Using discourse markers to negotiate epistemic stance: A view from situated language use

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A R T I C L E   I N F O

A B S T R A C T

In this paper, I analyse the usage of a discourse marker =*mari*, belonging to the epistemic paradigm attested in Upper Napo Kichwa (Quechuan, Ecuador). I show that the use of =*mari* indicates that the information is known well to the speaker, but also to some extent familiar to the addressee. In situated language use, the marker contributes to creating a knowing epistemic stance of the speaker. The analysis presented here is based on a 13-h documentary corpus of interactive Upper Napo Kichwa discourse, recorded on audio and video. For the purpose of the paper, the relevant utterances are analysed in their broad interactional context, including not only the surrounding text, but also relationships between the interlocutors, their shared life experience and possible shared knowledge derived from other sources. First, I analyse the semantic and pragmatic contribution of =*mari* to the conversational turn it occurs in, drawing on conversations extracted from the corpus. Following on from that, I show how tokens of =*mari* are situated in interactional sequences, and examine how the semantics/pragmatics of the clitic contributes to the discursive actions achieved by the turns which contain it.

1. Introduction

In the study of minority languages, most attention to date has been granted to distinguishing between formal expressions of evidentiality — the marking of the source of information, or mode of access — and epistemic modality, related to degrees of certainty (cf. e.g. Aikhenvald, 2004; Cornillie, 2009; Boye, 2012). In recent years, however, many descriptions of lesser-known languages have contributed data showing that grammaticalised epistemic systems can also encode meanings related to authority over knowledge, distribution of knowledge in discourse, its activation and the involvement of discourse participants in the described event (e.g. Bergqvist, 2016; Gipper, 2011, 2015; Grzech, 2016, 2020a; Evans et al., 2018a, 2018b; Floyd et al., 2018, among others; see Section 2.3). This catalogue of epistemic factors is by no means conclusive, and much new epistemic research on lesser-spoken languages is currently underway.

Research on interactive discourse in better-described languages routinely discusses issues such as *epistemic access*, *primacy* and *responsibility* (cf. Stivers et al., 2011b), irrespective of whether they are grammaticalised or not. Epistemic distinctions are regarded as means of constructing one's *epistemic status* and *stance*, which can be defined as follows:

> '(…) epistemic status vis-a-vis an epistemic domain is conceived as a somewhat enduring feature of social relationships, epistemic stance by contrast concerns the moment-by-moment expression of these relationships' (Heritage, 2012: 6).

For instance, pragmatics research on Germanic and Romance languages acknowledges that evidential and modal markers can play complex roles in interaction (cf. e.g. Cornillie and Pietrandrea, 2012). In Spanish, the use of certain lexical evidentials can be conditioned by the imbalance of knowledge between interlocutors (cf. Cornillie and Gras, 2020) or used to elicit or confirm alignment between them (e.g. Cornillie, 2010).

At the same time, in research on lesser-described languages, considering notions such as epistemic stance and status (cf. Heritage, 2012, see also Section 2.3) is a relatively new trend. While research in descriptive linguistics focused on describing the morphosyntactic and semantic properties of epistemic markers, studies on well-known languages have tended to focus on the functions epistemic strategies play in discourse. In recent years, researchers have begun to realise that this division, rather than being a representation of the actual nature of linguistic systems, is a by-product of how these systems have been analysed in different research traditions. In fact, the use of both grammaticalised evidentials and evidential strategies is underpinned by the same pragmatic factors (Mushin, 2013: 627), and the same claim could very likely be extended to other epistemic categories. Moreover, adopting a particular epistemic stance is not necessarily motivated by how the information is rooted in the language-external reality. Speakers use evidentials, as well as other forms of epistemic marking, in line with their rhetorical intentions, depending on 'how they want their own utterance to be understood and treated at the moment of interaction (…). Their choice is also dependent on their overall communicative goals' (Mushin, 2001: 58). Thus, the use of both grammaticalised evidentials and evidential strategies is not necessarily a reflection of how knowledge was acquired, and conventional associations exist between source of knowledge and its status in conversation (Mushin, 2013: 633). Consequently, the 'exploitation' (cf. Aikhenvald, 2004) of epistemic marking should not be treated, as it still often is, as abnormal use which needs not be analysed in detail. Rather, it should be included in the analysis of the communicative functions of any epistemic marker and treated on a par with its other uses.

This article contributes to the analysis of the role of epistemic marking in conversation through a case study of Upper Napo Kichwa, a Quechuan language spoken in the Ecuadorian Amazon. The discussion focuses on the epistemic clitic =*mari*, which belongs to the paradigm of eight epistemic discourse clitics, encoding meanings related to distribution of knowledge and epistemic authority between participants of discourse (see Section 2.3 for the discussion of these notions). The paradigm has been described in more detail elsewhere (Grzech, 2020a, 2020b) and will be briefly introduced in Section 2.1. The conversation in (1) illustrates the use of epistemic clitics. It comes from the naturalistic corpus of Upper Napo Kichwa (see Section 2.1) and takes part between a native speaker interviewer (NA), an expert on medical plants (CG) and the expert's husband (AR), while the team is out in the woods collecting plants for preparation of a natural remedy.

(1)

1. NA: | *Ñakas* | *piton* | *nishkakwintalla* | *rikurij* |
| ñakas | piton | ni-shka-kwinta=lla | riku-ri-j |
| almost | kind.of.tree | say-ANT-SEMBL=LIM | see-CAUS-AG.NMLZ |

2. | *yura* | *rikurij* | *ashka…?* |
| yura | riku-ri-j | a-shka |
| tree | see-ANTIC-AG.NMLZ | COP-ANT |

'It almost looks like the *piton* tree,
it looks like it?'

3. CG: | *Mjm…* | *shina**rá**.* |
| aha | shina=**tá** |
| INTER | like.this=**TÁ** |

'That's right.'

4. AR: | *Shinay,* | *shinakwinta* | *rikurij**tá**.* |
| shina=i | shina-kwinta | riku-ri-j=**tá** |
| like.this=EMPH | like.this-SEMBL | see-ANTIC-AG.NMLZ=**TÁ** |

'That's it, it looks like that.'

5. NA: | *Pitun* | *yurakwintalla* | *rikurij…* |
| piton | yura-kwinta=lla | riku-ri-j |
| kind.of.tree | tree-SEMBL=LIM | see-ANTIC-AG.NMLZ |

'It looks just like the *piton* tree…'

6. CG: *Ñakas,   pangara   riksisha…   kamakpi,   ayaj**mari**.*
     ñakas   panga-ta riksi-sha kama-kpi ayaj=**mari**
     almost leaf-ACC   know-COR try-SWREF bitter=**MARI**
     'Almost, knowing the leaf...when you try, it's bitter.'

7. NA: *Ayaj**cha**   panga?*
     ayaj=**cha**   panga?
     bitter=**CHA**   leaf
     'Is this leaf bitter?'

8. AR: *Ayaj**tá***
     ayaj=**tá**
     bitter=**TÁ**
     '[It is] bitter.'

9. CG: *Ayaj**mari**.*
     ayaj=**mari**
     bitter=**MARI**
     '[It is] bitter'

10. NA: *Chiraygu**mari**   ambinga?*
     chi-raygu=**mari** ambi-n=ga
     D.DEM-CAUSAL=**MARI** heal-3=TOP
     'That's why it heals?'

11. CG: *Mjm*
     aha
     INTER
     'Yeah'

12. AR: *Mjm,   ayaj**mari**.*
     Aha   ayaj=**mari**
     INTER bitter=**MARI**
     'Yeah, [it is] bitter'

13. CG: *(…) ñuka,   pay   kujpi,   apij   kus   kus   mikustakani   pangara.*
     ñuka pay ku-kpi,   api-j   kus kus miku-sta-ka-ni panga-ta
     1SG 3SG give-SWREF grab-AG.NMLZ IDEO IDEO eat-STA[1]-PST-1 leaf-ACC
     '(…) when he gave me the leaf I grabbed it and ate quickly, *kus kus*'

(The conversation continues on the topic of the leaves, their taste and curative powers).

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Although the conversation is relatively lengthy, there is little information transmitted between its participants. In line 3, CG, who is the expert on medicinal plants, first voices an opinion about a tree they are discussing. CG uses the clitic =*tá*, which indexes epistemic authority of the origo (see Section 2.3) in cases where the knowledge is activated, and to some extent shared by discourse participants. In line 4, AR − CG's husband − echoes her previous utterance using the same clitic. In line 6, CG provides more information about the tree in question, this time marking it with =*mari*. In line 7, NA, the interviewer, asks a confirmation question, to which AR and CG provide the same response. AR uses =*tá*, which both indexes his epistemic authority over information, and acknowledges the addressees are also aware of that information. CG, on the other hand, marks the same information with =*mari*, making a more forceful claim to a knowing epistemic stance. In line 10, NA responds to her with a =*mari*-marked question, in which the epistemic authority is indexed to the addressee. However, CG fails to provide an epistemically-marked answer, and AR seizes the opportunity to display a knowing stance, making a =*mari*-marked claim in line 11. CG re-asserts her epistemic authority over her husband and the interviewer in line 12. Although she does not use any marker, she mentions her direct experience from the previous year, when she was bitten by a snake and would have died, if it was not for the bitter leaf that AR gave her as medicine. CG thus reinforces her authority by referencing a personal experience.

In this competition for epistemic authority, =*mari* is used particularly often (n = 4). This raises the question of what =*mari* contributes that =*tá*, also a marker of epistemic authority, does not. While the interaction in (1) suggests that =*mari* indexes the speaker who uses it as a knowing subject (cf. lines 5, 8 and 11), the details of its contribution to the utterance are unclear. That the use of =*mari* is related to distribution of knowledge in interaction can be appreciated more clearly in (2). This exchange occurred during a celebration of Mother's Day. The men are making a meal for the community, and they talk and joke while preparing the food. The member of the documentation team is recording the event.

(2)
A: [In Spanish] *Cocinero medio marica, todo…*
     'The cook is a bit gay and all…'

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[1] *-sta-* indicates that an action was performed in an abrupt, forceful manner.

B: *Kan*   *rimawshkara*   *apiw**mari**…*
    kan   rima-u-shka-ta   api-u=**mari**
    2SG   talk-PROG-NMLZ-ACC   grab-PROG=**MARI**
    'He is recording what you are saying…'

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When A makes an inappropriate joke, B tells A that everything they say is being recorded. A and B already know this, so B's utterance can be analysed as a reminder for A; The interlocutors have equal access to the proposition that B chooses to mark with =*mari*: they both know they are being recorded. This, as well as the situational context, suggests that =*mari* indicates that B thinks A ought to know that they are being recorded, but acts as if he doesn't. In other words, the enclitic is used to remind the addressee that knowledge/information is shared, when the addressee acts or speaks as if they were not aware of that.

The uses of =*mari* in examples (1) and (2) share some features. Both examples show that the meaning of =*mari* is related to the epistemic rights and responsibilities of speech act participants (see Section 2.3). In both cases, =*mari*-marked utterances serve to challenge the prior epistemic stance of the interlocutor (cf. Mitchell, this volume). Over the course of the article, I develop this analysis, showing that the Upper Napo Kichwa =*mari* can be seen as a resource for constructing epistemic stance and delimiting the 'territories of information' (cf. Kamio, 1997).[2] Thus, it is functionally similar to epistemic expressions and strategies found in better-described languages, including turn order, repetitions, the use of discourse markers and the like (e.g. Hayano, 2011; Heritage and Raymond, 2005; Mushin, 2001; Stivers et al., 2011a).

This paper has several aims. It sets out to present a convincing analysis of =*mari* in interaction, showing that the marker's functions align with the functions of epistemic expression and strategies in other languages. In keeping with the theme of this Special Issue, the paper also contributes to what we know about how epistemic rights and responsibilities can be negotiated in small communities, akin to 'societies of intimates' (Givón, 2005). Such communities have small numbers of members who share large amounts of knowledge, derived both from shared culture and from shared life experience (cf. Mushin, this volume). Thus, in such communities, including the Upper Napo Kichwa speaker community, the use of epistemic expressions cannot be analysed on the same terms as in communities where people share relatively little knowledge with one another. In this paper, I take a closer look at one epistemic device, the enclitic =*mari*, and explore how it helps speakers negotiate what is known by whom, and how and why this is important in their everyday communicative practice.

2. Background

Before I proceed to the description and analysis of the use of =*mari*, this section provides a brief background on the language and the epistemic paradigm attested in it (2.1), the data used in this study (2.2) and the definitions of the notions relevant for the analysis of =*mari* (2.3).

2.1. Upper Napo Kichwa and its epistemic paradigm

Upper Napo Kichwa is a Quechuan language of the QII branch (Torero, 1964). It is spoken by ca. 46,000 people in Ecuadorian Amazonia (INEC, 2010), along the upper course of the river Napo, an affluent of the Amazon. Upper Napo Kichwa belongs to the dialect continuum of Amazonian Kichwa languages (cf. Grzech et al., 2019). Like all the languages of the Quechuan language family, Upper Napo Kichwa is agglutinative and almost exclusively suffixing. The default word order is SOV, and — although simpler than in Peruvian Quechuan varieties — verbal morphology is the most complex part of its morphosyntax. Quechuan languages are widely known for their evidential clitics. Most varieties exhibit a three-way distinction between marking direct, inferential/conjectural and reportative evidence (e.g. Weber, 1996; Cusihuamán, 1976/2001; Floyd, 1997; Faller, 2002). Some others also make distinctions between individual and shared knowledge, exhibiting a paradigm of 5 or 6 markers (c.f Howard, 2012; Hintz and Hintz, 2017). In Upper Napo Kichwa, the epistemic paradigm has eight members (Grzech, 2016, 2020a). The epistemic clitics are syntactically non-obligatory and can occur on all types of phrasal heads. Their position in the clause is determined by considerations related to information structure, and their occurrence in discourse — conditioned by epistemic factors.

The Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic paradigm contains the cognates of evidential markers from other Quechuan varieties, =*mi* and =*cha*. In other Quechuan languages, these markers have been analysed as a direct evidential/marker of 'best possible ground' and inferential/conjectural evidential, respectively (e.g. Faller, 2002). In Upper Napo Kichwa, the enclitics encode exclusive epistemic authority (=*mi*) and a disclaimer of such authority (=*cha*, cf. Grzech, 2020b). Apart from =*mi*, =*cha* and =*mari*, the remaining markers in the paradigm are: =*ma*, distributionally near-identical with =*mi* but not yet fully analysed; =*tá*, marking speaker-exclusive epistemic authority over shared and activated knowledge; =*chari*, the meaning of which still requires more analysis; =*chu*, marking negation and polar questions, and =*ta*, marking content questions.

The enclitic =*mari*, which is the main focus of this paper, has previously been analysed as an emphatic version of the direct evidential =*mi* (e.g. Cole, 1982; Faller, 2002). However, the authors do not discuss the meaning of this marker in detail, and no

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specific evidence, or detailed explanation, is provided for such analysis. In the context of how =*mi* is analysed, it is also problematic to define the notion of emphasis. As stated by Faller (2002) for Cuzco Quechua, the marker =*mi* explicitly encodes what an unmarked declarative statement merely implies: that the speaker has the best possible ground for making a statement. Utterances marked with =*mi* are perceived as more forceful and persuasive, both in Cuzco Quechua and in Upper Napo Kichwa. In this context, it is particularly unclear what the meaning of the emphatic version of =*mi* could be. The enclitic =*mari* has previously been analysed as a combination of =*mi* and the affirmative particle *ari* (e.g. Jake and Chuquín, 1979, cited in Floyd, 1997; Weber, 1996: 595). In Upper Napo Kichwa, another possible source would be the juxtaposition of =*mi* or =*ma* with an emphatic clitic =*ri* (Grzech, 2016: 225—226). However, at this stage of the research on the language, this analysis is hard to uphold — or refute — on the basis of the available data. It is also unclear what evidence would be needed to (dis) confirm such an analysis, especially since the semantics and pragmatics of the markers involved in this potential juxtaposition remains poorly understood. More in-depth analysis of =*ma*, =*ri* and =*mari*, and a clearer picture of the semantics of *emphatic* and *expressive* meaning in Upper Napo Kichwa would be needed before any claims can be made in this respect. For the above reasons, I opt to analyse =*mari* as a separate marker. Understanding its functions in discourse can help shed light on whether the marker is a juxtaposition of two other clitics, as well as determine the extent to which it has become grammaticalised as a separate expression. However, the analysis of the discourse functions of =*mari* presented here is independent of the marker's etymology.

2.2. Data and research questions

The analysis presented in this paper is based on a documentary corpus of Upper Napo Kichwa, collected in 2013 and 2014. The documentation project, supported by ELDP (see Acknowledgements) was a collaborative effort. Native speaker researchers were involved in all stages of it, from selection of topics, through data collection, to transcription and translation of audio-visual recordings in ELAN (cf. Wittenburg et al., 2006).[3] This allowed the team to collect a rich corpus of naturalistic discourse, with each transcription and translation revised twice, amounting to almost 11 h of data. The corpus also includes 2 h of 'staged communicative events' (Himmelmann, 2006), containing re-telling of the *Pear Story* (Chafe, 1980) and interactive stimuli from the QUIS set (Skopeteas et al., 2006), subject to the same procedure as the naturalistic discourse corpus, and additionally parsed and glossed. The purpose of this smaller sub-corpus was to elicit relatively natural discourse, while at the same time being able to control for what information was or was not shared between discourse participants. Such an awareness, unattainable in case of most naturalistic interaction, was necessary to delimit the context of use of epistemic discourse clitics.

Both parts of the corpus were collected following the ethical standards of language documentation. The documentation project was approved by the community at an official meeting, and each time a recording was made, the involved speakers were asked for their consent to record and archive the data. Speakers and community authorities were given the copies of the data. The corpus is deposited both in the Archive of Languages and Cultures of Ecuador (*Archivo de Lenguas y Culturas del Ecuador*), and — in a more complete version — with the ELAR archive (cf. Grzech, 2020c). The corpus contains mostly audio-visual recordings, in which it is possible to identify the speakers. However, for the purposes of linguistic analysis, including the present paper, they have been anonymised. Consequently, in the examples across this paper I only use initials or random letters to designate speakers.

The analysis developed in the following sections is based on both sub-parts of the corpus. The 'staged communicative events' corpus only contained 13 tokens of =*mari* (in 1537 turns). The 11 h of naturalistic discourse contained 317 tokens of the marker. However, for the purpose of this analysis I selected the 115 of those tokens that were part of interactive discourse, excluding those which occurred in longer monologues. The reason for excluding the instances of =*mari* in monologic speech was that it is only in the more interactive contexts that the interlocutor's reaction to a =*mari*-marked turn can be observed and analysed.

Thus, only interactive discourse can provide evidence necessary for answering the research questions behind this paper: (1) whether and in what ways does the use of =*mari* play a role in recipient design, and (2) whether and how =*mari* is used for constructing and/or displaying epistemic stance in interaction. These questions were prompted by the initial observation that =*mari* — and, in fact, other epistemic enclitics attested in Upper Napo Kichwa — seem to be used when communicative disfluencies occur or are anticipated by the interlocutors. This was showcased in (1), where several turns consisted of repetitions of the material stated previously, marked by a different clitics. Elsewhere, I propose that the overarching role of epistemic enclitics in Upper Napo Kichwa is to facilitate the interaction by making the interlocutors aware of each other's epistemic status and stance (Grzech, 2020a). In this paper, I focus on how exactly this is achieved by means of using the marker =*mari*. The initial observations suggest that =*mari* is used to mark shared knowledge, which is, however, presented as unknown in the utterance or action to which the =*mari*-marked utterance responds. This meaning of the clitic emerges clearly from example (2) above. In the following section, I analyse the data to determine whether this hypothesis can be sustained after a detailed examination of the marker's use in conversation.

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[3] ELAN software was created by the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, The Language Archive, Nijmegen, The Netherlands. It can be downloaded here: https://tla.mpi.nl/tools/tla-tools/elan/.

2.3. Definitions of the relevant notions

The analysis of the complex semantics of =*mari* requires describing a variety of nuanced epistemic distinctions. This, in turn, requires the use of specific terms. Two such terms are *epistemic stance* and *epistemic status* (Heritage, 2012), already defined above. Epistemic status is more objective, and relates to the total knowledge accumulated by a given discourse participant. Epistemic stance, on the other hand, varies depending on the situation. A speaker with the same epistemic status can adopt different stances: a knowing one, when talking to someone less familiar with a topic of their expertise, and an unknowing one when talking to someone more experienced. The notions of stance and status are related to another term commonly used in the field, i.e. *epistemic authority*, 'the right to know' (Stivers et al., 2011b: 13) or 'the right to evaluate the matters assessed' (Heritage and Raymond, 2005: 16), akin to epistemic status.

How, though, do speakers acquire rights to know? According to the theory of *territories of information* (Kamio, 1997), mentioned in Section 1, each person has their own 'territory' of knowledge. It includes one's personal and professional experience, knowledge about one's family or people one is close to, etc. In successful communication, the interlocutors discursively position themselves with respect to each other's territories, recognising that each of them has epistemic authority over the matters in their own territory. People's territories differ, but they can also overlap. Some information can be shared because both interlocutors have experienced it, but one of them could still have a superior epistemic stance if the information in question falls within their epistemic territory. For instance, a layperson and a car mechanic can both witness a traffic accident, but the mechanic is entitled to a superior epistemic stance when assessing the damage to the involved cars. It follows that shared perception does not always guarantee that the distribution of knowledge in interaction is symmetrical; rather, the extent to which knowledge can be shared between discourse participants is gradable.

Epistemic rights are but one of the dimensions of knowledge (Stivers et al., 2011b). With rights come responsibilities: 'obligation[s] to have certain information' (Stivers et al., 2011b: 13). For instance, one has an epistemic responsibility, as well as a right, over the basic information such as one's name or address or the names of one's children. Not knowing the information over which one has epistemic responsibility might results in not being considered a fully competent interlocutor.

It should also be noted that perception is but one of the ways in which one can access information — others include reasoning about the observed events, reports, hearsay etc. In these article, all the modes of access to information are subsumed within the term *epistemic access*. For an adequate analysis of the Upper Napo Kichwa =*mari* it is also relevant to introduce the concept of *activation* (cf. e.g. Prince, 1981; Lambrecht, 1994: chap. 3; Chafe, 1987). Even if we know something, the relevant information is not activated if it remains outside of the current focus or our awareness or attention.

3. Analysis: =*mari*, epistemic stance and territories of knowledge

The potential influence from the discourse context, the interpersonal configuration of interaction and the multiple epistemic parameters involved make it necessary, in particular when looking at naturalistic discourse, to approach the analysed epistemic expressions with some initial assumptions or hypotheses. In case of the analysis of =*mari* developed below, the underlying assumptions emerged from the analysis of other markers in the Upper Napo Kichwa epistemic paradigm (Grzech, 2016, 2020b). The members of the paradigm which I analysed to date encode parameters related to epistemic authority, i.e. 'the relative right to know or claim' (Heritage and Raymond, 2005; Stivers et al., 2011b: 13) and to whether the knowledge is shared. The latter, as mentioned previously, is also encoded by epistemic marking in some varieties of Quechua in Peru (Hintz and Hintz, 2017). The semantic distinctions relevant for the other markers were the first epistemic categories considered in the analysis of =*mari*. It was also assumed that, alike the other markers in the paradigm, =*mari* is used by Upper Napo Kichwa native speakers to construct a particular epistemic stance in conversation.

In this section, I look into what kind of epistemic stance =*mari* is used to construct, and how this construction is achieved. To that end, I first examine a representative selection of the uses of =*mari*, analysing the clitic's contribution to the utterance and the pragmatic context of its use (3.1). Secondly, I look into the syntactic forms and interactional functions of =*mari*-marked utterances (3.2).

3.1. =*mari* and the construction of epistemic stance in conversation

As shown in examples (1) and (2) in Section 1, the meaning of =*mari* seems to be related to negotiating epistemic authority. The particular aspect of its meaning that stands out is signaling that, although the addressee should be aware of some information, they act as if they were not. This was particularly evident in example (2) above, and also obtains for example (3) below. Here, husband and wife are narrating the *Pear Story*. When it was the husband's turn to talk, he did not start despite my having prompted him to do so. His wife reacted:

(3)
*Kanda,   kan**mari**!*
kan-ta   kan=**mari**!
2SG-ACC   2SG=**MARI**
'[she is talking] to you, you'

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In this case, =*mari* adds an additional force to the utterance, which could be interpreted as the wife saying something along the lines of 'I heard the linguist called you. You should have noticed but you didn't.' Indeed, after her utterance, the husband immediately turns his attention to me.

As already mentioned in Section 1, the examples above could suggest that the marker is used to indicate epistemic responsibility. However, epistemic responsibility is associated with information belonging to one's personal domain or − in Kamio's (1997) terms − one's 'territory of information', which includes personal information and actions, and information about one's family and professional domain. Thus, if the interpretation of =*mari* as a marker of the addressee's epistemic responsibility was correct, it would be expected to frequently occur in 2nd person contexts. This, however, is not the case, and (3) is the only instance of the marker occurring in such a context in the data. On the other hand, the data contains 5 occurrences of =*mari* on verbs inflected for 1st person singular, as well as occurrences on 1st person predicates and in utterances about the personal domain of the speaker, as shown in (4) and (5), respectively.

(4)

1. AA: | *Imaranga* | | *shina* | *rimanguichi* | *kawnara,* | *'alara* | *kuy'* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ima-ta | a-nga | shina | rima-nguichi | kanguna-ta, | ala-ta | ku-i |
| what-ACC | COP-FUT | like.this | talk-2PL | 2PL-ACC | crest-ACC | give-2SG.IMP |

2. | *nipi,* | *kunaga* | *rechasanun....* | *ñuka* | *mal* | *sakirini.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ni-kpi | kuna-ga | {rechasa}[4]-nun | ñuka | {mal} | saki-ri-ni |
| say-SWREF | now=TOP | refuse-3PL | 1PL | badly | leave-ANTIC-1 |

'What is it that you say, saying 'give [us] the [chicken's] crest', now you refuse [to take] it and I lose face'

3. AA: | *Ruku**mari*** | *ani* | *ñuka,* | *mana* | *wawa,* | *kawna* | *burlana…* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ruku=**mari** | a-ni | ñuka | mana | wawa, | kanguna | {burla}-na |
| old=**MARI** | COP-1 | 1SG | NEG | child | 2PL | joke-INF |

'I am old, I'm not a child, for you to mock…'

4. WA: | *Mana,* | *mana* | *piñarinundzu* | | *kanda.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| mana | mana | piña-ri-nun=chu | | kan-ta |
| NEG | NEG | quarrel-ANTIC-3PL=Q/NEG | | 2SG-ACC |

'No, no, they are not arguing with you.'

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In (4) AA complains to the camera crew that they asked her for a favour only to reject it. In line 3, AA uses =*mari* to make an assertion about her age, underlining the point that she should be taken seriously. The =*mari*-marked assertion is a 1st person predicate, relating to the territory of information of the speaker − her age. Thus, in this case it is not reasonable to interpret =*mari* as a marker of the addressee's epistemic responsibility, since this information is within the epistemic territory of the speaker, not the addressee. The same holds for (5), where RD uses the marker when she informs her interlocutors about how many children she has.

(5)

1. ES: | *Kuna,* | *imasna* | *wawara* | *charingui* | *kuna* | *kay…* | *mushukwaga?* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| kuna | imasna | wawa-ta | chari-ngui | kuna | kay… | mushu-wa=ga |
| now | how | child-ACC | have-2 | now | P.DEM | new-DIM=TOP |

'Now, how many children do you have with the new [husband]?'

2. RD: | *Cuatro**mari***. |
|---|
| {cuatro}=**MARI** |
| four=mari |

3. ES: | *Tukuy,* | *imasna* | *wawara* | *charingui?* | *Tukuy* | *kambaj...* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| tukuy | imasna | wawa-ta | chari-ngui | tukuy | kan-paj |
| all | how | child-ACC | have-2 | all | 2SG-PURP |

'All in all, how many children do you have? All of yours…'

4. RD: | *Ña* | *kuna* | *kaywaga…* | *doce**mari*** | *ñukak.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ña | kuna | kay-wa=ga | {doce}=**mari** | ñuka-k |
| well | now | P.DEM-DIM=TOP | twelve=**MARI** | 1SG-BEN |

'Well, now with this little one…[there is] twelve of mine.'

5. NA: | *Doce* | *wawaguna?* |
|---|---|
| {doce} | wawa-guna |
| twelve | child-PL |

'Twelve children??'

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4 {} mark borrowings from the major contact language, Spanish. Convention found in Nikolaeva (2014).

In (5), the interviewers ES and NA ask RD about her life experience. ES, who arranged the interview, knows RD reasonably well. Consequently, when ES asks about how many children RD has, the interviewee has reasons to believe that ES already knows this, and asks only for the purpose of the interview. This assumption is confirmed by ES's follow-up question in line 3. If he did not know how many children RD has, he would have no reason to enquire again after her response from line 2. Thus, the =*mari*-marked information about how many children RD has (lines 2 and 4) is in the personal domain of the speaker, but also known to the addressee, ES. Examples (4) and (5) therefore suggest that, rather than marking epistemic responsibilities of the addressee, the meaning of =*mari* is intersubjective; Its semantics seems to be related to the epistemic stance and status of both the speaker and the addressee. The way =*mari* is used in conversation, including its distribution with 1st and 2nd person in (3) and (4), as well as its use in the 'competition' for epistemic authority, shown in (1), suggest that when using =*mari*, the speaker considers that they have superior epistemic rights to the information in question. In other words, while the access to the information is symmetrical, the authority over it is not − the speaker has superior epistemic status and/or stance. An example situation where this would obtain could be e.g. a parent and their neighbour observing the parent's child and commenting on the child's actions. In this case, both interlocutors have the same access to how the child behaves − they both see it. However, the parent has superior epistemic rights derived from the child belonging to their 'territory of information' (see Section 2.3 above and Examples 9 and 11 below).

The examples above suggest that what triggers the use of =*mari* is the addressee's behaviour (verbal or otherwise), indicating that they are not aware of a certain piece of information to which they have epistemic access. This is shown clearly in (6), a conversation that took place during a community event:

(6)
1. YC: *Tukuy,   kasna   tason   bulltiachina   kasna…   indzira   mikuna…*
        tukuy   kasna   {tasón}   bulltia-chi-na   kasna…   indzi-ta   miku-na
        all   like.this   bowl   turn.around-CAUS-INF   like.this peanuts-ACC   eat-INF
        '[Drink] everything, [you have] to turn the bowl upside down like this, to eat the
        peanuts…[laughs]'

2. MC: [In Spanish:] *Yogúr   amazónico.*
        'Amazonian yoghurt'   [talking to the camera, showing the bowl of chicha[5]]

3. YC: *'Tukuy' nini**mari**,   imasna   ñuka upini   shina   upina   angui   kambas.*
        tukuy   ni-ni=**mari**,   imasna   ñuka upi-ni   shina   upi-na   a-ngui kan=pas
        all   say-1=**MARI**   how   1SG   drink-1 like.this drink-INF AUX-2   2SG=ADD
        'I say 'all of it', what I drink you have to drink too.'

4. MC: *Mana, chillara   upini   ñuka, mana ashkara.*
        mana   chi=lla-ta   upi-ni   ñuka   mana ashka-ta
        NEG   D.DEM=LIM-ACC drink-1 1SG   NEG   much-ACC
        'No, I drink just up to here, not much.'

                                                      ev_04102013_02   032-036

YC is serving *chicha* in a bowl, a customary thing for Kichwa women to do at community gatherings. She is playfully encouraging MC, her lifelong neighbour with whom she is on very good terms, to drink. Since MC does not comply, she insists in line 3, reminding him of her previous 'order' in a self-quotation marked with =*mari*. Still playful, in line 4 MC reiterates his refusal to drink the full bowl. This example shows that =*mari* can be interpreted as marking information which the speaker judges as accessible to the addressee, but at the same time remaining outside the addressee' awareness or attention. Line 1 is a request for action: YC urges MC to drink a full bowl of *chicha*. In line 2, MC talks to the camera, acting as if he was not aware of YC's request, so she reiterates it in line 3, using =*mari* to mark self-quotation of the previous utterance, which MC should by now be aware of, but acts as if he is not. This reiterated, =*mari*-marked claim finally elicits a response from MC. In line 4, he explicitly rejects YC's request to drink the full bowl.

The interpretation of the semantics of =*mari* which I propose above is easy to sustain in cases of immediate perception or shared access to events occurring at the moment of speech. In such cases, establishing the epistemic status of each discourse participant is relatively straightforward, as shown in examples (3) to (6). The interpretation of =*mari* as marking information over which the speaker has epistemic rights, and which she/he judges as accessible to the addressee, but not recognised as such, is consistent with all the examples in the sample where the marked proposition can be traced back to immediate discourse context or immediate perception.

However, epistemic access and rights are harder to track and analyse in cases where the information which the speaker assumes the addressee is aware of is not derived from immediate perception, but from cultural norms, experience or other, more arbitrary sources (cf. also Mitchell, this volume). In such cases, the speaker's assumptions about potentially shared knowledge, or accessibility of certain information to the addressee, is not easily verifiable. Consider (7) below. The example comes from an interactive task in which two consultants were asked to talk about videos showing reciprocal situations (Evans

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[5] The most typical local drink made from mashed, fermented yuca.

et al., 2004). Having trouble with the interpretation of the videos, the speakers try to understand them with reference to the local cultural practices.

(7)
(In 4 previous lines, NA talks about his interpretation of the video where the characters great each other with a handshake. The interpretation continues in the following exchange.)

1. NA: *Kay   pay   nijpi   ñuka   salurani   kambas   salurangui…   pay   randi*
        kay   pay   ni -kpi   ñuka   {salura}-ni   kan=pas   {salura}-ngui   pay   randi
        P.DEM 3SG   say-SWREF   1SG   greet-1   2SG=ADD   greet-2   3SG   rather

2.   *paywa   churimachari   saluran   o   shina   kachunma*
        pay -pa   churi ima=chari   {salura}-n {o} shina   kachun   -ma
        3SG -GEN   son   what=CHARI   greet-3   or   like.this   daughter.in.law -DAT

3.   *parijumandami   salurarinun   shina.*
        {pariju}-manda=mi   salura-ria-nun   shina
        equally -ABL =MI   greet-PROG-3PL   like.this
        'As one says, I greet, you also greet…him, on the other hand, he greets his son
        or someone…also his daughter-in-law, they are greeting each other like this.

4. NA: *Ñuka   shina   rikuni   kaybi…   kaybi…   paynapura…*
        ñuka   shina   riku-ni   kay-pi   kay-pi   payguna-pura
        1SG   like.this   see-1   P.DEM-LOC P.DEM-LOC 3PL-among
        'That's what I see here…here among them.' [in the video the consultants watched]

5. JC: *Ñuka   rikukpi   chi   kan   nishka   anga,*
        ñuka   riku-kpi   chi   kan   ni-shka   a-nga
        1SG   see-SWREF   D.DEM   2SG   say-ANT   AUX-FUT

        *maykambi   kumba   tukusha**mari**…*
        maykambi   {kumba}   tuku-sha=**mari**
        sometimes   compadre   become-COR=**MARI**
        'According to me it is like you say, sometimes when we become godparents [we greet like this]'

6. NA: *Mjm*
        aha
        INTER
        'Yeah'

7. JC: *'kunaga   kumbami   tukunchi,   kunaga   kumbami   tukunchi'…*
        kuna=ga   {kumba} =mi   tuku -nchi   now =ga   {kumba}=mi   tuku -nchi
        now=TOP   compadre=MI   become-1PL   now =TOP   compadre=MI   become-1PL
        '[saying] *now we become compadres, now we become compadres* [we shake hands]
        …'

8. NA: *Saluraraw   shina,   ari,   shinakwinta   ñakas.*
        {salura}-ra-u   shina   ari   shina -kwinta   ñakas
        greet-COV-PROG   like.this   yes   like.this-SEMBL   almost
        'As if they were doing the greeting, yes, almost like
        this.'

9. JC: *Ari.*
        ari
        yes
        'Yes.'

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In lines 1 to 4, NA gives his opinion about the characters' actions. In response, JC contributes his own opinion, which in this case constitutes a second assessment. He explicitly agrees with NA, but adds a culturally relevant explanation of the events in the video. The characters greet each other as Kichwa people do when they become *compadres*, united by being godparents to each other's children. Becoming *compadres* is an extremely important cultural practice that both interlocutors are familiar with. However, by making a =*mari*-marked statement in line 5, JC presents himself as having superior epistemic stance, probably because he is the one to have discovered the parallel between the behavior of the strange people in the video and a familiar, more easily interpretable cultural practice.

In (7), it is straightforward to establish that the information referred to with the =*mari*-marked statement is shared, despite not being experienced at the moment of speaking. NA and JC are of roughly the same age, and they are lifelong neighbours whose families are in the relationship of *compadrazgo* with one another. However, from a researcher's perspective, it is not always easy to know whether the knowledge is actually shared. Consider the exchange in (8), which occurred during a cooking session recorded for the documentation project, where the expert (MC) was teaching the interviewer (WA) how to make a traditional dish, *maito*:

(8)

1. MC: *O   kaymas,   riki kay purawamas   shaychi,   ari*
          {O} kay-ma=pas   riki kay   pura-wa-ma=pas   shaya-chi   ari
          or   P.DEM-DAT=ADD see   P.DEM side-DIM-DAT=ADD   stand-CAUS   yes
          'Or here too, look, put [it] to this side, exactly.'

2. MC: *Cheska* (…) *takashkasupay***mari**   *mashti   tumati   imaras,   shina.*
          chi=ga   taka-shka-supay=**mari**   ima.shuti {tomate} ima=ta=pas   shina
          D.DEM=TOP   smash-ANT-AUG=**MARI**   what.is.it tomato   what=INT=ADD   like.this
          'This one has also been totally smashed, what is it, as it if it was a tomato [tomato-like pepper], like this.'

3   WA: *Ima   uchuray   kayga?*
          Ima   uchu=ta=i   kay=ga
          what   chili.pepper=INT=EMPH   P.DEM=TOP
          'What type of a chili pepper is this?'

4. MC: *Alli   puka uchu,   atun mashti…   ima ninun…   payguna ninun…*
          alli   puka uchu   atun ima.shuti   ima   ni-nun   payguna   ni-nun
          good   red   chili.pepper big   what.is.it   what   say-3PL   3PL   say-3PL

5. MC: *Tumati   uchurukumi   ninundzu,   atun uchuruku***mari**.
          {tomate}   uchu-ruku=mi   ni-nun=chu   atun   uchu-ruku=**mari**
          tomato   chili.pepper-AUG=MI   say-3PL=Q/NEG big   chili.pepper=**MARI**
          'Tomato-like chili pepper they call it, the big chili pepper.'

                                                                            in_20092013_02   258-264

MC and WA are both Kichwa women, coming from adjacent communities. MC was in her fifties, and WA was eighteen at the time of the interview. In line 2, the =*mari*-marked statement made by MC could be interpreted as a reference to immediate perception. I have shown above that =*mari* indicates shared epistemic access, and in this case the smashed chili is in front of the two women: WA stirs it with a spoon as she asks the question in line 3. In line 5, it is less clear what prompts the use of =*mari*. It could, potentially, be MC's expectation that as a young Kichwa woman who has spent her entire life in the community, WA is familiar with the types of locally-grown chili peppers. It could also be an attempt by MC to construct WA as a knowing interlocutor, perhaps to encourage her to learn. In this sense, (8) is similar to (1), where =*mari* was used to discursively create a knowledge discrepancy between a novice and an expert, while at the same time indexing shared epistemic access to a given piece of knowledge (cf. Mitchell, this volume, for similar use of epistemic particles in Datooga; see also Section 3.2).

In this section, I have shown that the Upper Napo Kichwa =*mari* is used to construct an epistemic position whereby the speaker assumes superior epistemic stance, but also points to shared epistemic access. For a researcher interested in epistemicity, it is impossible to always know which information is shared between interlocutors; Being able to determine this would require having access to the mental states of the interlocutors whose interaction we aim to analyse (cf. Kittilä et al., 2018). However, analysing the use of =*mari* allows us an insight into how speakers construct a given epistemic stance through their choice of how to present a given piece of information. At the same time, it is crucial to remember that the use of the marker can be motivated both by actually having certain knowledge, and by merely wanting to adopt a certain epistemic stance. Thus, the decision about whether to use the marker might sometimes be a feature of a personal style (Gipper, 2019), as well as be motivated by politeness or by the willingness to include the addressee as 'knowing' for pedagogical reasons.

3.2. =*mari* and the structure of discourse

In the previous section I proposed that =*mari* indexes shared epistemic access in situations where the speaker assumes the addressee fails to recognise having such access. If discursive action indeed is best examined through reaction (Heritage, 2012: 2), the use of =*mari* implies that the interlocutor might have indicated lack of epistemic access in their prior actions or turns, despite the fact that they should have had access to the information in question. If the above semantic/pragmatic characterisation of =*mari* is accurate, we should be able to find further evidence for it in the syntactic structure and interactional functions of the utterances containing the clitic. This is the goal of the current section.

In order to examine the patterns of the use of =*mari*, I analysed 126 tokens of the marker attested in interactive discourse. This includes 115 tokens from the 'naturalistic discourse' corpus, and 11 out of the 13 tokens attested in 'staged communicative

Table 1
Syntactic form of utterances containing =*mari*.

Sentence type	Number of tokens	% of tokens
declarative	122	96.8
imperative	1	0.8
interrogative	3	2.4
Total	**126**	**100**

events' (see Section 2.2). I examined this data with respect to the syntactic form of the clause in which =*mari* occurred (Table 1), as well as the position of =*mari*-marked turns in adjacency pairs and the actions achieved by those turns (Table 2).[6]

Table 1 shows that a vast majority of the uses of =*mari* occurred in declarative clauses. This is to be expected, given that the clitic indexes a knowing epistemic stance of the speaker − default in declaratives (cf. e.g. Faller, 2002). Thus, what would be expected is that the marker should occur in declarative clauses, in turns which are used to answer questions or − given thath =*mari* also indexes shared epistemic access − to give the interlocutor additional information about the matter at hand. This is confirmed by the data in Table 2: 100 out of 126 tokens (i.e. almost 80%) of the enclitic are used to accomplish the discursive actions of informing (n = 56, 44.5%) or answering a question (n = 44, 35%). Such 'canonical' use of =*mari* is exemplified below:

(9)

LC:	*J.*	*compadre*	*ima*	*wasira*	*rawn?...*		*cosina...?*
	J.	{compadre}	ima	wasi-ta	ra-u-n		{cocina}
	NAME	compadre	what	house-ACC	make-PROG-3		kitchen
	'How is *compadre* J. doing with the house? [Will he make the]						
	kitchen?'						

SA:	*Mana,*	*mana*	*rawn**mari**.*
	mana	mana	ra-u-n=**mari**
	NEG	NEG	make-PROG-3=**MARI**
	'No, he is not doing [anything].'		

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In (9), the interlocutors belong to the same extended family. LC knows that J. is not progressing with building the house, but nonetheless asks his wife (SA), for confirmation. What goes on in SA's house is within her private sphere, but houses are constructed in such a way that anyone passing by − including her neighbour and relative, LC − can see that J. is not making any progress on the kitchen. Thus, SA's use of =*mari* is warranted by the fact that the women have shared access to the information. In the discussion that follows, I discuss the less frequent patterns attested in Tables 1 and 2.

Let us first consider =*mari* in non-declaratives. Its one use in an imperative utterance is shown in (10), an exchange between a mother and a child who was asked to bring the mother's purse, but cannot find it.

(10)

Mother:	{*Miyu*	*digo*...}	*ñukajta**mari**...*		*maskay!*
	{mío	digo}	ñuka-j-ta=**mari**		maska-i
	mine	I.say	1SG-BEN-ACC=**MARI**		look.for-2SG.IMP
	'I say mine. Mine...look for [it]!'				

Child:	[In Spanish:] *Pues digo no hay...*
	'But I say it's not there...'

in_25052013_1_02   185-187

Here, =*mari* occurs when the mother reiterates a previously given instruction to find the purse, which the child was not able to carry out. Although this is the only example of =*mari* in a syntactically imperative clause[7], the clitic is used in several more instances of 'requests for action' (n = 6, cf. Table 2). The other requests are syntactically declarative, e.g. clauses which repeat the previous imperative utterance (cf. line 3 of example (6) above). Thus, it seems that =*mari* is used in functionally or syntactically imperative turns in line with the semantics discussed in Section 3.1; The inaction of the addressee leads the speaker to assume that they are not aware of how they should proceed, which triggers a =*mari*-marked instruction.

Unlike in the case of requests, the number of =*mari*-marked questions aligns exactly with the number of syntactic interrogatives in the data (n = 3). Example (11) represents the interrogative use of =*mari*, although it comes not from the recorded corpus, but from an attested real-life situation.

Table 2
Distribution of =*mari* across sequential positions and discourse actions.

	Utterance position			
	FPP	SPP	PoEx	Total
Action				
informing	25	6	25	56
answer		44		44
request for action	6			6
assessment	3	1	1	5
confirmation		1	2	3
question	3			3
evaluation		2		2
approval		1		1
correction		1		1
denial		1		1
elaboration			1	1
exclamation			1	1
permission		1		1
warning		1		1
Total	**37**	**59**	**30**	**126**

(11)
*Abi**mari**   kaywas?*
Abi=**mari**   kay-wa=pas
NAME=**MARI**   P.DEM-DIM=ADD
'Is this Abi's too?'

                                                                                        attested

The utterance occurred when two women were putting away recently washed clothes. The speaker knows Abi (a little girl) very well, while the addressee is Abi's aunt, now washing the girl's clothes. The speaker takes one of the items on the pile and shows it to the addressee, uttering (11). The analysis of =*mari* in declarative contexts allows us to predict the function of the clitic in an interrogative utterance such as (11). We can expect that the marker will index shared access, but – by virtue of origo shift – designate the addressee, rather than the speaker, as the primary knower. This is the case in (11), where the speaker's intended meaning is along the lines of 'Does this belong to Abi? I am not sure, but I know you know'. This same characterisation of =*mari* also obtains for the tokens attested in the interrogative clauses in the corpus. All three tokens occur in confirmation, rather than content questions. This, again, is to be expected given that =*mari* indexes shared epistemic access. A straight-forward request for information would index the speaker as having an un-knowing epistemic status (Heritage, 2012: 16), while in case of confirmations, the speaker can also claim epistemic access to the matter at hand. Consider:

(12)
1. MC: *Chayashka**mari**.   Chayashka**mari**.   Apastay!*
        chaya-shka=**mari**   chaya-shka=**mari**   apasta-i
        boil-ANT=**MARI**   boil-ANT=**MARI**   put.away-2SG.IMP
        'It's boiled, it's boiled! Put it away [from the fire]!'

2. WA: *Chayashka?   Kasna**mari**?*
        chaya-shka   kasna=**mari**
        boil-ANT   like.this=**MARI**
        'Boiled? [starts to put the
        pot away] Like this?'

3. MC: *Ari,   kayma....   ari.*
        ari   kay-ma   ari
        yes   P.DEM-DAT   yes
        'Yes, here...yes'

                                        in_20092013_03   156-158

This example comes from the same 'cooking lesson' context as (8) above. Here too, the primary knower is the addressee of the question in line 2: MC, whose epistemic stance in this exchange is that of a teacher. In (13) below, =*mari*-marked interrogative is also uttered by the less experienced and directed at the expert addressee. The conversation takes place between a midwife (CG) and NA, the husband of a heavily pregnant woman CG is visiting. NA joins the conversation as the women discuss the position of the baby, who appears to have turned in the womb.

(13)
1. CG: *Chi,   kasna   tianamari   aka...*
       chi   kasna   tia-na=**mari**   a-ka
       D.DEM   like.this be-INF=**MARI**   COP-PST
       'This, it should be like this [the head].'

2. NA: *Mjm*
       aha
       INTER
       'Right'

3. CG: *Umawa   kayway   tiajta   kayway,   day   jejeje.*
       uma-wa   kay-wa-pi tia-j-ta   kay-wa-pi   day   hahaha
       head-DIM P.DEM-DIM-LOC be-AG.NMLZ-ACC P.DEM-DIM-LOC IDEO (laughs)
       'The little head being here, just here, *day*.'

4. NA: *Bultiarindza,   allimari   bultiarin?*
       bultiari-n=cha   alli=**mari**   bultiari-n
       turn.around-3=CHA   well=**MARI**   turn.around-3
       'Did it turn around, turned around the right way?'

5. CG: *Mjm,   bultiarindá.*
       aha   bultiari-n=tá
       INTER   turn.around-3=TÁ
       'Yes, it did turn around.'

                                                   co_06112014_01   067-071

Lines 1 and 3 are the midwife's assessment of the baby's position. In line 4, the father asks about the baby, first disclaiming his epistemic authority with =*cha*, and then asking a =*mari*-marked question, which indicates the midwife as having a superior epistemic stance. However, NA has just heard the midwife's assessment, so his use of =*mari* could be interpreted as asking for clarification, to make sure that he interpreted the previous utterances correctly.

Example (13) can also serve as an illustration of another pattern in the data which, at first glance, countered the analysis of the marker as indicating joint epistemic access. Table 2 shows that 37 tokens of =*mari* (ca. 29%) occurred in 'first part parts' of adjacency pairs. Such use is illustrated in line 1 of (13) above. Given that =*mari* indexes shared epistemic access, its use in the first part of an adjacency pair could be surprising. However, in (13) this could be explained by the fact that NA has default epistemic authority over the matters concerning the baby as its father; the baby is in his personal sphere by virtue of his status, whereas the midwife has experiential access to its position through touching NA's wife's belly. Of the 37 tokens of =*mari* in first parts of adjacency pairs, 28 can be explained as above: =*mari*-marked turns preform an action of assessment (n = 3) or informing (n = 25), where joint access to the proposition can be traced to prior discourse, immediate perception or shared cultural knowledge. The remaining 9 tokens of the clitic in first pair parts occur either in questions (n = 3) or in requests for action (n = 6), both of which were discussed above.

4. Conclusions

The analysis developed in this paper has shown that the Upper Napo Kichwa =*mari* is an epistemic marker encoding shared access to knowledge by the speaker and the addressee (although epistemic rights are skewed towards the speaker), as well as the speaker's assumption that the addressee has not recognised having epistemic access in the local context of the interaction. This characterisation, although complex, is supported by the patterns attested in the Upper Napo Kichwa corpus. It is also congruent with studies which show that the use of evidential markers in Quechuan languages is not conditioned solely by source of evidence for or mode of access to a given information. Studies show that in certain varieties of Peruvian Quechua (South Conchucos, Sihuas, Huamalíes) evidential marking also allows to distinguish whether knowledge is individual or shared (Hintz and Hintz, 2017). Huamalíes Quechua also has enclitics which mark co-constructed knowledge, i.e. knowledge 'established as the outcome of a co-operative enquiry (…) between the two parties in the interaction' (Howard, 2012: 250). Therefore, in many Quechuan languages, 'evidential' markers have a stance-taking function at their core (cf. Howard, 2012), related to expressing the perspective of the speaker as opposed to the perspectives of other discourse participants (cf. e.g. Nuckolls 2008; 2012; 2018). This analysis is in line with the observations regarding the Upper Napo Kichwa =*mari* developed in this paper.

Moreover, by providing a detailed analysis of =*mari* as an epistemic marker with a very specific semantics and certain pragmatic contexts of use, this paper also contributes to the description of the cognates of the marker in Quechuan languages. As mentioned in Section 2.1, =*mari* has often been analysed as an emphatic equivalent of the direct evidential =*mi*, but the analysis developed here suggests that there is possibly more to the semantic difference between the two clitics than just emphasis, however the latter would be defined.

Finally, it should be underlined that the complex epistemic semantics of discourse markers is also attested in a host of other lesser-known languages described to date. The Datooga particle *néadá* (cf. Mitchell, this volume) can be used both to

challenge the interlocutor's epistemic stance and to establish 'an assumption of shared experience and understanding'. Grammaticalised markers with similar semantics have also been attested e.g. in Kogi (Arawako-Chibchan, Colombia; Bergqvist, 2018) or Yurakaré (isolate, Bolivia; Gipper, 2015, 2019). Like Upper Napo Kichwa, the languages mentioned above are spoken in small communities. As already mentioned in Section 1, members of small communities share large amounts of knowledge. This shared knowledge can originate from different, overlapping sources, including cultural practice, history, subsistence practices, and everyday experience shared with neighbours, family and community. Consequently, speakers who belong to small communities need to keep track of the multiple possible sources of shared knowledge, as well as of the overlapping sources of epistemic rights. Complex epistemic systems, like the one discussed in this paper, can facilitate these tasks. In a context where one shares most of their life experience with a small group of people, minor distinctions related to being aware of some information, which are expressed by markers such as =*mari*, might well be crucial for communicating epistemic rights and responsibilities with a sufficient level of granularity. Moreover, the use of particular epistemic expressions, especially those that emphasise the shared nature of knowledge, might play an important role in achieving smooth social interaction and regulating potentially conflictive situations related to competition over epistemic rights (cf. Mushin, this volume, Mitchell, this volume).

Although this paper focuses only on the epistemic clitics, and particularly one of them, this should not be taken to imply that these enclitics are the only linguistic resource which Upper Napo Kichwa speakers use to manage epistemic issues in discourse. From a functional point of view, epistemic marking is used to achieve social and interactional goals, and other resources, e.g. those related to sequentiality of discourse and organisation of turns can be used to the same effect (e.g. Heritage, 2012; Heritage and Raymond, 2005; Schegloff, 1996). As stated by Mushin (2001: 57), 'it is rarely the case that the burden of a particular communicative function is carried out by only one type of form'. Given the limited scope of this paper, I only look at one morphological element dedicated to expressing an epistemic meaning, but this does not preclude the existence of other linguistic resources that could be used for a similar communicative purposes in Upper Napo Kichwa.

Functionally-oriented literature has long established that languages develop strategies for displaying an monitoring epistemic stances, and that epistemic vigilance is crucial for communication (cf. Sperber et al., 2010). As observed by Clark (1996: 96):

> (…) [P]eople take a proposition to be common ground in a community only when they believe they have a proper shared basis for the proposition in that community. If this (…) is correct, people should work hard to find shared bases for their common ground, and that should affect how they proceed in language use.

This observation might be particularly applicable to small communities where people have a limited number of relationships over the course of their lifetime. The existence of evidential, egophoric and other epistemic markers dedicated primarily to establishing how information is acquired, known and shared — many of which are used in small language communities — could be taken as confirming Clark's observation. People do 'work hard' to establish a shared basis for knowing, and languages dedicate resources — grammaticalised or not — to disambiguating the interlocutors' epistemic states in conversation. Much more work remains to be done on those systems, many of which are — like the Upper Napo Kichwa clitic paradigm — not syntactically obligatory, and thus pose additional research issues. In order to fully grasp the functions of epistemic marking in interaction, we need to not only understand what the markers contribute to a given utterance, but also what communicative motivations prompt the speakers to use them at a given point in discourse.

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