) the type of events (major or minor or both) one aims at including, without making a distinction between intended or unintended, and (2) what is impacted: societal values, critical infrastructures, societal functions, personal safety, and state as such (with the latter sometimes but not always included).

The terrorist attacks on 22 July 2011 perpetrated by Anders Breivik shook the whole of society. The Gjørv Commission was appointed to recommend improvements in the national crisis management system (NOU 2012:14, 2012). While the Commission was still working, the Ministry of Justice and Preparedness launched a new White Paper 29 (2011–2012), Societal Security (St. Meld. 29, 2012), which was very much influenced by that tragic event, to the point that the definition of samfunnssikkerhet made an explicit distinction of three kinds of events, the last one a clear reference to the terrorist attacks:

Samfunnssikkerhet involves protecting society from events that threaten fundamental values and functions and that put lives and health in danger. Such events may be triggered by nature, be a result of technical or human error, or of deliberate actions.

(St. Meld. 29, 2012:9)

In addition, it is the society as a whole that needs to be protected, in this approach. No distinction was made between societal values, critical infrastructures, societal functions, personal safety, and so on. White Paper 29 reviewed the national crisis management system and promoted measures and initiatives to avoid future similar events by strengthening collaboration and coordination among the responsible actors from the local to the national level. The renamed Ministry of Justice and Preparedness was invested with four new tasks: reduce societal vulnerability, strengthen interactions in preparedness and crisis management, improve management and management culture, and knowledge-based prevention.

The latest White Paper on samfunnssikkerhet (St. Meld. 10, 2016) was published in December 2016 with two novelties. First, the content of the document was presented as the Norwegian government’s samfunnssikkerhet strategy in a four-year perspective. The lexicon in the White Paper recalled the strategies provided by the European Union on several topics,
but, particularly, in the field of security such as the 2003 European Security Strategy and 2016 European Union Global Strategy released few months before this White Paper. Second, for the first time, an English version of the content was made available, with the title White Paper 10. Report to the Storting (White Paper) Risk in a Safe and Secure Society. On Public Security (White Paper 10, 2016). The Norwegian term samfunnssikkerhet is here translated as public security and the definition is as follows:

Public security is society’s ability to protect itself against, and manage, incidents that threaten fundamental values and functions and that put lives and health in danger. Such incidents may be caused by nature, by technical or human error, or by intentional acts. Public security is influenced by three factors: the values we seek to protect, and their vulnerabilities; the dangers and threats we are confronted with; our ability to prevent and manage.

(White Paper 10, 2016: 8)

This definition draws together wording from White Paper 17 (the ability of a society, societal functions, fundamental values) and from White Paper 29 (events that threaten fundamental values and functions and that put lives and health in danger. Such events may be triggered by nature, be a result of technical or human error or of deliberate actions). However, the definition from White Paper 10 underlined two substantial shifts. First, the notion of ability regained a central role. The ability of the society to cope and manage was, indeed, lost in the White Papers following White Paper 17, in which society was treated almost as a passive recipient of protection from an external entity. Second, the main expression of this ability is self-protection and self-management. These two tasks give society a more active and dynamic role and come close to a form of ‘governmentality’, which encourages self-responsibilities and self-regulation, similar to those associated with the term resilience, as argued by Joseph (2013; see also Villumsen Berling and Lund Petersen, this volume). Indeed, White Paper 10 stated that “a society’s ability to prevent and manage crises depends on more than public resources and efforts” (White Paper 10, 2016: 7) and that in a resilient society everybody is called to contribute to making Norwegian society stronger, since “we must all accept responsibility for how our own actions can affect the security of others” (White Paper 10, 2016: 7). In this context, the state’s main role is to provide Norwegian society with the best instruments to protect itself, bounce back after a crisis and learn to live and cope with risks and threats. This expanded upon White Paper 17, which had briefly mentioned individual responsibility in carrying on samfunnssikkerhet (St. Meld. 17, 2002: 4). To some extent, the Norwegian counterterrorism policy follows the same trend, as the chapter by Jore (this volume) demonstrates. Table 4.1 summarises the definitions of samfunnssikkerhet from the various policy documents analysed in this chapter.
Table 4.1 Summary of *samfunnsikkerhet* definitions in policy documents

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<td>To safeguard</td>
<td>To safeguard</td>
<td>To protect</td>
<td>Society</td>
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<td></td>
<td>To maintain</td>
<td>To protect</td>
<td>To protect</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fundamental values</td>
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<td></td>
<td>To safeguard</td>
<td>Civilian population</td>
<td>Civilian population</td>
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<td>and functions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Important societal</td>
<td>Key societal</td>
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<td>Lives and health</td>
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<td>functions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>citizens’ lives</td>
<td>Important</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Health and basic needs</td>
<td>infrastructures</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>The state’s existence</td>
<td>The state’s basic</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>material values</td>
<td>as such is not threatened</td>
<td>interests are not threatened</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nation’s independence or existence</td>
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<tr>
<td>What is under threat/risk</td>
<td>Various forms of stress</td>
<td>Attacks Other harmful situations</td>
<td>Threatening and dangerous events</td>
<td>Nature, technical or human error, or intentional acts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Specification of what is the threat/risk/crisis</td>
<td>Full range of challenges, from limited, natural events to major crises</td>
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Emergence of *samfunnsikkerhet* in Norway
In sum, the ostensible aim of *samfunnssikkerhet* does not substantially change through the various policy documents in terms of what is said to be protected and safeguarded. The exception here is White Paper 17, which explicitly includes the state’s independence and existence as requiring protection, while the Proposition to the Parliament 42 and White Paper 37 leave this articulation out. In contrast to that general continuity, the various definitions differ in how they describe which threats, risks, or crises most directly implicate *samfunnssikkerhet*.

**Samfunnssikkerhet in the Norwegian academic community**

The evolution of the concept of *samfunnssikkerhet* was not limited to the political arena. This section illustrates the Norwegian academic community’s contribution since the late 1990s to establish *samfunnssikkerhet* as a subject to be taught in higher education. It is possible to track the beginning of this process, thanks to original documents such as minutes of internal meetings at the then-Stavanger University College (now the University of Stavanger), where in 1995 a group of scholars, supported by local and national politicians, started to draft a Master level study programme in *samfunnssikkerhet* (HiS, 1999a; Aven, 2013). Until then, no such term could be found in Norwegian academia (Aven et al., 2011). The closest, conceptually, that one could find was related to Norwegian research generated in the 1980s regarding industrial safety and the oil and transport sectors’ technological challenges. Since 2002, the Research Council of Norway had supported research programmes such as RISIT – Risk and Safety in the Transport Sector and HSE Petroleum (NFR, 2005). Study programmes, mainly at the University of Trondheim (NTNU), Stavanger University College, the University of Oslo, and Stord/Haugesund University College (now Western Norway University of Applied Sciences), focused on industrial safety. In particular, Stavanger University College had a long tradition in teaching subjects in this field: in 1981, thanks to a collaboration with Phillips Petroleum Company, a Bachelor’s programme in safety management was established, while, in 1987, petroleum technology studies were enriched by specialisations in safety techniques, thanks to collaboration with Statoil (now Equinor), the national oil and gas company (HiS, 1999b).

The group of academics at Stavanger University College who launched the Master’s programme in *samfunnssikkerhet* looked first and foremost at their own academic profiles to design the curriculum: risk analysis, urban planning, and accident prevention were the main areas in which they taught. Second, they considered accidents and crises in Norway during recent years and recognised their variety and the series of new challenges they raised for Norwegian society and the policy-makers. They made the distinction between intentional and unintentional events, since what they could provide was their expertise on unintentional events and their consequences. Intentional events, such as terrorism and sabotage, were purposely left outside
the scope of the Master’s programme (Boyesen Interview, 2019). Third, they received support from the County Governor and the Directorate for Civilian Preparedness. Local and national politicians were included in the working group in charge of preparing the application for the establishment of the Master’s programme, together with representatives from the business community and from other universities and university colleges in Norway. Professor Hovden was among the academic representatives, and he later became Adjunct Professor in Stavanger for a few years, to cooperate with the local academic community in supporting the Master’s programme. The application for the establishment of the Master’s programme was sent to the then-Ministry for Church, Education and Research in 1997, approved in 1998, and the first cohort of students matriculated in autumn 1999. Even before the report of the Vulnerability Commission and White Paper 17, the term *samfunnssikkerhet* emerged as the main focus in a new study programme in Stavanger.

The pioneering aspect of this Master’s programme rested in its multidisciplinary approach, during a period when academic disciplines were still developed within their rigid traditions. The Master’s programme relied on a group of academics from different disciplines, working at the Department of Technical and Natural Sciences and the Department of Economics, Culture and Society, which jointly established the programme. They considered that challenges related to *samfunnssikkerhet* needed the contribution of different disciplines. This multidisciplinary approach led to 30 years of research in a field that today has been firmly established as interdisciplinary and one that combines theory and practice. The education and research on security in Norway, from being dominated by engineering and, to some extent, economics within the field of industrial safety and accidents, have been enriched by the perspectives of social science, psychology, and anthropology due to the increased interactions between society, technology, organisations, and crises.

Interestingly, in the Master’s programme study plan, there is no definition of *samfunnssikkerhet* (HiS, 1999a). However, the Master’s programme was meant to provide students with competence to the development of a resilient society, a profound understanding of emergency preparedness, crisis management, and how society could be protected against threats and risks. The English name given to the Master’s programme was Resilience Management, reflecting the relative fungibility of the concept (see also Hyvönen and Juntunen, this volume, for similar developments in Finland). As of 2020, the time of writing, the University of Stavanger offers the widest and oldest higher education in *samfunnssikkerhet*, with subjects at Bachelor level, a series of Master’s programmes, an experience-based Master’s programme, and a multidisciplinary PhD programme.

A few years after the Master’s programme in *samfunnssikkerhet*, the Norwegian academic community began to reflect on the meaning of *samfunnssikkerhet*. Following the recommendation of the Vulnerability
Commission’s report to establish a research programme on *samfunnssikkerhet*, the Research Council of Norway invited the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and academic representatives from Stavanger University College, NTNU, Rogaland Research, SINTEF, the University of Oslo, and the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment to meet in a so-called ‘consensus seminar’ in Stavanger in October 2004 (Kruke et al., 2005). The participants aimed to better explain the key terms contained in the definition from White Paper 17 and to establish useful criteria, in order to distinguish which events threatened *samfunnssikkerhet* and which ones were outside its scope. The meeting concluded with the following points:

- **Ability (evne):** society’s daily management, as well as institutions and society’s management of extraordinary events.
- **Maintain (oppretholde):** to be resilient.
- **Critical social functions (viktige samfunnsfunksjoner):** both the institutions and the systems which keep a society functioning.
- **Protecting the life and health of citizens and meeting their basic requirements (borgerens liv, helse og grunnleggende behov):** institutions should cope with negative events, by guaranteeing protection to their citizens.

An event affects *samfunnssikkerhet* if it falls into one or more of the following categories:

- **Major events that go beyond the ability of the affected local community to manage the consequences, since they are impossible to handle with established systems and common routines (extraordinary stresses and losses).**
- **Events impacting technological and societal systems with complicated links and strong mutual dependence (complexity and mutual dependence).**
- **Events that undermine trust in the institutions that should protect and prevent (trust in vital social functions).**

These categories were not meant to be exhaustive, but a way to operationalise what *samfunnssikkerhet* was and to avoid that it included all kinds of stresses. For instance, national defence, human security, and sustainable development were areas falling partially outside the scope of *samfunnssikkerhet*. Moreover, events such as daily life damages, common diseases, isolated accidents, and common crime were not considered a risk or a threat to the Norwegian society. However, the participants admitted that there were grey zones and overlapping issues in both cases. It was further argued that traffic accidents, domestic accidents, or work accidents might not have any impact on *samfunnssikkerhet* (ibid., 2005). The participants fully supported the recommendation from the Vulnerability Commission’s report to establish a national research programme. Indeed, in 2006, the Research Council of
Norway launched SAMRISK (*samfunnssikkerhet og risiko*), using a similar concept and perspective, which contributed to additional institutionalisation of the term (NFR, 2011, 2014, 2018).

The key findings of the seminar were refined in an English article published in 2007 by some of the seminar’s participants (Olsen et al., 2007). In the article, *samfunnssikkerhet* was translated as societal safety in English. This translation reflects the peculiar context in which *samfunnssikkerhet* was born as an academic subject, characterised by a strong academic tradition in safety science and safety management of accidents occurring within high-risk industries such as oil and gas, shipping, nuclear plants, and transport, and very much influenced by the seminal works of Perrow (1984), La Porte and Consolini (1991), Beck (1992), and Rasmussen (1997). However, if one follows the distinction between safety and security from the heuristic figure by Hovden, mentioned earlier (see NOU 2000:24, 2000: 287), safety is related to unintentional events, while security is related to intentional events like terrorism. Thus, societal safety poses the problem of emphasising only certain kinds of events, while in the Norwegian term there is no such differentiation, since *samfunnssikkerhet* covers safety as much as security. Indeed, the 2007 article uses examples of events that fall under both headings. At this point, a linguistic digression is necessary, since the use of another language may have effects in the way *samfunnssikkerhet* research is conveyed. According to the Oxford Dictionary, security derives from the Latin word, *securus*, which means free from care (*se* (sine) – without and *cura* – concern, care, responsibility). In English, security is “the condition of being free from danger or threat” (Oxford Dictionary, 2019a). Safety derives from Latin, *salvus*, which means unharmed, safe, alive. In English, safety denotes a condition, too: “the condition of being protected from or unlikely to cause danger, risk, or injury” (Oxford Dictionary, 2019b). Both words describe a condition or a state, while the only distinction that may arise in practice is that security cannot be achieved if safety is not guaranteed. As Finn-Erik Vinje, a philologist and professor in Nordic languages, pointed out (Vinje, 2005), a distinction between *safety* and *security* based on the type of the events – unintentional in the case of safety, intentional in the case of security – does not exist in English, as much as it does not exist in the Norwegian word *sikkerhet*. Furthermore, Vinje argues that if the focus is on unintentional or intentional events, then the Norwegian language should use other terms such as *trygghet* (to be safe) and *sikring* (protection), respectively. Vinje’s philological attempt did not find any further development in Norwegian academia and remains the only one of this kind. To some extent, his proposal was taken up by the Standards Norway, which admitted that the English terms security and safety have been widely used, often inconveniently in the Norwegian context and thus they prefer to use the term protection for intentional events, instead of security (Standard Norge, 2012). Engen et al. (2016) argue that a clear distinction between safety and security is difficult to achieve. One should rather discuss threats and risks that impact the
Conclusion

The changed global geopolitical situation after the end of the Cold War questioned the Norwegian total defence approach. In the attempt to adapt to new times, total defence was modified in the relationship between its two pillars – military defence and civilian preparedness. Civilian preparedness has undergone the most radical changes, with a progressive disengagement of the Armed Forces in this field and the emergence of *samfunnssikkerhet*, a concept embedded in Norwegian national policy, as well as in the higher education and research field. The total defence approach survived in a new fashion, as a complement to strengthen *samfunnssikkerhet* by supporting Police and civilian authorities in coping with crises and disasters.

The definition of *samfunnssikkerhet* is political in the sense that it stems from public policy documents, starting from White Paper 17. These documents were the Norwegian government’s response to security changes and challenges at international and national level. Events with global impact, like the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 or the 2004 Tsunami, raised the same concern as local events like a flood or an avalanche: how to make Norwegian society, its infrastructures, and its functions increasingly robust. The external-internal divide that characterised the total defence approach does not concern *samfunnssikkerhet* in most of the policy documents analysed in this chapter. This political definition is not questioned by the Norwegian academic community, whose main contribution is to operationalise it by studying what or who is under threat or at risk, why, and which measures and initiatives the Norwegian government should pursue to strengthen *samfunnssikkerhet*.

In the Norwegian context, *samfunnssikkerhet* includes three aspects. It is, first and foremost, an ability of the society with the following attributes: to maintain, safeguard, protect, and manage. While society is treated as a static object in White Paper 17, in White Paper 10, society is construed as having a more active role in self-protection and self-management. Second, *samfunnssikkerhet* is a state’s task, which, through measures and actions against a wide range of stresses, provides protection to society and lessens vulnerabilities, but at the same time, seeks to make the Norwegian society more self-reliant, as White Paper 10 underlines. Third, *samfunnssikkerhet* is everything that needs to be protected and preserved to make the Norwegian society properly perform: fundamental values, critical infrastructures, societal functions, basic needs, the integrity and the sovereignty of the state.

As made clear in this chapter, the notion and deployment of *samfunnssikkerhet* as concept were influenced by broad societal debates, institutional interests, and, of course, actual events. In these aspects, the development
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of the concept follows a similar line to the development of the ‘societal security’ or samhällssäkerhet concept in Sweden (Stiglund, this volume) and in the related ‘comprehensive security’ concept in Finland (Valtonen and Branders, this volume) or ‘security uncertainties’ in Denmark (Liebetrau, this volume). In all cases, the perception of a changing security environment, from the end of the Cold War to 11 September 2001, and the rise of societal threats such as pandemics and cyber-attacks prompted ongoing revisions and rearticulations of the goals of national security policies in these Nordic countries. The most recent shift in the security environment, often articulated as the ‘return of geopolitics’ following the Russian invasion of the Crimea in 2014, portends further changes in the articulation of security goals. In Norway, this is likely to play out in new relationships between the broad samfunnssikkerhet concept and the more traditional total defence notion. While the latter has until now been seen as a complement to the former, time will tell whether it regains dominance in the years ahead.

Notes

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2 A White Paper illustrates challenges in certain national policies and offers recommendations on how to solve them. They are not binding documents, but after a White Paper is approved by the Government, it is sent to the Norwegian Parliament (Storting), which usually elaborates proposals based on it that eventually become Norwegian laws. Usually, a White Paper is preceded by Official Reports, which are the result of working groups or committees – established inside the various Ministries, including the Prime Minister Office – to discuss and then report to the Ministry on a topic deemed relevant for the Norwegian society. In general, the members of these committees are selected by the political parties from different public services and the academia to guarantee a broad and diversified professional representation. The Propositions to the Parliament are the Norwegian government’s requests to the Parliament to take a decision about new legislation or amendments to an existing legislation, the budget, or other issues where the Parliament has to vote upon. The documents serving this chapter are provided by the websites of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Justice and Public Security.

3 All translations of Norwegian into English are done by the author.

4 For detailed accounts on the total defence during the Cold War, see Rønne and Sørlie (2006), Gjeseth et al. (2004), and Skogrand (2004).

5 The names of ministries and national agencies change through the chapter according to the changes introduced during the period under study.

6 The name was changed in January 2012.

7 The author worked with both versions, the Norwegian and the English, to verify the adherence of the English translation to the Norwegian text.

8 The author adopted the names as they were used at that time.
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5 Tracing the Finnish Comprehensive Security Model

Vesa Valtonen and Minna Branders

Introduction

The provision of security and defence in modern societies struggles with growing threat complexity and a widening array of actors. As the UK Ministry of Defence put it in 2018, the

rate of change and level of uncertainty [in modern security governance] may outpace good governance and unity. The complex interaction of these trends is potentially a game changer and demands a new approach that places strategic adaptability at its core.

(MoD UK 2018, 11).

This chapter traces how Finland has reacted to such pressures both conceptually and in bureaucratic practice, namely, it deals with the emergence of the “comprehensive security” notion, which in Finland can be called a “Comprehensive Security Model” (CSM). The Finnish CSM suggests a certain governance model for how security should be addressed across societal and governmental levels, especially in an anticipatory fashion. It emphasises information sharing, preparedness planning, and effective implementation among multiple actors in different sectors. The CSM is in many respects a governance model, focused on coordination, a phenomenon-led approach, and firmly situated in the rule of law.

The chapter begins by reflecting on the Finnish comprehensive approach in relation to other concepts such as societal security and resilience. It then offers an overview of the Finnish approach, which is crystallised in practice by CSM, and outlines its key components. The chapter then traces the Finnish concept of comprehensive security as a public policy, analysing its development into a rather unique model of practice. The chapter poses a question: how and under what circumstances was the model developed? More specifically, how were the policy features involving comprehensive security interpreted, conceptualised, and put to work in Finland, and with what implications? The approach we use is document analysis at the strategic level, including white papers and steering documents, because comprehensive security is a strategy or state level concept.
We argue that a number of key developments shaped today’s Finnish approach to comprehensive security, including the historical context of wars fought by Finland and the resulting sense of trust and shared purpose that led to the notion of Total Defence. The post-Cold War security context and a widening threat perspective further enabled the emergence of a new approach to security thinking and practice, built on pragmatism and strongly backed by politicians. In this context, the CSM emerged as both a concept and a model of practice that included coordination within a common framework, regular interaction, and trust-building amongst officials. We conclude the chapter with an overview of enduring challenges to the CSM model, many brought by an increasingly complex threat environment, and reflect upon Nordic similarities and differences.

The comprehensive security concept in comparative perspective

The Finnish model of comprehensive security, especially in the context of this book, must be seen in relation to broader Nordic notions of “societal security”. In a Nordic perspective, the concept of societal security has an ambiguous origin and can be linked both to the initial conceptualisation of the Copenhagen school of securitisation and to a later functional variant that broadened security practices across the region by bringing crisis management, preparedness, hybrid threats, and military discourses into the concept (Rhinard, this volume). Broadly speaking, societal security can be understood as a new approach to security that involves a wide set of considerations necessary to permit society to retain and underpin its identity and core values.

According to some studies, societal security is likely to become a dominant security policy referent object, in which all other phenomena, including national security, are subsumed (see Aaltola et al. 2018, 8). Nordic security research equates societal security and holistic security thinking with not only the identification of uncertainties and the resilience perspective but also the link between development to the security environment, the development of capabilities, and the knowledge base to promote security, and emphasises contexts such as the human, socio-technological, societal, political, organisational, and international (Nordforsk 2013). Societal security has clear consequences for society and its functioning, social institutions, civil society, and democracy (Virta and Branders 2016, 2).

The generic, scholarly notion of “comprehensive security” is also worth discussing before outlining the Finnish version in practice. In academic literature, the concept of comprehensive security is characterised from a holistic point of view as a target, a process, or the ideal state. The interpretative framework can be systemic or dynamic. Buzan (1991, 364–368) creates both systemic and complex perspectives with regard to security to capture the connotations of comprehensive security. According to Buzan, security issues can be described as more systemic problems. Political, military, economic, societal, and environmental factors are seen as interacting factors. The Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe’s definition
emphasises politico-military security, but also human rights and security democratic standards, economic and ecological aspects (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2013).

Comprehensive security is alternatively interpreted as both a conceptual approach and a governance model. It is thought to be the key concept of security policy and a goal that is achieved by coordinating non-state and state instruments and elements (Fitz-Gerald and Macnamara 2012, 4). Narratives associated with the concept usually include arguments that military capabilities are a key security instrument, but in themselves an inadequate tool, as a changing security environment requires a wider range of means to fight against modern security threats (see Fitz-Gerald and Macnamara 2012; Kauner and Zwolski 2013; Rieker 2006).

Branders (2016) studies the phenomenon of comprehensive security and recognises seven dimensions through which the notion of comprehensive security can be framed in political discourse (e.g. in security policies and policy papers): (1) the use of “broad security” as a policy and strategic doctrine, involving unifying and holistic security thinking; (2) “comprehensive security” as requiring ongoing and continuous processes, and taking into account global flows and systems; (3) the development of a stable and peaceful society, including the welfare dimension and “human security”; (4) comprehensive defence (linked to “Total Defence”, as discussed below); (5) preparedness and continuity management; (6) the operational dimension of public authority cooperation; and (7) the ecological dimension (Branders 2016). Comprehensive security can also be seen as a matter of strategic state. The idea of strategic state includes common preparatory work, focusing on citizens’ needs and democracy (Murphy 2014, 243–244).

Despite the widespread use of broadening security concepts, especially in the Nordic region, the Finnish CSM is unique in several ways. First, as we will see below, the CSM emerged from a distinct historical context. As for other Nordic states, that context was rooted in a Total Defence-like security approach. Finland’s defence, however, differs over the years in its stance and relation to powerful neighbouring states like Russia. Second, general comprehensive security concepts tend to cover broad security threats and even safety issues (which in Finland are combined in the word turvallisuus). In Finland, however, broad security notions have been implemented and defined through the specific adoption of the model. The CSM emphasises, in short, how to operationalise comprehensive security – and it does so by suggesting governance approaches such as the collaboration of the security actors involved in planning and conducting preparedness (Security Committee 2017, 93). We now outline precisely what the CSM in Finland looks like.

**The Finnish CSM in a nutshell: securing the vital functions of the society**

The Finnish approach to comprehensive security takes the form of a model outlined in a series of government documents, both strategic and policy. In
essence, the CSM includes a broad array of threats and necessary responses, and includes the full range of action from pre-emption to crisis management and recovery, but is primarily directed towards implementation of those ideas by (a) focusing on coordination across and between governance levels, (b) taking a phenomenon-led approach, (c) being solidly built on the rule of law, and (d) emphasising preparedness.

The most recent and illustrative description of the Finnish CSM can be found in the Security Strategy for Society, which is a Government Resolution from November 2017. The foundation of that Security Strategy is collaboration between security actors. That means collaboration between authorities, the business community, and organisations – even citizens – while respecting the clear responsibilities of different authorities. Today, the private sector plays an important role in the CSM. The authorities secure the vital functions of the society with the assistance of private companies. In this regard, the capacity of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is important, especially in the latter phases of a crisis or, for example, in the event of a migration crisis. It is good to remember that there are some 130,000 registered associations in Finland which serve a variety of purposes.

The strategy reflects the core principles of the comprehensive security approach in Finland by outlining the importance of safeguarding the vital functions of the society: leadership, international and European Union (EU) activities, defence capability, internal security, economic infrastructure and security of supply, functional capacity of the population and services, psychological resilience (Security Committee 2017). The idea of having seven “vital” functions instead of a long list of critical functions is to provide guidance for thinking collaboratively. The interconnection and interdependence between various vital functions require information sharing and collaboration. Understanding the connections – and even beyond – raises joint awareness and builds trust.

The CSM is characterised by four major components. Starting with coordination and cooperation, the Finnish CSM has been developed as a process aiming towards better coordination amongst national security authorities, local authorities, organisations, and citizens. The model also takes into account the requirement of foresight on the security governance level. The term “comprehensive” has often been used in connection with crisis management as a comprehensive approach or framework (Mero 2009). Indeed, it regards a crisis as a process.

Coordination at the national level is centred on the Security Committee, which is responsible for facilitating the networked demands of comprehensive security. These collaborative forums, supported by various secretariats, meet regularly in order to share information, discuss security issues brought up by the members, and plan preparedness exercises. In practice, the Finnish CSM provides a model for municipalities and regions as well.

By having monthly or quarterly meetings with collaboration forums consisting of authorities, private companies, and NGOs, it is possible to
concentrate on how to reach another level of security actors: the citizens. Citizens are considered security actors in the Security Strategy for Society (2017), which reflects the desire to involve and motivate individuals to ensure their own resilience. New methods have been developed in order to motivate people. One good example is the “72 hours concept” (https://72tuntia.fi/en/) of the Finnish National Rescue Association. The 72 hours concept details the level of domestic preparedness recommended by the authorities and NGOs, so that the average citizen might survive for 72 hours without state assistance. The dialogue between authorities and citizens has been improved with the concept of “Security Cafés”. The Security Café is a deliberation and data collection method developed for the use of security authorities and researchers to access the general public opinion on safety and security issues. It is based on the ideals of deliberative democracy, and the method derives from Citizens’ Juries and World Cafés (Puustinen et al. 2020). The study on Security Cafés showed that people are willing and able to participate in local security planning and information sharing (Jalava et al. 2017).

Second, the Finnish CSM has been developed on a phenomenon-based approach, meaning that the development of security collaboration has emerged because of practical needs rather than administrative decisions. For example, the collaboration concept of the Border Guard, Customs, and Police has been developed through practical needs. The security phenomena do not follow the administrative sectors and therefore collaboration is required. This phenomenon-based orientation has penetrated even into the latest government programmes (Sitra 2018). Phenomenon-based security collaboration provides actors with incentives to work in an appropriate, feasible, timely, and proportionate manner. It also has an internal dynamic that allows for a future-oriented, more anticipatory way of working, compared to sectoral goal setting. According to Lähteenmäki-Smith and Virtanen (2019, 3) a phenomenon can be understood as a simple object of observation, something that is perceived, the reasons or explanations of which being ambiguous and the fundamental causalities or determining dimensions not being directly distinguished. Such phenomena need thus to be understood more comprehensively, from various points of view, systematically and beyond administrative or disciplinary boundaries.

Third, the rule of law is an important component to the CSM. The competent authority carries the main responsibility for planning and action in different emergencies and disruptions. In most cases, regular legislation is sufficient. However, when necessary, and if the conditions turn out to be unconventional, the Emergency Powers Act may give more capabilities and powers to different authorities. For example, Ministry of Transport and Communications may prioritise the use of traffic or communication networks for the authorities. The act also includes preparedness obligations for unconventional circumstances (Finlex 1552/2011).

Fourth, in the field of preparedness, the principle of being proactive in order to reduce costs and improve security has created foresight processes.
They are integrated into the Finnish model of Comprehensive Security today (Security Committee 2017). The foresight process within the Security Committee every year is a good example of that. It utilises several networks of expertise, and the end product is evaluated by an official collaborative forum for the use of state leaders (called a Cabinet Report). In addition, security of supply utilises the foresight process within the same processes (Huoltovarmuuskeskus 2018).

**The development of the concept**

The following discussion will present the development of the CSM in four steps. The first lays out the defence origins of the concepts, which is followed by a description of its leading principle, which we term as pragmatism. The third step reviews the threat-based planning that has occurred in the face of a changing security environment for Finland. Finally, a fourth step sets out the arguments used in favour of a “comprehensive approach”.

**The defence origins of comprehensive security**

The Finnish model of comprehensive security can be traced to the first decade of the country’s independence. Soon after the declaration of independence in 1917, Finns had to face a civil war, which was the outcome of the Bolshevik revolution encouraging the Finnish Red Guards to start a revolution. The state’s troops, the White Civil Guards, later supported by volunteers trained in Germany, the Finnish Jägers, and even German troops suppressed the revolution in May 1918. The aftermath was bloody, with the White side punishing the Reds (Tepora and Roselius 2014). The scars of the civil war were deep and still recognisable in the rhetorics of people and media even today, which was notable in social media during the centennial commemorations in the spring of 2018.

The building of regular security structures began immediately after the end of the civil war. In the early decades, the building of national security concentrated on the border guard and defence forces. In late 1918, the White Guards played an important role in the establishment of a police force (Hietaniemi 1992). The border in the east was very restless and required militarily organised troops, yet organised in a European manner under the Ministry of the Interior. The security situation in Karelia remained unstable even after the Treaty of Tartu in 1920. Finnish voluntary expeditionary troops moved over the eastern border in order “to liberate Karelian tribes” in the Soviet Union between 1918 and 1922. These so-called tribal wars were more or less improvised manoeuvres, and reflected the uncertain political atmosphere of the first years of Finland’s independence (Niinistö 2005).

In 1924, the first state level collaborative body, the Defence Council was established. The Ministry of Defence, Chief of the Army, Chief of the Civil Guard, and officers from the Headquarters constituted the Council.
It focused on the establishment of garrisons and material procurements. It was very soon supported by the Economic Defence Council, which was chaired by a senator and consisted of civil servants, CEOs, and bank managers (Tervasmäki 1983).

The 1920s and 1930s were the early decades of the building of the nation’s security structures. Finland’s own defence solutions and development of operational art and tactics and material were rather unique. The military concepts used in the First World War and the leading European countries were not applicable to the Finnish context, so many domestic innovations were put in practice; the Suomi-submachine gun, ski troops using sledges and tents with stoves proved to be very effective in action (Hollanti 2019).

The Finnish collaboration capabilities were put to a test during the Second World War. The so-called Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact¹ between the Soviet Union and Germany led to the Winter War in 1939–1940. The Soviet Union started its campaign to occupy Finland in November 1939 (Kivimäki 2012; Varrak 2016). Despite the poor material capability of the Finnish Defence Forces, Soviet attacks were stopped by using tactical and technical innovativeness supported with a strong will to defend the country. The concentrated masses of Soviet troops broke through at Summa on the Karelia Isthmus in February 1940, which urged Finnish politicians to seek peace, even with harsh conditions. The Finnish Army was exhausted after three months of fierce fighting, practically without reserves. Western European countries’ eagerness to support Finland turned out to be rhetorical and only quite modest support arrived from other countries. Swedish volunteers made an exception, as they contributed to the defence of Lapland, which helped Finnish troops to concentrate on the most critical areas in Karelia and on the coast of the Gulf of Finland (Ahto 1990; Kivimäki 2012; Vehviläinen 2002).

Against all odds, Finland was able to remain independent. The losses were big, but the morale was relatively strong. This had a socio-historical impact on collaborative thinking and support in the country. For example, one interesting feature is that merely two decades after the Civil War, there no longer was a sense of a strong divide between “Red” or “White” Finns, only Finnish citizens fighting for their fatherland. That had been a miscalculation from the part of the Soviets who thought that the Finnish working class would support the Red Army and the Soviet Komintern. On the contrary, the surprising outcome of the Winter War built up the narrative of the Finnish success story and unified the people (Ahto 1990; Kivimäki 2012).

The next phase of the Second World War was fought in an alliance with Germany. This was a politically sensitive issue, and Finnish politicians wanted to emphasise that Germany was not an “ally”; Finland was only fighting alongside Germany in order to reclaim what was lost in the Winter War peace agreement in Moscow in 1940. Of course, Finland was still widely considered to be in alliance with Germany, despite the attempt to avoid such a view on the political level (Vehviläinen 2002).
Finland recovered the lost areas of Karelia and access near Leningrad and the Murmansk railway as a part of Germanys’ offensive against the Soviet Union in 1941. This so-called Continuation War from 1941 to 1944 ended poorly after the first years’ success. The outcome was even worse than that of the Winter War. Karelia was lost again. Petsamo was lost with access to the Barents Sea. Still, Finland had to pay the equivalent of 300 million dollars in goods in war reparations to the Soviet Union 1944–1952 (Rautkallio 2014). Germany had been fighting alongside Finns in the Finnish Lapland, but now Germans had to be forced out of the country. The Lapland War between former allies was the last stage of the Second World War for Finns, ending in the spring of 1945 as the last Germans left Finnish soil (Ahto 1980; Kivimäki 2012). Once again, Finland managed to remain independent.

**Pragmatism as principle**

The devastating years of the Second World War resulted in hundreds of thousands of refugees from Karelia, 90,000 people having lost their lives, and the entire country being exhausted. As Finland had been forced to mobilise the whole nation in order to support its armed forces and survive, the concept of Total Defence was developed during and after the war. Since then, Finns have had a strong national will to defend their country, which has built both confidence in authorities and a willingness to work together. These features remain important cornerstones of building comprehensive security today (Ries 1988). Indeed, the lesson of the Second World War clearly suggested to the security establishment that a small country could not survive on its own for long. On the other hand, it was problematic to be allied to a partner that you could not really influence. The difficult alliance with Germany during the Continuation War 1941–1944 led to a war in Lapland against the former ally. This drastic experience has led to the dominance of pragmaticism as a principle in Finland, not only with regard to military alliances but also concerning broader efforts to security society.

During the Cold War, for example, the Soviet Union pressured Finland to keep a distance from other Western countries. This cognitive notion of Finland being regarded as “separate” from the rest of the world became institutionalised in official and unofficial thinking (Aaltola et al. 2014). This led to the famous Finnish mindset of go-it-alone isolationism captured by the Finnish word “impivaara”. Indeed, from the late 1940s to the early 1990s, Finland’s difficult balancing act between accepting Soviet pressure and trying to be part of the West gave birth to the term “Finlandization” (Aaltola et al. 2014, 160; Salminen 1999).

Despite these difficulties, the necessary focus on self-reliance led to pragmatic solutions and new innovations, especially in the field of security collaboration. They could be described as the nation’s “survival methods”, including security of supply during the early stages of comprehensive security. As reviewed earlier, Total Defence, including economical preparedness
and territorial defence, made up a solution that served as a common framework for preparing for war (Hollanti 2019). It also set the criteria for preparedness for the civil society.

Key to these innovations was the Finnish Defence Council, which restarted its activities in 1958 after being in silence mode during and after the Second World War. From this time, the Council helped devise the fundamental components of Total Defence that were organised and created from 1958 to 1966, detailed in the previous sections. Preparedness plans and organisations were formulated in the most important sectors of the society such as the economy, medical supply, telecommunication, and civil defence. Even scientific and psychological forms of resilience were organised. Highlighting the interplay of education and policy, as in Sweden (Larsson, this volume), so-called “national defence courses” were created then to provide comprehensive Total Defence education for key leaders in the beginning of the 1960s (Tervasmäki 1983).

Pragmatism, it can be said, led to a willingness to coordinate in Finnish government. For example, one significant success factor in security collaboration has been interagency collaborative forums at the state level. This started in the 1970s and 1980s, when the Finnish Defence Council engaged in high-level cooperative initiatives to improve Total Defence solutions. The President of the Republic or Prime Minister chaired the Council, while “Preparedness Chiefs” met in collaboration forums since 1978. Every ministry designated a security expert as its chief of preparedness. Their task was to support ministerial and governmental preparedness planning and incident management (Parmes 2019; Tervasmäki 1983). Chiefs of preparedness were either permanent secretaries of the ministries or other security experts, so the discussions were high-level and often led to concrete results. The secretary and, later, Chief of Preparedness of the Ministry of Communications and Traffic, Rauli Parmes, pointed out many successful collaborative actions concretised via the collaboration forums. One example is the TETRA-communication system for security authorities. The relevant authorities created a common communication system with the support of business community service providers in the 1980–1990s (Parmes 2019). The system is still valid and operative in the current generation of collaborative forums. As we can see, then, the foundation for much of what we see in today’s formulation of Finnish comprehensive security was set years earlier through the history, and defensive posture, of Finland towards its external security environment along with a degree of pragmatism in coordinating across governmental structures.

A widening threat environment

At the same time, perceptions of a changing security environment added additional pressure to change the strategic doctrines of Finnish security policy. For instance, at the turn of the millennium, developments in the
security environment and changing threat scenarios pushed Finland’s domestic policies to recognise cross-border interdependencies (Aaltola et al. 2014; Fjäder 2016). The collapse of the Soviet Union in the beginning of the 1990s and Finland’s entry into the EU in 1995 were the most important turning points in this respect. Finland’s EU membership made it possible for the country to improve its Western security collaboration. Soon enough, the NATO Partnership for Peace programme opened possibilities for Finland for strengthening military collaboration in various branches (Aaltola et al. 2014; Michel 2011). For Finland, security was a very important reason for joining the EU (Tiilikainen 2015).

In the late 1990s, war was no longer the “worst case scenario” for preparedness planners, since unintentional threats had joined intentional threats on the perceived threat spectrum. As for other Nordic countries, discourses emerged to suggest that Finland needed to have a more comprehensive approach to security. For example, many likeminded Western countries started to develop their critical infrastructure protection (CIP) concepts (Hagelstam 2005), and Finland followed suit. In late 2003, the Finnish government approved the first strategy for securing the vital functions of society. That was the first strategy providing common planning instructions involving threat scenarios for vital functions that needed to be secured in any circumstances, including general guidelines for managing a diverse array of security incidents (MoD 2003). The strategy was updated three times, leading first towards more specific preparedness planning. The strategy in 2006 represented for the first time the strategic tasks (counting 50) for ministries and disruption models (counted at 64) which required collaborative planning, thus reflecting the phenomena-based thinking discussed earlier. The second update in 2010 outlined the key aspects of a “comprehensive approach”. Ministerial tasks in the field of security of supply, for instance, were introduced as a new feature (Ahokas 2019; MoD 2006, 2010). The last update focused on creating general preparedness principles for supporting long-term planning and over the parliamentary terms.

During these years, the model of Total Defence gradually evolved into the Finnish concept of comprehensive security (see e.g. Hallberg Report, Valtioneuvoston kanslia 2010). It was based on an all-hazards principle, which placed central responsibility to the competent authority, placing all other relevant security actors in supporting roles. Involving all relevant security actors locally and regionally already at the planning phases in e.g. risk assessment ensured a shared situational understanding via information sharing. Training together was supposed to build trust and result in better preparedness. It can be argued that training for storms and natural hazards, for example, creates capabilities to manage not only man-made disasters but also hostile attacks. In both cases the actors use risk management models, share situation picture, do cross-agency co-ordination (Ministry of Interior 2018).
The shift from Total Defence to the comprehensive approach took place little by little in the beginning of this millennium. Total Defence could be criticised as a militarisation of the nation. These notions among others were weighed when the so-called Hallberg Committee examined the development needs especially with regard to Total Defence and comprehensive security (Valtioneuvoston kanslia 2010). The Committee Report suggested the current comprehensive approach. It suggested that the term Total Defence should be replaced with comprehensive security and the Defence and Security Committee should be called Security Committee. Other suggestions concerned information sharing and improvement of situational picture and awareness.

The shift from Total Defence to the comprehensive security approach can be regarded as a success. It fits very well with the National Defence Courses as a framework for preparedness education. According to Committee members (see i.e. Blogs from www.turvallisuuskomitea.fi) and several local-regional commentators it has contributed to dialogue and involvement in many practical exercises. It has allowed for a broader approach towards preparedness planning, which contributes to countering hybrid threats. The shift from defence-oriented preparedness to an all-hazards perspective provides more options for private companies and organisations to participate in common preparedness planning and implementation. Still, the comprehensive security concept includes Total Defence, and military exercises are conducted regularly in all parts of Finland (Ahokas 2019).

Political backing of comprehensive security

Political backing of the Comprehensive Security Model has remained strong. The model leans on principles of coordination instead of command and control. The rule of law and the principle of competent authority are highly respected. According to Branders (2016), the concept of comprehensive security has “positive valence” due to its holistic and promising nature as a target state. Furthermore, according to Patton et al. (2013), political viability means that a phenomenon is acceptable and it meets the requirements set for it. However, more attention should still be paid to the cooperation of security authorities on all levels of society, and in every phase of the planning process (Branders 2016, 146–150).

The comprehensive approach continues to enjoy high political backing. In 2019, the approach of Prime Minister Antti Rinne was repeated by Prime Minister Sanna Marin: “Preparedness will be carried out in line with the comprehensive approach to security and by developing the statutory basis” (Valtioneuvosto 2019b). In the official government programme, areas of development were represented phenomenon by phenomenon. This approach was a significant improvement from the comprehensive security point of view. That reflects the same approach which has been visible in security planning through the development of the security strategies for society.
Understanding the necessity of comprehensive thinking among politicians and key leaders from every vital branch is supported via National Defence Courses. Most of the members of Parliament, top CEO’s of critical infrastructure companies, NGO leaders, media leaders, cultural influencers, artists, and university personnel have attended the 3.5-week National Defence Course. The context comes from the CSM, and the 2017 Security Strategy for Society more specifically. The eagerness to participate in those courses expresses the will to take national security aspects seriously. At the moment, there are 600 Finnish top leaders queuing for the course, but only 200 are signed up per year. The courses have built shared understanding and practitioner networks despite differing political views since 1961.

The positive orientation towards domestic security cooperation is also supported by general conscription, and the fact that a significant number of leaders have a reserve officer rank. Conscription for men and voluntary women creates bonds not only among conscripts and reservists but also makes the military a visible and normal part of society. This contributes to the strong willingness of Finns to defend their country. In 2015, Europeans were asked: “Would you fight for your country”? Over 74 per cent of Finns were willing to defend their country when the average in other Western European countries was around 25 per cent (Minister of Defence, Antti Kaikkonen speech 20.1.2020).

In short, the current Finnish approach to comprehensive security is strongly shaped by the history of Finland and its geographical situation with 1,300 kilometres of border with Russia. This is not just a military matter. The relationships between the two countries are of utmost importance for decision makers. At the same time, Cold War pragmatism and a widened threat environment have made Finland willing to forge collaborative responses to modern security complexity, an issue we further explore in the next section.

**Future ambitions: managing complexity through the CSM**

As discussed, the Finnish version of comprehensive security crystallises in the form of an operational model intended to steer multiple actors in a complex security environment. Indeed, a key work used in Finnish security discussion is “complexity” – both of the threat environment and threats themselves. Here we discuss how CSM is intended to help manage that complexity and the challenges that remain.

According to Hanén (2017) complexity must be responded to by creating structures that facilitate a more horizontal situational awareness by practitioners, and by reforming structures in ways that make them less hierarchical and rigid. The CSM creates both an agenda for a more phenomenon-based security governance platform, and responds to the needs for cooperation in anticipating trends, threats, and useful practices. Furthermore, the systems of (security) governance need to be more adaptive and, for example, experimentation and exploration are required in complex adaptive systems: they
cannot be served by linear public policy intervention models, targeting only one area of policy development, one agent or actor, or individual policy sector. Therefore, the useful framework for addressing such societal security challenges is the CMS’s phenomenon-based system described in section “The Finnish CSM in a nutshell: securing the vital functions of the society” (see also Lähteenmäki-Smith and Virtanen 2019; Sitra 2018).

To be sure, the Finnish CSM is still a work in progress. New challenges emerge from new complex threats and societal risks identified on a regular basis, and calls have been made to ensure the CSM is even more process-oriented and allows for smoother movement between different administrative sectors (silos) and levels. The core principle of collaborative planning has enabled the possibility of thinking about phenomena out of the box, and other “black swans”. For example, when the Ministry of Justice started its campaign to raise awareness on possible election interference, the matter was brought to the Security Committee, which gave its support and prompted an analysis, using both permanent and ad-hoc networks. The outcome was information packages for raising awareness of different audiences, and several concrete capabilities and suggestions to encounter hostile information influencing. According to the committee, these actions represented better preparedness to prevent election interference, even if we cannot say to what extent (Valtioneuvosto 2019a).

As has been argued (Innes and Booher1999; Shine 2015; Thomas 2012), complexity is problematic only if we try to solve the drivers and consequences of complexity with old mindsets: such systems require adaptive and reflexive policy-making to fit the needs of such a system (Lähteenmäki-Smith and Virtanen 2019). Knowledge and learning are also features of a complex adaptive system (Eidelson 1997). Learning creates shared meanings and knowledge. To that end, the Finnish CSM arguably offers platforms that are ideal for dealing with complexity. Networked information sharing seems to be rather unique in the Finnish concept, because the private sector and NGOs are included as security actors at every level of action, including at the planning stage. At the local and regional levels, many actors reap the benefits of comprehensiveness, because the Finnish approach encourages round table collaboration and information sharing, especially with the business community and NGOs, which otherwise tend to have problems achieving synergies in exercises and operative action. Furthermore, a lack of resources in many areas in Finland has created innovative solutions on how to share the burden. For example, a collaboration model between the Border Guard, Customs, and Police developed in rural Lapland precisely because of limited resources, and is now used as an example of effective planning and coordination thanks to new security mindsets.

Conclusions and implications

The Finnish security concept might seem quite unique in comparison with those of the other Nordic countries. It developed from a specific historical
context – repeated conflict with, and influence from Russia – and the resulting defensive posture and societal solidarity taken. Moreover, the Finnish approach to comprehensive security is less conceptual, one might argue, and more operational. It is used to underpin a CSM and to steer cross-sector, multi-level governance towards managing an array of threats. It includes pragmatic benchmarking of security goals, such as in security of supply, is upheld by centralised governance structures such as the Finnish Security Committee, and highlights preparedness planning to a great extent. It is, as argued earlier, as much about practical action as it is about conceptual understanding.

However, a number of Nordic similarities emerge from this analysis, too. First, the Finnish approach is reminiscent of a “societal security” perspective and, as pointed out in section “The comprehensive security concept in comparative perspective”, related concepts such as resilience. It encompasses a wide range of threats, implies a broad number of responses, and places an emphasis on effective coordination. Second, the Finnish approach should be seen as emerging from, not distinct to, the previous Cold War notion of “total defence” that was present in several Nordic countries, not least Sweden and Norway (see also Larsson, and Morsut, respectively, this volume). Comprehensive security built on the mindsets (including deep levels of societal trust) and structures what existed before, while filling a conceptual vacuum that opened during the early 1990s. Third, Finland’s broad security approach is central but not dominant in national security practices, as highlighted by differences witnessed in national strategic choices (e.g. Telford 2016, see also Hyvönen and Juntunen, this volume).

To be sure, these similarities assist and shape Finland’s cross-border cooperation, for instance in its defence collaboration with Sweden today (Fjäder 2016; Valtonen 2010). The broad approach to security likely facilitates relations with the EU, too, which as discussed earlier, shares some conceptual affiliations with the comprehensive approach (particularly, societal security) and through which Finland achieves security collaborations. The same goes for NATO. Finland’s comprehensive approach no doubt eases relations with diverse other partners in various activities associated with the Partnership for Peace programme (Aaltola et al. 2014). The Finnish CSM raises interest in many countries, which suggests that all states are considering how they organise or conceptualise security, whether they are members of the EU and/or NATO or not.

Indeed, the Finnish CSM model assists with platform-based networking collaboration across Finland, and works well in many cases. However, problems remain – many of them related to poor resourcing. New political leaders are elected every four years and financial allocation is mostly planned in four-year governmental phases. Long-term development and planning can thus be challenging because of fast changes in the policy and security environment or due to fluctuations in economy. This has implications especially for comprehensive security planning, where steady and shared
perspectives are helpful. Even with strong incentives to cooperation via the CSM, there are equally strong incentives to engage in bureau-politics. There are rivalries between administrative sectors and processes are carried out at different pace among agencies or without proper coordination. Necessary sharing of information within the forum must take place, without leaking information and violating trust in the common good. (Valtonen 2018) Indeed, the Finnish approach to comprehensive security is strongly built on trust, which has to be validated. In these very broad collaboration forums, collaboration skills and faithful implementation are required. Despite the success of the CSM, constant reminders and training in the importance of a comprehensive, anticipatory, and cross-disciplinary preparation approach must take place (Valtonen 2010).

Notes
1 In the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact Finland was left to the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence.
2 The term “Impivaara” in Finnish describes the traditional stubborn way to try to cope alone. It originates from Aleksis Kivi’s 1870 novel Seitsemän Veljestä (“Seven Brothers”).

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Tracing Finnish comprehensive security


Vesa Valtonen and Minna Branders


Security, uncertainty, and possibility

As emphasised in the introduction to this volume, an empirical shift in how discourses, practices, and technologies become related to security, risk, resilience, and emergency management, at the expense of traditional Cold War thinking, can be observed in the Nordic countries (Larsson and Rhinard, this volume). This general development is mirrored in the changed discourse on national security threats to Denmark following the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, the threats to Denmark’s national security are said to have not only mushroomed but also become increasingly volatile and unpredictable. This observation was recently confirmed by the Director of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service when he presented the organisation’s yearly security risk assessment in November 2019. The director emphasised that ‘the threat picture has not solely become more complex. It has also become increasingly capricious and hence unpredictable’ (Findsen 2019). Hence, the constantly changing and borderless nature of threats to Denmark ‘has created a space of uncertainty, an idiom of unease’ (Petersen and Tjalve 2018: 21).

The Danish Defence has traditionally been designed to defend Danish territory against known threats. Today, the Danish Defence has become a multiuse security policy instrument operating in an age of uncertainty and unpredictability (Barfod 2017; Nørgaard et al. 2008). This is reflected in the Danish Defence’s development of a novel managerial security practice regime. As threats to national security have become increasingly complex, unpredictable, and uncertain, the Danish Defence has responded by paying profound attention to the competencies of its managers and their everyday security decision-making practices (Barfod 2017; Holsting & Nørgaard 2006; Holsting et al. 2007; Nørgaard 2010; Nørgaard & Holsting 2014; Nørgaard et al. 2008, 2015; Nørgaard & Sjøgren 2019; Olsen 2006). Empirically, this chapter investigates how the post-Cold War Danish national security discourse – enacting an uncertain and unpredictable future threat environment – has conditioned this novel managerial security practice regime in the Danish Defence. Decentralised decision-making and continuous...
individual development and adaptability are the answers provided by the post-Cold War managerial security practice logic, but it offers no explicit answers when it comes to the increasing uncertainty and complexity of contemporary threats. It thereby obliges individual security practitioners to expect the unexpected and decide the undecidable.

The main argument of this chapter is that the changing security and threat discourse enacts a situation where the temporal uncertainty regarding the future threats to Danish national security is displaced on the everyday security practices in the Danish Defence. This implies that security decision-making is decentralised and the individual practitioners responsibilised. This is democratically salient, as the decentralised managerial security practices risk clashing with the traditional need for politicians and the institution of the armed forces to assume authority and responsibility to act in the interest of Danish national security. Moreover, I discuss the latent governance pitfalls in the growing tension between a desire to adapt to a constantly changing, unknowable, and uncertain threat environment vis-à-vis a desire to govern through conventional Weberian bureaucratic measures, including the challenges it brings to fundamental democratic values, specifically authority, accountability, and responsibility.

The development of the new managerial security practice regime in the Danish Defence reflects a broader trend in Danish public administration by which ‘the biggest challenge for welfare managers is the expectation that their leadership rests on the premise that all management premises are questioned. Thus, the basic premise for welfare management is the dissolution of premises!’ (Andersen and Pors 2016: 2). Consequently, the task of management becomes one of establishing ‘expectations about the future with the expectation that all expectations will undergo a radical change’ (Andersen and Pors 2017: 132). Following this line of thought, I show how the changing security and threat discourse has stimulated the development of a different type of societal security than the ones highlighted in other chapters of this book. It is a type of societal security that expects the Danish Defence and its security practitioners to organise a ‘double uncertainty’. In other words, the Danish Defence is expected to act as public sector body on an equal footing with all other public sector entities, while it simultaneously has to be the institution that fathoms and practices war and the state of exception in an uncertain threat environment. The organisational solution to this ‘double uncertainty’, I argue, becomes the establishment of a managerial security practice regime that focus on constantly creating potentials for the future. The managerial programme offers to dissolve the contradiction of this ‘double uncertainty’ by organising and making productive that which cannot be planned, expected, or decided. The feasibility of this is, however, questionable.

In the subsequent section, I first clarify my analytical approach. Next, I examine the conceptual developments in the reports of the Defence Commissions of 1988, 1997, and 2008. The analysis shows how the discourse on Danish national security has changed from primarily being structured
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around known and determined threats to a situation in which future threats are increasingly perceived of as uncertain, unpredictable, and constantly changing. Hence, a divergence arises between the need for strategic and political security decision-making, on the one hand, and a greater uncertainty making it risky to determine the means and ends of security policy, on the other hand. The second analytical section examines how the post-Cold War Danish national security discourse has conditioned the development of a novel managerial security practice regime in the Danish Defence that aims at fostering potentials for the future in the face of uncertainty. It is, however, also a regime that decentralises political and military-strategic security decision-making. It thereby responsibilises the individual security practitioner in new ways. In conclusion, I discuss the democratic consequences of these conceptual and practical changes to security in Denmark.

Analytical strategy

Theoretically, the chapter shares the foundational assumption of Critical Security Studies (CSS) that ‘security threats and insecurities are not simply objects to be studied or problems to be solved, but the product of social and political practices’ (Aradau et al. 2015: 1). Moreover, the empirical developments observed in Denmark since the end of the Cold War potentially change what security is, the means by which it is provided, and by whom. Hence, the main concern of this chapter lies not in maximising or achieving better security, but in problematising paradoxical and contradictory conceptual and practical changes to Danish security by exploring the conditions for their emergence and development a development, I argue, that not only affects how Denmark practice, organise, and govern security but also basic understandings of what societal security is.

In CSS, much attention has been given to the ways in which various security practices – such as risk management, scenario construction, data visualisation – aim at reducing uncertainty by rendering the future knowable and manageable (see e.g. Amoore 2013; Anderson 2010; Aradau and van Münster 2012; Aradau et al. 2008; Corry 2012; Petersen 2011, 2012). Alongside this development, we have witnessed the successful advance of the concept of resilience in both policy and academia, a concept that is predicated on emergent processes of adaptability (see e.g. Bourbeau 2018; Cavelty et al. [2015; Chandler 2014; Corry 2014; Petersen and Tjalve 2013; Walker and Cooper 2011]. Olaf Corry (2014: 267) encourages us to ‘follow the idea of comparing resilience to what it might be replacing’, which enable us to ‘consider what the wider implications might be for security politics if resilience challenges the otherwise dominant idea of defence as the core concept of security’. Following this line of thought, I examine how various entanglements of security and temporality emerge and disappear in the national security discursive development and the managerial practices of security in the Danish Defence. This is significant, as the Danish Defence is still a core institution securing the Danish society, despite the increased Danish focus
on resilience building and societal threats such as terrorism, extremism, and cyber security risks (Berling and Petersen, this volume).

Arguably, the post-Cold War Danish national security concept and the Danish Defence security practice regime share similarities with resilience thinking, as they accept the future threats to Denmark as inherently uncertain. However, the Danish Defence managerial security practices are increasingly aimed not at absorbing uncertainty, but rather aimed at both maintaining and generating uncertainty in order to create new possibilities for security practices themselves. Consequently, a security practice regime emerges that is less concerned with questions of how to specify future threats and make them controllable and manageable. Instead, it is more concerned with how to make uncertainty productive through the development of personal competencies, which instils continuous adaptability and possibility at the heart of the Danish Defence managerial security practices. This raises a similar question to the one posed by Berling and Petersen (this volume) of whether it is possible to have political and military-strategic planning and decision-making at the macro level when uncertainty becomes not just the primary narrative, but a productive force.

To develop a research design for the analysis of the conceptual development of security for the Danish Defence, I first draw on conceptual history (Andersen 2003, 2011a), particularly the ways in which it has been developed by researchers working broadly on developments in public sector governance and management (Andersen 2003, 2011b; Andersen & Pors 2016, 2017). The aim is to uncover the ways in which meaning has been attributed and imbued into the concept of security in the Danish Defence Commissions reports of 1988, 1997, and 2008. This is thus a study of ‘comparative moments’ that develop around three clearly defined times that are tied to specific events (Hansen 2006: 78). Tracing and exploring the conceptual development of security enables me to, as a second step, understand how some managerial practices, decisions, and solutions become possible and others impossible for the Danish Defence. To explore how the conceptual changes convey and prescribe a novel security practice regime, I study how temporality and security emerge in the Danish Defence managerial programme, as it has developed in the past 15–20 years. This analytical move enables an analysis of how the Danish Defence enact and organise the narrative of the future as uncertain and unpredictable, including its effects on security governance as the distribution of political authority, responsibility, and accountability.

Conceptual changes to security in the Danish Defence commissions

This section provides an analysis of how meaning has been attributed and imbued into the concept security in the Danish Defence Commissions of

**The 1988 report: a moment of bounded transition**

In the 1988 Danish Defence Commission report (DDCR 1988), the stable Cold War nuclear order is perceived as dissolving. The present is instead observed as a moment of transition: ‘The pattern of security policy, which in the years following the Second World War constituted the security policy framework for the defence policy measures in the East and West, today seems to be entering a period of transition’ (DDCR 1988: 25). In the stable Cold War order, experiences relating to the past drove expectations for future national security and threat developments. In 1988, however, the ambiguity of the future threat environment is accentuated. Consequently, the report emphasises that projecting future security developments based on current trends is paved with uncertainties (DDCR 1988: 26; DDCR 1988, appendix 1: 77).

Yet, the discursive change is ambiguous, since the relationship between the East and the West and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries continues to play the dominant role in the report. This is exemplified by the fact that the report is structured around a worst- and a best-case scenario for East-West disarmament (DDCR 1988: 26). The East-West relation is still the point of departure from where security challenges are derived, extrapolated, and projected (DDCR 1988; DDCR 1988 appendix 1). The relationship between East and West is, however, susceptible to change. The simultaneous importance of and change to the East-West relationship allow for both stability and change to emerge in the conditions of possibility for Danish national security and defence policy.

Similarly, the report underlines that the Danish Defence’s core task still lies in providing security, understood as Denmark’s continued territorial existence (DCCR 1988: 92, 1988b: 76). This demonstrates how the future threats to Danish national security are enacted as a continuation of past conditions. In sum, the 1988 report illustrates a moment of bounded transition that partly releases the conditions of possibility for Danish security policy from its Cold War straightjacket. The space for actively doing and deciding on security policy is about to open up, whereas the defence policy remains constrained, as the East-West dynamic is still very much structuring it.

**The 1997 report: a moment of change**

The report of the Defence Commission of 1997 (DDCR 1997) articulates a clear distinction between the context of the 1997 report and its predecessor of 1988. This distinction is of great importance for the articulated security
discourse. Most importantly, the ties to the past have now been finally cut (DDCR 1997: 17). The present is only to a very limited degree stretched between a common past from where problems are derived and projected and a future of continuation. A situation arises between multidimensional and changing images of the future on the one side and a one-dimensional Cold War past on the other side. The report explicitly underlines how the East-West relations have slipped into the background:

Since the Defence Commission of 1988 presented its report in 1990, Europe has undergone a number of major changes. It has not only had implications for the security policy picture in Europe, but also at the global level... The removal of the East-West conflict has fundamentally changed the threat picture from the potential threat of a massive and extensive attack from the East towards less clearly defined risks. (DDCR 1997: 65)

This is directly linked to the tasks of the Danish Defence, as ‘the task of the defence has consequently changed character from being an element in a reactive and dissuasive security guarantee to also being an active instrument used for confidence building as part of Danish security policy’ (DDCR 1997: 17). The report further emphasises Denmark’s privileged situation through the introduction of the notion of ‘indirect security’, which merges classic national interests and idealism. In the absence of direct threats, priority can instead be given to spreading peace and creating stability which, in turn, is expected to, indirectly, benefit Danish security in the long term (DDCR 1997: 65; Olesen 2015: 414). Hence, defence policy is conflated with the broader notion of Danish security policy. Danish defence policy is thereby increasingly made an object for political-strategic decision-making (Heurlin 2004).7

Related to the diminishing importance of the East-West distinction, the threats to Danish national security are perceived of as having expanded, as the security agenda is heavily influenced by various global trends. The report concludes that there is a need to see military issues in a wider context, including in relation to political, economic, and cultural aspects. Second, it is an increasingly widespread notion that new issues such as environmental degradation, refugee flows, and organised, cross-border crime can become security concerns in line with traditional military challenges (DDCR 1997: 17).

The armed forces are not only supposed to be able to defend Denmark and Danish territory, now they also have to take into account that transboundary societal threats and risks such as migration and organised crime ‘can develop into security policy challenges similar to traditional military ones’ (DDCR 1997: 17). At the same time, the Danish military engagement in the Balkans underlined the perceived need for the Danish Defence to fight in military operations abroad. These fights are not forced upon the
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On the contrary, Denmark can increasingly select the time, place, and intensity of the potential fighting, including whether to get involved or not (Heurlin 2004). In sum, the future of Danish security and defence policy cannot as easily as before be predicted and planned. Instead, the Danish security and defence policy is framed as having become increasingly transgressive at home and selectable abroad. This raises questions concerning assumed ways of thinking, structuring, and planning Danish security and defence policy in a changing security environment. In short, the changing threat environment allowed Denmark to become a strategic security actor (Rynning 2003).

The 2008 report: a moment of security and uncertainty

The opening paragraph of the 2008 Danish Defence Commission report (DDCR 2008) establishes a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, the report says that ‘since the end of the Cold War, Denmark has not been directly confronted with conventional military threats and therefore benefits from a favourable security environment unparalleled in history’ (DDCR 2008: 38). On the other hand, the report emphasises how globalisation has led to a widened security policy horizon, implying ‘that security policy will be carried out in a context with many dimensions as well as great complexity, dynamism and unpredictability’ (DDCR 2008: 38). The present is thus observed as a moment of simultaneous security and uncertainty. The present is no longer stretched between a common Cold War past – from where problems are derived and expected – and a future of continuation. The past is no longer considered relevant, as the future is no longer a continuation of it. This provides a country like Denmark with an increased opportunity to pursue an active foreign and security policy (DDCR 2008: 38).

The emergence of an increasingly complex threat environment is framed as providing a strategic opportunity for Denmark to include new issue areas and objects – sitting next to traditional territorial existence – in the security and defence policy. The importance of territorial defence does not disappear, but is complemented by a range of more abstract and open-ended security policy objectives all tied to globalisation (DDCR 2008: 38,39). These objectives include contributing to ‘stable and sustainable development’, ‘promoting democracy and human rights’, and ‘preventing terrorism’ (DDCR 2008: 39, 78, 89, 133). In other words, the security discourse has developed from a point where threats against Denmark’s security were presented in a simple particular form – here-and-now threats – to a point where the security and threat landscape is described in indefinite terms. Due to the changing figures of temporality visible in the report, the object of national security and the threats to it have become further selectable, political, and strategic. This development enhances the trend found in the 1997 report (see also Stiglund, this volume).
Moreover, the 2008 report demonstrates an increasing awareness of the fact that the future towards which security and defence policy is carried out will have transformed into something different before the strategic efforts have been implemented. The tension between past and future is thus observed as a tension between multidimensional futures with uncertain and unintelligible consequences:

the future security policy development will be extremely complex and characterised by unpredictable factors, including the possibility of irregularities, disruptive and even catastrophic events of a global, security nature.

(DDCR 2008: 65)

The increased uncertainty and unpredictability presents a challenge when it comes to the formulating and planning of security and defence policy, as it opens a contingent horizon of different possibilities. This changing enactment of the past, the present, and the future entails a risk of tying Danish security and defence policy to specific future scenarios and threats, which might not hold true. The report hence underlines the difficulties in formulating policies and military strategies for a future that is based on the idea of having to expect the unexpected.

It has been more than a decade since the latest report from a Danish Defence Commission. As demonstrated elsewhere in this book, conventional geopolitics and threat perceptions have made somewhat of a return in the Nordic countries since 2008. However, the articulation of complexity, unpredictability, and uncertainty has by no means run out of steam, as the chapter’s opening quote indicates (see also Petersen and Tjalve 2018; Berling and Petersen this volume). Hence, we are still faced with the puzzling situation in which security and uncertainty are simultaneously present. It is still a crucial policy challenge to balance unpredictable, uncertain, and ever-changing future threats, on the one hand, with the need to establish security policy and military-strategic ends and means, on the other hand.

In sum, the analysis demonstrates a significant development in the Danish security and defence policy discourse that brings an uncertain future to the fore and prescribes a threat environment that is increasingly complex, unpredictable, and always in flux. The development in security discourse hence demonstrates a conception of the future of Danish national security and the threats to it as something that cannot be imagined and described from the perspective of the present. The situation that emerges mirrors Ulrich Beck’s argument ‘that in conditions of extreme uncertainty, decision-makers are no longer able to guarantee predictability, security and control’ (Aradau and van Münster 2007: 93). A present in which the idea of complete security has been abandoned in the face of unceasing uncertainty (Rasmussen 2006). The shifting security discourse is not replacing the former, however, but layered on top of or sitting next to it. The contemporary
Danish national security discourse seems somewhat fragmented and without a clearly defined strategic focus (see also Stiglund, this volume). In the following section, I shed light on the implications of this changing discourse on the Danish Defence’s security practices.

**Temporal changes to security practices in the Danish Defence**

This section traces the emergence and development of the managerial security practice regime in the Danish Defence. It demonstrates how the enactment of uncertain and unpredictable future threats co-constitutes the development of decentralised and individualised political and military-strategic decision-making. In addition, it shows how the managerial security practice regime aims at cultivating personal adaptability and potentiality in order to dissolve the contradictory ‘double uncertainty’ demand of having to simultaneously be a conventional public sector body and the institution that comprehend and provide national security.

**Practicing security in a constantly changing threat environment**

The development of the novel managerial regime is predicated on the acceptance of a changing post-Cold War role for the Danish Defence:

> the role of the defence has changed in significant areas. The conventional military threat to Danish territory has lapsed and has instead been replaced by a number of new asymmetric and transnational threats.  
> (Holsting and Nørgaard 2006: 10)

Following from this, it is found necessary in the managerial programme to consider ‘how these changes in the security policy conditions are reflected in the military organisation and its leadership practices’ (Holsting and Nørgaard 2006: 11), as well as ‘what the consequences are of the increasing politicisation and globalisation of the military tasks for the individual soldier and for the organisation overall’ (Holsting and Nørgaard 2006: 12). In light of the changing and uncertain security and threat environment, the Danish Defence’s overall answer to these questions is that

> the military security task is therefore not a predefined and determined task, but a relationship that is constantly challenged and redefined... Security, in this sense, does not refer to an objective reality, but must rather be seen as a social construct that designates something and makes it a matter of security.  
> (Holsting and Nørgaard 2006: 27)

At the heart of the emergence of the new Danish Defence’s managerial security practice regime thus lies an attentiveness and recognition of security as
negotiable, contextual, and questionable. The view on the military practice and profession that follows from this demonstrates a break with the traditional view of the military task. This view is expressed in Samuel Huntington’s ‘The Soldier and the State’:

The military profession exists to serve the state. To render the highest possible service the entire profession and the military force which it leads must be constituted as an effective instrument of state policy. Since political direction comes from the top, this means that the profession has to be organised into a hierarchy of obedience.

(Huntington 1957: 73)

The new military managerial security practice regime, however, does not refer to clear political and military-strategic direction from the top. Instead, the recognition of the social and contextual construction of security expresses an acceptance of its ultimate contingency. In other words, we see a reversal of the relationship between frame and function so that the frame is no longer presupposed but is constructed and chosen relative to the function.

The change in the perception of what security is and how it comes about has profound effects on the framing of the managerial practices in the Danish Defence. In a publication on ‘military ethics and management in practice’, it is stated that

in the new “political wars” the military effort will not just create security. It must also promote good governance, human rights and economic and social development, i.e. shaping the whole of civil society and its political and moral constitution.

(Nørgaard et al. 2008: 34–35)

Moreover, the conceptual transformation of security from a narrow, traditional problematisation of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and military defence to a wider, more comprehensive set of problematisations covering multiple areas of social, political, economic, and ecological life seems to have effect on the military management practices of security. Consequently, the management program acknowledges that ‘the battlefield and the Danish Defence as an organisation have both become more and more complex. The Danish Defence must be able to do it all in different contexts’ (Barfod 2017: 5).

Rather than politicians combining parts in larger policy and military-strategic wholes, a new form of security and defence governance emerges that increasingly rely on the individual security practitioner to define the specificity of Danish national security and the threats to it. The individual decision-makers hence face the precarious situation of having to embrace the whole and the parts as well as the strategic and the situational simultaneously, be it at home or abroad (Nørgaard et al. 2008: 34–35 and 57).
The logic stemming from this is that the only stability left is uncertainty and constant change, which demands continuous construction and selection of future threats. As emphasised in critical security and risk studies, this entails a futurisation of the present (Aradau and van Münster 2012) by which the security decision-making space is opened up to cope with threats situated in a multitude of possible scenarios and unknown futures. The future threats, however, cannot function as a stable premise for security decision-making in the present due to their uncertainty and unpredictability. Still, the security practitioners are urged to conduct security decision-making in the present by determining, acting on, and shaping the future. The managerial security practice regime thus seems to rely on an inherent dilemma as it, on the one hand, stresses the inability of deciding on the future while it, on the other hand, demands exactly that (see also Berling and Petersen’s description of the Swedish resilience logic, this volume).

Thereby the authority and responsibility for deciding upon what Denmark’s security entails and how it is best ensured are gradually decentralised and devolved from politicians and the institution of the Danish Defence to the individual security practitioners. The security practitioners are faced with having to make ‘trade-off decisions between political, military and economic considerations’ (Nørgaard et al. 2015: 12), as they increasingly play the ‘role of strategic sparring partner in a complex and changeable security policy terrain’ (Nørgaard et al. 2015: 16). The local, practical, and operative decision-making processes hence become increasingly political. As expressed in the Danish Defence managerial programme:

we are turning our attention away from the organisation as an ethical arena towards the soldier as an ethical/political actor – from the organisational decision-making context towards each soldier as a decision-maker and risk taker.

(Nørgaard et al. 2008: 72)

This development heralds a decentralised security practice that loses its reference to traditional exceptional political decision-making. There is then a risk that security practices become increasingly routinised and invisible (Bigo 2006; Huysmans 2006, 2011). Moreover, we run the risk of security becoming detached from decisions of political and military leaders, including their strategic directions on where to go and how to get there. It thus becomes harder for the public to hold policy professionals responsible and accountable for security policy developments, and it becomes equally difficult for the security practitioners to defer responsibility with reference to the political and the military systems.

This raises the issue of how to strike a balance between centralised security political authority and governance vis-à-vis individualised security
practices that increasingly function as security policy and military-strategic decision-making. The inherent dilemma in striking this balance is seen across the Danish public administration, as we have witnessed a general shift in the perception of the future as being increasingly unpredictable and uncertain, a development that largely opposes central political and strategic planning (Andersen and Pors 2016, 2017). Consequently, the task of public administration managers has become one of establishing ‘expectations about the future with the expectation that all expectations will undergo a radical change’ (Åkerstrøm and Pors 2017: 132). Again, managers need to expect the unexpected and decide the undecidable. As the next section will demonstrate, the Danish Defence managerial programme aims at making these impossible demands productive by cultivating managerial security practitioners that are able to continuously create possibilities and potentials out of future uncertainty.

Practicing security between uncertainty and potentiality

The conditions of possibility for Danish Defence managerial security practices are further complicated by the fact that uncertainty is also enacted on the inside of the organisation, so to speak. According to the managerial programme, the individual security practitioner is faced with two contradictory logics, stemming from two management stereotypes: the ‘warrior’ and the ‘administrator’.9

The Danish Defence solves its tasks under very different and often rapidly changing conditions. On the one hand, the Armed Forces must solve risky operational tasks in accordance with the mission of the Armed Forces. On the other hand, the Armed Forces must be run like any other public administration in Denmark in accordance with the administrative framework that applies in society in general. This requires that management in the Armed Forces can support both external and internal efficiency. In practice, this means that managers must be able to handle complex operational tasks that require military risk management, while they are also able to handle the optimisation of management tasks that require administrative management considerations (The Danish Defence management protocol 2008: 11).

The separation of and contradiction between the administrative and the operative logics are not easily coped with, as these dual demands of military risk management and administrative governance are difficult to separate in time and place, and will therefore often manifest themselves in dilemmas and paradoxes. The assigned management tasks must therefore be handled by balancing incompatible or opposing considerations (The Danish Defence management protocol 2008: 12) (Table 6.1).

The new managerial security practice regime is thus reliant on the individual managers’ ability to develop the necessary skill-set to cope with these
seemingly impossible demands. In the words of the managerial programme, the Danish Defence security practitioners must therefore acquire a professional judgment that is not based on abstract principles and rules, but on a sustained educational effort that draws on his entire horizon of experience. It is thus the edification work that shapes the soldier’s ethical competence, i.e. his ability to distinguish between good and bad decisions, both as a “warrior” and as a “administrator”, i.e. both when exercising operational risk management and when exercising public administration management.

(Nørgaard et al. 2008: 18–19)

It is, hence, only through continuous educational and edification efforts that the security practitioners become capable individuals that can manage to navigate the commonalities and contradictions between the two logics. Moreover, the managerial security practice programme calls upon the managers to act politically and strategically:

a greater openness and “political readiness” is required, which will enable both the warrior and the administrator to act as ethical and strategic actors in the political battlefield. They both must practice ethically and effective judgment and professional risk assessments, whether fighting the Taliban or conducting budget negotiations.

(Nørgaard 2010: 14)

Security is enacted as a matter of adaptability and agility spurred by a need to constantly evaluate, revise, and be reflexive about one’s actions and decision-making, as it produces (in)security and risks. This development mirrors the focus on resilience in security politics that refers to the learning and understanding of the role of the self in the production of new risks (Chandler 2014; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2017; see also Berling and Petersen, this volume on how this type of resilience is also present elsewhere in the emergence of Danish societal security).

### Table 6.1 The logics of the warrior and the administrator

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<tr>
<th>Warrior</th>
<th>Administrator</th>
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<tr>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Managed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk-willing</td>
<td>Cost-effective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unpredictability</td>
<td>Political requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operational conditions</td>
<td>Administrative requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust logic</td>
<td>Cost-consciousness</td>
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<td>Decentralisation</td>
<td>Centralisation</td>
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We are, however, still left with a question of how the security practitioners are expected to make sense of and navigate this impossible ‘double uncertainty’. The answer provided in the Danish Defence managerial security practice regime is that the development of a non-binary ethics is needed:

we must devise a practical ethic that is not bound by a binary “either-or logic”... instead, we shift the perspective to a “both-and logic” which does not exclude either of the professional logics, but considers them both on the basis of the difference that separates and connects them.

(Nørgaard 2010: 55)

The warrior can only become an administrator by calling off and suspending themselves. The managerial programme thus reaches for a unity that can never be. The demand to develop managerial skills through continuous educational and edification efforts, however, becomes a way for the managerial programme to make the observed uncertainty and unpredictability productive, as it, paradoxically, demands the exercise of the warrior practice and the administrator practice – separately – together (Nørgaard 2010: 14–15). This paradoxical move entails a hybridisation of the managerial security practices:

in this context, hybrid organisation can be understood as an internal restructuring that occurs when the decision-making processes in the organisation become so complex that they cannot simply refer to either the operational or the administrative domain, i.e. neither the warrior nor the administrator practice, but must address both of them as a whole in one and a single manoeuvre.

(Nørgaard 2010: 61)

By relying on a hybrid logic, the managerial security practice regime attempts to call upon managers to double themselves, obliging them to create their own management and decision premises (Andersen 2011b: 228), as these are neither given at the military nor political level. In this way, the uncertainty of the future is no longer enacted simply as something counterproductive and risky that cannot be managed and contained, but as something productive. In this way, uncertainty becomes a potentialiser:

… it becomes clear that the hybrid logic is not a new management technology that modern leaders need to attend a course to learn. Rather, it is an active principle in complex organisations, which enables them to “translate” between and act in different and competing management arenas simultaneously. The benefit of the hybrid logic is that it is not forced to make yes/no decisions, but opens up a range of new action and interpretation possibilities.

(Nørgaard 2010: 65)
This quote reflects the way uncertainty is treated as a resource in the Danish Defence managerial programme. Uncertainty is desired as it fosters possibilities. Its triggering potential lies in security practices becoming a process of open-ended, self-generating, self-management. It becomes a way of cultivating a managerial security practice that facilitates an independence where the practitioner continually confronts him or herself by reflecting on whether a given action or procedure might be carried out differently or might be rethought. In the words of Andersen and Pors, this boils down to the dictum: everywhere and always – it could be different (see Andersen and Pors 2016, chapter 3). A pitfall is that this fosters a security practice that risk being more preoccupied with constantly creating new opportunities and potentials for future security practices than achieving the realisation and determination of these, as they could always be different.

This illustrates how the Danish Defence responds to the ‘double uncertainty’ by increasing organisational and managerial undecidability. The managerial programme, it can be argued, aims to increase possibilities by making it an open question who holds responsibility for deciding upon what Denmark’s security entails and how to ensure it. Democratically, this is problematic. When political decisions and military strategies are no longer viewed as the given frame but as different possible forms that the security managers continuously create, the individual managerial security practice has to assume political responsibility for what it defines as Danish security and threats to the country.

This development is in line with the development of resilience thinking demonstrated in Berling and Petersen’s chapter. In this case, the managerial security practice regime developed in the Danish Defence – much like the resilience logic of security – offers solutions on how to practice security in a context of changing and unexpected threats, as it puts trust in the individual practitioner’s capabilities to self-adapt, self-manage, and self-reflect. Consequently, security solutions are increasingly offered at the level of individuals rather than at the organisational and political level of the military and the government. As argued by Berling and Petersen, this is ultimately democratically untenable, as no positive vision and direction on where we, as a society, want to go is provided.

In sum, the Danish Defence practitioners are expected to politically and strategically experiment with the means, ends, and performances of security, their organisation, and themselves depending on the specific always-uncertain challenges and situations they co-constitute. Moreover, we see a move towards uncertainty as an enabler for potentiality management that aims at grasping the horizon beyond the horizon and thereby produce new possibilities for defining what Danish national security entails and the threats to it are. The managerial security practice regime shows a desire for consistency with respect to conventional administrative and bureaucratic tasks, on the one hand, and a seemingly opposite desire to adapt, open up, and transgress due to the uncertain and unpredictable future threat environment, on the other hand.
Conclusion: the need for accountability

In a world in which governments have long since retreated from the promise of universal security (Aradau 2014: 83), the chapter demonstrated how the societal security lens allows us to explore the ways in which contemporary security practices tap into or are at odds with traditional forms of security policy authority and democratic accountability and responsibility. It did so by identifying and exploring changes to the concept and the practice of security in Denmark since the end of the Cold War. The chapter showed how the concept and practice of security co-constitute an enactment of the future of Danish national security and the threats to it as uncertain and unpredictable. The analysis revealed how this changed notion of temporality, on the one hand, has fostered decentralisation of security political and military-strategic decision-making, as well as a responsibilisation of the individual security practitioners in the Danish Defence. On the other hand, it showed how this, partly, allows the Danish Defence to encompass paradoxical – if not antagonistic – demands for managerial security practices by establishing a managerial programme that focuses on constantly creating potentials for the future. The managerial programme hence offers to dissolve the contradictory management logic of ‘double uncertainty’, by claiming to organise and make productive that which cannot be planned, expected, or decided. However, this comes at the price of placing security decision-making at the managerial and individual level, thereby risking to make it more opaque. Letting go of political and military decision-making at the macro level makes it harder for the public to hold the political level of government and the military organisation responsible and accountable for security developments.

The Danish Defence’s approach to security as constructed, contextual, and intersubjective is very much in line with the theoretical grounding of this analysis. Yet, it does require us to consider the possibility for democratic governance, including the distribution of authority, accountability, and responsibility. If we, in the name of uncertainty, unpredictability, and contextualism, give up on the possibility of political and military-strategic planning, we simultaneously give up on the ambition of having a public and democratic discussion of the way we practice security and war. If we let go of the idea that the practitioners act on behalf of, or with instructions from an accountable political level, we simultaneously question the premise of democracy itself (Tjalve 2012: 10). This problematisation does not entail a longing for traditional Weberian bureaucracy. With its somewhat depoliticised and technocratic approach, such a tradition presents its own democratic challenges. It is rather necessary to insist on having a visible and responsible political and military leadership at the macro level that the public can hold to account, both when societal and military forms of security are to be provided.
There is a massive focus on which of today’s trends and developments may constitute the threats of the future. A major challenge of crafting political and military-strategic planning in a changing world is less unpredictability per se, but the question of how to democratically cope with the uncertainty of making choices when the outcomes are not fully predictable. How can societal as well as military security be governed on the basis that the object of governance cannot be unambiguously defined nor controlled by conventional tools of governance?

Notes

1 All quotes are translated from Danish into English by the author.

2 The texts referred to are all published by The Royal Danish Defence College which has spearheaded the development of a novel managerial security practice regime.

3 Following the expanded scope of what constitutes Denmark’s national security and the threats to it, Denmark has seen an increased – although somewhat peripheral and fragmented – focus on societal security, understood as collective emergency preparedness and increased resilience building (Petersen and Berling, this volume). Nevertheless, the concept of societal security or total defence is not as present in Denmark as in Sweden and Norway (see Larsson and Morsut, respectively, this volume).


5 Denmark has had eight defence commissions since the first was established in 1866 after the loss of the southern duchies in 1864. The next commission was established in 1902 to prepare laws for the organisation of the Army and Navy in 1909. After World War 1, a third commission was established in 1919 and after World War 2 a defence commission was established in 1946. Four years later a fifth commission was establish in order to prepare the new law on defence. In connection with the Social Liberal government co-operation with the Liberals and the Conservatives in 1969, a fifth defence commission was created. In recent times there has been defence commission in 1988, 1997 and most recently in 2008. https://fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Pages/DefencecommissionsinDenmark.aspx


7 This development is mirrored in the intense debate on Danish activist foreign policy (see e.g. Olesen 2015, Petersen 2004, Rahbek-Clemmensen 2017, Rasmussen 2005).

8 As well as other areas of the Danish public administration (see Andersen and Pors 2016, 2017 for an overview).

9 Not only the warrior but also the administrator navigates in a context of uncertainty:

in the new “strategic role” not only must the warrior, but also the administra-
tor continuously assess his risks and distinguishing between “friends and enemies”. Not only the warrior, but also the administrator must deal with “asymmetric threats” and manoeuvre in an unpredictable political terrain characterised by struggles to win support to specific strategic objectives (Nørgaard 2010: 12–13).
References


**Official sources**


Part III

Issues and processes
Resilience as a security practice

Resilience has become the new means in security politics. It defines a security practice and organisational raison d'etre that takes uncertainty and the possible future catastrophe as its main condition. New uncertainties require resilient organisations; organisations that can withstand, bounce back or adapt to new circumstances through strong social networks, community building, awareness and preparedness.

In security studies, the debate on resilience has grown for the past five to ten years and, while most security scholars agree that the concept draws on its metaphorical association with its sister concepts in biology and development studies, the translation has not happened without debate (cf. Cavelty et al 2015; Walker and Cooper 2011). Boiling it down, the main debate has been over the level of decision-making (micro versus macro level) and over the meaning of change (adaptation versus progression).

In terms of level of decision-making, resilience has traditionally been thought of as a solution that relies on each individual's capacity to act. Yet, and unlike its biological sister concept, resilience in security politics refers to more than just the inner strength of individuals and organisations, but also to that of learning and understanding the role of the self in the production of new risks (Chandler 2014; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2017). It is about agility and therefore also about the ability to constantly evaluate and revise actions in the face of new threats. While the concept of resilience is a concept that offers solutions to new and unexpected threats, it turns security away from macro-planning, and puts trust in the individual's capabilities to self-reflect and self-govern. The security solutions are, in other words, mainly offered at the level of individuals and organisations rather than at the political level of governments.

If one takes this turn to micro-planning seriously in international relations, it might have grave implications for the idea of international or national security. From being a question of macro-planning and strategic thinking (based on democratic concerns), the practice of resilience makes security politics a local and individualised matter – a decentralised rather
than centralised practice. Implications include the repositioning of the individual citizen as a ‘voluntary’ frontline defence, and an institutionalisation and legitimation of surveillance around the clock. This call to civil action might create, what Awan calls, a general ‘state of civil anxiety’ (Awan et al. 2019, 69), and a polity that makes every individual’s ‘wrong-doing’ subject to a symbolic political blame-game. As the threat is considered highly diffuse and unknown, the security decision loses its reference to the exceptional movement in the acts on security (Bigo 2006; Huysmans 2006). The securitising move, thus, becomes invisible, or ‘banalised’ as Didier Bigo contends (Bigo 2006). Security becomes detached from decisions of leaders and their speech acts on where to go and how to get there.

The conceptualisation of change (temporality) related to resilience is moreover different from the one we normally associate with security. Where resilience is described as a management solution in the face of uncertainty, like precaution or pre-emption (Corry 2014), a discourse on national security usually identifies the presence of a threat. The description of new and uncertain threats (possibly catastrophic), which resilience is considered to be an answer to, makes us give up on the idea of being able to identify, plan and thus mitigate new threats at a strategic level. While Phillipe Bourbeau (2018) is right in arguing that ‘Resilience is not only about maintaining the status quo, but it is also about transforming and re-modeling an individual, a group or a social structure’ (28), resilience does not entail a grand vision for change. It is not about providing promises, as Claudia Aradau rightly argues (Aradau 2014). Rather, in the image of resilience, change becomes a matter of adaptation to new circumstances. Because the practice of resilience fundamentally relies on an acceptance of the future as uncertain, it is, in many ways, an anti-thesis to political planning and strategy. On might even say that the concept of resilience describes a shift in security thinking from ‘grand design’ to ‘muddling through’: it is preparation without grand visions or promises.

The question is of course whether the actual practice of resilience, in the field of security, is a ‘muddling through’ individualised practice or whether the role of strategic thinking still plays a major role in the security thinking on resilience. Are there, we ask, different kinds of resilience in play? Is there ‘a form of resilience’ that leaves open the possibility for planning and grand visions contrary to what the theoretical discussion argues? In even wider terms, this raises the question of whether it is actually possible to have ‘grand designs’ and strategy in a world where uncertainty is the overarching narrative.

In this chapter we zoom in on those questions by studying resilience practices in the three Nordic countries, Denmark, Sweden and Norway (see also Hyvönen and Juntunen, this volume, for the Finnish case). The political systems of these countries are in many ways similar: all celebrate a welfare state model which aims to secure economic equality and individual freedom, and all, following from this belief in the welfare state, have a remarkable degree
of trust in the state’s ability to handle personal information. Based on this description of the political systems in Scandinavia, one might expect rather similar policies and attitudes towards security and resilience. The study presented below, however, points in a different direction, showing considerable diversity in the Nordic approaches to resilience. While the study shows that all countries place great trust in state institutions when it comes to that of ‘creating’ a resilient civil society, the national approaches differ quite substantially when it comes to the meaning of adaptation: where the Norwegian discourse tends to stress society’s ability to bounce back in the face of an external threat, the Danish and Swedish discourses also conceptualise resilience as that of being reflexive about one’s own production of threats. Further, where Swedish and Norwegian authorities have openly enrolled all citizens as first responders if a catastrophic event should occur, the Danish authorities target only certain groups in society for this.

In the following we will first substantiate our choice of material, our method and selection of sources. Second, we dig deep into the empirics as we investigate how the term ‘resilience’ has been used in the Scandinavian debates on national security and terrorism, from 2011 until today. We argue that it is possible to identify three concepts of resilience: ‘robust resilience’, ‘reflexive resilience’ and ‘organised resilience’. Organised resilience emerges as a form of resilience not covered in the academic literature. It offers conceptual renewal but also a dubious form of strategic security politics. In conclusion, we will discuss whether it is possible to talk about a Nordic Model on resilience.

Research design

In the following, we present a comparative study on the Scandinavian public debates on resilience in security politics, from 2011 until 2017. In this period, we witnessed three terrorist attacks: first the Breivik attacks in Oslo and on Utøya in 2011; second the Copenhagen shootings at the venue ‘Krudttønden’ and against a Jewish synagogue in 2015; and third the so-called Stockholm attack in 2017, where a truck rammed into a crowd in central Stockholm.

By comparing the responses to these crises in Denmark, Sweden and Norway, we implement a most-similar research design that allows us to analyse differences and similarities in the Nordic perceptions of resilience as a means to national security.

The governmental institutions included in the study are mentioned in Table 7.1. The media analysis covers all media sources mentioning the concept of resilience, as well as some of the synonyms often used in relation to the concept. Following the German conceptual historian, Reinhart Koselleck, by tracing and mapping the concept of resilience, we can come to understand the political possibilities imbedded in the choice of resilience, as a solution to today’s security issues. While the concept of resilience is studied by tracing the word and the discursive meaning given to it, the
entire semantic field of concepts is of interest here. The concept of resilience should be understood as part of a semantic field of many concepts (similar and counter-concepts) that gives it meaning. In all of the three countries, we can observe how ‘robustness’, ‘comprehensive security’, adaptation, radicalisation and most recently ‘cyber security’ are central to the semantic field. However, in the case of Denmark, we find especially strong references to ‘preventive security’; in Norway, the concept of ‘total defence’ appears strong; and in Sweden, the concepts of ‘civil defence’ and ‘holistic approach’ stand out.

Based on a systematic reading of governmental reports, plans and strategy papers as well as newspaper articles from the period covering these three events in the three countries, we found three main discourses on resilience:

i One concept of resilience, termed ‘robust resilience’, refers to having a personal or organisational, inner strength and ability to adapt. This concept is often organised around practices of individual self-sufficiency and survival, physically and mentally. Commonly, it is assumed that threats are external to the individual or the organisation and that resilience fundamentally is a matter of being able to bounce back.

ii The second concept of ‘reflexive resilience’ designates resilience as an ability to be reflexive about our co-production of new threats; being self-aware of the future (unknown) consequences of one’s own actions. This discourse often stresses learning as a tool for progressively reaching such state of reflexive resilience.

iii The third concept, termed ‘organised resilience’, is discursively unstable as it conceptualises resilience as a management tool within a means-ends logic, yet getting its authority by reference to uncertainty. This concept stresses how new forms of institutions, e.g. partnerships, outreach, education and training programs, can help create expectations about expectations for the management of future threats. Settled within a discourse of uncertainty, the focus is on agility, voluntary actions, hand-shakes,
and character-building and new forms of institutions, rules and control. We found two versions of this concept in the empirical material: one that aims to manage the future by setting up tools to support robustness, and one that aims to create reflexive resilience for the purpose of improving future management. What the two versions share – and what they add to the first two discourses on resilience – is a belief in the possibility to plan and manage the unmanageable: by means of robustness or reflection, or a combination of the two. This concept of organised resilience, which so far has been overlooked in the literature on resilience, is powerful in the governmental reports. It is however also a concept that raises many questions. Ultimately, it is democratically untenable, as it promises direction based on worst case scenarios rather than on positive visions on where we, as a society, want to go.

Three concepts of ‘Nordic’ resilience: robust, reflexive and organised resilience

As mentioned earlier, in all three of the Nordic countries, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, the semantic field defining the meaning of resilience all stress societies’ (and individuals’) ability to adapt and defend themselves against new and uncertain dangers. Concepts such as adaptation, robustness and comprehensive security are commonly used to describe this development. We also see a common focus on topics such as terrorism, extremism and cyber security as risks with catastrophic effects and which are hard to locate and manage by normal means of control. While many of the words used in relation to resilience are the same in the three countries, they are given different connotations. For example, as we shall see in the analysis below, the concept of Total Defence has resurfaced as important for understanding the Norwegian concept of comprehensive security. In Sweden, on the other hand, there is a strong emphasis on ‘civil defence’, something that only plays a minor role in the two other countries. Finally, Denmark stands out as the only country without mass distribution of crisis information to households testifying to a different understanding of how to handle so-called black swan events.11

Below we present three discourses on resilience, which can be identified in the analysed material: ‘robust resilience’, ‘reflexive resilience’ and ‘organised resilience’. As we argue below, not all three discourses are equally represented in the three countries. There are important deviations. Together, they however tell us how ‘security governance as resilience’ is justified in these Nordic countries and how the ‘strategic’ role of governments is constructed. This matters politically as it helps us to comprehend how some managerial practices and solutions become possible and others impossible, as well as helps us to understand how Nordic security institutions and media perceive the role of planning and strategy in a world increasingly apprehended as uncertain.
The concept of ‘robust resilience’

This form of resilience refers to that of having strength, mental robustness and health: the ability of individual adaptation to new situations and demands. It is a matter of taking psychology and physical needs into the practice of security. Much of what can be observed in this debate on resilience is well known from the emergency preparedness we saw during the World Wars and the Cold War. It stresses the individual’s or the organisation’s ability to survive in the face of shocks, by building shelters and fences, by storing food and otherwise preparing for war (gas masks, taping up windows). This discourse of physical and mental protection is strongest in Sweden and Norway, while almost absent in Danish media and official reports.12

In 2015, a crisis drill concerning the resilience of the Swedish people was held. Headlines in local newspapers in the aftermath were gloomy: ‘Three days. That’s how long a household should be able to stand its ground in the event of a crisis. But the preparedness of the public seems low’ (Nya Wermlands-Tidningen, 03.03.2015).13 Summing up after the drill, Stefan Anering, unit manager at the Swedish MSB, concluded that ‘Swedes will not survive a crisis’.14 Pure and simple. He continued: The system in place for crisis management builds on individual responsibility, at least in the beginning of a crisis. Most people lack the mental preparedness that something could happen’. In 2020 another drill is planned for to exercise ‘total defence’.15 While this drill does not run contrary to the other drills, it emphasises the need for people to assist during wartime, understood in rather conventional terms. Thereby, robust resilience runs as a common thread through wartime and peacetime alike in Sweden.

A certain level of household preparedness forms part of this preparedness16: ‘access to water, some dry and canned food, perhaps batteries for a radio, a flashlight and such things’17 (Arbetarbladet, 26.02.2015). These quotes illustrate that it is clearly the responsibility of the individual Swede to withstand in the event of a crisis, and that most people are not mentally prepared. This is supported by the following quote in which it is spelled out that individuals are frontline fighters alongside corporations and public administration in the event of a crisis: ‘It is clearly not just businesses and authorities that lack crisis preparedness. Our civilian preparedness is not among the best either’.18

In an attempt to teach the public its role in crisis preparedness and the mental robustness required, the Swedish civilian organisation ‘Lottakåren’ has held courses all over Sweden. The courses are called ‘Take care of yourself’19 and teach the participants to plan an individual emergency response. It is underlined that this does not mean to ‘not give a damn about others’20 as it is bluntly expressed by a volunteer.

It might seem provocative, but it means that you have to strengthen yourself first in order to be able to help others. Precisely like the oxygen
masks on an airplane where you put your own on first and then help others.  

This form of resilience is repeated in many of the sources from Sweden. To take an example, after the terrorist lorry attack in the centre of Stockholm in 2017 we find similar sentiments:

While authorities, police, and politicians do their best to protect the citizens from crime and terror, we have to do our part as private citizens to protect society. That entails to keep trusting our fellow citizens and our social system. We can do it. Everyone in Stockholm who helped one another during and after the attack in Drottninggatan showed us that.


In Denmark we see a slightly different and less optimistic attitude when it comes to the strength of the individual as a frontline fighter. In relation to a terrorism case (Kundby sagen), the national newspaper Jyllands-Posten expressed scepticism towards the idea of ‘robust resilience’:

The concept of robustness is used so often – it has become a sort of “airbag of life”. We only know if it works when we crash. The discouraging news is that there is no robustness test or a “quick fix” which can check and boost your mental robustness.

(Jyllands-Posten 08.04.2017)

In Norway, like in Sweden, a brochure on how to withstand the first 72 hours of a crisis has been distributed with similar recommendations as to what to keep in stock in the event of catastrophe. Furthermore, individual, robust resilience was discussed extensively after the 2011 attacks. Primarily in terms of robustness, expectations and control ‘How can we learn to live with the fear of terror?’, a sociologist asked soon after the Utøya shootings and the bombing of the government quarters in Oslo.

We need more knowledge about the social and psychological mechanisms that partake in developing collective and individual resilience when our society is struck by such meaningless terror. Norway has to learn from what has happened on many levels, also the psychological one.

(‘Hvordan leve med terrorfrykt?’, Aftenposten, 29.07.2011).

Another voice joined the choir and spoke of how the group enhances individual resilience: ‘External danger makes people move closer together and often a strong group bond develops. This enhances a person’s resilience considerably. Team building and a strengthened esprit de corps and we-feeling
are essential’ (‘Norsk mestring av terror’, Forskning.no, 28.07.2011). He continues by stating that when facing risk, it is ideal if a person has positive expectations so that if anything happens, the person thinks that ‘something can be done, by yourself or by the authorities’ (ibid.). On the contrary, a person who expects the opposite is ‘prone to feeling helpless’ and might in the worst case ‘deny that the risk exists’ and therefore will not prepare and protect himself (ibid.) This kind of feeling of lack of control and ensuing helplessness is clearly not considered desirable. The solution can be found at the level of perceptions:

Actual control in the sense of being able to make a choice and solve or avoid a problem is of course preferable. When actual control is not possible, a sense of control can be very useful. It has been shown that many people have the ability to feel a certain degree of control even in situations where this feeling is not accurate.

(Norsk mestring av terror, Forskning.no, 28.07.2011)

An individual who perceives of herself to be in control – even if this is not the case – creates robustness. However, ‘[r]esilience (…) or resistance/survivability is natural and cannot be taught. Research shows no results in such training programmes. Natural resilience is the most important mechanism in how people handle trauma and grief’ (Sorg og smerte er individuell, Stavanger Aftenblad, 27.07.2011, Tommy Ellingsen).

But even if resilience cannot be taught, individuals are clearly held responsible for their own robustness and resilience in the Norwegian sources:

Recent research shows that those who spend a lot of time in front of a screen checking the news have more negative reactions. Even if cause and effect are unclear, we can as individuals take responsibility by shielding ourselves (and our children) from too much exposure to media and thereby avoid anxiety and retain robustness.

(Hvordan leve med terrorfrykt?, Aftenposten, 29.07.2011)

In Norway, there is also a very strong sense of how the group assists in creating robustness. There are recurring references to a special kind of Norwegian pride connected to how they handled the attack as a group (ibid.). ‘…what better societal security exists than the fact that we stand united when some extreme terrorist or terrorist group attacks our society?’ (Tanker etter terrortragedien, Hallingdølen, 11.08.2011).

Overall, robust resilience is present in Sweden, Denmark and Norway, but in different forms. In Norway, the group is of utmost importance for robust resilience. In Sweden, the physical robustness and mental preparedness are key. And in Denmark, robustness is recognised, but not to the extent where brochures are distributed nationwide in order to enhance our chances of survival during a crisis.
The concept of ‘reflexive resilience’

Resilience in this form is an ability to not only adapt but also to be reflexive about our production of new threats. This is what Chandler calls a ‘post-modern’ concept of resilience. He explains, ‘the goal becomes not security but a self-reflective awareness of the unintended consequences… of any securitising measure’ (11). It puts ourselves and our communities centre stage, not only as frontline defence but also as co-producers of threats. The distinction between ourselves and our environment is blurring, as the outside threat can never be fully understood as external to our own doing.

This concept of resilience assumes (or wants to promote) individual and organised reflexivity. It assumes that we live in a Beckian ‘risk society’ where we as individuals have become aware of and reflexive about our own production of risk (Beck 1999). Resilience is not directed towards one thing, person or threat (as in the first discourse on robust resilience), but everyone has to tap in and contribute to the definition and management of the threat. Resilience is in this way ‘the creation of a society that creates… [C]itizens are asked to not only create resilience but also to co-create the mere definition of resilience’ (Petersen and Tjalve 2013, 12).

This discourse on resilience is strongly represented in the Danish and Swedish debates on security and resilience, while it is almost absent in Norway. The Norwegian discourse on resilience is very modern in the sense that the focus is primarily on the inner strengths of the individual citizen to withhold and adapt to a rather firmly defined threat (the first discourse).

In Denmark, this form of resilience is found in government reports on radicalisation, cyber security and emergency management. In the 2016 annual report, the Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET) writes how resilience is about ‘including local societal actors, who can contribute to secure the social cohesion and resistance of local communities towards radicalisation’ (18). Similarly, the emergency management agency (DEMA) writes ‘A contingency thinking and culture has to be anchored in society, to make citizens and companies better empowered and self-governed to prepare and manage larger incidents and crises’ (DEMA 2016, 21, our underlining). Unlike in the first discourse on robust resilience where citizens were asked to stock up supplies in the event of a crisis, the Danish strategy is awareness-making and the creation of a contingency culture. For both the intelligence agency and the emergency management agency, resilience is used to describe their approach to preventive security. As we will argue below, this preventive effort described in the Danish and Swedish reports is linked to new forms of organisation and security governance: the use of public-private partnerships (PPPs), outreach programmes, risk communication and implementation of a special operational unit within the Security Intelligence Agency (PET 2016: 21, 23, 2017: 4, 17). These instruments are constructed to help manage future threats and build up resilient local environments.
In the media sources we found this form of resilience present as well. In an interview, a volunteer from the Swedish ‘Lottakåren’, Britta Christott, explains that

there is so much to gain from being mentally prepared in the event of a crisis. You have to learn to turn on your radar and pay attention to connections you might not have seen before. The next step is to create your own crisis plan.33

(‘Kriskurs till länet’, Länstidningen Östersund, 21.02.2015, 9)

Given that the organisation itself is part of the Swedish Total Defence, one could have expected a presentation of ‘Lottakåren’ as one that helps to defend against a demarcated outside territorial threat. This example however shows no clear defining line between the threat environment and the individual that needs to act. Rather, the individual constantly is asked to assess the situation and the environment that he/she is part of.

Similarly, in Denmark, the incident known as ‘Kundby-pigen’, where a 17-year-old school girl was apprehended by police while planning terror attacks against schools, the focus also turned to reflexive resilience:

…teachers learn to spot stress and signs of radicalization. This is a skill which is likely to be more important in the coming years. The work has to be systematized in order to focus on the resilience towards extremist opinions and movements in children and youth

(Berlingske, ‘Lærere slog alarm over Kundby-pige forud for anholdelse’, 16 April 2017).34

Another source supports this focus on reflexive resilience:

For every terror suspect apprehended, there are heroes we never hear about. But there are even more heroes for each person with massive social and psychological problems that never end up as a terrorist suspect. Because someone did something extra for the man who was far out, but didn’t come that far. Police officers, school teachers, educators, social workers, abuse consultants, publishers, coaches and other volunteers. Family and friends.


Reflexive security is a form of resilience that takes into account the feedback loops and effects of one’s own sayings and doings. We found this form of resilience present in Sweden and Denmark primarily.

The concept of ‘organised resilience’

Overlooked in the literature on resilience but powerful in many governmental reports across the Nordic countries is this concept of organised
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resilience. This concept is settled within a discourse of uncertainty and focuses on agility, voluntary actions, hand-shakes, character-building and new forms of institutions, rules and control. In this discourse, the strategic element of planning for and managing the future figures more prominently than in the two aforementioned forms of resilience. Briefly speaking, one can say that resilience is, in this discourse, a tool of management between means and ends, the end however being defined negatively as a matter of ‘coping with uncertainty’ and the possible catastrophe and the means being that of setting up the right institutional structures. We argue that organised resilience comes in two forms in the empirical material: one connected to robustness, and one connected to reflexive resilience. What the two versions share in common – and what they add to the first two discourses on resilience – is the idea that it is possible to plan and manage the unmanageable: by means of robustness or reflection, or a combination of the two.

While seemingly a logical development in times of uncertainty, this concept raises many questions. Ultimately, it is democratically untenable, as it promises direction based on worst case thinking rather than on positive visions on where we, as a society, want to go. The discourse seems unstable as it, on the one hand, stresses the inability of planning (cf. the stress on uncertainty) while it, on the other hand, engages with exactly that. When Lindberg and Sundelius (2012: 1297) paint a picture of how Sweden should prepare for so-called black swan events through resilience they follow this exact logic: calling for the management of the unmanageable. Quoting Comfort, Boin and Demchak (2010: 9) they write ‘Resilience is the capacity of a social system (e.g., an organization, city, or society) to proactively adapt to and recover from disturbances that are perceived within the system to fall outside the range of normal and expected disturbances’ (quoted in Lindberg and Sundelius 2012). Accordingly, we should plan for that which we cannot plan for, anticipate that which cannot be anticipated and manage that which cannot be managed (Lindberg and Sundelius 2012). How does that make sense? How can we plan for a future that we do not know?

In an article on the logic of administrative decision-making in the Danish public administration, Andersen and Pors (2017) show how uncertainty came to matter by the turn of the 21st century. Where decision-making in the 1960s and 1970s focused on planning for a known future, in the 1980s we start to see supervision (a call for self-governance and the use of internal contracts between state and municipalities) as the main idea behind decision-making. The future is no longer an image of the past but is considered as something complex that can only be managed locally, under the supervision of the state. Around the year 2000, they argue, the basis for decision-making changed once again as the idea of a fundamentally uncertain future takes over from ‘complexity’. The aim is now to see and consider the potentials for the future by means of co-creation, innovation and re-thinking. The answers to future problems can hence not be guided by planning or supervision. Instead, the task becomes one of establishing ‘expectations about the future with the expectation that all expectations will undergo a radical
change’ (Åkerstrøm and Pors 2017: 132). The goal is to establish institutions and means of governance that create potentials for the future. One example of such an institution is PPPs, but also outreach programmes and organisations for dialogue with religious communities are doing exactly that. These institutions and organisations are organised around a discourse on uncertainty, demanding awareness, flexibility and co-creation of future solutions.

As we argue below, such institutions and programmes are formulated as a means for governing resilience and thereby as the solution to many of the new security threats. These organisations seemingly dissolve the paradox of uncertainty by claiming to organise that which cannot be planned, assuring flexibility, agility and decision in the face of the unknown.

In the governmental reports and newspaper articles from the three countries, this form of organisation spans from organisations of dialogue and awareness in Sweden and Denmark (including PPPs) to ‘How-to-survive-campaigns’ in Sweden and Norway.38 Where the first kind of organisation (awareness and dialogue) mainly supports and emphasises ‘reflexive resilience’ thinking, the ‘how-to’ campaigns are set up to support ‘robust resilience’.

Organising reflexive resilience

In Sweden the web-based tool, the Dialogue Compass (Samtalskompassen), is a good example of an attempt to create dialogue and awareness on extremism in society. In an editorial with the title ‘Will you be an extremist, little friend?’39 the editor of a large Swedish newspaper explains how the web-based educational tool is for people who meet ‘persons in risk of radicalization, primarily young people’. The tool will help by teaching ‘supportive and preventive dialogue to strengthen the resilience against extremist messages’ (‘Blir du extremist, lille vän?’ Fria Tidningen, 25.02.2015).40 In an interview, Swedish national coordinator on violent extremism (and former minister) Mona Sahlin explains further:

If the extremists can succeed in finding youth to recruit, the society can too. Or we should be able to. But we have to be more vigilant. We can never give up the fight to avoid radicalization, recruitment to violent extremism, or to teach people to refrain from using violence.41 (‘Vi måste växla upp mot extremismen’, Expressen, 22.02.2015)

The method is clearly one of organised ‘reflexive’ resilience.

In order to identify these people in time and to prevent that they commit crime, the different parts of society have to cooperate. Parents, sports trainers, social workers, teachers, priests, nurses, after school teachers,
imams and police in the vicinity of the person in question have to come together to discover, understand and act.

(‘Vi måste växla upp mot extremismen’, Expressen, 22.02.2015). 42

And this is the responsibility of all: ‘The fact that the dialogue compass is available to all means that there is no longer any excuse for not participating in the preventive work’ 43 (‘Nationella samordnaren mot våldsbejakande extremism lanserar utbildningsmaterial’, Cision Wire, 17.02.2015). 44 In Denmark, similar educational initiatives have been taken to raise the Danish public’s awareness towards radicalisation. Yet, these have been organised as projects, especially targeted at schoolchildren. 45

Similar teaching and communication projects on extremism and cyber security have also targeted private companies. In Denmark, the Danish security intelligence has initiated three of such programmes. In the course description of one of the courses (RASK46), the PET writes:

Humans are generally the bulwark against threats, but are also the weakest part of an organization’s security. The human side of security is an aspect of resilience that is central but perhaps more complex or controversial to speak of? Threats from spies and insiders are well-known to many, but how do we deal with these human threats? How to prevent and manage the situations where employees accidentally make mistakes that can have major consequences for the company or the organization.

And two sentences down:

Participants are enabled to come up with ideas on how to involve and create ownership for the security of both management and employees.47

Organisational learning and employer awareness are stressed as tools for creating ‘ideas’, ‘ownership’ and thus responsibility for progressively reaching security.48

Following up on the same idea, the Swedish political party Moderaterne has argued that

We also need to identify ways of communication and develop targeted messages in order to enhance the robustness of specific groups against extremist viewpoints. The state is often not the most efficient messenger, and therefore businesses working with social media or anti-extremist and anti-terrorist Muslim organisations should be involved.

The idea is to support reflexive thinking amongst different groups in society, to make them partners in managing the threat, not by defining exactly what should be fought but to have their ears and eyes open to new developments.

**Organising robust resilience**

While the examples mentioned so far stress the need for citizens, school-children and employees to be more reflexive about their own production of risks, other discourses on ‘organised resilience’ tend to enforce a much clearer distinction between the citizens and the threat environment, stressing the possibility of organised robustness. This type of organised resilience is mostly found in Norway and in Sweden. The role of the authorities is here more on of directing the behaviour of citizens, to enhance peoples’ and critical infrastructures’ robustness and frontline defence. Emergency management is, in this case, the typical instrument of an organised resilience which stresses robustness (rather than reflexive thinking).

Most explicitly, this form of organised resilience has resulted in the campaigns in both Sweden and Norway under the title of ‘72 hours’ mentioned earlier under robust resilience. This is how long a household has to withstand in the event of a major crisis such as breakdown in electricity, flooding, fires and the like. A Swedish representative of the emergency services (MSB) explains how the ‘crisis response of the common people needs to be improved’:

This entails sitting down and talking about what your household needs are. Don’t underestimate the power of thought. Be innovative and don’t complicate it too much. Use what you have and add a few things, such as flashlights and batteries. This is a process of gradual knowledge-sharing and responsibilisation.

Basically, the plan is that every household in Sweden needs its own crisis response strategy. The message is clear in an article entitled ‘Prepare for the unexpected’:

…not only individuals, but also municipalities need more knowledge about their duties. The people must understand that the resources in society are not sufficient if many people are hit at the same time. People will have to wait and therefore they have to take more responsibility.

Here we thus have a discourse on resilience that is founded on a dilemma between uncertainty and management, yet solves this but turning to robustness and emergency preparedness.

In Norway, the answer has also become a refocusing on the concept of Total Defence:

Cooperation is a prerequisite for good societal security and reasonable use of our resources. When the resources of civil society are not
adequate the defence can assist as long as possible. This concerns everything from search and rescue to the handling of terror attacks. In the same way, civil society can assist the defence during crisis and war. We call it Total Defence and it concerns how we as a nation make all resources available during serious incidents. It is about defending ourselves with all we’ve got.55

(‘Totalforsvar viktig’, Avisa Nordland, 24.04.2017.)

The threat is uncertain, but the answer is coordination and mobilisation of all levels of society – for the purpose of creating robustness. After the Utøya attacks, the focus was less on the grand design, but rather on thinking through and systematising what went well that day in July 2011. One of those things was the remarkable willing to act on the part of random bystanders. Therefore, an initial conclusion was that

\textit{it is important to study the informal ad-hoc structures.} Amongst these the people on the camping sites [close to Utøya]. It is said that the person who will save your life is the person next to you. That capacity of random people has to be studied from an emergency perspective \( (\textit{Aftenposten}, 09.08.2011). \)56

Overall, ‘[a]cting together is a concept which has caught on after the 22 July terror. To find one another, learn about others’ capacities and identify mutual dependencies between emergency actors are central elements of the concept of acting together’ (\textit{Aktuell Sikkerhet}, 01.03.2017).57

In both cases of organised resilience – the one that stresses the enhancement of reflexiveness and the one that stresses the creation of robustness, the focus is on uncertainty but the institutional answers through management are different. Planning used to be done against the image of future which was expected to be complex, yet manageable. Planning was a way of prescribing a strategy for improvement – a matter of picturing a new future and defining how to get there (Brodie 1973). This image of organised resilience turns everything upside down as the description of the future becomes a negative one. In the image of uncertainty, strategy is a question of avoiding the ‘worst case’, not one of defining a new vision for the future. The question is how to instrumentally prepare for uncertainty by setting up the right institutional framework. It is in this sense a rather apolitical and instrumental solution to security.

Yet, while this discourse on the one hand draws its authority by referring to the unknown future, it also rests on a modern belief that knowledge accumulation and information sharing will help us to improve and prepare for the so-called black swans. Similar to the second discourse, on reflexive resilience, we see an optimistic emphasis on learning. Risk communication is one tool that, BRF and MSB repeatedly argue, will help create a ‘contingency culture’ in local communities. Likewise, PPPs are suggested by both the national and the defence intelligence agencies (especially on cyber
security) as a way to increase the knowledge base and help avoid the next big event (Petersen 2019).

In this discourse, resilience comes to resemble what we would normally associate with a precautionary approach to risk: it is not described as ‘just’ a matter ‘muddling through’ by strengthening the capabilities to cope with new situations (discourses one and two), but it is based on the belief that it is possible to set up an institutional structure that makes society able to circumvent potential future catastrophes. Thus, macro-planning is considered possible.58

This concept of organised resilience, however, raises many new questions and concerns as it is ultimately democratically untenable. These institutional forms (dialogue initiatives, outreach programmes, educational initiatives and ‘how to survive guidelines’) are presented as ‘sponges’ that can absorb the worst in any crisis, yet what exactly has to be absorbed is virtually unknown.

Conclusion: regaining strategic initiative

Resilience as a theoretical concept has received a lot of attention in scholarly debates over the past five to ten years. In this chapter, we asked if those widely described individualised security practices could be identified or whether other forms of resilience practices were visible in the Nordic countries, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. The chapter has argued that three forms of resilience can be found in media sources and governmental reports: the concept of robust resilience, the concept of reflexive resilience and the concept of organised resilience. The latter concept has not before been identified in the scholarly debates and thus constitutes a novel contribution.

In terms of the different resilience practices in the Nordic countries, the chapter started out with an expectation that these quite similar Nordic countries would have similar patterns of practice related to resilience. Overall, it was confirmed that the trust in the state and the overwhelming willingness to share information with the state are common features that enable resilience practices. However, differences were also clear. For example, robust resilience in the form of physical and mental protection was far more widespread in Norway and Sweden. Denmark did not use nationwide distribution of crisis instructions as part of the resilience toolbox, whereas both Sweden and Norway did. Further, an interesting difference appeared when comparing the discourses on reflexive resilience. Where Sweden and Denmark were both highly influenced by this Beckian risk society form of resilience understanding, stressing reflectivity and co-production, Norwegian sources tilted towards an understanding of risks coming from the outside, and not as something we are co-producing ourselves.

The last form found in the material – namely organisational resilience – is probably the most politically problematic. While all countries agreed that future threats were uncertain and that prediction and a positive end goal no
longer steered security planning, all three countries enacted initiatives to make authorities and citizens expect the unexpected. To prepare for the unknown. To a large extent, this produces a normalisation of the exceptional and legitimises a range of initiatives in the name of safeguarding against any future threat. Resilience becomes the standard answer in the Nordic countries, but we are unsure to what. Resilience is however not entirely without promises. The promises are instead in the expectations that key institutions will deliver on the promise of always adapting and finding new solutions to future challenges. The strategic feature of the concept of resilience is, in other words, reduced to a matter of finding the right architecture to cope with future challenges, and does not entail a description of that future – as the future is basically unknown. We find this highly problematic. This notion of resilience entails a description of the future in terms of fears and thus tends to nourish an inward-looking and anxious mode of existence. Also, this turn to organised resilience changes our understanding of authority and responsibility in security politics by dispersing power and responsibility to the many on the one hand, while still claiming to be able to somehow steer. Yet, while security might still be supervised by the state, the vision of the future is wrapped in an uncertainty and no one can really be held accountable for the future events. This is hardly a way of regaining strategic initiative.

Notes

1 As the military strategist Bernard Brodie wrote in 1973, the focus of strategy is – at the level of planning – to prescribe new and better solutions (Brodie 1973: 332). Strategy has since been used by a wide set of organisations to define a general direction that defines a preferred future and the steps needed to achieving that future.
2 Yet, at least in policy debates, there is a striking difference between a precautionary approach and that of resilience. Where the precaution principle holds on to the promise of macro-planning in its description of ‘the principles’ that we, as a community, have to follow (Stirling 2007), the thrust of resilience lies in decentralised individual decision-making.
3 Anders Wivel (2017) even discusses a special Nordic Model of International Peace and Security and Hagemann and Bramsen (2019) discuss the many Nordic peace and conflict resolution efforts in a Nordic Council of Ministers report.
4 Reference to the ‘72 hours’ pamphlets in Norway and Sweden.
5 The quotes in the following analysis are representative. When including references to local media the direct source is quoted. The same wording is, however, most often found in many similar articles in other local journals on the same or the following day because the local media outlets use the same source.
6 Search words in the analysis were: Norway: Resiliens, Samfunnssikkerhet, Totalforsvar, Motstandskraft, Motstandsdyktig, Robusthet. Sweden: Resiliens, Totalförsvar, Samhällssäkerhet, Motståndskraftig, Motståndskraft, Samhällsskydd, Robusthet. Denmark: Resiliens, Samfundssikkerhed, Totalforsvar, Modstandsdygtig, Modstands Kraft, Samfunds mæssig sikkerhed. We are aware that ‘Samhällsskydd’ is also part of the Swedish emergency management agency, and that ‘Samfunnssikkerhet’ forms part of the name of the Norwegian counterpart.
In Sweden this appear as ‘holistic approach’ (Counterterrorism strategy 2014/15), ‘whole of society’ or ‘greater societal capacity’. In Norway, this is referred to mostly as ‘total defence’, while in Denmark the concept of ‘societal cohesion’ is used as synonym to comprehensive security.

In Norway agility is referred to as adaptability (‘Omustillingsparat’, NSM 2017, DSB 2017: 70); and in Denmark, as ‘adaptive operations’ (PET 2016) and ‘crisis-capacity’. Adaptation is not as often mentioned in the Swedish texts but appears as ‘proactive adaptation’ (see more under organised resilience); yet the concept of ‘motståndsanda’ appears from 2017.

Sometimes also referred to as ‘whole of society’ (see Lindberg and Sundelius 2012: 1297).

This concept of ‘reflexive’ is taken from Ulrich Beck, who observes how we, in the second modernity, have become self-reflective of our own role in the production of dangers, looking back at the industrial modernity. It describes that of being self-critical and aware about the (often unintended) consequences of our own acts and calling for self-limitation, -restrain and -control (1999: 79–81).

The popularity of Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s 2007 book, The Black Swan, made the ‘black swan’ image a metaphor of the unlikely and unpredictable future event that might change societal and organisational priorities by destabilising the modern understanding of risks, as something to be forecasted.

The reasons for this can be many. Norway and Denmark were both frontline countries during the Cold War, but differ on this aspect. Neutral Sweden has focused on civil and frontline defence as a shield against foreign invasion for a long time.

‘Tre dygn. Så länge ska ett hushåll kunna klara sig om en kris skulle uppstå. Allmänhetens beredskap verkar dock vara låg och kommunen jobbar på att ta fram tips och råd’ (Nya Wermlands-Tidningen, 03.03.2015).

‘Svenskar klarar sig inte i kris’ (Arbetarbladet, 26.02.2015).


The official pamphlet distributed to all households can be found here: https://rib.msb.se/filer/pdf/28706.pdf


Så det är tydligt inte bara företag och myndigheter som saknar krisberedskap. Vår civila samhällsberedskap är alltså inte den bästa in ’Vår krisberedskap är inte god’ (Nya Wermlands-Tidningen, 24.02.2015, 22).


‘… innebär inte att du ska “skita i andra”’ (ibid.).

‘Det kan uppfattas som provocerande, men det handlar om att man ska stärka sig själv först för att sedan kunna hjälpa andra. Precis som med syrgasmaskerna på flygplanen som man också först måste sätta på sig själv för att sedan hjälpa andra med sina’ (ibid.).

‘Medan myndigheter, poliser, politiker och andra gör sitt för att skydda medborgarna från kriminalitet, brott och terror, så ska vi göra allt som privatpersoner för att skydda samhället. Det innebär att vi fortsätter ha tillit till våra
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24 ‘You form part of Norway’s preparedness’, see also www.sikkerhverdag.no/din-beredskap/hendelser-og-kriser/beredskap-i-hjemmet/. For some reason, Norwegians are advised to keep iodine tablets in case of a nuclear incident.


26 ‘Ytre fare gjør at mennesker søker sammen og ofte oppstår et meget sterkt gruppesamhold. Dette øker personens motstandsksraft betraktelig. Teambygging og styrking av korpsånd og “vi”-følelse er derfor essensielt’ in ‘Norsk mestring av terror’ (Forsknings.no, 28.07.2011).

27 ‘Det beste er selvfølgelig at man har reell kontroll, dvs kan foreta et valg som gjør at problemet løses eller unngås. Der reell kontroll ikke er mulig, vil oppelevd kontroll kunne være meget nyttig. Det viser seg at mange mennesker har evnen til å føle en viss grad av kontroll selv i situasjoner hvor denne ikke er så helt reell’ in ‘Norsk mestrings av terror’ (ibid.)


30 ‘… hva er vel bedre samfunnssikkerhet enn det at vi kan stå sammen, når en eller annen ytterliggående terrorist eller terroristgruppe måtte true samfunnet vårt?’ in ‘Tanker etter terrortragedien’ (Hallingdol., 11.08.2011).

31 This vision is echoed in the yearly reports and strategies of the DEMA all the way back to 2014. Before that the focus was more on the institutional capacity to coordinate amongst different national authorities, thus on the horizontal coordination. In the publications of the PET, the discourse is also present in the 2014 reports. In Sweden we see a similar shift from coordination to self-governance.

32 Lottakåren is a Swedish women’s organisation that works on civil preparedness in the event of a crisis. See also www.svenskalottakaren.se/.

34 ‘...lærere (...) lærer at spotte mistrivsel og tegn på radikalisering. En kompetence som der er udsigt til, får mere fokus i de kommende år. (...) indsatsen skal systematiseres for at øge fokus på børn og unges modstandskraft mod ekstremistiske holdninger og bevægelser’ in ‘Lærere slog alarm over kundby-pige forud for anholdelse’ (Berlingske, 16.04.2017).


36 The concept of ‘organised resilience’ is inspired by Michael Powers term ‘organised uncertainty’ (2007). Similar to his argument on how we as society have come to see risk management (compliance systems and auditing techniques) as a matter of ‘just’ organising uncertainty, one can argue that the institutional structures set up to create resilience (and thereby organise uncertainty) are resting on a similar paradox of wanting to control the uncontrollable.

37 A typical example is to base administrative decisions on works of commissions and public councils, in order to work out the problems and recommend new directions. Accordingly, the future was considered calculable and therefore possible to control (Andersen and Pors 2017: 125–126).

38 Both campaigns are from 2018. Please see links to brochures earlier in notes 10 and 20. The Norwegian state radio even ran a podcast called ‘72 timer’ (72 hours) in which they discuss the level of individual preparedness (‘egenberedskap’) with several famous Norwegians. https://radio.nrk.no/podkast/72_timer), accessed 13 August 2019.

39 ‘Blir du extremist, lille vän?’ (Fria Tidningen, 25.02.2015).

40 ‘...ett webbaserat utbildningsmaterial under namnet “Samtalskompassen”. Webbsajten sägs rikta sig till de som “möter personer i riskzonen för radikalisering, framför allt unga i deras vardag” och sägs ge verktyg för att “med hjälp av stödjande och förebyggande samtal, stärka ungas motståndskraft mot extrema budskap”’ in ‘Blir du extremist, lille vän?’ (Fria Tidningen, 25.02.2015).


42 ‘För att identifiera dessa personer i tid och förebygga att de begär brottsliga handlingar måste samhällets olika instanser samverka. De föräldrar, idrottstränare, socialarbetare, lärare, präster, sjuksköterskor, fritidsledare, imamer och poliser som finns i personens närhet måste tillsammans verka för att upptäcka, förstå och agera’ in ‘Vi måste växa upp mot extremismen’ (Expressen, 22.02.2015).

43 ‘Att Samtalskompassen finns tillgänglig för alla gör att det inte längre finns några ursäkter för att inte delta i det förebyggande arbetet’ in ‘Nationella samordnaren mot våldsbejakande extremism lanserar utbildningsmaterial’ (Cision Wire, 17.02.2015).

44 Another initiative that falls under this concept of resilience is the recent Swedish decision to include psychological defence under the emergency management agency. It was announced at the annual ‘Folk och försvar’ security conference in Sälen on 14 January 2018. See also www.thelocal.se/20180115/sweden-to-create-new-authority-tasked-with-countering-disinformation, accessed 5 November 2019.

45 One such initiative is a web-portal entitled ‘strong communities’ (www.stærkefælleskaber.dk), created on private funding by a consultancy company (Certa for Trygfonden).
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46 RASK stands for ‘Risiko, Adfærd og Sikkerhedskultur’ (Risk, behaviour and security culture).

47 ‘Mennesker er generelt et bolværk mod trusler, men er også samtidig det svageste led i organisationens sikkerhed? Den menneskelige side af sikkerhed er et aspekt af modstandskraft som er centralt, men måske mere komplekst eller kontroversielt at tale om? Truslen fra spioner og insidere er for mange velkendte, men hvordan håndterer vi disse menneskelige trusler. Hvordan forebygger og håndterer man de situationer, hvor medarbejdere utilgåeligt begår fejl, der kan have store konsekvenser for virksomheden eller organisationen’ and ‘Deltagerne sættes i stand til internt at komme med idéer til at inndrage og skabe ejerskab til sikkerhed hos både ledelse og medarbejdere’, available at www.pet.dk/Forebyggende%20Afdeling/~media/Forebyggende%20Afdeling/Kurser/201706FolderenRASKFINALpdf.ashx.

48 The term ‘learning from near-misses’ is often used in relation to resilience and organisational learning (see Dalgaard-Nielsen 2017 for an analysis of how Danish organisations understand resilience).


50 At the local level in Halland, Sweden, people are working to become resilient together: ‘Resilience in society does not exist. If supply of electricity or oil were stopped in a crisis situation, how long would we be able to manage with existing repositories? For that reason (...) we have decided to start up an exchange-circle [bytesring]. We want to become self-sufficient in water and electricity’, translated from ‘Det finns ingen resiliens i samhållet i dag. Om tillgången till el eller olja skulle stoppas i en krissituation, hur länge klarar vi oss då på det som vi har i förråden? Därför vill vi i sambruket bygga upp en bytesring. I sommar kommer förmodligen en i arbetsgruppen också att arbeta med att starta ett socialt företag och anställa arbetslösa. Vi vill bli självförsörjande på allt från vatten till el’ in ‘Två sambruk startas i Halland’ (Fria Tidningen, 24.02.2015).


53 In Swedish: ‘Förbered dig på det oväntade’.


57 ‘Samvirke som begrep har fått et godt fotfeste etter 22.juli terroren. Å finne hverandre, lære hverandres kapasiteter å kjenne og identifisere gjensidige avhengigheter mellom beredskapsaktører, er sentrale deler som inngår i samvirkeprinsippet’ (Aktuell Sikkerhet, 01.03.2017).

58 As argued by Stirling (2007), precautionary measures usually assume the possibility of planning at the level of governments.

References


Of the new concepts that have started to define the way we think about security today, resilience is arguably one of the most influential ones. Indeed, it could be asserted that resilience is the notion that captures most succinctly the recent turn to “societal security” as a response to new threat perceptions, both in the Nordic region and elsewhere. Security has been defined in relation to such “new issues” as the flow of information, resources, and people, the cyber domain, ecological systems, and international terrorism. As a result, the threats faced by contemporary democratic societies are increasingly viewed as wicked and complex problems that challenge the more traditional strategies of producing (national) security. In addition to defence, protection, and prevention, the focus of security policies has fell more and more on adaptive capacities – that is, on the ability of the key societal functions to pertain their operativity during shocks or disruptions, and to initiate learning-processes in their aftermath. The concept of resilience refers exactly to this ability to combine resistance to crises with adaptive learning. Thus, it has become one of the most pivotal “mentalities” of contemporary security governance, and politics more generally. Several European countries and the EU, as well as the US and many international organisations, have adopted resilience to their vocabularies.

Following the lead of practitioners on this score, resilience has also emerged as one the key terms of International Relations (IR) scholarship in the recent years, especially in the sub-field of security studies. Much has been written, in particular, about the links between resilience and the broader contemporary trend of (biopolitical) neoliberalism. For example, Jonathan Joseph (2013a) has suggested that contemporary resilience policies need to be understood in the context of the neoliberal turn as a tool for shifting responsibility from governments to the individuals and local communities. According to this line of thinking, it is no longer up to the state, to put it bluntly, to protect its citizens. Rather, the state must “nudge” its citizens towards taking responsibility for their preparedness and self-organisation.
Such criticisms capture vividly the political dangers of resilience discourse, especially as it has been implemented in the Anglo-Saxon world. By the same token, it is worth noting that the term is utilised for variety of purposes, and yielding to plethora of different political outcomes. Resilience has been applied to countless different and disconnected aspects and areas of global politics from development, economic policy, and environmental governance to counterterrorism and refugee flows. Besides, policy-makers are usually not *principally* interested in conceptual accuracy and precision (which is not to say they would be incapable to think security conceptually). In the empirical world of politics and governance, resilience is not even an “essentially contested concept”. It is a dispersed non-concept that has become a political buzzword (see Brand and Jax, 2007). Hence, scholars ought to be wary of essentialising resilience in their critiques. Indeed, it makes more sense to talk about “resiliences” rather than about a singular object called “resilience” that carries the same attributes across various contexts (Walklate et al., 2014, p. 419).

In this chapter, we emphasise this polyvalence by calling attention to the local trajectories that define the specific forms taken by resilience as a security political notion in Finland. Policies are not devised and implemented from the scratch, but build on local and contextual trajectories, path-dependencies, and (state) strategic cultures. Resilience policies of the recent years are no exceptions. As Berling and Petersen also suggest in their chapter in this volume, there is variance in the discursive production of resilience policies even across the Nordic countries. Our main argument is that on a strategic and political level, buzzwords such as “resilience” are received as “semi-empty signifiers”; they gain their meaning and practical efficacy when the concept is remoulded and fitted into the historically habitualised understandings of security politics, governance, and strategic culture embraced by the receiving actor or collective.

The first main section of the chapter argues that in order to understand the concrete forms taken by resilience policies in different countries, security studies scholarship needs to balance the conceptual genealogies of resilience with more local and contextual ones. The form taken by Finnish resilience policies, for example, needs to be understood as a dynamic process in which domestic traditions and international trajectories interact with each other. The language game of “resilience” is not only translated into the Finnish language, but also fitted to the grammar and syntax of a more established “comprehensive security” framework. In the second section, we offer an ideal-type taxonomisation through which resilience can be separated from other key mentalities or imaginaries of security governance such as “defence”, “protection”, and “prevention”. This ideal-typical taxonomy serves as a basis for analytically dissecting the typical features of resilience approach. On this ground, the third section argues that resilience has been translated into the Finnish context of comprehensive security in a manner that harks back to the discourse of spiritual defence (or psychological defence) that was developed during the Cold War years.
This does not have to mean that the domestication and translation process of resilience would turn out to be nothing but old wine in new bottles, though. As we discuss in the conclusion, the process of rebaptising may turn out to be a productive act of renewal. The interplay of translated resilience and the historical trajectories may give birth to a new type of resilience (the Finnish or Nordic model), one that is better attuned to the demands of democratic participation, the heritage of the Nordic welfare state, and the requirements of effective climate policies than the ones implemented in the Anglophone world. But the process also has its pitfalls: translation may bring about a loss of analytical clarity, leading to inability to think clearly. And as the avalanche of critical literature clearly indicates, the political “promise” of resilience as a tool for producing security in democratic societies is hardly unambiguous. Especially as a buzzword, it is vulnerable to ideological projections.

**Old wine, new bottles? Towards a genealogy of resilience in Finland**

In the IR scholarship, the analyses of concrete forms of contemporary resilience policies have been supplemented with and heavily influenced by a genealogical look at the concept’s history (Brasøtt et al., 2013; Cavelty et al., 2015). For us too, genealogy seems central for the purposes of making sense of current resilience thinking. Genealogy can be understood as a way of articulating – making conceptually visible – the historically emerged ways of thinking that condition us in the present (See e.g. Koopman, 2013, pp. 1–4, 24, 129). We use the word in a broad sense instead of following the methodological lead of, say, Foucault in detail. For us, genealogy stands for an inquiry into a plurality of historical trajectories looming behind the present-day practices and discourses. Such inquiry serves critical analysis of the present by bringing in light the contingent composition of elements (discourses, institutions, practices) that form the current policies. In contrast to the dominant understanding in IR scholarship, we highlight the importance of context-specific genealogies in addition to conceptual or universal ones.

The critical literature on resilience policies tends to focus exclusively on the trajectory of the concept from life sciences and psychology to policy discourses in the Anglo-Saxon context, and inadvertently universalising this to other contexts as well. In policy-making, however, historically emerged ways of thinking do not derive from scientific literature only but are deeply rooted in local and national decision-making cultures. This is not to say the scientific-conceptual genealogies are not important. They just need to be supplemented with a more context-sensitive ways of tracing historical developments. Thus, our chapter at the same time problematises the rather univocal treatment of the concept of resilience in the critical IR literature and highlights the restrictions imposed by historical state culture for a meaningful resilience policy in Finland.
Particularly influential in IR resilience scholarship has been the genealogy presented by Jeremy Walker and Melissa Cooper (2011). In it, Walker and Cooper argue that resilience was born in system ecology in the 1970s. The notion was then imported to world politics in response to increasing neoliberalisation of the political atmosphere, together with the sense of increased demand for ideas to nurture adaptability in the face of supposedly uncontrollable risks and threats as suggested by the “intuitive ideological fit” of the complex adaptive systems theory and the neoliberal turn (ibid., p. 141; see also Davoudi and Madanipour, 2015, pp. 95–97). In a recent article Philippe Bourbeau (2018) criticises and supplements the argument presented by Walker and Cooper, thereby expanding and diversifying our understanding of resilience and its scientific origins. Instead of the rather uni-directional approach of Walker and Cooper, Bourbeau argues that resilience has percolated from science and research into international politics through several different trajectories (psychology, engineering, social work, ecology) after the Second World War.

As a result of these two genealogies, scholars have a satisfying picture of the diverse trajectories from which resilience has entered international politics. We argue, however, that such conceptual genealogy of resilience is only one aspect that needs to be considered if we are to understand resilience policies currently crafted for security governance purposes. It is equally pertinent to account for the specificities of local political histories and state cultures. The domestication of global trends and buzzwords indeed always takes place through a process of negotiation with the local policy traditions (See Alasuutari and Quadir, 2014). This insight, however, has been lost in the research that has traced the historically effected nature of resilience practices through generalising genealogies.

More generally, too, analytical perspectives on domestication and trans- lation of concepts and governance trends are rarely present or prominent in security studies. In the case of resilience scholarship, this is in part, we suggest, because most research on the topic has been conducted in an Anglo-Saxon context. This is justifiable as countries such as the UK were among the first to re-design its security politics according to the logic of resilience. However, insofar as resilience is approached as a properly international object of research, we need a better analysis of its different instantiations in different policy-contexts. In other words, we need local genealogies in addition to the abstract conceptual ones, and must be careful not to generalise from the Anglo-Saxon experience. As Bourbeau (2018, pp. 21–22) notes, genealogy as a form of inquiry implies an open-ended interpretation of historical trajectories. It also embraces the idea of historical processes as multidirectional. Building on these insights, and further expanding the argument presented by Bourbeau, we argue that the multidirectional nature of the genealogies of contemporary resilience policies is further highlighted when we consider the local histories within which resilience is adopted.
We also follow the lead of two recent studies, one by Roth and Prior (2014) and another by Joseph (2019). The latter focuses on the applications of the “Anglo-Saxon idea of resilience” in German critical infrastructure protection and overseas humanitarian policies. As a result of his analysis, Joseph argues that resilience remains an idea that is defined by an Anglo-Saxon neoliberal mindset. As such, outside the Anglo-Saxon world, it is easier to implement it in overseas policy, where the conflict with social and political cultures is less likely to emerge (what this tells about the logic of humanitarian policy is beyond the scope of our argument). From our perspective, however, Joseph’s argument is slightly too focused on resilience as a rather univocal Anglo-Saxon import that either does or does not fit the German state culture. Hence, he pays relatively little attention to the dynamic process during which resilience undergoes a transmutation as it draws from historical-cultural resources as it is being translated. Even when resilience was not a key concept of policy-making, every country per force was always already engaged in some strategies that can be retrospectively understood in terms of enhancing resilience. Thus, when the current discourse of resilience is translated into policy practice, the intertwining local and conceptual genealogies of resilience may produce wildly different outcomes across different contexts.

Roth and Prior (2014), who come closer to our argument, have studied the amalgamation of resilience thinking and the tradition of civil defence culture in the context of Switzerland’s societal security strategies. In the case of Finland, we claim that the tradition of top-down structure of security governance and the Cold War era emphasis on spiritual (or psychological) defence, combined with the Nordic model of melioristic welfare state, have formed a force-field that, in the process of domestication, has impacted the reading of the concept of resilience decisively. The result has been a rather robust reading of how resilience is understood as a national-level attribute and a hierarchical reading of how resilience is built in the field of societal security. This comparison is evident when looked against the understanding of resilience either as an embodiment of neoliberal governance or a tool to enhance individual and local actorness in the realm of societal security.

In the following sections, we substantialise our claim by discussing the emergent resilient paradigm in Finland in the context of the comprehensive security model – a combination of critical infrastructure protection, vital societal functions, and societal security – that has defined Finnish security politics and societal security strategies for the past 15 years or so. Our genealogical analysis traces a strong continuity between Finland’s Cold War conceptions of total/spiritual defence and the recent (re-)emergence of the calls to enhance societal resilience. Instead of witnessing exclusively a turn to “neoliberal governmentality”, or reflexive understanding of resilience as a strategy of responsibilisation, in Finland the surge towards resilience has led to a more robust reading of the concept. It combines societal and defence policy concerns, coupled with a limited amount of civil society
responsibilisation, at least when understood in terms of genuine empowerment. Moreover, the emerging Finnish doctrine of resilience seems to emphasise psychological and material preparedness to resist the status quo threatening effects of certain crisis scenarios, thus pointing more towards the idea of bouncing back in order to preserve the existing order than to the neoliberal idea of adaptive learning through the crisis.

**Resilience as a security mentality**

To trace out the amalgamation of resilience thinking and the tradition of comprehensive security model in Finland, a baseline criterion or typification on security governance based on the concept of resilience is needed. We do not offer a universal definition of resilience as it would be counterintuitive against our leading premise that security governance techniques and practices should always be studied against local contexts. Indeed, as many scholars have pointed out, the proliferation of resilience discourses and practices in various fields of security governance makes it more comfortable to speak about resilience in the plural and study it contextually (Anderson, 2015; Bourbeau, 2013; see also Berling and Petersen, this volume). But when looked purely from an analytical perspective, it is fruitful to pinpoint some ideal-typical features that separate the (neoliberal or Anglo-Saxon) mainstream understanding of resilience from other strategic concepts of security governance.

Based on definitions put forth in various scientific traditions such as developmental psychology and socio-ecology, resilience is usually defined as the latent ability of systems, individuals, communities, and organisations. Understood as a process, this latent ability is actualised in three necessary steps: the ability to (i) withstand the effects of major disruptions, (ii) maintain one’s ability to act amid a crisis, and (iii) “bounce back” from the crisis with the addition of being able to learn from the experience in order to increase one’s adaptability in the future (Brand and Jax, 2007; Juntunen and Hyvönen, 2014). Understood as a process, resilience thinking challenges some of the traditional state-centric approaches to security (see further Hyvönen and Juntunen, 2016; Juntunen and Virta, 2019; Virta, 2013). For example, in defence policy and military security the yardstick of successful policies is the safeguarding of the territorial integrity and continuity of key societal functions of a nation state (focus on external security). The main security threats are usually perceived as other state actors or other relatively organised collective entities or polities. In the case of protection and crime prevention, to name other examples on some key concepts informing security strategies, governance focuses either on social, economic, and political substructures that correlate with the level of human development (as in human security paradigm that is based on the idea of protection), or on providing internal security and order through punitive actions, policing, and other deterring technologies and practices (prevention). Here the main
threats are either perceived as stemming from the structural distortions of societies, such as poverty, inequality, and other cultural practices that cause structural violence, or from organised illegal activities and specific societal distortions that endanger the orderliness of the society from within (as in the process of political radicalisation).

Resilience thinking, by contrast to the logics of defence, protection, and prevention, emphasises the openness and uncertain nature of the threat environment in an age of increasing complexity. Thus, the primary objective of resilience politics is not to enhance the robustness of critical infrastructures (e.g. energy networks) against certain specific threats, but to increase preparedness to face several possible, even emergent crisis scenarios. Nor does resilience politics rely purely on physical technologies of coercion or dissuasion (e.g. deterrence achieved through the military or police forces). Instead, the logic of resilience emphasises the need to increase the mental, physical, and organisational adaptability of individuals, communities, the private sector, and the civil society to face the unpredictable, even inevitable threats that can stem both from outside and inside of the society. In short, resilience politics focuses on the enhancement of the society’s functionality in order to face unpredictable societal and ecological threats.

In addition to the dominant threat perceptions and the epistemological grounding of security governance, the questions of who the key security providers are and to whom or what security is provided for can be used to separate different security logics from each other. When it comes to situating the agency of societal security governance, resilience strategies tend to emphasise private sector, civil society, and eventually individual citizens (Gladfelter, 2018; Stark and Taylor, 2014; Tierney, 2015). However, as several scholars have recently pointed out, the relocation of the agency does not necessarily mean a true transition of power from the central or local government to the local actors and civil society (in terms of being able to define what societal resilience means as a strategic objective) (see, e.g., Roth and Prior, 2014, p. 108; Stark and Taylor, 2014; Virta and Branders, 2016).

As Joseph (2019, pp. 151–152) points out, aforementioned techniques of responsibilisation are typical to the Anglo-Saxon approaches to societal resilience building:

[i]n Anglo-Saxon policy making, there is a fairly swift move from thinking about the dynamics of systems to emphasising individual responsibility, adaptability and preparedness. […] The Anglo-Saxon approach to resilience thus constitutes an active intervention by the state into civil society and the private sphere [of which] is premised on a certain view of the relationship between state, society and its citizens, of the duties and responsibilities of each, of the role of government, civil society and the private sector, of the means by which information is shared, the public informed and their roles understood.
There are several reasons why the process of responsibilisation is problematic: citizens’ unwillingness or fear to take responsibility, the lack of material or psychological resources and skills as well as poor organisation and lack of leadership on a community level are possible reasons that point towards the “receiving end” of the responsibilisation act. On the other hand, several scholars have noted that community-based resilience projects can have negative impact among the civil society (also the receiving end of the project) if participation is limited to a top-down process initiated and controlled by the authorities. The option would be to empower local actors and individual citizens by encouraging outcome-oriented models of participation. In other words, the process of responsibilisation should be perceived as transformative, not merely as a temporary delegative act that is introduced as a response to, say, resource scarcity (Stark and Taylor, 2014; Virta and Branders, 2016).

In the next section, we will use the ideal-typification of resilience-based security mentality to trace the prominence of societal resilience discourses and practices in Finnish comprehensive security model, including the two security strategies for society published in 2010 and 2017. Moreover, we will evaluate what kind of interpretations of resilience (threat perceptions, agency, and location of security) and its societal significance these strategies produce. Our leading hypothesis is that the historical path-dependency of the concept of comprehensive security, stemming from the Cold War era conception of spiritual defence, has “domesticated” the Anglo-Saxon understanding of resilience into a more robust local reading. This robust reading of resilience emphasises the top-down process of defining the strategic priorities and the importance of maintaining the national cohesion (key national values and the need to build them on the basis of bottom-up legitimacy based on high levels of political trust within the society). It also emphasises resistance through preparedness and fast recovery instead of the adaptive and self-governing capacities of the population.

Historicising robust resilience in the context of Finnish spiritual defence model during the Cold War

During the early 1960s Finnish Agrarian Union-led government appointed an expert committee to work on the question of how national defence policy could be advanced on the basis of developments in theoretical and applied psychology. Already in 1957, the National Association for Military Psychology had suggested to the defence minister that a committee working on the systematic integration of the psychological dimension in Finnish defence policy should be established. Eventually the committee was appointed with the name *Henkisen maanpuolustukseen komitea* (The Committee for Spiritual National Defence; HMP committee). This was done as a part of wider effort to establish comprehensive organisational structure of advisory boards to support national defence planning.
Key figure behind the social-psychological turn in defence planning in Finland was General Jaakko Valtanen – later also The Chief of Defence in Finland between 1983 and 1990 – whose 1954 dissertation already dealt with questions concerning national “defence will”. In addition to Valtanen being appointed as the secretary of the HMP committee, the data collected by Valtanen already in 1954 was reportedly used by the HMP committee and younger-generation sociologist Antti Eskola whom the committee commissioned to study the development of values and attitudes that affected to individual’s willingness to defend the society (Rainio-Niemi, 2014, p. 109).

The decision to use the term “spiritual” (in Finnish, *henkinen*) instead of “psychological” defence was not merely semantic in nature: the committee thought that “spiritual” implicated a much broader ideological and societal agenda than the original task that was explicitly based on the integration of military psychology to defence planning. According to Rainio-Niemi (2014, p. 106) this followed direct translation from the German word *Geistige Landesverteidigung* that was in use in Switzerland already in the 1930s. The committee aimed to bring the wider societal fabric – key societal values, the sense of national unity and purpose as well as the ideological foundations of these values – under the comprehensive agenda of total defence planning and monitoring. From here on the foundations of the willingness of the citizens to defend the democratic society and its core values was perceived as key ingredient of the Finnish national defence ethos (ibid., p. 108).

The ability to endure large-scale societal distress was one of the cornerstones of the total defence doctrine. As a pronouncedly national-level policy, the total defence concept was implemented as a top-down doctrine. The “spiritual” component here was about the integration of the societal dimension as a kind of a base structure that would support total defence planning. As Rainio-Niemi (2014, pp. 18–19) points out in the context of Austria and Finland, the concepts of *Geistige Landesverteidigung* and *henkinen maanpuolustus* “[…] were about promoting […] new type of state consciousness and national awareness among the citizens to instill a new sense of ‘enlightened patriotism’.”

The final report of the committee (*Henkisen maanpuolustuksemme perustekijät: sen kokonaistavoitteet ja eri alojen tehtävät sekä johto- ja suorituselimet rauhan ja sodan aikana*) was ready in 1962, two years after the inauguration of the committee, and eventually published in 1964. In the report the committee proposed a new, more modern, positive, and pluralistic understanding of patriotism that should be based on key national values of democracy and neutrality. Although the whole project should be interpreted in the context of the Cold War competition between political ideologies, the idea was to present these key values so that they would root in the everyday consciousness of the citizens’ life without the need to rely on explicit enemy images.

The cultivation of the civil culture through the education system was seen integral in the struggle against communism, although the threat of
communism was not explicitly mentioned due to Finland’s compromised geopolitical position vis-à-vis Soviet Union. This era also witnessed the invention of national defence courses that aimed to integrate and habitualise influential individuals, interest groups, and branches of the society into national defence thinking. In light of analysing the historical practices and ideational constructs that condition the present resilience discourses in Finland, it is important to note that the underlying pedagogical idea of the “spiritual defence” project was to maintain it as an essentially top-down endeavour. It was based on the recognition of the importance of citizens’ voluntary commitment “to the maintenance and further cultivation of the distinctively national democratic way of life” (quoted in Rainio-Niemi, 2014, p. 112). Thus, the top-down project of building the foundations of spiritual defence was deemed to be based on bottom-up legitimacy that was achieved through policies that are nowadays linked to the Nordic model of social security and welfare state: the inclusive social welfare and educational policies, transparency of the public administration, and a general sense of common Nordic identity as basis of societal stability (Aaltola and Juntunen, 2018, p. 31).

As Roth and Prior (2014, pp. 110–113) point out, this kind of top-down version of responsibilisation typical to modern societal resilience programmes was already present in Switzerland’s Totale Landesverteidigung (doctrine of total national defence) during the Cold War and in its predecessor geistige Landesverteidigung (spiritual defence) model during the inter-war period. Similar defence political doctrines were adopted also in other neutral or neutralist states in Europe during the Cold War, including Austria and Sweden (the latter was especially important reference in Finland during the late 1950s and early 1960s; see Rainio-Niemi, 2014). Distinctive feature of these spiritual defence doctrines, especially when compared to the Anglo-Saxon idea of resilience that emphasises individual- and community-level responsibility, is that the reference point of responsibility (responsibility to whom or what) is pronouncedly national. The underlying rationale in the spiritual defence model was to support the strategic priorities of the state through a whole-of-society approach to crisis preparedness and vital societal functions.

The spiritual defence doctrines adopted by the former Cold War neutrals also shared other key elements. The most obvious of these was conscription-based military service that tied majority of male population to the defence system. In this context it is important to note that Finland is one of the few European countries that has maintained compulsory military service and conscription-based army (large reserves) as the foundation of its defence policy also in the post-Cold War era – a clear sign of continuity in the Finnish strategic culture, especially if compared to transformation of national security thinking and practices in Sweden during the 2000s (see Larsson, this volume). Eventually these tenets led to an amalgamation of a top-down model of national security governance and, on the other hand, networked
security and preparedness strategy for the society in the post-Cold War era (Aaltola and Juntunen, 2018, p. 27).

The idea of “enlightened patriotism” and its key role as the societal basis of the total defence doctrine was solidified into Finnish security culture during the 1960s and 1970s. That said, the evolution from the total defence doctrine to the concept of comprehensive security has not been a linear process. Nonetheless, it is impossible to neglect the historical path-dependencies in this transformation, something that also points towards the need to take local genealogies into account when interpreting the ideational impact of in-vogue concepts of security governance such as resilience.

What is important to note here is that these proto-resilience policies were based on a rather robust reading on the goals and methods of national security policy. The aim of these policies was not to increase adaptability in the face of various external threats. Instead, the focus was on the ability to withstand heavy societal pressure, caused by an external aggressor, both on an individual and on a societal level in order to maintain independence and key values of the society. As Bourbeau (2013, p. 13) suggests, a society that understands resilience first and foremost as an attribute needed to maintain the existing order intact “will deal with endogenous and exogenous shocks with rigidity and will underscore the potentially negative transformative consequences brought about by these events”. This kind of policy response that Bourbeau labels “resilience as maintenance” is usually coupled with securitisation acts based on external enemy images and threats. This approach differs from agile and more transformative Anglo-Saxon ideas of resilience building where the concept is understood as a general adaptive capacity that the society, political system, and individuals can use to renew themselves after various types of crises and disruptions originating from conscious political actions or from natural sources.

The aim of psychological defence, then, was not about openness to renewal and learning but to secure the functionality and identity of the society at large, to maintain its key values and norms intact, and to restore the pre-crisis status quo as quickly as possible. The threat conception that drove these policies was also very state-centric, although with an ideological-political underpinning. Although this policy was primarily based on the security mentality of defence, it already included hints of what is now understood as resilience building, especially through the recognition on the importance of bottom-up legitimacy needed for the official doctrine and the key role of mobilising the society as a whole to support the doctrine.

From spiritual defence to robust resilience: the evolution of Finland’s comprehensive security model in the post-Cold War era and the domestication of resilience politics

As Roth and Prior’s (2014) analysis indicates, the tradition of total defence doctrine – its state-led top-down conception of governance and emphasis on
enhancing the psychological robustness of the civil society to protect its key values – has plenty of similarity with the responsibilisation agenda of the in-vogue resilience strategies in the present. What is left somewhat unnoted in their analysis is the historically effected nature of security governance and strategic thinking, namely, how the inherited practices from the total defence doctrine era affect newly imported security mentalities such as resilience and the way they are perceived and put into practice.

Jonathan Joseph (2013b) makes similar argument in the context of France, where the Anglo-Saxon conception of resilience and its emphasis on individual-level responsibilisation has not manifested into an observable change in local strategic culture. Instead, the French white papers on security policy have presented a more robust reading of national resilience with a strong emphasis on “unitary state with highly centralised administration”.

By starting from Roth and Prior’s observation and continuing from Joseph’s point on the need to take the local strategic culture and practices of governance into account, we also argue that the Finnish discourse and practices on resilience politics are historically effected, that is, conditioned by the tradition of total (spiritual) defence policies of the Cold War era and its present reformulation, the comprehensive security model. In order to make sense of local genealogies of resilience one has to both contextualise and historicise their application.

From total defence to comprehensive security

The end of the Cold War brought rapid changes in Finland’s security environment. The demise of the Soviet Union, deepening of the European integration (Sweden and Finland joined the European Union (EU) in 1995), and the wider trend of global economic liberalisation shook the foundations of Finnish defence and security policy. Moreover, ideational trends such as the broadening of international security agenda and dominant threat perceptions (including the rise of the human security paradigm) and New Public Management theories also affected to the way the Cold War era doctrine of spiritual defence and welfare state model was adjusted in the new era.

During the last decade and a half Finland has adopted the concept of comprehensive security as an all-encompassing strategic framework to security governance. It can be understood as a government-led project that partly responds to the aforementioned trends without losing a sense of continuity in strategic culture. It is in this context that the domestication process of resilience discourses into Finnish strategic culture and security governance should be understood.

Although the idea of comprehensive security was already evident in the 2003 and 2006 strategies on securing the vital functions of the society – these strategies were still based on the conception of comprehensive defence, a successor of the total defence doctrine – Finnish government officially defined the concept (in Finnish, kokonaisturvallisuus) as late as in 2012.
Comprehensive security was defined as a desired state of affairs where all threats to the sovereignty of the state, living conditions of the population, and other vital societal functions are perceived to be manageable. State authorities, private business sector as well as various civil society organisations and individual citizens were defined to bare collaborative responsibility on providing comprehensive security – a responsibility that covers preparedness, continuity management during large-scale societal disruptions and the period of recovery.

The sense of increasing interdependence between states and other international actors also affected to the way international and national securities were started to be understood as an all-encompassing phenomena during the 1990s. New emerging threats such as international crime and terrorism, environmental degradation, internal conflicts based on ethnic cleavages, and identity politics as well as the increasing amount of displaced people and migration challenged the old military-centric conceptions of security. This was also evident in academic literature that started to parse security into a wide array of alternative dimensions – like those of economic, environmental, political, and societal sectors (Buzan et al., 1998). In policy world this was evident in the proliferation of strategies that contemplated the interrelationships between various levels and dimensions of security under the traditional rubric of national security.

Although issues related to economic security (security of supply), identity security (sense of societal cohesion and national togetherness) and, to a lesser sense, environmental security were already present in the defence planning during the last two decades of the Cold War era, it is important to remember that these issues were subdued to the needs of military security and defence. In other words, they were not treated as separate sectors of national security policy as such. The shift towards genuinely broader understanding of security sectors and threat conceptions happened during the first half of the 1990s. This process culminated in the first government white paper on security policy published in 1995.

The emergence of the concept of comprehensive security in Finland can be partly understood as a response to these trends. That said, although the official definition of the concept is based on broad understanding of security threats, something that government’s white papers on defence and security policy adopted already in the 1990s, the main impetus behind the comprehensive security concept was that it offered a cross-sectoral cooperative framework for various governmental and civil society actors.

The emergence of the concept of comprehensive security also aligned with the arrival of New Public Management theories and practices from the late 1990 onwards. In the early 1990s Finland faced a major economic depression, partly caused by the sudden end of bilateral trade with Soviet Union. From the mid-1990s onwards the recession was followed by a period of swift economic integration within the EU and waves of privatisation and deregulation, a process that led to an increasingly pluralised group of actors
participating in securing key societal functions and societal security at large. These processes also challenged the traditional understanding of centralised and hierarchical state-led models of security governance, especially when it came to the operational questions of who is ultimately responsible on providing security functions. The concept of comprehensive security is, in essence, a framework that the state actors started to use in order to integrate the interests of various non-state actors participating to the widening security sector to fit the national-level strategic ambitions.

Although in the 1990s and 2000s government’s security strategies were already drafted on the basis of a broader conceptualisation of security, the role of Defence Ministry has remained relatively strong within the comprehensive security model. 13 Virta and Branders (2016), for example, have pointed out that although the role of the private sector and the civil society is emphasised on the level of discourses on societal security, in practice the formulation of these policies is still very much a top-down exercise: there is no genuine devolution of power and agency to the civil society and local communities. In this context resilience is used more as a pedagogical framework to inform the public on the official doctrinal purpose and functions of the comprehensive security model.

Robust reading of resilience

In a sense the government also used the concept of comprehensive security to maintain strategic autonomy in a situation where increasing amount of key strategic functions and assets of societal security were not anymore controlled by the state as such. It should be no surprise, then, that the concept of resilience was also amalgamated with the existing comprehensive security framework when the debate on its meaning started to gain momentum in Finland during the early 2010s. 14

The first time the word resilience (resilienssi in Finnish) was explicitly mentioned in the government’s security strategies was in the 2013 Cyber Security Strategy (Government of Finland, 2013). 15 The strategy defined “cyber resilience” in relation to the objectives of comprehensive security, covering preparedness, ability to function during unexpected disruptions and ability to recover from harm, objectives that were due to reach in co-operation with private businesses and civil society organisations. Another traditional domain where resilience-driven agenda started to resonate early on was critical infrastructure protection and security of supply policies – a sphere where the importance of private sector actors is also notable. Pursiainen (2018, p. 633) points out that the comprehensive approach to enhance the resilience of vital societal functions was almost a direct continuation of the Cold War era total defence approach and that the latter was merely adjusted to face the demands of a new security environment.

As already pointed out, the robust reading of resilience in Finland is entrenched in the path-dependent ideational and conceptual process that can
be traced back to the tradition of total/spiritual defence during the Cold War. This is also evident in the 2003 and 2006 strategies of vital societal functions that were still based on the conception of total defence. One of the seven vital functions was, and still is, psychological ability to withstand the effects of major disruptions. In the English version of the security strategy for society in 2017 the concept of *henkinen kriisinkestävyys* has been translated as “psychological resilience”, although a more straight translation would be “mental crisis resistance” or “mental ability to withstand crises”. Security Committee (2020) translates psychological resilience “as the ability of individuals, communities, society and the nation to withstand the pressures arising from crisis situations and to recover from their impacts,” and continues by stating that “[g]ood psychological resilience facilitates the recovery process” from societal crisis scenarios.

Unlike the Anglo-Saxon reading of resilience where it is understood as an overarching strategic concept, the understanding of resilience adopted in Finnish societal security strategies thus seems to be narrower in scope. The Anglo-Saxon reading of societal resilience emphasises the need to increase the ability of the population to govern themselves through reflexivity, entrepreneurial attitude, and community-level self-awareness (Joseph, 2019, p. 151). In Finland resilience is (still) primarily understood – in a way that seems to correspond to a similar reading of “robust resilience” also visible in other Nordic countries, especially in Norway, as analysed by Berling and Petersen in the current volume – as a national-level psychological attribute that supports government in its ambitions to maintain the continuity of key societal functions.

In terms of location of security agency, Finnish societal security thinking mixes the traditional top-down model of national security with a bottom-up reading of resilience building by various networks of civil society and private sector actors (Aaltola and Juntunen, 2018, p. 27). Whereas the strategic priorities of societal security and its key concepts, including resilience, are defined in a state-led process, usually with a special focus on protecting critical infrastructure and key societal functions, the resilience capacities offered by the wider society is understood as an integral part in the execution of these strategic priorities (see also Virta and Branders, 2016). The importance of bottom-up legitimacy, political trust towards authorities, and a general sense of national togetherness – already present in spiritual defence models of the Cold War era – still play an integral part of an otherwise rather top-down state-led model of security governance (Aaltola and Juntunen, 2018, p. 26).

That said, there seems to be a nascent transition towards emphasising further the responsibility of civil society and individual citizens in national resilience building. This is evident when one compares the 2010 and 2017 Security Strategies for Society (see Government of Finland, 2010, pp. 48–49; 2017, p. 40). While in the 2010 strategy psychological resilience was still linked to the level of national defence will, sense of solidarity, and
perceived cohesion of the national identity, in the 2017 strategy one can see an added emphasis on the responsibilities of civil society organisations and individual citizens. These responsibilities include the attitudes, skills, and “security enhancing outlook” of active citizens who are deemed as key supportive societal assets in national-level psychological resilience building. Moreover, the ability of individuals and civil society organisations to act as resilience providers in their local communities is also mentioned in the 2017 strategy.

One can sense the influence of international and EU-level conceptions of resilience in the aforementioned shift towards the responsibilisation of civil society and individual citizens as key agents in resilience building. On the other hand, the foundations for psychological resilience are still conceived to be something that is constructed through a state-led policy planning based on intra-administrative cooperation. The role of the educational system (critical media literacy is mentioned separately), vertical and horizontal political trust (especially citizens’ trust towards officials and institutions), equally distributed social and welfare services, prevention of rising inequality, national defence will, and social capital accumulated through voluntary work are mentioned as key components upon which psychological resilience capabilities are understood to be based on during normal circumstances. This all sounds familiar when one looks back at the conceptualisations of spiritual defence model during the 1960s.

Moreover, in addition to the top-down national reading of the concept, resilience is still associated with state-led policies of preparedness. This can be interpreted as another sign of continuity in Finnish strategic culture and security governance practices. In the Finnish reading, resilience is understood as a nationwide psychological attribute that is associated with continuity management. Thus, the strategic ambition of reinforcing psychological resilience is to help to restore the operational functioning of society as rapidly and comprehensively as possible should the society as a whole face a major disruption (Government of Finland, 2017, p. 8, 10).

This robust reading can be contrasted to Anglo-Saxon and EU-level conceptions of resilience that emphasise communities’ and individuals’ readiness for positive learning processes, adaptation, and the ability to self-initiated reform after unavoidable crises and disruptions (see European Union External Action, 2016, p. 23). In other words, the Finnish reading of resilience is more reminiscent of the traditional engineering understanding of “bouncing back” (the modern or linear understanding of how to preserve something valuable, or resilience as maintenance), whereas the neoliberal understanding emphasises abilities and attitudes needed in the self-governing processes that aim to “bounce forward” (the post-modern, non-linear understanding on how to learn to live with surprises and failure, or resilience as renewal) (Bourbeau, 2013, pp. 11–14, 16; Chandler, 2014, p. 6).

Finally, it is also worth to note that the understanding of resilience in Finnish comprehensive security strategies does not equate societal cohesion
to ethnic identity, language, culture, and customs, unlike in the original academic definitions of societal security put forth by the Copenhagen School. Instead, national cohesion is understood as an aspired level of interoperability and shared mentality of togetherness that is needed to face major societal disruptions – disruptions that are generally understood to originate outside of the society. In this sense psychological resilience is closely tied to the old concept of spiritual defence. In many ways the “robust” reading of resilience in Finland relies more heavily on a framework based on modern conceptions of sovereignty, territoriality, and national unity than the more post-modern formulations of resilience one can find from the EU Global Strategy, for example (on the latter, see Tocci, 2016).

In this sense the robust reading of resilience also reproduces the logic of dissecting the threat environment into internal and external spheres, an epistemic premise familiar especially from the security mentality of defence. This might paint a misleading picture on the dominant threat perceptions as it seems to hide the fact that certain exceptional measures have been taken to control the threats emerging also inside the society. This is evident in the introduction of new intelligence laws and surveillance measures in 2019 and how they were justified with the increasing need to respond to certain transgressive, internal, and asymmetrical threats such as terrorism and radicalisation.

The interplay between state authorities and the rest of the society is still very much a top-down exercise where societal resilience capabilities and other vital functions are organised on the basis of the strategic goals set by the former. At the same time the cross-sectoral logic of governance, including increasing public-private partnerships, is based on the whole-of-society approach of the comprehensive security model. This seems to make security as an all-encompassing societal issue, something that is also evident in the reading that associates resilience with the psychological and material preparedness of the nation as a whole. On the other hand, this “societalisation” of security politics seems to soften the “hard edges” of security thinking based on military security and the logic of defence. In other words, the process of securitisation of the societal fabric is not based on the logic of exceptionality in a sense that it would endanger the normal working order of democratic process. The securitisation of the social sphere should not be understood here solely as a result of political speech acts that claim a deviation or rupture from the normal running of the social order. Instead, the logic of resilience seems to “banalise” security governance when security functions are layered across the whole spectrum of the societal fabric and its “organic” processes.

This has been evident in the recent debate in Finland (and elsewhere) on how to respond to hybrid interference in the post-2014 security environment in the Baltic Sea region. Although there is no official resilience-based government-led programme or strategy to face the so-called hybrid threats in Finland, individual, societal, and democratic resilience capacities have
been put forth as potential “deterring” or “dissuasive” response to threats stemming from the combination of state-originated hybrid interference and inherent vulnerabilities of democratic societies (see, e.g., Wigell, 2019). This is not completely unproblematic in a sense that it might pave way for further defence politicisation (or securitisation) of the societal fabric, including free media and public speech (assuming the sources of hybrid interference are understood to be originated mainly from other state actors such as Russia) (see further Mikkola et al., 2018).

To sum up the analysis, although the definition and scope of resilience thinking is still being debated in Finland, in official strategic parlance the term was adopted in a rather conservative fashion during the early 2010s (see especially Hyvönen et al., 2019, pp. 14–15). Resilience discourses were amalgamated with the already available concept of comprehensive security and its reading on how to secure key societal functions against plethora of traditional and new threats. According to our genealogical analysis, the Finnish reading of resilience in the context of comprehensive security is historically conditioned and can be traced back at least to the invention (or domestication) of the conceptions of total/spiritual defence from the late 1950s onwards. Thus, in order to understand the specific local connotations of resilience politics, one has to be aware of their contextuality and historicity.

The Finnish reading of resilience portrays it as a robust attribute, as a readiness to endure severe distress, to maintain the essential functioning and cohesion of the society and, eventually, the ability to bounce back to the pre-crisis state as quickly and effectively as possible. When compared to the dominant international understanding of (societal) resilience as an attribute referring to processes of adaptation and learning through resposibilisation, the Finnish reading of the concept tilts more towards resistance and maintenance than the Anglo-Saxon understanding of resilience seems to imply. In the concluding remarks we reflect the possible future of Finnish resilience politics and suggest some ways to develop it further.

Conclusion: on the future of the “Finnish model” of resilience

In this chapter, we have argued that the forms of resilience policy currently prevalent in the Finnish security discourse have to be understood both against the “universal” genealogy of resilience as a scientific notion and against the local genealogy of Finnish security politics. This Finnish model is of a “top-down” quality, but in a characteristically different way than the dominant Anglo-Saxon reading of the concept. This is due to its adherence to the longer tradition of valuing the psychological preparedness of the citizens and civil society by large to commit and participate in securing and defending the vital functions of the society. Moreover, in the last couple of decades or so, the Finnish reading of resilience has “domesticated” the concept into auxiliary role in the comprehensive security model – a key strategic concept or cooperative framework that is also based on preparedness and
readiness to endure large-scale societal disruptions rather than on adaptive notions of the ability to reform. This is also evident in the official translations of EU documents, which tend to replace renewal capacities of the English version with an ability to withstand crises in Finnish.

The main contributions of the chapter are threefold. First, our analysis helps to understand current trends of security discourse in Finland more thoroughly, especially in the context of government strategies. Second, with reference to the IR resilience scholarship, we highlight the importance of local genealogies. Focusing only on the scientific genealogy of resilience and its appropriation by neoliberal ideologues runs the risk of overly essentialising the notion. In the worst-case scenario, this means treating the Anglo-Saxon applications of resilience as universal, teleological models that are perforce imposed on anyone who invokes the word “resilience”. Thus, and relatedly, the third contribution of the chapter talks more broadly to the critical security studies community, urging scholars to pay increasing attention to the acts of translation and domestication that define the local applications and implementations of global trends.

Moving between the three points, we wish to conclude by reflecting the possible future trajectories of the Finnish model of resilience. For now, resilience is still very much used either as a buzzword or as a synonym for a narrowly defined psychological and material ability to withstand crises in the security political discourse. However, a more clearly articulated notion of resilience is likely to emerge in the coming years. The trajectory taken by this development is still very much in the air and depends on political struggles and contestations of various sorts. There are several promises as well as threats that can be conceived in the trajectories of resilience-in-the-process-of-translation in Finland. If resilience remains a vaguely defined buzzword, its implementation is bound to produce clouded reasoning, and the word is likely to remain vulnerable to ideological projections. But other results are also possible.

We see promise in the possibility of translating resilience more effectively into the terms of comprehensive security framework, creating something like a Finnish model of “comprehensive resilience”. Such translation, however, would have a considerable impact both on the Finnish comprehensive security model and on the internationally dominant Anglo-Saxon model of resilience. It would place a lot of emphasis on the political and social foundations of resilience building: societal welfare, education, democratic participation, and inequality reduction. It would also take seriously the centrality of resource and environmental security questions for the upcoming decades. What we envisage, then, is a model of resilience building that simultaneously considers, to use Kate Raworth’s (2018) terms, the social foundation and the ecological ceiling between which policies must move; that provides ample opportunities for democratic participation; and that invests in education of the population. The Nordic countries are in a unique position to go forth with such model, but there is still a long way to go, especially when it comes to climate policy (Hakala et al., 2019). What is more, even if resilience would be translated into a new type of practice according to the
Nordic/Finnish model laid out here, it would nevertheless be important to emphasise that resilience cannot and should not replace the defensive, preventive, and protective strategies articulated above. Resilience, in short, is not the answer to all the security challenges societies face.

Notes

1 “An earlier draft of this article was presented at the European International Studies Association conference in Prague in 2018, Tampere Security Research Seminar (TASER) at Tampere University in 2018, Finnish International Studies Association conference in Majvik in 2019 as well as in the final conference of the NordSTEVA project in Copenhagen in 2019. We express our gratitude to all the audience members and fellow panelists in these events, especially Hiski Haukkala, Sirpa Virta, Kari Möttölä, Matthew Ford, Juha Vuori, Rune Saugmann and the editors of this volume, Sebastian Larsson and Mark Rhinard, for their valuable comments that have helped us to improve our argument. Of course, the responsibility for the arguments remain solely with the authors.”

2 By “Anglophone” concept of resilience, we mainly refer to the notion of resilience emerging from the national security strategies of the UK and the US. City-level and ecologically oriented resilience strategies may differ from this concept.

3 This is also considered as key to maintain the core purposes of societies during crises due to the tight coupling of the societal functions with the increasing complexity and vulnerability of modern physical infrastructure (see further Pursiainen, 2018).

4 HMP committee worked under the coordination of the Defence Council (established in 1958) that was tightly controlled by President Urho Kekkonen (on the establishment and first assignments of the HMP committee see Visuri, 1994, pp. 150–163).

5 Sweden had a similar committee that had published its report already in 1953 – an example that was explicitly mentioned as an inspiration when the Finnish counterpart was established. See also Larsson (this volume).

6 The successor of the committee, Henkisen maanpuolustuksen suunnittelukunta (Planning Commission on Spiritual Defence; HMS), was established in 1964 on basis of the committee’s recommendation. In 1976, after some domestic political debate on the purpose and relevance of the institution – a debate ignited especially by some younger generation politicians in the left of the political spectrum – the agenda of HMS was limited to tasks related to collecting and sharing information on defence and security political matters to the citizens and key interest groups. At this point the name of the commission was finally changed to Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta (The Advisory Board for Defence Information; MTS) under which it still operates today.

7 The concept of total defence (in Finnish, kokonaismaanpuolustus) was officially adopted, or explicitly mentioned, for the first time by the second Parliamentary Defence Committee in 1976. This was done after the adoption of the territorial defence doctrine in the early 1970s. That said, in practice Finnish defence planning was executed on the basis of total defence thinking already before the official adoption of the term. It referred to a comprehensive policy of preparedness in order to enhance the ability of the society and defence forces to operate under conditions of national emergency, integrating a wide spectrum of non-military societal actors and resources into defence planning. (See Riipinen, 2008, pp. 20–23; Ries, 1988, pp. 262–264.)

8 National defence courses, organized both on regional and on national level by the Regional State Administrative Agencies and Defence Forces (National Defence University), respectively, are still an ongoing practice in present-day Finland. The explicit aim of these courses is to “[…] improve cooperation between different
sectors of society and facilitate networking of people working in the various fields of comprehensive security”. See National Defence University (2020).

9 This includes the still ongoing tradition of constantly evaluating and measuring citizens will to defend the nation. National defence will have been measured continuously with the same questionnaire since 1963 by the Advisory Board for Defence Information that works under Defence Ministry (See Kosonen et al., 2017, p. 96). Both the general and personal will to defence the nation has traditionally been comparatively high in Finland. For example, in 2018 the overall level of willingness to participate into the defence of Finland when the nation was under attack was 84 percent. Even slight declining trends in the general will to defence have usually been a source of domestic debate in Finland (See Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta, 2018, pp. 7–11).

10 There is an obvious temporal confluence between the rise of resilience-related research themes in the social psychological literature internationally and the build-up of Finnish psychological defence conceptions in the 1960s (on the former, see Bourbeau, 2018, pp. 25–26).

11 Economic security was especially topical from the early 1970s onwards due to the need to secure access to strategic energy sources after the two oil crises (see Limnéll, 2009, p. 214).

12 The constitutional reform in 2000 continued the parliamentarisation of the foreign and security policy decision-making system and further eroded the power of the President in these matters, especially in relation to EU decision-making. This also led to the disbanding of the Defence Council whose tasks were split among the Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security policy (responsible for the actual preparation of foreign and security policy, chaired by the Prime Minister but in practice the Committee is organized around joint meetings between its ministerial members and the President of the republic) and Committee on Security and Defence Issues (responsible on the development and coordination of policies related to crisis preparedness and comprehensive defence). The latter was located under the Ministry of Defence, but left without political decision-making or executive power, and in 2013 replaced by The Security Committee whose role was depicted as to “assist the Government and ministries in matters pertaining to comprehensive security [and to follow] the development of Finnish society and its security environment [and coordinate] proactive preparedness which is related to comprehensive security” (Ministry of Defence, 2020).

13 As a sign of times the 1995 white paper on national security strategy, coinciding with the ongoing parliamentarisation of the Finnish foreign and security policy decision-making system, was prepared under political guidance by a working group of government officials convened by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The 1995 white paper, first of its kind, introduced the concept of broad and comprehensive security (in Finnish, laaja ja kokonaisvaltainen turvallisuuden käsite) as the baseline idea for future strategic planning of Finnish security policy. The broadening move aimed to introduce issues such as the respect for human rights, rule of law, economic cooperation, and solidarity in environmental protection as equal issues to security policy agenda alongside traditional themes of military and political security (see Government of Finland, 1995, p. 11). Separate section on defence policy, prepared under the political guidance of the Defence Council or Ministry of Defence, was added to all subsequent white papers from 1997 onwards. This led to a kind of a “dual policy” that only managed to integrate the broadening of the security agenda and the traditional focus on national territorial defence capabilities partially (the uncertainty on the direction of Russia’s transition being a unifying factor between the two mindsets). Limnéll points out that in practice the defence-oriented mindset dominated over the more cooperative understandings of international security (see Limnéll, 2009, pp. 214–219, 223).

The strategy was updated in October 2019, now in a more compact format and without references to strategic conceptions such as “cyber resilience”. Instead, the new strategy merely listed three strategic priority areas for the development of future cyber security policies: international cooperation; leadership, planning, and preparedness; educational capacities and national proficiency (Security Committee, 2019).

Other six key societal functions were state leadership; international activities (including the EU); national defence capability; internal security (threat prevention and justice system); economy, infrastructure, and security of supply; income security and the functional capacity of the population and services (Government of Finland, 2017, p. 14).

It is worth to note here that the Strategy of Internal Security prepared under the Ministry of the Interior in Finland emphasises the importance to prevent the root causes of these transgressive threats such as halting social polarisation and processes of social and economical exclusion within the society. The Strategy of Internal Security also mentions societal resilience (yhteiskunnan kriisinkestokyky) as a key aspect that is based on individual citizens’ readiness to face societal disruptions and recover from them fast but reduces this into a secondary role after the responsibilities that state authorities have in protecting the citizens (see Ministry of the Interior, 2017, pp. 41–42).

Similar tendencies can be found from the Swedish case where the total defence doctrine was developed towards novel conceptions of societal security and crisis management from the late 1990s onwards (see also Larsson, this volume).

The idea of securitisation through everyday security practices, “little security nothings”, is taken from Huysmans (2011).

The current authors have articulated their own suggestion for the future of resilience in Finland in a more elaborated manner in the final report of a project funded by the government’s analysis, assessment, and research activities (see Hyvönen and Juntunen et al., 2019).

References


Robust resilience in Finland


9 Countering radicalisation in Norwegian terrorism policy
A welfare state approach to societal security

Sissel H. Jore

Introduction
During the last decade, there has been a growing focus in most Western countries on preventing individuals from becoming radicalised. The militarised response of the “Global War on Terrorism” doctrine has not been regarded as sufficient to meet the threat of so-called home-grown terrorism, and subsequently current counterterrorism policies focus on preventing terrorism through understanding the underlying causes of terrorism (Sageman, 2014). Central to this new doctrine is the belief that countering terrorism requires contextualised and locally based efforts to identify individuals capable of turning towards terrorism in a heterogeneous society (Borum, 2011). The underlying notion is that terrorism is a ubiquitous and permanent condition of modern society and that terrorism can be prevented by focusing on “radicalisation”, which is understood as a way to classify, understand, and prevent trajectories towards terrorism (Awan et al., 2011; Crone, 2016; Horgan 2008; Sedgwick, 2010). Accordingly, to counter terrorism through the lens of radicalisation is nowadays regarded as a necessary element of an effective and comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. As a result, most Western countries, including the Nordic countries, have during the last decade published anti-radicalisation strategies (Aly, 2013, Sivenbring and Malmros, 2019).

Also in the last decade, terrorist attacks in the Nordic countries have occurred that have illustrated that there are radicalised individuals also in the Nordic countries who pose a danger to society. Examples of such events are the terrorist attacks in Norway in 2011 by Anders Behring Breivik, the Copenhagen terrorist attack in 2015 by Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein, the stabbing attack in Turku in 2017 by Abderrahman Bouanane, the truck attack in Stockholm in 2017 by Rakhmat Akilov, and the mosque shooting attack in Bærum by Philip Manshaus in 2019 (Sivenbring and Malmros, 2019). During this time period, all the Nordic countries have published a considerable number of counter-radicalisation strategies, especially focusing on preventing terrorism at the local level where municipalities, schools, and social workers are now responsible for detecting, reporting, and preventing radical individuals (Mattsson, 2019; Sjøen and Jore, 2019).
In all the Nordic countries, counter-radicalisation nowadays is described as a multilevel, multiagency approach where civil society plays a central role (Sivenbring and Malmros, 2019). The increased focus on radicalisation and the associated devolution of counterterrorism responsibility to the local level is a trend the Nordic countries share with most countries worldwide. However, even though an increasing number of threats against Nordic security is global in character, global threats such as terrorism always have local manifestations. The threat picture any society faces may be globally oriented, but a shared global perception of terrorism is unlikely (Burgess and Jore, 2008). Thus, how a country perceives the threat of terrorism and how it should be prevented are determined by local properties rather than global ones. Particular cultural traditions, a distinct historical background, and a concrete geographical setting are factors that influence threat perception and accompanying countermeasures. Consequently, policy responses to terrorism are never neutral – they are always culturally, historically and socially contingent. Moreover, such policy responses also have consequences for how security is perceived, organised, and acted upon in a specific country.

This chapter approaches the discourses and practices of “societal security” through the case of Norwegian counterterrorism policy and investigates the radicalisation approach that currently dominates the Norwegian approach to terrorism. Counterterrorism serves as an example of how societal security is perceived, carried out, and organised in Norway. The radicalisation approach is investigated by studying 4 national guidelines and 36 municipalities’ guidelines on how to prevent radicalisation. The aim is to examine the assumptions about terrorism in the radicalisation approach and explore whether this approach is similar or different from previous Norwegian approaches on terrorism prevention. We conclude that although the Norwegian radicalisation approach follows a historical trend of seeing terrorism as an extreme form of communication utilised by marginalised groups, the current approach differs from previous terrorism approaches by focusing on individuals as the locus of change, and where social-psychological factors are considered causes of terrorism. This way of viewing terrorism decontextualises and depoliticises terrorism by downplaying political and international factors. The radicalisation approach represents a radical change in the Norwegian terrorism approach that justifies efforts associated with the Norwegian welfare state as counterterrorism means and legitimises the use of counterterrorism measures that formerly have been seen as threats to civil liberties. As a result, the Norwegian radicalisation approach legitimises a decentralised form of security where local actors and individuals become a form of first line defence.

The Norwegian approach to terrorism and counterterrorism in a historical perspective

In the Nordic countries and elsewhere in the Western world, security has come to be organised around a rather holistic conceptualisation of what
composes a threat as well as the range of responsibilities required to address them (Larsson and Rhinard, this volume). Over the past two decades, terrorism has increasingly been portrayed as a threat to Norwegian peace and security. Although terrorism and radicalisation nowadays are phenomena that feature strongly in policy documents and the media, this has not always been the case in Norway. What constitutes the threat of terrorism, its magnitude, and the legitimate ways to counter it have changed drastically over the last three decades (Jore, 2012, 2016; Larsen, 2018).

In the 1990s, the threat of terrorism was predominantly seen as something that happened in other countries. Consequently, most terrorist threats against Norway were seen in relation to high-level visits, such as threats to controversial political actors coming to Norway to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. The risk of terrorism was assessed as low, and there was a general belief in Norwegian policy discourses that there were characteristics of Norwegian society that made Norway a low-risk society. For instance, Norway was described in the 1990s as geographically remote, homogeneous, inclusive, and transparent: all factors that appeared to make Norway less of a target for terrorism (Ministry of Justice 1993; Jore, 2012). In that era, counterterrorism measures were regarded as a controversial and unnecessary element of a free, open, and democratic society. In accordance with this view, Norway refused to implement counterterrorism measures, such as specific legislation against terrorism, that might be seen as a threat to civil liberties. At the time, terrorism was not a major concern and the responsible parties involved in terrorism security were national actors: for instance, the defence establishment and the police (Jore and Njå, 2008). Thus, security practices associated with terrorism were considered a centralised responsibility.

The terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 (9/11) put terrorism on top of the political agenda in most Western countries. This was also the case in Norway. Terrorism after 9/11 was framed as a catastrophic risk that threatened democracy, modernity, national security, and critical infrastructures. Therefore, the whole of society needed to be protected, in line with broader societal security discourses outlined in this book. From this time, counterterrorism measures went from being presented as threats against civil liberties to a necessity (Jore and Njå, 2009). In Norway, counterterrorism measures were presented as a trade-off between security and liberty; in order to achieve security, some civil liberties had to be sacrificed. Thus, it was essential to find the right balance between previous “naiveté” and a turn towards a totalitarian state (Jore, 2012).

After the terrorist attack in Norway on 22 July 2011, debates on countermeasures re-intensified and numerous measures were implemented, on multiple scales, to prevent future attacks (Kolås, 2017). Counterterrorism went from being a national and centralised responsibility to becoming a multilevel and multiagency responsibility where the local level and civil society played an important role. It was during this time, in fact, that the concept of radicalisation appeared in Norwegian policies. The outpouring
of foreign fighters from Norway and attacks from the Islamic State in Nordic and European cities raised concern that these actors could also target Norway. This further intensified the focus on radicalisation in Norwegian policy documents, but this approach to terrorism also carried with it a new conceptualisation of what terrorism is and how it should be prevented.

In Norway, the dominate conceptualisation of terrorism has for many decades been to regard it as a form of political violence. Terrorism was seen as an extreme form of political communication fighting for a political purpose (Jore, 2012). Thus, in Norwegian official discourses, terrorists have been described as rational actors that might be fighting for a legitimate cause. For instance, one official text argued that:

\[\text{...several groups and organizations are fighting for morally good values such as freedom and political independence, but in this fight use acts of terrorism as political means}\]

(Ministry of Justice, 1993, p. 12).

This was the prevailing view of terrorism in the Norwegian official communication over several decades. Although other discourses on terrorism coexisted (Jore, 2012), the dominant substantiation of terrorism in the official discourse was to see terrorism as an extreme form of political violence that should be fought by targeting root causes by improving social justice and dialogue. Even though Norway participated with military forces in the US-led Global War on Terrorism, military activities from a Norwegian perspective were most often framed as peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations.

The transformation from hard counterterrorism measures, such as the militarised participation in the Global War on Terrorism doctrine, towards newfound attention to understanding the underlying causes of terrorism is, at first glance, in line with the Norwegian conceptualisation of terrorism and what is considered legitimate ways to counter terrorism. However, the shift of terrorism responsibility from a centralised responsibility to a decentralised and local multiagency focus also entailed a shift in who is responsible for securing society. Thus, the radicalisation approach brought about a change in how security in Norway was perceived, executed, and provided in the Norwegian society.

**Theoretical and methodological approach**

The focus on preventing terrorism through the lens of radicalisation is a European trend that reached the Nordic countries in the first part of the current decade. Denmark was the first Nordic country to publish an Action Plan against extremism in 2009 (Sivenbring and Malmros, 2019). At the time, several terrorist plots had been revealed or terrorist attacks had taken place in the Nordic countries. Additionally, the concern about so-called
foreign fighters was rising in the Nordic countries. During that time, all the Nordic countries published counter-radicalisation strategies that portrayed terrorism as a major threat to Nordic security (Ibid). Norwegian authorities published an Action Plan for how to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism in 2010. Hence, the Action Plan against radicalisation in 2014 was a revision of an already existing strategy. In the years following the revised Action Plan, numerous guidelines and action plans were published in different sectors, especially on the municipality level.

The material analysed in this chapter consists of Norway’s 4 radicalisation actions plans and guidelines published at the national level, and 36 action plans and guidelines published at the municipality level (for a complete list, see the annexes to this chapter). We investigate the assumptions behind the threat of terrorism, the assumed causes of terrorism, and the views on legitimate counterterrorism measures. Our postulate is that the reorganisation of counterterrorism responsibility in Norway is contingent on how the terrorism threat is perceived and the associated understanding of what measures are regarded appropriate and legitimate. The starting point is that terrorism is not a neutral word used to refer to an independent, objective, ontological phenomenon. The concept of terrorism functions as a subjective, normative frame that shapes and constructs how individuals and society view a threat and the legitimacy of such actors and associated counter measures (Jackson et al., 2011). Thus, the Norwegian conceptualisation of terrorism as a threat is contingent on historical, cultural, and political framings. Consequently, the terrorism concept cannot be separated from its broader context. Different conceptualisations of terrorism influence what society perceives as effective ways to counter terrorism (Crelinsten, 2009; Jackson et al., 2011), and, as a result, the perception and organisation of terrorism lays the premises for different notions and practices of security.

The radicalisation approach

The radicalisation concept did not feature strongly in Norwegian terrorism approaches before the publication of the Action Plan to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism in 2010. In fact, it was a concept that was rarely found in official documents previously. Thus, to publish an Action Plan to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism that almost exclusively focused on the prevention of radicalisation marked a change in Norwegian counterterrorism policies when it came to what terrorism was, how terrorism should be prevented, and what were considered effective and legitimate ways to counter the threat.

Assumptions of terrorism as a threat

The Norwegian Action Plan to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism published in 2010 described the Norwegian threat picture as similar to that
of other European and Nordic countries. The security situation for Norway was described as:

…a transition to a terror threat picture more like the one we see in countries where terror attacks have been or have been attempted to be carried out.

(Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2010, p. 5)

The argument was that because of the increased terrorism threat, Norway had to take:

…a precautionary approach. Providing protection is also about prevention, both here in Norway and internationally.

(Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2010, p. 5)

What the Norwegian 2010 Action Plan referred to when talking about precautionary prevention was to prevent terrorism through the lens of radicalisation. Thus, to protect society it was deemed necessary to focus on the processes that led to terrorism. This process was one in which groups or individuals developed attitudes that supported the use of political violence as a means. The 2014 Action Plan against Radicalisation described radicalisation as:

…a process whereby a person increasingly accepts the use of violence to achieve political, ideological or religious goals.

(Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2014 p. 7)

The process of radicalisation that could result in violent extremism was characterised as:

…a process whereby a person or group increasingly condones the use of violence as a means to reach political, ideological or religious goals, and whereby violent extremism may be a result.

(Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2015, p. 13)

Accordingly, radicalisation was considered a process of attitude change, whereby the most extreme consequence of the radicalisation process was terrorism. This process was described as a sequential and linear trajectory in which violent behaviour followed a radical attitude change, whereby a person became more and more likely to utilise violence as a political means. This process was described in multiple documents as the “Radicalisation Tunnel”. The policy goal was to prevent a person from entering into this process or stopping a person already on this pathway. The assumption was that if there is a process that leads to terrorism, there is also a way to stop or reverse this process by removing the intent to commit an act of terrorism.
Thus, counterterrorism policy had become a matter of preventing certain attitudes or changing unwanted attitudes. The novelty of this framing of terrorism was that terrorism was now directly connected to a person’s personal attitude. Previously, official documents had highlighted the importance of not criminalising attitudes, claiming that terrorists could just as well be fighting for a legitimate political issue (Ministry of Justice, 1993, p. 12). Thus, the idea that terrorists also could be seen as freedom fighters was no longer an element in the authorities’ description of the phenomenon of terrorism. In the radicalisation approach, terrorism was only portrayed as negative – an act of fighting illegitimate political goals with illegitimate political means because these individuals had developed the “wrong” set of attitudes. The broader consequence of this was that security now had been directly connected to having the “right” kinds of attitudes.

**Perspectives on the cause of terrorism: individual vulnerability**

Preventing terrorism by targeting root causes has been an important element in the Norwegian understanding of terrorism over several decades (Jore, 2012). Up to the 2010s, the root causes of terrorism were primarily ascribed to political injustice. Terrorists were portrayed as rational actors fighting for a political agenda. Thus, root cases were traditionally understood as political injustice, poverty, lack of education, and lack of democracy.

The focus on root causes is still present in the radicalisation approach. However, since the radicalisation approach has a domestic perspective, root causes of terrorism are now translated into the Norwegian context. While root causes of terrorism historically were limited to political factors on the international and national level of other states, root causes are in the national and municipalities’ action plans and guidelines attributed to aspects of the individual and to his or her living conditions in the local community – not to broader characteristics of Norwegian society or politics.

The root causes of terrorism, in these texts, are thus described at the individual level, where individuals have some sort of vulnerability that make them prone to adopting extreme attitudes. Lillesand Municipality’s Action Plan against radicalisation (2016, p. 10), for example, claims that four motivators play a role in the radicalisation process. First, extremists search for belonging and security. Extremists are driven by a desire for affiliation, friendship, and protection. Second, extremists are motivated by idealism and the sense of injustice. Extremists are driven by political and ideological goals, and get involved because of the suffering of others. Third, social frustration is also a motivating factor; extremists often have a wounded past, and may have experienced violence, discrimination, and substance abuse. Lastly, the quest for excitement or meaning in life is also a motivating factor; extremists are seen as driven by fantasies of being a hero who fights violently for “good” against “evil”. The majority of the motivating factors mentioned are factors attributed to the individual level. Although the political aspect
of terrorism is mentioned, most of the issues considered to lead to terrorism are not described as political but as individual psychological and socio-economic factors.

The national and local action plans against radicalisation describe so-called risk factors and protective factors for potential radicalised individuals. According to Tromsø Municipality (2018, p. 10), for instance, a risk factor may be defined as “any factor in the individual or in the environment that can be associated with increased likelihood of negative psychosocial development in the future”. A protective factor is “any factor in the individual or in the environment that can be associated with a reduced likelihood of future negative psychosocial development”. Consequently, protective and risk factors are connected to an individual’s psychosocial development.

According to Lillesand Municipality (2016), protective factors and risk factors on the individual level are numerous, as outlined in Table 9.1.

Although official documents acknowledge that radicalisation is multi-causal and complex, it is obvious that these documents highlight individual vulnerabilities caused by psychological and social-economic factors when explaining causes of terrorism. The assumption about the causes of terrorism is that terrorism derives from a form of individual vulnerability that makes a person prone to adopt extreme attitudes. These vulnerability factors are often attributed to aspects of the local environment that influence an individual’s upbringing in a negative way. These descriptions of risk factors describe characteristics common in adolescence, and, consequently, all forms of mental health issues or negative psychosocial development can be interpreted as signs of radicalisation. Thus, vulnerability to radicalisation is described as similar to risk factors for young people in general. Roger Berg of the Norwegian Security Police, citied in a municipal report, argues that:

There are many and complex reasons why young people enter into a process where they gradually approach violent extremism, but often this is related to mental vulnerability, identity conflicts and conspiracy theories.

(based on Birkenes Municipality, 2018 p. 7)
It is apparent that the vulnerability approach permeates policies in Norway as shown in this statement. In fact, radicalisation is described as a random process caused by vulnerability:

Whether a person ends up having drug problems, being a criminal, or a violent extremist is a random process, depending on what problem “reaches” the person first. The commonality between all these issues is being vulnerable.

(Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2010, 8)

The focus on individual factors is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that many of the official documents reviewed here include lists of “Possible signs of concern” as exemplified in Table 9.2.

In the official documents published in recent years, there is one risk factor that receives particular attention: “outsiderness”. The National Emergency Preparedness Council (2018, p. 2) defines outsiderness as a term used in everyday speech to denote inadequate social affiliation with the wider community. The term describes a situation in which individuals or groups of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9.2 Possible signs of concern³</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statements/messages</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Intolerance for others’ points of view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hostility to perceived enemies – us and them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conspiracy theories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hate rhetoric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sympathy for absolute solutions, such as abolition of democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Legitimising violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Threats of violence in order to achieve political goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interests/appearance/use of symbols</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Providing and searching for extremist material on the Internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Changes appearance, style of clothing, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Uses symbols linked to extremist ideals and organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Quits school or stops taking part in recreational activities, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Concerned with extremism on the Internet and in social media</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Takes part in demonstrations or in violent clashes with other groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Uses threats and violence as a result of extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hate crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Travel activities that may result in increased radicalisation and contact with extremists</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Friends and social networks</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Changes network and social circle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Associates with persons and groups that are known for violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Associates with groups where threats, violence, or other criminal activities are practised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Member of extremist groups, networks, and organisations</td>
</tr>
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</table>
people do not feel included in society because of bullying, marginalisation, or lack of linguistic or cultural affiliation. As such, to build an inclusive and just society where everyone has the same opportunities to education, work, health, and economic security has now become a part of counterterrorism policy. Consequently, measures associated with the provision of the Norwegian welfare state have become the means to counter terrorism. Moreover, since terrorism is predominantly attributed to the individual level, political factors or factors at the macro level are not considered important explanations of why people become terrorists. Consequently, the emphasis on radicalisation as an individual process de-emphasises broader social and political circumstances as explanatory factors. By focusing on individual factors, the political aspect of terrorism is downplayed in the radicalisation approach and security is conceived as building robust individuals using the traditional means of the Norwegian welfare state.

**Assumption about legitimate counterterrorism measures**

Since the Norwegian action plans against radicalisation describe the causes of radicalisation as individuals' vulnerability, the measures seen as legitimate are counterterrorism measures that aim to create safe and inclusive local environments for young people. The aim is to work with vulnerable individuals to develop a form of psychological robustness that makes potential terrorists refrain from radicalised ideas. The underlying assumption here is that terrorism can be prevented by developing some form of psychological capacity and critical reflection skills in individuals that prevent them from being drawn towards violent extremist ideologies or groups. Consequently, in the radicalisation approach, the ability to refrain from extreme ideas becomes a characteristic that can be learned and internalised. The main idea is that individuals should share the same political attitudes as the mainstream community. According to the underlying assumption, this should be achieved by living in harmonious local communities.

This notion of terrorism is grounded in the idea of terrorism as a product of social, economic, and political inequalities, and that alienated and marginalised individuals are more likely to engage with radical groups when they are isolated from the broader community or suffering mentally. Thus, social factors at the community level are aspects that help to prevent terrorism. Consequently, the official documents emphasise the importance of creating a safe and inclusive society for every individual as a way to prevent terrorism. Thus, avoiding outsiders and providing young people with an inclusive socially and economically favourable local environment is seen as a counterterrorism measure. According to the 2014 Action Plan, prevention involves:

...ensuring good formative conditions for children and youth, fighting poverty and working to ensure that everyone, regardless of their
background, shall have a sense of belonging and be protected against discrimination.


A majority of the measures mentioned to prevent radicalisation are measures associated with the Norwegian welfare state, such as access to education, work, equal opportunities, poverty reduction, and integration. The underlying notion is that the ideals present in Norwegian society will also serve to prevent radicalisation. As such, counterterrorism has become a form of safeguarding vulnerable individuals with the means of the welfare state. Therefore, counterterrorism measures are no longer portrayed either as controversial or as trade-off between civil liberties and security. Rather, counterterrorism measures are seen as a means to protect society and vulnerable individuals.

Since the risk factors for radicalisation is considered to be the same as for other negative youth behaviours such as mental illness and crime, the suggested countermeasures are the same as for other negative youth behaviours:

The core of prevention of radicalisation and development of extremism is the same as for prevention of, among other things, school dropouts, drug problems and crime. This is about that we in all areas of society must strive to counteract the exclusion mechanisms in the everyday lives of all children and adolescents. We must work actively to prevent anyone from feeling that they are standing outside of the “great good community”. We must try to help young people develop self-esteem and an identity related to being part of the community and not a marginalized and/or extremist environment.

(Levanger Municipality, 2015 p. 9)

The assumption that terrorism is caused by vulnerability and outsiderness implies that the local community is responsible for recognising and helping potential radicalised individuals.

In Norway, counterterrorism has traditionally been seen as the responsibility for the Police and the Norwegian Security Police (PST), although the Ministry of the Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have also historically had counterterrorism on their political agendas. Consequently, up to 2010, counterterrorism had mainly been considered a national and centralised responsibility. Thus, when the 2010 Action Plan introduced a decentralisation of Norwegian counterterrorism responsibility, this was a new trajectory in Norwegian counterterrorism. The majority of the measures suggested in this document were measures that had to be executed on the municipality level. The numerous municipality guidelines published after this are a direct result of this reorganisation and downsizing of counterterrorism responsibility. According to Roger Berg of the national Police Security Service, “the beginning of a radicalisation process is not a direct Police
Security Service matter but first and foremost a social responsibility” (Cited in Birkenes Municipality, 2018. p. 7).

When counterterrorism is turned into a social responsibility, it is no longer the state that is responsible for counterterrorism. On the contrary, counterterrorism is embedded into the everyday practices on the local level. In fact, many of the guidelines published on the municipality level not only target local community organisations but also individuals close to a potentially radicalised person, as illustrated by a quote in a report by Bømlo, Fitjar, and Stord Municipalities (2016, p. 8):

Are you an individual who is concerned about a neighbour, colleague, or another citizen you should do the following: Take the concern seriously! Think about what you are upset about and take responsibility for your unrest!

Such statements point directly to the individual citizen, suggesting that everyone is responsible for countering terrorism. The joint responsibility of counterterrorism is constantly repeated in the guidelines for preventing radicalisation. The Norwegian Prime Minister, Erna Solberg, claims: “It is the responsibility of each of us to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism” (cited in Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018). It is worth noting that this is a welfare state argument; everyone has to take care of each other to achieve security. The idea is that by imposing a sense of community where everyone acts as responsible citizens, terrorism will be prevented.

The appropriate tool to be utilised when concerned for a potential “radicalised person, according to the Action Plan, for how to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism in 2010 is dialogue:

We must do more to prevent undesirable behaviour before it is too late and we must do so in a broad perspective. We must resolve conflicts, rather than aggravate and create new ones and we must choose dialogue rather than creating a divide between individuals and groups. It is through increased democratic participation that we can drive back those who wish to use violence to achieve their political goals...We will combat such views with words. Racist and discriminating views should be met on a broad front. This is our joint social responsibility.

(Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2010, p. 5)

In fact, the national guide for the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism from 2015 (Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2015) and the majority of the municipalities’ action plans offer concrete descriptions on how to create dialogue with potential radicalised individuals. Norwegian authorities have always highlighted “dialogue” as a legitimate counterterrorism means. Consequently, the use of dialogue as a counterterrorism measure is in line with the historical Norwegian perspective on
counterterrorism. Nevertheless, the radicalisation approach diverges from the traditional Norwegian perspective on terrorism in that dialogue from this approach is not a means to negotiate or reach political consensus but a means to build robustness in individuals and to make potential terrorists refrain from extreme ideas. Thus, dialogue can be used not to achieve political consensus but as a therapeutic means. As such, radicalised views are not rational political opinions, but something that can be stopped if only individuals are integrated into harmonious local communities.

Discussion

Norwegian authorities have for several decades conceptualised terrorism as a form of political communication and claimed that terrorism should be prevented by focusing on root causes and social justice. The current radicalisation approach thus diverges from previous approaches on terrorism in three different ways. First, the radicalisation approach focuses on individual vulnerability factors. Second, it regards counterterrorism as a process of attitude change. Third, counterterrorism measures in the radicalisation approach are turned into something positive that are needed to build a safe and democratic society.

The first way the radicalisation approach differs from previous Norwegian discourses is in the way that explanatory factors for the causes of terrorism are predominantly ascribed to the individual level. In the concept of radicalisation lays a promise that there is a certain pathway that individuals are on in the process of becoming a terrorist that can be disrupted if only the right measures are in place. Psychological distress of individuals is described as the causes of terrorism, pointing at the individual as the locus of change. Consequently, the radicalisation approach downplays the political aspects of terrorism and focus on explanations and solutions on the micro level instead of national or international levels. The radicalisation approach removes the emphasis on terrorists as rational political individuals, seeing potential terrorists as vulnerable individuals that need to be safeguarded by the local environment. From this perspective, individuals and actors on the local level become a form of “first line defence” where counterterrorism is everyone’s responsibility (Larsson, 2017; Petersen and Tjale, 2013). This has implication for the governance of security: it suggests not only that terrorism can be prevented if we achieve a just society; it is also made clear that counterterrorism is a societal responsibility and a social practice that everyone has to participate in.

Consequently, the radicalisation approach offers solutions to the problem of terrorism that can be implemented on a local level. The idea is that if the structures and measures already in place in Norway are utilised, these will also prevent terrorism. Thus, the concept of radicalisation, as it is deployed in the Norwegian approach, conceals the diversity of explanatory factors and proposes that individuals who become terrorists share a common set of
characteristics or vulnerability (Awan et al., 2011; Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2009; Neumann, 2013; Sedgwick, 2010). Because terrorism is seen as the result of socio-psychological vulnerability factors, measures associated with the proper functioning of the Norwegian welfare state will also prevent terrorism. Research conducted in Norwegian municipalities has showed that those officials working with radicalisation tended to have similar view on possible signs of radicalisation. They viewed the causes of radicalisation as similar to crime, drug abuse, and violent behaviour (Lid et al. 2016; Sandrup et al. 2018). Consequently, terrorism is no longer seen as a product of a political struggle, but as a product of growing up or living in an environment characterised by negative risk factors.

The second way the radicalisation approach diverges from previous Norwegian terrorism approaches is in the way that it stretches the phenomena of terrorism and counterterrorism into the mind and the attitudes of individuals. In the radicalisation approach, emphasis is placed on having the right attitudes. However, attitudes in the radicalisation approach are not seen as a result of political process or social injustice. Attitudinal change in the radicalisation approach is caused by individuals vulnerable to extreme worldviews. Counterterrorism has become a question of having the right attitudes and a form of mental robustness. As a consequence, local actors such as teachers, social workers, and youth workers are turned into security actors representing the state and looking for alarming signs of attitude change (Mattsson, 2019). This is a dangerous trajectory for a democratic society because most individuals with a radicalised worldview will not use violence as a tool. Additionally, what is considered radical in one era might be considered mainstream in another. One might note that the Norwegian traditional conceptualisation of terrorism, focused on terrorists as fighting for a legitimate political issue, is no longer valid under the radicalisation approach.

The third way that the radicalisation approach diverges from the historical substantiation of terrorism is in the framing of counterterrorism measures. Historically in Norway, there has always been scepticism of implementing counterterrorism measures. The counterterrorism measures implemented in the aftermath of 9/11 were debated and criticised, especially the War on Terrorism, surveillance, fortification of civil society, and new terrorism legislation. The argument for implementing these measures was that in order to achieve security, civil liberties had to be sacrificed. The measures proposed in the radicalisation approach have not met the same criticism. Many of the local actors who carry out local counterterrorism policy have welcomed the increased focus on communities and civil society in counterterrorism (Sjøen and Jore, 2019). Accordingly, government-centric efforts regarding counterterrorism lack credibility, and, consequently, communities and local actors are better situated to have the knowledge on what measures are required at a local level to prevent radicalisation (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2016). However, after scrutinising the national and local documentary evidence in this study, one striking observation is how similar the plans are. The local action plans
do not describe any profound understanding of, or reflection on, local needs nor adaptation to the presence of potential individuals in the local community in focus. Thus, even though numerous local action plans exist, these are not locally adapted strategies but rather formal procedures.

The storyline embedded in the radicalisation approach is that terrorism is a pressing problem to Norwegian security and that the whole of society needs to assist the state to prevent the ubiquitous threat of terrorism from materialising. Since the counterterrorism measures proposed in the radicalisation approach are dialogue, equality, social justice, and building robust citizens who thrive in their local community, counterterrorism measures are in line with what Norwegian citizens consider the role of the welfare state. As such, counterterrorism in the radicalisation approach becomes a form of caregiving and safeguarding of vulnerable individuals. Consequently, while counterterrorism measures previously were portrayed as threats to civil liberties, the radicalisation approach’s preventative efforts are instead considered a key element of ensuring fundamental values such as democracy, human rights, and security. Thus, counterterrorism measures are no longer described as a negative that have to be weighed against civil liberties to gain security from terrorism. Quite the opposite, in fact, counterterrorism in the form of preventing radicalisation has now become a means to achieve civil liberties, human rights, and democracy (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2014). Since counterterrorism measures are generally described as measures consistent with the welfare state, counterterrorism is not presented as a required trade-off but as a positive engagement that will create robust individuals, safe local communities, and an equal and inclusive society. However, even though most Norwegian citizens may believe that social justice, inclusion, and building robust individuals are ideal goals in a welfare state, there seems to be little discussion in Norway of whether these measures are effective counterterrorism measures or not. Thus, the positive framing of such measures also entails that debates regarding the negative side-effects of counterterrorism measures are curtailed in the Norwegian approach. This idea of safeguarding vulnerable individuals is probably an explanatory factor for why the radicalisation approach has been subject to such little criticism. The notion of safeguarding vulnerable individuals is in line with the Norwegian model and the welfare state that ascribes to local actors such as teachers, social workers, and the local police the role of preventing crime and social problems in the local environment. Nevertheless, the safeguarding lens takes the focus away from the fact that a wider array of society has become security agents and that such a regime might contribute to normalising distrust.

Conclusions

Norwegian authorities have for several decades conceptualised terrorism as a form of political communication and claimed that terrorism should be prevented by focusing on root causes and social justice. The focus on root
causes, social harmony, and equality that features prominently in the Norwegian radicalisation approach makes it a counterterrorism policy that fits the Norwegian view on what terrorism is and how it should be prevented. However, the radicalisation approach represents a substantial change in Norwegian counterterrorism policy by describing terrorism as a result of individuals vulnerable to attitude change caused by social-psychological factors. Thus, political aspects and factors on the macro level are downplayed. Perhaps the most radical change in the Norwegian counterterrorism policies, though, is that counterterrorism measures no longer are seen as controversial or negative. The radicalisation approach transforms counterterrorism into something positive that is needed in order to build a safe and democratic society; counterterrorism is in the radicalisation approach described as a part of the public good and the welfare of the members of society. The measures build on the already existing structures of the welfare state, and are expected to develop a form of resilience in the face of extreme attitudes.

The focus on radicalisation in counterterrorism is not a trend unique for Norway or the Nordic countries; this is an international trend seen in policy responses worldwide (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018). The radicalisation approach is an attempt to counter terrorism within a democratic frame with legitimate means. However, the so-called democratic approaches to counterterrorism can also have negative consequences. In many other countries, radicalisation and resilience policies have been criticised for being a part of a neoliberal tendency where the state redirects responsibility to the local level in order to save costs (see, e.g., Chandler and Reid, 2016). In Norway, with a well-developed and rich welfare state, this neoliberal argument has not been present. The radicalisation approach and its accompanying counterterrorism perspective offer a solution to terrorism that fits the values of the welfare state that Norwegian society is based on. Additionally, since counterterrorism is portrayed as a form or caregiving and safeguarding of vulnerable individuals, this approach is framed as a positive element and in line with how local actors see their role in the Norwegian welfare state. This is probably why this approach to counterterrorism has faced so little criticism in Norway compared to many other countries. Since radicalisation is primarily understood as a result of socio-economic conditions and individual vulnerability, it makes sense that local actors and individuals close to a potential radicalised person are considered the ones who have the possibility to discover early warning signs and therefore prevent radicalisation. Moreover, the idea of conflating the welfare state with security has a long-standing tradition in Norway. In Norway, there is a tradition of solving risk problems at the municipality level. Thus, the devolution of counterterrorism responsibility fits, in some respects, the Norwegian model on how to manage risks in general and security threats in particular. A closer look, however, reveals that although the radicalisation approach may, on a superficial level, look like an extension of former counterterrorism policies, in practice the
approach is a radical change in Norwegian counterterrorism policies that might contribute to increased distrust and alienation. There is every reason to question, therefore, whether it is time for Norwegian authorities to reflect upon the current policy trajectory and whether changes are needed.

Notes

1 All translations from Norwegian into English have been done by the author.
3 Adapted from Ministry of Justice and Public Security (2014).

References


List of national guidelines and action plans for preventing radicalisation


List of municipalities studied

- Oslo Municipality
- Kristiansand Municipality
- Time Municipality
• Lillesand Municipality
• Birkenes Municipality
• Tromsø Municipality
• Lenvik Municipality
• Hamar Municipality
• Bergen Municipality
• Stavanger Municipality
• Gjøvik Municipality
• Ålesund Municipality
• Salto Bærum Municipality
• Elverum Municipality
• Sandefjord Municipality
• Gjesdal Municipality
• Larvik Municipality
• Lindesnes Municipality
• Skien Municipality
• Øygarden Municipality
• Lyngdal Municipality
• Stjørdal Municipality
• Gran and Lunner Municipalities
• Øvre Eiker Municipality
• Berum Municipality
• Horten Municipality
• Lesja, Dovre, Sel, Vågå, and Lom Municipalities
• Trondheim Municipality
• Vestre Toten Municipality
• Søgne and Sogndalen Municipalities
• Risør Municipality
• Marker og Rømskog Municipalities
• Lillehammer Municipality
• Frosta Municipality
10 Threats, risks, and the (re)turn to territorial security policies in Sweden

Jonatan Stiglund

Introduction

Nordic, and particularly Swedish, security policies have undergone a significant discursive shift in focus during the 2010s, with 2014 representing a decisive year for a change of direction. The Russian annexation of Crimea and instigating of war in eastern Ukraine that year came to be understood as meaning new geopolitical realities for European security, which Swedish security elites had to consider and take into account in their assessments and policies (Agrell, 2016; Ds 2017:66, p. 17). The proponents of the shift towards increased long-term defence spending, territorial defence, hostile intentions, and hybrid warfare as core parameters of security argued that this change was long overdue and one that Sweden was particularly ill-positioned to make at this point in time (Sveriges Television, 2015). The background is the, until that point, long-established understanding dominating official Swedish security policy about an increasingly peaceful Europe, and that security had come to concern not existential threats to the state and its citizens, but domestic problems related to non-military matters and international security abroad (Agrell, 2016). Swedish governments had since the early 1990s successively dismantled the capabilities and resources designed to confront military assets of hostile actors that might pose a direct threat to Swedish integrity or territory (Dalsjö, 2010). While this was not a uniquely Swedish development, Sweden made this transition to a greater extent and more swiftly than most of its Nordic neighbours and European partners (SIPRI, 2019).

The solution that came to fill the partly empty security policy space was introduced in the 1990s mainly as new focus areas or activities that security and defence spending would not prioritise, without a new institutional home. Later, new and reformed government agencies were given an increased role, more resources as well as legal measures in the sphere of Swedish security broadly conceived. The intentions and ideas expressed in official Swedish security discourse were clearly directed towards an increased scope of what security is about (or at least how the prioritisation of security dangers is made) as well as a more dispersed institutional structure designed to
accomplish the security goals of this new era. This has been alternatively labelled societal security, a new version of the Swedish comprehensive security concept including several actors and security concerns simultaneously. The key component in this new security doctrine guiding Swedish policy for at least 20 years was the deprioritisation of territorial defence as the core component of security policy. However, this doctrine is no longer supported as being sufficient or suitable for the current security climate and Swedish security concerns. There is significant support among major influential actors that a shift towards increased defence spending, more advanced military capabilities, and a greater concern for hostile territorial incursions by Russia have become key aspects of Swedish security policy in the 2010s.

Interestingly, while this quite significant shift in discourse and ongoing concrete change towards increased concern for military security is both obvious and supported by the majority among security elites, it has not replaced or diminished the conceptual understanding of a broad security strategy that continues to govern official security policy. At the same time as attention and resources are designated to purposes pertaining to defending Swedish interests and assets against hostile aggression (in varying shapes and forms), the institutional structure designed to deal with new kinds of security risks and threats, and the conceptual understanding that this wide range of phenomena constitute security problems for Sweden remain.

The developments we may observe in Sweden are possible to identify also in a larger context, across the Nordic region, as well as at the European Union (EU) level (Rieker, 2006; see also Götz and Haggrén, 2009). Current EU practices and policies such as PESCO3 and the European Defence Fund (Biscop, 2018) show that the union, after having established internal security cooperation (Boin and Ekengren, 2009; Bossong and Rhinard, 2013), has now taken steps to increase cooperation also on military defence in the EU structure, indicating a convergence or coexistence of both traditional and new emerging security issues simultaneously within the EU system, problematising the external-internal security divide (Duke, 2019). This could be a sign of multiple existing security logics also at the EU level or at least an indication of how our societies aspire to control and deter all sorts of different threats and risks as part of security policy.

If at one point territorial defence and what we could label “traditional security concerns” were the dominating (albeit not the only) security problems relevant for Sweden to address, and the same issue was later reframed as very minor and low risk for a long time following the end of the Cold War, the place we are at now is unique. Either we are in the middle of a shift towards an actual replacing of the broad comprehensive security concept by a new version of the military or hybrid warfare aggression understanding. Or, which I argue is more likely, we are at a place in which distinct and simultaneously present security logics will continue to co-exist, resulting not only in different sets of security policy activities and dangers to address, but also in co-existing and mutually exclusive ways of imagining and engaging
with security problems. It is presented as vital to Swedish security to increase military capabilities to deter and resist potential Russian attacks. It is also vital to consider new kinds of malevolent agents and the challenges of hybrid warfare as a method used by both conventional and unconventional actors. Additionally, Swedish security is about mitigating and dealing with the effects of climate change, risks connected to technological development and infrastructure, global security issues, environmental problems, international development, and refugee flows. The point is not that these issues per se are new. They are not. It is that the security discourse today lacks a clearly defined focus and is instead fractured and designates all these different phenomena as security problems at the same time.

We need to understand the security politics of our time with an understanding of this complex picture. Security is necessarily more than any one theoretical model can capture from the perspective of elite security officials. One option would be to select a theoretical approach that frames security either as primarily about military threats or as predominantly about societal risks, thereby selecting certain issues as more pressing than others within the security space. Alternatively, however, we could acknowledge an ongoing shift that is redefining and broadening what security policy means, which goes beyond what can be identified by predefining security in particular ways. This chapter sets out to do the latter, by providing an account of these matters from the perspective of the Swedish government, and how it defines threats and risks.

Background

In the early 1990s, as a response to what was viewed a positive geopolitical development from the Swedish perspective with the Cold War coming to an end, three large processes were initiated relating to Swedish security politics. First, Sweden applied for membership in the EU, which would integrate the country with most of Western Europe and break with the neutrality policy that had been formally in place since the early 1800s (Dalsjö, 2010). Second, the defence forces were to be reduced and rearranged, focusing less on territorial defence and more on security goals in other areas (Agrell, 2016). Third, the objectives of defence and security politics were reconceptualised during this period, partly as a result of the other two processes mentioned here (Westberg, 2015). It was in this context, and to deal with these issues, that the parliamentary defence committees during the 1990s were created, and their reports became important grounds for the defence bills that came to quite radically remake Swedish defence and security politics from a Cold War mode to what was seen as a more modern security politics (Agrell, 2016, pp. 155–157). The process of reaching a consensus in this new space for Swedish national security is ongoing to this day, and we are at a place in which multiple ways of constructing and tackling security challenges are co-existing without any one taking clear primacy (Prime Minister's
Office, 2017). The government defence bills and the parliamentary defence commission reports have been analysed for the purposes of this chapter. They constitute the major written documents with legal and policy implications that guide the overall security and defence spending and prioritisation from the viewpoint of the Swedish government, essentially speaking also to the public in this way. Furthermore, they are regular and ongoing processes resulting in and representing the evolving changes that this chapter is interested in. In addition, a couple of public inquiry reports on security and defence issued conducted on behalf of the ministry of defence are also included in the empirical material.

What has happened in Swedish security policy has been processes of transformation from one military-centric total defence concept, where all of society were involved in the quest for national security, though under the primacy of military defence and the defence forces as the dominant actor, to a very different – however in language terms similarly sounding – concept of “new” total defence. The idea has progressed from a previous divergent notion of identifying and dealing with all kinds of security issues in different fields – development, energy, global stability, environment, economic, social – where the military and traditional aspects of national security were de-prioritised in the 1990s and early 2000s, to a situation now in which also the latter aspect has grown in importance again, but alongside the quite broadened security conception that has been advanced for many years (see Agrell, 2016; Westberg, 2015).

Sweden’s security, and consequently our national interests, are currently impacted by a large number of factors. These involve both new and more traditional threats, and immediate and long-term risks. The careful examination of these factors and strengthening our abilities to prevent, warn of, withstand and tackle the challenges that they generate form an important part of our security efforts.

(Prime Minister’s Office, 2017, p. 17)

The security strategy quoted above consciously identifies both threats and risks as security problems, forming a comprehensive – yet complex – understanding of security. It continues, “While the benefits of digitalisation are welcome, it is clear that the risks and threats with which it is associated are some of the most complex security challenges that we face” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2017, p. 18). Interestingly, both threat and risks are drawn on in these accounts, and a distinction is portrayed between traditional security problems and other types of problems (security risks), where the latter can be of both short- and long-term nature. Additionally, the goal for Swedish security – that which shall be sought for security to be had – includes both preventive and reactive measures. Not only is it important to act before-hand to mitigate and absorb effects of security problems. There is also a need to actively engage with the environment that is generated as a result of the complex security dangers faced.
Moreover, the shift in Swedish security discourse since the end of the Cold War reflects how a significant broadening of security has taken place at the same time as a military-territorial logic has resurfaced in recent years, in connection with the geopolitical developments in 2014 (see Agrell, 2016). This makes it clear that we are not dealing with one or the other, not broadened non-military security or primarily a traditional perspective, but rather both logics simultaneously put at the forefront of government security policy.

The conceptual intersection of risks and threats

With the help of the risk concept, we can explore how security dangers can be categorised as risks alongside the threat security logic (Hammerstad and Boas, 2015). The famous concept of the risk society came to the fore through Ulrich Beck, in explaining how increasingly complex problems emerge and are addressed as political problems for governments. Technological development and the conditions of globalisation bring about risks created by our own very existence and ways of living (Beck, 1992). Managing and calculating risks, the notion of precaution of risks, and the role of security technologies have become dominating features of political life (Aradau and van Munster, 2007). Security policy also works through technology, in how digitalisation and data are employed in risk governance. By collecting and analysing the “digital footprints”, the politics of risk security

acts not primarily to prevent the playing out of a particular course of events on the basis of past data tracked forward into probable futures but to preempt an unfolding and emergent event in relation to an array of possible projected futures.

(Amoore, 2013, p. 9)

In this reading, risk and risk discourses constitute one dominating mode of governance, where representations of risk and uncertainty are used to engage and shape our world (ibid., p. 7; see also Liebetrau, this volume).

Within the constructivist school of international relations (see Adler, 2013), the concept of securitisation became influential as a mode of analysis for threat construction. Initially formulated by Wæver (1995), securitisation allows for both a deepening and a broadening (Buzan and Hansen, 2009) of what threats to security can be. Securitisation studies demonstrate how governments construct phenomena as existential threats to certain values and show how that enables political action (Buzan et al., 1998). Corry (2012, pp. 237–238) argues that “riskification”, in contrast to securitisation, does not revolve around existential dimensions of security. Risks differ from threats in not operating with the same degree of immediacy and directness. Instead of enabling certain emergency measures, riskification points to measures that need to be taken for politics to manage them in the long run,
pre-emptively (ibid., pp. 244–245), suggesting a different temporality from a threat logic. The risk logic builds on the goal of taking actions to govern the conditions of possibility rather than defending a specific value or object. Riskification functions through governing the inherent vulnerabilities of danger (Corry, 2012, pp. 246–248). Williams (2008, p. 68) proposes that societal values rather than risk-governance capacities constitute that which is to be protected from the effects of the risks, and present risk security in the following way:

Threats are finite because they emanate from a specific actor, with a limited amount of resources to support capabilities. Risks are infinite. Since risks are only possible scenarios—devoid of any ‘real’ capabilities—they can exist to a far greater extent than threats. Furthermore, as the ‘boomerang effect’ notes, in managing a future risk, new risks proliferate. Risk management is a never-ending process—it is about living with insecurity, not providing security through deterrence of the threat from an outside actor, as was the case in the Cold War. The problem is that unlike a threat-based system, where obvious capabilities and intent make it easier for policy-makers to determine where threats lie, a risk-based mindset means that policy-makers must act with far less information to go on

(Williams, 2008, p. 66)

Based on the theoretical propositions presented, Table 10.1 represents crudely the components belonging to different ways of imagining and constructing security.

Four categories or factors for understanding security as threat-driven or risk-based ideal types are used to guide the focus and analysis of the empirical analysis. The nature of security dangers is one characteristic important to understanding the constructing of security. It concerns how security dangers are defined, what is known about them, and how they are constituted (Beck, 1992; Vaughan-Williams, 2015). Agency and intention behind security dangers is another relevant dimension that is used to explore the material. It has to do with what kind of agency and intentionality that are underlying and driving the security dangers (Corry, 2012; Williams, 2008). A third category that helps guide the analysis has to do with the degree to which the security issues are predictable or unknown in terms of how and when they could materialise (Amoore, 2013). Lastly, the way in which politics is proposed to mobilise in order to respond to the security problems – i.e. reactive or pre-emptive efforts – is a fourth category that is important for analysing the material from the point of view of risk and threat logics of security (Aradau and van Munster, 2007; Corry, 2012). These four categories for analysing the material are present in the empirical presentation beginning in the next section.
Swedish national security: risks, threats, and uncertainties

The chapter proceeds in two parts. This first part addresses specifically the Swedish security context during its institutional time of transition from a Cold War structure to one in which military security was significantly deprioritised in favour of other security problems. This includes also account of the official Swedish security policy during the 2000s, in which much of this transition was finalised. The second part addresses the recent years with a focus on the increased relevance again for territorial security in the new European security context.
Although the empirical material examined in this chapter stems primarily from the policy area of defence, as I will show, the material uses the broader security concept that goes well beyond military security, and deals with threats and risks within policy areas concerning both justice and home affairs as well as climate and environment. One result of the defence commission reports and defence bills during the last decades has been to include in the policy area of defence security problems of very different types. The institutional structures of defence commissions and defence bill processes have been used as vehicles for politically transforming defence policy from the traditional Cold War understanding to a much broader and more complex idea of security politics. It should be said, however, that not all aspects concerning security in the wide sense are included in this material. The material presented here represents the most central widespread understandings of the most important challenges to Swedish security. The material will allow us to see what the broadening and deepening of security has come to mean in Swedish politics, both in terms of the phenomena denoted as security problems and in terms of the expansion of the policy field of defence politics to include these dangers.

The first defence commission in its present form was initiated by the Swedish government in 1992, to facilitate and seek consensus for reforms in Swedish security and defence policy after the Cold War (Agrell, 2016, pp. 93–94). The first comprehensive defence bill to begin to implement a shift (ibid., 2016, p. 140) was presented to the Swedish parliament in September 1995. There was a clear and open recognition that the security environment as such has indeed undergone significant change and that security must be understood as a broader concept. It explains how old threats have been eliminated or reduced, transforming the security politics to now dealing with new risks and challenges that have emerged (Prop. 1995/96:12, p. 2). The change was evident also concerning civilian societal safety issues, in talking about the broadening of security, and new risks and uncertainty emanating from societal change, technological change, and complexity (SOU 1995:19, p. 57).

The understanding of the time was that global developments were transformative, which necessitated adaptation from public governance functions to adapt military and civilian resources to better achieve societal safety and security. The definitions of threats and risks offered are that whereas the latter is concerned with probability for something undesired to happen, a threat is imminent and represented by a concrete actor or a chain of events that – if not stopped – will bring harm (SOU 1995, p. 65–66). It is noteworthy that the defence bill from 1992 was overtly positioned in relation to issues of possible concrete attacks or territorial incursions, where a military reactive logic was the dominating means to deal with that possibility. Although a changing security environment was recognised, the bill nevertheless corresponds very much to a traditional threat-based logic ideal of a view of security (Prop. 1991/92:102, pp. 4, 8–9). This shows that the transformative
process instigated by the new defence commission process and the resulting policy changes were designed to point to a new way of imagining security and defence.

The purpose of the 1995 total defence bill was to address a context in which security politics must be holistic, dealing with military security problems as well as non-military threats and risks (Prop. 1995/96:12, p. 4). While the military perspective is still present and important, the bill also emphasises how the new security climate is more unpredictable, and that it needs to be watched closely, for security politics to be able to adapt to new conditions (ibid., p. 6). The bill explicitly designates several security problems as not being military threats, but which nevertheless constitute security problems that this bill serves to enable agencies to combat (ibid., p. 8). Denoting broadened security as a guiding concept, it is clear that the government wants to promote a different way of conceiving security, one that includes military threats, the uncertainties concerning global development, the vulnerabilities inherent in modern societies, and the risks that they might be connected to (ibid., p. 29–30).

A holistic view of security where military and civilian agencies are required to tackle security issues was also present in the preceding report from the parliamentary defence commission in May 1995, which emphasised how financial flows, technological developments, and social and economic tensions are all relevant factors for security politics broadly (Ds 1995:28, p. 111). The interface between technologies, vulnerabilities, and natural disasters as well as hostile acts are described as new types of risks and threats (ibid., p. 112).

The role of the armed forces and a traditional threat perspective remains important, but merely represents some out of many other equally important aspects of security in this time (Ds 1995:51, p. 37). It is acknowledged – without making any meaningful distinction between the two concepts – that “dealing with all threats and risks necessitates a degree of balancing between pre-emptive measures and actions to deal with incidents as they occur” (ibid., 41, my translation). The continued relevance of broadened security issues and associated ideas during the second half of the 1990s is displayed in Table 10.2, following the policy change the preceding years.

At the end of the 20th century, it has been made abundantly clear that the security environment has undergone a major change since the end of the Cold War, and that this has implications for Swedish – and indeed, European – security. At the same that what we can call the geopolitical security context, that is relations between states, has improved and the outbreak of war in Sweden is deemed highly unlikely, the uncertainties in this new context are many and impossible to control. While security comes to take on properties that go well beyond military operations and wartime scenarios, the same uncertainties and new risks and threats that become politically incorporated in the field of security politics may give rise to situations and effects that in the unknown future come to worsen the overall security
environment. This tells us two things. First, it becomes obvious that security politics came to incorporate military security awareness and preparedness as well as an expansionist broadening of security during and through this transformation. Second, the reports and defence bills collectively recognise – and demand – the need for continuing assessments and reassessments of the security situation from this new broad perspective. That means that

Table 10.2 Threats and risks in Swedish security discourse 1996–1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Threats and risks, context, and actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ds 1996:51, pp. 34–35</td>
<td>Military conflicts, supply crises, ecological imbalances, mass migration, nationalism, ethnical and cultural conflicts, terrorism, interdependencies and complexities in modern societal functions, technologies, and infrastructure, non-state actors, intra-state conflicts, WMDs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ds 1998:9, pp. 102–103</td>
<td>Technological dependencies, intra-state war, non-state actors, changing nature of military force, new means to conduct war and military operations, new technologies, military resources and strategies, precision weapons, small military units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ds 1998:9, p. 132</td>
<td>Conflicts between nations and groups, social and economic inequalities, mass unemployment, extremist movements, pollution, raw material shortages, complex connections, unpredictable security context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ds 1999:2, pp. 84–86</td>
<td>Traditional military and new security problems resulting from technological development, modernity, complexity, societal vulnerability. Increasing robustness, acting against dangers that affect society at large or many individuals prioritised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ds 1999:55, pp. 59, 89–90</td>
<td>Traditional security readiness against potential military attacks. Importance of broadening security, comprehensive security, civil defence, securing societal functions, dealing with vulnerabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. 1999/2000:30, p. 31</td>
<td>Swift and limited military armed attack, attacker that is difficult to identify new forms of coercion, information systems, non-state actors, advanced and non-conventional weapons, severe societal stresses.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
there was never a complete shift from one way of thinking and doing security to something else, in the sense that both approaches remained present. But there was clearly a shift in the sense that the shapes and forms of security problems were recognised to have expanded to include numerous complicated phenomena that were not – and could not – be the domain of the defence forces. In that way, security politics was indeed reconceptualised substantially by elite politicians and the Swedish government during the 1990s. Security problems could emanate domestically as well as in distant places. Some problems directly endangered the security of individuals, whereas others primarily concerned societal functions or the environment. Some security problems were to be dealt with via direct measures, after having been delimited, identified, and concretely present in some form. This concerned mainly military security problems. Others were vaguer in nature, not yet having become manifest, and yet were identified as potential future sources of security problems that should be pre-emptively worked against, speaking to the threat/risk distinction.

It is obvious from these texts that the authors did not attach fundamental distinctions to the terms threat and risk, and often times did use them interchangeably. However, it is equally clear that the two different security logics – as ideal types – that lie at the basis for this study can be identified as simultaneously present in these texts. By expanding security to include so much, it becomes difficult even for the most ambitious government to pretend that it can actively and at all times take action against all security challenges that exist. It by necessity becomes a matter of analysis, control, selection, and – for certain issues – pre-emptive measures.

The scope of security politics has substantially broadened, covering many different areas and political sectors. It cannot be fixed, and the area instead must be continuously analysed and the capabilities and responses adapted. Concerning the nature of security dangers, those that concern military attacks and traditional security dangers are deemed quite few and unlikely, and in that sense then delimited and concretely identified. However, many of the “new” security problems suggested are associated with much more complexity and cannot be easily identified or traced to some specific source. The picture is similar regarding agency and intentionality behind security dangers. Some states, organisations, and groups are denoted intentions and agenda to influence Sweden in negative ways through different means, whereas other security problems are open and not associated with agency. The time and space perspectives have overall been quite unspecific, and no security danger has been specified to occurring at one specific point in time or at a particular place. What is interesting, however, is the distinction being made between some phenomena that are imagined needing to be dealt with swiftly and immediately as they occur, and other problems that are better addressed by strengthening societal robustness at home and pre-empting conflicts abroad. This “dual approach” to security represents an obvious shift from a Cold War military logic to a much more open, flexible, and complex security understanding, with a comprehensive, broad, and risk-influenced component making out one of the two legs.
During the 2000s, the same development was to a large extent affirmed, almost to the point of constituting a security paradigm of comprehensive security policy. The same type of documents for the years 2001–2009 and how they emphasise partly new issues following the established view of security since the start of the transformation process in 1995 are summarised in Table 10.3.

Table 10.3 Threats and risks in Swedish security discourse 2001–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Threats and risks, context and actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ds 2001:14, pp. 115, 177, 212–213</td>
<td>Local and regional conflicts abroad, international crises and conflicts, pre-emption of conflicts abroad also for Swedish security. Direct, intentional attacks against electricity, information and communications systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ds 2003:8, pp. 48–49</td>
<td>Increased focus on terrorism: complex problem requires international collaboration, a threat as well as a risk. Shift from direct threats to inherent risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ds 2003:34, pp. 20, 27–28</td>
<td>Terrorism, non-state actors, information technology, WMDs, vulnerabilities in infrastructure and modern societies. Long-term international political developments, climate change, and acute situations connected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ds 2004:30, pp. 42–43</td>
<td>Connection between political oppression, socio-economic conditions, ethnic and religious tensions, and terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. 2004/05:5, p. 31</td>
<td>Military resources, military security one important part of the security concept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ds 2006:1, pp. 17–18</td>
<td>Inherent unpredictability and uncertainty of security dangers, constant process of change. Reducing inherent vulnerabilities, preventive measures, long-term pre-emption of climate change and poverty important.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. 2007/08:92, pp. 7, 55</td>
<td>Agency for comprehensive societal safety and crisis management coordination formed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. 2008/09:140, pp. 11–12</td>
<td>Deactivated mandatory conscription, new employment structure, emphasis on Swedish military at home and abroad, swiftly employed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The security developments in Sweden during the first years of the 2000s are very much a continuation – and oversee the actual implementation – of the transformative shift in thinking about security that took place the preceding decade. It became increasingly clear that the scope of security could not be confined to any one domain or a few policy areas. Security became instead established as a cross-sectoral concept including even more of transboundary properties. Concerning the set of security dangers identified, they were more specified, and the suggested links between certain phenomena and the implications for security were clarified. This suggests an expansion of a risk security logic, with everything security-related becoming even more complex and uncertain (see also Liebetrau, this volume). This is analogous to what happened concerning the category of intentionality behind security dangers. It is arguably the same broad philosophy of security politics that underlies the texts during both periods, but during the 2000s the texts are much clearer as to the distinction between intentional and non-intentional security threats, and in acknowledging that both exist and need to be dealt with by security politics. Regarding locating threats and risks temporally and spatially, it is still to a large extent unclear as to how the security dangers are delimited in the texts. However, since the time and space dimensions are discussed more as a general point, including temporal connections between different security-related events and an emphasis on the lessening relevance of borders and the “national” part of security, the security concept evolved a step toward the risk logic during these years. Perhaps most interestingly, the focus on pre-emptive measures to reduce vulnerabilities and possible future security dangers increased during this period. The underlying notion of acting in the present to avoid possible harms in the future connects to the risk logic of security. The threat logic, driven by reactive measures and direct action toward security problems, however, was still present, although to a lesser extent. In summary, after the continued reforms during the 2000s, all the indicators tell us that the uncertain and open risk logic had gained ground in Swedish security thinking, although it is difficult to determine its precise relative weight compared to the threat logic. The important point is that both logics were clearly present, and that security thus had come to include temporal and spatial properties that go beyond traditional conceptions.

2013–2017: a new security logic?

The most recent defence bill was accepted by the Swedish parliament in 2015, and it was preceded by two reports from the defence commission that were directed to provide background analyses and recommendations for its content. The 2013 defence commission report and its account of Swedish security, threats, and risks does not differ in any relevant way from the view of security in the 2009 bill, other than the specific way in which they are
presented. The following quote is presented to illustrate the 2013 security concept:

The threats to our security cross borders and sectors. They can be terrorism, organized crime, disruptions in critical systems and flows, failing states, economic crisis, political and religious extremism, threats to democracy and rule of law, social alienation, migration streams, threats to values, climate change, natural disasters and pandemics, and armed attack. These threats are of varying force and in some cases characteristically highly diverse

(Ds 2013:33, p. 215, my translation)

As is evident, this security concept is arguably as broad as it gets, and the accounts in the report are otherwise similar to the texts from the late 2000s. Much of the content is also similar in the report from May 2014 with one main exception: the Russian annexation of Crimea, following deployment of military personnel, in February the same year. According to the report, it represents a break of the European security order and is an act of aggression that will require a re-evaluation of the security analysis, and the aggression is predicted to have long-term negative consequences for the EU-Russia relationship (Ds 2014:20, pp. 16, 21). Although the overall security threats and risks are similar to previous texts, and that the likelihood of an armed aggression against Sweden is determined to be unlikely, given the close to static condition of the guiding principles for security thinking for many years, this does suggest a significant shift going forward. Cyber security as a concept is given a more important position in this report and is used to describe antagonistic threats to information and communication systems and data storage servers. Not only is security seen to incorporate the functioning of these important services as has previously been established. It is also explicitly described that these systems need safeguarding to prevent vital information from falling into hostile hands, and it is in this context that cyber security becomes important (ibid., pp. 32–33).

Cyber security and the related concept of information warfare or information operations, designed to distract and affect a target through the dissemination of false or misleading information, are presented as central concepts in a challenging security environment in the government’s defence bill in 2015 (Prop. 2014/15:109, pp. 40–41). All the previously established long-term security challenges abroad and in the international development are in the bill, but they are not as central as in earlier texts. Noteworthy, among the thematic security threats identified, all are antagonistic security in nature (information warfare, cyber security, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction) (ibid., pp. 40–41). The only identifiable significant change in the security environment is the Russian aggression towards Ukraine, including Russia supporting irregular Ukrainian forces engaged in fighting with the Ukrainian army. The bill acknowledges that the Russian government made
use of conventional military assets, unconventional military strategies, and employed information warfare as a complement to the military aggression (ibid., p. 42). One conclusion is that the security situation has deteriorated and become more dangerous as a result of the Russian aggression (ibid., p. 11). Another conclusion is that Sweden must prepare to be affected by hybrid operations involving both conventional means and information warfare employed jointly, and that military aggression can be implemented with varying purposes and ideas (ibid., pp. 46, 55).

The overall threat and risk assessment is similar in the 2017 report from the defence commission compared to the 2014 version. It clarifies that cyber-attacks and information system incidents should be seen as possibly integrated events of an armed conflict and broadly emphasises the importance of digital issues for security. The report also goes further in specifically identifying the terrorist threat as being growing, and represented by radical Islamic, autonomous leftist and right-wing extremist groups (Ds 2017:66, p. 18). The Swedish security strategy presented by the government in January 2017 represents a very clear broad security perspective. All potential security dangers that have previously been accounted for in this chapter are identified, and each one includes a prevention or vulnerability dimension alongside a more active concrete reactive logic (Prime Minister’s Office, 2017 pp. 17–25). The threats are both external and internal, and the dependencies on supply flows, access to information, and the complexity associated with unpredictable security dangers make them challenging to control (ibid., pp. 5, 8).

Recognising this complexity and the very broad – and integrated – approach to security proposed by the strategy is the recommended way forward from the Swedish government. Military threats make out one category in the strategy while the military component was more prominent in the current defence bill, indicative of that the different texts serve different functions and audiences. If the security strategy represents a recognition of how both ideal-type logics can have a role to play for all identified security dangers, the institutional structure and the consensus-seeking purpose of the defence commission suggests that its reports also represent the political prioritisation of which security challenges are most crucial. From that perspective, we observed that there was indeed a change in priorities in 2014 and 2015, following the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Not only did the defence bill and the defence commission address this as the most influential event in European security in the last 25 years. It was also the most prioritised security problem in those texts. It becomes an especially striking shift in the context of widespread ideas about “permanent peace” having been prevalent with the political leadership only a few years earlier (Westberg, 2015, pp. 203–204). Security is clearly about many different policy areas and domains. There is also still a broad range of different security problems present in the accounts. However, due to the 2014–2015 change, one event (Russia’s military aggression) was given a more important
The focus on military aggression, terrorism, and cyber security attacks also suggests a shift toward an increased focus on intentional agents behind security dangers compared with the 2000s. There is no meaningful change concerning the time and space category. Security threats and risks remain elusive and unpredictable. The responses to security dangers are mixed and constituted by aspects from both security logics: pre-emption, resilience building, and swift reactive responses, depending on the nature of the situation and event. In sum, this demonstrates how the threat logic has become more present (again) during the last years, but given the widespread cohabitation with risk security, the picture is complicated. For instance, the focus on military force in 2014–2015 represents means (armed aggression) which are associated with the ideal-type threat logic, but where the conduct (resources, strategy, operations) are complex and partly associated with an ideal-type risk logic.

In order to get a better grasp of where we are and which ideas and underlying purposes that control what is going on, we would need to know more about the actual policies that are implemented and with what aims and implications. Based on the presentation in this chapter, the following security problems have been identified as the most important found in the texts: military aggression by a state, terrorism acts, cyber security and information attacks, migration flows, climate change and environmental disasters, diseases and pandemics, local and regional instability abroad, technical infrastructure and communication problems, and supply shortages of resources and energy. Judging from the last defence bill and defence commission report, the first three are presently the most emphasised security dangers. The return to territorial defence as a primary security issue since 2014 is consistent with the post-Crimea arguments of a return to geopolitical concerns for Europe and the US (Mead, 2014). This is consistent also with the arguments about a return to geopolitical considerations, or at least a revival of them, following 2014, which has meant a re-emphasis on territorial security in Europe (Raik, 2019). Broad, emerging security challenges going far beyond territorial security were if not a paradigm at least an assumption in parts of the field (Swain, 2013) which is now complicated in the Swedish case both by scholarly arguments about the return to territoriality, not least in the Nordic region (Åtland, 2016), and by the mixed empirical picture presented here. There is a dual or twofold structure in place, consciously, or otherwise designed in such a way, which includes security policies and actors focusing on both conventional threats and emerging risks of different sorts. This means that there is not one overall security logic or paradigm at work as we understand it.

Conclusion: towards a new security paradigm?

The findings result in three trends of relevance for Swedish security policy. First, there has been an expansion in the types of phenomena being
named as problems of security, relating to different policy areas. Second, it is striking to observe how security has become a goal and a problem for politics at large, from previously having been primarily attached to the defence sector. Third, risk language has made inroads in the security discourse, progressively over the years, alongside the still prioritised threat language. This is particularly the case for technical infrastructure matters and general developments abroad, whereas cyber security and certain aspects of military security retain properties connected with the threat logic. Indeed, what complicates the picture is that this change towards broadened security and a risk conceptualisation has happened while at the same time traditional security ideas have remained important as well. We therefore have to deal with an empirical context that has not “evolved” from one mode of security to something else. It is rather the case that we can see a broadening and deepening of security, including conceptualisations in terms of risk and a way of “doing” security which has to do with climate-related security challenges, technological vulnerabilities, global patterns of mobility, and the risk of terrorist acts.

Based on these results, it can be concluded, on the one hand, that traditional security thinking is still prevalent as one main logic for how national security politics pursues threats and risks. That we have a more complicated picture today does not mean that we should disregard the existential (albeit low risk) dangers to territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Granted, no other identified security problem than military aggression is recognised as having the potential to imminently endanger the continued existence of the Swedish state. However, the emphasis here must be placed on the “imminently” part, since many risks that are defined can surely be seen as severely threatening or putting at risk the functioning of Sweden as a political entity and the well-being of its population, although not in a clearly identifiable way and immediate sense.

On the other hand, the chapter has shown that Swedish security politics has changed to incorporate a risk logic alongside a threat logic, leading to an increase in risk security in the national security thinking in Sweden. While security policy is clearly about territorial security and national sovereignty through military means and resources, it is about much more than that. It is about economic, societal, and health security as well. It takes the shape of risk in addressing the always non-fixed nature of security problems and the possible consequences of climate change, natural disasters, potential terrorists, and technological disruptions. It recognises how many of the risks that endanger Swedish security can never be controlled or indeed even completely identified, and suggests a way of thinking about, living with, and dealing with security that is existentially distinct from how we politically relate to defence planning issues. It shows that security politics has taken on properties that do not operate according to the assumed principles of traditional security, with clearly identifiable threats that can be eliminated and society thereafter resuming “normalcy” before the next acute problem arises. We can instead see how security politics in part is configured in terms
of a continuous state of managing potential and uncertain security problems of different types across several policy sectors, in the name of security.

If the concept of risk in security politics during the Cold War was instrumentally deployed as a means of assessing probabilities of adversaries taking action – particularly concerning nuclear weapons – and attempting to estimate the consequences of those actions (Lundgren, 2013), risk security in the sense that it is employed here suggests a more opaque logic. Today, risk security would seem to encompass generally harmful events, military and otherwise. This shows how the concept of security has more layers now than retrospective understandings of Cold War security included. The risk concept is more a way of thinking about and “doing” security, rather than as an instrument for assessing the likelihood of something happening.

The security apparatus now consists of multiple actors, technologies, and mandates assigned to dealing with a complex range of issues, which break down many of the conceptual distinctions that have previously upheld security policy as such, but also the two separate logics employed in this chapter. We are dealing with external threats as well as with internal risks, with intentional hostile agents as well as non-agent-based dangers, with state actors and non-state actors, with military as well as non-military, with identified actors and non-identifiable agents, with threats that are concrete and taking place in a physical space, and with risks that can take place on unknown multiple locations, or in cyberspace, all with varying degrees of predictability. Risk security, in other words, increasingly targets individuals or groups, as either potential dangers or objects of protection, “inside” the realm of governance. However, at the same time, traditional policies related to more or less concrete and war-related threats from the “outside” of the state have remained in place or been only temporarily suppressed. The implications from this suggest that governments will engage with an obscure security environment, where they claim to be addressing all kinds of risks and threats, but where ultimately priorities will be made which privileges some concerns over others, through decision-making processes deserving of public scrutiny.

Policy priorities related to Swedish total defence that became taken off the agenda after the Cold War have resurfaced or been re-established with, in some cases, only slight adjustments and updates. Indeed, new risks, old threats, as well as hybrid and in-between phenomena are now supposed to be handled by what can be referred to as a “total defence 2.0”; that is, a “holistic” apparatus covering a spectrum of dangers, antagonistic forces, and suspicious individuals, a system for targeting a multiplicity of both threats and risks – without conflating them into one and the same. It can be concluded, therefore, that Swedish security policy today is rendered by a logic and rationale that is not entirely open-ended, nor strictly dichotomous, but if anything, dual and twofold. What was once understood as “total” in the traditional, Cold War era model of Swedish “total defence” has in a sense taken on a new, expanded, and far more complex meaning.
“Total” does no longer refer to mobilising the different branches of domestic defence, but rather refers to how virtually all societal phenomena may be considered “dangerous” and therefore a potential “security matter” to be handled by a “security professional” and sorted into frameworks for risk management or threat mitigation.

Security politics have, in a way, become the new “normal politics” today, in the sense that almost all policy areas in different ways have come to relate to – that is, support or undermine – the constitution of, planning for, and operation of both societal and territorial forms of security. Territorial security did not turn to societal security after the Cold War, and societal security did not return to territorial security after 2014. Perhaps, with the duality and twofold-ness of contemporary security work, the total defence 2.0 model that is presently being planned in Sweden may signify an emerging form of “socio-territorial security”.

Broader issues of concern for security studies that we need to know more about relate to the prevalence and co-existence of threat and risk logics in other settings. To what extent have similar developments and “returns” to territorial logics unfolded in the rest of the Nordic region? How have other Nordic governments responded to the Swedish (re)turn to defence thinking? With the coalescence of EU member states around new forms of European defence cooperation, how does this affect the dynamics and solidarities within the Nordic “community”? The shifts observed in this chapter indeed problematise what “Nordic security” means and does, and point towards the need for continued critical attention towards the evolution of security policies, not only in Sweden, but across the Nordic region and the rest of Europe.

Notes

1 The ministry of defence is the branch of the Government Offices of Sweden formally behind all released government bills, defence commission reports, and the public inquiry reports related to security and defence issues that are included as empirical material in this chapter. However, the content of the defence commission and the public inquiry reports are not the same as the view of the ministry of defence or the government. For reasons of clarity and in order to separate between the different empirical documents cited, the empirical material from the ministry of defence is consistently cited in-text by their designated document type and registry number in the public records in addition to the year it was published. “Ds 2017:66” refers to a document (departementsskrivelse) published by the Government Offices of Sweden in 2017, and 66 identifies the specific document. In this chapter, all sources of this type are defence commission reports. Cites that refer to “Prop.” followed by the parliamentary year in which it was published (i.e. 2000/2001, which covers the period between the opening of parliament in September each year, lasting well into the following year) and a number refer to a government bill (proposition) and their specific registry number. Lastly, cites that begin with “SOU” refer to a public inquiry report (Statens Offentliga Utredningar). All sources are found in the reference list, in which the in-text citation information is found in the title of each document.
2 See also Larsson (this volume).

3 Permanent Structured Cooperation.

4 This chapter serves as an important complement to Larsson’s reading of the post-Cold War reform period in Sweden, since it focuses not on tracing the socio-historical production of security knowledge and authority at the bureaucratic and agency level, but rather on mapping in detail the discursive shifts in security policy at the parliamentary and governmental level.

5 A New defence bill is expected to be proposed from the government to the Swedish parliament in late 2020.

References


Official documents


Part IV

Conclusions
11 Conclusion

Convergence and divergence in Nordic societal securities

*Sebastian Larsson and Mark Rhinard*

**Introduction**

This book set out to explore how different Nordic countries, namely, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Denmark, discursively and practically treat the question of societal safety and security. We explored how discourses and practices related to the security of Nordic societies transformed in both similar and different ways in the region during the post-Cold War era, from the beginning of the 1990s to the 2000s. Moreover, we departed from the crude assumption that, because of their broadly similar social welfare systems, these countries also display a common approach to domestic security. Our focus was on the publicly deployed concepts that governments adopt in the pursuit of security. And we critically assessed the origin, development, and effect of those concepts. We built our study around the notion of ‘societal security’, a concept present in all societies but at different levels of institutionalisation, as an analytical starting point. From there we found both signs of convergence and patterns of divergence, and above all a set of constantly changing and overlapping conceptual discourses with quite significant implications for how security is approached in different countries.

By way of conclusion, this chapter draws out the main findings of the book as a whole. It begins by outlining key similarities in discourses and practices, before identifying areas of clear divergence. It then reflects upon some broader themes elicited by this book, not least regarding the gradual trajectories taken by these concepts, the politics behind their emergence, and the values reflected – for better or for worse – by their adoption. We conclude by offering three paths for future research on Nordic societal security.

**Convergence and divergence in Nordic societal security**

The impetus behind this book came from the casual assumption, present in some security writings (Hamilton 2006; NordForsk 2013), that Nordic safety and security policies reflect broadly similar conceptional moorings: wide views of threats, society itself as a central referent object, and a holistic form of security that mirrors comprehensive social welfare systems. The Nordic
origins of ‘societal security’ seem to reflect some degree of commonality in this respect. We set out to explore these assumptions and asked whether convergence or divergence characterises Swedish, Norwegian, Finnish, and Danish approaches to security. Perhaps unsurprisingly, we found a degree of both. A brief overview of similarities and differences serves as a brief – albeit too brief – summary of the findings in the chapters.

**Lines of convergence**

To be sure, all countries and issues examined in this book confirmed the tendency in the Nordic region to embrace rather commodious security concepts. Whether ‘societal’ security in Sweden and Norway, ‘comprehensive’ security in Finland, the broad use of ‘resilience’ in multiple countries, or the widened discourse of security ‘uncertainties’ in Denmark, the trend is clear. These countries all pushed for a shift in security thinking towards concepts with an ‘all-hazards’ and ‘whole-of-society’ scope. Of course, this is not limited to the Nordic region. ‘Broad’ security concepts swept the globe at the end of the Cold War (Stritzel and Vuori 2016). But the countries studied in this book tended to so with particular gusto, using them to rethink and reorganise security and defence post-Cold War and post-11 September 2001.

Indeed, this might be explained in part by another cross-Nordic similarity: namely, the shared history of comprehensive, inclusive, and pan-sectoral (‘total’) defence planning during the Cold War. Particularly in Sweden and Finland, and to a significant degree in Norway and Denmark, peacetime planning for invasion and war was the *modus operandi* for governments during the latter half of the 20th century. Hence, in the Nordic countries, where a wide spectrum of actors – from government agencies to local municipalities and businesses to individual households and citizens – were to be included in the operation of both civil and military forms of defence planning, the subsequent leap to a similarly wide and inclusive (‘societal’) approach to post-Cold War security was more straightforward than it might initially appear.

The Nordic countries’ defence heritage also involved immaterial forms of defence planning and war preparedness. As observed in some chapters in this volume, defence models necessarily had to include mechanisms for generating a ‘will’ within the population to participate in defending the country. Captured by slightly different terms – e.g. ‘psychological’ defence in Sweden, ‘spiritual’ defence in Finland – the Nordic countries developed this approach not simply as nationalistic ‘propaganda’ to mobilise volunteers, but as a way to safeguard against enemy disinformation campaigns and foreign intelligence operations while simultaneously building a widespread trust and belief in the total defence enterprise among citizens (Larsson, and Hyvönen and Juntunen, respectively, this volume). This, we may reasonably suggest, can be strongly linked to the observation that current-day Nordic societies generally tend to have a ‘great public trust in the authorities’ compared to many other countries (NordForsk 2013, 15).
The general acceptance and inclusiveness in security, moreover, makes the Nordic societies and their approach to security stand out to some extent in relation to other regions and countries. In the US, for instance, where the ‘homeland’ security paradigm has dominated ever since the start of the so-called ‘war against terrorism’ era, citizen participation in everyday policing and surveillance follows a rationale driven perhaps more by fear and less by trust, and is typically forced upon the population via various public information campaigns such as ‘if you see something, say something’ (Larsson 2017; Petersen and Tjalve 2013). As noted in this volume, Nordic approaches to counterterrorism are more generally rooted in the notion of social welfare, and the terrorist threat is perceived as not necessarily some inherently violent and uncontrollable phenomenon, but an issue that may be prevented and managed by means of socialisation, integration, and caretaking (see Jore, this volume). Indeed, the discourse of ‘homeland security’ – including the connotations and implications that come with it in a US context – did not catch on in the Nordic region, as these countries did not to the same extent or in the same organised manner as many other Western states make a ‘hard turn’ towards coercive or potentially rights-infringing security practices aimed at monitoring certain individuals and preempting would-be terrorists. Rather, as the Nordic countries moved into the 2000s, they either implicitly or explicitly centred security on society – its vital functions, its ‘fabric’ – and not the ‘homeland’.

**Lines of divergence**

However, when it came to specifying or defining the already vague notion of ‘society’ for purposes of security work – e.g. when it came to further conceptualising and operationalising the notion of societal security – the Nordic countries began to diverge significantly. Societal security ranged from being used doctrinally in official policy (Norway), to being used in practice but in combination with a range of related concepts such as ‘crisis management’ (Sweden), to being ignored in favour of the similar-sounding ‘comprehensive’ security concept which essentially captured the same issues and solutions (Finland), to being rejected but nonetheless implicitly at work when conventional security actors were forced to rethink their organisation and mission in the post-Cold War period (Denmark).

Not only was the notion of societal security received rather differently by the respective Nordic governments’ ministries and agencies, but even within the few countries where it became institutionalised, like Norway, it was still never clearly defined. Or rather, to the extent that definitions did surface in official discourse, they continuously and subtly changed over time and became reinterpreted, reformulated, reworked (see the chapter by Morsut, this volume). This illustrates how language, discourses, concepts – particularly concepts pertaining to the contested and politically sensitive area of security – are always contingent and always conditioned by the social relations and structures through which actors operate in practice. Conceptually, if not
formally, societal security may have emerged to an extent in all Nordic countries, but it did so without a common definition. Rather, it is more accurately concluded that multiple societal securities emerged after the Cold War and in the 2000s that all referred to slightly different things, implicated different actions in practice, and did not always engage the same actors or focus on the same threats and risks. Societal security is thus conceptually fluid, open-ended, and at times, it has arguably worked as a kind of ‘enabler’ or empty signifier which practitioners, politicians, scholars, and even private security and defence companies may fill with content in order to reach a particular goal or address a certain opportunity (Hall 1993; see also Larsson 2019).

Thus, any argument that a ‘Nordic model for societal security’ exists homogeneously at a regional level and in multiple Nordic countries, covering their entire populations and governance systems, seems at odds with the empirical findings revealed in this book project. As seen throughout the chapters, more nuance and diversity has emerged than what can be captured through the notion of a single Nordic model for societal security. In the respective analyses, covering both country cases and particular issues and processes, we saw a striking width and breadth of security discourses, practices, instruments, strategies, and actors. We saw how this heterogeneity stemmed from the Nordic countries’ related but still unique histories, their related but still diverging political trajectories in recent years, their similar but still slightly different public administration systems. We noticed how societal security became promoted in contexts like the Nordic Council as a way to reinforce a high-level, political sense of community and togetherness, despite the fact that the Nordic countries have participated and committed rather differently in military alliances like NATO and supranational institutions like the EU. Societal security is less of a coherent ‘Nordic model’, we may conclude, and more of a loose yet sometimes efficient work label, a slightly disjointed and often top-down form of security narrative, and finally, an imaginary of, or political vision for, Nordic security cooperation.

Central themes in the study of Nordic societal security

The chapters of this book illuminated the rich features of Nordic security thinking and practice. In addition to the previous section’s conclusions regarding convergences and divergences in the Nordic countries’ approach to societal security, additional key themes have also emerged that are worth lifting up for further discussion.

First, the movement of security concepts across space and time, touched upon by all the chapters, is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The notion of societal security emerged – indeed, was made possible – by the historical conceptual apparatus that preceded it and the social networks that co-evolved with it. This is clear for Sweden and Norway, which made a decisive shift towards societal security even though that concept still shares
a kinship to its predecessor: the totalising and cross-society notion of ‘total
defence’. These evolutionary traits appear in the Finnish case, too, although
Finland’s comprehensive security ‘model’ bears a much closer family resem-
b lance to its wartime, militarised ancestor (similarly termed ‘total defence’).
Denmark has not taken on board the societal security concept per se, but
it is clear that threat perceptions and responses have similarly widened –
from known and measured threats to a wide panoply of various insecurities
requiring action. Yet this took place gradually, over time, and within a his-
torical trajectory unique to Denmark.

Second, the evolution of supposedly new security concepts, in virtually
all cases examined in this book, is complex and far from linear. They take
shape through processes that involve not only agents and structures, but
also intention and accident. The end of the Cold War prompted a search for
new security paradigms, especially those based on non-antagonistic risks,
but the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US brought a new set
of priorities and concepts. Centrally placed actors may promote a certain
vision of security, but deeply rooted norms and institutional traditions can
stymie their efforts. The evolution of societal security, especially as docu-
mented by Larsson (this volume), can be traced but only by widening the an-
alytical lens to include the ‘social’ – the mix of actors, their relations, norms,
epistemes, and mindsets or paradigms that co-create concepts over time.
The straightforward image of a problem being neatly framed and carried
into policy battles, as some research suggests, cannot be found in the rich,
multitudinous factors shaping concept evolution in this book.

Third, the notion of societal security is far from objective or divorced from
political processes. Indeed, as several chapters allude to in this book, soci-
etal security is itself politics: both the creation of the term, which privileges
certain interests and suggests certain values worth protecting, and the use of
the term, which is used to prop up certain power structures and delegitimise
others. In the Finnish case, for instance, it is clear that traditional defence
communities within that country wished to promote a modern version of
traditional defence concepts – presumably to keep control over a politically
meaningful and resource-rich issue. In the Swedish case, a small group of
‘pracademics’, academically trained policy advisors, crossed national and
supranational borders to promote the opposite cause: the conceptualisation
of security as both relating to and coming from society itself rather than
territories or militaries. This would potentially wrest control over the ques-
tion from traditional military authorities and redistribute resources across
government. As the previous point made clear, such instrumental efforts are
far from straightforward. Not only does the movement and interaction of
social groups across fields (Bourdieu 1982) defy prediction, but the success
of any such effort is bound to be disrupted by any number of countervailing
factors. Nevertheless, as is well known in critical concept analysis (Beren-
skoetter 2016), the supposed content of concepts reveals essential struggles
of ‘who wins and who loses’ in politics.
Fourth, the studies in this book show that the study of security concepts is closely linked to conceptions of societal values. The emergence of widened meanings of security suggests a desire – implicit, and perhaps misguided – to make society itself the referent object of security. It is an embracing notion, perhaps inspired by Nordic welfare state traditions as we discuss in this book’s introduction, or by an expansive notion of the social contract. Whatever the case, to cast the notion of societal security (which in several Nordic contexts goes even further to include ‘safety’) as such is to make a statement as to what is worth holding dear. The epilogue to this volume by Peter Burgess reflects directly on the question of values vis-à-vis security. It argues that societal security, as a concept, serves as a vanguard that draws security studies into a deeper set of puzzles. The notion of a society worth securing emphasises notions of community, for instance, and thereby leads the discussion into questions of inclusion and exclusion, and of individual perceptions of insecurity.

Indeed, the link between societal security and insecurity emerges in various chapters of this book. While societal security may be closely linked to values, and although one proposed value, especially one expressed by practitioners, is to ostensibly ‘safeguard society’, another dynamic is at play: the diffusion through society of a general sense of insecurity. This has been documented largely through political sociology approaches to security. Didiér Bigo, for instance, has insisted that security functions like a ‘tipping edge’ in how security, mobility, freedom, and fundamental rights for some always entails insecurity, interception, coercion, and suspicion-making for others (Bigo 2013; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008). ‘Security’ cannot, therefore, be seen as a positive state or some ultimate end goal, but must be understood as a politics, a practice, and a process of (in)securitisation which per definition includes and values some while excluding others. Jef Huysmans goes even further to suggest that:

security is a political practice that is defined through its tensions with the democratic organisation of political life. Democracy is a political stake in security practice, not simply because of fundamental rights being violated in the name of security but because security practice inherently organises social and political relations around enemies, risks, fear, anxiety. When insecurities pervade how we relate to our neighbours, how we perceive international politics, how governments formulate politics, at stake is not our security but our democracy.

(Huysmans 2014, 4)

Liberty and rights cannot be ‘balanced’ against security: they are fundamentally and forever at odds with each other, according to Huysmans. Societal security, in this view, thus becomes a paradox. It becomes a practice of removing or suspending the democratic politics that make up society. Societal security, if taken to its limit, becomes an insecurity for society itself.
Fifth, and somewhat awkwardly for a book aiming to provide a current ‘state of play’, Nordic security discourses continue to evolve. The latest phase of development mentioned in several chapters is the recent, at the time of writing, shift back towards conventional threats and territorial security thinking in both academia and practice. A number of events, from the Russian invasion of the Crimea to sabre-rattling in the South China Sea, and from US assassinations of Iranian leaders to Chinese power games, portend a supposed ‘return to geopolitics’ (Mead 2014). In some respects, this shift draws the military back to the core of discussions regarding what societal security is, and what it means. It also represents a form of resistance in the dynamics underpinning conceptual politics in all Nordic countries. The extent to which traditional security thinking can fit into the current widened approaches in the Nordic region is subject to each country’s specificities. Since military actors were never fully displaced from security policies in any Nordic country, any journey back to ‘total defence’ models may be quicker than we expect. Yet that journey, we might surmise, would be longer for Sweden and Norway, for instance, who displaced military security actors, institutions, and ideas further to the periphery than in Finland, where comprehensive security represents a new form of military-style preparedness and resilience thinking. Whatever the length of the journey, the conceptual apparatus to emerge is likely to be – and empirical evidence from some of the chapters is beginning to show – some hybrid form of security that might be called ‘new total defence’ (see also Stiglund, this volume). In any case, these dynamics provide a trenchant reminder that security concepts evolve, shift direction, reorder benefactors and beneficiaries, and shape outcomes in ever-changing ways – and the Nordic region is no different.

Next steps in the study of Nordic societal securities

Despite the supposed return to geopolitical threat constructions, societal security as a concept and ostensible goal is not going away. Particularly in the area of security research and development at the EU level, the terminology of societal security is firmly rooted. It was proposed and established as one of the core ‘themes’ in the two recent EU framework programmes guiding research grants, including the European Security Research Programme (ESRP). Between 2007 and 2020, billions of euro, given to universities and research institutes as well as to private security and defence companies in transnational consortiums, were devoted to technologies for crisis management as well as surveillance, infrastructure protection, policing, counterterrorism, and border and migration control. The ‘Secure Societies’ theme thus expanded on the EU’s idea of ‘internal’ security cooperation and policies in the area of freedom, security, and justice, and, it can be added, contributed to the shift in priorities towards border security in recent years (Hayes 2009, 72; see also Jones 2017; Martin-Mazé 2020). The role that the notion of societal security continues to play within the EU policy and funding system, for
both research and practice, therefore demands further research. In particular, it is worth pursuing how the concept will impact upon, and potentially intermingle with, the upcoming European defence research programme and related investment funds and EU defence policies.

Second, and relatedly, what will be future of societal security from a policy perspective? What effects will societal security thinking and strategising have in a future with increased focus on geopolitics? Who will care about the safety, security, and continued functioning of societies, if the political class claims that the very existence and sovereignty of Nordic countries is under threat? Will societal security and related concepts be swept under the rug as the Nordic governments start to revisit policies for defence planning and war preparedness and again increase investments into defence materiel and armaments production? Most likely, the answer to the latter question will be ‘no’. Recent geopolitical developments have led to a revival of the ‘total defence’ concept, and voices from across the region speak of a ‘new total defence’ or even a ‘total defence 2.0’. The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) is one such key organisation which has started to push for an increasingly synchronised and modernised regional total defence, not excluding the many valuable lessons learned in the post-Cold War security era (NORDEFCO 2015, 2016). It remains to be observed and studied, therefore, precisely which role societal security will play in a geopolitically oriented and potentially militarised future. Will it be displaced or consumed by national defence priorities? Will it be revived in the form of a new civil defence? Will the safety dimension of societal security (emergency management, non-human crises, environmental hazards, etc.) become a separate area of policy and practice? How will the hybrid threat of, say, invading armies in combination with asymmetrical attacks and cyberthreats be constructed in more detail, and how will security policy and governance solutions be defined?

Finally, in such an impending political future, what will be the theoretical implications for the analytical use of societal security? How can a continued analysis and critique of societal security be refined, opened up, multiplied? How can critical perspectives on societal security be related to, or combined with, critical perspectives on the military (Stavrianakis and Stern 2018)? As discussed by Stiglund (this volume) as well as by Larsson (2019), it may be time to start questioning the suitability of terms like societal, comprehensive, internal, or homeland securities in a world of resurging militarisation and militarism. As Stiglund proposes, the ‘dual’ (in)security logic that is now emerging in contemporary policy discourse – which draws simultaneously on threat and risk languages and involves both external and internal security actors – may be understood as ‘socio-territorial security’. However, whatever new concept arises and is ‘put to work’, it is crucial that we do not permit theoretical terms to conflate, or allow diverging empirical patterns to coalesce and converge into a single, sweeping concept. For the study of
Nordic societal security to remain relevant and intellectually rigorous, it must also remain reflexive, curious, and willing and able to adjust its focus. By showing that even one oft-used term in relation to modern security provision – societal security – is more aptly described as multiple ‘societal securities’, in different contexts across the Nordic region, we hope this book will support that point and encourage further investigation into the many shapes, changing meanings, and multiple implications of security in the world today.

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12 Epilogue

Security without society?

J. Peter Burgess

22 July 2011

At 3:25 P.M. on 22 July 2011 a terrorist’s bomb went off in a van parked immediately in front of the Norwegian government headquarters in downtown Oslo. The building housed the Prime Minister’s offices and the Ministry of Justice. The shockwave caused by the explosion broke windows and shook buildings in a radius of up to several hundred meters. The explosion killed 8 people outright and injured 209, 12 of them serious, and caused heavy damage to several buildings in the quarter.

At Utøya, a 10 hectare island located in the Tyri Fjord 38 kilometres northwest of Oslo, the same terrorist, who had departed from Oslo centre in a second vehicle just prior to the explosion, arrived at the ferry dock just over an hour later. Dressed in a police uniform he hailed the island ferry and arrived on Utøya. He immediately approached a small group of people near the quay, including the camp manager and the off-duty police officer hired for security. After a brief exchange he shot them both dead, then began a 90-minute shooting spree before surrendering to the police. Of the over 600 people on the island 68 were killed outright, and 110 were injured, 55 of them grave. One additional victim died in hospital two days later (NRK, 2011).

Dagsrevyen, the centrepiece evening news programme of the Norwegian Broadcasting Company, went on the air as scheduled at 7:00 P.M., only 3.5 hours after the explosion in the centre of Oslo. The opening vignette showed scenes of damage and destruction in the streets of the capital. Windows were blown out in entire buildings, fire and smoke still appeared from broken and fragmented walls and gaping window frames. Images of ambulances, emergency vehicles, and rescue personnel traversed the silent frame. A gurney silently appeared carrying a disfigured victim. As the voice-over began, footage of a middle-aged light-haired woman appeared, her face completely bathed in her own blood, moving to safety with the help of a second woman holding her hand. The image would have been petrifying coming from any distant war-zone. To viewers of the evening news of this provincial nation, schooled in solidarity, accustomed to consensus politics and low-crime society, and a self-affirmed ‘culture of peace’, it was utterly shocking.
The news anchor began: ‘The situation in Oslo is very uncertain for police, and police ask people to stay away from the centre and avoid large gatherings of people’. Indeed, the situation was so unclear in many respects, with only fragments of confirmed information available. Was the attack over? Were more perpetrators involved? Were there still elements to the attack that were yet unknown? What was the link between the two events? Uncertainty seemed total, about what in fact had happened, about what was continuing to happen, about how many and who were hurt or killed, about who was responsible, and about the complex chain of events still unfolding on the island of Utøya. All of this unfolded live on the most watched programme on national television.

All these questions were to remain unanswered for some time. Finally at 8:00 P.M., 1 hour after the beginning of the news programme the Prime Minister appeared on television from an undisclosed location, speaking to a reporter, clearly shaken, nervous, tense, perspiring, and grave. Despite the extraordinary situation and uncanny ambiance, the Prime Minister firmly formulated a principle that would be repeated over the course of the next days and weeks, and which would become the hinge to the question of liberal approaches to illiberalism in many settings across the world:

\[
\text{it is important to not let fear take the overhand. We want in times exactly like these to stand up for what we believe, an open society, a society where political activity can take place in safety without threats, and where violence will not frighten us away from normal activity} \\
\text{NRK, 2011).}
\]

For the next four hours of the broadcast, the strange dialectic of certainty and uncertainty cruelly played out: the more one knew, the more the scope of the unknown grew. The details of the horrific attacks fed an economy of longing for knowledge and, more gravely, for understanding what was happening. Neither the experts nor government figures were able to say who the enemies were, what they wanted, and how or to what degree they had done damage. Slowly, over the course of the night and the next days, a more pathos-filled question began to appear on the lips of both citizens and expert commentators: the question of ‘why?’ Why would anyone want to hurt us? What have we done? Of what are we guilty in the eyes of the perpetrators?

Can ‘societal security’ as a concept or as a toolbox help us to navigate this complex social, political, cultural, moral, spiritual territory? This book presents evidence that it can.

**Modelling Nordic societal security**

A plausible social scientific path to exploring the societal correlate of any concept or phenomenon – ‘security’, among others – is to chart its variation across a range of empirical values, contexts, settings, (‘dependent variables’).
On this methodological argument, and before asking more culturally sensitive questions about the ‘nature’ or the ‘character’ of Nordic societies, the present volume presents a valuable exercise in collecting contributions about and around the concept of Nordic societal security. The research groups at the origin of these chapters have sustained a multi-year dialogue about research on societal security, understood on more or less uniform set of criteria, about a set of more or less consensually accepted objects (Larsson and Rhinard, this volume). Thus, Larsson traces Swedish societal security thinking in a period of civil defence reforms and threat reconstructions. Morsut charts the parallel evolution of the concept of ‘samfunnssikkerhet’ in Norwegian public policy, which for reasons that are clarified in her contribution, she leaves untranslated. Valtonen and Branders present and analyse the evolution of the Finnish ‘comprehensive security model’. Liebetrau analyses the theoretical mutation of societal security thinking toward a deeper concern with uncertainty within the Danish defence. Others place societal security in a constellation of other concepts. Juntunen and Hyvönen offer a transversal mapping of a security concept (‘resilience’) that enacts a kind of resistance to the Norwegian and Swedish historical trend toward harmonisation of societal security thinking in institutional practices. For Jore it is correlated with the parallel discourse of the terrorist radicalisation and de-radicalisation. In the Swedish sub-case, Stiglund usefully correlates it with the rising and ever-evolving discourse of risk. As Villumsen Berling and Lund Petersen show, the Nordic region is one in which the concept of societal security is far from dominant, and where a significantly politicised concept such as resilience in fact has more analytic traction.

In short, the project of capturing the Nordic model can, on the one hand, be understood in a nearly observational mode as an answer to the question ‘how is the idea of societal security used in the Nordic countries?’ However as Larsson and Rhinard show, each in his own way, the concept of Nordic societal security does not bear out this scientific innocence, but is rather the issue of political processes that ironically might have been interpreted as an expression of Nordic societal insecurity and the search to fortify the meaning, legitimacy, and singularity of the Nordic.

Since the mid-20th century the concept of a ‘Nordic model’ has had a progressive social democratic aura about it. The perceived success of social welfare models, minimal earning inequality, low crime rates, strong norms of gender parity, and consistently high scores on popularised ‘happiness’ indexes – Finland, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Sweden rank 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7, respectively, in the 2019 World Happiness Report (Helliwell et al., 2019) – have contributed to a kind of Nordic mythology (Aylott, 2014; Brandal et al., 2013; Hilson, 2008). Supported by the good moral standing with which the Nordic communist and social democratic political parties emerged from the rubble of the Second World War, 20th-century industrialisation and globalisation processes were shepherded with strong centralised economies and robust labour unions. Despite the derisive cultural critique
of some, like Witoszek’s *The Origin of the “Goodness Regime”* (2011) and the right-wing complaints of the “overbearing kindness” (*snillisme*) toward immigrant communities (NTB, 2016), the myth of the Nordic model has flourished, becoming a cottage industry for Nordic ‘reputation management’. The legend of the Nordic model makes for good geopolitics and international finance. The Nordic model is good business and good politics.

Something like a Nordic model did indeed emerge after the Second World War, characterised by close cooperation between social democratic political parties and the blue-collar trade unions, well-functioning multi-party systems, a consensual approach to policy making, systematic consultations across societal sectors, centralised systems of collective bargaining, active role of the state in market regulation, and the personalisation of relations among the political elites (Arter, 1999; Kvist and Fritzell, 2011; Kvist and Greve, 2011). In short, the Nordic countries are thought to share a pragmatic approach to governing one based on personal relations, a closely knit governing and bureaucratic class, shared values, and an informal, customary-based approach to policy-making and political problem-solving.

Similar qualities characterise the more or less shared structures and customs of welfare-state economies. Its origins are frequently traced to the Depression era book by Marquis W. Childs, *Sweden: The Middle Way*, which from Sweden’s position of neutrality during Second World War situated Sweden socio-economically between the destitution of US capitalism and the overreach of Soviet communism (Childs, 1936). The robust pragmatic model of governance then underwrites the components of the Nordic welfare state, characterised by citizenship-based social rights, strong or monopoly public sector role in the planning of public services, comprehensive social-policy provision, strong income distribution based on explicitly ideologies of social equality (Arter, 1999; Dølvik, 2007; Greve et al., 2016).

This chapter was opened by evoking the 22/7 Norway attacks to suggest that, while there is considerable interest in this volume and elsewhere in exploring the origins and institutional trajectory of the concept of societal security, these studies tell only part of the story. In the Oslo/Utøya case, they tell us little about the spiritual wave that washed over Norway in the hours, days, weeks, even years after the attacks of 22 July 2011, a wave that touched the other Nordic countries and the rest of the world as well. It cannot account for moral life of Nordic culture and of those who witness, remember, or fear violence, either close at hand or at distance. It does not bring us closer to understanding the creation and evolution of *community* through, around, and within the experience of danger. It does not fully consider the close but ever-changing relation between the experience of security and that of community, that a community is both always under threat and as a fundamental security-giving force. It does not search out correlation between values and life. It does not account for the forces at work to transform human energies – fear, anger, sadness – into political expression. It cannot help us to better grapple with the scientific pretences that seem to be our only tools for
analysing the experience of the proximity of death, of association with those that are gone, or of the Nordic values shared with a killer.

**Non-societal ways of securing society**

In all fairness, the contributions to this book have not done these things because they have not sought to. They have had other valid and valuable objects to attend to. And yet, as this epilogue will try to show, with the social scientific foundations of societal security laid, there is a considerable horizon that is now opening to understand societal security as a problem for the human sciences, as a cultural, ethical, psychoanalytical, and even spiritual question.

Perspectives like this would help us to understand the Oslo and Utøya attacks, and to better explain the radical evolution that has taken place in societal security thinking in the Nordic countries and elsewhere nearly a decade after, and how the discourses surrounding them have transformed themselves into a kind of instrumental security governance: logistical questions, boats and helicopters, radios and databases, traffic patterns, engineering methods, chains of command, organisational procedures, institutional communication, accountability, and emergency powers.

Forgotten is the nature of insecurity of not only that day, but of the days, weeks, and months following it, the residual insecurity that lives on in the hearts and minds of Norwegians and others. Gone is the memory of the immediate lived insecurity of that day and today, the way it reached into the personal experiences of individual lives, how both fear, comfort, courage, and resolve grew out of people and their relations with other people. The fear felt by Norwegians and others that day was not only for life, but for a way of life, a culture, a self-image, for individual and collective values. This was proclaimed over and over again, but with gradually decreasing regularity, in the wake of the attacks. This was an attack against ‘us’, it was said, against who ‘we’ are, what we believe, our way of life, etc. It transcended the loss and suffering of the immediate victims. The threat was to something that lived before and lives on after. Also long forgotten is the uncanny realisation, particularly in the immediate aftermath, that society itself was by far the most meaningful resource. Also misunderstood, misplaced, and mistaken is the immediate awareness for anyone who was present in Norway during the aftermath that the unparalleled source of security of Norwegians was – and of course is still – society itself.

Lived insecurity is of course the only insecurity there is. It is only by a ruse of language that we speak of the insecurity of inanimate things. A bridge, a railroad line, or an oil platform is insecure only in the sense that it is imbued with lived insecurity. Only in the sense that the steel and concrete is part of human relations, not as a ‘function’, but as material imbedding of life and social relations. As much as pundits and scientists alike will argue that a bridge, a railroad line, or an oil platform is an object of societal security,
this can only become meaningful once we discover their social function. If the concept of societal security has so far done good work, it still holds the potential to do more.

For, at the risk of appearing trivial: there is societal insecurity only, well, if society is insecure.

Where does one start to ask and answer the question of ‘society’ in societal security? Sorting out, documenting, and analysing what actually takes place in a given event; what the ‘facts’ are; what the precise circumstances were; and are the chain of events, the direction of the causality, and the identity of the legal subjects to be ascribed legal responsibility, these are the questions for first-line forensic analysis of an event. Such first-order legal protocols require only an entirely de-personalised narrative of the episode, a series of actions and events that together form a juridical package of responsibility and eventually legally determined guilt, and that can be attributed to any legal subject, attached like an external legal appendage to the legal subject.

The Norwegian case of 22 July 2011 demonstrates that the life-giving virtues of societal security are everything but material, and suggests that security takes a far more fundamental form than ‘object-security’ and should be construed as more than the sum of its material functions. This insight, which will be fleshed out in what follows, can offer a real supplement to current mainstream approaches to societal security. A truly societal approach can generate a security vocabulary that fills the gaps left by the neopositivist assumption that politics is nothing more than the sum of all political utterances, that functionalism is the aggregate of all functions, that insecurity can be adequately captured as the aggregation of all threats, or that security could ever be provided to a society by preventing the destruction of the collection of all material things to which society is attached. If, on the assumption that insecurity is identical to the sum of all threats, we were indeed able to imagine and then set in place measures necessary to eliminate these threats, if societal security were understood as a terminal process, with a finite, totalisable, objective end-state of security zero, then this end-state would be neither desirable nor virtuous. It would not even be society.

The societal ethos of insecurity

This is not the course that history took. If we return to the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the discourse moves in the opposite direction. In the words and actions of the Norwegian Prime Minister, the bare material facts of the terrorism, what will ten years later become relics of a nation-wide bureaucratisation process, are ‘spiritualised’. They are removed from their facticity, from their immediate objectivity from the moment they become established as facts. Out of the brutal reality of the events emerges an uncanny tone of humanity. From the Prime Minister’s press conference the evening after the attack:
This is an evening that demands much of all of us. The days that are coming will demand even more. We are prepared to meet this. Norway stands united in times of crisis. We mourn our dead. We suffer with the injured and we feel with their next of kin. This is about an attack on innocent civilians, on youngsters at a summer camp, on all of us.

(NRK, 2011)

The Prime Minister appeals to a substance that both precedes and transcends the horrible facts of the attack. He evokes the responsibility that the facts demand of Norwegians, and will continue to demand of them, beyond their facticity. What do facts demand? Nothing, of course. Unless, they are transformed or lifted to a plane of accountability, normativity, compassion, affect, and action. All these qualities are in some sense evoked by the Prime Minister. As the events and reactions unfold over the next days, Norwegians and the Norwegian political class showed themselves to be up to the challenge, as the Prime Minister rightly predicts. They reacted to it in terms of their moral, cultural, or spiritual experience, precisely on the terrain where it by nature does the most damage. For while the individual lives lost are tragically irreplaceable, the explicit and real target of terrorism is to weaken, damage, or destroy the moral character of society: its values, its traditions, its historical substance, its forms of culture practice, etc.

Against all scientific reason the facts and values seemed at that moment to be inseparable. Thus, the Prime Minister, in his speech, swerves back to the empirical – ‘This is about an attack on innocent civilians, on youngsters at a summer camp’ – before again collectivising, consolidating, spiritualising the violence as an attack ‘on all of us’. The collective position and ethos continues as the Prime Minister delivers a ‘message’ to those who have attacked us:

It’s a message from all of Norway. You will not destroy us. You will not destroy our democracy, our engagement for a better world. We are a little nation, but we are a proud nation. No one can bomb us into silence. No one will shoot us into silence. No one will ever scare us from being Norway.

(NRK, 2011)

The role of a political leader, representative of a sovereign state, is to send and receive political messages from that state. He or she who possesses the political legitimacy to do so represents the democratically determined general will of the people. Yet the nature and content of the general will of a democratically determined people has long remained a mystery of political philosophy. The rights and obligations granted by the societal contract have accompanied the long pedigree of the nation-state, even if for inexplicable reasons. In this sense, what it means to ‘speak for Norway’, either war or peace, joy or sorrow, is unclear, though there is little doubt that Norway is
spoken for, both through and around the person of the Prime Minister. The official bureaucracy, the enlightened public sphere, the political masses all participate, both in form and content, in the expression of ‘the Norwegian’. Its institutions and authorities, by carrying on business as usual, by enacting the Norwegian through the customs, traditions, and values they embody.

In the closing sequence of what we can imagine was a speech hastily prepared under trying circumstances, the Prime Minister again plays on the twin chords of Norwegian collective experience – the individual and the collective. ‘This evening and tonight’, he continues,

> we will take care of each other, give each other comfort, talk with each other, stand together. [...] The most important thing this evening is to save human life, to show care, for all those who have been struck, and their next of kin.

(NRK, 2011)

Surely only in Norway, where the imagined community is small – though in fact over 5 million people – would expressing such a sentiment be possible. It was. Its plausibility stemmed from the presence in national, regional, and local culture of traces of a folk culture, patterns of speech and behaviour, national customs whose pretence is to create comfort for those who understand the codes. It can be witnessed in the Norwegian popular culture, national manifestations, sports events, and social life, even while being gradually displaced by globalising or Europeanising forms of professionalism, administrative and bureaucratic culture, New Public Management, all based on one form or another of the ideology of efficiency as homogenisation, accountability as replicability, and interoperability. This popular culture has also resisted, not without some effort, the marginal trend toward populism, which, compared to Trump’s America or the various European new nationalisms, is difficult to take seriously. Norwegians can still, at least according to a certain imaginary, take care of each other, give each other comfort, talk with each other, and stand together. And yet, for the Prime Minister, in the late hours of 22 July 2011, this imagined local imagery is linked to the equally, and necessarily, imagined collective agency of the Norwegian:

> Tomorrow we will show that world that Norwegian democracy becomes stronger when it counts. We will find those who are guilty and hold them responsible.

[...]

> We must never stop standing up for our values. We must show that our open society passes this test too. That the response to violence is even more democracy, even more humanity, but never naivety. We owe that to the victims and their next of kin.

(NRK, 2011)
The collective Norwegian implicitly knows and understands, according the Prime Minister, what is under threat when the Norwegian is under threat. It is something that transcends the hideous death and injury of individual Norwegians, transcends the horrific material destruction in downtown Oslo. Norway as a society was targeted by the attacks, but the Prime Minister contributes to a discourse, as would many others in the days and weeks that were to come, that seeks to protect society, understood not as a collection of individuals, but as a far richer, deeper, older collection of spiritual values and democratic customs.

The comments by the Prime Minister are in this sense really quite remarkable, unique, perhaps even unheard of in the cultural politics of the post-9/11 era. They can serve as the baseline for an analysis of the gradual bureaucratisation of response to terrorism that was to follow, apparently the only visible path for the political apparatus whose task is to administratively embody the heart and soul of Norwegian society. The Prime Minister, together with others, expresses an idea of societal security that starts a journey, moments after the attacks in Oslo and Utøya, from the preservation of the Norwegian as a spiritual matter to the preservation of the Norwegian as a bureaucratic matter.

**Society as a protector and protected**

There is of course a gaping double-meaning at the heart of the concept of societal security. On the one hand, the term refers most commonly to the absence of threat to a thing called ‘society’. On the other hand, it refers to a certain kind of security of the kind that is provided by society. Both of these meanings can be readily identified in the contributions to this volume.

The most challenging component in the societal security is undoubtedly society itself. It seems to be so self-evident that few seek to interrogate it. ‘Society’, one imagines, is what is, was, and will remain, apparently self-evident. There is a kind of chronic indifference to what society is, most notably when society is in political or existential terms. Society is like a blind spot for anyone interested in formulating claims about the security of society. And yet, society inevitably plays a remarkable role during security events, before disaster occur, during, and in the wake of them. On the one hand, there is an understanding of society that positions itself as central actor in a range of functions, as a perceiving, thinking, active, reactive, autonomous entity capable of participating actively in its own security, among other things. On the other hand, it is often understood as the passive recipient of security measures, as that which is under threat, that which is to be protected and preserved. Society thus has a responsibility linked to the ancient social contract, to provide security for its citizens.

What does it mean to say that a society holds responsibility for the security of society? The idea that a given society holds a certain responsibility, a responsibility that other societies do not have, must in some sense stem
from the principle that it possesses special qualities, special capabilities, and thereby special responsibility to prevent security threats. That society should have ‘failed’ must mean that the implicit values in society, its properties, its identity, etc., have failed, not the political components that make up what one designates as ‘society’, its form and substance. It seems clear that the bureaucratic apparatus, with its detailed guidelines, mandates, and instructions, can be held responsible for the correspondence between task and performance. But can society itself? Can a society be held responsible for something other than itself? When and under what circumstances? Which society are we talking about? Whose society, society for whom? Rhetorically speaking, in rock-solid social democracies like the Nordics, ‘society’ remains the fundamental anchoring point for a tacit understanding of a certain kind of security, security as an aspiration, a norm or societal ambition, even a promise. In this sense societal security is a project, an uncompleted undertaking, an enterprise in the making, one which the collective resources of the nation must participate in. It is against the social democratic backdrop of society as a guarantor of security that society may fail, may let down its obligation to itself.

Thus, the society of societal security nearly appears as a kind of riddle, a question mark, a misunderstood notion, or even an unknown. A variety of understandings of ‘society’ emerge and disappear. It has many functions, some overlapping, some contradictory, and many ways of being, reprimanding some, praising others. Society appears, on the one hand, as something under threat, something to be protected. Society is at times taken as the collective expression or symbol for an inherent vulnerability of all citizens. Elsewhere it is an expression of the vulnerability of the state as a sovereign entity. Of course from the national standpoint there is nothing about a given society that is not worth preserving. Like most well-integrated nation-states, society in Norway is itself wrapped up in this logic in a very complex way, through the interlacing of people, organisations, and institutions, on the one hand, and by the long reach of history, tradition, heritage, etc., on the other hand. Society is the primary actor in the project of its own security. Society is in many ways a proxy, a stand-in, for its own security: it acts and is acted upon. By both acting and functioning as a society, it generates security, while at the same time accumulating the value which puts it raises the spectre of the threat of its demise. Society is a security perpetuum mobile.

Homegrown insecurity

The extraordinary twist in the story of the 22/7 attacks in Norway was that it pulverised the global terror-morality play of the U.S.-orchestrated war against terror. With the devise of Bush Jr.’s “You are either with us or you are with the terrorists!” echoing in their heads, many Norwegians spent the tense afternoon hours of 22/7 imagining the “other” at whose hand they were under attack, and in some cases accosting immigrants on the open
street for their ingratitude. When it was revealed on the evening news that the terrorist was a blond-haired, middle-class Christian Norwegian, they were forced to realise that it was entirely possible to be ‘with us’ and ‘with the terrorists’, that the terrorist other was actually the same, that the Bushian prophylactic project of purifying the world of terrorism was not viable, and that anyone, any Norwegian, any Scandinavian, and human being, could ultimately be a terrorist.

In this sense, all the elements of the new age of uncertainty are present: The dangers we confront today, in particular the threat of terrorist violence, are not exogenous or foreign to the societies they threaten. They are not alien corpuscles to a body-politic that is already safe and secure, spiritually sound and morally righteous on its own right. By the same token, the threat cannot be prevented in becoming a reality by holding it at bay, blocking its contact with the sanctity of the society it threatens. As disconcerting as it may seem, the threat to society is, in the case of Breivik and many others, a creation of that society, a symptom of its own maladies, spill-over from its excesses, penury from its insufficiencies. From a societal point of view, that is, setting aside the relatively extraordinary personal psychological situation that surrounded Breivik during his upbringing and youth (Berntzen and Sandberg, 2014; Leonard et al., 2014; Melle, 2013), Breivik is a product of Norwegian society, its culture, welfare, values, religion, and customs. He benefited in his misdeeds from the social conventions, political liberties, and legal permissiveness enjoyed by any modern liberal society, but most markedly the Norwegian.

This inversion of the threat logic in the experience of terrorism dovetails with the kind of post-Cold War security narrative studied throughout this volume. The evolution in the discourse of security after the Cold War revealed a shift away from the bipolar logic of security – away from an individualised, identifiable source of threat subject to monological, predictable, accountable, predetermined, rational, and finite counter-measures – to a reflexive notion of security characterised by the inward threat of multifarious dangers. A traditional geopolitical threat horizon was replaced by a security imaginary according to which threats are both invisible and immediate. Security went from being an outward focus on a distinct known enemy to an inward focus on a ubiquitous enemy.

The politics of security thus shifts from being about the other to being about us and, most significantly, about the other in us. Danger is sleeping in our imaginations, in our minds, and in our memories. The empirical threats that preoccupy us, like climate change, pandemics, cyberattacks, do not arrive from far out there beyond the wall or beyond the enforced border but rather here in our presence, integrated within society (Burgess, 2015).

The insight at the core of the concept of societal security is that indeed all threats today are homegrown. Not because their perpetrators hold the same passport as their victims. Rather, it is by virtue of the fact that the force of their danger is parasitic on the values of a society. The danger, the fears, the
risk, and the uncertainty that fuel the insecurities of our time, be they terrorism, pandemic disease, climate change, etc., find their destructive meaning and power not in their objects, but in the societal value configurations that make them attractive. Societal security is for this reason a powerful objective because all threats are societal. Even the most material, ‘non-social’, objects – in the way that a bridge or an oil-refinery would be a legitimate target for a symmetric military conflict – are ultimately societal, and thus, their insecurity is governed by a societal rationality (Burgess, 2007). As a consequence, all terrorism is homegrown. All insecurity is homegrown because only the ‘home’ can generate security.

From the collective ethos of the Rose Demonstration

Perhaps the most remarkable manifestation of the humanist-cultural-democratic baseline ethos that I have tried to signal in certain parts of the official discourse, primarily in the discourse surrounding the Prime Minister, came from the public demonstration that took place in the evening of 25 July, the so-called ‘Rose Demonstration’. The demonstration quickly came to be known by that name because participants were encouraged to come carrying a rose, a logistic feat which, had it been centrally organised, would have doubtless been impossible, but which on a person-by-person basis produced an astonishing and moving manifestation. Estimates varied between 150,000 and 200,000 people, about one third of the population of Oslo (Fuglehaug, 2011; Solberg et al., 2011), and an equally extraordinary embodiment of the solidarity and unity was thematised through the songs, poems, and speeches that were represented. The crowd was addressed by the Prime Minister and others before Crown Prince Haakon gave a speech that seemed to capture the mood of a nation.

The speech was the antidote to any kind of escalation or militarisation as a result of the attacks, to vengeance or retribution. It focused on unity and solidarity in a way that echoed the Prime Minister in the preceding days, and, above all, it emphasised the responsibility all Norwegians hold, to be clear about the fundamental societal values that are under threat and the response we should make to this threat, namely, through a re-assertion of the values of openness and democracy. The speech was reproduced over the entire front page of Aftenposten, Norway’s largest print newspaper:

This evening the streets are filled with love; we have chosen to answer cruelty with closeness; we have chosen to meet hate with unity; we have chosen to show what we stand for

[...]

Norway is a country in grief; we think of all those who have suffered loss, who are missing; of all those who made a historical effort to save life and to re-establish our security; and of our leaders who have been
forced to face difficult trials in the last days; those who were on Utøya and in the Government Quarter were targets for terror, but it afflicted us all.

[...]

After July 22 we can never again permit ourselves to think that our opinions and our attitudes are without meaning; we have to be there every day, armed in the fight for the free and open society we love so much

[...]

The Norway we want, no one will take from us; we are facing a choice. We cannot undo what has been done; but we can choose what it will do with us as a society and as individuals; we can chose that no one must stand alone; we can choose to stand together

[...]

It is up to each and every one of us now; it’s up to you and it’s up to me; together we have a job to do; it’s a job that is done around the dinner table, in the cantina, in the clubs, among volunteers, by men and women, in the counties and in the cities.

(Haakon 2011)

The speech contains an appeal to unity, an appeal to meet hate with love, to feel and speak freely. It is a call to think about society and fellowship, about who Norwegians are and what they are, what it means, culturally, spiritually, to be a Norwegian; what ‘the Norwegian’ oblige Norwegians to do; and, not least, what kind of actions and attitudes it is incompatible with.

It might have come across as a series of clichés and banalities coming from a tall, impeccably dressed man. But the presence of an intensely present crowd, spontaneously singing the Norwegian national anthem (‘Yes, we love this land’) and other well-known folk songs, somehow gave body to the message, performed it in a way that was unique, particularly, in an era of tough talk, militarisation and authoritarianism, and against terror.

Following the speech of the Crown Prince, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg again took the stage with his societal discourse, perhaps the last time in the course of the national grief process, when that discourse would stand unadulterated or even stand at all.

Thousands and thousands of Norwegians in Oslo and over the whole country are doing the same thing this evening. They are conquering the streets, the marketplaces, the public spaces, with the same stubborn message: “we are heartbroken but we do not give up”. With torches and roses, we give the world notice: we do not let fear break us, and we don’t let the fear of fear silence us. The sea of people before me and the warmth I feel from the country make me certain in my conviction: Evil can kill a person, but never conquer an entire people.
There will be a Norway before and a Norway after 22 July 2011. But we will decide which Norway. More openness, more democracy, resoluteness and strength – that is us, that is Norway. We will take back our security. Out of all of the pain we glimpse, paradoxically enough, roots of something valuable. What we see this evening can be the greatest and most important march we have set out upon since World War 2: A march for democracy, a march for unity, a march for tolerance.

(Stoltenberg, 2011)

Not unexpectedly, simultaneous with the discourse of unity, of ‘the Norwegian’, and of societal values, a discourse of accountability in a more or less narrow sense blossomed. During the three weeks between the attacks and the formal creation of the 22 July Commission, meant to review the events in their broad context, a number of critiques of the actions of the police, emergency services, ambulance services, the Ministries of Defence and Justice, the Office of Public Works, local and national authorities, lawmakers, budget-makers, and, not least, the government emerged (Dragnes, 2011; Fuglehaug et al., 2011).

But by far the most prominent and emotional critique raised against public authorities in the wake of the attacks concerned the time required for the police to arrive at Utøya. This would lead to a more or less instrumentalised claim that since the terrorist could have stopped earlier, more lives could have been saved. Since subsequent forensic analysis and reconstructions were able to pin-point the precise time of death of each victim, highly speculative suppositions emerged, in part supported by the 22 July Commission report, that the closer a victim’s death was to the conclusion of the shooting rampage, the more dependent it was on the efficiency of the commandos in obtaining a cease-fire. This instrumental reasoning of life-and-death would tend to support and advance both a variable scale of responsibility of the public services for the deaths of individuals – the closer to the cease-fire, the more responsible – and a variation in the ‘saveability’ of life itself – those who died later being forever regarded as more ‘saveable’ than those who died early.

Toward societal security

As this book attests, approaches to understanding societal insecurity vary almost as widely as approaches to conceptualising terrorism. Psychological approaches seek to understand violent extremism as part of an internal determinism or link to group influence. Societal approaches try to draw lessons from group interactions and institutions. Cultural analyses focus on cultural interactions, and above all, conflicts. Political approaches underscore the channels of political expression and the availability of political institutions for enacting changes. Legal approaches focus on the function of
local, national, and international regulatory measures. But like most scholarly approaches, these attempts to come to grips with violent extremism reflect as much their own starting points, premises, and values, as they do the object they seek to study.

What is however a constant is that societal insecurity, in essentially all of its forms, grows in a paradoxical way out of modern liberal society. It is paradoxical because, in more or less all cases, it is, on the one hand, a reaction to the values of liberalism and, on the other hand, made possible by the channels of free self-expression that are in turn made available by liberal society. The link between liberalism and extremism becomes clear when we consider the paradox at the heart of liberalism. All societies, from liberal to authoritarian, from democracies to informal communities to business partnerships, have one trait in common: they rest upon a bond. This bond is not a given. It is not a necessity, cannot be taken for granted, no matter what the setting is. More importantly, this bond cannot be forced. It is in-compatible with force. Thus, force, or even violence, as an expression of a social pact is simply incoherent.

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