Exercising Peace
Conflict Preventionism, Neoliberalism, and the New Military

Mattias Viktorin
For Alva
Contents

Abbreviations ....................................................................................................................... xi
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................. 13
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 15

1. Convergence: Sweden, the Military, the World ......................................................... 41
   The Military .................................................................................................................. 43
   Foreign Intervention ..................................................................................................... 46
   Traditional Peacekeeping ............................................................................................ 46
   “An Agenda for Peace” ............................................................................................... 47
   Failure: Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda ................................................................................ 48
   A New Concept of Peace Support Operations .............................................................. 49
   Human Rights ............................................................................................................... 51
   Origins ......................................................................................................................... 51
   Contemporary Debates ............................................................................................... 52
   Anthropological Approaches ...................................................................................... 54
   Sweden, the Military, the World .................................................................................. 55
   The Courtyard Coup .................................................................................................... 56
   “Our Preparedness is Good” ....................................................................................... 58
   Opération des Nations Unies au Congo ....................................................................... 63
   “Whiskey-on-the-Rocks” ............................................................................................ 66
   “Don’t Shoot, I’m from Sweden” ................................................................................ 68

2. Aggregation: Civil-Military Cooperation at Work ....................................................... 71
   Civil-Military Cooperation .......................................................................................... 71
   Military Humanitarianism, Humanitarian Militarism—or Neoliberalization? ............. 72
   In Formation ............................................................................................................... 74
   Emergent Entanglements ............................................................................................. 76
   The Main Planning Conference .................................................................................... 76
   Informal Relations ....................................................................................................... 77
   Orientation Devices ..................................................................................................... 79
   Civil-Military Groups and Boundaries ........................................................................ 80
   Competitive Humanitarianism ..................................................................................... 83
   Rethinking Roles and Relations .................................................................................. 85
   From Aggregation to Assemblage ................................................................................. 86
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>American Anthropological Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BFOR</td>
<td>Bogalnd Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRC</td>
<td>Bogaland Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFL</td>
<td>Cease-Fire Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Core Planning Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXEVAL</td>
<td>Exercise Evaluation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBA</td>
<td>Folke Bernadotte Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOI</td>
<td>Swedish Defense Research Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPC</td>
<td>Final Planning Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILAC</td>
<td>International Legal Assistance Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>Main Planning Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>Network of Concerned Anthropologists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>Opération des Nations Unies au Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPS</td>
<td>Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTF</td>
<td>Peace Team Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWS</td>
<td>Real World Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANT</td>
<td>Swedish Anthropological Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Supreme Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDWC</td>
<td>Swedish Defense Wargaming Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMA</td>
<td>Swedish Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMTECH</td>
<td>Simulation Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedint</td>
<td>Swedish Armed Forces International Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SweFOR</td>
<td>Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UI</td>
<td>Swedish Institute of International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCHR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIB</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bogaland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOGIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observations Group in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOB</td>
<td>Visitors and Observers Bureau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgments

This book draws on research conducted under the auspices of the larger interdisciplinary project “Kosmopolit: Culture and Politics in Global Society,” and I am grateful for the funding provided by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation. My work has been generously supported also by research grants from the Swedish Fulbright Commission, the Gålö Foundation, and the Helge Ax:son Johnsson Foundation.

At the critical phase of designing this project, Eyal Ben-Ari’s and Erna Danielsson’s enthusiasm and suggestions were reassuring and of great help. During my subsequent fieldwork—within the Viking 03 project and in other contexts—I incurred many more debts. I want to thank in particular Stefan Ceder, Anders Johansson, Nicolas Roduit, Jenny Lundgren, Marika Ericson, and Fredrik Wallenberg. Thanks also to Malin Ahlander, Jonas Alberoth, Margareta Andemo, Maria Asplund, Elisabeth Backe, Göran Bergström, Thorleif Boman, Björn Carlsson, Carl Colliander, Conny Ekdahl, Bengt Ekholm, Lars Eliasson, Göran Engdar, Kent Fredriksson, Lina Frödin, Lars Glad, Göran Gunnarsson, Harriet Jacobsson, Annelie Jansson, Kerstin Karlén, Anna Kåsjö, Frank Larsson, Jan Lindahl, Lars Lindberg, Lars Listi, Elisabeth Löfgren, Cenneth Quick, Rolf Lövstrand, Johan Sandler, Peter Schneider, Marcus Sjöström, Charlotte Svensson, and Maria Wahlberg.

In the Department of Social Anthropology at Stockholm University, I am most indebted to my thesis advisor, Ulf Hannerz, who continuously offered support and intellectual guidance. He patiently read and commented on all drafts and generously shared his time and knowledge. I have greatly appreciated and benefited from our conversations over the years. Gudrun Dahl and Christina Garsten, too, offered early and ongoing help, encouragement, and inspiration that much improved my work. Johan Lindquist and Erik Nilsson are friends and colleagues who have engaged with this project over a long time, and their input at various stages has been invaluable. My three compadres in the Vasa Seminar—Urban Larssen, Philip Malmgren, and Hans Tunestad—also deserve special recognition. Always merciless and to the point, their critique literally forced me to improve. In addition, I would like to thank all my other colleagues who in different ways make the Stockholm anthropology department an inspiring milieu, particularly Örjan Bartholds-
son, Ulf Björklund, Bengt-Erik Borgström, Sverker Finnström, Johanna Gullberg, Eva-Maria Hardtmann, Anna Hasselström, Tova Höjdestrand, Anette Nyqvist, Per Ståhlberg, Renita Thedvall, Susann Ullberg, and Helena Wulff. Thanks also to the department’s administrative staff: Lena Holm, Annelore Ploum Jonnarth, and Petra Pålsson.

I spent the academic year 2006/2007 as a Fulbright visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, and I am grateful to the faculty, staff, and graduate students in the UC Berkeley anthropology department who helped make my year a great experience. First I want to thank my advisor, Aihwa Ong. She gave support and advice both during and outside her office hours, and read and provided valuable feedback on parts of the manuscript. Paul Rabinow’s help, too, improved this project considerably. He engaged with my material in a very generous way, and also took time to read and comment on one of the chapters. I benefited in addition from conversations with Liisa Malkki and Jim Ferguson at Stanford University. Several Berkeley graduate students became good friends: Jerome Whittington, Alberto Sanchez-Allred, and Limor Darash all read one or more chapters and offered challenging response; and I am particularly grateful to Kevin Karpiak for letting me stay with him while I was looking for an apartment. Laura Hubbard’s hospitality, too, was much appreciated. Also, I was fortunate to get to know Robin Higashi, Adrian McIntyre, Erin Mahaffey, Jelani Mahiri, Amelia Moore, Mary Murrell, Meg Stalcup, and Anthony Stavrianakis. And thanks are due to Ann Gilbert, the department’s academic personnel coordinator, for being extremely helpful and friendly.

I owe special thanks to Bengt-Erik Borgström, Gudrun Dahl, Christina Garsten, Ulf Hannerz, Urban Larssen, Johan Lindquist, Philip Malmgren, Per Ståhlberg, Hans Tunestad, and Charlotta Viktorin who read the entire manuscript. Their comments and suggestions made this a much better study.

Yet, my greatest dept is to my wife Charlotta Viktorin, who has sustained me during the writing of this book. Not only by discussing my ideas with me, inspiring me, and helping me to improve—but also on a much more profound level. I feel extremely fortunate to have her as my partner in life. Finally, I want to dedicate this book to our daughter Alva, who brings so much happiness to us.

Stockholm, August 2008
Mattias Viktorin
Introduction

To act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin […] to set something into motion.

— Hannah Arendt

I. Conflict Preventionism

“THE WORLD AROUND US IS CHANGING, AND SO ARE WE.” The heading was in conspicuous block letters and adjacent to a full-page photograph depicting two models. Yet while deliberately reminiscent of a fashion advertisement this was clearly something different. The models carried firearms and the outfits were military uniforms. A caption in small print read, “The new desert uniform M/90 to the right, has been tried out for instance by the Swedish Rapid Deployment Platoon FSO9 in Mazar-i-Sharif in Afghanistan.” In the main text, the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, Håkan Syrén, claimed that, “We now live in a different era” in which we face “new kinds of threats” that call for novel approaches to “peace and security.” The new desert uniform on display, he suggested, constituted “an apt illustration” of this transformation.

On May 4, 2006, this ad covered an entire spread in all major Swedish newspapers, thus initiating a nationwide “knowledge campaign” about the transformation and internationalization of the armed forces (see figure 1). At an estimated cost of 66 million Swedish kronor (approximately 10 million US dollars), the campaign also included TV commercials, a website, and subsequent public events in Stockholm and other cities. “I see it as an important task to tell the people of Sweden about this major transformation,” the Supreme Commander stated, “to explain what the development in the world

2 All translations from the Swedish advertisement are mine.
3 This advertisement, designed by the international agency DDB, was published in the two leading Swedish morning newspapers, Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet; in the free newspaper Metro; as well as in various tabloids, including Expressen and Aftonbladet. The picture was also posted as a downloadable file on the Swedish Armed Forces website, www.mil.se (accessed June 12, 2006).
around us implies, and what decisions the parliament and the government have taken concerning the future direction for the Armed Forces.”

Figure 1. “The world around us is changing, and so are we.”

The military certainly seems to be changing. In recent years, the armed services in Sweden and in other countries have downsized remarkably. Few states within the European Union (EU) now maintain strong national armies; and while traditionally the military has sought to protect the territory of a specific state, participation in international peace support operations now constitutes an increasingly important task. In these contexts, armed forces personnel often work closely with representatives from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Such civil-military partnerships suggest that not only the military is changing, but that security and humanitarianism tend increasingly to merge in particular ways.

This book takes the changing role of the military as a starting point for exploring a set of broader ongoing processes at the intersection of security and humanitarianism. The focus is on one particular assemblage, described here as conflict preventiom (see also Viktorin 2005: 270-74; 2008: 252-55). This notion brings together the transformation of the military, the prolif-

---

4 “An assemblage,” according to Stephen Collier and Aihwa Ong’s (2005: 12) definition, “is the product of multiple determinations that are not reducible to a single logic. The temporality of an assemblage is emergent. It does not always involve new forms, but forms that are shifting, in formation, or at stake.” For a more extensive conceptual discussion of “assemblage” (in relation to “problematization” and “apparatus”), see Paul Rabinow’s *Anthropos Today* (2003: 54-6). On the concept, see also Deleuze and Guattari (2005 [1980]: 503-5).
eration of civil-military cooperation, and the increasing interest in managing and preventing violent conflicts within a single framework.5

Among academics and other commentators, opposing positions have emerged in response to these transformations. One is mainly supportive. According to this perspective, improving civil-military cooperation is imperative for succeeding in international attempts at managing conflicts (see, e.g., Lang 2003; Marten 2004; O’Hanlon 2003; Weiss 1999; Wenger and Möckli 2003). The other position is largely critical. It holds that military interventions constitute a new imperialism, and identifies civil-military cooperation as part of a process in which humanitarian aid is increasingly becoming militarized (see, e.g., Chandler 2001, 2002; Chomsky 1999; Jokic 2003b; Orford 1999, 2003; Razack 2004; Weissman 2004). Debates on interventionism, while typically involving commentators from a number of academic disciplines, thus often retain a narrow focus. The central question mostly pertains to whether, or under what conditions, intervention is justified—ethically, legally, or politically.6

Exercising Peace goes beyond these debates. It seeks instead to give form to a mode of inquiry that renders visible how various actors, concepts, and organizational techniques converge. The term conflict preventionism is analytically productive in this regard. It has emerged out of my empirical inquiry at the intersection of security and humanitarianism. As such, it is not a concept used by the people I study, but has been developed as a tool to actualize an emergent form and enable analytical thought.

The military advertisement exhibits several facets of conflict preventionism. Its invocation of the “world around us” as something that calls for urgent “responses,” signals a self-consciously interventionist approach. The attempt to inform “the people of Sweden” about the “future direction” of such responses, exemplifies both the emergence of a new directionality and the tendency to make this orientation transparent and open to scrutiny. Its form—a commercial advertisement—also suggests that with the expansion of neoliberalism states increasingly tend to operate in a businesslike manner.7

6 See also Chatterjee and Scheid (2003), Holzgrefe and Keohane (2003), Jokic (2003a), Keren and Sylvan (2002), Mills and Brunner (2003), and Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996).
7 Neoliberalism, as Wendy Larner and William Walters point out, “is used to denote nothing less than a fundamental restructuring of the world political economy over the last thirty years.” It “is associated with a series of developments across the fields of economy, society, politics and culture. These include policies such as privatization, deregulation, trade liberalization and marketization; economic phenomena such as the rise of transnational corporations and the power of global financial markets within capitalism; institutional developments such
The campaign thereby points to the set of questions at the center of this study: How does conflict preventionism open up a space at the intersection of security, humanitarianism, and neoliberalism where it becomes possible for civilian and military actors to collaborate? How is directionality imposed on such engagements? And how, as it emerges, does conflict preventionism help to fashion an orientated world?

II. Fieldwork

Bogaland

Imagine a scenario in which humanitarian NGOs work side by side with the military in almost perfect harmony; and how, through their mutual efforts, they ultimately succeed in bringing sustainable peace to a war-torn society. In 2003, almost a thousand people imagined precisely this—and they imagined that it happened in a place called Bogaland.

Bogaland is a fictitious country. It had been created as the training scenario for Viking 03, a major international civil-military exercise, organized by the Swedish Armed Forces. Among the participants were both military personnel and civilian NGO representatives. They came from twenty-six countries, including Sweden, France, and the United States; but also—

as the growing prominence of international economic institutions (IMF, WTO, etc.); and ideological shifts such as the valorization of the market over the state” (Larner and Walters 2004b: 8). For anthropological approaches to neoliberalism, see Gledhill (2004), Harvey (2005), and Ong (2006). Recent studies in anthropology that converge on processes of neoliberalization include Dunn (2004) on privatization in Poland; Elyachar (2005) on NGOs and economic development in Cairo; Ferguson (2006) on Africa and globalization; Hayden (2003) on bioprospecting in Mexico; and Lutz (2001: 215-53) on the US military. (See also Chapter 2 of this book.)

Sara Ahmed’s (2006) most recent book, which centers on the specific question of sexual orientation at the intersection of phenomenology and queer theory, deals in intriguing ways with the question of orientation also on a more general level—of how we find our way in a world that acquires new shapes, depending on which way we turn. “To be orientated,” she suggests, is “to be turned toward certain objects” (p. 1). “Orientations shape not only how we inhabit space, but how we apprehend this world of shared inhabitance, as well as ‘who’ or ‘what’ we direct our energy and attention toward” (p. 3). Ahmed speaks of “collective direction: of ways in which nations or other imagined communities might be ‘going in a certain direction,’ or facing the same way, such that only some things ‘get our attention.’ Becoming a member of such a community, then, might also mean following this direction, which could be described as the political requirement that we turn some ways and not others. We follow the line that is followed by others: the repetition of the act of following makes the line disappear from view as the point from which “we” emerge” (p. 15). Indeed, as we have learned from phenomenology, the world itself appears for us to be orientated. “The object,” as Ahmed puts it, “is an effect of towardness; it is the thing toward which I am directed and which in being posited as a thing, as being something or another for me, takes me in some directions rather than others” (p. 27).
perhaps more unexpectedly—from states like Albania, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan.

Viking 03 was presented as a response to contemporary violent conflicts. The goal was to bring together a diversity of actors who would work on improving civil-military cooperation, and many participants seemed to share the sense that a new collaborative approach to peace and security was called for. The main plot of the exercise was this: When a violent conflict had recurred in Bogaland over an extended period, the United Nations (UN) finally declared that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security; and when subsequently a military force led by NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) intervened in the country, peace could finally be enforced.

Viking 03 was a computer-based exercise. No troops, in other words, took part “in the field.” Instead, video clips and text documents were the most tangible representations of Bogaland and of the intervention. Producing the Bogaland scenario was one of the major tasks during the planning for the exercise. Military and civilian participants were involved together in this extensive process, which began more than a year in advance; and the scenario that evolved eventually described the fictitious country in great detail. One set of documents told the history of Bogaland and traced the origins of the conflict several hundred years back. Another set focused instead on the current situation.

I find the Viking 03 project intriguing for several reasons. It illustrates the current reorientation of the armed forces from national defense and warfighting to international intervention and peace enforcement. Viking 03 also brought together conspicuously diverse actors. For more than a year, the military organizers worked closely with NGOs such as Save the Children and Amnesty International. Furthermore, Viking 03 exemplifies the current interest in understanding, managing, and preventing violent conflicts. During the course of the planning, the fictitious Bogaland increasingly appeared as a textbook example of a “failed state.” Finally, the project-based organization of Viking 03, with its usage of scenario planning, is itself interesting. Centered on “cooperation,” “transparency,” and “audit,” it exemplifies a timely and decidedly neoliberal organizational logic. This became explicit particularly during an exhaustive project evaluation.

Siting Conflict Preventionism

In his article “From Dangerousness to Risks,” Robert Castel identifies what he calls “a profound transformation in medical practice.” This entails among other things that the “site of diagnostic synthesis is no longer that of the concrete relationship with a sick person, but a relationship constituted among
the different expert assessments which make up the patient’s dossier” (Castel 1991: 282).9

A similar transformation characterizes recent changes at the intersection of humanitarianism and security. With conflict preventionism, the need to act on certain conditions is recognized. Ultimately, Viking 03 was an attempt to develop and institutionalize technologies and procedures to enable such interventionist engagements. The Bogaland scenario comprised diverse “expert assessments” which, taken together, called for particular responses. Thus the fictitious scenario—not a real conflict—constituted a site of “diagnostic synthesis” in Castel’s sense. During the collaborative production of Bogaland, as the participants brought together heterogeneous elements, “the conflict” in fact gradually dissolved as a coherent object. Instead, it appeared as something inexhaustible demanding urgent remedial work. Viking 03 and Bogaland thereby exemplify another of Castel’s observations: a shift from an obsession with discipline to an obsession with efficiency (which on a broader level is related to recent processes of neoliberalization).10 The “chief artisan is no longer the practitioner on the ground,” as Castel phrases it, “but the administrator who plans out trajectories” (Castel 1991: 295).

Castel’s observations are noteworthy because they suggest an almost complete reversal of a traditional anthropological mode of inquiry. While anthropologists typically maintain that what happens among local practitioners “on the ground” is what really counts, Castel helps us see other spaces for inquiring into the contemporary. The Viking 03 project constitutes one such site. If we are interested in emergent directionals for engaging with the world, Viking 03 offers an opportunity to explore conflict preventionism, literally in the making. It allows us to observe how various actors take up humanitarian concepts, security procedures, and neoliberal organizational techniques and make them work and merge in particular ways.11 Ultimately the exercise illustrates how conflict preventionism, set into motion, causes “the world” to appear in ways that enable civilian and military personnel to take action.

9 Writing in 1991, Castel claimed that this transformation was currently in the process of being developed, most notably in the United States and France. “Like all important transformations,” he explained, “this one presupposes a slow preceding evolution of practices which, at a certain moment, passes a threshold and takes on the character of a mutation” (Castel 1991: 281).

10 This observation resonates with what Gernot Grabher more recently has called “situative pragmatism,” which often characterizes contemporary project-based organizations. Situative pragmatism implies that “knowledge is valued according to its usefulness to solve the specific project task rather than to the authority of its disciplinary, institutional or departmental origins” (Grabher 2004: 1492).

11 Viking 03 thus appears as a strategic research site in Ulf Hannerz’s sense. That is, an interface “where the confrontations, the interpenetrations and the flowthrough are occurring, between clusters of meaning and ways of managing meaning; […] where diversity gets, in some way and to some degree, organized” (Hannerz 1989: 211).
Viking 03 was the third exercise in a series of international civil-military projects organized by the Swedish Armed Forces.\footnote{Earlier exercises had been organized in 1999 and 2001. See also the Viking 03 Press Release, which is available online at http://www.mil.se/viking03/attachments/pressreleasevk03.pdf (accessed August 12, 2008).} Some eight hundred people took part in the 2003 project. The participants represented twenty-six countries: Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United States, and Uzbekistan.

Despite its explicitly international focus, Viking 03 also captured something decidedly Swedish. Sweden has a long history of participating in UN peacekeeping missions and, more recently, in operations led by NATO and the EU. Such international engagements have in fact often been presented as integral to the Swedish self-image as a “moral superpower.” To some extent the Viking 03 project exhibited historical continuity in that it presented a contemporary version of this image, but it also mirrored a set of critical post-Cold War transformations in the relationship between Sweden, its military, and the world (see Chapter 1).

A majority of the Viking 03 participants were military officers. But the exercise, whose main goal was to improve civil-military cooperation in peace support operations, also included a significant civilian part. The different NGOs and various other groups that participated exemplify that Viking 03, in addition to being international in the strict sense of involving different states as corporate actors, also exhibited connections that were decidedly transnational (cf. Hannerz 1996: 6). The following government agencies, international institutions, and NGOs were represented in the project: Amnesty International (AI); the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA); the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); the International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC); the National Association of Swedish Women’s Voluntary Motor Transport Corps; Save the Children; the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA); the Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation (SweFOR); the Swedish Police; the Swedish Power Grid; the Swedish Red Cross; the Swedish Rescue Services Agency; Swedish Women’s Voluntary Defence Service; and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (see Chapter 2).

Viking 03, which was conducted “in the spirit of” NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program (PFP), exemplifies that security is no longer simply defined in terms of the defense of national territorial boundaries, but rather in terms of collective defense and international security.\footnote{Only NATO member states are allowed to organize PFP exercises. Since Sweden is not a member of NATO, Viking 03 could not formally be a PFP exercise. Yet, in practice, the} The end of the Cold
War has particularly encouraged a further internationalization of security affairs, and Viking 03 resonated with the increasing emphasis placed on strengthening and extending regional cooperation on security issues. All twenty-six countries that participated, for example, were either NATO or Partnership members. Even traditionally neutral states like Sweden now seem unable to sustain their military independence (Held et al. 2000: 125).

NATO and, more recently, the EU are key forums for formulating and agreeing on defense strategies, and through the PFP program, NATO has initiated cooperation also with non-member states (see, e.g., Gudmundson 2000: 96-111). Launched in 1994, the PFP currently comprises thirty-four countries, and its overarching aim, according to the NATO website, is to “reinforce stability and reduce the risk of conflict.” More specifically, PFP seeks to establish dialogue between NATO and participating countries:

*Joint activities* and regular consultation improve transparency in national defense planning and budgeting, encourage democratic control of the armed forces and help nations equip and train to operate at the Alliance’s side, generally furthering the democratic values at the heart of NATO’s partnership policy. [...] By assisting participants with reforms, the PFP helps them build a solid democratic environment, maintain political stability and improve security.15

Through military exercises and other engagements, Sweden has taken an active role within the PFP. A recent government bill from the Ministry of Defense states that “[t]he Government is of the opinion that Sweden should continue to develop cooperation with NATO within the framework of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) initiative. Sweden should also take existing opportunities to participate in international crisis management exercises with NATO” (Swedish Ministry of Defense 2004: 8-9). Indeed, according to the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, Sweden has in practice adapted even more to NATO standards than many NATO member states

Project followed a PFP-model closely and was thus presented, on the website and elsewhere, as conducted “in the spirit of PFP.” And at the Viking 03 “Distinguished Visitors Day luncheon” on December 9, 2003, the Swedish Minister of Defense, Leni Björklund, emphasized in a speech her gratefulness to NATO. “Especially, I would like to thank NATO for the support given in mentoring that the exercise has been performed in accordance with the established procedures for the cooperation within Partnership for Peace.” Björklund’s speech is available online at http://www.mil.se/viking03/attachments/modspeech.pdf (accessed August 12, 2008).

14 As of April 21, 2008, the NATO Partnership for Peace framework comprised the following countries: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. See http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-cntr.htm (accessed August 12, 2008).

(Syrén 2006: 52). By emphasizing PFP keywords such as “cooperation,” “transparency,” and “security,” Viking 03 reinforced this orientation toward NATO. The main objectives of the project were to promote

- civil-military cooperation (CIMIC),
- transparency between all parties,
- multinationality,
- contacts between the nations and individuals,
- the development of the ability to work together, and
- greater cooperation and dialogue among the wider defense and security communities in NATO and Partner nations.\(^{16}\)

The PFP transcends a narrow focus on security. It also encompasses “disaster relief and civil emergency control, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, armaments co-operation and Peace Support Operations (PSO).”\(^{17}\)

The focus on internationalization—and on concepts such as “cooperation” and “transparency”—also resonates with the expansion of neoliberal reform and emergent audit procedures (see Chapters 2 and 4). In other words, the PFP framework, as exemplified through Viking 03, exhibits key facets of conflict preventionism.

**Observing Participation**

This book draws on fieldwork conducted during the planning, execution, and evaluation of Viking 03, from March 2003 to January 2004.\(^{18}\) The changing role of the military, civil-military cooperation, and contemporary violent

---

\(^{16}\) Quoted from the Viking 03 website, see http://www.mil.se/viking03/article.php?lang=Eandid=9166 (accessed August 12, 2008).

\(^{17}\) Quoted from the Viking 03 website, see http://www.mil.se/viking03/article.php?lang=Eandid=8965 (accessed August 12, 2008).

\(^{18}\) A note on fieldwork. Between March 2003 and January 2004 I had opportunities to participate in various kinds of settings. I always attempted to take extensive field notes during meetings, seminars, workshops, and conferences; typically on a laptop computer. Yet on more informal occasions—during lunches, at coffee breaks, in the pub, and so forth—I mostly abstained from taking notes. Instead, I summarized my observations in writing afterwards; often later the same day. In addition to informal conversations, I also conducted semi-structured interviews of various lengths with many people. Depending on what worked best on a particular occasion, I either taped these interviews or took notes. Throughout the book I have edited some of the interview quotes (without altering meaning or style) to make them easier to read. Where I have translated excerpts from Swedish (from interviews, from conversations, or from written material), this is always clearly indicated. Consistently, I have also attempted to maintain the confidentiality of those who spoke with me by using pseudonyms. However, there are two exceptions to this rule. I have used real names when I quote formal statements about Viking 03 made by participants on leading positions when they spoke as representatives of the project. I have also used real names when I quote from speeches that are or have been available on the Viking 03 website. Real names always include surnames, pseudonyms never do.
conflicts, however, are all timely and interminably debated topics. I thus extended my fieldwork intermittently, from 2002 through 2004, to other sites where these issues were at stake.

A seminar at the Global Academy in Stockholm in March 2003, for instance, centered on how the Swedish Armed Forces take on new humanitarian tasks in international missions. In September 2004, the Swedish Armed Forces International Center (Swedint) hosted a three-day workshop on civil-military cooperation in which both military officers and civilian representatives took part. Also, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) organized an interdisciplinary conference in 2003 on contemporary violent conflicts. Another noteworthy conference, Lessons Learned and Best Practices from the Western Balkans, considered these three topics—new military tasks, civil-military cooperation, and contemporary conflicts—in relation to one another. Some 150 international participants attended this two-day event, which had been organized by the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) in October 2003.19

Other places I visited recurrently for seminars, workshops, and meetings included the Swedish National Defense College, the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI). These organizations and agencies have also published widely on topics such as the transformation and internationalization of armed forces (e.g., Boëne et al. 2000; Dandeker 1999), civil-military cooperation in peace support operations (e.g., Asplund et al. 2003; Asplund and Wahlberg 2004; Wahlberg and Asplund 2004), civilian humanitarian assistance (e.g., Gunnarsson et al. 2004), and conflict prevention (e.g., Mellbourn 2004, 2005). Such reports, together with newspaper articles, journals, and books, have functioned as additional ethnographic data.

I first heard of Viking from a representative from Amnesty International during an interview I conducted with her about the organization’s approach to civil-military cooperation. After a few additional conversations with people at the Swedish National Defense College, the Swedish Defense Research Agency, and Swedint, I knew that I wanted to focus my fieldwork on Viking 03. The question of access was my only concern—yet this worry proved entirely unfounded. Early in 2003, I simply emailed a research proposal to one of the Viking 03 organizers at the Armed Forces Headquarters, and after a subsequent and rather informal meeting, he granted me permission to conduct participant observation throughout the whole project. He also made clear that no information I would come across would be restricted or classi-

19 For a report from the Lessons Learned Conference, see The Folke Bernadotte Academy (2004). A recently established Swedish Government agency, and a Viking 03 participant, FBA is “dedicated to improving the quality and effectiveness of international crisis management and peace and disaster relief operations” (quoted from http://www.mil.se/viking03/article.php?id=9891, accessed August 12, 2008).
Viking 03, he emphasized, would be entirely transparent (see also Chapter 2).

Viking 03, then, became my main fieldwork site. Although of course I learned a lot from taking part in other contexts, the typically short duration of such events—often only a few hours, and rarely more than a couple of days—made them somewhat elusive. Viking 03, by contrast, exhibited continuity. While the exercise itself only lasted for two weeks (in December 2003), the process of planning was extensive. Thus I had the opportunity to work closely with the same group of people for a continuous and extended period. Viking 03 was a multi-sited exercise, with six remote sites located in Zagreb, Croatia; Tartu, Estonia; Niinisalo, Finland; Curragh, Ireland; Constanța, Romania; and Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Still, it made sense to carry out fieldwork in Sweden: this was where the entire process of planning occurred and where the main exercise site was located. During the exercise, most participants gathered at the Uppland Regiment, S1, in Enköping—an hour’s drive from Stockholm—and from this site, the exercise scenario was “distributed” via the Internet to the six remote sites.

The process of planning for Viking 03 provided a useful infrastructure for conducting fieldwork. Preparations followed a standard schedule for NATO PFP exercises. It consisted of recurrent workshops and planning conferences, mostly organized at conference centers or military regiments in the Stockholm area. On these occasions, the number of participants ranged from ten to fifteen people at the smallest workshops, to more than a hundred at the largest conferences. In between these events, I spent most of my time at Försvarets krigsspelscentrum—the Swedish Defense Wargaming Center (SDWC). An independent organization within the Swedish Armed Forces, SDWC had the main organizational responsibility for Viking 03. Normally the center is “responsible for wargaming from operational to tactical level and for coordi-

20 Several anthropologists have similar experiences from fieldwork. Gísli Pálsson, for instance, describes how, when he embarked on his fieldwork within the multinational corporation deCODE genetics, the company’s director “seemed to appreciate that an anthropologist proposed to witness at close range what was going on, at a time when his company and the database project were being attacked domestically and internationally by a whole army of academics who usually based their analyses on either second-hand accounts or extremely brief field trips […] After some weeks of deliberations, I was given a magnetic security card, which provided me with access to the company’s premises, and the permission to more or less ‘do what I wanted’” (Pálsson 2007: 15).

21 The Viking 03 Deputy Exercise Director, the Swiss officer Peter Schneider, explained to me in an interview (conducted in English) why a multi-sited exercise was convenient. “To send many people abroad for training eventually is a costly exercise; and if we manage, step by step, that a remote training audience can work on its own facilities at ordinary running cost, [and] could then plug in to such an exercise in a fairly simple manner, it will become an easy alternative. […] It’s technically feasible, it’s practical. You know, you can justify it to a large extent because of the technical possibilities; you can justify that you’re training so and so many people in NATO procedures together with [other countries] at a fairly moderate cost. And then you do not need to enter into a huge political loop to justify a high cost with not necessarily very visible results.”
nating and standardizing the Swedish Defense Forces modeling and simulation strategy.”22 The SDWC is not a strictly military milieu. About fifteen employees, including both military and civilian personnel, work fulltime at SDWC. During the planning of Viking 03, however, the center hired extra staff to help with preparations.

More specifically, planning was divided between different “syndicate groups.” These teams each had their own set of assignments. Real World Support (RWS), for instance, dealt with all issues related to the “real world,” such as logistics, transportation, and the organization of accommodations for the participants. Meanwhile, Simulation Technology (SIMTECH) provided the infrastructure to the exercise simulation—setting up computer systems and maintaining the technological equipment. The Information group (INFO) was responsible for the Viking 03 website (www.mil.se/viking03). It also took care of other information-related issues. The Visitors and Observers Bureau (VOB) in turn sought to promote Viking 03 as a Swedish initiative of international importance. The VOB people arranged guided tours during the exercise for specially invited visitors—mostly foreign military officers, politicians, and representatives from organizations such as NATO. Visitors also included the Swedish Minister of Defense as well as members of the Swedish royal family.

The team I followed most closely was the Operations group (OPS). Given my particular research interests, this group appeared most intriguing: it developed the fictitious Bogaland scenario and had responsibility for all civil-military relations within the project. Intermittently I also participated in the activities of another team, the Exercise Evaluation group (EXEVAL), whose members continually evaluated the work of all other groups throughout all phases of the project. This truly was “audit culture” (Strathern 2000a) at work (see Chapter 4).

I do not think I ever heard anyone talk about the “Exercise Evaluation Group,” “Simulation Technology,” or “Operations,” though. Everyone invariably referred to these teams as EXEVAL, SIMTECH, and the OPS-group. The use of acronyms and abbreviations within the armed forces sometimes borders on the obsessive, and in Viking 03 it gradually turned into a characteristic acknowledged as distinctively military. During meetings, for instance, officers repeatedly apologized to the civilian participants for this vocabulary, often joking that it was integral to their military culture: “This is how we talk!”23

---

23 Actually, the use of abbreviations within the military does sometimes quite literally border on the obsessive. For instance, Sebastiaan Rietjens, who has carried out research within the Dutch armed forces, describes how he was initially struck by the use of jargon and of abbreviations. “To overcome these difficulties,” he explains, “I was handed a glossary in which the 50,000 most frequently used military abbreviations were included” (Rietjens 2006: vii).
The Viking 03 participants referred explicitly to different forms of culture—military, civilian, organizational, national, and so forth. Officers who had taken part in international operations, for instance, frequently compared their experiences from a mission area in terms of cultural or national particularities. I also often heard project participants discussing what they found specifically distinctive about the “culture” of officers from a certain country. These were mostly informal chats, usually involving jokes. Yet the fact that this kind of talk has become widespread is noteworthy, as I will have reasons to discuss later.

By taking part in the preparations, I learned together with the participants what the project was about, how different participants related to it, and what it was like to work on it. Several insights from fieldwork have led me to question a conventional anthropological approach toward cultural critique; and in what follows I seek to clarify how Viking 03 in fact demands a re-thinking of certain rhetorical analytical tropes.

III. Inquiry

Cultural critique has endured as a powerful mode of anthropological inquiry. The strategy to disrupt the present and “make it strange” has proved particularly productive, and abundant examples illustrate its continuous potential within the discipline (e.g., Gusterson 1996; Li 2007; Luhrmann 2001). Today, however, an increasing number of contexts outside anthropology have also come to encompass facets of this approach. The contemporary Swedish Armed Forces constitutes one such example. “Culture” has for instance become an important tool for the military in their attempt to reform and rethink old assumptions (cf. Callaghan and Kernic 2003b; English 2004). Furthermore, Viking 03 exemplifies how an increasingly self-critical approach has emerged also through new collaborative forms where military personnel work with NGOs such as Amnesty International. These varieties of “critique” certainly seem productive for the military. Yet it remains unclear what a critical mode of anthropological inquiry into these kinds of situations would look like. A common saying within the Swedish Armed Forces is that they tend to do things “fort men fel” (fast but faulty). As anthropologists, however, perhaps we should instead stop here for a moment to think.

In response to recent events such as the international military presence in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq, the relationship between anthropology, governance, and the military has become increasingly debated within the discipline—especially in the United States. Numerous articles reflect this (see, e.g., González 2007; Gusterson 2007; McFate 2007; McFate and Fondacaro 2007; Stannard 2007). A recent conference on “Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency,” organized at the University of Chicago in April
2008, also focused on precisely these issues;\textsuperscript{24} and then there is the \textit{Network of Concerned Anthropologists} (NCA)—“an independent ad hoc network of anthropologists seeking to promote an ethical anthropology.”\textsuperscript{25}

My focus in this section diverges from these debates. I am interested in the military here primarily as a space where critique, contingency, and disruption seem to be at stake in ways that are decidedly timely. More specifically, I explore how Viking 03 in fact intimates particular challenges to the anthropological conceptual toolkit, and I ask how anthropology could approach such contexts in an analytically productive way that retains the intellectual vitality of cultural critique.

**Disruption**

First published in 1726, Jonathan Swift’s \textit{Gulliver’s Travels} was intended partly as a response to \textit{Robinson Crusoe}. While in that book Daniel Defoe asserts “imperialistic” liberties based on the belief that they signify progress, \textit{Gulliver’s Travels} parodies such Western complacency. By sending Gulliver to a set of fictitious places, Swift succeeds in unveiling a striking ethnocentrism prevalent in his contemporary Europe. This destabilization of the “Western imagination” of progress, and the way Swift scorns its defenders, indisputably remains one of the most outstanding examples of political satire.

Evocative of Swift, anthropologists have mostly been, in attempts to answer grand questions, “inclined to turn toward the concrete, the particular, the microscopic. We are,” as Geertz had it, “the miniaturists of the social sciences, painting on Lilliputian canvases with what we take to be delicate strokes. We hope to find in the little what eludes us in the large, to stumble upon general truths while sorting through special cases” (Geertz 1968: 4). Perhaps this was particularly true in the early and mid-twentieth century United States, when such anthropologists as Franz Boas, Margaret Mead, and Ruth Benedict sought to make the “Western” cultural lens available for critical scrutiny. “Realizing that our own ways are not humanly inevitable nor God-ordained, but are the fruit of a long and turbulent history, we may well,” as Mead pointed out, “examine in turn all of our institutions” (Mead 1961 [1928]: 233; cf. Benedict 1989 [1934]: 9). At the time, the culture con-

\textsuperscript{24} See http://anthroandwar.uchicago.edu/ (accessed August 12, 2008).

\textsuperscript{25} The NCA was founded by Catherine Besteman, Andrew Bickford, Greg Feldman, Gustaaf Houtman, Roberto González, Hugh Gusterson, Jean Jackson, Kanhong Lin, Catherine Lutz, David Price, and David Vine. In a “Pledge of Non-participation in Counterinsurgency” they make the following statement: “We, the undersigned, believe that anthropologists should not engage in research and other activities that contribute to counter-insurgency operations in Iraq or in related theaters in the ‘war on terror.’ Furthermore, we believe that anthropologists should refrain from directly assisting the US military in combat, be it through torture, interrogation, or tactical advice” (quoted from http://concerned.anthropologists.googlepages.com/home, accessed June 3, 2008).
cept functioned as an efficient tool for achieving this critical shift in focus and for establishing anthropology as a vehicle for cultural critique (see Marcus and Fisher 1999 [1986]). Horace Miner’s (1956) article on the “Nacirema” is possibly one of the best examples of this Swift-esque anthropology.

While anthropology of course has gone through a whole set of “reinventions” since Mead, Benedict, and Geertz, many scholars continue to embrace this mode of critique. To Jeremy MacClancy, for example, “exposing the cultural fabrication of what appears natural” still appears as a “radical shift in position” (MacClancy 2002: 8). Much contemporary anthropology in fact exhibits facets of this perspective. Tania Li’s approach to studying development, for instance, is “to make improvement strange” (2007: 3); Stefan Helmreich’s Silicon Second Nature (2000) attempts to ferret out the cultural beliefs that orient Artificial Life science; Hugh Gusterson, in his Nuclear Rites (1996), makes a point of treating the Livermore Laboratory in California as a culture; and in Of Two Minds, Tanya Luhrmann (2001) “comes to [American] psychiatry the way Margaret Mead went to Samoa … She approaches it as a collection of beliefs and practices which young people are socialized into.”

To call a phenomenon “a culture” and put it under anthropological scrutiny—to disrupt the present and “make it strange”—once constituted a powerful mode of inquiry into the contemporary. What at one moment in time served as an eloquent model for critique, however, now arguably appears increasingly exhausted. The need for a different approach became clear to me early on in my fieldwork.

I had, perhaps naïvely, anticipated that many Viking 03 participants would be surprised that an anthropologist would want to study the project. I was mistaken. While some officers found it amusing to have become anthropological objects of study—assuring me that I was liable to find the military an “interesting culture”—no one, as it turned out, seemed the least surprised. Many anthropologists tell similar stories. Helmreich writes that once researchers at the Santa Fe Institute, where he did fieldwork, understood that he was an anthropologist studying them, “they often joked that Artificial Life scientists were indeed an odd ‘tribe’” (Helmreich 2000: 37); Luhrmann tells us that it was a young psychiatrist who first suggested American psychiatry to her as an anthropological field (Luhrmann 2001: 4); and Kaushik Sunder Rajan recounts how, in a comment on his anthropological research on genome scientists, one informant at the National Center for Biotechnology Information told him, “I’ve read Paul Rabinow, so I know exactly what you want to do” (Sunder Rajan 2006: 1).27

26 This is an excerpt from a review in The New Yorker, reprinted in a blurb on the cover of Luhrmann’s book.

27 While anthropologists once regarded it their job to “elicit reflexivity from their research subjects,” Marilyn Strathern notes how nowadays “they are often presented with a high degree of already cultivated self-awareness and self-consciousness (members of these organisa-
Clearly a Swift-esque strategy to disrupt the present no longer constitutes a particularly radical approach (cf. Rose 2007: 5). Rather it is precisely what to expect from “critical anthropology.” Thereby it arguably becomes increasingly methodologically questionable: it simply does not tell us anything new. One of the Artificial Life scientists who figure in Helmreich’s book, for instance, bluntly deems the study to be “a poor example of anthropology.” He claims that Helmreich, rather than trying to understand his subjects, “forces them into the template of anti-heroes in his own politically motivated world view” (quoted in Helmreich 2000: 239). “We could be replaced by anyone,” he complains, “and [Helmreich’s] thesis would be essentially the same.” Helmreich reads this complaint as an example of “the discomfort several researchers expressed to me about cultural accounts of science” (Helmreich 2000: 240). This might of course be the case. Yet rather than confirming the “radicalism” of a Swift-esque approach, I think this example points even more to its limits: that traditional analytical strategies, concepts, and rhetorical tropes, when applied to certain contemporary contexts, might actually amount, as Helmreich’s informant had it, to little more than poor anthropology.

Thus I agree with Michael Fischer and George Marcus when, in the introduction to the second edition of Anthropology as Cultural Critique, they argue that “it is to the advantage of critical anthropology to recognize the fact that anthropology no longer operates under the ideal of discovering new worlds like explorers of the fifteenth century.” And that a primary framing task of any ethnography would be to juxtapose “preexisting representations, attempting to understand their diverse conditions of production, and to incorporate the resulting analysis fully into the strategies which define any contemporary fieldwork project” (Fischer and Marcus 1999: xx).

Collaboration and Denunciation

Twenty years ago, Jean Jackson argued that the Tukanoan Indians of Colombia had only recently begun seeing themselves as “having” a culture. In a process instigated by the Indian rights movement, they were “learning how to think of themselves in this fashion with input from both whites and other Indians” (Jackson 1989: 139). Jackson also noted that anthropology, beyond the typical romanticizing or denigrating responses, had provided few terms for describing such processes. Thus in order to understand emergent “inauthentic” cultural forms, she called for a new, more creative, language.
The military has recently begun seeing themselves as “having” a culture. Policy makers, too, now speak of the importance of developing a “culture of conflict prevention” (see, e.g., Mellbourn 2004). Such a culture, according to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, denotes a certain “way of thinking” which increasingly “permeates the activities of all those engaged in the implementation of preventive policy—be they NGOs, states, or regional and global organizations” (quoted in Carment and Schnabel 2003: 12).

Some anthropologists seem to take the recent emphasis on culture as an indication that anthropology truly has come of age (see, e.g., Frese and Harrel 2003). With “public controversies about issues such as a ‘clash of civilizations,’ multiculturalism, gender, ethnicity, family structure, religious revitalizations, and the problems associated with economic change,” anthropology should, according to one commentator, “be at the forefront” (Barfield 1997: vii). Perhaps it could. Not only would we advance our ethnographic descriptions if we force ourselves to find ways to speak of emergent situations; but through such attempts, as Jackson pointed out, we might also “find our theory and method much enhanced” (Jackson 1989: 139).

Beyond a few routinized responses, however, anthropology once again largely lacks a language for rendering emergent processes analytically legible.28 Meanwhile many anthropologists simply take on the role as “experts on culture.” Some—like Montgomery McFate (2005, 2007) or Anna Simons (2003)—collaborate with the armed forces: by educating the military about “adversary cultures” etc., they seek to contribute to the improvement of contemporary military operations (cf. also Frese and Harrel 2003; McFate and Fondacaro 2007). Most anthropologists certainly remain critical toward such collaborations. Their critique, however, nevertheless often operates within the same mode of reason.29

The book Why America’s Top Pundits Are Wrong: Anthropologists Talk Back (Besteman and Gusterson 2005a), for instance, shows how critical anthropologists, too, tend to assume the role as “experts.” Not, of course, to

---

28 I refer here specifically to anthropological approaches to the military (and related topics such as humanitarian intervention and conflict prevention). I should also add that many anthropologists certainly engage in various forms of concept work to enhance analytical thought within the discipline and interdisciplinarily. Paul Rabinow’s anthropology of the contemporary, with its analytical emphasis on the emergent, has been particularly influential in this regard (see especially Rabinow 2003, 2006, 2008). Recent anthropological attempts to approach emergent phenomena through innovative ethnographic studies include Andrew Lakoff’s Pharmaceutical Reason (2005), Johan Lindquist’s The Anxieties of Mobility (2009), Celia Lowe’s Wild Profusion (2006), and Janet Roitman’s Fiscal Disobedience (2005).  
29 A recent article in The San Francisco Chronicle Magazine, “Montgomery McFate’s Mission: Can One Anthropologist Possibly Steer the Course in Iraq?” captures this (see Stannard 2007).
engage in collaboration—but in denunciation. In the introduction, Besteman and Gusterson make the following assertion:

As anthropologists, we specialize in studying human nature, cultural interaction, ethnic conflict, social stratification, and the workings of race and gender—all the issues the pundits write about. [...] We are experts in the history, the politics, and the economics of the places we study, but we also understand these places in terms of the human interactions we have had with the people who live there. (Besteman and Gusterson 2005b: 4-5, emphasis added)

They thus make truth-claims about the same issues as the “pundits” they criticize, albeit in a manner which allegedly is more ethnographically rich, analytically sophisticated, and scientifically reliable. Besteman and Gusterson claim for instance that, in their book, “Tone Bringa sets the record straight on Bosnia.” In contrast to Robert Kaplan, one of the “pundits” they criticize,

Brenga did not simply pass through the Balkans between book tours. Bringa is an anthropologist who won her knowledge the hard way—by living in a Bosnian village before and during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, getting to know its Bosnian Muslim and Croat Catholic inhabitants intimately. (Besteman and Gusterson 2005b: 5)

One might sympathize with the attempt to “talk back” to Kaplan and others. Indeed, as a book primarily targeting students in an attempt to “offer alternative, anthropologically based readings” (Besteman and Gusterson 2008: 62), Why America’s Top Pundits Are Wrong certainly seems, on one level, irreprouachable. Still, the mode of critique exemplified by Besteman and Gusterson in their introduction ultimately becomes analytically restricting. Specifically the part about Bringa winning her knowledge “the hard way” appears also to represent a romantic conception of fieldwork, which in most contemporary settings hardly would make methodological sense.

For instance, the anthropologist Jeremy MacClancy asserts that “elites” constitute “cultures unto themselves with their own self-justifying logics and staffed by professionals who evolve their own, ever more elaborate languages in order to legitimate their claims to specialist expertise” (MacClancy 2002: 11). It remains unclear, however, whether the relation between this rather outrageous claim and the title of the piece in which it appears, “Taking People Seriously,” is deliberately oxymoronic. Perhaps it is only moronic.

See also Matti Bunzl’s critique in which he suggests that, essentially, Besteman and Gusterson reproduce what he calls “the basic move” of much contemporary sociocultural anthropology: “the critique of generalization through the insistence on complexity” (Bunzl 2008a: 58). See also the reply by Besteman and Gusterson (2008) and by Bunzl (2008b).

Such an ideal for fieldwork nevertheless continues to appear surprisingly rigid within the discipline. Again, this is MacClancy: “[Anthropological fieldwork] means living, day and night, with a group of people for a protracted period, usually about two years, at least for the initial study. It also means trying, as much as possible, to live like the locals: participating in daily activities while at the same time observing and asking questions. [...] By living for so
The fact that the military now seems to acknowledge that culture matters should not, I think, force us to choose between denouncing this claim as a self-justifying pretense, or collaborating with the military in order to help them improve their knowledge of culture. Instead, it should lead us to pause to think. Not about how anthropologists could function as watchdogs of “correct” uses of culture, which increasingly would entail observing and making truth-claims about the same “first-order objects,” in Niklas Luhmann’s (1998) sense, as the people we study—either to help or critique them. I also do not think we should spend too much time thinking about how, as Fischer (2007) has recently suggested, anthropology could work on the culture concept (and in effect continually disrupt conventionalized understandings of the term) in order to maintain its timeliness as an analytical tool.

If we take the primacy of inquiry seriously, we should think instead about what might constitute a productive and critical mode of analysis at a time when “culture” has become a defining feature of the contemporary.33

Contingency

It is useful at this point to consider a claim that Luhmann makes near the beginning of his Observations on Modernity. Contemporary society, writes Luhmann, “has lost faith in the correctness of its self-description” (Luhmann 1998: ix). I take this observation as an imperative for exploring integral features of Viking 03 and of conflict preventionism. It points toward a change in the forms of authority and toward the emergence of what Luhmann calls the “politics of understanding,” which in many contexts is taking the place of authority. Luhmann defines “understandings” as “negotiated provisos (a condition attached to an agreement) that can be relied upon for a given time.”

They do not imply consensus, nor do they represent reasonable or even correct solutions to problems. They fix the reference points that are removed from the argument for further controversies, in which coalitions and oppositions can form anew. Understandings have one big advantage over the claims of authority: they cannot be discredited but must be constantly renegotiated. Their value does not increase but instead decreases with age. And this, too, makes it likely that the real problem of modernity lies in the time dimension. (Luhmann 1998: 69)

long with one group of people, [the anthropologist] is eventually able to discern their basic beliefs, to apprehend their degree of order, and to put the seemingly irrational into context” (MacClancy 2002: 4-5). Critical and innovative explorations of contemporary forms of field research include Gupta and Ferguson (1997), Hannerz (1998), and Malkki (2007).33 This does not imply that I seek to write “against culture” in Lila Abu-Lughod’s (1991) sense. My concern, I should stress, is analytical. However, this is not the place to rehearse debates about the anthropological culture concept (see, e.g., Caglar 1997; Clifford 1988; Hannerz 1993; Sewell 2005; Wicker 1997).
Ultimately this book seeks to explore emergent forms of collaborative action at a time when everything is regarded as contingent. One reason that a Swift-esque approach appears obsolete is that in such a context there simply remain very few Defoes. At a time when most people seem increasingly aware of the limits of knowledge, then, Luhmann’s observations become helpful. The officers in Viking 03, for example, realized that military authorities could not set the security agenda by themselves. Most of them seemed in fact to have lost faith in the correctness of some of their old self-descriptions: they explicitly asked their critics for advice. It would make little analytical sense, then, to “denounce” Viking 03 as “ethnocentric,” or attempt to “unveil” a set of shared beliefs or biases among the project participants. Such an approach would add little to what was already performed in the project. In fact, the project administration did everything it possibly could to involve actors who would perform precisely this kind of critique; and what, after all, would be the point in denouncing that the emperor has no clothes, if he does not know what to wear?

“Stopping to Think”

“Everything we feel and do is somehow oriented ‘lifeward,’” wrote Robert Musil in his novel The Man without Qualities, “and the least deviation away from this direction towards something beyond is difficult or alarming” (Musil 1996: 134). Criticizing what is felt to be oriented “lifeward” will thus undoubtedly appear untoward. “Stopping to think,” as Musil concluded ironically, “is dangerous.” Yet at one stage in his novel something unexpectedly seems to alter the apparent “lifewardness” of things:

The current and heartbeat that constantly flows through all the things in our surroundings had stopped for a moment. “I’m only fortuitous,” Necessity leered. “Observed without prejudice, my face doesn’t look much different from a leper’s,” Beauty confessed. Actually, it did not take much to produce this effect: a varnish had come off, a power of suggestion had lost its hold, a chain of habit, expectation, and tension had snapped; a fluid, mysterious equilibrium between feeling and world was upset for the space of a second. (Musil 1996: 134)

Anthropologists have repeatedly tried to produce this effect. “We have, with no little success, sought to keep the world off balance,” as Clifford Geertz (1984: 275) famously put it, “pulling out rugs, upsetting tea tables, setting

34 It should go without saying, however, that this is not always or universally the case. The US policy in Iraq, for instance, appears to stand out as a radically different example. Still, it is worth noting that Montgomery McFate, although she hardly qualifies as a critic of the military, has been invited to collaborate with the US Armed Forces precisely on the military effort in Iraq (see Stannard 2007).
35 I thank Aihwa Ong for this phrasing (personal communication).
off firecrackers.” A standard way to approach conflict preventionism anthropologically through the Viking 03 project, then, would be to ask how it could be possible for the military and NGOs such as Amnesty International to work together in the first place; to explore the cultural imaginations that need to be established, and continuously reestablished, in order for this kind of project to make sense; to ferret out, through a “reading” of Bogaland, the various biases—about conflicts, about ethnicity, about religion, and so forth—that went into the production of the scenario; and to denounce, by way of ethnographic comparisons with real conflict situations, the Viking 03 representations as oversimplified, prejudiced, and ethnocentric.

In what follows, however, I do not seek so much to upset the tea table around which military officers and representatives from international institutions and NGOs have recently gathered. Musil, it seems to me, suggests something more promising. His notion of “lifewardness” draws attention to directionality. It begs the question of how directionality becomes orientated, and through what analytical tools we can render such processes available to critical thought. Rather than focusing on reproduction, then, I am interested in what might be emergent in this context.36 I find the following quotes from Paul Rabinow’s most recent book, Marking Time: On the Anthropology of the Contemporary (2008), useful for clarifying this difference. “Most of anthropology and significant portions of the other social sciences,” he writes,

concentrate on how society or culture reproduces itself (and this includes many models of “change”) through institutions, symbolic work, power relations, or the cunning of reason. And there is much to be said in favor of this mode of analysis. (Rabinow 2008: 3-4)

This final point, I think, is important. By emphasizing emergence, I do not take a stand in this book against an analytical focus on reproduction per se. I seek only to demarcate and clarify a particular mode of anthropological inquiry. This is because “it has become apparent,” as Rabinow continues, that

there are other phenomena present today, as no doubt there have been at other times in other places, that are emergent. That is to say, phenomena that can only be partially explained or comprehended by previous modes of analysis

---

36 An analytical attention toward the emergent has become increasingly common in anthropology (see, e.g., Collier and Ong 2005; Fischer 2003; Maurer 2005; Miyazaki and Riles 2005; Rabinow 2003, 2008). Nikolas Rose has provided a useful definition. Emergence, he writes, “suggests that the present, while not radically different from that which preceded it, may nonetheless be a moment within a process in which something novel is taking shape. Something novel that is taking shape as a consequence of the intersection of multiple contingent pathways, while not being a consequence of any individual development. Something novel that is arising from the intertwining of ways of thinking and acting in a range of practices—medical, legal, economic, political, ethical—while not being posited directly by any of them. Something whose characteristics may be identifiable, but whose productivity cannot be predicted” (Rose 2007: 80-1).
or existing practices. Such phenomena, it follows, require a distinctive mode of approach, an array of appropriate concepts, and almost certainly different modes of presentation. (Rabinow 2008: 4)

A mode of inquiry centered on emergence is not, in other words, concerned so much with cultural “beliefs” or “imaginations” that might have informed the production of Bogaland. Instead it orients us toward transfiguration. The creation of the Bogaland scenario in fact facilitated both a problematization of contemporary conflicts, and a rethinking of the relationship between military and civilian actors in the context of peace support operations. Thus I am interested precisely in how the Viking 03 project helped to create a forum where novel forms of civil-military cooperation became possible, and how it orientated these engagements in particular ways. More specifically, I explore the convergence of histories, ideas, and representations (Chapter 1) that have enabled the aggregation of various actors, concepts, and procedures (Chapter 2); and I ask how, within the context of a contemporary problematization of conflicts, these features become remediated (Chapter 3) into a form that imposes directionality on military and humanitarian engagements with the world (Chapter 4).

By disrupting some of the analytical tools at hand (and they certainly appear to be oriented “lifeward”) rather than the empirical material under scrutiny, I thus seek in this book to contribute to opening up a space where, as Musil had it, “stopping to think” becomes possible.37

The Organization of the Book

My argument evolves through five chapters. Chapter 1 (Convergence: Sweden, the Military, the World) provides a historical background to the contemporary confluence of security and humanitarianism manifested in Viking 03. Briefly it explores the changing role of the military, the development of UN peacekeeping operations, and the history of human rights. Many standard accounts organize these developments into successive “generations,” thereby suggesting an evolutionist historical progression. In contrast, this chapter seeks to develop a different narrative form through an analysis of four contested incidents in Sweden during the twentieth century: the so-

37 Hannerz’s recent Foreign News (2004b) exemplifies important virtues of the approach I seek to take in this book. He explores international news reporting without deducing it beforehand to what already is known, and without reproducing routinized forms of media critique. By contributing to an advanced understanding of the actual practices of foreign correspondents, Hannerz thereby opens up a space where it becomes possible to critique particular assumptions that typically characterize “critical studies” of contemporary media. My analytical starting point is inspired also by recent publications such as Global Assemblages (Ong and Collier 2005) and Global Governmentality (Larner and Walters 2004a). I share with these scholars among other things a sense that “the fields of moral, ethical, or political valuation and activity are shifting, and that, consequently, these fields should themselves be a central object of inquiry” (Collier and Ong 2005: 17).
called courtyard crisis of 1914; the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939; the Swedish participation in the UN operation in the Congo in 1960; and the stranding in 1981 of a Soviet submarine on Swedish territorial waters. These events exemplify diverging ways in which national security, military force, and international engagements have been at stake at different times. Also, they illustrate how the meaning of “Sweden,” “the military,” and “the world”—and the relationship between these notions—have shifted as they have been assembled into various configurations. Ultimately this chapter thus seeks to open up an analytical approach for inquiring into conflict preventionism as an emergent form that again makes things work in new and unexpected ways.

Chapter 2 (Aggregation: Civil-Military Cooperation at Work) shifts attention to civil-military cooperation. It recounts ethnographically how the diverse Viking 03 participants became organizationally interconnected, and how particular technologies functioned in the project as “orientation devices.” This exploration of how civil-military cooperation literally was put to work evinces intriguing resemblances between conflict preventionism and organizational facets of neoliberalism, epitomized by increasingly ubiquitous concepts such as “partnership,” “transparency,” and “evaluation.” An organizational focus on Viking 03 also renders visible a movement from aggregation to assemblage. The argument of this chapter, then, is that the aggregation of actors, concepts, and organizational procedures at the intersection of security, humanitarianism, and neoliberalism constituted a critical mass out of which a novel assemblage—conflict preventionism—could emerge and be set into motion. Thus rather than a “focused gathering,” Viking 03 appeared more as a form for gathering focus.

Chapter 3 (Remediation: Bogaland and the Problematization of Conflicts) explores what perhaps is the most central facet of conflict preventionism: the contemporary interest for managing and preventing violent conflicts. Viking 03 is telling in this regard. As its starting point the project identified conflicts as problems that demand collaborative remedial action, and through the subsequent production of Bogaland, it facilitated both a problematization of contemporary conflicts and a rethinking of the relationship between military and civilian actors. Arguably, the exercise scenario thus functioned as a tool for “remediation.” This concept, which is borrowed from the analysis of new media, refers to practices that remake already existing relationships in the context of a problematization—and as in remedy, it also contains the suggestion of improvement. Through an analytical focus on remediation, this chapter seeks to explore the mode of collaborative engagement that stands at the center of conflict preventionism. More specifically, it draws attention to how Bogaland formed new connecting links between different features represented in it, and it asks what the scenario, as a particular means of conveying those features thus assembled, actually did.
Chapter 4 (Directionality: Countering Violence, Exercising Peace) turns to the execution of the Viking 03 exercise. Together, the performative features of this event—the enactment of civilian expertise, of the Bogaland conflict, of “Swedish-ness,” and of “the international”—comprised a background against which conflict preventionism could appear. The chapter identifies the deployment of the Bogaland intervention as a particularly significant moment. Following the aggregation of various actors, concepts, and procedures, and the remediation of the relationship between them, the exercise intervention instigated a shift in focus from the conflict to the subsequent peace process. It thereby enabled the beginning of a kind of collaborative action that neither assessed the past, nor sought to agree on a description of the present, but was initiated in anticipation of the future. Ethnographic examples from the exercise evaluation process show how such a temporal orientation constituted an essential aspect also in the organization of the Viking 03 project itself. This leads to the central argument of this chapter. Conflict preventionism does not settle on one particular understanding of conflict, but rather imposes directionality on contemporary engagements with the world.

Chapter 5 (Temporality: Fiction, Action, Ethics) seeks to place the study of Viking 03 in a larger context by considering conflict preventionism in relation to the recent proliferation of scenario-based exercises more broadly. Within the contemporary problematization of conflicts, a failure to act increasingly appears unethical; and as the Viking 03 project exemplifies, more and more actors seem to start from the assumption that “something needs to be done.” Viking 03 also exemplifies how attempts at criticism through conventional forms often appear as unproductive interruptions of actual efforts to “do something.” Despite all the talk of evaluation and audit, critique has thus in practice often become problematic. Yet one subsequent civilian project nevertheless succeeded in responding critically to Viking 03—by organizing a scenario-based exercise of their own. What ultimately was at stake in this critique was not the content of the Viking scenario per se—but the temporality of intervention and the directionality of the response that followed from it. Centered on this example, the chapter explores how fiction in the form of scenario planning in fact constitutes a timely and versatile technique for engaging with the emergent. In conclusion, it discusses in relation to the question of ethics the kind of collaborative action that conflict preventionism enables.

As an attempt to engage anthropologically with a set of contemporary problems, Exercising Peace also actualizes analytical problems and possibilities of a more general character. What exactly does it mean for anthropology to pay analytical attention and give form to the emergent? The Epilogue (On Timely Appearances) concludes the book through a meditation on this question. It aims to open up for wider reflection by discussing certain convergences in the histories of anthropology and art. While different in
their modes of engaging with or acquiring knowledge about the world, anthropology and art arguably tend to intersect precisely on the problem of form-giving. Actually, to place anthropology within the context of art illustrates a movement from a concern with building or reproducing theory to an emphasis on giving form to the emergent. Thus rather than reiterating the arguments of *Exercising Peace*, the epilogue is itself an attempt at remediation in order to enhance the analytical directionality of the preceding chapters.
1. Convergence: Sweden, the Military, the World

To avoid becoming the object of the problems that you take as your object, you must retrace the history of the emergence of these problems.

– Pierre Bourdieu

Everything about the officers’ mess at the Swedish Armed Forces International Center (Swedint) appeared anachronistically out of place. With leather sofas and armchairs in comfortable adjacency to an old-fashioned fireplace and a tiny bar, the spacious lounge was reminiscent of a nineteenth century gentlemen’s club. It was also abundant in patriotic and national symbols. Medals from sports tournaments together with military memorabilia decorated the walls alongside gold-framed mirrors, oil paintings of former officers, and, the ultimate anachronism, a portrait of the Swedish royal family.

I was at Swedint to attend a “Partnership for Peace Planners Course” together with Thomas and Magnus. It was an April afternoon in 2003, and these two Swedish officers had recently begun to work full time on the Viking 03 project. We had visited the mess to get coffee before the lecture. During subsequent months of fieldwork, I gradually grew accustomed to all kinds of military settings. But at this point, the bourgeois furnishing struck me as profoundly overdone and conspicuously nationalistic. Thomas and Magnus, however, gave the impression of being entirely at home in this environment.

The school building, although located next door, seemed worlds apart from the mess. Nothing about it was old-fashioned or nationalistic. Instead, with a world map sitting next to a United Nations flag on one of the walls, and with seminar rooms named Mozambique, Liberia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, the focus had clearly shifted toward the international. The lecture took place in “Nicaragua.” Officers from diverse countries—including Austria, Azerbaijan, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Greece, and the United States—were among the seminar participants on this afternoon. It

39 See Hallén and Hellsppong (1998: 9-54) for a comprehensive history of military mess halls in Sweden. For their description of this particular mess, see pp. 148-50.
occurred to me, as the lecturer began his PowerPoint presentation in English, that Thomas and Magnus appeared perfectly comfortable in this situation too.

I find the contrast between the officers’ mess and the seminar room noteworthy. It seems to epitomize the current reorientation of the military: from national defense and warfighting to international intervention and peace enforcement. Yet the fact that Thomas and Magnus moved effortlessly between these contexts should make us think twice before we assume, as the anthropologist Robert Rubinstein (2003: 16-17) seems to do, that these perspectives, each supported by different sets of memorabilia, necessarily comprise different “military cultures.” The emergence of the new does not in this case imply the disappearance of the old. Neither is it separated from the old. As a matter of fact, Viking 03 exemplifies how diverse features converge through a novel organizational logic into an emergent form. I call that form conflict preventionism.

This chapter provides a background to the emergence of conflict preventionism. Part I explores briefly the reformation of the armed forces. Conflict preventionism, however, is not limited to the military: through the concept I seek to capture a broader set of transformations. Thus in what follows I also trace two other developments that I find especially significant: the emergence of UN peace support operations (Part II) and of the notion of universal human rights (Part III).

Viking 03, which was organized by the Swedish Armed Forces, also exemplifies something decidedly Swedish. On the face of it, the history of Sweden’s military engagement with the world appears to be a straightforward development from an emphasis on nationalism in the early twentieth century, via a focus on internationalism during much of the Cold War, and toward notions of cosmopolitanism since the 1990s. Yet the meaning of international missions and the problems they have sought to confront have differed significantly over time (cf. Finnemore 2003). In a historical section (Part IV), I discuss successive (and often contested) configurations of “Sweden,” “the military,” and “the world”; and through these histories, I seek ultimately to give form to a certain kind of inquiry. A final section on convergence concludes this chapter. More importantly, it also imposes analytical directionality on the chapters that follow.

---

40 The reorientation of the military resonates in this regard with what Saskia Sassen notes in relation to recent denationalizations of particular state functions: that key state capabilities developed in an earlier phase can “become foundational to a subsequent phase but only as part of a new organizational logic that in fact also foundationally repositions those capabilities” (Sassen 2006: 15).
I. The Military

Since the end of the Cold War, national defense and warfighting have appeared increasingly antiquated. Currently, as the focus of the armed forces in many countries shifts toward participation in international peace support operations, the military tends to take on tasks “other than war.” Internationalization and professionalization have thus emerged as two central themes in the research of the contemporary military (see, e.g., Caforio 2000; Červinková 2006: 148). In addition to new tasks, professionalization encompasses new relationships between the military and society. The citizen is for instance no longer expected to be a soldier. Instead, as Christopher Coker points out, “the soldier is being required to act more and more like a citizen,” and as a profession, the military “is now accountable to the public in a way that was not true before” (Coker 2001: 94, 101).

But the armed forces also retain many traditional tasks. The Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, for instance, speaks of the contemporary focus in terms of både och—“both one thing and the other” (see Syrén 2007, my translation).41 The Swedish Ministry of Defense, too, reflects this double focus when it states that the objective for Sweden’s total defense is to preserve the country’s peace and independence by doing the following:

- helping to manage and prevent crises in the world around us,
- asserting our territorial integrity,
- defending Sweden against armed attack,
- protecting the civilian population and safeguarding the most important societal functions in the event of war.42

---

41 “The Supreme Commander, the SC, is the authoritative head of the [Swedish] National Defence (Armed Forces) and supervises the Armed Forces on the basis of the information provided by the Government authorities. Within the framework of the Government decisions and objectives, the SC must weigh the immediate against the long-term effect as far as defence is concerned. The SC supervises the Armed Forces on a central level, assisted mainly by the director general and the Armed Forces Command. The Headquarters assist the Supreme Commander in his authoritative command. At a local level the SC supervises the Armed Forces with the assistance of the heads of units, schools and centres. The Armed Forces Command (AFC) consists of the SC, the director general, the chief of command, the head of the strategy department, the financial director, the production command, the personnel command, the mission command, the head of Must, the intelligence command and the principal lawyer. The AFC handles matters on which the SC will or may take decisions and which are of primary significance or otherwise of great importance” (quoted from http://www2.mil.se/en/About-the-Armed-Forces/Organisation/Supreme-Commander/, accessed March 14, 2008).

Several recent studies of the Swedish Armed Forces explore decisive facets of the ongoing military reformation (see, e.g., Boëne et al. 2000; Haldén 2007; Viktorin 2005). Researchers have focused on different aspects, including novel military tasks related to participation in peace support operations (Johansson 2001); changes in the selection and education of officers (Weibull and Danielsson 2000; cf. Hedlund 2004); new demands on military leadership (see, e.g., Andersson 2001); and the reformation more broadly of the military profession (Bolin 2008). Most of these studies demonstrate that changes in the Swedish Armed Forces are by no means limited to the sphere of security, but that the military continuously adapts also to broader issues, such as the changing defense industry policy (Britz 2004), an increasing Europeanization (Andersson 2005), and expanding processes of neoliberalization (Viktorin 2008).

Armed forces in many countries go through similar changes (see, e.g., Dandeker 1994). Thus what is new is not the international orientation of the military per se, but rather a specific interrelation between the national and the international on the one hand, and between the political and the military on the other. According to one commentator, the altered “relationship between warfighting and the political, economic and cultural-ideological domains” ultimately constitutes a “new Western way of war” (Shaw 2005: 55).

Military sociologists typically treat these post-Cold War transformations of the armed forces in relation to broad geopolitical structures. Charles Moskos and James Burk, for instance, offer a typology “as a guide to systematize current research findings.” They posit three types of relations between the military and society.

The first is the modern type which dates, roughly speaking, from the late eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. The second is the postmodern type which we believe is emerging in the present and will persist into the indefinite future. A third, the late modern type, is added to help explain the transition from modern to postmodern military organization. It dates from the mid-twentieth century to the early 1990s. Although the typology draws heavily from Western experience, the essential differences between armed forces and society in these three types are couched in general terms suitable for broad cross-national analysis. (Moskos and Burk 1998: 168, emphasis in original)

A subsequent publication, The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War (Moskos et al. 2000), comprises a number of case studies based on this model. Chapters explore how a set of “variables”—such as “perceived threat,” “force structure,” “major mission definition,” “civilian employees,” and “women’s role”—have varied between the modern, late modern, and postmodern eras.43 By implication, armed forces appear in their model as

43 The book includes case studies from the following countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, Switzerland, the
essentially responsive. As the world changes, the military adapts to the “new times” (Burk 1998).

While decidedly sweeping, Moskos and Burk’s model thus invites detailed case studies of armed forces in various countries. Rather myopically, many such studies conceptualize the military as “a culture” that follows the territorial boundaries of a certain state (cf. Callaghan and Kernic 2003a; Dandeker 1999; English 2004). Jean Callaghan and Franz Kernic, for instance, insist on “military culture” as a critical concept. They maintain that military sociologists “need to have an intimate knowledge of and understanding for the military and its culture”; but they also admit that this emphasis on “microcosms,” as they put it, poses a disciplinary dilemma. Researchers, they claim, “often lose track of the broader societal and theoretical contexts of the issue being studied […] and begin instead to uncritically admire, identify with, and accept as natural and correct all behaviors and choices of those they are studying” (Callaghan and Kernic 2003b: 17).

Meanwhile, several anthropological studies intimate certain limits of military sociology. For instance, that the “eras” are questionable and that the so-called “variables” are problematic and remain contested. Anthropological explorations thus destabilize sweeping claims by focusing on the particular. Recent examples include Sabine Frühstück’s (2007) ethnography of the Self-Defense Forces in Japan; Hana Červinková’s (2006) investigation of the post-Cold War reform of the Czech Armed Forces; Catherine Lutz’s Home-front (2001) on a US military town; and Eyal Ben-Ari’s (1998) study of an elite unit in the Israeli Defense Force. While they focus on specific cases, however, these books do not find coherent national military cultures. On the contrary they demonstrate among other things how the “space in which the military, state and society meet,” as Červinková (2006: 144) puts it, is characterized not by consensus, but often “by mutual distrust, dependency and anxiety.”

Viking 03 certainly captures central facets of a “new military.” Yet the fact that military and civilian participants from various countries identified one another as partners in a mutual effort also signals a shift that cannot be explained by investigating one single country. Neither is it limited to the military sphere. On a broader level Viking 03 is also connected to the emergence of a new way of conceiving the world, relating to it, and acting within it collectively (see also Viktorin 2005: 270-71).

United Kingdom, and the United States. This is the entire list of “variables”: perceived threat, force structure, major mission definition, dominant military professional, public attitude toward military, media relations, civilian employees, women’s role, spouse and military, homosexuals in military, conscientious objection (see Moskos 2000: 15).

44 See Ben-Ari (1998: 15-23) and Simons (1999: 89-90) for overviews of anthropological studies of the military.
II. Foreign Intervention

A collective system for safeguarding international peace and security emerged with the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations in 1945. Today various kinds of peace support operations exist. They differ in mandate, tasks, and leadership. In this brief overview of the development of UN peacekeeping, I seek to illustrate the evolution of different types of operations. This history provides a necessary background for understanding the Viking 03 project and the timeliness of its focus on civil-military cooperation.

Traditional Peacekeeping

The UN Charter states that the Security Council shall “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken […] to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Such measures could include both non-military coercion (such as embargoes or economic sanctions) and the use of military force directed against a certain state. Originally, the Charter envisaged that the UN member states would put armed forces personnel at the Council’s disposal on a permanent basis. This never happened. In practice, UN-led operations have instead depended on the voluntary provision of troops by member states on a case-by-case basis (see Frowein and Krisch 2002: 763).

Throughout the course of the Cold War, however, the permanent members of the Security Council—China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States—mostly lacked the political will to unite on collective enforcement measures.

The concept of “peacekeeping” emerged as an attempt to enable the UN to act despite this Security Council “deadlock.” Developed by the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld as part of his “preventive diplomacy,” peacekeeping gradually became a means for the peaceful settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (see, e.g., Wallensteen and Eliasson 2005). The UN Charter itself, however, does not mention the concept. Its principles emerged progressively as the UN responded to particular situa-

---

45 For a historical overview of collective security before 1945, see, e.g., Bring (2002).
46 Charlotta Viktorin brought new literature on peace support operations to my attention and offered advice that truly improved the entire section on foreign intervention.
48 The US-led 1950 intervention in Korea is the only exception. This operation became possible only because of the absence of the Soviet Union, following its boycott of the Security Council, at the time of the decision. China, too, was absent at this time since between 1946 and 1971 Taiwan occupied its seat in the Council (see Bothe 2002: 661; Thakur 2006: 308).
tions. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Suez Canal Area in 1956, for instance, constituted an important event in this regard.\textsuperscript{49}

It was to a large extent Hammarskjöld’s main report to the General Assembly on the establishment of UNEF that set the standards for peacekeeping. According to one commentator, this document “both laid the foundations for an entirely new kind of international activity and set out principles and ideas that were to become the basis for future UN peace-keeping operations” (Urquhart 1972: 180). Hammarskjöld formulated three main principles of what subsequently has come to be called traditional peacekeeping: “consent of the host state to the presence of the force; impartiality of the force and non-intervention in the state’s domestic affairs; and the non-use of force except in self-defense” (Zwanenburg 2005: 13).

During the course of the Cold War, the UN deployed sixteen traditional peacekeeping missions. Between 1956 and 1990, these included operations in the Middle East,\textsuperscript{50} in Africa,\textsuperscript{51} in India and Pakistan, and in Cyprus (see, e.g., Bothe 2002: 665-8; Held et al. 2000: 126-7). The objectives of these missions were not to devise political solutions or to enforce agreements between the parties to a conflict. Instead, activities mostly consisted of observations, fact-finding, the monitoring of the parties’ compliance with a cease-fire agreement, or the physical interposition between the former belligerents (Bellamy et al. 2004: 97).

**“An Agenda for Peace”**

With the end of the Cold War, the role of the UN Security Council became more permissive. For the first time, it could begin to play the policing function originally intended by the UN Charter. Between 1990 and 2003, the UN established no less than forty-one new missions (see, e.g., Thakur 2006: 46). While still based on the same principles as traditional peacekeeping, these post-Cold War missions were decidedly more complex and multifunctional. Often including a significant civilian component, they aimed at a much broader set of tasks, including civilian administration, policing, democratic institution building, supervision of electoral processes, and the promotion of human rights more generally. Although some commentators have questioned their long-term achievements, these so-called second-generation operations are generally regarded as the UN’s most successful missions (see, e.g., Bellamy et al. 2004: 111-2, 114-23).

\textsuperscript{49} The deployment of the UNEF was a response to the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Area, which was met by attacks from Israel and a subsequent invasion of British and French troops.

\textsuperscript{50} These included operations in Israel (UNTSO), Egypt (UNEF I and II), and Lebanon (UNOGIL and UNIFIL).

\textsuperscript{51} These included operations in the Congo (ONUC, which I discuss more below, in relation to Sweden’s participation) and Namibia (UNTAG).
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*, reflected this post-Cold War optimism. This report is noteworthy because it suggested two departures from previous peacekeeping practices. First, by redefining peacekeeping as the “deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, _hitherto_ with the consent of all the parties concerned” (quoted in Zwanenburg 2005: 18, emphasis in original), it suggested the possibility of operations without such consent. Second, it proposed the establishment of peace-enforcement units. Thereby it extended the UN-mandated use of force beyond self-defense (Zwanenburg 2005: 18; cf. Huldt et al. 1995).

The operations in the former Yugoslavia and in Somalia, both deployed in the early 1990s, reflected these transformations. They were given “the power to use force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for specific purposes other than self-defense” (Zwanenburg 2005: 19). Thus they set into motion what often is called third-generation peacekeeping. Ultimately they also disrupted the earlier optimism.

**Failure: Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda**

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had begun as a traditional peacekeeping operation. Deployed in 1992, it sought to monitor a cease-fire agreement between Croatia and Serbia. Soon the conflict escalated and came to include Bosnia Herzegovina. In response, UNPROFOR gradually took on new tasks. Initially these centered on the support of the delivery of humanitarian aid, but they evolved gradually into military enforcement tasks under a broadened mandate. Under-staffed and inappropriately equipped for such engagements, UNPROFOR ultimately failed to prevent the increasing violence: in 1995 Bosnian Serbs killed at least 7,500 of the inhabitants in Srebrenica. Only after NATO’s air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, which had been authorized under Security Council Resolutions, did the war finally come to an end (see Bellamy et al. 2004: 133-7).

The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) was deployed in 1993. It took over responsibilities from a previous Unified Task Force, which had been led by the United States. Inaugurated with a broad mandate, UNOSOM II had enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter from the beginning. Gradually, factions of the warring parties in the Somalia conflict became increasingly averse to the UN mission. Hostilities culminated when eighteen peacekeepers were killed in an ambush during an inspection of a weapons storage. The Security Council responded by giving UNOSOM II authority to “take all necessary measures against all those responsible for
the armed attacks.” A US-led military force assisted UNOSOM II in these military enforcement actions. In practice, the UN mission had thereby become a warring faction in the civil war—with appalling results. During an operation in Mogadishu, Somali militiamen shot down two US helicopters, and in the fighting that followed they killed eighteen Americans and one Malaysian member of UNOSOM II. The US and other governments decided at this point to withdraw their troops, thus leaving UNOSOM II unable to carry out its tasks. By February 1994, the Security Council terminated the mission, and the last UN troops left the country in 1995 (Bellamy et al. 2004: 159).

Yet the event that most severely disrupted the post-Cold War optimism was arguably the inability of the UN in 1994 to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. UNAMIR—the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda—had been deployed in 1993. Its task was to implement a peace agreement between the Rwandan government and the Tutsi guerrilla army, the Uganda-based Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). In early 1994, the UNAMIR Commander, General Roméo Dallaire, reported that mass killings appeared to be imminent. Despite this the Security Council neither reinforced UNAMIR nor altered its mandate. On the contrary, it formally reduced the mission. Following the failures and casualties in Somalia, the US had at this point withdrawn from UN peacekeeping almost entirely. According to some commentators, this position influenced the UN in the Rwanda case (see, e.g., Bellamy et al. 2004: 82). As the situation indeed deteriorated into genocide, the remaining UN personnel could do little to stop the violence. A subsequent Security Council decision to authorize a force of 5,500 troops to join UNAMIR came too late. When the intervention, led by France as “Operation Turquoise,” was deployed in July, the Hutu militia had already killed approximately 800,000 Tutsis and 50,000 Hutus (Bellamy et al. 2004: 133-7).53

A New Concept of Peace Support Operations

The failures in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda led to interminable public and academic debates. A large number of publications appeared on “humanitarian intervention.” Commentators typically took diametrically opposed positions. Some were very critical: Noam Chomsky (1999), in his book on Kosovo, cynically identified a “new military humanism,” Sherene Razack (2004) saw the “Somalia affair” as a “new imperialism,” and Marjorie Cohn (2003) denounced humanitarian intervention as essentially a myth (see also Chandler 2002; Jokic 2003a, 2003b; Orford 2003; Weissman

---

53 Roméo Dallaire’s memoirs, Shake Hands with the Devil (2005), subsequently became an international bestseller.
Others—such as Michael Walzer (2002) in his “Arguing for Humanitarian Intervention” or Neal Riemer (2002) in his “Scholars Against Genocide”—defended interventionism (see also Keren and Sylvan 2002; Lang 2003; Mills and Brunner 2002). Some volumes also comprised less polemical texts on the topic (see, e.g., Chatterjee and Scheid 2003; Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003).

The failures in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda also led to a period of reflection within the UN itself. A Panel on United Nations Peace Operations conducted a review of the peacekeeping operations, inquiring into their mandates, their construction, and the way they had been managed. Many commentators had criticized the departure from the principles of traditional peacekeeping—consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense (Zwanenburg 2005: 21). The panel, too, concluded that these ought to remain bedrock principles of future peacekeeping, but it modified their original meaning. In its report it recommended that the military component of a peacekeeping mission should be “robust” and “able to pose a credible deterrent threat, in contrast to the symbolic and non-threatening presence that characterizes traditional peacekeeping” (quoted in Zwanenburg 2005: 29). Since contemporary conflicts tend increasingly to be “internal” and involve non-state actors, and “consent” thus may vary, the report also suggested that “impartiality” should imply that peacekeepers can discriminate between belligerents according to their adherence to the mandate, and treat like breaches in similar ways.

A new concept of peace support operations (PSO) emerged at this time. It encompassed both traditional peacekeeping under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and enforcement operations under Chapter VII (Bellamy et al. 2004: 88; cf. also Mayall 2000: 121-48). In addition, the new concept enabled individual states and organizations other than the UN to lead operations. Indeed, many new missions were led by NATO (in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan), the EU (in Macedonia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Bosnia), or by individual states (e.g., the Australian-led mission in East Timor) (see, e.g., Zwanenburg 2005: 22-28).

A 2001 NATO doctrine reflects the shift from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. It defines peace support operations as

multifunctional operations, conducted impartially, normally in support of an internationally recognised organisation such as the UN or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. PSO are designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specific conditions. They include Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peace-making, peacebuilding and humanitarian relief. (Quoted in Zwanenburg 2005: 30)
Against this background the Viking 03 project certainly appears as a felicitous effort. It sought to enhance peace support operations in two respects: by improving civil-military cooperation, and by furthering the process of internationalizing the military. Thus Viking 03 exemplifies the convergence of several things: recent transformations within the UN system, ongoing transformations of the military, and the increasing influence of NGOs.

III. Human Rights

The expansion of UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions is associated with the development of new international norms. The idea of human rights in particular relates closely to the changing role of the military, to contemporary peace support operations, and to civil-military cooperation (see Finnemore 1996; Held et al. 2000: 70-4, 130-1). Especially after the Cold War, breaches of human rights have come to be considered legitimate reasons for intervening militarily in conflicts in other states (Finnemore 2003: 135-37). To “defend democracy and human rights,” according to the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, now constitutes an important task for the military (Syrén 2006: 47). As Viking 03 illustrates, the concept of human rights has also enabled collaboration between the military and civilian NGOs. In what follows, I discuss the emergence of human rights and contemporary debates—within anthropology and beyond.

Origins

Since the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948, it has expanded into a remarkably powerful framework.\(^54\) Some commentators characterize the development of human rights as a more or less historically linear evolution (cf. Donnelly 1999). Others emphasize historical discontinuities (cf. Hunt 2000; 2007).\(^55\) Micheline Ishay (1997: xiii-xl) takes a middle position and traces the origins of human rights to a set of different but overlapping spheres: religious humanism and stoicism; the Enlightenment and liberalism; and socialism. She finds the earliest historical foundations of human rights in the humanist strand within the world’s major religions. Stoicism, for instance, influenced what eventually evolved into a discourse on rights. So did the

\(^{54}\) The Declaration was adopted without a negative vote. However, the states of the Soviet Bloc, the Soviet Union itself, Saudi Arabia, and the Union of South Africa all abstained from voting (see, e.g., Kunz 1949: 322).

\(^{55}\) Recent accounts of the history of human rights include Hunt (2007) and Ishay (2004).
natural rights theorists of antiquity. Thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Epictetus have been influential also in this regard.

What Ishay calls “the first generation of human rights” emerged during the Enlightenment. Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Paine, and others helped to redefine and secularize religious traditions into liberal and civic rights. And the American and French revolutions certainly are the most obvious precursors to the contemporary discourse on rights. While the American “Bill of Rights” (1776) and the French “Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen” (1789) both contained ideas with a long history, the precise forms into which they were assembled depended on specific historical circumstances. According to some commentators, the declaration of rights during the French revolution, which fundamentally was an effort to instigate a profound break with the past, would have been inconceivable before 1789 (see Hunt 2000).

“Second generational human rights” evolved in the nineteenth century. Socialist thinkers denounced the Enlightenment conception of liberal rights as ahistorical, and critiqued in particular the right to property. The socialist position emphasized instead rights to universal health care and education, the emancipation of women, the prohibition of child labor, universal voting rights, etc. Influential figures include Marx and Engels, and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (see Ishay 1997: xiii-xl). Finally, a “third generation” of human rights has developed in the twentieth century that centers on groups and peoples’ rights rather than on individual rights. Yet in many contexts claims such as the right to development, to natural resources, and so forth, still remain contested.

**Contemporary Debates**

Scholars agree that human rights are outcomes of historical processes, but no consensus exists regarding what exactly human rights are or ought to be. The idea of human rights per se, however, is rarely denied. Instead, dissenters tend to claim that the current discourse exhibits a Western bias (see, e.g., Young 2000; Donnelly 1988). While human rights are usually assumed to empower people, some commentators have thus come to view them instead as power over people, “expressed in exclusionary practices that deny the full participation of those who fail to support the interests of the dominant group” (Evans 1998: 4). More specifically, critics have recurrently denounced the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as a vehicle for economic and political liberalism (Rieff 2000). It has also been accused of containing a male bias (Peterson and Parisi 1998), a heterosexist bias (Mohr 1997), and, perhaps most frequently, a bias toward individualism (Dembour 1996: 27; Messer 1993: 227). Critics insist, in other words, that the Universal Declaration not only designates a set of abstract values, but also presumes particular social practices to realize those values (Donnelly 1999: 19).
Opinions also differ concerning whether human rights have epistemological foundations. Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler (1999) identify four broad metatheoretical positions in the human rights discourse: liberal natural rights, traditional communitarianism, communitarian pragmatism, and cosmopolitan pragmatism. Much of the development of the international legal regime on human rights rests on what Dunne and Wheeler call liberal natural rights thinking. For liberal natural rights theorists, all human beings are entitled to certain rights by virtue of their common humanity. Philosophically this position is grounded in the natural law tradition, which maintains a notion of unity among all peoples irrespective of cultural difference. Epistemologically, it draws on a “practical reason,” which claims that all human beings have the ability to deduce the correct moral code by which to live their lives. As some commentators have pointed out, however, liberal natural rights theorists ultimately fail to provide a convincing theory of human nature that would ground notions of human dignity. They also appear incapable of explaining why moral practices vary within and between cultures (Dunne and Wheeler 1999: 4-5; cf. Dembour 2001: 57).

A second position—the traditional communitarian perspective—understands human rights not as the cause, but as the consequence of liberal policies. It holds that people have rights as members of communities rather than by virtue of the abstract notion of a “common humanity.” Because it follows from social interaction within a particular community, morality for the traditional communitarians thus inevitably remains culturally bound. This, however, seems somewhat problematically to imply that cultures precede social interaction (Dunne and Wheeler 1999: 8; cf. Cowan et al. 2001: 18).

Communitarian pragmatism, in turn, rejects the different forms of epistemological foundationalism inherent in the two previous positions. This third perspective, exemplified for instance by Richard Rorty’s philosophy, denounces as mythic thinking the idea that reason or science can access truth. Essentially human rights would thus amount to nothing more than a story that liberal societies have decided to tell. As Dunne and Wheeler note, this would explain why only liberal societies provide an epistemological context for human rights justifications. A rejection of epistemological foundationalism, however, does not imply that human rights values cannot be defended. While communitarian pragmatists discard their philosophical foundations they hold on to and defend human rights values (Dunne and Wheeler 1999: 9-10).

Cosmopolitan pragmatists maintain a fourth position. In opposition to the communitarian pragmatists, who reject the idea that reason can arbitrate between rival validity claims, cosmopolitan pragmatists argue that universal values, while lacking an “objective basis,” are nevertheless possible. But they can only be decided through argumentation. The point, then, is not to discover values, but to agree on them—not within one particular community, but globally (Dunne and Wheeler 1999: 10-11).
Anthropological Approaches

Anthropologists have until recently mostly been left out of human rights research. There are several reasons for this. The most pertinent one, epitomized by the American Anthropological Association’s 1947 rejection of the UN’s proposed declaration, has been a prevailing notion of cultural relativism within anthropology (see, e.g., Messer 1993: 224; Preis 1996: 288). Another reason is that the concept of human rights mostly has been presented as a “given,” while anthropologists have typically preferred to focus instead on historical, social, and cultural contexts as constitutive of rights (Dembour 1996: 22).

Thus anthropologists have often retained a traditional communitarian perspective. Many scholars now find this perspective increasingly awkward—especially in cases when governments in Third World states invoke the idea of cultural relativism to legitimize human rights violations (see, e.g., Cowan et al. 2001: 7; Preis 1996: 305; Washburn 1987: 940-41). Paralleled by debates about the culture concept, then, the focus within the discipline has gradually shifted—often toward a cosmopolitan pragmatist perspective. Thereby anthropological approaches have in recent years become less dismissive toward human rights (see, e.g., Engle 2001; Hastrup 2001).

Some anthropologists now embrace the rights framework and present ethnographic studies as contributions in attempts to advocate human rights without destroying cultural diversity (see, e.g., Messer 1993; Sponsel 1997; Turner 1997). Others, however, take a more analytical approach. They treat the entire discourse on human rights as itself a cultural form (see, e.g., Cowan et al. 2001; Dembour 1996; Preis 1996; Wilson 1997). These anthropologists ask how individuals, groups, communities and states use the dis-

---

57 The Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association submitted its Statement on Human Rights (chiefly authored by Melville Herskovits) to the United Nations in 1947 (see American Anthropological Association 1947). According to Karen Engle, anthropologists have “been embarrassed ever since” (Engle 2001: 536). Yet the reasons for this enduring embarrassment have varied. In the late 1940s, she claims, anthropologists felt embarrassed because they saw the Statement as limiting tolerance. In recent years, however, they have felt embarrassed because of the document’s refusal to put limits on tolerance.
58 Ellen Messer, for instance, suggests how anthropologists “might make greater use of the human rights framework in their theoretical, action- or policy-oriented analyses” (Messer 1993: 225), while Terence Turner, in his article “Human Rights, Human Difference: Anthropology’s Contribution to an Emancipatory Cultural Politics” (1997), suggests how the human rights discourse might in turn make greater use of anthropological analyses. In fact, many pro-rights anthropologists seek to show that there is no opposition between relativism and rights. Thus rather than rejecting relativism, they find support for their position in it. Alison Renteln, for example, suggests that relativism does not imply tolerance: its major contribution, she claims, is instead the focus on enculturation. But the fact that people might prefer their own cultural standards does not mean that there will always be irreconcilable differences (see Renteln 1988; cf. also Engle 2001: 541).
course of rights in the pursuit of specific ends, and how they thereby become enmeshed in its logic (Cowan et al. 2001: 21).

IV. Sweden, the Military, the World

The standard narratives organize the histories of the reformation of the military, the development of peace support operations, and the emergence of human rights into successive “generations.” Viking 03 appears to fit well into such a narrative. It seems to capture a critical phase in the “evolution of military culture” (English 2004: 41) where security and development converge in “a culture of conflict prevention” (Mellbourn 2004), which is related more broadly to the “evolution of UN peacekeeping” (Goulding 1993). The fact that Viking 03 was a Swedish initiative also fits into this form. Sweden has a long tradition of international engagements, particularly within the UN structure. While decidedly international, Viking 03 thus resonates also with a somewhat complacent Swedish self-image as a “moral superpower.”

These narratives provoke equally conventional criticisms. Commentators, as I have already mentioned, recurrently denounce contemporary military engagements—typically as new imperialisms (see, e.g., Orford 2003; Razack 2004). Run of the mill accounts of the “Swedish model” tend also increasingly to be revised and critiqued (see, e.g., Almqvist and Glans 2001; Andersson and Tydén 2007). On the face of it, Viking 03, too, appears vulnerable to several such criticisms.

In this section, however, I seek to refocus our analytical attention through a particular narrative of Sweden during the twentieth century. More specifically, I describe four contested events: the so-called courtyard crisis in 1914; the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939; the UN operation in the Congo in 1960; and the stranding of a Soviet submarine on Swedish territorial waters in 1981. Through these histories, I show how notions of “Sweden,” “the military,” and “the world” have been at stake in different configurations. These events certainly exhibit continuity. Yet they also illustrate how, at different points in time, old and new features have converged in particular ways. Following Sassen, I thus use history here “to illuminate possibilities and lock-ins rather than tracing an evolution” (Sassen 2006: 7).

This perspective allows a rethinking of the pseudo-evolutionist accounts of the military and of international engagements. Thereby it also enables a move beyond much formulaic critique. It lets me ask how Viking 03 is related to emergent forms for engaging with the world where the meaning of the nation, the military, and the world—and the relations between these notions—are in a process of change.
The Courtyard Coup

Some claimed it was the largest demonstration in Sweden ever. More than thirty thousand people, most of them peasants, marched through Stockholm on their way to the Royal Palace. The activists, as they were called, had arrived from all over the country. They had come to the capital in these imposing numbers for a manifestation in support of a strong monarchy, a reinforced military, and, somewhat bewilderingly, in opposition to parliamentary democracy. When the crowd eventually reached the palace, the king himself, Gustaf V, appeared on the courtyard and, in a speech saturated with nationalistic and historical romanticism, praised the demonstration. Undoubtedly, this was the anticipated highlight of the occasion.

This event took place on February 6, 1914 and proved so controversial that the Swedish liberal government under Karl Staaff was more or less forced to resign in the debates that followed. The fact that Gustaf V in his speech had publicly challenged the government and its politics of defense was considered especially contentious. The demonstration, soon referred to as “the courtyard coup,” clearly had been far from a spontaneous uprising. It was the result of careful planning. Every last detail had been meticulously prepared in advance: the mobilization and transportation of the peasants, their accommodation in Stockholm, and, perhaps most importantly, the writing of the king’s speech. Representatives from the military elite were among the instigators, together with a group of conservatives on the political far right. Several of those responsible were closely affiliated with the royal family. The queen, one of the most relentless opponents of democracy in Sweden at the time, had personally followed the preparations with great zest.

---

59 The courtyard crisis has been described by Franzén (1986: 22-45), Hadenius (2005: 123-45), Hedin et al. (2005: 58-63), and, more extensively, by Johanson (1997) and Nyman (1957).

60 Historical romanticism was fundamental to the military activism of the conservative defense movement before the First World War (see, e.g., af Malmborg 2001: 108-9). The king’s 1914 courtyard speech, published unabridged in Ohlmarks (1982: 98-101), exemplifies this. Also, drawing on the widespread fear of Russia in Sweden, military activists systematically invoked “the Russian menace” to increase the support for a strong military defense (af Malmborg 2001: 105).


62 Sven Hedin, famous explorer and opinionatedly conservative pundit, had drafted the original proposal of the speech. For the final version, Hedin collaborated with Carl Benedich, a young officer in the Swedish Armed Forces (see Nyman 1957: 291-2). Cleas-Göran Dahl (2007: 61) identifies a third co-author: the lieutenant Axel Rappe—a somewhat conspicuous figure I will have reasons to mention again later.
The courtyard coup, or, more neutrally, “the courtyard crisis,” captures a peculiar divide between the political and the military elites. Indeed, within a few days, Hjalmar Branting of the Social Democratic Party organized a counter-demonstration. This event was in support of Staaff and the liberal government, and gathered even more people than the courtyard coup—between forty and fifty thousand participants. Branting stated that “the people of Sweden” would never comply with the claims of the monarch, but would continue to forcefully defend the values of democracy. Carl Lindhagen, the mayor of Stockholm, even took the opportunity to cry out “Up for the republic!” on the march through the city—an infelicity for which he was fined 100 Swedish kronor (approximately 15 US dollars) (Franzén 1986: 34; Hadenius 2005: 139-40).

The king, however, as Dagens Nyheter and other liberal newspapers noted at the time, appeared to pay more attention to the military elite than to the politicians (Hadenius 2005: 140). On February 11, for instance, he repeated his unequivocal anti-parliamentarianism; this time in an address to two thousand students who had gathered outside the Royal Palace to express their support for the monarch. Of course, neither “the politicians” nor “the military” make up homogenous or consensual categories. It is nevertheless helpful to provisionally treat them somewhat broadly as different, and often conflicting, positions. Thus sketched they illustrate a particular configuration of notions about Sweden, the military, and the world.

Conscription, which had been introduced in 1901, gradually brought changes to the Armed Forces—and beyond. Expressed in the slogan, “One man, one vote, one rifle!” (En man, en röst, ett gevär!), it resonated with emergent political processes, such as the growing class-consciousness among workers, the rising suffrage movement, and—ultimately—the democratization of Sweden.63 (These changes, as I come back to, became especially apparent when during the Second World War more than 300,000 Swedish citizens were enlisted in the armed services.)

Yet in 1914 the military remained nationalistic and conservative by default. Large sections of the public, too, were still liable to join together in a nationalistic form related closely to monarchy, to war, and to tradition. In fact, it appeared during the courtyard crisis as if the “old Swedish authoritarian state rose up to resist the attacks of democracy and parliamentarism on the traditional values inherent in Swedish government and Swedish commu-

63 See Ericson (1999: 10, 226-30). “The defence issue,” according to af Malmborg (2001: 103), subsequently “became closely linked to the question of general suffrage and other reforms. Under the slogan ‘Defence and reforms,’ it was argued that the working classes could only be expected to defend their country if they felt it was theirs, that is if they were accepted as equal citizens and were allowed a share in government.” Ericson, in his Medborgare i vapen (1999), provides a comprehensive historical overview of conscription in Sweden; cf. also Wollinger’s ethnographic study, Mannen i ledet (2000). See Leander (2004: 583-93) on recent Swedish reformations of conscription, and Sørenssen (2000) for Scandinavian comparisons.
nal life” (Nyman 1957: 293). While contested, war activism and support for the monarchy thus remained strong. After all, the liberal politicians who opposed the militaristic and conservative view of Sweden, and its specific relation to the world, had been “defeated”—and, in Lindhagen’s case, even fined.

Gradually, however, the courtyard coup and subsequent outbursts of war activism brought liberals and social democrats—who were equally opposed to traditional conservatism—closer together (see af Malmborg 2001: 143-44). When the First World War broke out on August 1, 1914, Sweden remained neutral and succeeded ultimately to entirely stay out of the war. Slowly, as a novel political configuration emerged, military conservatism in Sweden became weaker. By the time of the Second World War, the relations between the military and the political elites appeared very different.

“Our Preparedness is Good”

Only a few days before the outbreak of the Second World War, on August 27, 1939, the Swedish Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson assured in a speech that, “Our preparedness is good” (Vår beredskap är god). Yet, when later that fall the Swedish Armed Forces mobilized and marched toward the national borders, it comprised a force hardly equipped for Blitzkrieg. The total number of tanks in the country at that point did not exceed twenty. Infantry soldiers—many of them attired somewhat conspicuously in pointed hats from the First World War—carried nineteenth century Mauser rifles (occasionally deprived of proper ammunition) and were supported by heavy artillery mounted on horse-drawn carriages. Gradually, however, standards did improve. But when ultimately the preparedness within the Army appeared truly satisfactory, the war had already been over for four years.

Given these circumstances, we might ask what, more precisely, the Prime Minister meant when he asserted that the preparedness was good. Some historians argue that he was not primarily, if at all, referring to military preparedness (which was indisputably poor at the time), but to national supplies of food and other necessities for common maintenance, which most certainly made the country well prepared to meet harsh circumstances. Yet most


66 Gunnar Richardson, for instance, adheres stubbornly to this position, and has recently discussed at some length various interpretations of Per Albin Hansson’s speech (Richardson
observers seem to maintain, perhaps more convincingly, that the Swedish Prime Minister did refer also to military preparedness (despite its insufficient standards) and that with his speech, which was broadcast on national radio, he sought first and foremost to calm the Swedish public (see, e.g., Dahl 2007: 95; Dahlberg 1983: 10-11; Linder 2002: 19-20).

Per Albin Hansson’s statement, accounted for variously as political pragmatism, national complacency, or downright insincerity, could be seen as a starting point for interminable contestations concerning Sweden’s role during the war. These debates have, especially since the early 1990s, mostly taken a revisionist and often explicitly moral turn. This is particularly true for discussions about deviations from Sweden’s declared adherence to the principle of neutrality.67 My approach here is by contrast “post-revisionist” (cf. af Malmborg 2001: 2). I use the Prime Minister’s declaration, which remains remarkably well known in Sweden today, as an entry point for discussing the typically strained relations between the political and the military elites during the war. Pivotal in this context is the shifting notion of “Sweden.” My emphasis, in other words, is not so much on “preparedness” but remains mostly on the first part of the statement: the meaning of the word “our.” While in what follows I talk about “notions of Sweden,” I do not, however, mean to treat Sweden as a homogeneous actor—a common yet increasingly castigated mode of writing about Sweden during the Second World War (see Estvall 2007, for a recent critique). My focus is rather on how representatives of different positions, vying for political legitimacy, invoked conflicting conceptions of Sweden.

* * *

On November 30, 1939, the Soviet Union invaded Finland. The Swedish government turned down a Finnish request for military help on December 2, and refused persistently throughout the Winter War to send troops to aid its neighbor. Yet, without becoming directly involved, Sweden did as much as it could to support Finland. The government never issued a neutrality declaration; and as a “non-belligerent,” it could supply volunteers and provisions to Finland—including weapons and ammunition—without breaking the Haag conventions (see af Malmborg 2001: 138; Agrell 2000: 52). Still, the support for a military intervention in Finland, particularly among conservatives and within the military elite, remained strong.

---

67 Johan Östling has discussed conflicting narratives about Sweden during the Second World War (Östling 2007, see especially pp. 34-38). On neutrality, morality, and Sweden, see also Agrell (2001), Åmark (2007), Boëthius (1999), and Zetterberg (2007a).
In a major demonstration, organized in February 1940 in Stockholm, activists demanded a Swedish intervention on Finland’s side. The then 82-year-old king, Gustaf V, again played an important part. This time, however, he sided with the politicians. On February 20, in what some commentators call his most important statement since the 1914 courtyard speech, Gustaf V expressed his firm support of the government’s ambition to keep the country out of the war. Loyalty to the monarch was important to conservatives. Thus the king’s statement, published the next day in bold print on the front page of one of Sweden’s leading newspapers, made further war activism increasingly difficult (af Malmborg 2001: 137; Hadenius 2005: 230-32; Linder 2002: 37).

Meanwhile, the political elite appeared during the Second World War for the most part as one distinct unit.68 The main reason for this was the coalition government that had been inaugurated in December 1939. With representatives from all Swedish parties except the communist party, it sought during the war to emphasize Swedish national unity. Perhaps this attempt became most explicit in Stockholm during May 1, 1940, when demonstrations turned into a major national manifestation. Domestic political disputes were set aside as representatives from most parties and large organizations in Sweden walked side by side, under the slogan “For the Freedom and Independence of Sweden” (För Sveriges frihet och oberoende) (Dahlberg 1983: 213-4). The national elections that year proved that the support for the government, and for Prime Minister Hansson, remained exceptionally strong: the Social Democratic Party won no less than 53.8 percent of the votes (Linder 2002: 21; Oredsson 2001: 238).

Swedish democracy, however, was still in its infancy—universal suffrage had been introduced only in 1921—and it remained contested (see, e.g., Dahlberg 1983: 200). A majority of the representatives of the military elite, for example, retained an attitude toward parliamentarianism that hardly differed from that of 1914. “The mere word democracy,” as one officer confessed in 1940, “works as an emetic on me” (quoted in Nilsson 2000: 49, my translation).

Yet something new clearly was emerging. The notion of “Sweden” manifested in the demonstrations on May 1, 1940, differed remarkably from that invoked during the courtyard crisis. It was decidedly democratic and progressive. Throughout the war, the coalition government in fact carried out several reforms that became foundational to the future Swedish welfare state. Indeed, Per Albin Hansson’s image of Sweden as a “People’s home” (Folkhem)—an effectual combination of traditional nationalism and a socialist vision for the future—probably remains the most powerful symbol for the

68 The Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Richard Sandler, was one of few leading politicians who wanted Sweden to intervene militarily in the Winter War. This deviating opinion forced him to resign.
social democratization of the country that ensued after the war (Dahlberg 1983: 215; Johansson 1984: 35-7; cf. Hägg 2005). In other words, the Social Democrats, the leading political party since 1932, did not oppose a nationalist historic narrative so much as fitting it into a different framework (see Linderborg 2001: 88-91). They thus shared with the conservatives a strategy to create national consent by emphasizing historical tradition and retaining continuity with the past. But, while conservatives stressed the unique relation between the peasantry and the monarch (exemplified during the courtyard crisis), social democrats sought instead to establish trust between the people and the state—that is, the Social Democratic Party itself (Linderborg 2001: 93).

The conservative, anti-democratic, military activism that had forced the liberal government to resign in 1914 now appeared increasings anachronistic. A debate between Prime Minister Hansson and the chief of staff at the Defense Headquarters, Axel Rappe, clearly illustrates this. On February 21, 1940, Rappe—a notorious war activist and possibly one of the co-authors of the king’s 1914 courtyard speech—suggested to the government that a joint Swedish and Finnish force should advance on Soviet territory to cut off Russian units. His plan was to force the Soviet Union to sign a peace agreement that would be favorable to Finland. Thus before an audience of bewildered politicians, Rappe demanded the government’s consent for sending between 80,000 and 100,000 thousand Swedish troops to take part in the Winter War. To this Per Albin Hansson simply responded: “Bloody drivel!”—Djävla skitprat!—a comment which Tage Erlander, Hansson’s successor, later characterized as “entirely exhaustive.” (Agrell 2000: 53; Linder 2002: 35; Oredsson 2001: 228-9.)

The military was also changing from below, so to speak. Swedish politicians, despite Per Albin Hansson’s assurance that the preparedness was satisfactory, had mostly ignored recurrent military intelligence about the imminence of Germany’s Operation Weserübung. On April 8, 1940, the Minister of Defense told the Supreme Commander that these rumors were most probably exaggerated. Thus he turned down a request to increase the military preparedness. The next day, however, German troops invaded Denmark and Norway—while southern Sweden unpromisingly remained almost entirely undefended. Obviously this caused anxiety. “Immediately after April 9 we were prepared for anything,” one former army recruit recalls, “we were ready to make sacrifices like the Finns did during the Winter War. Ready to defend ourselves with old double barrel rifles.” Mobilization commenced within a few days. “To receive the draft card on April 11,” he remembers, “felt like a relief” (quoted in Linder 2002: 46-7, my translation). By May, 330,000 men had been enlisted in the armed services.69

The mass recruitment to the armed forces augmented the new “social democratic” outlook on Sweden. It made the military more folklig. This word lacks an English equivalent: it captures a particular combination of something national, popular, and (social) democratic. Thus it stands in sharp contrast to the military elite at the time, which, while national, qualified neither as popular nor as particularly democratic.

With wartime censorship in Sweden, the theater, the cinema, literature, and art all became important media for opposing defeatism and the fear of war. Several novels, for instance, such as Vilhelm Moberg’s allegorical *Rid i natt!* (Ride this Night!), took a critical position toward Sweden’s role during the war. Popular culture functioned also as a vehicle for reinforcing the notion of the military as folklig. The tune *Min soldat* (My Soldier), performed by Ulla Billquist, became something of the theme song of the years of Swedish military preparedness. Rather than warfighting heroes, it affectionately invoked notions of drafted soldiers attired in ill-fitting uniforms, far away from home—somewhere in Sweden. Decidedly folklig, the recording sold more than fifty thousand copies (Olsson 1974: 210-5).

Some forty new Swedish movies were at this time produced annually, and people went to the movie theaters as never before. Military comedies about life as an army recruit became particularly popular. Undisciplined conscripts typically evaded mockery, while hawkish officers on the contrary were subjected repeatedly to contemptuous ridicule (see Dahlberg 1983: 192-9). Growing indignation among officers led to a proposal in 1942 that manuscripts for all future films would have to be approved in advance by the Swedish Officers Association. Anticipating that such a demand would be greeted with even more derision, however, the Board of Directors decided instantly to turn down the suggestion (see Dahl 2007: 108).

Gunnar Ahlström’s 1941 drama *Beredskap* (Preparedness) exemplifies how the theater, too, became a vital medium for changing old attitudes. A “play with no hero,” *Beredskap* captured the atmosphere among a number of drafted soldiers stationed close to the Norwegian border. The heterogeneous group comprised men from diverse social backgrounds and from different parts of Sweden. Under the threat of war, however, they downplayed class differences; and in its place emerged a democratic and decidedly more harmonious mode of togetherness (Ek 2007: 172).

Yet the feature that, perhaps more than any other, has come to symbolize the Swedish military, and the folklig-ness inherent in its system of conscrip-

---


71 For a brief discussion of shifting understandings of “the military” in Sweden, see Wollinger (2000: 16-19).
tion, arguably is a comic strip called *91: an Karlsson*. Its main character, Private Number 91-Karlsson, has really become a *folklig* “hero” (remarkably illustrated by the fact that in 1980 his portrait appeared on Swedish stamps). Somehow this “man of the people” bears a certain resemblance with Hašek’s good soldier Švejk. Irreproachable in his righteousness, he is a little too ingenuous for his own good. Over the years, Private Number 91-Karlsson has in any case turned into such a strong symbol for the Swedish military that he is recurrently invoked in debates about the future of the conscript system. “Let Private Number 91-Karlsson resign once and for all,” as the editorial of *Expressen*, a major Swedish tabloid, had it in 1997 (see Ericson 1999: 276-78, my translation).

**Opération des Nations Unies au Congo**

On July 17, 1960, the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld turned to Sweden with a request for military assistance to the ONUC—the *Opération des Nations Unies au Congo*. The Swedish government gave its immediate consent. After the formal decision had been taken the following day, the transfer of troops to Congolese Léopoldville was completed remarkably fast—within less than one week. Swedish military personnel then remained in the country throughout the entire operation, until 1964.

I find some of the circumstances surrounding the Swedish participation in this UN intervention intriguing. They illustrate how the political and military elites suddenly found themselves in entirely reversed positions. While a broad political consensus supported the decision to send troops abroad, the military elite insisted on staying at home—and out of the war. In what follows, I further explore the relations between Sweden, the military, and the world, and the ways in which they then appeared to be at stake.

The Swedish military presence in the Congo during the early 1960s exemplifies a turn toward a more active foreign policy. Indeed, the event marks an almost complete change of course. For decades, the primary political goal had been to create and sustain the best possible circumstances for Sweden to survive as a sovereign state (epitomized in the 1940 May Day
slogan, “For the Freedom and Independence of Sweden”). Meanwhile the military elite had mostly opposed this “passivity,” advocating instead a more aggressive approach; but, as we have seen, such military activism became increasingly challenged and eventually regarded as discomfitingly outdated (recall, for instance, the debate in 1940 between the Prime Minister and the chief of staff at the Defense Headquarters). After the Second World War, the positions within the political and the military elites had appeared to gradually converge on the primacy of national interests. A Swedish decision in 1952 to turn down a previous UN proposal to put troops at the organization’s disposal (see Lödén 1999: 339-40), for instance, exemplifies both how the Swedish foreign policy in the early 1950s remained restrictive, and that international military operations appeared incompatible with national interests.

Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, however, abundant international engagements became essential and characteristic features of Swedish foreign policy. This shift was related closely to a certain ideological vision, and Olof Palme and other social democratic politicians sought actively to promote “the Swedish model” internationally as an ideal for modern, democratic societies (see, e.g., Lödén 1999: 38, 250-3; cf. Judt 2005: 365-69). Thus Sweden gradually took on the role as a “moral superpower.” This self-image as an independent champion of international solidarity was decidedly complacent, and perhaps exaggerated. Still the country did inhabit for some time a rather unique and prominent position in world politics. Sweden’s adherence to the principle of neutrality constituted an important prerequisite for this position. It allowed Sweden to act internationally without the restrictions or dependencies imposed by an alliance. Throughout the Second World War, neutrality had mostly remained a narrow, realist strategy for national survival. Now it increasingly emerged as a national consensus ideology—with a tinge of moral righteousness or even superiority (see, e.g., af Malmborg 2001: 146). Apart from extensive participation in UN peacekeeping operations, Sweden began in addition to support decolonization and to advocate various foreign aid projects. It also strongly promoted international arms control (see, e.g., Agrell 2000: 172-3; Sköld 1995; Steene 1989: 177).

Two renowned Swedes in particular have frequently been invoked as symbols for this image of Sweden: Folke Bernadotte and Dag Hammarskjöld. As the vice-chairman of the Swedish Red Cross, Bernadotte emphasized the importance of international humanitarian aid. Internationally he is probably best known as the organizer of the 1945 “White Buses” program to rescue Scandinavian prisoners from German concentration camps (see, e.g., Hadenius 2007: 81-127). Given his royal family ties—Folke Bernadotte was a nephew of King Gustaf V—one might in fact claim that he literally embodied a new convergence of Swedish monarchy, international humanitarianism, and national security. Indeed, after his death in Jerusalem, where he was assassinated in 1948 while serving as the UN Security Council mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict (see Ericson 1996: 235-38; Hadenius 2007:
Bernadotte was eulogized as “the first citizen of the world” and as a “servant of humanity” (see, e.g., Stavenow 1949). The decision in 2002 to use the name “The Folke Bernadotte Academy” for a new Swedish government agency centered on international crisis management and peace operations, exemplifies his continued symbol value.76

Dag Hammarskjöld’s reputation as an “international hero” is arguably even more powerful. During the years as UN Secretary-General, he sought to reform the organization as well as the role of the Secretary-General, and posthumously, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his international engagements. Yet particularly the debates during the 1960 UN General Assembly meeting, when Khrushchev challenged him to resign, also illustrate that he was not an uncontroversial figure. Hammarskjöld’s response to the Soviet leader—the famous “I shall remain in my post” speech—is in turn indicative of his unyielding approach (see Lash 1962: 263-80; Möllerstedt 1981: 237-50; Urquhart 1972: 459-67). He consistently repeated the same message: “the need for the brotherhood of all people everywhere; for reason, cooperation, communication; and, above all, for peaceful solutions to all problems” (Sheldon 1987: 70).

The Swedish government’s immediate and affirmative response to the request of military assistance to the Congo suggests an unequivocal support of Hammarskjöld’s internationalism (see, e.g., Åström 2005: 82-3). Despite the adherence to an ideological internationalism, however, Sweden’s political activism throughout the Cold War arguably retained as its ultimate goal the advancement of Swedish interests. At least in part, it constituted a strategy for protecting Swedish welfare and sustaining national security within a new kind of international political environment. In a 1965 speech, the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Torsten Nilsson, explicitly emphasized that a further expansion of international cooperation increasingly appeared as a national interest.77 Sometimes, however, the focus on Swedish interests was less overt. Folke Bernadotte and representatives from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance, had allegedly turned downed a Danish offer of assistance to the “White Buses” program. They wanted, according to some commentators, the humanitarian operation to remain an entirely Swedish effort (see Hadenius 2007: 96-97).

Representatives from the military elite, too, emphasized national interests. In spite of this common focus, however, the military authorities again took a

76 Yet Folke Bernadotte’s international role has in recent years also become critically reassessed. In particular, his negotiations toward the end of the Second World War with the German military leaders have increasingly generated critique (see, e.g., Hadenius 2007: 217-32).

77 These are Nilsson’s own words: “En följd av detta ömsesidiga beroende nationer och folk emellan är, att ett utvidgat internationellt samarbete alltmer framstår som ett nationellt intresse. En kris någonstans på jorden som innebär hot mot freden är ett hot mot oss alla. Det nationella intresset måste i dagens värld ges en annan och vidare tolkning än som var fallet till för bara kort tid sedan” (quoted in Lödén 1999: 286, emphasis in original).
position that diverged from the political majority. While representatives from the Armed Forces today often emphasize the long history of Swedish participation in UN peacekeeping operations, the Swedish military elite in fact persistently opposed international missions throughout much of the Cold War (see, e.g., Boëne et al. 2000: 155; Sköld 1994: 189-91). The reason for this resistance was that international engagements, regarded among many officers merely as “side-shows,” took resources from the main task of the Armed Forces—to defend Sweden (Sköld 1994: 110; cf. Abrahamsson 1971: 95-101). Officers who returned to Sweden from the Congo intervention even found their experiences ignored or brushed aside as irrelevant. “Immediately after returning from the Congo,” one officer recalls, “I started at the Military Academy where tactics and strategy were discussed […]. When with great enthusiasm I tried to share some of my experiences from the Congo, they looked at me like something the cat had dragged in” (quoted in Agrell 2000: 190, my translation).

While “national interest” remained the main goal for both the political and the military elites, then, the principle led to opposing ideas about what actions ought to be taken. Politicians actively sought to engage with the world and change it—in the name of national interests. Military authorities, on the contrary, focused exclusively on Sweden while leaving the world unchanged. Compared to the situation during the Second World War, the political and military positions thus appeared completely reversed.

“Whiskey-on-the-Rocks”79

One early October morning in 1981, a naval base in southern Sweden received a piece of exceedingly unsettling information. A fisherman reported that what appeared to be a foreign submarine had run aground in ominous vicinity of the base. When Swedish military officers arrived on the scene, they could see for themselves that this indeed was the case: U-137, a Soviet Whiskey-Class submarine, had stranded on some rocks. Unable to extricate itself it had been stuck, without being detected, for more than 12 hours—not only on Swedish internal waters but also, somewhat disturbingly for the Swedish Navy, within one of the two most highly restricted naval areas in Sweden.80

---

78 The military opposition to international missions subsequently gave way to a more positive attitude (see Sköld 1995: 126). Some Swedish officers, however, still retain a negative approach to international missions. One commentator, for instance, recently claimed that “[t]he boys who go abroad are seen as traitors [by their fellow officers]. And when they return they often find their jobs gone” (quoted in Jonsson 2008, my translation).
79 The expression is Lawrence Freedman’s (see Freedman 1987: vii).
The Swedish officers contacted the Headquarters in Stockholm. Lennart Ljung, the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, ordered that the submarine should be retained on Swedish territory. He also informed the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the situation. The political authorities took immediate action: the Soviet Union’s ambassador to Sweden, Mikhail Jakovlev, received the first formal note of protest later that afternoon. Assertively, the Swedish government also refused a subsequent Soviet request to send its own rescue team to remove the submarine. When Soviet vessels were nevertheless discovered en route to Sweden, the Prime Minister—Thorbjörn Fälldin—authorized the use of military force to stop further violations of Swedish sovereignty. In the end, the Soviet rescue team never entered Swedish territorial waters—and no military hostilities erupted.

The submarine event led to a provisional and rather unusual consensus between the political and the military authorities. Prime Minister Fälldin and Supreme Commander Ljung appeared to entirely agree with one another about the way ahead (see, e.g., Sundelius et al. 1997: 63). Yet the political and military elites might have had somewhat different reasons for agreeing at this time.

Recurrent military reports about deliberate intrusions on Swedish territorial waters prior to the 1981 incident had failed to convince the political authorities to increase the military budget. Instead, Swedish politicians continued to assure that Swedish foreign policy remained respected internationally—in the West and in the East—and this made intrusions seem unlikely. Perhaps one reason for this political persistence was an actual anxiety that Swedish foreign policy in fact was becoming increasingly challenged or threatened (see, e.g., Ottosson 2003: 95). Officers had in any case continued to argue that a stronger military defense was needed to secure Swedish sovereignty—and suddenly they received all proof they needed to win over even the most skeptical politicians (see, e.g., Lindfors 1996: 108). Thus for the navy people, the stranded U-137 was in a sense, as one commentator put it, “a dream come true” (Bynander 2003: 105). When the Swedish chief of staff at the Defense Headquarters, Bengt Schuback, received the information about the stranded submarine, he cried out, “At last!” (quoted in Hellberg and Jörle 1984: 96, my translation).

No previous incident in Sweden had ever drawn this much international publicity. Reports on the submarine intrusion severely threatened the image of neutral Sweden as an internationally respected and inherently peaceful country. The political authorities, however, sought in different ways to retain that view of Sweden (Ottosson 2003: 43). To deny intrusions altogether was no longer an option. Through their immediate and assertive response to the Soviet Union, however, the authorities succeeded to invoke the image of tiny neutral Sweden standing up alone, yet without hesitation, against the imposing military apparatus of the communist superpower (Lindfors 1996: 111)—not entirely unlike the spirit of Hammarskjöld’s 1960 response to Khrush-
Together with the Supreme Commander, the Swedish government thus dismissed all subsequent explanations from the Soviet Union that the intrusion was a mishap. Rather, they maintained that the intrusion had been a deliberate violation of Swedish territory—and that Sweden had responded accordingly (Agrell 1986: 54; Lindfors 1996: 119).

Perhaps this explanation initially preserved something of Sweden’s international image. A few years later, however, debates erupted in Sweden in which critics began to denounce the officially asserted explanation as a “myth” (Myhrberg 1985; see also Oredsson 2003: 211-5). This is not the place to go further into these debates, however. Instead, I am interested in the submarine incident because it captures, perhaps more clearly than any of the events discussed in this chapter, how the political and military elites sought to reproduce a particular image of Sweden. Of course, more than the country’s self-identity was at stake. While in place, the defended image of Sweden would also secure a certain form of military, and perhaps more importantly, enable specific relations to the world. Arguably, the responses to the alleged Soviet violation were thus related not so much to ways of seeing—but rather, paraphrasing Scott (1998), to ways of looking like a state.

“Don’t Shoot, I’m from Sweden”

On December 5, 2007, one of the leading newspapers in Sweden, Dagens Nyheter, ran an editorial on a recent report by the Swedish Defense Commission. What I found most intriguing, however, was the adjacent comic (see figure 2). It shows a NATO military jeep that has stopped in a vast desolate and somewhat ominous desert landscape. A soldier walks away from the vehicle alone toward a nearby rock formation, looking surprisingly confident. While wagging his finger, presumably at a concealed adversary, he calls out with unmistakably complacent authority, “Don’t shoot, I’m from Sweden.”

Actually what the illustration evokes is a particular configuration of Sweden, the military, and the world. Each feature somehow seems familiar. The soldier’s supercilious attitude is redolent of the Swedish self-image during the Cold War as a “moral superpower.” His exaggeratedly righteous appearance also bears a certain resemblance with the naïve Private Number 91-

---

81 Swedish security politics since the Second World War has officially remained faithful to the neutrality doctrine. In practice, however, the country’s approach to this principle has been remarkably pragmatic. Neutrality thus appears less as an essential principle and more as a flexible framework for finding ways to act in critical situations (see Linder 2002: 216; Sundelius et al. 1997: 62).

82 The incident remains contested. Leitenberg (1987: 35-47), for instance, asserts that it was a deliberate intrusion. Most commentators, however, agree that the incident was most probably the result of a navigation mishap (see, e.g., Bergström and Åmark 1999: 20-37; Hasselbohm 1984: 54-64; Lindfors 1996: 114-21). Agrell (1986: 53-7) provides a summary of several early hypotheses.
Karlsson-esque military of the 1940s—but now in a NATO-led international rendition. With its ostensible yet unseen threats, finally, the foreign setting itself conjures up a striking image of the world as it appears in contemporary security politics. Surely the comic strip is telling—but most of all it is funny. Indeed, most combinations of various well-known stereotypes tend ultimately to amount to precisely this: something silly.

Figure 2. “Don’t shoot, I’m from Sweden.” Illustration by Magnus Bard. Published in Dagens Nyheter on December 5, 2007. Reproduced with permission.

While the strategy to reduce the contemporary to what already is known might result in a funny comic, it would, however, arguably give rise to a rather dull anthropology. Of course, knowledge of the past is imperative for understanding what goes on in the present. Without at least a sense of a background, the comic would seem neither telling nor funny. Yet when exploring the contemporary we should not focus too much on the established meanings of its constituents. From time to time, as Rabinow reminds us,

new forms emerge that catalyze previously existing actors, things, temporalities, or spatialities into a new mode of existence, a new assemblage, one that makes things work in a different manner and produces and instantiates new capacities. (Rabinow 1999: 180)

Such forms are interesting because they make many other things suddenly conceivable. Still the emergent often appears analytically illegible. The reason for this, according to Rabinow, is that “much effort has been devoted in the name of social science to explaining away the emergence of new forms as the result of something else” (ibid.). While we should not reduce the con-
temporary to what already is known, however, we should not assume that “the new” is dominant either. I find “assemblage” a useful concept in this regard. An assemblage neither reflects a set of shared notions about the world, nor does it constitute a semantic or a cultural whole. Instead, it denotes something emergent—an “experimental matrix,” as Rabinow puts it, “of heterogeneous elements, techniques, and concepts” (Rabinow 2003: 56; cf. also Collier and Ong 2005: 12).

The events I have discussed in this chapter illustrate among other things the aggregation and disaggregation of notions of Sweden, the military, and the world into different forms. One significant site of inquiry is precisely how such various features—old as well as new—converge in a novel assemblage and are set into motion (cf. Rabinow 2007: xxii-xxiii). In the chapters that follow, I explore various facets of this process in relation to the emergence of conflict preventionism.
2. Aggregation: Civil-Military Cooperation at Work

Now, as men cannot create any new forces, but only combine and control those that do exist, they have no other means of self-preservation than to form by aggregation a sum of forces which may prevail over the resistance, to put them in action by a single motive power, and to make them work in concert.

– Jean-Jacques Rousseau

I. Civil-Military Cooperation

A recent handbook on civil-military cooperation in international peace support operations, published by the Swedish Armed Forces, includes a curious drawing (see figure 3). It shows a group of people who collaboratively, and indeed literally, support the world: they carry the globe on their extended arms. On top of the world stands, somewhat conspicuously, a lone military officer. To support the world here apparently means also to support the military; and to support the military, the illustration seems to suggest, means in turn to support the world.

The group of “collaborators” consists of five diverse characters. Three of them are easily identified as, respectively, a physician (attired in a white robe and with a stethoscope visible in his pocket), a worker (in orange-colored coveralls and hard hat), and a UN soldier (geared up in uniform and the characteristic blue helmet). The remaining two seem more ambiguous. One is a woman in a civilian outfit and a pair of eye-catching red high-heels. Possibly, she is an NGO activist. The other is a man probably intended to represent a member of the “local population”: dressed in casual civilian clothes, his dark hair and stupendous mustache comprise the only distinctive markings. The word “CIMIC”—an abbreviation for civil-military cooperation—appears at the center of the illustration. A caption reads, “CIMIC co-

84 Published in Försvarsmaakten (2002: 15).
stitutes a tool for the commanding military officer in this context” (my translation).

Military Humanitarianism, Humanitarian Militarism—or Neoliberalization?

What can we make out of this drawing? One might argue that the illustration epitomizes a process in which humanitarian aid, under the pretense of civil-military cooperation, is becoming militarized (cf. Chandler 2001, 2002; Chomsky 1999; Orford 1999; Pugh 2000). Or one might claim almost the opposite, that the focus on civil-military cooperation marks a gradual “civilianization” of the armed forces, which is related to the emergence of a “global civil society” and the spread of human rights—a process in which

A consideration of Viking 03 complicates this picture somewhat. Essentially the project aimed at enhancing civil-military cooperation in peace support operations. Yet contrary to the “military imagination” of CIMIC as a useful “tool” for the commanding officer, armed forces personnel in Viking 03 also wanted to gain knowledge from civilian organizations in order to rethink their own roles. The Viking 03 Deputy Exercise Director, a Swiss officer, emphasized that cooperation implies reciprocity. “We must learn how to work together with the civilians,” he stated; “and to accept their lead.” Examples from Viking 03 thus suggest the emergence of a situation that deviates from the “militarization thesis” (cf. Lutz 2004) and related critiques of civil-military cooperation as “military humanitarianism” (cf. Chomsky 1999).

Also, Viking 03 illustrates that it would be misleading in this context to understand NGOs merely as missionary bearers of meaning—“as ‘teachers of norms’ to reluctant states,” as one commentator has it (Thomas 2002: 91). Much has certainly been written on NGOs and new social movements along these lines. In one recent book, for instance, Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink (2002a) attempt to bring together two major sets of literatures—“the literature on transnationalism, regimes, and norms in the international relations subfield of political science, and the literature on social movements in sociology and political science” (Khagram et al. 2002b: 5). The authors see serious flaws within each faction, characterizing the former as “myopically state-centric,” and the latter as “myopically domestic” (ibid.: 6). By bringing these scholars together, however, they hope to create a fruitful dialogue. Yet the resulting perspective, which still tends to see actors either as “norm makers” or “norm takers” (cf. Björkdahl 2005), arguably produces particular analytical blind spots.

True, civilian organizations in Viking 03 wanted to convey their perspectives to the military personnel—to function, in a sense, as “norm-makers.” Amnesty International, for instance, focused on human rights issues in general, while Save the Children brought attention to situations involving child soldiers, “separated children,” sexually abused children, and other issues related more specifically to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Meanwhile, the Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation (SweFOR) concentrated on peace-building capacities of the civil society, with a focus on religion and the concept of non-violence. The International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC), an NGO centered on rebuilding justice systems in post-war settings, offered advice on juridical issues; and the International Com-

---

mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in turn, assisted military personnel on issues related to detainees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and the use of the Red Cross/Red Crescent emblem. Other organizations too—the UNHCR, the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) among them—each contributed with their own specific focus and set of competencies.

And yet, the form of civil-military cooperation that Viking 03 attempted to promote was undoubtedly more than simply a one-way relationship. The exercise, as one participant from the Red Cross phrased it, “works both ways”:

There are a lot of positive extra effects for both sides: Knowing and understanding each other’s working methods, aims and expertise is in our view one of the keys to a successful overall result of a [Peace Support Operation]. That different actors—military as well as civilian—are getting to know each other and learn about each other’s strengths, weaknesses and abilities, can prove to be very valuable in the next real mission.

Improving civil-military cooperation, she concluded, “is equally important for both military and civilian participants.”

Actually, the forms of cooperation that took place during Viking 03 suggest that all actors—including NGOs—currently are transforming in accordance with an emergent logic consisting of a certain set of organizational technologies. Structured around concepts like “cooperation,” “partnerships,” “transparency,” and “evaluation,” such procedures are often identified as inherently neoliberal. We should think twice, however, before we denounce these partnerships between state and non-state actors as “nothing but” neoliberalism. Such an approach is problematic because it treats neoliberalism as something that already is known, and because further inquiry into what has been identified as “neoliberal” thereby appears superfluous.86

In Formation

In what follows, I thus abstain from repeating the somewhat routinized critique of civil-military cooperation as “militarization”; from duplicating conceptualizations of NGOs as “norm-makers”; and from reiterating denunciations of organizational procedures as “neoliberalism.” In relation to the specific questions that interest me here these perspectives would not so much contribute to rendering visible what is emergent as to sustaining what Saskia Sassen has called the “illegibility of social change” (Sassen 2006: 12).

---

86 Lisa Hoffman, Monica DeHart, and Stephen Collier (2006: 9), for instance, recommend that we pause to critically “reassess neoliberalism’s coherence as a hegemonic project, and its stability as a predictable ‘package’ of policies, ideologies and political interests.”
Arguably, Viking 03 constitutes an apt ethnographic starting point for developing a more analytically productive inquiry into contemporary forms of civil-military cooperation. While the project illustrates that diverse civilian and military actors are certainly aggregating into a novel form, it also shows that this form does not comprise a fully demarcated whole, but is evolving and open-ended. To retain this ongoing-ness I structure my inquiry around the notion of aggregation. This allows me to consider diverse things within the same analytical framework.

In *The Social Contract*, which was first published in 1762, Jean-Jacques Rousseau uses “aggregation” to denote a certain kind of formation. Unlike “association,” an aggregation in Rousseau’s sense has neither public property nor a body politic. Instead, it produces a sum of forces by a combination of the many. Rousseau writes,

> Now, as men cannot create any new forces, but only combine and control those that do exist, they have no other means of self-preservation than to form by aggregation a sum of forces which may prevail over the resistance, to put them in action by a single motive power, and to make them work in concert. (Rousseau 2002 [1762]: 163, emphasis added)

Since that time, social scientists have invoked “aggregation” in various ways. My own use of the term remains close to Rousseau’s account, and to the dictionary meaning—“a group, body, or mass composed of many distinct parts or individuals.” More specifically, I mean by aggregation the provisional formation of various actors, concepts, and procedures out of which a novel assemblage—conflict preventionism—can emerge and be set into motion.

This chapter focuses on the movement from aggregation to assemblage. It takes civil-military cooperation to be one constitutive part of conflict preventionism; and by exploring the organizational logic of Viking 03, it seeks to render visible both how diverse actors are becoming interconnected, and how specific technologies function as “orientation devices” in and of conflict preventionism. This inquiry into decisive organizational procedures and technologies ultimately helps us see the contours of an emergent orientation for engaging with the world.

---

87 *The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary* defines “aggregation” as “1: a group, body, or mass composed of many distinct parts or individuals 2 a: the collecting of units or parts into a mass or whole b: the condition of being so collected,” see http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggregation (accessed August 5, 2008).
II. Emergent Entanglements

The Main Planning Conference

In June 2003, the Swedish Armed Forces International Center (Swedint) hosted the Viking 03 Main Planning Conference (MPC). This three-day meeting, which gathered more than a hundred civilian and military participants, was the largest conference thus far in the preparations for the exercise. Conveniently located in Almnäs, less than an hour’s drive south of Stockholm, Swedint seemed like an obvious choice for this meeting. Established in 1961, it aims at being a “leading center of competence in Peace Support Operations characterized by multifunctional training and education in a multinational environment.”

Each year, some three thousand people from Sweden and abroad receive training at Swedint; and in 1999, NATO recognized it as the first Partnership for Peace (PFP) Training Center.

I arrived at Swedint together with a group of military planners one day before the conference began. Early that morning we had met at the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters in Stockholm and packed all necessary equipment into several army vehicles. Arriving at Swedint, we checked in at the accommodation facilities located on the premises (like most participants, I stayed at Swedint overnight throughout the conference). After lunch, a group of military officers from the United States joined us. All of them had taken part in previous Viking projects and were well acquainted with the Swedish organizers. Together, the officers prepared for the conference throughout the afternoon by rehearsing parts of the MPC program and by testing the technical equipment in the seminar rooms.

Almost everyone met in the officers’ mess for drinks that first evening. I sat together with a group of Swedish officers who spoke of the transformation of the military profession. This was a common topic. When it was brought up, I often noted a frustration among officers with colleagues who did not recognize that Viking 03 signified the future direction for the military. Such people were typically dismissed as conservatives; old timers who “still want to drive tanks and fire cannons,” as someone put it. Adapting to the contemporary, everyone seemed to agree, was important. In fact, adaptation could perhaps be thought of as something like a military virtue, which represents both continuity and change within the army profession.

Officers also spoke with disdain of colleagues who, in their attempts to pursue a career, seemed prepared to do virtually anything to “please the politicians,” and who thereby failed to remain “loyal to ‘the firm,’” as they put it. This tension—between adaptation to the new and remaining faithful to traditional

---

88 As Lieutenant Colonel Håkan Wallin phrased it in his presentation of Swedint during the opening of the Main Planning Conference, on June 3, 2003.

military virtues—constituted, as we shall see, an issue at the heart of the current transformations of security and humanitarianism.

**Informal Relations**

The majority of the MPC participants arrived the following morning. The project secretary and an officer from the Real World Support syndicate group attended to practical issues and handed out nametags and conference documents to the participants at a registration booth. Coffee was served outside the main assembly hall. It was a warm summer’s day and the participants mingled on an adjacent patio before the conference commenced. The MPC took place approximately halfway through the process of planning, and most participants thus knew one another from previous workshops and meetings. Many of them had also met in other contexts, before the Viking 03 project. They were, as one civilian representative later phrased it, already members of “the old gang.”

This familiarity between civilian and military participants was one of the first things I noted during my fieldwork. The first Viking 03 workshop I had taken part in was held at the Swedish Defense Wargaming Center at the Armed Forces Headquarters in Stockholm. I had not anticipated direct animosity, but I had expected civil-military relations to be at least somewhat constrained. The friendliness and relaxed atmosphere between the civilian participants and the military personnel therefore came as a surprise. When we had coffee before the meeting, everyone was chatting and catching up on what they had been doing recently. Most participants already seemed to know one another. I learned that many had taken part in previous Viking exercises (conducted in 1999 and 2001 respectively), and I assumed they had become acquainted through these projects. Later that day, however, I realized that these interconnections—both informal and formal—were certainly not restricted to the Viking projects.

I had decided to leave the workshop shortly after lunch to attend a seminar at Sida (The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency). Titled “Soldiers for Poverty Alleviation? How Swedish Military Works Internationally,” this was the second of two events organized on the theme “The Military and Development.” It turned out that Magnus, one of the Swedish officers in Viking 03, would also take part in that Sida seminar—coincidentally, as one of the speakers. That afternoon, we thus left the civil-military meeting together. Sida is located in central Stockholm only a five-minute subway ride away from the Armed Forces Headquarters, and to travel together with Magnus from one place to the other came for me to

---

90 This seminar (the Swedish title was “Soldater för minskad fattigdom? Så arbetar svensk militär internationellt”) was organized in Stockholm on March 26, 2003, by the Global Academy, a SIDA-financed organization.
symbolize very tangibly the new mobility between the spheres of security and development.

The Sida seminar gathered approximately the same mix of participants as the Viking 03 workshop we had just left. I even met some people that I knew myself from the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI). As I was having coffee with them before the seminar, hearing about what they were up to and reporting on how my own work was unfolding, the scene from the headquarters that morning seemed thus in a somewhat peculiar way to repeat itself.

During subsequent months of fieldwork, I recurrently observed similar gatherings—often involving the same people—during seminars, workshops, and conferences at a range of places outside Viking 03. These included the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA); the National Defense College; Swedint; the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI); and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI). Rather than merely by-products, these informal networks arguably constitute preconditions for the emergence of novel forms of civil-military cooperation.

In Viking 03, many participants emphasized explicitly the importance of this informality. Eva from Amnesty International described to me her first contact with the military, in the mid-1990s. At the time, military personnel from the Swedish National Defense College actively sought to engage civilian organizations in training related to international missions. When two officers approached Amnesty, Eva agreed to meet them. She remembered how before that initial meeting she had discussed with a colleague what would be appropriate to wear. They had both assumed that the officers would be in uniform. “And then came two men dressed in casual civilian clothes,” she laughed, “and we really hit it off.” “Because,” she emphasized, “it is all about personal contacts—and we became a team that worked together pretty well.”\footnote{I have translated these quotes from a recorded interview conducted in Swedish.}

That meeting turned out to be a starting point that facilitated further contacts. Amnesty International subsequently received invitations to the National Defense College, and the organization later became involved in seminar series and other projects—like Viking 03.

Thus a representative from the US Armed Forces, Major General Thomas Matthews, repeated a widely shared view when during the Viking 03 closing ceremony he made the following statement: “Make no mistake: the relationships and friendships you’ve built in the coffee breaks, lunches and social encounters are equal in value to the benefits you received in the training experience.”\footnote{Matthew’s speech is available online at http://www.mil.se/viking03/attachments/matthewclosingspeech.pdf (accessed August 12, 2008).}
Orientation Devices

The Main Planning Conference commenced at 10 a.m. All participants gathered for the opening in an assembly hall named after the Swedish former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. Representatives from Swedint welcomed the Viking 03 participants to the center. They called attention to its long tradition of education and training in the field of international peace operations (alluding also, albeit more implicitly, to Sweden’s allegedly prominent role in such operations). During subsequent presentations from members of the Viking 03 core planning team, it became clear that the MPC would center mostly on organizational, technological, and evaluative aspects of the project. More specifically, the MPC aimed to update all participants on the current planning situation; to develop the organizational and technological structures of Viking 03; and to decide on procedures for EXEVAL, the exercise evaluation group.  

Actual work during conferences and workshops was for the most part carried out within the syndicate groups (see the Introduction). On recurrent occasions, however, all participants would meet, like they did this morning, to get an idea of the overall situation and to facilitate communication across the different working groups. Throughout the first day, military representatives from all Viking 03 syndicate groups thus reported on the process of planning within their respective areas of responsibility. They all used PowerPoint presentations. Many of them also visualized the project in a timeline, which showed clearly what had been achieved thus far, what remained to be done, and how much time remained until the exercise (see figure 4). This timeline, which everyone had also received as a printout along with the conference documents, was used frequently throughout the project. Apart from providing an overview, it helped to orient the participants in time and toward the same goal. It seemed to impose on Viking 03 an intrinsic tempo by conveying a sense of forward trajectory.

Bruno Latour argues that scientists “start seeing something once they stop looking at nature and look exclusively and obsessively at prints and flat inscriptions.” What is present in laboratories are not “confusing three-dimensional objects,” as he puts it, but mostly “papers, prints, diagrams, archives, abstracts and curves on graph paper” (Latour 1990: 39). In Viking 03, the novel focus on civil-military cooperation became visible through similar techniques. Like Latour’s scientists, the project participants could

---

93 The participants received a bundle of conference documents, including the aims of the MPC. This is the entire list: “Update all exercise planners/participants on the current planning situation. Further develop the elements of the Exercise Planning Instruction (EXPI), especially scenario and training, as well as the organizational structure of both exercise command and control and of staff under training. Further develop the technological aspects of the Exercise. Continue the manning process. Agree on the EXEVAL [the Exercise Evaluation group] process. Agree on media handling (real world). Agree on the training process. Agree on RWS [Real World Support] issues.”
begin seeing this focus, and engage with it, when real objects were temporally discarded. The timeline thus served as an “orientation device” (Ahmed 2006: 3), and exemplified how Viking 03 functioned in practice as a “site of synthesis” in Castel’s sense (see the Introduction).

![VIKING 03 Timeline 2003](image)

**Figure 4.** The Viking 03 Timeline.

The timeline also exhibited many of the features anthropologists observe in calendars. Workshops, conferences, and other displayed events functioned in the project as calendrical milestones. Such “calendrical events,” as Margaret Paxson has pointed out, appear not only as “mirrors within which we regard ourselves (individual and group), but as occasions to intercede in the yearly cycle and, indeed, to set things right and keep them on course” (Paxson 2005: 269).  

**Civil-Military Groups and Boundaries**

On occasions when all participants were gathered, civilian representatives would often take the opportunity to emphasize the import of the civilian

---

94 In *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Émile Durkheim wrote that “[t]he division into days, weeks, months, years, etc., corresponds to the recurrence of rites, festivals, and public ceremonies at regular intervals. A calendar expresses the rhythm of collective activity while ensuring that regularity” (Durkheim 1995 [1912]: 10). For an overview of anthropological approaches to calendars, see Paxson (2005: 266-70); cf. Hunt (2008: 24-39) and Ricoeur (1988: 105-9).
component in Viking 03. During the opening of the MPC, it was Emma, a participant from the Red Cross, who reported on behalf of all civilian organizations. She explained that

one of the aims common to all the civilian organizations participating in the Viking 03 is to function as counterparts in civil-military cooperation and thereby reflecting a realistic situation in the field. Representatives from the civilian side have been taking part in the planning process of the exercise. This is giving us a very good opportunity to influence the scenario and events, and for that we are grateful. This helps us fulfill our goal of providing a [context] as realistic as possible.

Many participants referred to civil-military relations in these terms, suggesting that civil-military cooperation is based on a notion of complementarity—a complementarity needed to meet the demands of “real” situations. “Diversity,” as the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces has stated, “is an asset.”

We need both civilian and military competencies. We need both men and women. […] Everyone should be able to contribute with his or her strengths and competencies in order to solve our task. We should be allowed to retain our differences, but become united through a desire and an effort to reach common goals. (Syrén 2007: 13, my translation)

It is significant that Emma represented all civilian organizations in her MPC speech, and that she referred to them as “counterparts” to the military. This exemplifies how the divide between the civilian and the military spheres was held in place, and how the Viking 03 organizational structure itself tended to reproduce this separation (see also Chapter 4). During major conferences, such as this one and the subsequent FPC (Final Planning Conference), the civilian participants took part the entire time. During most workshops, however, civilian participation was restricted, typically to one out of three days. The civilian representatives themselves saw this as a marked improvement from previous Viking projects, when everyone had been taking part all of the time. Viking 03, they agreed, was more efficient. Of course, this restriction also increased the organizational division between military and civilian participants.

Unanimity mostly characterized the civil-military dialogue throughout the project. It often surprised me how little debate actually took place, given the range of diverse actors involved. Occasionally, however, disagreements did erupt—typically during work in smaller groups. One of the MPC disputes is worth recounting in some detail.

It was the third day of the conference. After a morning meeting in the Dag Hammarskjöld assembly hall, the participants dispersed for work within the syndicate groups. The Operations group, which this morning comprised rep-
representatives from most civilian organizations as well as military personnel, gathered in an adjacent seminar room. After a few remarks from Thomas on planning and upcoming deadlines, the participants spent about one hour discussing possible themes to be developed for the exercise, specifically in relation to civil-military cooperation. Everyone at the table offered suggestions. As usual, the discussion started off smoothly: someone would talk about what he or she had in mind, Thomas or Magnus took notes on a whiteboard, and it would not take long for everyone to agree and move on to the next person.

Yet on this occasion one remark unexpectedly disrupted the customary style of unchallenging interaction. When a representative from Save the Children proposed centering a set of incidents on children who had been sexually abused, one officer immediately objected. He agreed that child abuse is a terrible crime, but argued very dismissively that such incidents would fall outside the scope of Viking 03. The exercise, he reminded the civilian representative, would focus on a brigade level. This meant that, no matter how appalling, a sexually abused child would remain irrelevant to the commanding officer. Other military participants agreed and provided additional explanations why it would be a bad idea to include this suggestion. They all seemed very indignant about this.

I find these objections, and the petulant way in which they were offered, noteworthy. Technically, the officers were correct. Viking 03 did aim at an altogether different set of issues, related more directly to the organization of an international intervention, and the coordination of diverse organizations. Arguably, however, this was not the only reason for their assertive responses. I think the dismissive attitude among the officers was also related to the fact that taken seriously, the suggestion would potentially call into question the unambiguous divide between civilian and military tasks. At times when this distinction appeared blurred, it needed to be reaffirmed; and through their unequivocal dismissal of the suggested theme, the officers performed precisely such a reaffirmation.

Once in place the civil-military division was decidedly productive. It enabled military personnel to emphasize their focus on security and the use of force as critical measures in the context of peace operations. It also made it possible for NGOs to assert independence from the military, which was of vital importance to many of the participating organizations. As Andrew Barry has noted, NGOs in fact increasingly tend to “occupy an ambiguous and shifting position in relation to the conduct of companies and more disorganized forms of political activism.”

---

95 The ultimate effects of a blurring of the civil-military divide might indeed be unsettling. In a recent discussion on terrorism, for example, Arjun Appadurai points out that “[t]errorists blur the line between military and civilian space and [thereby] create uncertainty about the very boundaries within which we take civil society to be sovereign” (Appadurai 2006: 92).
They may both engage in negotiations with companies concerning their ethical conduct, and form loose alliances with less compromising and organized oppositional groups. There is no clear point at which government ends and resistance begins. (Barry 2004: 203, emphasis in original)

By emphasizing the civil-military division, civilian participants could mitigate such ambiguity. Eva from Amnesty International, for example, assured that civil-military cooperation within Viking 03 would not stop the organization from criticizing the military. Bengt from the Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation (SweFOR) likewise stressed that, “if someone thinks that cooperating in these exercises would imply that [SweFOR] would criticize official Swedish politics to a lesser extent—they have got it entirely wrong.” Bengt, who frequently pointed out that “a military perspective” was inherently dissimilar from “a civilian perspective,” told me that he regarded participation in Viking 03 as an opportunity to inaugurate a “civilian awareness” into that “military way of thinking.”

I heard several civilian representatives speak of their participation in Viking 03 in the same way. Apparently, many participants imagined themselves to be “norm-makers.”

**Competitive Humanitarianism**

Civil-military relations tended to move smoothly as long as the civil-military division remained firmly in place. In contrast, a marked competitiveness often characterized relations between the civilian organizations. Observations of such competitiveness in other contexts have led some commentators to refer to representatives from humanitarian NGOs as “disaster professionals” (Stirrat 2006: 16) and to identify an emergent international “aid market” (Duffield 2002: 54).

My own conversations with civilian representatives in Viking 03 confirm that the participants themselves regarded these relations as competitive. Also, they exemplify how informality and competitiveness are related. During that first morning of the MPC when we had coffee outside the Dag Hammarskjöld Hall, Michael from the ICRC (the International Committee of the Red Cross) told me about a course on civil-military cooperation that he

---

96 I have translated these quotes from a recorded interview conducted in Swedish.
97 Consider, for instance, Jock Stirrat’s recent observation from the post-tsunami relief work in Sri Lanka. “In Colombo the major social centre patronized by [aid workers] was a bar known as ‘The Cricketers.’ On one level this became a clearing house for information and, it has to be said, a setting where informal forms of coordination were worked out and deals over territory made. But it was also the scene of reunions between people who had worked together in previous post-disaster situations and were now recreating the social networks through which future jobs could be ensured. Career paths and development become a matter of gaining a reputation and ‘doing well’ in the disaster business, and this involves successfully shifting relief materials both physical and financial. Again we are in a competitive milieu which whilst extolling the virtues of coordination and collaboration is at the same time based on individual self-interest” (Stirrat 2006: 16).
had recently taken part in. He recounted how at one point two civilian participants had become involved in a dispute over the correct way to handle a certain issue, and how, as the argument had unfolded, one of them had claimed that his organization had a higher mandate and thus a right to exercise authority over the other. One important function of informal social networks, it seems, is that they allow for informal coordination among actors. On occasions when such coordination fails, as Michael’s example illustrates, issues of hierarchy typically emerge.

Another example comes from Eva who represented Amnesty International.98 She told me about the first major civil-military exercise that Amnesty had been involved in—a 1998 event called “Nordic Peace.” Eva recounted how, after an initial invitation from the Swedish Armed Forces, Amnesty had been encouraged to take part in Nordic Peace also by civilian organizations that were already involved, including UNHCR and ICRC. When Amnesty eventually did join the project, preparations were already underway. “It felt quite awkward,” Eva remembered, “because they had by then come quite far in their planning—and it wasn’t really that difficult with the military, because they greeted us with open arms. It was more complicated with the civilian organizations.” The reason for this was that these organizations had already staked out their respective areas of expertise. But Eva had felt that if Amnesty were to invest time in the exercise, the organization should make sure to get its own particular focus across. In the end, she had had to “fight quite a bit” to convey Amnesty’s perspective on human rights issues. While initially the relations between civilian organizations were “a little strained,” as she put it, Eva recalled how gradually the situation “sort of improved the more we got involved—and above all,” she repeated, “I felt a very, very positive attitude from the military.”

Still, Eva maintained that it is also pivotal to retain a certain degree of “positioning” among civilian organizations, not least for conveying to the military personnel what each individual organization stands for. In Viking 03, the consistent focus on civil-military cooperation appeared from time to time to blur these differences between the civilian organizations. For this reason civilian representatives frequently reemphasized the diversity within the civilian sphere. Emma, for example, explained in one of her conference presentations that

there is a tendency to talk about civilian organizations as one common actor, but that is not quite in accordance with reality. There is a vast number of civilian organizations working in the field in different parts of the world, all with their own special focus and working methods. We of course have similarities—in the sense that we all share the goal of improving the overall hu-

98 I have translated all quotes from Eva in this section from a recorded interview conducted in Swedish.
manitarian situation and to reach peace and stability in the mission area. We all work to assist the population and to avoid any unnecessary suffering.

Although Viking 03 focused on the divide between civilian and military actors, examples from the project show that in practice it is was often equally important to establish boundaries between civilian organizations. Informal networks facilitated this division of labor.

**Rethinking Roles and Relations**

For cooperation to make sense, it was necessary to characterize the military and civilian spheres as different. At the same time, many Viking 03 participants wanted for several reasons also to problematize this division—at least to a certain degree. The representative from Save the Children who had proposed the scenario incident involving a sexually abused child, for instance, later told me that she wanted to initiate a questioning of the split between military and civilian tasks, in order to make officers more cognizant of humanitarian issues.

Although most officers had opposed her suggestion, there were also military representatives who agreed with her. Peter Schneider, the Viking 03 Deputy Exercise Director, was one of them. At one point during the MPC, he even urged the civilian organizations to continue emphasizing whatever issues they regarded as important—regardless of what the military personnel would think. Schneider later explained to me in a lengthy interview that the reason he wanted the civilian participants to remain persistent was to prepare military personnel for their new role. An exercise like Viking 03, he claimed, must go beyond a focus on what military personnel already think of as proper military tasks. Because during peace operations in conflict areas, the military is never alone: it always has to co-exist with NGOs and other civilian actors. A failure to prepare military personnel for such situations, Schneider emphasized, would constitute a big mistake.

Viking 03 focused mainly on organizational dimensions of civil-military cooperation. According to Schneider, this is one of the main challenges today for the military: to find ways to work with organizations that have an entirely different structure. These actors, he explained, “that are not so easy to access; that do not necessarily have a chain of command; who do not necessarily accept another authority, because their authority is their sponsors—very often non-state money.” Viking 03 aimed at training some of these aspects: to convey at least an idea of what a real situation might be like. “Real life,” Schneider added, “is a bit more complicated.”

Defining new roles was one of the main reasons for organizing Viking 03. Classic military thinking—“defense thinking,” as Schneider put it—implied

---

99 These quotes are from a recorded interview with Peter Schneider conducted in English.
that the military had a designated area of responsibility. “In military terms,” he explained, “this means, ‘I’m in charge of what happens in that area and I give orders.’ That’s what we’ve learned.” According to defense thinking, civilian actors have little choice but to follow the orders of the commanding officers. Civil-military cooperation from such a perspective would thus amount to little more than a tool for the commanding officer, as the CIMIC illustration suggested. In contemporary peace operations, however, this no longer is the case. Schneider stressed that now both military and civilian actors have to find new roles. “Things,” he emphasized, “will happen by consensus and not by ordering things.”

Many civilians spoke of the importance of rethinking the role of the military. It is noteworthy that Schneider mentioned how new forms of civil-military collaboration also called for a rethinking on the part of the civilians. “To some of those civilian organizations who are very active in, for example, former Yugoslavia,” he explained, “the military is not necessarily their closest friends. To them the military is rather a political enemy—or almost.” But with the emergence of new peace operations, he continued, “the civilians suddenly find that they need us, because they need to be protected—all those missions that only the military can do.” Schneider also claimed that through the Viking projects it is gradually becoming apparent to most organizations that the focus of the military actually is changing. “This was very much so in Viking 99 and Viking 01. Some civilians had a new view of the military afterwards.”

III. From Aggregation to Assemblage

Words at Work

“FOUR LEGS GOOD, TWO LEGS BAD!”—the central maxim of Animalism. In the beginning of my fieldwork, this phrase from Animal Farm admittedly came to mind more than once. The reason for this was that everyone—military personnel, government officials, and representatives from NGOs—seemed incessantly to repeat the same string of words: CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION. Not entirely unlike the sheep in Orwell’s novel, they also typically refrained both from defining what exactly this slogan meant, and from explaining the specific reasons for its alleged significance.

Michel Callon’s (1998) claim that the actor’s ontology is variable comes to mind here: “his or her objectives, interests, will and thus identity, are caught up in a process of continual reconfiguration, a process that is intimately related to the constant reconfiguration of the network of interactions in which he or she is involved.” (See also my discussion on “Fiction” in Chapter 5.)
Yet as my fieldwork progressed, the impression that the humanitarian rhetoric within the military resembles Orwellian Newspeak, as for instance David Chandler (2003: 37) insists, gave way to a less cynical interpretation. I want to recall here one comment from a Viking 03 participant that I find particularly telling. Johan was a civilian employee at the Armed Forces Headquarters and an officer in the reserve. With experience from both previous Viking projects, he worked during the preparations for the 2003 exercise in the Operations group. At one civil-military workshop halfway through planning, he told me how he had become so used to typing the word “humanitarian” lately that, as he sat down by his computer, it seemed to appear almost automatically on the screen.

Johan’s joke helped me realize that the Viking 03 participants were more than uncritical bearers of an increasingly dominant discursive logic. While indeed mastering the accepted humanitarian rhetoric fluently, most of them were also aware of its striking ambiguity. Orwell, again, comes to mind. “[W]hen you meet anyone in the flesh,” he once observed, “you realize immediately that he is a human being not a sort of caricature embodying certain ideas.” (To this he added, “It is partly for this reason that I don’t mix much in literary circles, because I know from experience that once I have met [and] spoken to anyone I shall never again be able to show any intellectual brutality towards him, even when I feel that I ought to” [quoted in Symons 1993: xiii].) I thus agree with Janine Wedel and Gregory Feldman’s claim that only by exploring ethnographically how actors and organizations are interconnected can we illuminate “the structures and processes that ground, order and give policies direction” (Wedel and Feldman 2005: 2). Johan’s comment exemplifies how fieldwork, sometimes unexpectedly, points us in novel and perhaps more analytically productive directions.

The distinctly humanitarian rhetoric that was ubiquitous within Viking 03 is related to the changing role of the military, and to the novel focus on civil-military cooperation. It was no coincidence that Eva had had her first encounter with the military in the mid-1990s. Johan told me how at that point the Swedish Armed Forces were actively searching for a new direction. “In some sense,” he explained, “the invasion-oriented defense had by then already lost its hold.” After the end of the Cold War, the Swedish Armed Forces continuously faced processes of downsizing, and the future of the army profession seemed increasingly uncertain. Meanwhile, Swedish foreign policy became increasingly oriented toward international missions and civil-military cooperation, and Johan recalled how it suddenly had dawned on many officers that “this is what we should do!”

Johan remembered that once the idea of civil-military cooperation began to take hold, many officers had regarded it as a panacea. Here was a focus that seemed to promise a new timely role for the military. His impression

---

101 I have translated these quotes from a recorded interview conducted in Swedish.
was that many people initially had had an almost romanticized image of civilian organizations and of what to expect from civil-military cooperation. Nobody seemed to stop to reflect on what, more specifically, cooperation should be about.

Today, however, Johan claimed that on the contrary it has become widely recognized that civil-military relations inevitably comprise different sets of agendas. Indeed, during subsequent months of fieldwork, I occasionally heard people pointing out how CIMIC was an inherently ambiguous concept, and how insincere actors tended to appropriate it to advance all kinds of political agendas. As I attended CIMIC workshops and seminars outside the Viking 03 project (including events at Sida, Swedint, and FOI), I also noted this awareness. The “ politicization” of the concept was widely discussed. One recurrent story, for example, recounted how a German project to rebuild residential areas in the former Yugoslavia was advertised as a “CIMIC initiative,” but merely constituted an attempt at administering a forced repatriation of refugees from Germany—in a “politically correct” manner.102

At the heart of the CIMIC contestation lies also the NATO definition, which stipulates that CIMIC is “[t]he co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the [military] mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies” (quoted in Forsvarsmakten 2002: 18). This understanding, however, is changing. Thus it would be misleading to view civil-military cooperation today primarily as a military initiative to meet military objectives. Many officers who took part in the organization of Viking 03 agreed that, on the contrary, civil-military cooperation ought to be a civilian initiative, and that military personnel must learn to “follow their lead,” as Peter Schneider put it. To be sure, civilian organizations do seek cooperation with the military. It is increasingly common, for instance, among civilian organizations to demand military assistance and protection (see, e.g., Duffield 2002: 58); and in 1995—the same year as the Swedish Armed Forces approached Amnesty International—UNHCR even published a manual to facilitate coordination between itself and the military in humanitarian operations (Duffield 2002: 60).

Most people who work with civil-military cooperation welcome both problematizations of the CIMIC concept and critical appraisals of civil-military practices. A growing number of publications also center on precisely these questions, typically offering suggestions for how to improve future collaborations (see, e.g., Asplund et al. 2003; Byman 2001; Weiss 1999; Winslow 2002). Most Viking 03 participants seemed to expect some-

---

102 I heard several people refer to this story, which also was published in a FOI report (see Asplund et al. 2003).
thing similar from me, telling me that they were looking forward to reading my “evaluation” of Viking 03.

Yet in what follows I want to push beyond the question whether or not civil-military cooperation truly is “humanitarian,” or how to improve collaboration, and to ask instead how, through the deployment of particular sets of procedures and concepts, CIMIC was put to work.

**An Organizational Logic**

During one subsequent workshop, only a few months before the exercise, Thomas, the officer in charge of the Operations group, explained one restriction within the exercise scenario. No incident or event could include anything that might discredit any of the participating civilian or military organizations. With Viking 03 representatives from twenty-six countries, he wanted to avoid what he saw at least potentially as a politically sensitive issue. While reports from real operations about troops who misbehave are rather common (see, e.g., Razack 2004: 51-86), Viking 03 was to enact nothing of that. Bengt from the Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation objected immediately. This restriction, he claimed, would convey a “dream world” rather than a “real world” scenario. The officer whom I was sitting next to began to shake his head in frustration. He leaned toward me and whispered, “That guy just doesn’t get it.” Most people seemed to be thinking the same thing, that Bengt’s comment was only unproductive—and annoying. Some openly offered support for Thomas’s suggestion. As always there were many things to accomplish during the workshop, and everyone just wanted to move on rather than debate what was regarded as a trifle. Yet I think it is worth reflecting somewhat more closely on what, as the officer put it, this NGO representative “did not get.”

A particular organizational logic characterized Viking 03. It centered on “cooperation,” “transparency,” and “evaluation.” Indeed, one of the main aims of the project was to “promote transparency between all parties.” The military is perhaps not the kind of organization one would readily associate with the notion of transparency, but as its role is shifting, transparency has emerged as a key concept in the organization of the armed forces. Security more broadly has also become based increasingly on cooperation and openness—on “mutual transparency,” as Robert Cooper phrases it (2004: 28; see also Florini 2003: 32ff).¹⁰³

When I began my fieldwork, officers in charge of Viking 03 assured me that no information I would come across would be restricted or classified. Viking 03, they claimed, would be completely transparent (see the Introduc-

---

¹⁰³ For a recent exploration of the ideas and practices of transparency in different contexts, see Christina Garsten and Monica Lindh de Montoya (eds), *Transparency in the New Global Order: Unveiling Organizational Visions* (2008).
tion). Members of an exercise evaluation team (EXEVAL) also followed the entire project as critical observers. The officer in charge of this assignment often reminded the organizers that their work was under continuous observation and evaluation. No one that I spoke to seemed to mind this. And as far as I know, no one ever questioned my presence in the project. On the contrary, as planning evolved people always talked to me in an unobstructed way, answering my questions openly and frankly. Sometimes participants even told me that it was “a good thing” that I was there, because, as they claimed, “it is always important to receive an outside opinion.”

Viking 03 thus exemplified defining characteristics of what Marilyn Strathern has called an “audit culture” (Strathern 2000a; cf. Power 1997). The discourse of audit was discernible not only in official presentations of Viking 03 but seemed to permeate all levels of the project. In fact, the military, which has an ingrained tradition of organizing accountability in very tangible ways indeed, is a kind of organization perhaps particularly well suited to adapting to emergent audit procedures. Although audit culture typically is described as a form of power inherently different from sovereign or hierarchical power, the military thus appears to be a context in which these two forms can easily merge.

Audit culture is often identified as intrinsically neoliberal (see, e.g., Shore and Wright 2000). And the Viking 03 aim to promote transparency, as well as the focus on partnerships between states and NGOs, certainly does resemble specific processes of neoliberalization (cf. Gledhill 2004: 333). However, while neoliberalism mostly is understood as an ideology that aggressively seeks to enforce and expand capitalist markets—a process habitually denounced as “a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites” (Harvey 2005: 19)—I suggest here a somewhat different approach. Rather than using a definition of neoliberalism as something more or less coherent that already is known, I follow Aihwa Ong’s (2006) approach to neoliberalism as a set of flexible techniques that might be appropriated by diverse kinds of actors to different ends (cf. Larner and Walters 2004b: 4, 8ff).

This approach makes room for “the unpredictable” (cf. Strathern 2004: 5). For instance, while neoliberalism is often associated with a dismantling of the state, processes of downsizing are also typically paralleled with the emergence of new demands on states. In many contexts, state influence is

---

104 To some extent, the military way of organizing things explains this attitude. Since the officer in command had agreed to my presence, nobody objected. Yet the policy of transparency was arguably the main reason for this openness. (And, of course, my presence within the project as a field-working anthropologist only strengthened this policy.)

105 See Grotjer (2004) for a recent study of the institutionalization of evaluation in the Swedish state administration.

106 Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat call this the paradox of inadequacy and indispensability. “[W]hile the authority of the state is constantly questioned and functionally undermined, there are [also] growing pressures on states to confer full-fledged rights and enti-
thus not so much diminishing as transforming. The intersection of security and development is a case in point. Mark Duffield argues that governments have in this context been closely involved in organizational changes and networks. Rather than weakening per se, he claims that attenuation “has been associated with the emergence of new linking institutions, modes of representation, contractual regimes, and so on. In this way, governments are acquiring the ability to project authority through non-territorial and non-state systems” (Duffield 2002: 72). The emergence of this organizational logic, I argue, constitutes a significant background for understanding the Viking 03 emphasis on civil-military cooperation and on interaction between state and non-state actors.

Many commentators have noted that new forms of collaboration, such as proliferating public private partnerships, constitute timely approaches to solving problems (see, e.g., Mörth 2006: 38). Surely, civil-military partnerships tend to be framed in precisely such a way—as novel responses to violent conflicts. Yet Viking 03 showed that emergent forms of cooperation seem to work also on other levels. For instance, while the Swedish Armed Forces have in recent years faced severe downsizing, the Viking projects and the focus on civil-military cooperation, have provided the military with a new direction that has become economically prioritized. According to several Viking 03 participants, the Swedish Armed Forces even aims at selling the entire Viking exercise concept to NATO (which might explain the choice of Viking as a typically “Swedish” name, although one might also find the set of connotations associated with that name somewhat awkward in the context of peace operations).

To pursue a career within the armed forces today—in Sweden and in other countries—officers are increasingly expected to serve in international peace support operations. “International experience,” as the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces has recently made clear, “is a necessary element in every officer’s career” (Syrén 2006: 43, my translation). While Viking 03 was permeated with a humanitarian rhetoric, however, the focus on international engagements and civil-military cooperation did not necessarily signify an increased level of ideological awareness or of cosmo-
politan engagement among individual participants. Over coffee at one workshop, for instance, a group of five or six Swedish officers spoke of the Swedish participation in the mission in Kosovo, which at the time was about to be reduced. They all feared that, without a strong international military presence, the fighting might erupt on the Balkans again. “Probably within twenty-four hours,” one officer speculated. “If people have been fighting for centuries, what would make them stop now?” Half-jokingly another officer wondered aloud what the Albanians were doing in Kosovo anyway. He pointed out that Kosovo actually belonged to Serbia, and suggested that perhaps the Albanians should have stayed in Albania in the first place. Later I asked one of these officers if he could tell me what the conflict was about. “Like all conflicts,” he explained, “it’s about power.” Yet what has made the Kosovo conflict particularly problematic, he continued, is the fact that “people there still live according to norms and ideas we abandoned several hundreds years ago.”

Cosmopolitans or not—most Viking 03 participants simply wanted to do a good job while remaining loyal to “the firm,” as the officers put it. As suggested by the discussion in the officers’ mess that first evening before the MPC, a failure to adapt to contemporary demands appears as precisely that—a failure. Yet Johan’s joke about getting used to typing the word “humanitarian” also suggests that while it is critical to master the current rhetoric, one should also retain a certain degree of distance (see also Chapter 4).

At this point, I want to return to Bengt’s objection with which I opened this section. What frustrated some other participants was not so much the fact that he was critical. On the contrary, military participants frequently invited critique and suggestions. Instead, the reason they found him an annoyance was arguably that he disrupted the collaborative work in unproductive ways. Unlike Johan—who mastered the accepted humanitarian rhetoric while retaining a certain degree of pragmatic distance that allowed him to get work done—Bengt did not seem to “get” the organizational logic of the project. By denouncing the scenario as unrealistic, for instance, he seemed to focus too much on particular details. “An organization in which the contents are constantly shifting,” as Richard Sennett (2006: 126) has noted, “requires the mobile capacity to solve problems; getting deeply involved in any one

---

109 Edward Bruner’s (1986) work on experience comes to mind here. In a key paragraph, he argues that “[p]articipants in a performance do not necessarily share a common experience or meaning; what they share is only their common participation” (p. 11).

110 This argument was common among officers. In a debate article published in the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter on May 3, 2004, for instance, the Swedish Brigadier General Anders Brännström, who had served as commanding general in Kosovo, emphasized the importance of the presence of a strong international military force in the area. He claimed that the segments of the Kosovo Albanian population who are “prone to violence” will initiate an ethnic cleansing of “everything Serbian” as soon as they get an opportunity (Brännström 2004).

111 This was a conversation in Swedish; the English translations are mine.
problem would be dysfunctional, since projects end as abruptly as they begin.” The required skill, then, seems increasingly to lie in cooperation itself.

During fieldwork I noted how those Viking 03 participants who accepted and adapted to the prevalent organizational logic were in fact able to inhabit certain positions in the project—seemingly regardless of which organizations they themselves represented. I want to relate this observation not only to Sennett’s claims about contemporary capitalism, but also to what Luhmann has identified as a change in the social imperatives for individuality. “The question,” according to Luhmann, “is no longer ‘What should I be?’ but rather ‘How should I be?’” (Luhmann 1998: 7). Here, Ong’s approach to neoliberalism becomes especially useful because it allows us to consider features commonly defined as “neoliberal” in relation to specific organizational procedures and techniques rather than as parts of a coherent political or ideological “package.” Viking 03 is instructive in showing how various actors took up “neoliberal” concepts and organizational procedures and made them “work.” Viking 03 also illustrated how participants who did not go along with particular procedures appeared untoward, as Bengt in the example above.

I should note here as well that those participants who seemed most skilled in presenting themselves in accordance with this organizational logic could easily move between different positions. Susanne from the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), for instance, started after the completion of Viking 03 to work for the Swedish Rescue Service Agency, and was later hired by the Swedish Ministry of Defense. Meanwhile, Emma from the Red Cross first assumed a position within the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), and then worked at SEMA, before she accepted a job offer within the Swedish Armed Forces. The civil-military divide was transgressed also in the other direction. Several organizations that took part in Viking 03, such as Amnesty International and the ICRC, had former military officers among their members.

**Gathering Focus**

In his article “Deep Play,” Clifford Geertz characterized the Balinese cockfight as a “focused gathering.” Geertz used this term to delineate a set of persons engrossed in a common flow of activity and relating to one another in terms of that flow. Such gatherings meet and disperse; the participants in them fluctuate; the activity that focuses them is discrete—a particular process that reoccurs rather than a continuous one that endures. They take their form from the situation that evokes them, […] but it is a form, and

---

112 For an anthropological exploration of contemporary forms of flexibility in work and labor markets, see, e.g., Christina Garsten’s *Workplace Vagabonds: Career and Community in Changing Worlds of Work* (2008).
an articulate one, nonetheless. For the situation, the floor is itself created […] by the cultural preoccupations […] which not only specify the focus but, assembling actors and arranging scenery, bring it actually into being. (Geertz 1999 [1973]: 424)

On the face of it, this seems like an appropriate characterization of Viking 03. The project certainly comprised “a set of persons engrossed in a flow of activity,” and these people related to one another in terms of that flow. They met for recurrent conferences and then dispersed; the participants on these occasions fluctuated; and the activity that focused them—_attempts at improving civil-military cooperation—was discrete.

Yet, on closer inspection the comparison becomes problematic. According to Geertz, it is “cultural preoccupations” that bring the focus of the gathering into being, and he famously goes on to tease out the broader features of Balinese culture that the attendants to the cockfight allegedly enact. To some extent, Viking 03 of course also enacted certain features that already existed. An attempt to ferret out the set of cultural preoccupations that focused the Viking 03 gathering, however, would obscure that the project also helped to bring a novel focus into being. While presumably every Viking 03 participant had particular reasons for taking part, it would be misleading to explain the project in these terms. Because by taking part in Viking 03, the participants did not ultimately enact already existing beliefs so much as alter them. Rather than a focused gathering, then, one might say that Viking 03 was a form for gathering focus.

In other words, Viking 03 was not a gathering of people who shared a set of beliefs, but a site where various actors aggregated to initiate work, to set something into motion. This loose aggregation of civil-military actors, humanitarian concepts, and neoliberal procedures did not constitute a cultural or semantic whole. It comprised a repertoire of things: the critical mass out of which a novel assemblage, conflict preventionism, could emerge. This chapter has centered on organizational facets of the process from aggregation to assemblage. In the next chapter, I expand my inquiry by shifting attention to the processes through which the world itself is appearing—and appearing as already orientated.

113 Geertz borrowed the concept from Erving Goffman, who had introduced “focused gathering” to designate a particular kind of interaction. Goffman’s original discussion, partly because he emphasizes the temporal dimension, seems in fact more useful than Geertz’s rendition. Focused interaction, according to Goffman, occurs when people “effectively agree to sustain for a time a single focus of cognitive and visual attention, as in a conversation, a board game, or a joint task” (Goffman 1967: 7). This differs from unfocused interaction, which consists of “interpersonal communications that result solely by virtue of persons being in one another’s presence” (p. 7). Also, in contrast to a group, which typically endures beyond occasions when members actually meet, Goffman also characterized a focused gathering as dependent on “the participants’ maintenance of continuous engrossment in the official focus of activity” (p. 11). If this focus is called into question, tensions arise in the gathering (p. 13).
3. Remediation: Bogaland and the Problematization of Conflicts

[I]t is less the case that the sense of a literary work is provided by the common property meaning of words, than that it contributes to changing that accepted meaning.

– Maurice Merleau-Ponty\textsuperscript{114}

The Combat School of the Swedish National Home Guard is located in Vällinge, twenty kilometers south of Stockholm. Once the center of a historic industrial community, the premises comprise a mid-eighteenth century mansion and a few smaller houses. In the adjacent garden stand a couple of vintage cannons, and Swedish flags fly in front of the stately main building. Situated amid lush vegetation on the shore of Lake Mälaren, the site is arresting picturesquely—\textquoteleft\textquoteleft a perfect symbol, it seems, of the \textquoteleft national home\textquoteright\ that the military has traditionally sought to protect.

In August 2003, sixty years after the National Home Guard first appropriated the grounds at Vällinge, the Combat School hosted a workshop with a noteworthy novel focus. The workshop was part of the Viking 03 project, and was one of several occasions on which civilian and military participants from various countries met to work collaboratively on the exercise scenario: the fictitious Bogaland. In addition to exemplifying the internationalization of the armed forces (see Chapter 1) and the proliferation of civil-military cooperation (see Chapter 2), this workshop also illustrated the third feature of conflict preventionism: an emergent focus on managing and preventing violent conflicts in other parts of the world—far beyond the \textquoteleft national home\textquoteright. The contrast between the old-style military atmosphere at Vällinge and the orientation of the Viking 03 workshop also demonstrates that something new can indeed be created within, and out of, the most traditional forms.

During the process of planning, the exercise scenario gradually evolved into a country study of surprising detail. What kind of place, then, is Bogaland? What does the scenario tell us about how different actors imagine contemporary conflicts, their causes, and the ways to solve them? How did the production of Bogaland help the project participants to fashion a world

\textsuperscript{114} Merleau-Ponty (2002 [1945]: 208-9).
around them? This chapter engages with these and other questions. More specifically, Part I explores the content of the Bogaland scenario documents, Part II discusses the contemporary problematization of conflicts more broadly, and Part III analyzes how Viking 03, through the production of Bogaland, enabled new collaborative forms of remedial work.

I. Exploring Bogaland

In December 2003, a UN-supported multinational force led by NATO intervened in the Bogaland civil war. This was the overarching plot of the Viking 03 scenario. From the main exercise site in Sweden, the virtual deployment of the troops and their subsequent mission in Bogaland was distributed via computers to the exercise participants in Sweden and on six remote sites in other countries.

Written documents, video clips, fictitious media, and information posted on the exercise website represented what happened in Bogaland during the exercise. To enable the use of real maps, the Viking 03 planners had decided to impose Bogaland on a map of Sweden. Most cities, lakes, and other landmarks in the scenario were thus referred to by their real names. As will become clear below, this resulted in a somewhat awkward mix of real and fictitious names.115

Country Study

The Viking 03 organizers spent much time on developing the background to the fictitious conflict. Civilian and military participants wrote the scenario documents collaboratively over the course of several months, and new updated versions were presented at each workshop or conference. At the time of the exercise, a thick bundle of documents covered everything from ancient history and geography, to media and political organization. The military officers who received their training during Viking 03 were, in other words, presented with a lot of information about Bogaland. This is what they were told:

Bogaland is a small country situated between Northland and Southland. The country is 150 km long and, on average, 150 km wide. The highest peak is only about 270 m high. The area is divided by the lakes Mälaren and Hjäl-

115 The reading instructions distributed to the participants explained that “Names or locations, which could be found at a map are marked with capital letters (e.g. SÖDERTÅLJE). Names or locations, which are fictitious, are marked with capital, italic letters (e.g. MIDA).” I have omitted capital and italic letters in all quotes that follow. The scenario documents I quote from were all written in English.
Lake Mälaren is an important trade route that connects the Northland city of Uppsala with the Baltic Sea. It is not possible to reach Mälaren through the Northland capital Stockholm. There are plenty of small lakes all over Bogaland. […] The indigenous population is of Indo-European descent. […] [And the] official language in Bogaland is Bogalandian.

Although the history of Bogaland focuses mostly on the twentieth century, the story of the conflict begins much earlier. The scenario document reports that Bogaland was originally a kingdom, ruled “in ancient times” by leaders “known as Bogakings.” In the sixteenth century, the country converted to Christianity, and was subsequently incorporated into the Great Nordlandic State. In the 1650s, the reformation of the church split the Great Nordlandic State into Northland and Southland, dominated by Delta Christians and Echo Christians respectively. In the process, Bogaland was also divided into two religiously defined regions, “named after ancient areas”: Kasuria in the North, dominated by Delta Christians; Mida in the South, dominated by Echo Christians. This division, where religion and territory seemed to overlap, marks the beginning of the Bogaland conflict.

In the remainder of the narrative, this conflict recurs and deepens until the deployment of the international intervention four hundred years later. In the course of the story, however, the initial focus on religiosity, territory, and ethnicity gradually gives way to an emphasis on economy, politics, and international activism.

**From Ethnicity to Economy**

During the industrial revolution, Kasuria and Mida developed in somewhat different directions. At the turn of the twentieth century, a leader from Kasuria—fittingly named Kasurius—nevertheless succeeded in uniting the two regions in a common resistance against Northland and Southland. On December 12, 1900, he proclaimed the Republic of Bogaland. However, a “deep rift” soon appeared between Mida and Kasuria. The scenario document explains the reasons for this.

Since the liberation from Northland and Southland, the governance of Bogaland has been dominated by Kasurians. Religion plays an important role, and the constitution is relating to religious adherence to define ethnicity and thus determine the rights of certain groups. […] Due to various means and methods only Kasurian politicians have been elected as governors, even in Mida-dominated areas in Bogaland.

In 1928, the great depression led to a shift in “governmental style.” The “hard times demanded a totalitarian leadership,” as the scenario document has it. This political development resulted in open harassment of Echo Chris-
tians (i.e., Midans) while Delta Christians (i.e., Kasurians) enjoyed increasing privileges. The period of “totalitarian leadership” was paralleled by a state-controlled economy—what the document labels “totalitarian economic regulations.” Consequently, “much needed investments in heavy industry and important infrastructure, such as communications, have not been done.” Also, the document reports that “telephone systems, and power grids are worn-down and slowly deteriorating.”

At this point, economy emerges as a pivotal feature in the narrative. And while specific economic regulations apparently cause problems, economy seems also to contain within it hopes for a peaceful development. Discoveries of uranium in the mid-twentieth century, for instance, put Bogaland in a position as one of the most prosperous nations in the world: for a short period in the 1960s, living standards were high and the country wealthy. The document notes that the booming economy helped to put the “old conflicts” between Mida and Kasuria aside “in the climate of national pride and self-confidence.”

With the oil crises in the 1970s, however, the situation changed. The failing economy, which especially affected Mida, immediately disrupted the sense of national unity: “This difference in economy together with the earlier earned privileges of the Kasurians increased the social and economical [sic] gaps between Kasuria and Mida.” Kasuriusson, who had been “elected president by narrow margins,” now replaced Kasurius, and the scenario document recounts how the new leader, despite “his otherwise totalitarian leadership,” was eventually “forced to accept a certain degree of free enterprise to achieve some sort of economical [sic] growth.” At a time when the failing economy clearly escalated the conflict in Bogaland, even Kasuriusson thus realized that a more market-oriented economy would offer the only realistic way ahead.

“Warlordism” and Nationalism

And yet, the situation in Bogaland continued to deteriorate into the 1980s.

[When] a Midan religious-nationalistic group occupied the Kvicksund bridges, and demanded national, religious, and economical [sic] equality, they fuelled a conflict that had been repressed for decades. This situation was solved by direct negotiations between [President] Kasuriusson and the leader of the group, a Midan named Anders Ostman. The rift between Mida and Kasuria had painfully surfaced!

Rather than fulfilling his promises, however, the President initiated a campaign of open oppression against Mida. With Kasuriusson’s political betrayal, the document introduces a new theme: insincere leaders. All leaders in Bogaland, from local warlords to the President, now appear to have their
own hidden agendas. The Viking 03 planners even decided to devote an entire document to “Strategic Goals and Hidden Agendas” among local actors. Political careers and identity politics dominate the remainder of the narrative.

The former leader of the Kvicksund Bridges’ occupants, Anders Ostman, started a career as a political leader. Ostman’s political platform was based on co-operation over religious and ethnical [sic] borders, and liberal thoughts. Thanks to Mida’s economical [sic] growth, Ostman’s political influence increases dramatically over time. The gap between Kasuriusson’s totalitarian regime and Ostman’s liberal ideals created a tense political climate.

Open conflict broke out when Anders Ostman was assassinated. And to make things worse, his brother, Bengt Ostman, who now took the role as leader of Mida, “started to act more and more nationalistic.” A full-scale civil war ultimately erupted in May 2003 when Ostman led an uprising against President Kasuriusson.

During the beginning of the Civil War, the forces of the self-proclaimed “State of Mida” pushed back the Kasurian forces and reached Västerås, threatening to capture the Kasurian capital. After fierce fighting Kasurian troops managed to push the invading Midans back to the confrontation line that eventually would become the Cease-Fire Line (CFL).

In August 2003, with the assistance from the United Nations, the warring parties agreed on a cease-fire. During negotiations for a political solution, however, ideological disagreements surfaced within Mida. The document explains that West Mida was more willing to accept a federation with Kasuria than “the more fundamentalistic” East Mida. Despite the cease-fire agreement “skirmishes” thus continued:

Numerous incidents with human causalities, ethnic cleansing and large-scale material damage have been reported. Tens of thousands of refugees from Kasuria went to Northland (northern neighbor of Kasuria) and refugees from Mida went to Southland. There are also huge numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in both Mida and Kasuria. During this period police brutality has increased, and the Bogaland Police Force has begun to act more and more in co-operation with the Bogaland Armed Forces.

Activism

At a point when Bogaland seems to be on the verge of a collapse, religion reemerges as central feature in the narrative. This time, however, the document cites religiosity not only as a cause of further hostilities, but also as “a source of tolerance and stabilization.” This introduces another novel theme: international activism and associated actors such as NGOs. Under the aus-
pieces of the Bogaland Fellowship of Reconciliation—a “faith-based organization with well developed international connections”—a number of “Parishes for Peace,” comprising some nine thousand members, were established throughout Bogaland. Peace activists from several Bogaland churches began to demand that “the armed conflict has to be transformed and dealt with by peaceful means.”

Yet, while the Delta church was gradually becoming less bound by tradition—“a more critical attitude to nationalistic ambitions has developed and created a space for peace activists and others acting for international solidarity,” as the document phrases it—Echo Christians remained “generally more fundamentalists than Delta Christians,” favoring, somewhat more ominously, “traditional customs and values.” Major religious differences thus prevailed.

At the time of the intervention, Bogaland appeared in other words as a textbook example of a “failed state.” Transnational advocacy networks were represented in the country and local resistance toward the conflict was strong. Still, a military intervention—a peace support operation—appeared as the most promising international response. The Viking 03 Exercise Director, Swedish Major General Tony Stigsson, even claimed that the military has in these kinds of situations “an obligation to prevent violence through the use of force.” The scene, then, was set for the exercise.

II. The Problematization of Conflicts

The Bogaland scenario epitomizes a central feature of conflict preventionism: the increasing international interest in understanding, managing, and preventing violent conflicts. It exemplifies an emergent field of debate, which comprises diverse notions of conflicts and their causes. It also exemplifies how various actors—including international institutions, national governments, NGOs, and private corporations—increasingly agree on conflicts as urgent issues that call for new forms of collaborative responses.

Actors

Since the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, the United Nations has consistently centered on preventing and controlling armed conflicts. Exemplified by the former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, the organization has since the end of the Cold War taken a somewhat new approach toward peace and security. One crucial shift has been from peacekeeping to peace enforcement operations (see, e.g., Mayall 2000: 121-48). Also, the organization has increasingly authorized operations led by NATO and more recently by the EU (see Chapter 1).
Another significant shift has been from intervention to prevention. In fact, “conflict prevention” has recently emerged as an extremely powerful concept.

The United Nations’ General Assembly and the Security Council have expressed commitment to pursue conflict prevention with all appropriate means. The European Union has adopted a European Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, stating that the highest political priority will be given to improve external action in the field of conflict prevention. A vast number of non-governmental organizations, individuals and non-state actors have been promoting the idea of conflict prevention. Today, a near-universal agreement on the idea of conflict prevention is emerging [...] when it comes to dealing with violent conflicts. (Björkdahl 2002: 15)

As conflicts become regarded as urgent problems of global concern, major international institutions such as the World Bank have also taken an interest in these issues (see, e.g., Collier et al. 2003) together with an increasing number of private corporations. Some commentators even speak of the rise of a “privatized military industry” (Singer 2003; see also Holmqvist 2005). Arguably, however, NGOs, new social movements, and transnational advocacy networks constitute the most notable contemporary actors in this context. Since the early 1990s, the number of international NGOs has expanded explosively (see, e.g., Boli and Thomas 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram et al. 2002a).

The foreign policies of several states also reflect a new approach to managing and preventing conflicts. Sweden and Canada are important examples in this regard. In Canada, an ambitious plan has brought together the Departments of Foreign Affairs, International Trade, and International Development in the so-called “Canadian Peace Building Initiative.” Meanwhile, the Swedish government has made conflict prevention the foremost goal in the country’s development policy, comprising both military and diplomatic services (see Björkdahl 2002; Hettne 2003: 152-3; Wimmer 2004: 7). Recently, the Swedish Ministry of Defense stated that “Sweden’s capability to participate in all kinds of peace-promoting operations, from preventive measures to peace-enforcement, should increase both qualitatively and quantitatively” (Swedish Ministry of Defense 2004: 9).

Indeed, several international projects on conflict prevention and conflict management have originated in Sweden in the past few years. “The Challenges Project” is one example. Initiated in 1997, it aimed at exchanging experiences and ideas on how to enhance the planning, conduct and effectiveness of multinational peace operations. Between 1997 and 2002, the project organized a series of seminars comprising participants from 230 organizations and fifty countries (see The Challenges Project 2002). More recently, the Madariaga European Foundation launched a “Programme on Conflict Prevention” together with the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation,
with the aim to broaden the European debate on conflict prevention through a dialogue between actors from the public and private spheres, civil society, and academia (see Mellbourn 2004, 2005). And then there is “The Project on Prevention of Armed Conflict,” a network organized in 2004/2005 by the Peace Team Forum (PTF) which comprises some fifty Swedish NGOs (see Chapter 5).¹¹⁶

Academics, too, have taken a renewed interest in research on “how to understand ethnic conflicts and on how to prevent such conflicts, settle them by outside interference, and design institutions that reduce the risk of escalation” (Wimmer 2004: 1-2; see also Carment and Schnabel 2003; Crocker et al. 2001; Wallensteen 1998). Anthropological research on conflicts — while often critical toward prevalent notions of ethnicity, culture, and conflict — has in this context become regarded as increasingly relevant.¹¹⁷ In 1993, for instance, British anthropologists and sociologists established the Forum Against Ethnic Violence. In opposition to primordialist interpretations of ethnicity, the forum aims at making alternative understandings available outside the discipline. In the introduction to a subsequent publication, Tim Allen and Jean Seaton explain how members of the organization “have sought to argue their position with journalists, non-governmental organizations, students and other academics through conferences, workshops, commissioned reports, and publications” (Allen and Seaton 1999a: 2). Similar initiatives, but with an explicit feminist emphasis, have also emerged recently (see, e.g., Giles and Hyndman 2004; Jacobs et al. 2000).

Conflicts

A series of diverse actors are in other words engaged in discussions and debates on the nature of conflicts and their causes. No consensus necessarily exists between these different perspectives. Yet it is worth noting that the notion of “novelty” constitutes a central, if contested, feature in most conceptualizations. As a matter of fact, contemporary conflicts are often treated as a distinctly new kind of phenomenon — as “new wars,” in Mary Kaldor’s terminology (Kaldor 2001; cf. Hettne 2003: 94-102).¹¹⁸ An alleged character-

¹¹⁶ For other international project reports on how to understand, manage, and prevent violent conflicts, see, e.g., Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997); The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001); and The Folke Bernadotte Academy (2004).

¹¹⁷ Recent anthropological studies on war and conflict include Sverker Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings (2008); Carolyn Nordstrom, Shadows of War (2004); Paul Richards (ed.), No Peace No War (2005); Valery Tishkov, Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society (2004); and David Turton (ed.), War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and Local Violence (1997). See also Jack David Eller’s From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict (2002) for an anthropological critique of “culture” and “ethnicity.”

¹¹⁸ For recent debates on the notion of “new wars,” see Duyvesteyn and Angstrom (2005), Hirst (2001), and Newman (2004). See also Kaldor’s (2005) response to her critics.
istic of “new wars” is that, like Bogaland, they appear to be “neverending.” Ann Hironaka, for instance, argues that they often recur—even years after their initial conclusion. “This tendency,” she writes, “is unusual from a historical standpoint.”

The civil wars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries typically ended decisively and permanently. In contrast, contemporary civil wars tend to have an intermittent quality, dying down for some years before coming to life once again. Conflicts may simmer for years at low intensity, then erupt or re-erupt into full-scale civil war. (Hironaka 2005: 150)

New causes of conflicts are also identified. Commentators tend increasingly to explain contemporary violence in relation to failing states and failing economies, rather than as the result of ancient ethnic hatreds (see, e.g., Collier et al. 2003). Meanwhile, “ethnicity” is mostly becoming regarded as a fiction appropriated by insincere local leaders for their own illicit purposes (see, e.g., Kaldor 2001). There is even, as Duffield (2002) notes, a growing tendency to criminalize “ethnic conflicts.” These characterizations of conflicts—as essentially illegitimate products of the present, explicitly related to failing economies—have not only opened up the possibility for foreign intervention. They have also allowed policymakers to suggest privatization and other market-friendly reforms as tools for securing sustainable peace (see, e.g., Gerson and Coletta 2002; cf. Wenger and Möckli 2003).

It is worth noting that this shift from ethnicity to economy in some sense is reminiscent of “critical” anthropological perspectives (cf. Joras and Schetter 2004). Anthropologists also often claim, for instance, that ethnicity and ethnic differences are not so much causes as the results of conflicts (Allen and Seaton 1999b; Tishkov 2004); that conflicts are products of the present rather than created in the past (Eller 2002); and that most “local” conflicts have in fact global economic connections (Nordstrom 1997, 2004; Turton 1997). Perhaps ironically, the spread of constructivist interpretations of ethnic conflicts seems thus to have lent force to a set of unintended effects: a “de-historicizing” of conflicts, an “individualization” of their causes, and a “neoliberalization” of solutions.

I want to note here as well that the shift toward seeing conflicts as “complex political emergencies” (Goodhand and Hulme 1999) also has enabled a new discourse on contemporary threats. According to the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, Håkan Syrén, for instance, the threats we face today include “refugee catastrophes, ethnic cleansing, failing states, genocide, large scale terrorism […] and] circulation of weapons of mass destruction” (Syrén 2004: 15, my translation). This statement exemplifies the extraordinarily wide scope of the emergent discourse on threats, and how it deploys a rhetoric that is simultaneously humanitarian and security-oriented. Such rhetoric reinforces the notion that we live in a “world of emergencies”
(Calhoun 2004), which calls for new responses—an orientation which constitutes a central feature of conflict preventionism.

“Hospitality of Critique”

Viking 03 was explicitly framed as a response to contemporary forms of violent conflicts. It tried to fashion a new direction—centered on civil-military cooperation—for managing such issues. New forms of cooperation were regarded as critical, and the Bogaland scenario arguably constituted a useful tool in the attempt to forge a common orientation between civilian and military actors. While the final narrative comprised many contemporary notions of conflicts, it did not settle on one exact model. Instead, it encompassed different and even contradictory perspectives. Before I approach the Bogaland scenario analytically, I want to reflect briefly on this inclusive “capacity,” and its implications for a critical approach.

Viking 03 did not shy away from critique. It invited it—exemplified, for instance, by the Viking 03 Deputy Exercise Director’s claim that the project sought to include actors who were openly critical toward the military (see Chapter 2). A conversation I had with Robert, a Swedish officer, also exemplified an interest toward new perspectives. During a workshop centered on Bogaland, he told me that he thought it would prove helpful to have an anthropologist in the project. “Someone,” he said, “who can help to make the scenario more realistic: explain how people from Bogaland think; how various parts of the country differ culturally from one another—you know, those kinds of things.” I reminded him that my reason for participating was to study Viking 03, and that I lacked special knowledge about conflicts. He nevertheless remained convinced that I would be of help, especially regarding cultural issues. “As an anthropologist,” he persisted, “you have expert knowledge about these things.”

Robert’s expectation exemplifies a tendency toward inclusion that is central to conflict preventionism, and which resonates more generally with neoliberal organizational procedures. This apparent hospitality of critique also points toward certain problems: to accept Robert’s proposal would mean to accept a particular position as critic or expert. Such already designated positions for critique, however, appear decidedly limiting. Zygmunt Bauman has noted that contemporary society has given to the “hospitality of critique” an entirely new sense and has invented a way to accommodate critical thought and action while remaining immune to the consequences of that accommodation, and so emerging unaffected and unscathed—reinforced rather than weakened—from the tests and trials of the open-house policy. (Bauman 2000: 23)

\[119\] We had this conversation in Swedish. The English translations are mine.
This resonates with the situation in Viking 03. Critical organizations did participate in the project, often, as I described in Chapter 2, with the aim to change the military from “within”; but in the end, they had limited opportunities to actually make a difference. While Viking 03 included actors with diverse perspectives, its overarching directionality remained intact. Thus, most critique appeared “toothless.” (I come back to this in Chapters 4 and 5.)

III. Remediation

The contemporary focus on conflicts, then, does not consist of one coherent perspective, but comprises many—and even contradictory—approaches. The Viking 03 exercise scenario certainly exemplified this lack of coherence. At the time of the 2003 intervention, Bogaland had in fact evolved into an extremely peculiar place. On one side in the civil war were the Midans—characterized in the scenario document as politically liberal religious fundamentalists, who somehow were also politically conservative nationalists. On the other side were the Kasurians: a group of secularized totalitarian peace activists who oppressed Midans while acting for international solidarity. At this point, we must pause to ask how we could make sense of this. How can we approach Bogaland analytically, and what can we learn from it?

From Representation to Remediation

In a discussion of military simulations in the US during the Cold War, from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, Catherine Lutz makes the following assertion:

Any military simulation attempts to draw an objective model of the world and its potential situations. But because it involves peering into the void of the future and the blurry shapes of the present, it must also be mythic: It has to draw on culturally tutored imagination, fears, and wishes. (Lutz 2001: 87-88)

The Bogaland scenario of course tried to convey potential conflict situations, thus inevitably mirroring particular imaginations, fears, and wishes. Yet Lutz’s approach, which is concerned with an entirely different historical and security context, would not be of much analytical help in the case of Bogaland. It is illuminating, I think, to elaborate on three points of divergence.

First, to describe Bogaland as an “objective model” would be misleading. It suggests that the scenario represents something that already exists. Bogaland, however, was arguably almost the opposite of this. It constituted
an unfinished part of something which currently is unfolding. To describe the scenario as “peering into the void of the future” would be equally specious. Rather than a speculation on what the future might hold, Bogaland constituted a tool for engaging actively with the future in order to shape it. Finally, it would be problematic to think of Bogaland as “mythic.” Bogaland was a fiction—and that is something different. Myth, as Malinowski argued, “possesses the normative power of fixing custom, of sanctioning modes of behavior, of giving dignity and importance to an institution” (Malinowski 1984 [1922]: 328). But while myths are about legitimacy and stability, “fictions,” as literary critic Frank Kermode reminds us, are instead “the agents of change” (Kermode 2000 [1966]: 39; cf. Brooks 2005: 215).

To say that Bogaland is a fiction that functioned as a tool for change is not to say that the scenario referred to reality in an arbitrary manner. Instead, Bogaland made use of particular combinations of the representative and the referential. I quote here from Leona Toker. “Replication,” she writes, “is an attempt to model the structure of the original by identifying its constituents; simulation consists in tracing the way things work, that is, the function of specific constituents” (Toker 2000: 137-8). These principles are helpful for describing how Bogaland modeled reality. At workshops during planning, the Viking 03 participants first identified different features of conflicts: things they wanted to include in the scenario. For example, the military often emphasized security; Save the Children mostly suggested issues related to children in war situations, while Amnesty International focused on Human Rights more broadly. This, in Toker’s terms, is replication. At subsequent workshops, a smaller group of participants linked these features in a narrative. This is simulation.

Toker also mentions a third principle: formalization, which, as she puts it, “involves a competition with the original for philosophical or aesthetic coherence” (Toker 2000: 138). This is where Bogaland differs—both from a conventional text and from a myth. It was never formalized in this sense. It did not even aim at coherence. Instead, it remained open-ended.

To approach Bogaland in an analytically productive way we thus need to move beyond a conventional approach for analyzing texts. Given that Bogaland was the result of collaborative work, a conventional textual approach is problematic also because it presupposes what Michel Foucault (1984b) has called a particular “author function.” According to Foucault,

---

120 In his book The Content of the Form, Hayden White identifies two phases of what he calls a “conventional approach” for analyzing texts. First, we “try to identify certain generic elements of the text, themes, arguments, and so forth, in the interest of establishing what the text is about, what point of view its author represents, and its importance as evidence of some aspect of […] social and cultural history. We might say that the text sets forth views and arguments with respect to politics, society, culture, ethics and morality, epistemology, and so forth, and we would then proceed to assess the validity of the positions assigned to the author or the text, to determine the extent to which they were prophetic, prejudiced, foresighted, reflective, sapient, antiquated, and so forth” (White 1987: 194).
however, our notion of “the author” is not the only principle by which we might understand or approach texts. Rather than asking, “Who really spoke?” we might inquire into the modes of existence of a discrete discourse: where it has been used, how it can circulate, and who can appropriate it. We can ask where in it there is room for possible subjects, and for whom it is possible to assume these various subject positions (see Foucault 1984b: 119-20).

In other words, rather than asking what Bogaland represents, whose model this is, and whether it realistically resembles a conflict, I want to ask how the scenario functioned in the Viking 03 context. The Viking 03 project started from the assumption that “something needs to be done” about contemporary violent conflicts. More specifically, it sought to improve civil-military cooperation in an attempt to enhance the efficiency of peace support operations. Bogaland proved to be a useful tool precisely for initiating such collaborative remedial work.

I find remediation a helpful concept for characterizing the mode of engagement that Bogaland enabled. Borrowed from the analysis of new me-

---

[121] My use of remediation draws on collaborative concept work that I was involved in while participating in “Writing-Method-Design,” a graduate course led by Paul Rabinow at the University of California, Berkeley, in the fall of 2006. This is the entire collaborative piece: Remediation refers to contemporary practices that remake already existing objects in the context of simultaneous possible solutions to conceptualized difficulties, that is, in the context of a problematization. We are using “remediation” as a cover term that refers to a wide variety of operations going on today in such diverse milieu as synthetic biology, humanitarianism, criminal intelligence analysis, biosecurity, spatial technologies for handling risk, conflict preventionism, generic drugs, reading, public health, social marketing practices, and conservation science. Remediation is a response to problems, an intervention on existing objects, which seeks to find new media for new mediations. These objects, and the relations among their constituent elements, undergo transformation in both content and form, yet they maintain partial continuity with the objects upon which the work of remediation was performed. Remediation also contains within it the suggestion of improvement through corrective changes, as in remedy or reform. In contrast to reform, however, remediation is a practice without strategy or telos. We identify “reform” with social planning strategies around population security or welfare. Our use of remediation gestures toward a new problematization that demands new responses. At the same time, we understand these two terms to be not in opposition but crucially in relation to each other. The past is an active part of today in that it is present in our perceptions as well as our institutions, and what we think about the past moves in tandem with what we understand about today. The object remediated into an assemblage doesn’t leave our perceptions of the original untouched. This makes remediation different from “representation.” In a representational act, the represented object and its representation share a double identity. There are two simultaneously existing manifestations: the “physical” manifestation and its “representation.” With remediation, however, this simultaneity no longer exists. While a remediated form retains features of the “original” at any given time, it does not share a double identity with it. The practice of remediation does not create a new manifestation but diverts and manipulates what already was. Thus the temporality of remediation, as both process and result, must be kept in mind. The term remediation is borrowed from the analysis of new media (following Manovich 2001). In many contemporary art practices, objects are not assembled from scratch but from ready-made parts identified and selected from databases of already existing items. Yet remediation is not limited only to items. It is selected from already existing procedural techniques which are part of “language” in Mano-
dia (see, e.g., Manovich 2001: 89), remediation refers to practices that re-make already existing objects or relationships in the context of a problematization (see Rabinow 2008: 127-28). Remediation is a response to problems, and as in remedy, it contains the suggestion of improvement. In contrast to reform, however, remediation does not imply a movement toward a goal that has been clearly defined in advance. Instead, it is an attempt to find new responses—and to set something into motion.

Rather than to critically unpack the various features in the scenario, then, remediation helps us see how Bogaland worked to reconfigure and to synthesize; and how the scenario literally helped to re-mediate the relationships between the civilian and the military spheres in the context of a problematization of conflicts. In other words, an inquiry into Bogaland as a tool for remediation draws attention to how the scenario formed new connecting links between different features represented in it, and what the scenario, as a particular means of conveying those features thus assembled, actually did. To explore this, we need to go beyond a textual analysis of the scenario documents. We need ethnography.

**Replication**

At this point, I want to return to the Combat School of the Swedish National Home Guard that I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. In August 2003, some thirty Viking 03 participants met for three days at the Combat School in Vällinge to develop the content of the exercise scenario. Representatives from all participating civilian organizations took part in this workshop, together with military officers from several countries, including Greece, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, and Uzbekistan.

The work carried out during this workshop could be characterized as examples of replication, to recall Toker’s terminology, where addition is the dominant procedure (Toker 2000: 139). Indeed, most themes suggested during the Vällinge workshop, as we shall see, did make it into the scenario. Ultimately, Bogaland thus mirrored the interests of all participating organizations. This of course made most participants feel involved in the Viking 03 project. Yet it also implied that in its entirety, the final narrative, as we have seen, did not make proper sense to anyone.
I had arrived at Vällinge early to help with preparations. After checking in at the austere military quarters, I accompanied Thomas, the Swedish officer in charge, to the classroom where most of the work would take place. The aim of the workshop was to decide what events and incidents to include in the exercise scenario. Since participants had recurrently discussed the design of Bogaland at previous workshops, many ideas and suggestions already existed. The “freezing Bogaland winter,” for instance, had been proposed as the main humanitarian theme. “Winterization,” as the Swedish officers phrased it, would make an intervention both urgent and difficult, thus really putting the international community to the test. They also assumed that most participants were liable to agree on climate as a central theme since it was “politically neutral.” A few other issues had also been regarded from the beginning as self-evident parts of the scenario, such as internally displaced persons, a local Mafia, drug trafficking, and “warlords.”

Prior to the Vällinge workshop, then, Thomas had collected a list of nineteen preliminary themes to be further developed collaboratively. Before the meeting began, I helped him write these on flipchart sheets that we posted on the classroom walls. Among the headings were “heavy fighting,” “mass grave,” “media handling,” “return of IDPs and refugees,” and “chemical leak.”

After welcoming the participants to Vällinge, Thomas went through the program for the workshop in a PowerPoint presentation, and since there were some new people present at this meeting, he also took a few minutes for introductions. As usual, practical issues took time. About an hour passed before the discussion finally got around to Bogaland. Eventually, Thomas asked the participants to consider the suggested scenario themes, and invited critique and suggestions for improvement. Another officer asked everyone to keep in mind that, ultimately, all events had to be of relevance on a staff level. The reason for this was that Viking 03 centered on training military officers, not soldiers. Pointing this out, however, functioned also as a way to limit the scope of the discussion, and to reaffirm the boundary between the civilian and the military spheres (see Chapter 2). Some participants, particularly civilians, were suspicious toward any such limitations. When Bengt from SweFOR asked if the military were interested only in incidents reflecting their own preferred tasks, however, a Swedish officer from the Viking 03 Core Planning Team (CPT) assured him that no “military agenda” existed. The events to be included in the exercise would be those suggested by the participating organizations.

Indeed, the Bogaland conflict did directly mirror the competencies of the organizations that took part in Viking 03. Heavy fighting, for instance, obviously appealed to most military officers, while improving preparedness for discovering a mass grave constituted a key issue for Amnesty International. Meanwhile, the Swedish Emergency Management Agency was involved in media handling, whereas refugees and individually displaced persons consti-
tuted critical themes both for the UNHCR and the Red Cross. And a chemical leak inevitably called for the expert knowledge of the Swedish Rescue Services Agency.

It was striking how the subsequent discussion centered mostly on details. Two officers, for instance, spent time discussing whether “ethnic cleansing” should constitute an event in itself or rather be a sub-theme of “war crimes.” This led one civilian participant to complain that the military personnel neglected the broader political goals of the intervention. Thomas objected to this by pointing out that the military only should focus on military tasks. Others take care of the political level. Much of the ensuing discussion thus followed a detailed level of concern. Events were re-titled—“war criminals” became “respect for humanitarian law,” “assist humanitarian organizations” became “assist humanitarian and other NGOs.” Participants spent little time discussing why exactly these themes were important, and my impression was that as long as everyone agreed on what to call them, events were added to the scenario without hesitation. I also found the discussions and presentations conspicuously slow, and began to realize what the more cynically inclined officers meant when they spoke not of Partnership, but “PowerPoint” for Peace.

During the dinner break, however, I began to modify these opinions. Gustav, a senior officer who had been involved in the two previous Viking exercises, explained to me what he saw as the “real” workshop objectives. The aim, he argued, was not only to improve “media handling,” “return of IDPs” and all the rest of it, but also to create international and civil-military networks and get people from different organizations to know one another. With several social events scheduled, the program for the workshop seemed to confirm this emphasis. The Viking 03 organizers were always liable to arrange something “typically Swedish” for such occasions (see also Chapter 4). With a “traditional crayfish party” planned for one of the evenings, the Vällinge workshop was no exception. (And despite the fact that few international participants seemed overly excited about the food, this turned out to be a much-appreciated event.) It is worth noting that people scarcely discussed Viking 03 on these occasions. Instead, the crayfish party and other such events helped to make the project appear merely as work to be done. True, it was critical to take part in the process of planning. However, taking it too seriously, as I suggested in Chapter 2, was frowned upon.

After dinner, the participants continued work in small groups. After an hour or so all met in the classroom and Thomas asked everyone to gather in front of one of the flipchart sheets with scenario themes to add suggestions. In that way work proceeded for the next few hours. With thirty participants adding suggestions, and with nineteen themes to cover, this took time. Through this practical work, however, Thomas succeeded in involving everyone in the process. Still, many participants felt it was unclear what had actually been achieved during the evening. “I wonder what we’ll do today,”
one civilian representative said to me at breakfast the following morning, adding, “not that I’m entirely sure I understood what we did yesterday.”

Simulation

The meeting in Vällinge was followed a month later by another workshop. A lot of input now existed concerning the content of the Bogaland conflict, but a narrative that could bring these details together was still lacking. At the headquarters in Stockholm, preparations for the exercise were at this stage of planning becoming rather hectic. To get some work done on the scenario, Thomas thought it might be a good idea to leave town for a few days, and decided to organize a workshop in Östersund, a provincial military town north of Stockholm. Early one September morning, I met him and three other officers from the Operations group—Magnus, Gustav, and Jonas—at the airport. Together with representatives from the Swedish police and the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, we traveled north.

A few other military participants joined the group at the military garrison in Östersund. They began work immediately. Thomas got all the usual equipment in order—the map of Bogaland, the PowerPoint projector, and the bundles of exercise documents. He explained that the main task during the days in Östersund was to develop the scenario documents: to account for how incidents and events in Bogaland were connected. “We must work hard,” he warned them, “but I hope that we can also try to have fun together.” Actually, this is an apt characterization of much work on Bogaland. While people did work hard, they also frequently joked about the scenario—sometimes adding features just for fun. When some officers marked on the “Swedish” map where one of the most notorious warlords in Bogaland was thought to reside, for instance, they deliberately picked a location where they knew that a fellow officer lived.

One afternoon in Östersund, during a discussion of “Road to Conflict,” one of the scenario documents, Magnus pointed out that perhaps they ought to find a better name for the Bogaland president. Considering that the country was a republic with elected leaders, he found the name used so far—Kasurius II—simply too unrealistic. Thomas thought it was unnecessary to discuss such details, but agreed to change the name. Someone suggested Kasuriusson, and that is how the president got his name. Considerably more time was spent on the overarching narrative. In fact, the entire conflict narrative took a somewhat new turn during the Östersund workshop when Gustav suggested that they should avoid emphasizing history too much in the “Road to Conflict” document. What mostly mattered in contemporary conflicts, he claimed, were economic and political issues—not historical disputes. To illustrate his point, he circulated a copy of a diagram out of Mary Kaldor’s *New and Old Wars.*
As these examples show, the details were decided rather arbitrarily, while more consideration went into the overall framing. Most of the content had already been developed collaboratively during Vällinge and other workshops. In Östersund and on a few subsequent occasions, the organizers thus simply added whatever they found necessary in order to bring those events together. In other words, we should not read too much significance into the exact contents of the final narrative. Although Bogaland was not put together in an entirely haphazard or sloppy manner, it was clearly looked upon primarily as work to be done. Few Viking 03 organizers, it seemed, would lose sleep to find the right name for the president.

I should note here as well that the name Bogaland itself, while decidedly conspicuous, appeared to lack a consistent organizing idea. When I asked why the fictitious country was called Bogaland, Thomas and Magnus said they were not sure who had made it up or what it meant. “It’s just a name.” Apparently, it had been used long before the Viking 03 project. Magnus thought it might have originated during a course at Swedint. When I later had the opportunity to interview a former course-leader at the center, he confirmed this, but said that Bogaland already existed as a name for training scenarios when he first started at Swedint in the 1980s. He did not know when it had been made up.

If the Vällinge workshop exemplified replication, the emphasis at Östersund was instead on simulation—a procedure that in contrast to replication mainly involves subtraction: “details irrelevant to the mechanics of the proceedings tend to get purged,” as Toker (2000: 139) phrases it. While the narrative produced in Östersund described how procedures typically take place in a conflict situation, it lacked sufficient explanations for the particular situations accounted for. As a result, the incidents and events in Bogaland appeared both typical and random.

The Speaking and the Spoken

In the next few decades, according to the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, Håkan Syrén, “military and civilian efforts will be much needed within the entire unstable zone which stretches today from Africa over the Middle East and to Central Asia” (Syrén 2006: 19, my translation). Arguably, the vagueness of this statement is what makes it possible. Bogaland constituted a refined version of such an approach, and its fictitious status added a noteworthy flexibility. In factographic texts, all details are supposed to be referential. In fictionalizations, by contrast, referentiality is mainly restricted to broader historical or cultural aspects of the setting (Toker 2000: 123). Bogaland did not represent an actually existing conflict. Instead, the content of the scenario was representative in a much wider sense. It exemplified features that one might find in conflict situations: warlords, suffering local populations, etc.
Bogaland thus allowed the Viking 03 organizers to include in the exercise various features whose precise relationship to one another remained somewhat unclear. Few participants seemed bothered by this incoherence. As a matter of fact, the inconsistency of the scenario helped to shift the focus toward what was regarded as most critical: civil-military cooperation in peace support operations. Emma from the Red Cross, for instance, told me that while she found several features of the scenario problematic, she nevertheless liked “the basic idea.” Several participants that I spoke to shared this opinion.

Many participants even joked about features they found especially unrealistic. Yet oversimplifications also made it possible to talk about, and engage with, what Bogaland was understood to oversimplify: a set of issues regarded widely as appallingly real. Reminders of the fictional status of a plot, as Toker tells us, can thus serve to “bring into further relief the solidity and coerciveness of the settings” (Toker 2000: 138-39). Significantly, the incoherence of the scenario suggested in addition that the main moral and ethical issues at stake in contemporary violent conflicts ultimately are of the same kind—regardless of particular local circumstances. Conflicts call for international collaborative responses—and through Bogaland, it became possible for the Viking 03 participants to initiate such work.

As an acknowledged fictionalization, then, Bogaland went beyond what could be enunciated with reference to what already exists. The scenario thereby received a “speaking” quality in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s sense. A speaking word, writes Merleau-Ponty, is “one in which the significant intention is at the stage of coming into being. Here existence is polarized into a certain ‘significance’ which cannot be defined in terms of any natural object” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 [1945]: 229). This is why Lutz’s approach would fail in an analysis of Bogaland. It recurrently falls back on already existing meanings; on what, in Merleau-Ponty’s vocabulary, is “spoken.” The spoken word, as he puts it, “enjoys available significances as one might enjoy an acquired fortune” (ibid.). While helping us see constitutive features of the scenario, Lutz’s approach would thus—precisely by drawing attention to already existing significances—inevitably obscure the extent to which Bogaland is speaking, which arguably is the most central significance of the scenario.

Bogaland is oriented toward the future. “It is somewhere at a point beyond being that [the speaking word] aims to catch up with itself again,” as Merleau-Ponty phrases it; “and that is why it creates speech as an empirical support for its own not-being” (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 229). This helps us see that the production of the scenario was imperative for Viking 03. It offered empirical support for its own not-being and enabled a remediation of relationships whose novel significance is in the process of coming into being. Ultimately conflict preventionism thus centers less on a deep understanding
of past or present conflicts, and mostly on developing forms for future collaborative responses.
4. Directionality: Countering Violence, Exercising Peace

Let us then formulate this general definition for any beginning that involves reversal, change of direction, the institution of a durable movement that increasingly engages our interest: such a beginning authorizes; it constitutes an authorization for what follows from it.

– Edward Said122

The deployment of the intervention during the Viking 03 exercise functioned as a narrative closure to the Bogaland conflict. It instigated a break with the past by reorienting attention to the future. Now the peace process came into focus. Ultimately this temporal shift enabled particular forms of collaborative action; and while the conflict, as we saw in Chapter 3, appeared haphazard and omnidirectional, these civil-military responses in contrast exhibited a strong sense of organized directionality. The shift from conflict to peace process also implied a shift from content to form. Thereby it captures an intriguing resemblance between Bogaland and the organizational logic of Viking 03 itself. To “take part in the process,” for instance, constituted a central imperative, both in the fictitious scenario and in the actual Viking 03 project. Through the exercise, the process of planning, too, received closure.

This chapter explores how Viking 03—in addition to aggregating actors, concepts, and procedures (Chapter 2), and in addition to fashioning, through a certain problematization of conflicts, an oriented “out-there-ness” (Chapter 3)—imposed directionality on collaborative engagements with the world.123 More specifically, the chapter comprises three parts: “Performance,” “Proces-sualization,” and “Evaluation.” First, I scrutinize the performative features of the exercise: the enactment of civilian expertise, the Bogaland conflict, “Swedish-ness,” and the “international.” However, I do not approach the

---

122 Said (1975: 34, emphasis in original).
123 I have borrowed the term “out-there-ness” from Latour and Woolgar. In Laboratory Life, they argue that “‘reality’ cannot be used to explain why a statement becomes a fact, since it is only after it has become a fact that the effect of reality is obtained. […] We do not wish to say that facts do not exist nor that there is no such thing as reality. […] Our point is that “out-there-ness” is the consequence of scientific work rather than its cause” (Latour and Woolgar 1979: 181-82, emphasis in original).
exercise as a site for cultural reproduction. Instead, the features enacted arguably constituted a background against which conflict preventionism could appear. The instigation of the peace process, which I discuss in the second part, was a significant moment in this actualization of a conflict preventionist directionality. Finally, I analyze the project evaluation process, which enhanced both the organizational and the temporal directionality of Viking 03. Directionality, of course, indicates a direction in space, but also relates to direction or guidance of thought or effort. Viking 03 illustrates that conflict preventionism encompasses both meanings: on the one hand, conflict preventionism seems to move in a certain direction; on the other hand, the futuristic mode in which it appears imposes directionality in the second sense.

I. Performance

The Opening Ceremony

A welcome ceremony at the Uppland Regiment in Enköping opened the Viking 03 exercise on December 2, 2003. Everyone at the main site—between four hundred and five hundred people—gathered in a provisional assembly hall. Participants at the various remote sites could also follow the event, which was broadcast via the Internet as a videoconference. Apart from a stage decorated by Swedish and UN flags, the large room was empty. Seemingly out of habit, the military personnel got into formation in front of the stage. Most civilian participants, in contrast, looked decidedly confused; and they remained at the back throughout the event, appearing more like spectators than participators.

Tony Stigsson, a Swedish Major General and the Viking 03 Exercise Director, welcomed everyone to the exercise, addressing the participants as “Fellow Vikings.” In his speech, he emphasized the importance of civil-military cooperation, and said he was “happy to see that a lot of new people and their experience are added to our ‘family.’” A peace support operation, according to Stigsson, “is carried out in order to prevent or resolve a conflict, and to protect human rights,” and it is “the obligation of military organiza-

\[124\] Stigsson’s opening speech is available online at http://www.mil.se/viking03/attachments/speechattheopeningcer.pdf (accessed August 17, 2008). I should note here as well that in 2005, Tony Stigsson became the subject of massive media attention as he was arrested on suspicion of having beaten and raped his wife. The charges against him were extended as the police found top-secret military documents during a search of his home. Stigsson was initially suspended from his position within the Swedish Armed Forces during the trial, and was ultimately dismissed. He was convicted in 2006 to three months in prison for assault, but was acquitted of the charges of criminal negligence by Stockholm’s district court in 2008 (see, e.g., “Tingsrätten friar Tony Stigsson,” *Dagens Nyheter*, July 3, 2008, p. 11).
tions to prevent violence through the use of force, with the purpose to restore order and avoid affliction.” Civil-military cooperation is necessary to succeed in such attempts. “As long as we live in a world with injustice, corruption, poverty, and terrorism,” as Stigsson put it, “we will need the civilian organizations to provide help to those less fortunate than us.” Hence the importance of Viking 03. “In order to be able to work together smoothly,” he explained, “the heads and staff members of military and civilian organizations from different nations must train together, which is what Viking is all about.”

This exercise will give you an opportunity to get some insights of how this coordination is accomplished, and which organizations and individuals you may be working with in the field some day. I urge all of you to share your knowledge and take advantage of each other’s different experiences.

The exercise aim was to “develop technology and procedures that can be used when preparing a brigade or a division for a specific peace support mission”—an effort, Stigsson promised, that would be “carefully evaluated.” The emphasis in this regard—which signals the link between conflict preventionism, neoliberalism, and audit culture—was on form rather than content: on “technology and procedures,” as Stigsson phrased it. Thus the question at stake concerned whether Viking 03 was a good exercise—not whether it was relevant.

Karlberg’s Voluntary Music Corps, a Swedish military orchestra, performed during an intermission. Then Michael Sahlin, the Director General of the Folke Bernadotte Academy, took the stage to speak “on behalf of the civilian participants.” His speech was conspicuously reminiscent of Stigsson’s. He, too, addressed the participants “Fellow Vikings,” spoke of the importance of civil-military cooperation, and was convinced that the exercise ultimately would “generate important knowledge.” Also, he explained that each organization had an important role in the exercise as to “enhance field reality” and to “reflect all kinds of complexities.” The military and civilian speakers on stage thus seemed entirely to share common ground. Meanwhile, the military and civilian participants in the audience tellingly remained spatially divided throughout the event, with the military personnel as devoted partakers and the civilians as more ambivalent observers.

At formal gatherings, the performative features of Viking 03 stood out. The opening ceremony exemplifies how such occasions sometimes also suggested particular tensions. After a description of the Viking 03 main site and the exercise organization, I discuss in turn the enactment of civilian expertise, the Bogaland conflict, “Swedish-ness,” and “the international.” Together, these four areas comprised a background against which conflict preventionism could appear.
The Main Site

I had arrived at the Uppland Regiment, S1, in Enköping the day before the exercise began. Since the regiment had hosted several Viking 03 workshops and planning conferences in the previous months, S1 was already a familiar place. However, some new arrangements had been made for the exercise. Armed sentries, for instance, were now posted at a military checkpoint, and a permit was needed to enter or leave the exercise area. Outside the main exercise building, flags from all twenty-six participating countries were flying, which produced a rather grandiose impression. Inside, at “The Civilian Exhibition,” most organizations displayed information about their work. Thus anyone visiting the exercise immediately understood that Viking 03 was related to the military, to internationalization, and to civil-military cooperation.

S1 looks like a typical Swedish military garrison. Clusters of austere brick buildings dot the premises. The conscripts are barracked in small houses adjacent to a centrally located restaurant, which also accommodates an officers’ mess and a bar. Nearby is the regiment fitness center with a gym and other facilities, and somewhat further ahead lies the set of buildings where the exercise took place.

S1 was well suited to host a large computer-assisted exercise. As a signal regiment, it specializes in various forms of technologically mediated communication, and organizes recurrent educational courses for military personnel from other garrisons. Most military participants in Viking 03 were quartered in barracks on the premises throughout the exercise. Together with the civilian participants and some of the military organizers, I stayed instead in a hotel in nearby Enköping. Shuttle buses left for S1 early each morning—a mere 5-minute ride. Soon the hotel bar became a central node for meeting socially on evenings when no formal events were planned.

The exercise building consisted of two training halls. From one of them the organizers controlled the exercise, while the other hosted one portion of the “training audience” (other parts of the training audience took part at the various remote sites). This was a rather telling name for the officers who received their training. Since the exercise mostly enacted what already had been prepared during the process of planning, these officers sometimes literally appeared as an audience.

The organization of the exercise was straightforward, but involved many people at various units. Small cubicles with desks, telephones, and computers made the hall reminiscent of an open-plan office. “Scenario Control” was located in the center. A large screen showed digital maps over Bogaland with all units marked, and for each day, the personnel at “Scenario Control” produced a list of incidents and events, including both civilian and military features. At “Plans,” located in an adjacent cubicle, a group of officers processed these lists, usually working two days ahead of “scenario time.” With
strict deadlines, they were often busy. Essentially, however, they only processed various pieces of information. “You don’t have to put any thought into this,” as one of the officers put it.

The Headquarters of the Bogaland Forces (BFOR) was an interface between the exercise control and the training audience. The Force Commander Staff accessed the lists of incidents and events and wrote orders to the military units stationed in Bogaland. The training audience received these orders by email, fax, or telephone, and had to continually report back to the Force Commander Staff. Meanwhile, observers from “Scenario Control” supervised the workload at the training units. Depending on how they handled the various situations, “Scenario Control” could either speed up or slow down the so-called game flow. With one of the training sites located at S1, I could thus literally follow how individual events moved through the entire exercise system.

“You Are the Experts”

The “civilian cell,” as it was called, was one of the more spacious cubicles. A Bogaland map sat on one of the walls, and in the middle of the room stood a large table. Participants often gathered here for meetings and to discuss various issues. Each civilian organization also had its own booth, with a desk, a telephone, and a computer. Magnus, the Swedish officer from the Operations group, led meetings in the civilian cell every morning, together with John from the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA). On these occasions, all civilian representatives took part. Typically, Magnus and John went through the exercise agenda for the day and answered any questions that the civilian participants might have; then a more general discussion followed.

In Chapter 2, I described how each organization emphasized a specific set of competencies during the process of planning, and how some participants spoke of the relations among the organizations as competitive. This focus became more explicit during the exercise. On one of the first days, for instance, the civilian representatives took part in a press conference, which was broadcast as part of the scenario to the training audiences at all exercise sites. In a preceding meeting, Niklas from the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) suggested that the organizations should see the press conference as an opportunity to emphasize their own specific perspectives on the situation in Bogaland. All civilian participants were actually expected on various occasions to have a pronounced opinion on various matters—and to share their special knowledge. “You are the experts!” John reminded them during one meeting.

Throughout the exercise, each organization mostly repeated one set of questions. Marianne from Save the Children, for example, explained to me that she and her colleagues obviously focused on children—often by empha-
sizing the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. More specifically, they tried to convey to the training audience an awareness of “separated children,” child soldiers, and sexually abused children. (Despite the controversy during the MPC, described in Chapter 2, Save the Children had finally succeeded to include incidents centered on sexually abused children in the scenario.) The representatives from the Red Cross, in turn, emphasized four themes: “Freedom of movement,” the “Red Cross/Red Crescent Emblem,” “Exchange of Detainees,” and “Displaced Persons.” Yet Emma explained that, as far as possible, they wanted to avoid isolating individual issues, seeking instead to convey a holistic view, as she put it, of the Geneva Conventions.

“The Civilian Exhibition,” which was located in a specifically designated area close to the exercise registration desk, reinforced the impression of the civilians as experts. Here information about all the organizations was displayed and various printed material was available. Occasionally civilian representatives were there to talk about their work and to answer questions. During the planning, the military personnel had presented Viking 03 as an opportunity for civilian organizations to reach out with their messages; and they had really made efforts to create a space where the organizations could inform about themselves and their work. “These kinds of synergy effects,” as one officer put it, “are important to them.” Yet it appeared to me that most military participants in the exercise remained rather uninterested. The exhibition area was shown primarily to visitors as a tangible example of the civil-military focus of Viking 03. Otherwise it mostly remained empty. If the civilian participants, as I argued in Chapter 2, saw themselves as “norm-makers,” the military participants were not always that interested in taking the role as “norm-takers.” A Swiss officer in the training audience told me that one of the advantages with Viking 03, compared to other exercises he had taken part in, was precisely that he could easily avoid the civilian organizations. “It feels great,” he explained, “not having to listen to all that information—all over again.”

Despite all the talk of civil-military cooperation, many civilian participants thus felt that “a military logic” still dominated the entire project—the civilian aspects, as someone said, ultimately amounted to nothing but “the frosting of the cake.” Viking 03 appeared in other words to lack real opportunities for educating the military training audience on civilian issues. Somewhat unexpectedly, perhaps, during a discussion a woman from Save the Children called for a more self-critical approach among the civilian organizations. “In order to improve this situation,” she argued, “we should stop complaining. We need to become more self-critical.” I find her invocation of self-criticism intriguing. It resonates with Marilyn Strathern’s observation that, “When knowledge is pressed into the service of enhancement, the admonition to be explicit turns (self-) description into ground for improvement” (Strathern 2005: 465). This, Strathern claims, explains the
rise of management audit. She goes on to argue that the future, in such contexts, increasingly tends to be forecast as fragile. “Unless the organization strives to improve,” as she puts it, “it will fail to meet its (new) targets.” What makes the future fragile, then, is “not just the chronic ‘uncertainty’ that drives competition, but the need to translate abstract models into working practices, and back again” (Strathern 2005: 465, emphasis in original). Actually, the notion of self-criticism is widespread within the military too. “Ultimately it still comes down to ourselves,” as the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces put it in a discussion of future military tasks. “How do we think? What do we stand for? What is our culture?” (Syrén 2006: 45, my translation).

Within Viking 03 the future was forecast as fragile on at least two levels: “out there” and “in here.” Although future conflicts will occur, no one knows where or how: hence the need for the project. The future is also fragile for the organizations—civilian and military—involved in Viking 03. Thus they constantly need to improve. They need to become better at describing, or framing, not only the world “out there,” but also themselves, which leads to new demands on self-organization: new aims, new targets. Self-criticism, in such efforts, indeed becomes critical. Later in this chapter, I will have reasons to discuss issues of audit and evaluation in more detail (see Part 3).

“Lawless Land”

One way the members of the “training audience” could orient themselves during the exercise was through fictitious newspapers reporting from Bogaland. Apart from conveying scenario information, the idea behind the fictitious media was to incur among these officers an awareness of biased reports during conflicts. Thus the fictitious media was intriguing for several reasons. First, it represented the conflict situation in certain ways. At the outset of the intervention, for instance, one of the newspapers characterized Bogaland as a “lawless land” and emphasized “ethnic clashes” as the main source of the conflict. But the fictitious media also reflected assumptions about foreign news. With little exception, the local press was represented as notoriously biased and unfair, while the international newspaper offered reports that in contrast appeared balanced. With only three magazines—one international and two local dailies—this became almost too obvious, especially since the three newspapers always wrote about exactly the same incidents. When, for instance, the Kasurian Herald carried the headline “Our Hero from the Fighting in Bro,” the Mida Guardian wrote of “The Butcher from the Slaughter in Bro.” After reading such “cultural interpretations” of an incident, the officers in the training audience could consult the International Daily Press for a more credible version of what actually had happened.
In other words, the fictitious media exhibited a range of stereotypes not only about ethnic conflicts but also about “the local” and “the international.” It reinforced what the participants had learned from reading the scenario documents. Since the situation in Bogaland hardly made sense, the only attainable strategy for “building peace” seemed to be to give up any attempts to understand the local conflict, and to identify instead with “the international”—and focus on the peace process.

“For Sweden—With the Times”

On the first evening of the exercise, the participants gathered in the large conscripts’ section of the S1 restaurant for a “Host Nation Dinner.” Tablecloths and candles helped to metamorphose what was normally a rather unpleasant canteen. Undoubtedly the conscripts would have found the food too remarkably improved. The meal was advertised as “typically Swedish.” Yet apart from the glögg aperitif—a Swedish variety of mulled wine—the three-course menu with salmon as starter, a steak entrée, and apple pie for dessert must have appeared immensely customary to most international participants.

Still, the Viking 03 organizers took seriously the attempt to emphasize various facets of the exercise as characteristically Swedish (cf. Chapter 3). One example was the “weekend program,” which the organizers had arranged for the foreign participants who stayed at S1 over the weekend break, and which included visits to museums and other tourist attractions. Another example was the “Christmas dinner”—presented as “a typical Swedish smorgasbord”—which was organized on the last day of the exercise.

Perhaps the most intriguing of these attempts to exhibit “Swedish-ness,” however, was the much-anticipated royal visit. The more conservatively inclined Swedish officers—and there were quite a few of them—were surely excited when the king of Sweden, Carl XVI Gustaf, visited the exercise together with the Crown Princess Victoria. The king, who holds the highest military ranks in the Army, the Navy, and in the Air Force, is a prominent symbolic figure indeed within the Swedish Armed Forces. And since issues “surrounding crisis and conflict management—including the international peace-building work of the United Nations—are of particular interest to The Crown Princess,” as the Royal Court’s website has it, father and daughter thus appeared to complement one another remarkably well in the civil-military context of Viking 03.125

Together with four or five other Viking 03 representatives, the Exercise Director and his deputy—Tony Stigsson and Peter Schneider—guided the king and the princess around the exercise premises. I was having coffee in

125 Quoted from the Royal Court’s website at http://www.royalcourt.se/royalcourt/theroyalfamily/hrhcrownprincessvictoria/royalengagements.4.396160511584257f2180002525.html (accessed August 17, 2008).
the busy area outside the exercise halls when suddenly an officer appeared in a doorway and ordered everyone to immediately stand up—“The King is approaching!” The organizers had instructed all participants in advance on how to behave in the presence of the royal visitors and on the correct way of addressing them. And many had indeed prepared for the visit; some civilians, for example, had even dressed smartly especially for the occasion.

As we saw in Chapter 1, the strong relationship between the king and the military has a lengthy history in Sweden; and the royal visit certainly provided Viking 03 with an aura of tradition and continuity. However, the royal visit was more than merely a ceremonial performance of something traditionally Swedish. It was also an opportunity for the Viking 03 organizers to show the “new military” to the king and the princess. King Carl XVI Gustaf’s motto, “For Sweden—with the times,” actually is fitting in this context. In fact, the visit appeared as a striking symbol for how tradition and change, the old and the new, the national and the international, and the military and the civilian, merge in particular ways.

The International

The row of flags outside the exercise building served as a reminder of the international design of the project. “What we’re trying to achieve,” as the Viking 03 Deputy Exercise Director, Peter Schneider, told me, “is an international community that tries to work together.” The important thing, he claimed, is that each participant is doing a good job. “Whether he’s from this or that country doesn’t matter.” In some sense, this aim within Viking 03 to “promote multinationality” appeared as an attempt at top-down cosmopolitanism.126 Significantly, however, the quote from Schneider also illustrates the emphasis within the project on “getting the work done,” which resonates with the tension between “ideological involvement” and “pragmatic distance” that characterized the organizational logic of Viking 03 (see Chapter 2).

Actually, the international and cosmopolitan orientation of Viking 03 constituted in practice a rather flexible framework that allowed various things to be played out. What Eyal Ben-Ari and Efrat Elron (2001) have

---

126 “Especially during the past fifteen years or so,” as Hannerz observes, “ideas of the cosmopolitan have seen an upswing in many contexts, and not least in academic scholarship. This has been noticeable in a range of disciplines: anthropology, sociology, philosophy, political science, international relations… The reasons are not so difficult to find. The general increase in diverse kinds of global interconnectedness invests it with new relevance. In particular, the end of the Cold War, with its great divide running through the world, seemed to make it possible to think anew, on both large and small scales, about the unity and diversity of humanity, about cosmopolis, and about global citizenship and responsibility” (Hannerz 2005: 195). Among the many recent publications on various facets of cosmopolitanism, see especially Appiah (2006), Archibugi (2003), Beck (1999), Breckenridge et al. (2000), Calhoun (2003), Hannerz (2004a), and Vertovec and Cohen (2002a).
argued about multinational UN operations—that far from being unequivocal growth points for cosmopolitanism, they also tend to reinforce a nation-state logic—thus seemed true also for Viking 03. Recall, for instance, the conversation that I referred to in Chapter 2 among a group of Swedish officers about the international military presence in Kosovo. Or, indeed, the fact that Viking 03 was incessantly presented as a distinctly “Swedish” effort. Thus conflict preventionism appears to be a form within which various interests—including nationalism—might be expressed in a cosmopolitan language (cf. Vertovec and Cohen 2002b: 11).

The international focus, however, was of particular importance in the project. All presentations of Viking 03, for instance, emphasized that it was a multinational exercise with sites in seven countries. While according to the scenario all these units were located in Bogaland, no remote site seemed in practice to make an effort to give this impression. Instead, by displaying their own national flags in the background during videoconferences etc., they deliberately drew attention instead to the country where the site was actually located. Thus, when participants at S1 in Enköping spoke with people at the site in Ireland, for instance, it did not appear as a dialogue between military units in Bogaland, but was clearly a discussion between Sweden and Ireland. And I certainly never heard anyone saying that Michael from the ICRC, who during the exercise went to the remote site in Constanta, was in Bogaland. Even in conversations about specific scenario events the participants kept referring instead to the real countries: “Michael is in Romania.”

Likewise, when the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces claimed during one Viking 03 appearance to be impressed by “the realism provided through the computer screens,” he did not only have the fictitious Bogaland scenario in mind. In fact, he referred also to the “international community.”

The sense of realism provided through the monitors and video-screens around us here no doubt has been greatly enhanced by [the] fact, that today we are part of a networked and video-presented real world. Computer-assisted exercises today indeed are parts of a computer-assisted real world.127

During the exercise, people actually invoked notions of the international community in two different ways. In his closing remarks on the last day of Viking 03, for instance, Major General Thomas Matthews thanked the participants for what they “had done and continue to do for the benefits of the world community.”128 Here the world community appears as the background

127 General Johan Hederstedt was Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces at the time. His speech is available online at http://www.mil.se/viking03/attachments/viking03scspeech.pdf (accessed August 5, 2008).
128 Matthews’s speech is available online at http://www.mil.se/viking03/attachments/matthewclosingspeech.pdf (accessed August 5, 2008).
to Viking 03. When Leni Björklund, then the Swedish Minister of Defense, visited the exercise, however, she emphasized instead the “multinational cooperation” of the exercise itself.

If we look at it from an international, security-policy level, it is very important that people from different nations come together to meet and discuss common problems and procedures, hereby getting to know each other and develop an understanding that each situation can be approached from different directions. These directions can come from different national views and customs. They can also come from civilians and the military looking on a situation differently. But no one can solve the situations reflected in this exercise alone, be it a country, an organization, civilian or military. We must do it together.\footnote{Björklund’s speech, which she gave at the Viking 03 Distinguished Visitors Day luncheon, on December 9, 2003, is available online at http://www.mil.se/viking03/attachments/modspeech.pdf (accessed August 5, 2008).}

Björklund’s speech—together with the Deputy Exercise Director’s claim that Viking 03 sought to instigate “an international community that tries to work together,” and Tony Stigsson’s metaphorical use of “family” during the opening ceremony—illustrates how the project was presented not only as an effort for the international community but also as a representation of the international community. Thus it seems that Viking 03 in some sense symbolizes how the international community ceremonially worshipped itself.

II. Processualization

A press conference was organized on one of the last days of the exercise to answer questions about the mission in Bogaland. Had the intervening forces eventually caught the local warlord? Was it true, as rumors had it, that a large mass grave had been found? And what would constitute the general way ahead for the international mission, as winter now rapidly and irrevocably altered the humanitarian situation in the region? Everyone was there: the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General (SRSG); the military officer in command of the Bogaland Forces; a spokesperson from the United Nations Civil Police Force; and representatives from most international organizations and NGOs.

The SRSG opened the press conference with a brief overview of the current situation. “The rule of law,” he announced, “has returned to Bogaland.” He reported that criminal courts had been set up; that the UN Police force had successfully assumed responsibility for domestic law and order; and that the United Nations Mission in Bogaland (UNMIB) would continue its important work. In order to improve the humanitarian situation, they had for
instance launched a “winterization program.” Also, he revealed that the intervening forces had taught warlords and paramilitary groups throughout Bogaland what happens to those who try to stand in the way of the peace process. Satisfied with what had been achieved thus far, he finished by expressing gratitude to the international community.

The military officer in command confirmed that the overall situation in Bogaland had indeed been stabilized. Land mines, he admitted, still posed a great risk. Yet he was convinced that UNMIB—who made “use of every means available” and remained “dedicated to their tasks”—would ultimately succeed. After a few remarks from the civilian representatives, the SRSG concluded the event by stating that peace in Bogaland constituted a prerequisite for creating peace worldwide.

This press conference captures among other things a focus on the peace process, which implies a shift from the past to the future, and from content to form. In what follows, I explore this shift in more detail.

Moving On

When the scenario documents labeled a set of conditions in Bogaland a “conflict,” especially after the UN declared it a threat to international peace and security, all specific details became in some sense irrelevant. To name a thing, according to Merleau-Ponty, “is to tear oneself away from its individual and unique characteristics to see it as representative of an essence or a category” (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 204). In other words, to fully comprehend this specific conflict would be unnecessary: Bogaland exemplified a certain category. What was now critically at stake was how to respond correctly to this kind of situation. Thus interpreted, the fictitious conflict helped to produce an obligation to act. Bogaland, that is, motivated a particular response.

Indeed, the focus within Viking 03, as I suggested in Chapter 3, was not so much on conflicts and their causes, as on responses and the way ahead. To understand how Bogaland relates to reality, it is useful to recall Hayden White’s distinction between a historical discourse that narrates and a discourse that narrativizes. A discourse that narrates, he writes, “openly adopts a perspective that looks out on the world and reports it,” while a discourse that narrativizes in contrast “feigns to make the world speak itself and speak itself as a story” (White 1987: 2). Bogaland functioned as a technology for feigning. Yet it was not the conflict in Bogaland that came to life—the scenario did certainly not appear as a coherent model of a conflict. Instead, Bogaland narrativized the world: it helped making real conflicts “tell-a-story-aboutable” (Garfinkel 1999: 33) in particular ways, which, in turn, imposed directionality on international responses.

Arguably, this relationship between the motivating and the motivated is reciprocal rather than causal. To say that an act is motivated, as Merleau-Ponty (2002: 301-2) points out, means that it has its origin in certain facts
that provide the reasons for deciding to act. But the decision to intervene in Bogaland also affirmed the validity of the conflict as a motive. Motive and decision, in other words, constitute two elements of the same situation: “the former is the situation as a fact, the second the situation undertaken,” as Merleau-Ponty (2002: 302) phrases it. Thus, the conflict in Bogaland was a fact that motivated a military intervention, and the decision to intervene implied not only that the situation was acted upon, but it also validated the motive. An alleged motive, then, “does not burden my decision; on the contrary my decision lends the motive its force” (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 505).

Current Situation

An exercise document called “Current Situation” was meant to complement the documents on the history of Bogaland and the background to the conflict. It illustrates several facets of the shift from conflict to peace process. According to scenario time, the exercise commenced seventeen days after the deployment of the international mission. Most of the Bogaland Armed Forces remained at that time divided into two factions positioned close to the ceasefire line, apparently in compliance with the peace agreement. But the violence nevertheless continued. “The armed forces of both sides,” the document reports, “have committed serious violations against civilians including rape, torture and looting.” Also, it writes about massacres and abductions of civilian people: more than a hundred people were thought to have been “extra-judicially executed by local police or deliberately and arbitrarily killed by paramilitary groups.” In addition, the document lists cases of terrorism, armed rebellion, and the recruitment of child soldiers.

The situation in Bogaland thus remained chaotic. The document provides us with specific reasons for this.

Not all participants of the civil war welcomed the cease-fire. For a number of people on both sides, the war was an excellent excuse to further private agendas of nationalism and religious fundamentalism. When the war ended, these individuals soon began forming their own sub-units and groups. Several of these groups were disbanded or broken up by the military authorities. This caused some of the larger groups to leave their former military units and form paramilitary units. Currently there are three major paramilitary groups, two Midan and one Kasurian. The Kasurian group is approximately equal to a reinforced rifle company in strength, while both Midan groups are equal to an under-strength rifle company. None of the groups seem to operate with all of their personnel in one place at the same time.

While the document notes that “political/nationalistic/religious driving forces”—emphasized in the previous scenario documents as integral to the conflict (see Chapter 3)—remain critical, it also identifies new “motive powers,” which now seem more important.
Since their forming after the cease-fire, the paramilitary groups have begun to engage in more criminal activities. This has now become somewhat of an “ordinary daily lifestyle” to them.

Paramilitary groups and their leaders, we are told, have in fact begun to systematically split the criminal market in Bogaland. A Kasurian warlord leads a criminal network called “Kasuria Rednecks,” specializing in drugs; in West Mida, the “Mida Rebellion Movement” centers in turn on trafficking, while a third group—“East Mida Rebellion Force”—is into contraband. Their leaders have “a ‘Gentlemen’s agreement’ to stay out of each other’s ‘territory,’” as the document phrases it.

In other words, violence in Bogaland has become thoroughly criminalized and politicized—“directed” by warlords who take advantage of the chaotic situation. Indeed, by spreading false rumors about the military intervention, these leaders also deliberately seek to obstruct the peace process.

### Processing Peace

Arguably, the deployment of the international intervention could be seen as a narrative closure to the Bogaland conflict. According to White, a narrative closure signals “the passage from one moral order to another.” “I cannot think of any other way of ‘concluding’ an account of real events,” he writes,

> for we cannot say, surely, that any sequence of real events actually comes to an end, that reality itself disappears, that events of the order of the real have ceased to happen. Such events could only seem to have ceased to happen when meaning is shifted, and shifted by narrative means, from one physical or social space to another. […] Where, in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that morality or a moralizing impulse is present too. There is no other way that reality can be endowed with the kind of meaning that both displays itself in its consummation and withholds itself by its displacement to another story “waiting to be told” just beyond the confines of “the end.” (White 1987: 23-4)

In Bogaland, another story indeed waits to be told beyond the end of the conflict—that of the peace process. And as Martin Shaw has noted, so-called “peace enforcement phases” are often represented as radically different from war, typically also in cases where more soldiers and civilians are killed during this phase than in the actual war (Shaw 2005: 77). With the deployment of the intervention, then, emerges a new moral frame for interpreting the violence in Bogaland: it is now regarded primarily as interruptions of the peace process. Indeed, “warlords” and other leaders of “criminal violence” become legitimate targets of military force precisely because they “obstruct the peace”—recall, for instance, the SRSG’s words during the press conference. Laura Nader has noted how an entirely new vocabulary has in fact
emerged for responding to such “obstructions.” She points out that the US Naval War College, for example, has developed

a variety of strategies [in peace operations] to move “obstructionist leaders” toward cooperation. Obstructionist leaders are warlords or strongmen: “high-level indigenous leaders in civil conflicts who are bent on obstructing international effort to deliver humanitarian aid and advance peace.” (Nader 2002: 123)130

Significantly, the past thereby becomes increasingly irrelevant for interpreting, and acting, in the present. Instead, the current situation becomes framed mostly in relation to the future. In a discussion about conflicts, such as the war on the Balkans, Robert Cooper claims that

the best hope of a solution lies not just in trying to solve the quarrels between individual communities, but at the same time in placing all of these communities within a wider European context, encouraging a broader view of identity through membership of European and Atlantic institutions. (Cooper 2004: 147)

In order to win the peace, it seems, the conflict must literally be left behind. War itself thus appears as the main adversary.131 A recent information leaflet from the Swedish Armed Forces exemplifies this when it states that “all countries must work together in order to prevent all kinds of threats toward peace and security in the world” (Försvarsmakten 2005: 10, my translation). Carolyn Nordstrom’s book on the civil war in Mozambique, A Different Kind of War Story (1997), consti- tutes another example. She argues that peace in Mozambique became possible through a “bottom-up” peace process that united local people in a common attempt to stop the violence. Nordstrom emphasizes their strategy to oppose the war itself, while refusing to take sides in it, as the key to success.

In order to succeed in peace support operations, then, it seems important not only to engage various actors in multinational efforts, nor to “move obstructionist leaders toward cooperation,” but also to find local people, like those in Nordstrom’s book, who oppose the conflict. Mary Kaldor (2001: 119-37) calls this strategy for managing conflicts “cosmopolitan law enforcement.” It is always possible, she claims, to identify local advocates of cosmopolitanism: “people and places which refuse to accept the politics of war—’islands of civility’” (ibid.: 120). According to Kaldor, the key to suc-

131 Here Carl Schmitt’s ominous “war against war” inevitably comes to mind. According to Schmitt, a war against war “is necessarily unusually intense and inhuman because, by transcending the limits of the political framework, it simultaneously degrades the enemy into moral and other categories and is forced to make of him a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed. In other words, he is an enemy who no longer must be compelled to retreat into his borders only” (Schmitt 1996 [1932]: 36).
cess is to consult such people and treat them as partners (see also Kaldor 2002).

While Nordstrom speaks of a bottom-up process where people oppose violence through local cultural strategies, Kaldor’s focus is in contrast decidedly top-down. Significantly, however, both conceptualize responses to violence in terms of a process in which various actors have to collaborate and move in a particular direction—not only the civilian and military personnel of the intervention, but also members of the local population. Some commentators continue to criticize “interventionism” for sustaining a simplified dichotomy between the “local” and the “international” (see, e.g., Chandler 2002; Orford 2003). But rather than being treated as passive victims in need of international help, people in war-torn societies are thus increasingly expected to “take part in the peace process.”

In their article on “biological citizenship,” Nikolas Rose and Carlos Navas (2005) note a similar kind of development, but in a different context. Ill people, they argue, tend increasingly to engage actively in the production of knowledge of their illness—through reading, using the Internet, and communicating with other patients. Such engagements create a common language and a common cultural repertoire of hopes, fears, etc. If there is any consensus here, it seems to involve form rather than content. Arguably this is true also for conflict preventionism. Thus it is illuminating, I think, to conceptualize the emergence of both “biological citizenship” and of conflict preventionism in terms of directionality.

This brief comparison also illustrates how various areas tend increasingly to converge on the use of particular organizational forms, which again suggest a relationship to broader processes of neoliberalization (cf. Chapter 2).

**Beginning**

In the history of Bogaland, we saw a gradual shift from ethnicity, religiosity, and territorality, toward “warlordism” and illicit politics as causes of the conflict. The international intervention completed this shift. Yet rather than confirming a precise model for comprehending conflicts, the enactment of the Bogaland intervention functioned as a narrative closure to the scenario. This closure enabled the beginning of the peace processes, which made it possible for various actors to engage with the world in specific ways. I find Edward Said’s work on beginnings in literature useful for exploring this further. A point of departure, according to Said, has two aspects that animate one another.

One leads to the project being realized: this is the [temporal and] transitive aspect of the beginning—that is, beginning with (or for) an anticipated end, or at least expected continuity. The other aspect retains for the beginning its identity as radical starting point: the intransitive and conceptual aspect, that
which has no object but its own constant clarification. [...] These two sides of the starting point entail two styles of thought, and of imagination, one projective and descriptive, the other tautological and endlessly self-mimetic. The transitive mode is always hungering, like Lovelace perpetually chasing Clarissa, for an object it can never fully catch up with either in space or time. The intransitive, like Clarissa herself, can never have enough of itself—in short, expansion and concentration, or words in language, and the Word. (Said 1975: 72-3)\textsuperscript{132}

Viking 03 could be characterized as a conflict preventionist beginning (but not as the beginning of conflict preventionism). The \textit{transitive} aspect of the project is a quest “for peace and security.” This is related to a style of thought that is projective and descriptive. While it always strives toward peace, it can never, in a way reminiscent of Kant’s claim in \textit{Toward Perpetual Peace} (2006 [1795]), catch up with it. The \textit{intransitive} aspect of Viking 03 points instead toward the project itself as a form of constant clarification of its own technologies, procedures, and planning. It is both tautological—tellingly, the aim of the exercise was “to enhance multinational interoperability by providing a training environment that makes it possible for the involved military units and all participating organizations to achieve their objectives”\textsuperscript{133}—and self-mimetic. On one level, the aim of Viking 03, as we shall see, was to enable another Viking project. This helps us see an intriguing congruence between the world “out there” and the organization “in here.”

When Viking 03 participants intervened in Bogaland, they confirmed both an oriented “out-there-ness” and a certain directionality for acting in the world. At this and later points, reflection increasingly became oriented toward their own actions. How could civil-military cooperation be improved? How could Viking be improved? In fact, the Bogaland scenario created an infrastructure also for the enactment of processes of evaluation and auditing.

III. Evaluation

The Merging of Audit and Policy

During the exercise, I received permission to participate as an observer within the exercise evaluation group (EXEVAL). On one of the first days of the exercise, the EXEVAL team gathered to discuss the writing of the final Viking 03 evaluation report. Peter Schneider, the Deputy Exercise Director,

\textsuperscript{132} Said refers here to Clarissa and Lovelace, the two main characters in Samuel Richardson’s novel \textit{Clarissa or The History of a Young Lady}, which was first published in 1748 (see, e.g., Olsson and Algulin 1993b: 259-60).

\textsuperscript{133} See www.mil.se (accessed December 19, 2007).
opened the meeting by asking rhetorically why the report should be written, and to whom it ought to be addressed. In the discussion that followed, the meeting participants identified two main categories of readers. Obviously, the planners of the next Viking exercise would be interested in learning from the 2003 project. Yet they were considered to be of secondary importance. Instead, the EXEVAL group decided to address the report primarily to the Swedish Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. The participants reasoned that unless these politicians became convinced that the 2003 exercise had been a success, there would not be another Viking project.

Schneider stressed that the people who were to do the actual writing must be instructed on what to include, what aspects to emphasize, and what to leave out of the final text. Ideally, the report should reflect the general Swedish foreign policy, and stress for instance that Viking 03 was a joint body of work between government actors and international actors. The report would also include appendixes with comments from all participating organizations, and EXEVAL could not influence the content of these sections. Schneider, however, did not seem too bothered about this. The introduction, he concluded, mattered most. When this strategy was established, the exercise itself had only begun. In practice, the form and content of the evaluation thus emerged simultaneously with, or even preceded, the object of evaluation.

It appeared to me as if the reason for writing the EXEVAL report, and for conducting the entire evaluation, was to promote another Viking project. Indeed, at the Viking 03 Closing Ceremony, the head of EXEVAL presented a First Impression Report, which stated that the “overall impression” was that Viking 03 had “been executed successfully,” and that “it is the preliminary recommendation of the EXEVAL that there should be a Viking 05.” On the face of it, policy and audit might sound like opposite ends of a process. As the EXEVAL example shows, however, the distance between them is illusory (cf. Strathern 2000b: 282). In other words, the military has learned how to work with contemporary forms of neoliberal organizational techniques—and to deploy them in such a way as to achieve particular goals.

Evaluation

After the exercise, two workshops—one civilian and one military—evaluated the Viking 03 project. The Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) organized the civilian meeting in January 2004. Apart from representatives from the civilian organizations, Thomas and Magnus from the OPS-group also took part in this two-day meeting. John from SEMA presented the workshop as an opportunity for the civilian participants to “make their voices heard.” Ultimately, the aim was to suggest improvements for future exercises, and to develop the Viking exercise concept.
Throughout the afternoon, then, the participants discussed the exercise.\textsuperscript{134} Despite Viking 03’s policy of transparency, representatives from several organizations had felt that it was difficult to get an overview of what happened in the scenario during the exercise. “We found it hard to get a full picture,” as one woman from Save the Children put it. “We thought the technology took too much space. It was more of an annoyance than of help—but maybe it’s because we are not so technical…” Some participants claimed that, actually, the technological focus also made collaborative work difficult, and pointed out how rather than taking part in real civil-military cooperation, everyone had been stuck in front of a computer.

Most of the subsequent discussion focused on civil-military cooperation. The participants agreed that the military “training audience” had been interested in the civilian parts of the exercise, but thought that their will to cooperate and comply with the wishes of the civilian organizations had been somewhat exaggerated. “In the different incidents,” as one man from the Red Cross put it, “we always got exactly what we wanted, which perhaps did not mirror a real situation, where [for the military personnel] there are also other concerns to be taken into consideration.”

The common project vocabulary, exemplified by the CIMIC concept, had made interaction easy during the exercise. But it had also veiled disagreements that did not surface until later. One example concerned the CIMIC concept itself. Several civilian participants were disappointed about the way the CIMIC concept had been used during Viking 03. CIMIC is a NATO term that describes situations where military personnel work with civilians to fulfill military tasks, but Bengt from SweFOR pointed out that “during the exercise, a transformation of the concept took place, so that it seemed as if the civilian organizations were a part of CIMIC. We are not.” A representative from the Red Cross added that within this organization, members had decided not to use CIMIC at all. “We speak of civil-military cooperation, and by that we mean something completely different [from the military]; and I think that this is an important distinction to make. On whose terms are we cooperating?”

Although a number of problems were identified in these discussions, it is worth noting that no one at the civilian workshop questioned the Viking 03 project per se, or the idea that civilian actors such as Amnesty International should work with the military. Instead, most critique concerned organizational details and all critical remarks ultimately led to suggestions for improving future civil-military exercises.

Criticism on a more profound level was rare and tended to be misinterpreted as an attack not only on Viking 03, but on its alleged aims as well. This became obvious when I participated in the military “Post Exercise Di-

\textsuperscript{134} Only participants from Sweden took part in this workshop, and all conversations were held in Swedish. The English translations of the quotes that follow in this section are mine.
cussion” two weeks later. On the first morning, when I had coffee with two Swedish officers, one of them described the exercise as “nothing short of a success.” Apparently, the NATO observers had been extremely pleased with the exercise performance. “People are talking about Viking all over Europe right now,” he claimed. When I asked if they knew of any negative reactions, the officers told me about a military unit at one of the remote sites that had disapproved of “almost everything.” But they assured me that this did not matter as long as NATO remained satisfied. Also, they mentioned that members from SweFOR had been critical. These participants, however, were offhandedly dismissed as “not understanding what Viking is about.” Finally, almost as a joke, they mentioned a Danish officer who had been dismissive of the entire Viking 03 project in his critique and had refused to call the exercise a success. He has “lost it completely” one of the officers sighed. “Nobody understands what he’s doing.”

Apart from constructive criticism aimed at developing the exercise concept, those who were critical toward Viking 03 were sometimes rejected as not having understood what the project was about, to miss the point, or, as in the example above, even accused of being irrational. Audit culture, as Cris Shore and Susan Wright point out, thus indeed relies both on hierarchical relationships and on coercive practices: “challenging the terms or reference is not an option” (Shore and Wright 2000: 62).

Authorization

The things performed or enacted during the exercise—civilian expertise, the Bogaland conflict, “Swedish-ness,” and the “international”—comprised a background against which conflict preventionism could emerge. Ultimately the Viking 03 project helped to reinforce an emergent directionality for engaging with the world. Meanwhile, the process of evaluation structured critique in certain ways. It appeared that the organizational form of Viking 03 had itself a direction. Arguably, Viking 03 constituted a conflict preventionist beginning that authorized a particular form of engagement. I want to recall here Said’s elaboration on the relationship between beginning and authorization.

Let us then formulate this general definition for any beginning that involves reversal, change of direction, the institution of a durable movement that increasingly engages our interest: such a beginning authorizes; it constitutes an authorization for what follows from it. (Said 1975: 34, emphasis in original)

Understood as a conflict preventionist beginning, Viking 03 authorized what followed from it. The intervention in Bogaland authorized both the prior

135 We had this conversation in Swedish. The translations are mine.
situation as a motive for an intervention, and the decision to act as a justified response. It thus authorized a particular framing of contemporary violent conflicts. Meanwhile, the beginning of audit and evaluation authorized instead the continuation of preventive work: that is, a new Viking exercise. This implied a shift from criticizing the 2003 project toward improving ideas for the next project—in other words, an orientation toward the future.

Through the authorization of a conflict preventionist directionality, then, security, humanitarianism, and neoliberalism truly merge.
5. Temporality: Fiction, Action, Ethics

Fictions are for finding things out, and they change as the needs of sense-making change. Myths are the agents of stability, fictions the agents of change.

– Frank Kermode

One morning in March 2006, I woke up to the sound of persistent gunfire. Through the window of my Stockholm apartment, I could see that military troops at a heavily guarded roadblock had stopped all civilian traffic, while tanks and other army vehicles advanced up the local street. In Sweden this is a conspicuously unusual sight. When I went outside to find out what the military were doing in the middle of the city, one soldier told me that the Army was engaged in a scenario-based exercise centered on their new interventionist tasks. “Actually,” he explained, “this is not Stockholm; this entire part of the city has been transformed into a place called Bogaland.” This event coincided with the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Swedish Anthropological Association (SANT). That year the meetings were in Stockholm, and I was supposed to present a paper on Viking 03. I decided to skip several other panels, however, so I could hang out for a while in Bogaland. After all, it is a rather uncommon experience to find one’s field enacted literally at home (see figures 5 and 6).

“Combined Challenge” involved six thousand conscript soldiers. The media coverage was massive, and included such headlines as “THE ARMY EXERCISES FOR PEACE,” “THE MILITARY TOOK OVER THE CITY,” “KUNGSHOLMEN BECOMES A WAR ZONE,” and “TANKS WILL KEEP THE PEACE.” Naturally, the tanks, the soldiers, and the gunfire attracted a lot of attention. I was certainly not the only one in the neighborhood that morning who went outside to see what was going on. As some of the newspaper headlines suggested, however, the exercise also mixed these conventional military features with something new. The fictitious Bogaland scenario captured how the orientation toward international engagements has come to include more than

---


military tasks. “To practice to negotiate,” as the exercise leader Svante Borg explained, was for instance “one of the most important objectives of the exercise. The whole [Bogaland] scenario,” he continued,

aims to prepare the soldiers for international tasks. It is easy for the conscripts to resort to firepower during the takeover of an area. But in order to save civilian lives, and to minimize casualties among themselves, the soldiers must behave as a peace force. (Quoted in Wrangberth 2006: 27, my translation)

[Photo of a tank with a red sign: WARNING MILITARY EXERCISE]

Figure 5. “Caution, Military Exercise,” Stockholm, March 2006. Photo by Mattias Viktorin.

Actually this was not the first time that Bogaland appeared outside the context of Viking. Thus if Bogaland is not exactly an expansionist state, one might say that it is an expansionist state of mind, or alternatively a migratory figure of thought. In 2005, for instance, Peace Team Forum (PTF), a Swedish-based organization comprising some fifty humanitarian NGOs, had remediated Bogaland for a civilian scenario-based exercise. The PTF event was an explicit critique of Viking’s focus. And it shows how a critical response, too, in order to be efficient, must work with, rather than within or merely against, contemporary organizational forms. In other words, the military “Combined Challenge” and the civilian PTF event were more than further illustrations of how security and humanitarianism are transforming. Together with Viking 03, they also exemplify the expansion of a timely or-
organizational form: the scenario-based exercise. Scenario planning is by no means limited to the intersection of security and humanitarianism. In an era of neoliberalization, it is increasingly becoming big business in various contexts.

In this chapter, I seek to place my study of Viking 03 and the emergence of conflict preventionism within a larger context. By discussing the 2005 PTF event as a critical response to Viking, I show how “fiction” currently is emerging as a versatile organizational technique. Thus I do not approach the Bogaland scenario of PTF as a story that the participants told themselves about themselves in order to create meaning (cf. Geertz 1999 [1973]: 448), but as a form for gathering focus and for setting things into motion (cf. Chapters 2 and 3). By way of conclusion, I portray in relation to the question of ethics key facets of the form of action that conflict preventionism enables.

**Ignorance, Uncertainty, Power**

Fiction constitutes a timely form that offers unique possibilities for engaging with the emergent, and for organizing directionality. “The word ‘fiction’ is derived from the Latin fictio, which can mean ‘making,’ ‘feigning,’ or ‘lies’” (Toker 2000: 124). Here I focus on the first of these meanings: making. I explore how the PTF project in 2005 remediated Bogaland in an attempt to
impose a direction on interventions in foreign conflicts that deviated from that which appeared through Viking 03.

Before I go on to discuss the PTF event, however, I want to return briefly to the debate on the relationship between anthropology and the military mentioned in the Introduction. Steve Fondacaro, military officer and head of the US Department of Defense’s recently established program on “Cultural Operational Research Human Terrain System,” has argued the following:

If you’re a scientist worth your salt, and you object … to the way military operations and military thinking ruined the quality of life for the indigenous people we deal with … then the approach to solving that problem in my view is engagement and education. It’s not isolation […]. It’s not because we’re evil people, it’s because we’re stupid. And the cure for stupidity is education. And who’s going to do that education if it isn’t you, a cultural anthropologist? (Quoted in Stannard 2007: 15, emphasis added)

Fondacaro’s invocation of stupidity is essential. It exemplifies what Eve Sedgwick (1990: 4-8) in a different context has called “ignorance as power.” Indeed, the current communication of ignorance—or stupidity—seems to enable the military as an organization to take action and to legitimize it in specific ways.

In his Observations on Modernity, Luhmann (1998: 91) notes how the “communication of ignorance” in fact “relieves authority.” Arguably, by communicating ignorance the military receive possible advantages over other actors. As Viking 03 exemplified, many NGOs seek opportunities, as Fondacaro put it, to educate the military. Representatives from civilian organizations who did take part in Viking 03 thus found themselves in a situation where they were expected to communicate knowledge. “You are the experts,” as the officers recurrently told them. Yet, this proved to be a rather detrimental position. “Whoever communicates knowledge,” as Luhmann writes, “absorbs uncertainty and must consequently take responsibility for the truth or untruth of his knowledge. Whoever communicates ignorance is excused” (ibid.: 91). Indeed, the NGO representatives in Viking 03 tended to assume responsibility for what they saw as problematic in the project—often, as I discussed in Chapter 4, in the form of self-critique.

Luhmann’s observations—epitomized by his claim, which I quoted in the Introduction, that contemporary society “has lost faith in the correctness of its self description”—allow us, I think, to place the forms of civil-military relations that Viking 03 exemplified within a broader context. Not only in relation to processes of neoliberalization and audit procedures, as I have argued in previous chapters, but also in relation to what Hannah Arendt has called a modern loss of certainty. “What was lost in the modern age,” she writes, “was not the capacity for truth or reality or faith nor the concomitant inevitable acceptance of the testimony of the senses and of reason, but the

In a context where uncertainty in Arendt’s sense is widespread, it becomes problematic, if one wants to get certain kinds of work done, to make knowledge claims and express too much certainty—that is, to assume the position of a “Defoe figure” (see the Introduction). Individual actors might of course continue to feel complacently sure of themselves. What I am concerned with here, however, are the forms through which action becomes possible now. Luhmann mentions for instance how today we can speak of the future only in terms of the probable or the improbable; that is, in terms of a “fictively secured” reality, as he phrases it—reality duplicated by fictions.

We know that future presents will bring other things than the present future can express, and when we speak of the future we express this discrepancy by dealing only with probabilities or improbabilities. Those who claim certainty subject themselves to deconstruction and can expect support only from the faithful. (Luhmann 1998: 95)

The communication of ignorance, then, is enabling. One particular set of practical knowledges, however, nevertheless seems crucial: the organizational logic that permeated Viking 03 (see Chapter 2). The project illustrates how conflict preventionism indeed makes various things work in new ways. For instance, with its focus on cooperation and partnerships, Viking 03 seemed, as I argued in Chapter 3, to exhibit a novel “hospitality of critique”: the project organizers, as Peter Schneider explained, even sought to involve participants who were critical toward the military. Yet, as I have shown in other chapters, participants who did criticize various facets of the project were in practice often dismissed as not having understood what Viking 03 was about. Attempts to convey critique through conventional forms—such as Bengt’s denunciation of the Bogaland scenario as unrealistic: a “dream world” rather than a “real world,” as he put it (see Chapter 2)—were regarded by most other participants merely as untoward interruptions. Somehow such critique appeared to miss the point. Those participants who did not learn how to master the organizational logic of Viking 03, then, seemed ignorant in a way that made them decidedly powerless. “That guy,” as one officer said about Bengt, “just doesn’t get it.”

The PTF project, in contrast, succeeded in giving form to the kind of critique that mostly failed to appear during Viking 03. Arguably, one of the reasons for this was that it engaged with fiction as an organizational tech-

138 To some extent, Arendt’s claim also resonates with Christopher Coker’s recent discussion on irony in his book *Humane Warfare*. “Our age,” writes Coker, “is marked by a pervasive inability to take our own presuppositions seriously, and thus to be always at some ironic distance from ourselves. Nothing is more characteristic of the present mood then [sic] the ironic, detached self-consciousness that not only the public but many soldiers too now have of contemporary warfare and their own profession” (Coker 2001: 42).
nique. Fiction has in fact emerged as a decidedly timely and versatile response to a context of uncertainty where authority and the communication of expert knowledge have become problematic. In Chapter 3, I discussed in detail how the production of the fictitious Bogaland scenario enabled participants to engage with the emergent and to initiate remedial work. In what follows, I show how the PTF project, through the deployment of similar techniques, sought to criticize Viking.

Responding To and Through Fictions

In April 2005, Bogaland reappeared in a remediated form during a scenario-based exercise organized by the Peace Team Forum in cooperation with the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA). The PTF network of NGOs seeks to provide a forum for the exchange of information on issues relating to human rights, peace, development, and aid. Some twenty organizations participated in the scenario-based 2005 event, which was part of a broader PTF project on the prevention of armed conflicts.139

The PTF exercise aimed to “identify tools and opportunities for cooperation in prevention of armed conflict.” It was an explicit critique of the Viking focus. “Whereas the military exercise will take place when the peace process in this fictional country has failed,” the organizers explained, “the PTF project will attempt to make use of preventive measures at a much earlier stage in an attempt to avoid such conflict.” Thus the project presented two contrasting versions of Bogaland.

In December 2005, violent conflict will erupt in parts of Bogaland and the existing ceasefire agreement will begin to unravel across the country. A peacekeeping force, lead by NATO, will be deployed to the area in an effort to reestablish peaceful relations.

This was followed by the PTF version:

While still volatile, an outbreak of war has been avoided in Bogaland throughout 2005. Through the efforts of local community based groups and international NGOs, conflicts have been resolved before becoming violent.

An adjacent caption read, “Two clear paths. Two decidedly different outcomes. Which route will Bogaland choose? Which route will lead to a sustainable peace?”

Apart from the fact that PTF was an entirely civilian effort, it resembled Viking 03 in striking ways. Both projects conceptualized conflicts as local

---

139 For more information, see the PTF website at http://www.fredsforum.se/eng/default_eng.htm (accessed July 15, 2008). All subsequent quotes are from this website.
problems of global concern, problems that call for international responses; both projects centered on cooperation and involved the same kind of organizations, in some cases even represented by the same people; and both projects were scenario-based. Thus PTF, like Viking 03, exhibited defining features of conflict preventionism—how security and humanitarianism converge in attempts to manage or prevent violent conflicts, and how new collaborative forms emerge through the deployment of certain organizational techniques.

What was critically at stake in the PTF critique was the temporality of intervention. Significantly, the PTF organizers did not oppose the content of the Viking version of Bogaland per se. Nor did they seek to denounce the scenario as false: they knew that it was only a fiction. Instead, by creating an equally fictitious scenario, the PTF organizers succeeded in showing us something different. Ultimately their version of Bogaland, too, would be abandoned. Because unlike the testing of a hypothesis, as Kermode (2000 [1966]: 39) has remarked, there is no question that the fictive will be dropped at the end of the finding-out process. “In some ways,” he writes, “this is obviously true of the literary fictions.”

We are never in danger of thinking that the death of King Lear, which explains so much, is true. To the statement that he died thus and thus—speaking these words over Cordelia’s body, calling for a looking-glass, fumbling with a button—we make an experimental assent. If we make it well, the gain is that we shall never quite resume the posture towards life and death that we formerly held. Of course it may be said that in hanging ourselves we have, in the best possible indirect way, changed the world. (Kermode 2000 [1966]: 39-40, emphasis in original)

Setting Things into Motion

To characterize the PTF scenario in analytical terms, I find it useful to follow Paul Ricoeur in what he calls a decisive break with Romantic hermeneutics. Thus rather than focusing on the particular intentions of the project organizers, I am interested in what the PTF scenario did and how this was accomplished. Such a shift opens up analytical possibilities. What is sought, writes Ricoeur, “is no longer an intention hidden behind the text, but a world unfolded in front of it” (Ricoeur 2003 [1973]: 175). This “power of the text to open a dimension of reality,” he continues, “implies in principle a recourse against any given reality and thereby the possibility of a critique of the real.” The mode of being of the world opened up by the text, then,

is the mode of the possible, or better of the power-to-be: therein resides the subversive force of the imaginary. The paradox of poetic reference consists precisely in the fact that reality is redescribed only insofar as discourse is raised to fiction. (Ricoeur 2003 [1973]: 176, emphasis added)
The PTF project remediated the Viking version of Bogaland to impose a different directionality on the unfolding of events. Thus we could assess their use of the scenario according to its “transfiguration […] of the contingent” (Kermode 2000 [1966]: 36), that is, one of the criteria for judging novels. Actually, the PTF event made use of techniques that resemble those of literary fiction. The instigation of a new beginning, for instance, is a technique for refocusing attention through a temporal shift that we recognize from many literary works (perhaps most eloquently applied by Doris Lessing in her *The Grass is Singing*). Rather than engaging with Viking 03 on its own premises, then, the PTF exercise opened up a space where alternative forms of agency became possible. The instigation of a new beginning set things into motion in a different way; it authorized, to recall the discussion from Chapter 4, an alternative form of directionality.

Conflict preventionism is a form within which things are at stake in particular ways. Both Viking 03 and PTF, for instance, took as a starting point the recognition that something calls for improvement. This suggests how remediation as a distinct mode of engagement diverges from reform. In contrast to reform, remediation does not seek a goal that has been described in great detail in advance. Instead, the aim is to remedy, to improve, to make better. Hence I find directionality an illuminating concept, which also is related to the temporality of conflict preventionism; that is, the imperative to look to the future in order to improve it, rather than spending time on analyzing the past. As I showed in Chapter 4, for instance, most critique during the Viking 03 evaluation process concerned how to improve future exercises. Likewise, the PTF critique also anticipated the next Viking project rather than responding explicitly to the 2003 exercise. In their scenario the year is 2005.

The focus on what unfolds “in front of the text,” so to speak, is also related to a potential change in the self-identity of individual actors. Ricoeur argues that

> if fiction is a fundamental dimension of the reference of the text it is equally a fundamental dimension of the subjectivity of the reader: in reading I “unrealise myself.” Reading introduces me to imaginative variations of the ego. The metamorphosis of the world in play is also the playful metamorphosis of the ego. (Ricoeur 2003 [1973]: 176)

Fiction was a fundamental dimension of the reference of Viking 03, and it was equally a fundamental dimension of the subjectivity of the Viking 03 participants. In Chapter 2, in the section “Rethinking Roles and Relations,” I discussed how Viking 03 constituted a context that enabled the remediation of the identities of the participating organizations and of the relationships between them. By taking part in the project, it became possible or even necessary, at least to some extent, for participants to “unrealize” their already
constituted roles. The metamorphosis of the world in play—in the cases of Viking 03 and of PTF through the form of the fictitious Bogaland—is also, as Ricoeur puts it, the playful metamorphosis of the ego.

The notion of temporality is key here. The aggregation of actors, concepts, and procedures in the Viking 03 project comprised the context for a remediation of contemporary conflicts and, at the same time, of the relationships between particular actors. In this process, the fictitious scenario constituted a tool for enabling action and imposing directionality on future engagements. The PTF project, in turn, exemplified how the fictive also opens up possibilities for critique.

**Action and Ethics**

As a “conceptual fiction,” conflict preventionism has allowed me to explore a set of processes within a single analytical framework—the changing role of the military, the emergence of new forms of civil-military cooperation, and the increasing interest in managing and preventing violent conflicts.

Security and humanitarianism increasingly converge on the notion of conflict management and on what one might call a “will to peace.” In response, Viking 03 (and other events, including the PTF exercise) attempted to aggregate various actors, concepts, and procedures in order to initiate work, to do something, to act. Through the term conflict preventionism, I have sought in this book to capture decisive organizational facets of this attempt. Ultimately, Viking 03, as I have argued, remediated already existing roles, ideas, and procedures—a work that resulted neither in a model of conflicts, nor in consensus concerning an ultimate end goal, but in the gradual appearance of a novel directionality for engaging with the world.  

Directionality is related to movement and to action. “In a dynamic world,” writes Robert Cooper (2004: 171), “the worst policy is to do nothing.” Indeed, an increasing number of actors do agree that “something needs to be done” about violent conflicts. More and more actors are expected to take part in such attempts, not only civilian and military personnel of an intervention, but also members of local populations in war-torn societies. And those who oppose or obstruct such “peace processes,” like the warlords in the Bogaland scenario, are instead “moved” in the right direction—sometimes by military force (see Chapter 4). Directionality, we should recall, also refers to giving directions.

---

140 A focus on the organizational logic of Viking 03 illustrates that conflict preventionism is a timely and powerful form for collaborative action that differs from traditional military force. Arendt’s discussion on power as “potentiality in being together” is illustrative here because it treats power as intrinsically related to temporality. It is “dependent upon the unreliable and only temporary agreement of many wills and intentions,” as Arendt puts it (1998: 201, emphasis added). Here one might also recall Luhmann’s “politics of understanding” (see the Introduction).
This imperative to “do something” fits with remediation as a particular mode of engagement. What people agree on is precisely that improvement is called for. In such a context, critics of interventionism do not advocate inaction, but alternative forms of action. The PTF event exemplifies this orientation. Like Viking 03, it assumed moral responsibility by initiating action, and by setting something into motion—but through a beginning that deviated from Viking 03. A “failure to act” increasingly appears unethical.

In Conclusion: Exercising Peace

By way of conclusion, I want to reflect somewhat more closely on the mode of action that conflict preventionism enables. It is illuminating, I think, to consider conflict preventionism here as a particular configuration of the four basic categories through which Foucault approached ethics: ethical substance, mode of subjectivation, ethical work, and telos (see Foucault 1984a: 351-72; cf. Rabinow 1997: xxvii-xl).

First, with conflict preventionism emerges a “will to peace,” which seems to call for novel approaches to peace and security. “The world around us is changing, and so are we,” as was stated by the “knowledge campaign” of the Swedish Armed Forces with which I opened this book. More specifically, the first side of ethics, according to Foucault, answers the question: “which is the aspect or the part of myself or my behavior which is concerned with moral conduct?” (Foucault 1984a: 352). Arguably, the “ethical substance” of conflict preventionism is precisely the ability to act.

Viking 03 was an organizational attempt to “do something,” to actualize the moral obligation among various actors by inviting them to take part in collaborative work to improve civil-military cooperation. The second aspect of ethics, “mode of subjectivation,” is related precisely to form-giving—to “the way in which people are invited or incited to recognize their moral obligations,” as Foucault (1984a: 353) puts it. While the military has traditionally been mobilized in the name of the nation, Viking 03 exemplifies that conflict preventionism in contrast has a cosmopolitan orientation. Also, the project did not involve expert knowledge in a traditional sense, but could rather be described through Luhmann’s notion of a “politics of understanding,” which draws attention to its particular temporal design. Aggregation was the mode of subjectivation at work in Viking 03. Its focus was on collaboration, openness, and diversity in an attempt to find “best practices.”

Arguably, the “ethical work” of conflict preventionism mostly occurs through remediation. As exemplified by the production of the fictitious scenarios in the Viking 03 and PTF projects, remediation functions as the “the means by which we can change ourselves in order to become ethical subjects” (Foucault 1984a: 354). Through the work of remediation in Viking 03, military and civilian participants gradually found new ways of relating to one another in the context of a problematization of conflicts. Indeed, reme-
diation through fiction, as I have argued in this chapter, is a mode of engagement that also enables work on the self.

Remediation, however, is essentially a practice without “telos.” It does not move toward a goal that has been defined in advance. Conflict preventionism, then, is an ethical configuration that does not provide an answer to the question, “Which is the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way?” (Foucault 1984a: 355). Thus the aim of Viking 03—“to enhance multinational interoperability by providing a training environment that makes it possible for the involved military units and all participating organizations to achieve their objectives” (see Chapter 4)—is telling in that it seems to be designed to allow various things to appear. Viking 03 does not aim to become a stable apparatus, but is a temporal form that recurs. Orientation, organization, and directionality—not meaning, values, or beliefs—are key terms.

Conflict preventionism is nevertheless decidedly progressive: it is emergent and in motion. Yet the question is no longer, “What should I be?” but, as Luhmann (1998: 7) had it, “How should I be?” Still, “[n]o technique, no professional skill,” as Foucault (1984a: 364) reminds us, “can be acquired without exercise; neither can one learn the art of living, the techne tou biou, without an askesis which must be taken as a training of oneself by oneself.” Viking 03 was literally an exercise in this sense.
Epilogue: On Timely Appearances

To love something as an artist [...] means to be shaken not by its ultimate value or lack of value, but by a side of it that suddenly opens up. Where art has value it shows things that few have seen. It is conquering, not pacifying.

– Robert Musil

One of the novellas in Andrei Volos’s *Hurramabad: A Novel in Facets* includes a few intriguing paragraphs about a woman who sometimes feels unable to express her thoughts. The moment she attempts to share her ideas with her husband and son—conceptions that to her seem both clear and convincing—they invariably appear unfounded and without persuasive power. Persistently they refuse her attempts to “wrap them into words,” as Volos phrases it. Her thoughts, like luminescent fish of the deep sea, seem able to survive only by virtue of the pressure of a bottomless abyss. As soon as they surface, they die. And once they lay there, with bulging lifeless eyes, she too immediately finds them both dull and meaningless. It makes no difference if time ultimately would prove her right—because with time, novel thoughts, the one more important than the other, are liable to succeed her previous ones. Words, as Volos concludes, seem only to complicate things. They fail her.

And yet, without communication, ideas simply will not appear as real. “Each time we talk about things that can be experienced only in privacy or intimacy,” according to Hannah Arendt, “we bring them out into a sphere where they will assume a kind of reality which, their intensity notwithstanding, they never could have had before.” Thus in a sense, appearance—“something that is being seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves”—constitutes reality (Arendt 1998 [1958]: 50). More specifically, Arendt claims that the “whole factual world of human affairs depends for its reality and its continued existence, first, upon the presence of others who have seen and heard and will remember, and, second, on the transformation of the intangible into the tangibility of things” (ibid.: 95, emphasis added).

Musil (1990b [1911]: 7).

The English translation of *Hurramabad* (Volos 2001) comprises seven of the original’s thirteen stories. Among the omitted novellas is the one I refer to: “Ivachev’s Heritage.” For an unabridged translation into Swedish, see Volos (2005: 45-57).
I find Arendt’s discussion and the example from Volos’s story helpful for developing my thinking of how conflict preventionism appeared and received factuality through the Viking 03 project. The notion of “appearance” is illuminating, empirically and analytically. Empirically, because its connotation of a participation in a performance or an event—“to make an appearance”—fits well with my focus on the participation of various actors in the Viking 03 project. Analytically, because appearance also connotes a process of coming into being as in emergence, of becoming visible or noticeable. To speak of appearance, then, brings into focus questions about how something appears or is made to appear, and how it assumes or is given a particular appearance—precisely the kind of questions that have structured this book. Furthermore, it is impossible, as we have learned from Merleau-Ponty, “to separate things from their way of appearing” (Merleau-Ponty 2004 [1948]: 94). Thus appearance does not suggest a lack of ontology. Instead, it involves “attention” as an active and activating practice: it implies not a construction that veils or conceals reality, but an activation or actualization that brings distinct facets of the contemporary into view. And precisely since it does involve the actualization of a specific configuration, an appearance might indeed also be misleading.

As we might recall, the aim of the Viking 03 exercise was to “enhance multinational interoperability by providing a training environment that makes it possible for the involved military units and all participating organizations to achieve their objectives.” This open-ended design allowed various things to appear. Indeed, the aggregation of actors, concepts, and procedures during the process of planning constituted a critical mass out of which a novel assemblage—conflict preventionism—could be set into motion. Thus Viking 03, as I argued in Chapter 2, constituted a form for gathering focus. To use Arendt’s terms, the process of aggregation also guaranteed “the presence of others”; and the focus that appeared through the remediation of various notions of violent ethnic conflicts received a provisional tangibility through the Bogaland scenario (see Chapter 3). And with the subsequent enactment during the “Combined Challenge” exercise in Stockholm in 2006, Bogaland certainly appeared in the presence of others in a way that was conspicuously tangible (see Chapter 5).

143 Again, a paragraph from The Man without Qualities comes to mind. “It is reality that awakens possibilities,” Musil writes, “and nothing would be more perverse than to deny it. Even so, it will always be the same possibilities, in sum or on the average, that go on repeating themselves until a man comes along who does not value the actuality above the idea. It is he who first gives the new possibilities their meaning, their direction, and he awakens them” (Musil 1996: 12).
144 “[T]he world which I seek to achieve through each appearance, and which endows that appearance, rightly or wrongly, with the weight of truth, never necessarily requires this particular appearance. There is the absolute certainty of the world in general, but not of any one thing in particular” (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 347).
In this epilogue, I am concerned with appearance mostly on another level. I ask how we, as anthropologists, might render something emergent available to critical thought. As the example from Volos intimates, there is a difference between giving form to what is in a process of coming into being, and to represent what exists already—a difference which Merleau-Ponty discusses in terms of the “speaking” and the “spoken” (cf. Chapter 3). If, like the woman in Volos’s story, we try to wrap the emergent into already existing forms, into what is spoken, it inevitably evades us. To assume a Swift-esque line of attack, for instance, seems increasingly like tilting at windmills. It appears anachronistic precisely because, rather than contributing to an understanding of actual facets of the contemporary, it involves the projection of the past onto the present. Run of the mill reiterations of critical approaches tend in other words mostly to reproduce specific perspectives within anthropology itself (see the Introduction).

The organizers of Viking 03 and of PTF adapted to contemporary organizational forms rather indiscriminately in order to get particular kinds of work done. While anthropologists, too, in some sense need to be timely, we arguably need to move somewhat more slowly. We need to “stop to think” about what forms critical inquiry can take now. This entails critical reflection both on the ways in which anthropologists pay analytical attention, and on the relationship between anthropology and its objects of investigation—a relationship which in an important sense is reminiscent, I think, of that between the art critic and art. In what follows, I thus seek to draw attention precisely to shifting forms of observation, presentation, and critique: the work, that is, through which things become available as art—or as objects of anthropological analysis.

Throughout much of this epilogue, I continue to discuss anthropology in the context of art. The reason for this is that art and anthropology, while different in their modes of engaging with or acquiring knowledge about the world, tend to intersect precisely on the problem of giving form. Through this comparison, I seek ultimately to illustrate a movement from a concern with building or reproducing theory to an emphasis on giving form to the emergent. Rather than a reiteration of the arguments of Exercising Peace, then, this epilogue is itself an attempt at remediation to enhance the directionality of my preceding analysis.

---

Timeliness

In May 1908, three years after the acrimonious resignation from the Vienna Secession, the new artists’ association opened its first art show in the city. Gustav Klimt, the most prominent member of the group, had been intimately involved in the planning of the Kunstschau which, along with a remarkable variety of contemporary Austrian art, exhibited no less than sixteen of his own paintings (including Der Kuss, purchased instantly by the Ministry of Education). It was also an event of extraordinary proportions in other respects. Josef Hoffmann, perhaps the most important among Vienna’s fin de siècle architects, had been commissioned to design the exhibition complex especially for the occasion. That an entire room was devoted exclusively to Der Kuss tells us something about the level of ambition involved. Hinting at grandiosity, too, gilded letters above the main entrance stated, “Der Zeit ihre Kunst, Der Kunst ihre Freiheit”—To the age its art, to art its freedom. This had been the Secessionist motto. The “Klimt Group” had retained this dictum, however, when they left the organization—quite literally, in fact, by removing the actual sign from the Secession building.147

Most contemporary critics unequivocally praised the 1908 Kunstschau, which is still generally considered “the most important exhibition held in Vienna before the First World War” (Dube 1998: 181), and a “crucial turning point in Viennese artistic life” (Bassie 2005: 71). Nevertheless, according to Frank Whitford, the exhibition in one sense also intimated a limit to Klimt’s artistic reputation. “In the midst of all the critical enthusiasm, all the full-throated songs of praise to Vienna’s greatest painter,” he writes, “one voice hinted that Klimt’s art was so much part of its time that it would die with it” (Whitford 1990: 126).148 When the “Klimt Group” insisted on Der Zeit ihre Kunst, clearly this was not what they had in mind.

Yet a hundred years later Der Kuss, although decidedly dated, seems to remain at least equally popular. Timeliness, however, is important—not only the timeliness intrinsic to a work of art itself, but also that of particular ways of presenting and appreciating art.

If Klimt was accused of being too much in accord with his time, then the opposite could perhaps be said of the American modernist Charles Sheeler. Several different media—including photography, film, drawing, printmak-

147 Apart from well-established artists such as Klimt, Carl Moll, Kolo Moser, and Otto Wagner, the 1908 Kunstschau also exhibited works from young emergent artists, most notably Oskar Kokoschka. The exhibition, as Klimt himself phrased it, thus truly constituted an “overview of the powers in the Austrian Art World” (quoted in Brandstätter 2006: 190). See Bisanz (2006: 112-9), Fliedl (1990: 155-61), and Whitford (1990: 111-29) for descriptions of the exhibition.

148 “The voice was that of Otto Stoesl and it was raised in the pages of Die Fackel [The Torch], the journal which never ceased to undermine the assumptions on which Klimt’s art, the Secession and the Wiener Werkstätte were based. Behind Klimt’s obvious and outstanding talent, Stoesl wrote, a monster was lurking. The monster was ‘taste and it shares the fate of everything that is so relative and general: to pass away in time’” (Whitford 1990: 126).
ing, and painting—were central to Sheeler’s art. During most of his career, however, photography was not generally accepted as art. Thus in the early 1930s, Sheeler’s dealer, Edith Halpert, the founder of the Downtown Gallery in New York City, advised him to avoid all references to his photography, and to exhibit only paintings (Brock 2006: 109). And during the nine single-artist exhibitions she organized for Sheeler, not one of his photographs was included. (So much for Der Kunst ihre Freiheit.) Despite the fact that influential figures like Alfred Barr, at the MoMA in New York, had praised him as “one of the greatest American photographers” (quoted in Elderfield 2004: 215), Halpert and Sheeler’s patron, William Lane, even made sure after Sheeler’s death to acquire all his photographic prints and negatives—only to conceal them. And at that point in time, their strategy to promote Sheeler as primarily a painter continued to prove highly successful.

When in 2007 the de Young Museum in San Francisco opened a new exhibition on Sheeler’s art, the approach was remarkably different. “Across Media” was not a traditional retrospective. Instead, it focused explicitly on the relationships between the different media that Sheeler worked with. Timothy Anglin Burgard, curator at the Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco, claimed in a talk on Sheeler that thinking “across” media is the key to understanding his development as an artist, and to appreciate his art (cf. Brock 2006; Rawlinson 2007: 44-76).

Sheeler himself seems indeed to have been concerned with creating relationships across media—both within an individual image, and between series of works. The 1943 painting The Artist Looks at Nature is a case in point. It is based on a 1932 photograph (Self-Portrait at Easel) that portrays Sheeler in the process of making a conté crayon drawing (Interior with Stove), which was in turn based on a 1917 photograph (The Stove). Although the drawing Sheeler is working on shows a dark interior, the painting has him seated outdoors in a somewhat peculiar landscape. It does not depict one particular location, but is forged together of a set of diverse scenes that Sheeler had carried out in previous drawings (see Brock 2006: 108-17).

In some sense, we must engage with art in order to appreciate it. This is perhaps particularly true when approaching an artist like Sheeler, who, as Burgard put it in his talk, “shows everything but reveals nothing.” Of course, no artist steps out of his or her time; and no critic does either. Actually, “Across Media” conveyed a perspective, which is decidedly timely. Like Halpert’s concealment of Sheeler’s photographs, the current method through which his works become available as art is itself informative. I agree that instead of approaching The Artist Looks at Nature as a display of already existing significances—in the motifs represented in it, or of the media used to produce it—it seems more interesting to consider how, by bringing them

---

together, Sheeler reconfigures and literally remediates the meaning of motifs and media alike. Perhaps especially since “Across Media” really does seem to make sense, I think it offers an intriguing starting point for thinking about the contemporary, and the actual forms through which it appears.150

It is interesting in this context to recall once again the 1908 Kunstschau. In his opening address, Klimt explained his and his co-exhibitors’ view on who is an artist. “We construe the concept of artist just as generously as we do that of the artwork,” he declared. “Not only those who create, but also those who enjoy are in our view artists, people who are able to experience and to appreciate what has been created” (quoted in Brandstätter 2006: 184).

Anthropological Attention

Anthropology has a long tradition of paying attention to people who “represent the extreme development of the local cultural type”—not least because they seem, as Ruth Benedict put it, to “have a license which they may almost endlessly exploit” (Benedict 1989 [1934]: 276). Viking 03 and the Peace Team Forum exercises exemplify forms for acting collectively that are, if not extreme developments of a local cultural type, then at least decidedly timely; and the deployment of a novel organizational logic make them powerful in a particular sense. With the preceding discussion of Klimt and Sheeler in mind, I reflect in what follows on the notion of timeliness itself—not only of things in the world, but also of the ways through which we as anthropologists engage with them, how we pay analytical attention.

I find it helpful to recall here Merleau-Ponty’s definition of “attention” as “the active constitution of a new object which makes explicit and articulate what was until then presented as no more than an indeterminate horizon” (Merleau-Ponty 2002 [1945]: 35). “There are no arbitrary data which set about combining into a thing because de facto proximities or likenesses cause them to associate,” he writes. On the contrary, it is because we perceive a grouping as a thing that the analytical attitude can then discern likenesses or proximities. This does not mean simply that without any perception of the whole we would not think of noticing the resemblance or the contiguity of its elements, but literally that they would not be part of the same world and would not exist at all. (Merleau-Ponty 2002 [1945]: 19, emphasis in original)

In a previous discussion on the problematization of conflicts, I noted how anthropology, like other disciplines of the social sciences, often exhibits

---

150 A paragraph from Klee’s On Modern Art comes to mind: “To each dimension, as, with the flight of time, it disappears from view, we should say: now you are becoming the Past. But possibly later at a critical—perhaps fortunate—moment we may meet again on a new dimension, and once again you may become the Present” (Klee 1966: 17).
congruities with its objects of study (see Chapter 3). Pierre Bourdieu has observed how the work of production of “official problems,” as he put it, in fact “almost always leaves room for what are today called experts” (Bourdieu 1992: 240, emphasis in original). Indeed, events such as Viking 03 certainly seem to open up distinct spaces for the social scientist as expert. During my fieldwork, this became evident first on a general level related to expanding audit procedures—illustrated, for instance, by the participants who approved of my presence in Viking 03 by pointing out that, “it is always useful to receive an outside opinion” (see Chapter 2). Subsequently it also became evident on a level more specifically related to my role as anthropologist, perhaps exemplified most clearly by Robert’s insistence, at the workshop centered on the production of Bogaland, that “as an anthropologist, you have expert knowledge about these things”—that is, culture, ethnicity, religiosity (see Chapter 3). Finally, in the fall of 2004, I received an email from the organizer of the Peace Team Forum (PTF) project (see Chapter 5) who knew of my anthropological fieldwork within Viking 03. She asked whether I would be interested in taking part in the preparations of the PTF exercise—as an “expert” on scenario planning.

Examples from Viking 03 illustrate how such already designated spaces for expertise became problematic for many civilian participants (see Chapters 2 and 5). For the anthropologist they in addition appear restrictive analytically, particularly if we seek to pay attention to timely phenomena while retaining a critical attentiveness also toward the very constituents of their timeliness. Reflection on how we pay analytical attention thus inevitably actualizes the question of the relationship between anthropology and its object of investigation. To move beyond a framing of this relationship as merely a choice between collaboration and denunciation (see the Introduction), I consider here anthropological attention in terms of temporality and “distance.”

In his study of foreign correspondents, Ulf Hannerz discusses journalism and anthropology as two related forms for engaging with the contemporary. One defining difference between journalistic work and anthropological inquiry has to do precisely with time. Journalism is timely in a way that anthropology is not.

[B]y the time the parachutists pull out of the news site, and its lights perhaps go out as far as the news media are concerned, anthropologists, in the logic of academic production, may at best be polishing the first draft of a research proposal to a funding agency. (Hannerz 2004b: 229)

This slowness might at first seem like a problem for anthropology. Yet such a “slow-motion research proposal,” as Hannerz reminds us, “may be worth doing, after all,” especially if we seek to portray “the emergent rather than the emergency” (ibid.). If we are concerned with the emergent, then, we
arguably need to adopt a particular temporal orientation toward our object of investigation, which in turn implies a certain degree of distance or “disinterestedness.”

George Marcus has recently discussed the identity of the anthropologist in the context of what he calls contemporary regimes of intervention. The setting he has in mind more specifically is that of

the failed or weakened state, the breakdown of civil society, and the entrance of international multilateral authorities with various actors on the scene—the UN, NATO, the US as peacekeepers, humanitarian and other aid organizations, various kinds of NGOs, local political parties, social movements, armed factions, etc. (Marcus 2005: 32)

Marcus notes how within contemporary regimes of intervention the pressures on anthropologists “to align, to be useful, to be active are nearly overwhelming” (ibid.: 43). In addition to the examples I mentioned from my fieldwork, Steve Fondacaro’s call for collaboration between the military and anthropology comes to mind here—“who’s going to do that education if it isn’t you, a cultural anthropologist,” as he put it (see Chapter 5). As I noted in the Introduction, two major approaches have emerged in debates on the relationship between anthropology and the military. Arguably, both these positions—collaboration and denunciation—presume the same identity position for the anthropologist: that of the expert.

Yet Marcus, who thinks it necessary to reintroduce some concept of disinterestedness for anthropological research—particularly in the context of contemporary regimes of intervention—suggests a somewhat different identity pose: that of the witness. Currently he sees two forms of witnessing at play in anthropological identity. “On the one hand there is something akin to testimony […] in which accountings and narratives of suffering, victimhood and injustices take center place. […] On the other hand”—and this form seems the more interesting one for my own discussion—“there is a kind of witnessing that is a more intellectualized and conceptually abstracted account or narrative of the emergence of new orders, techniques, structures and social/cultural forms coming into being” (ibid.: 43). Marcus thus claims that witnessing is not just a solution to a predicament. As an identity purpose for anthropological research, it also “more positively participates in a major trend in the remaking of the place of the humanities and social sciences […] in relation to major institutions and the exercise of power, of different sorts” (ibid.: 44).

What I was observing during my fieldwork in Viking 03 could be described in these terms. Yet witnessing, since it implies paying attention, arguably involves form giving: the active constitution of an object. This is especially the case if we are interested, like Hannerz, in the emergent rather than the emergency. Thus while I think Marcus brings out a set of critical
issues for contemporary anthropological research—about the position of the anthropologist, the need for a certain degree of disinterestedness, and an attentiveness to the emergent, etc.—I am not entirely convinced by the notion of witnessing. Its connotations arguably seem too passive, particularly with Merleau-Ponty’s definition of “paying attention” in mind.

I think Paul Rabinow captures something more promising when he speaks of the position of the anthropologist in terms of adjacency (Rabinow 2008: 33-50). An “untimely anthropology,” as he puts it, could inhabit a space which is adjacent to its object of investigation; and from such a perspective “contextualizations, oblique discussions, and meandering beyond the plotted story line may indeed be welcomed” (ibid.: 47). Adjacency, it seems to me, implies a more active position from which the anthropologist could work with, rather than within (as in collaboration) or merely against (as in denunciation), various contemporary organizational forms.

Indeed, since the emergent by definition has not yet assumed tangibility in Arendt’s sense, we must engage analytically and conceptually with such a phenomenon in particular ways in order for it to appear. To explore such anthropological engagements, I find it useful to consider some convergences in the histories of art and anthropology. More specifically, I am concerned in what follows with a difference in focus between Impressionism and Expressionism, which illustrates, I think, certain challenges and possibilities for contemporary anthropology.

Reproduction

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Realist painters worked on landscape motifs in their studios according to strict aesthetic conventions. Impressionists, by contrast, advocated en plein air painting—they left the studio, brought their easels outdoors, and painted what they saw. Typically these works were carried out in light colors applied to the canvas in hasty brush strokes, because whenever possible the Impressionists preferred also to finish their paintings on location. Claude Monet played a decisive part in the development of this mode of art, as the French artist and critic Yvon Taillandier writes:

The young [Monet] felt dissatisfied with the useless, conventional form of teaching he received at the studio of Gleyre in 1863. He therefore rounded up three like-minded fellow pupils, [Pierre-August] Renoir, [Jean Frédéric] Bazille and [Alfred] Sisley and announced—“there is no sincerity here: the atmosphere is unhealthy: let’s escape.” Instead of taking them to another studio, they set out for the forest of Fontainebleau where they began to paint in the open air. (Taillandier 1982: 16)
At the time, these techniques and the corresponding aesthetics instigated a major break with academic art.151 “Courbet knew that grass was green, and that was an end to it,” as Alan Bowness puts it. “But Monet and Renoir saw that grass could look grey, or yellow, or blue, depending on the light, and this observation revolutionized their painting” (Bowness 2003: 26).152

Essentially, however, Impressionism shared with Realism the aim to record reality. “It simply reproduced phenomena of a colorful outer world according to the temperament of the artist with one or another emphasis,” as Paul Klee (1995 [1912]: 52) put it. In other words, how to properly represent an outer object remained the dominating concern. “The essential difference between Realism and Impressionism,” according to one commentator, “is that Impressionism recognized and, in a sense, fetishized the subjectivity of the act of representational transcription” (Brettell 1999: 16). Thus Impressionism still belonged to a representational art that left the idea of the artist as a subject who copies an outside object entirely unproblematized.

Reminiscent of Impressionists, anthropologists, too, have engaged directly with the world. Introduced through early enterprises such as the Torres Straits expedition of 1898 and, of course, through Malinowski’s subsequent work in the Trobriand Islands, the practice of fieldwork became essential to the emergent twentieth-century anthropology.153 Like en plein air painting revolutionized academic art, the instigation of fieldwork revolutionized anthropology. It was no longer adequate, as Anna Grimshaw points out, to sit like Sir James Frazer in a college study, and interpret or speculate on the basis of information supplied by an array of missionaries, explorers and colonial officials. It was important to go and see for oneself, to collect one’s own data in the field and to build theories around such first-hand information. (Grimshaw 2001: 20, emphasis added)

Yet anthropologists mostly remained, again in a way reminiscent of the Impressionists, in the category of the “representational.” While now based on first-hand observations, the aim was still to record reality and to build—or reproduce—theory.154

151 According to Taillandier (1982: 16), however, “impressionism is more a question of regrouping a certain number of processes and methods which had become dispersed than an invention in itself. One can go so far as to say that this regrouping was accomplished by many artists and that it is not possible to single out an individual as responsible for the impressionist style.” On Impressionism, see, e.g., Bowness (2003: 22-46); Lucie-Smith (1971: 209-38); and Walther (2002).
152 The French artist Gustave Courbet, leader of the Realist school of painting in France, represented precisely the kind of art that the Impressionists opposed.
154 At least this was the case within British social anthropology. In the United States, by contrast, Franz Boas opposed theoretical generalizations based on ethnological data (see, e.g., Boas 2000 [1920]). Also, it is worth noting that the focus on “seeing for oneself” remains at the heart of a critical approach that seeks to “unveil the truth” behind insincere pretenses through denunciation. Appearances, from such a perspective, are not to be trusted.
Emergence

Fieldwork-based anthropology, however, also contributed to altering the idea within contemporary art that artistic merit was assessed primarily by its ability to imitate.¹⁵⁵ This came about somewhat epiphenomenally. Several painters whose approach to art deviated from Impressionism began at the turn of the century to accompany anthropologists on their ethnographic expeditions to “exotic countries.” Notable such figures were Emil Nolde, Max Pechstein, and Wassily Kandinsky (see Selz 1974: 288-97). These and other artists—including Paula Modersohn-Becker, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, Erich Heckel, Franz Marc, Gabriele Münter, August Macke, and Paul Klee—soon came to be known as Expressionists.

“Primitive art” was an important source of inspiration for Expressionist painters.¹⁵⁶ Many felt a strong affinity with the “art of the savages.” Nolde, for instance—who frequently in his work used grotesque expressions to convey a directness that would “shake the observer into a new state of emotional awareness” (Selz 1974: 129)—found the power and immediacy of much exotic art deeply fascinating. He eulogized “its absolute primitiveness,” as he put it—“its intense, often grotesque expression of strength and life in the very simplest form” (quoted in Goldwater 1986: 105). In 1910, Nolde had begun sketching in the ethnographical museums; and a few years later, although he had to pay for his own trip, he accepted an offer to take part in the Külz-Leber expedition to the German possessions in the South Seas. Nolde was interested in primordial forms, and among the “primitive peoples” of the Pacific Islands, he hoped to find nothing less than the very sources of art. Thus in the fall of 1913—precisely one year before Malinowski’s seminal trip to the tropics—Nolde, accompanied by his wife, left for New Guinea. A common area of interest, then, seems to have existed between Expressionism and the emergent discipline of anthropology. “The science of ethnography, however,” as Nolde noted in his autobiography, “considers us still as trou-

¹⁵⁵ Bernard Denvir has explored the relationship between aesthetics, art history, and anthropology. He writes: “Artistic merit was assessed by its ability to imitate. By the second half of the [nineteenth] century, however, as aesthetics, art history and anthropology became more sophisticated, these certainties began to be eroded. Writers such as William Morris, defending the nature of medieval art, advocated a return to primitive craftsmanship. In Vienna the art historian Alois Riegl was propounding in the 1890s the theory that imitation was an entirely alien concept to “barbaric” artists and that the most important thing about a work of art was its “visibility,” its expressiveness, not its relationship to external objects or beliefs. This viewpoint became all the more persuasive as the mid-century tenets began to waver. The simplicities of Newtonian physics were being undermined by Einstein and others, the certainties of human choice were being questioned by psychologists such as Freud and the materialist historic determinism of Marx limited Romantic notions about the nature of individual creativity. Never again would people be able to look upon visual reality and its imitation as necessarily integral to art” (Denvir 1992: 92-3; see also Goldwater 1986: 15-50, 302-14).

¹⁵⁶ On primitivism and modern art, see Goldwater (1986) and Rhodes (1994).
blesome intruders, because we love sense perception more than sole knowledge” (quoted in Selz 1974: 289).

Unlike Impressionism (or modernist anthropology), Expressionism was not, in other words, concerned primarily with reproducing an outer world aesthetically (or scientifically). Instead, guided by the pleasure of design, these artists sought to invent aesthetic forms for expressing individual emotional states. Klee, in a review of a 1912 exhibition, provided one of the earliest definitions of the term:

[A] form of artistic expression in which a long period can elapse between the moment of perception and the actual painting, in which several impressions can be combined or rejected in the final composition, and in which the constructive elements of art is heightened and emphasized. (Quoted in Selz 1974: 214)

Klee outlines here a mode of art astoundingly deviant from Impressionism. Expressionism, as he defined it, introduces a shift in temporality, a new orientation toward composition, and an enhanced emphasis on the creative act.

The term “Expressionist” had in fact originated as a label for art that was self-consciously anti-Impressionist; and to be sure, Expressionism often did appear as its “counter-movement.” Kandinsky and Marc of the Blaue Reiter group in Munich, for instance, considered themselves “to be primitives of a new art and to be part of a loosely defined, radical European Post-Impressionist tradition that rejected nineteenth century Realism” (Rhodes 1994: 21). And Expressionism certainly was more than merely a new style of painting. It was a broad cultural movement—proclaiming an altogether new way of living—that emerged from Germany and Austria in the early twentieth century (see Bassie 2005: 7-10; cf. Butler 1994; Long 1995).

157 On Nolde’s journey to the South Seas in 1913-14, see Reuther (2008), Rhodes (1994: 136-40), and Selz (1974: 289-91). As a matter of fact, Malinowski, too, traveled to the tropics accompanied by an artist—his friend Stanislaw “Witkacy” Witkiewicz. Malinowski had wanted Witkacy to join him as a photographer and draftsman. Yet Witkacy’s subsequent exposure to the art and artists encountered on the journey made him develop an approach to art centered on an anti-mimetic aesthetic, and, ultimately, the relationship between the two friends ended in philosophical disagreement of the implications of what they saw during the trip (see Gerould 1993: 75-8; cf. Young 2004: 270-86). Perhaps the difference in focus between anthropology and art was also one of the factors that in 1896 led Kandinsky—who by then had completed “lengthy ethnographical and anthropological studies,” including a period of “field work among primitive Russian folk groups” (Selz 1974: 175)—to refuse a position at the University of Dorpat and instead move to Munich to become a painter.

158 Two of Kandinsky’s essays—Concerning the Spiritual in Art (Kandinsky 2006 [1911]) and “On the Question of Form,” published in The Blaue Reiter Almanac (Kandinsky and Marc 2005 [1912]: 147-87)—epitomized the ideas of the Expressionist movement. Together they constituted “almost a programmatic manifesto for the expressionist generation” (Selz 1974: 223).

159 “Expressionism” is a difficult term to define. Most commentators, however, agree on the temporal limits of the movement. “The foundation of the artists’ group Die Brücke (The Bridge) in Dresden in 1905 is generally regarded as the first cornerstone of Expressionism,
The Expressionists pointed out that Impressionism, although it allegedly broke with the norms of academic art, nevertheless remained firmly within its constitutive logic. Expressionism, they argued, went further. By problematizing the relationship between subject (the artist) and object (the world), it abandoned the idea of mimesis, focusing instead on what appeared in the process of creating art—not only the work of art itself, but also the painter as subject. The result was not abstract art—abstractions of something already known—but a non-representational art that offered new ways of seeing. Expressionist art, then, in the words of Oskar Kokoschka, was “form-giving to the experience, thus mediator and message from the self to fellow humans” (quoted in Selz 1997b: 115, emphasis added).

Yet as a revolutionary movement, Expressionism was transitory in nature. Gradually it gained wider popularity, and various epigones soon began to mimic and duplicate its aesthetic forms. Many artists found it problematic, or even offensive, that Expressionism transformed more and more into an accepted style of mainstream art. Actually, a proliferating sense of innovative exhaustion paralleled its gradual popularization. At least partly because of its own increasing fashionability, then, the Expressionist movement eventually dissolved. It did no longer “speak.” In 1919, the theorist and art historian Wilhelm Hausenstein, who had been one of its passionate supporters, declared that Expressionism was dead.160

We, who at one time expected everything from it, are not spared the admission that we are sinking back into bankruptcy after tremendous efforts. Ten or fifteen years ago, earlier for some areas, we were correct in noting the bankruptcy of Impressionism. After a passionately extended effort we have no choice but to confirm the collapse of Expressionism. We have moved from one ending into another. [...] Today Expressionism has its crystal palace. It has its salon. No cigarette advertisement, no bar can get along without Expressionism. It is revolting. [...] We, after having consciously experienced Expressionism, after having loved and fought for it, live today with the nagging feeling of having come face to face with nothing. (Hausenstein 1995 [1919]: 281-82)

and the revolutionary post-war unrest of 1920 is seen as the end of the movement in Germany” (Elger 2002: 8). Peter Selz’s German Expressionist Painting (1974 [1957]) arguably remains the best study of Expressionism. Overviews that are more recent include Ashley Bassie, Expressionism (2005) and Dietmar Elger, Expressionism: A Revolution in German Art (2002). In addition to painting, Expressionism also encompassed music, drama, and works of literature. Christopher Butler (1994), in his Early Modernism, offers an intriguing exploration of the relationships between literature, music, and painting in Europe between 1900 and 1916. I should perhaps note here as well the affinities between German Expressionism and the Fauves in France. See, e.g., Butler’s (1994: 25-37) discussion on Matisse and expression; Goldwater’s (1986: 86-103) overview of the primitivism of the Fauves; and Denvir’s (1977) concise study, which considers Expressionism and Fauvism together.

Hausenstein’s remarks bring to mind the problems that face a Swift-esque approach within anthropology at a time when the culture concept and particular forms of cultural critique have become widespread (see the Introduction). The death of Expressionism illustrates how such a proliferation of concepts or rhetorical tropes certainly might lead to innovative exhaustion. Indeed, the “repetition of expressionist forms in the postwar period,” as Selz (1974: 217) points out, “had little but popular value.” Perhaps, although I do not want to push this too far, we might even think of the mode of anthropology advocated by Boas and his students as Expressionistic in character. Through a detour via the “primitive,” they sought, not unlike Nolde, to shake the observer into a new state of awareness in order to achieve a defamiliarization of the taken-for-granted. And while Margaret Mead’s *Coming of Age in Samoa*, when it first came out in 1928, really did “speak,” duplications of this form of anthropological critique today—no matter how eloquent or accomplished—arguably seem as epigonic as post-war Expressionism.

Expressionism, however, also captures one significant aspect of art that I find promising for contemporary anthropology—its concern, as Kokoschka had it, with form-giving. One artist who did take up this dimension in extremely productive ways was Klee.

**Rendering Visible**

Paul Klee is in many ways a noteworthy figure.\(^{162}\) He shared with the Expressionists an obsession with the creative act in art, and remained immensely productive throughout his career. Indeed, with a catalogue of works encompassing close to ten thousand items, Klee can hardly have suffered from any severe innovative exhaustion (Lynton 1989: 220; Ruhrberg 2000: 114). Featured in many of the most significant exhibitions and journals of the period, Klee was an important member of the Expressionist milieu. Significantly, however, he never entirely adopted the Expressionist idiom.

Unlike most of the expressionist painters, Klee was not occupied merely with the state of his own mind, nor did he express an explosive image of an unresolved conflict with society. […] [He] was concerned with the world itself—not merely with the world as his senses perceived it. He considered the present state of things as only a momentary and accidental arrangement, and occupied himself with a visual formulation of the world as it might once have been or as though it were in the process of becoming something quite different. (Selz 1974: 296-7, emphasis added)

\(^{161}\) On Klee, see Ingvar Claeson et al., *Paul Klee* (1991) and Gualtieri di San Lazzaro, *Paul Klee: His Life and Work* (1957); cf. also Selz (1974: 214-19; 293-96). Also, Klee himself wrote several pieces on art. Perhaps the most important of these texts is his *On Modern Art* (1966). His diaries provide in addition a multitude of insights into his approach toward art (see Klee 1968).
To Klee, the mere “thought of having to live in an epigonic age,” as he wrote in his diary, was “almost unbearable” (Klee 1968: 125). Rather than embracing a single aesthetic model, then, Klee sought persistently in his work to give form to that which was in the process of becoming. “Art,” as he famously put it, “does not reproduce the visible; it renders visible” (quoted in San Lazzaro 1957: 105).

This orientation toward the possible and the “not yet” is in no way restricted to the visual arts. In this regard, Klee seemed for instance to share common ground with several modernist writers, including Robert Walser—whom Susan Sontag (2001: vii) has characterized as “A Paul Klee in prose”—and Robert Musil, whose approach to literature was continuously sustained by an “attitude that treats the given, the reality of facts, as merely one actualized option of countless nonrealized possibilities” (McBride 2006: 15; cf. Jonsson 2000: 213).162

According to Musil, the artist is “concerned with expanding the range of what is inwardly still possible” (Musil 1990b [1911]: 7). Thus in his own way, Musil, too, emphasized art’s ability to render visible: “To love something as an artist,” he wrote,

means to be shaken not by its ultimate value or lack of value, but by a side of it that suddenly opens up. Where art has value it shows things that few have seen. It is conquering, not pacifying. (Musil 1990b [1911]: 7)

At this point, I want to return briefly to the woman in Volos’s novella, whose “fishlike” thoughts no words seemed able to convey. Perhaps we can think of her predicament precisely in relation to the problem of form giving. What Musil has called the tertium separationis is “the condition that one cannot express what ought to be said directly as pure conceptualizing; otherwise,” he added, “everything except precise exposition would be inferior” (Musil 1990a [1912]: 16).163 Coincidentally, what appears in one of Klee’s most popular paintings, Der Goldfisch of 1925, is precisely a “luminescent fish [that] glows brightly in suspension in an aquatic netherworld” (Bassie 2005: 239).

162 On Musil’s orientation toward the emergent, see also his own sketch for an introduction to a planned volume of essays, in which he speaks of the nature of the intellectual imagination that guides his essays and of his search for “a possible image of the world and a possible person” (Musil 1998: 325, emphasis added). Comprehensive studies of Musil include Stefan Jonsson’s Subject without Nation: Robert Musil and the History of Modern Identity (2000); David S. Luft’s Robert Musil and the Crisis of European Culture, 1880-1942 (1980); and Patrizia C. McBride, The Void of Ethics: Robert Musil and the Experience of Modernity (2006).

163 Variations of this idea are common. Deleuze and Guattari, for instance, argue that, “in order to designate something exactly, anexact expressions are utterly unavoidable. Not at all because it is a necessary step, or because one can only advance by approximations: anexactitude is in no way an approximation; on the contrary, it is the exact passage of that which is under way” (Deleuze and Guattari 2005: 20, emphasis added).
Anthropologists who take seriously the primacy of inquiry could no doubt find inspiration in artists such as Klee and Musil, and in their persistent focus on giving form to what is in the process of becoming (see, e.g., Carrithers 2005; Marcus et al. forthcoming; Rabinow 2003: 68-75, 2008: 101-3). And anthropologists who are concerned, like these artists, with the emergent must also be creative. “That which one is trying to understand […] must be made into an object of study,” as Rabinow reminds us. “And, as any minimally coherent philosophical or social scientific understanding of Wissenschaft holds, that means it must be constructed” (Rabinow 2008: 34; cf. Bourdieu 1992: 224-47). Klee never fully adopted the Expressionist idiom. Musil, too, persistently opposed the doctrinal. In similar fashion, anthropologists should not, I think, adhere to one particular theory and apply it. Instead, as we engage with concrete empirical cases we must always be prepared to change our forms of inquiry. Klee himself, after all, felt a “distract for theorizing,” and, as he declared in his diary, “protested forcefully against the notion of theory in itself.” Yet he also admitted that he was “willing to exchange ideas, but healthy ideas arising from concrete cases” (Klee 1968: 318, 323-24).

It seems to me, then, that anthropology, although in a mode different than that of art, could give form to and expose that which cannot, in the words of Musil, “be said directly as pure conceptualizing.” What arguably makes the term conflict preventionism analytically productive is precisely the way in which it makes things appear. Conflict preventionism, to paraphrase Klee, does not reproduce the visible; it renders visible.

---

164 While I find the ideas of Musil and Klee helpful for thinking about anthropology, I do not mean to suggest that we should model anthropology on art or on literature. I agree with Rabinow (2003: 68-9) that, “If one is engaged in writing and exploring in the human sciences, it makes no sense to ‘imitate’ the forms used by those engaged in other practices, that is, those using other media in the pursuit of other ends. How would a twelve-tone anthropology sound? What would a fauvist sociology look like? Still, one can learn many things from other practices and take pleasure in what others have done or are doing.”

165 “Musil was attracted not to arguments or doctrines, let alone to a systematic philosophy,” as David Luft observes, “but rather to ideas and thinking as they are embedded in a process of lived experience […] Instead of despairing about a lost worldview, Musil was constantly absorbing the world as we actually live it and trying to understand its possibilities on the assumption that we barely understand a civilization that is just now coming into being” (Luft 1990: xxii, emphasis in original). This “nondogmatic empiricism,” as Patrizia McBride (2006: 25) puts it, was based on Musil’s “nonnormative, nonfatalistic view of reason,” which contained an “antiutopianism and antiapocalyptic quality.”

166 This claim is far from radical. “An axiom of what defines a science is that it changes its methods, its objects, and its ethos. A method that has proved productive for one type of object must be re-examined, and almost certainly modified, as the object of inquiry changes” (Rabinow 2006: 15).
References


Collier, Paul, V. L. Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis (2003) Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Develop-


Marcus, George E., Paul Rabinow, Tobias Rees, and James Faubion (forthcoming) Designs for an Anthropology of the Contemporary.


Index

adjacency, 157
af Malmborg, Mikael, 56n60, 57n63,
58, 59, 60, 64
aggregation, 36, 37, 38, 70, 75, 94,
145, 146, 150; and assemblage,
37, 70, 75, 94, 150; definition of,
75
Agrell, Wilhelm, 58n64, 59, 61, 64,
66, 68
Ahmed, Sara, 18n8, 80
Allen, Tim, 102, 103
Amnesty International (AI), 19, 21,
24, 27, 35, 73, 78, 83, 84, 88, 93,
106, 109, 133
“An Agenda for Peace,” 47, 48, 100
appearance, 18n8, 20, 38, 94, 116,
117, 145, 147, 149-50, 150n144,
151, 154, 157, 158n154, 163, 164;
and reality 149-50
Arendt, Hannah, 15, 140-41,
141n138, 145n140, 149-50, 157
assemblage, 16, 16n4, 36, 37, 69, 70,
75, 94, 107n121, 150; and aggrega-
tion, 37, 70, 75, 94, 150; definition
of, 16n4, 70
attention, and anthropological analy-
sis, 38, 151, 154-57; Merleau-
Ponty’s definition of, 154
audit, 19, 23, 26, 38, 90, 117, 121,
131, 132, 134, 135, 140, 155
authority, 33, 85, 90n106, 140, 142
authorization, 115, 134-35, 144
Barry, Andrew, 82-3
Bassie, Ashley, 152, 160, 161n159,
161n160, 163
Bauman, Zygmunt, 104
Ben-Ari, Eyal, 45, 45n44, 123

beginnings, 15, 38, 130-31, 134-35,
144, 146; Edward Said on, 130-31,
134
Benedict, Ruth, 28, 29, 154
Bernadotte, Folke, 64-65, 65n76
Besteman, Catherine, 28n25, 31-32,
32n31
Björklund, Leni, 22n13, 125,
125n129
“Blaue Reiter,” the, 160, 160n158
Boas, Franz, 28, 158n154, 162
Bogaland, 18, 19, 20, 26, 35, 36, 37,
38, 95, 96-100, 103, 104, 105-8,
108-12, 113, 115, 117, 118, 119,
121-22, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128,
130-31, 134, 137-38, 139, 141,
142-45, 150, 155; description of,
96-100; as fiction, 106, 112-13,
126, 142-44; intervention in, 127-
28, 130-31; and PTF, 138, 139,
142-45; production of, 108-12;
and remediation, 107-8, 113, 144;
in Stockholm, 137-38, 150
Bosnia, 22n14, 32, 48, 50
Bourdieu, Pierre, 30n27, 40, 155, 164
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 48, 100
Bowness, Alan, 158
Brandstätter, Christian, 152n147, 154
Branting, Hjalmar, 57
Brethell, Richard, 158
Brock, Charles, 153
Burk, James, 17n5, 44-45, 76n89
Butler, Christopher, 141, 160,
161n159
Calhoun, Craig, 104, 123n126
Carl XVI Gustaf, 122-23
Carnegie Commission on Preventing
Deadly Conflict, 31, 102n116
Carrithers, Michael, 164
Castel, Robert, 19-20, 20n9, 80
Červinková, Hana, 43, 45
Chandler, David, 17, 49, 72, 87, 130
Chomsky, Noam, 17, 49, 72, 73
CIMIC, 23, 71, 73, 86, 88-89, 133;
civilian critique of, 133; NATO
definition of, 88; politicization of, 88
civil-military cooperation, 16, 17, 18,
19, 21, 23, 24, 36, 37, 46, 51, 71-74, 75, 77-78, 79, 80-83, 84, 85-86, 87-89, 91, 94, 95, 104, 107, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 131, 133, 145, 146; and informal rela-
tions, 77-78, 110; in Viking 03, 21, 23, 73-74, 79, 80-83, 85-86, 108-10, 133, 146; rethinking of, 85-6, 88
civil-military division, 80-83, 93, 116-17
Coker, Christopher, 43, 141n138
Cold War, 21, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 65, 66, 68, 87, 100, 105, 123n126; Sweden during the
Cold War, 63-68
Collier, Stephen, 16n4, 35n36, 36n37, 70, 74n86
competitive humanitarianism, 83-85, 119
conflict prevention, 17, 19, 24, 31, 37, 50, 55, 95, 100-2, 142, 145
conflict preventionism, 15-18, 20, 23, 33, 35, 37, 38, 42, 70, 75, 94, 95, 104, 107n121, 113, 116, 124, 130, 134, 139, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 150, 164; and directionality, 38, 116, 130, 144, 145; and ethics, 38, 146-47; and neoliberalism, 17, 18, 20, 23, 37, 104, 130, 139; and remediation, 37, 107n121, 113, 144
conflicts, contemporary problematiza-
tion of, 36, 37, 95-96, 100-4, 105, 107, 108, 111, 113-14, 121-22, 126-30, 135, 142, 143, 145, 146-47, 150, 154
Cooper, Robert, 89, 129, 145
cosmopolitanism, 42, 53, 54, 91, 92, 123-24, 123n126, 129, 146; and human rights, 53, 54
“cosmopolitan law enforcement,” 129-30
critique, 27-34, 38, 55, 104-5, 141, 143, 151, 153, 158n154, 162; and Viking 03, 38, 83, 90, 92, 104-5, 109, 120-21, 133-34, 135, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145
cultural critique, 27-30, 162
culture concept, 26, 27-31, 32n30, 33, 33n33, 54, 55, 94, 162; and the military, 26, 27, 29, 31, 42, 45, 55
Dahlberg, Hans, 58n64, 58n65, 59, 60, 61, 62, 62n70
Dallaire, Roméo, 49, 49n53
Dandeker, Christopher, 17n5, 24, 44, 45
Deleuze, Gilles, 16n4, 163n163
Dembour, Marie-Bénédicte, 52, 53, 54
democracy, in Sweden, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 64
directionality, 17, 18, 20, 35, 36, 38, 39, 42, 115, 116, 126, 130, 131, 134, 135, 139, 144, 145, 147; definition of, 116
Duffield, Mark, 17n5, 83, 88, 91, 103
Dunne, Tim, 53
emergence, 31, 35-36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 55, 69-70, 74-75, 130, 134, 139, 142, 150, 151, 155, 156, 157, 163n162, 164; definition of, 35n36
Engle, Karen, 54, 54n57, 54n58
Erlander, Tage, 61
European Union (EU), 16, 21, 22, 50, 100, 101
expertise, anthropologist as expert, 31-32, 104, 155-56; NGOs as ex-
perats, 38, 73-74, 84, 110, 115, 119-21, 134, 142
Expressionism, 157, 159-62; and anthropology, 159-60, 162; and Impressionism, 160-61
“failed states,” 19, 100, 103, 156
Fälldin, Thorbjörn, 67
fiction, 38, 106, 112, 113, 137, 139, 141-44, 147; definition of, 139; and myth, 105-6
fieldwork, 23n18, 23-27
Finnemore, Martha, 42, 51
Fischer, Michael, 30, 33, 35n36
“focused gathering,” 37, 93-94, 94n113
Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), 21, 24n19, 65, 74, 91n107, 93, 102n116, 117, 142
Fondacaro, Steve, 27, 31, 140, 156
foreign intervention, see international intervention
Foucault, Michel, 106-7, 146-47
Franzén, Nils-Olof, 56n59, 56n61, 57
Frazer, James, 158
Frühstück, Sabine, 45
Geertz, Clifford, 28, 29, 34, 93-94, 139
“global civil society,” 72
Goffman, Erving, 94n113
Goldwater, Robert, 151n146, 159, 159n155, 159n156, 161n159
González, Roberto, 27, 28n25
Grimshaw, Anna, 151n146, 158, 158n153
Guattari, Félix, 16n4, 163n163
Gustaf V, 56, 56n61, 60
Gusterson, Hugh, 27, 28n25, 29, 31-32, 32n31
Hadenius, Stig, 56n59, 56n61, 57, 60, 64, 65
Hammarskjöld, Dag, 46, 47, 63, 63n73, 65, 67, 79
Hamnerz, Ulf, 20n11, 21, 33n32, 36n37, 123n126, 155, 156
Hansson, Per Albin, 58, 58n66, 59, 60, 61
Harvey, David, 18n7, 90
Hastrup, Kirsten, 54
Hausenstein, Wilhelm, 161-62
Held, David, 22, 47, 51
Helmreich, Stefan, 29, 30
Hironaka, Ann, 17n5, 103
Hoffmann, Josef, 152
human rights, 36, 42, 47, 51-55, 72, 73, 91n106, 116; and anthropology, 54-55; and cosmopolitanism, 53, 54
humanitarianism, 16, 17, 18, 20, 24, 36, 37, 48, 49, 64, 72, 73, 77, 83, 87, 88, 107n121, 110, 125, 135, 143, 145; humanitarian rhetoric, 86-87, 91, 92, 103
Hunt, Lynn, 51, 51n55, 52, 80n94
“ignorance as power,” 140-41
Impressionism, 157-58, 158n151, 158n152; and anthropology, 158; Expressionist critique of, 161
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 21, 74, 83, 94, 124
“international community,” the, 91n106, 123-25, 126
International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC), 21, 73
international norms, 51, 73
Ishay, Micheline, 51, 51n55, 52
Jackson, Jean, 28n25, 30, 31
journalism, and anthropology, 155
Kaldor, Mary, 17n5, 73, 73n85, 102, 102n118, 103, 111, 129, 130
Kandinsky, Wassily, 159, 160, 160n157, 160n158
Kant, Immanuel, 52, 131
Keck, Margaret, 73, 73n85, 101
Kermode, Frank, 106, 137, 143, 144
Klee, Paul, 154n150, 158, 159, 160, 162-63, 162n161, 164
Klimt, Gustav, 152, 154
Kokoschka, Oskar, 152n147, 161, 162
Kosovo, 49, 50, 92, 92n110, 124
Rabinow, Paul, 16n4, 29, 31n28, 35, 35n36, 36, 69-70, 107n121, 108, 146, 157, 164, 164n164, 164n166
Rappe, Axel, 56n62, 61
Razack, Sherene, 17, 49, 55, 89
remediation, 36, 37, 38, 39, 107n121, 107-8, 113, 138, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 150, 151, 154; and Bogalandy, 107-8, 113, 144; definition of, 107-8, 107n121
Ricoeur, Paul, 80n94, 143, 144-45
Rose, Nikolas, 30, 35n36, 130
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 71, 75
Rwanda, 49, 50
Said, Edward, 115, 130-31, 134
Sassen, Saskia, 42n40, 55, 74
Save the Children, 19, 21, 73, 82, 85, 106, 119, 120, 133
Schneider, Peter, 25n21, 85, 86, 88, 122, 123, 131, 132, 141
Selz, Peter, 159, 160, 160n157, 161, 161n160, 162, 162n161
Sennett, Richard, 92, 93
Shaw, Martin, 44, 128
Sheeler, Charles, 152-54
Sikink, Kathryn, 73, 101
Simons, Anna, 31, 45n44
Sköld, Nils, 63n74, 64, 66, 66n78
Somalia, 48, 49, 50
Staaff, Karl, 56, 56n61, 57
Stigsson, Tony, 100, 116-17, 116n124, 122, 125
Strathern, Marilyn, 26, 29n27, 90, 103, 112, 121
Sweden, and conflict prevention, 101-2; during the Second World War, 58-63; during the Cold War, 63-68; and international activism, 64-66; and neutrality, 22, 58, 59, 59n67, 64, 67, 68n81; self-image as “moral superpower,” 21, 55, 64, 68
Swedish Armed Forces, 15, 18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 42, 43, 44, 58, 58n65, 67, 71, 84, 87-88, 91, 93, 121, 122, 129, 146
Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), 21, 24, 74, 91n107, 93, 119, 132
Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation (SweFOR), 21, 73, 83, 89, 109, 133, 134
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), 24, 77-78, 88
“Swedish model,” the, 55, 60-61, 64
Swift, Jonathan, 28; Swift-esque approach in anthropology, 28-30, 34, 151, 162
Syren, Hakam, 15, 23, 43, 51, 81, 91, 103, 112, 121
Taillandier, Yvon, 157, 158n151
temporality, 16n4, 38, 69, 79-80, 94n113, 107n121, 115-16, 130, 143-45, 145n140, 146-47, 155, 156, 160
terrorism, 82n95, 103, 117, 127
Toker, Leona, 106, 108, 112, 113, 139
transparency, 17, 19, 22-23, 25, 37, 74, 89, 89n103, 90, 90n104, 133
United Nations (UN), 19, 21, 36, 37, 41, 42, 46-50, 51, 54, 54n57, 55, 63, 63n75, 64, 65, 66, 71, 96, 99, 100, 101, 116, 122, 124, 125, 126, 156
Viking 03, and civil-military cooperation, 21, 23, 73-74, 79, 80-83, 85-86, 108-10, 133, 146; and conflict preventionism, 19-20; critique of, 142-45; description of, 18-19, 21-23, 25-26; evaluation of, 131-34; the exercise, 116-31; fieldwork in, 23n18, 23-27; organizational logic of, 89-93; participants in, 21
Volos, Andrei, 149, 150, 151, 163
“warlords,” 98, 109, 111, 125, 126, 128-29, 130, 145
Wheeler, Nicholas, 53
White, Hayden, 106n120, 126, 128


20. First we are People... The Koris of Kanpur between Caste and Class. Stefan Molund. 1988.


45. “The Hospital is a Uterus”: Western Discourses of Childbirth in Late Modernity—a Case Study from Northern Italy. Tove Holmqvist. 2000.


56. *India Dreams: Cultural Identity Among Young Middle Class Men in New Delhi*. Paolo Favero. 2005.


