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TRADE IN RISKY ASSETS

by

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TRADE IN RISKY ASSETS

Abstract

This paper develops a theory of the international trade pattern in risky assets by applying the law of comparative advantage to asset trade. According to this law there is a tendency for a country to import assets that have relatively high autarky prices. The autarky price of an asset is high if the autarky real interest rate is low, or if the asset's autarky risk measure (the product of the risk premium and the asset price) is low. It is examined how autarky interest rates and risk measures are affected by international differences in (i) stochastic properties of output/endowments, (ii) the rate of time preference, (iii) the degree of risk aversion, and (iv) subjective beliefs, and how such differences predict overall capital account deficits or surpluses as well as the composition of the capital account into trade in arbitrary risky assets and the special cases of sure indexed bonds, stocks (claims to output), and Arrow-Debreu securities.

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1. Introduction

This paper develops a simple but general theory of the determinants of the international pattern of trade in risky assets. The importance of international trade in risky assets is obvious, with increased liberalization of international capital movements, and with the observation that in practice all assets are risky in the sense that their real returns are uncertain. Yet it seems that there is much less research done on the pattern of trade in explicitly risky assets than on the pattern of trade in goods.

The theory is developed by borrowing from and synthesizing several strands of literature. We start from the modern formulations of standard international trade theory, more precisely the general law of comparative advantage as developed by Deardorff (1980) and Dixit and Norman (1980). According to the law of comparative advantage there is a positive correlation between a country's net import of goods and the country's autarky prices relative to world prices (or relative to autarky prices in the rest of the world), such that on average a country is a net importer of goods for which autarky prices are relatively high. With only two goods, the law of comparative advantage provides an exact relation between the trade pattern and relative autarky prices. With more than two goods, it provides only a correlation between the vectors of net import and relative autarky prices, and it does not provide an exact relation for each individual good.

It is well known that the standard trade theory can be extended to an

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1 Stocks and equities are obviously risky assets, but so are all nominal bonds in any currency since there is exchange rate and price level risk. Exchange rate risk makes even very short-term bank deposits risky. A non-risky asset would be a hypothetical appropriately indexed (to some consumer price index, say) short-term deposit. Even such an asset is not sure in utility terms (see footnote 16).
intertemporal theory of international borrowing and lending, by interpreting commodities as dated goods. The law of comparative advantage then implies that a country will on average have a trade surplus in periods for which the autarky present value of goods is relatively high, that is, for which autarky interest rates are relatively low. It is also clear that the standard trade theory can be extended to the case with uncertainty, where goods are distinguished by the state of the world in which they occur. The principle of comparative advantage then says that a country will on average import goods in states for which the autarky prices for Arrow-Debreu securities, that is, state-contingent deliveries, are relatively high.

A special case of trade in risky assets has received considerable interest. This is trade in claims to firms' profits, equity. After pioneering work by Helpman and Razin (1978), a number of papers have recently examined the effects on trade in equities on welfare, resource allocation, and the goods trade pattern.

Here we will reformulate the law of comparative advantage so as to cover the case of trade in any arbitrarily specified set of assets, complete or incomplete. This will allow us to include as special cases trade in sure

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2 For an explicit statement of the intertemporal extension of the standard trade theory, see Persson and Stockman (1987).


5 The set of assets is complete (incomplete) in the usual sense of having at least as many (fewer) linearly independant assets as (than) the number of states of the world.
indexed bonds, trade in Arrow-Debreu securities, and trade in equities, or rather claims to firms' output (we shall make a simplifying assumption of exogenous stochastic outputs/endowments and no inputs, so as to be able to disregard the effect of trade in assets on production decisions, in which case claims to profit and claims to output coincide).

In standard trade theory, there are basically two approaches to examine the determinants of the trade pattern. One, the comparative advantage approach, is to start from the law of comparative advantage and its emphasis on autarky price differences, and then to go behind the autarky price differences and explain how these are caused by underlying differences between countries with respect to technology, endowments, preferences, or other characteristics. The other, the "direct" approach, is to look directly at trade equilibria without any reference to autarky prices, and infer how differences between countries directly determine the trade pattern. Whereas the autarky prices approach was common in the early work on the goods trade pattern, the direct approach has more recently been the dominant one, both in standard trade theory and in the literature on trade in equities referred to above.

There is, however, a special reason for basing a theory of the trade pattern for risky assets on relative autarky prices. The reason is that we can borrow from the general-equilibrium asset-pricing theory developed by

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6 See for instance the classic paper by Jones (1956).

7 For examples of use of the direct approach to the determinants of the pattern of trade, see Deardorff (1982), the survey by Ethier (1984), Dixit and Woodland (1982) and Markusen and Svensson (1985) for trade in goods, and Svensson (1984) and Ethier and Svensson (1986) for trade in goods and factors.
Lucas (1978), Breeden (1979), and others. It turns out to be very convenient to use this theory in order to express autarky asset prices in terms of autarky real interest rates and risk premia. Our work is hence closely related to international applications of this asset pricing theory, for instance Lucas (1982), Stulz (1981, 1984), Svensson (1985) and Stockman and Svensson (1987). That literature has focused on the determinants of prices on internationally traded risky assets, but not examined the trade pattern in risky assets in itself. In the typical set-up, as in Lucas (1982), there is trade in the outside assets, namely claims to output (equities), currencies and claims to government transfers. Since representative consumers with identical preferences are assumed, there is no trade in other, inside assets (which does not prevent any arbitrary inside asset to be priced, however). Furthermore, the trade pattern in the existing outside assets is trivial, since a perfectly pooled equilibrium is assumed, in which all investors hold the same portfolio.\(^8\) In our analysis, equilibria will

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\(^8\) That is, relative to autarky each country (in a two-country world) exports half of its assets and imports half of the other country's assets. Still, capital movements, and correlations between key macro variables like investment, the current account, output, etc., can be studied, as in Stockman and Svensson (1987), but any current and capital account movements are due exclusively to revaluation of domestically based assets relative to foreign based assets, not to changes in the ownership of assets.

Dumas (1986) considers a model with two investors with different degrees of risk aversion where the investors' portfolios are revised over time and asset trades between them occur. Stockman and Dellas (1986) and Stulz (1986) consider international asset pricing models with nontraded goods, where consumers do not have perfectly pooled equilibria but hold a larger share of domestic assets. Their focus is exclusively on equilibrium asset price and exchange rate determination and variability. Stockman and Hernandez (1986) utilize an international asset pricing model to demonstrate that the effect on policy like capital controls depends crucially on whether the private sector can hedge against the policy by trading in risky assets (in their case Arrow-Debreu securities). Gordon and Varian (1986) discuss welfare effects of taxes on internationally traded risky assets in a CAPM model and examine the analog to the optimum tariff result for trade in goods.
generally not be perfectly pooled.

We mentioned that our theory is general in the sense of covering any arbitrary complete or incomplete set of assets, including as special cases sure indexed bonds, equities and claims on output (stocks), and Arrow-Debreu securities. Also, our theory includes the determinants of the aggregate current account and capital account, hence aggregate international borrowing and lending, as well as the composition of the capital account, the trade in individual assets (subject to the qualification that when there are many assets results are in the form of correlations and hold on average, but not exactly for each individual asset).

The first step in our method is to express the autarky asset price for a given asset in terms of the autarky real interest rate and the autarky risk measure (the risk measure is the product of the risk premium and the asset price). Differences in countries' autarky real interest rates affect the autarky prices of and trade in all assets, and are related to whether a country has an overall capital account deficit or surplus and hence is a net lender or borrower. A country with a relatively low autarky real interest rate has a tendency to have an overall capital account deficit and be a net lender. Differences in autarky risk measures are specific to individual assets and are related to the trade in individual assets. A country with a relatively low autarky risk measure for an asset (that is, for which an asset is relatively less risky) has a tendency to import that asset.

The second step is to examine what determines the differences between countries' autarky real interest rates and risk measures. We will look at the effect on autarky real interest rates and risk measures of differences between countries with respect to technology, endowments and preferences, or
more precisely (i) the stochastic properties of output/endowments, (ii) the rate of time preference, (iii) the degree of risk aversion, and (iv) expectations (subjective probability beliefs).

The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 deal with preliminaries and can be skimmed by readers not interested in the standard derivation of the law of comparative advantage. Section 2 describes the model, the equilibrium for a single country, and demonstrates gains from trade in risky assets. Section 3 describes a world equilibrium with two countries and derives the law of comparative advantage for trade in risky assets. Section 4, the core of the paper, discusses the determination of autarky asset prices, derives the effect of cross-country differences in technology/endowments and preferences on autarky real interest rates and risk measures, and finds the trade pattern for arbitrary assets as well as the special cases of sure bonds, stocks, and Arrow-Debreu securities. Section 5 concludes.

The results are summarized in a highlighted paragraph at the end of each subsection of section 4. Reading just those paragraphs gives an overview of the results.

2. Equilibrium in a Single Country and Gains from Asset Trade

We consider a situation with one good and two periods. There are two countries, home and foreign, in the world. Period 1 outputs in the home and foreign country, $y^1$ and $y^*1$, are exogenous, and deterministic. Period 2 outputs in the two countries, $y^2$ and $y^*2$, are also exogenous, but stochastic. We call the vector $s = (y^2, y^*2)$ the state of the world in period 2. Goods are perishable and there is no storage or other investment technology.

There is a given set $J$ of $J$ different assets. (We let $J$ denote both the set and the number of elements of the set.) These assets are traded on a
world asset market in period 1, before the uncertainty about the state of the
world in period 2 is resolved. Each asset $j \in J$ is characterized by a given
(gross real) return function $R_j(s)$, which expresses the gross real returns
paid in the one good as a function of state $s$ in period 2. Returns are not
necessarily positive in all states.

Let us look at some special assets. First, the sure bond pays one unit
of the good in each state. It is identified with $j = 0$ and is defined by
(2.1a) \[ R_0(s) = 1 \text{ for all } s. \]
A second special case is trade in stocks. Let us identify home and foreign
stocks (claims to home and foreign period 2 output, respectively) as assets
$j = h$ and $j = f$, defined by the return functions
(2.1b) \[ R_h(s) = y^2 \text{ and } R_f(s) = y^*^2 \text{ for all } s. \]
Third, the Arrow-Debreu securities are the set of assets that each pay one
unit of the good in one specific state only. We identify the Arrow-Debreu
security for state $s$ with $j = s$, for all $s$. It is defined by
(2.1c) \[ R_s(\sigma) = 1 \text{ for } \sigma = s, \quad R_s(\sigma) = 0 \text{ for all } \sigma \neq s. \]

Let $S$ be the (finite or infinite) number of different states of the
world. In standard terminology, the asset market is said to be complete if
the set $J$ of assets is such that there are $S$ linearly independent assets
(that is, there are $S$ linearly independent return functions). Then agents
can reach the same consumption bundle across states via trade in the
available assets as they can via trade in the $S$ Arrow-Debreu securities. If
there are fewer than $S$ linearly independent assets, the asset market is said
to be incomplete. Our analysis does not presume that the asset market is
complete or that trade in Arrow-Debreu securities is feasible, but
incorporates these possibilities as special cases. Below, we shall sometimes
assume that the state of the world is bivariate normally distributed. Then,
whenever the number of assets is finite, the asset market is incomplete.

Let us now consider the home country. It has a representative consumer who is entitled to home output in the two periods. The consumer has a subjective probability distribution function $F(s)$ over the states of the world. The consumer has preferences over period 1 consumption, $c^1$, and state-dependant period 2 consumption, $c^2(s)$. The preferences can be represented by the additively separable expected utility function

$$U(c^1) + \beta E[U(c^2)],$$

where $U(\cdot)$ is a standard increasing concave sufficiently differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, $\beta > 0$ is the subjective discount factor, and $E[x]$ denotes the subjective expected value $\int x(s)dF(s)$.

Let $m$ denote (net) import of period 1 goods, and let the $J$-vector $z = (z_j)_{j \in J}$ denote (net) import of the $J$ assets from the world asset market in period 1. Then period 1 consumption and period 2 consumption in state $s$ are given by

$$(2.3a) \quad c^1 = y^1 + m \quad \text{and}$$

$$(2.3b) \quad c^2(s) = y^2 + \sum_{j \in J} R_j(s)z_j.$$  

It is practical to define preferences directly over import of period 1 goods and assets. Substitution of (2.3) into (2.2) allows us to define the trade utility function $\tilde{U}(m,z)$ by

$$\tilde{U}(m,z) \equiv U(y^1 + m) + \beta E[U(y^2 + \sum_{j \in J} R_j(s)z_j)].$$

Let $p$ and $q = (q_j)_{j \in J}$ denote the price of period 1 goods and the $J$-vector of

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9 As is well known, representing preferences by an additively separable expected utility function does not allow a separation between risk aversion and intertemporal substitution in consumption (see Selden (1978, 1979)). When discussing differences in risk aversion, we shall actually use Selden's formulation to separate risk aversion from intertemporal substitution.

10 We disregard bankruptcy issues, by not restricting consumption to be non-negative.
asset prices. It is convenient to define the balance-of-payments (deficit) function \( B(p,q,u) \) as the minimum expenditure on import of goods and assets required to reach a given utility level. That is,

\[
B(p,q,u) = \min \{ pm + qz \mid \tilde{U}(m,z) \geq u \},
\]

where \( qz \) denotes the inner product \( \sum_{j \in J} q_j z_j \). (The balance-of-payments function is simply the standard expenditure function minus the value of period 1 output.)

In the rest of the paper we will take period 1 goods to be the numeraire, \( p = 1 \), and hence express asset prices \( q \) in terms of period 1 goods.

It is now easy to represent a trade equilibrium for the economy, an equilibrium in which the economy faces a given vector of asset prices \( q \) on the world asset market. It is simply given by the equations

\[
B(1,q^t,u^t) = 0,
\]

\[(2.6)\]

\[
m = B_p(1,q^t,u^t) \quad \text{and} \quad z = B_q(1,q^t,u^t).
\]

\[(2.7a) \quad (2.7b)\]

Equation (2.6) says that the balance of payments is zero in equilibrium, whereas equations (2.7a) and (2.7b) express import of goods and assets as the derivative of the balance-of-payments function with respect to the price of period 1 goods and asset prices respectively, exploiting standard properties of expenditure functions. For given world asset prices \( q^t \), equations (2.6) and (2.7) can be solved for the corresponding home utility level \( u^t \) and the

\[11 \quad \text{This function occurs in the literature under a variety of names. See Lloyd and Schweinberger (1986) for references to its use in previous literature.}\]
import $m$ and $z$ of goods and assets.\footnote{If the balance-of-payments function is not differentiable in $p$ or $q$, goods and asset imports are not unique. We can then interpret $B_p$ and $B_q$ as correspondances. Our results below on the trade pattern do not depend on whether goods and asset imports are unique or not. For comparative statics of the Dixit and Woodland (1982) type, it is necessary that the balance-of-payments function is differentiable.}

An autarky equilibrium, an equilibrium without access to the world asset market, is given by the equations (2.6) and

\begin{equation}
B_q(1,q,u) = 0,
\end{equation}

the latter stating that the import of assets is zero. (Import of period 1 goods is then also zero, $B_p(1,q,u) = 0$, but by Walras's Law that equation is redundant.) Equations (2.6) and (2.8) can be solved for the autarky asset prices $q$ and the autarky utility level $u$.

It follows that the gains-from-trade theorem holds: Let $u^t$ be the utility level associated with a trade equilibrium, and let $u$ be the utility level in an autarky equilibrium. Then we have

\begin{equation}
u^t \geq u.
\end{equation}

The proof is as in the standard trade model (see for instance Dixit and Norman (1980) or Woodland (1982)). First, we have

\begin{equation}
B(1,q^t,u^t) = 0 = m^a + q^t z^a \geq B(1,q^t,u).
\end{equation}

The balance of payments in the trade equilibrium is zero (the first equality in (2.10). This trivially equals the value at trade asset prices $q^t$ of the autarky import $m^a$ and $z^a$ of period 1 goods and assets, since these are zero (the second equality in (2.10)). Zero import gives autarky utility level $u$. The minimum import expenditure at trade prices required to reach utility level $u$ cannot be larger, and will be less if there is some substitution and trade prices differ from autarky prices (the inequality in (2.10)). Second,
since the balance-of-payments function is increasing in utility, (2.9)
follows from (2.10).

We note that the gains-from-trade theorem implies that trade in
complete or incomplete asset markets is better than autarky. However, in
analogy with the case with goods trade only, it does not follow that trade in
more assets is better than in fewer, unless the prices of all previously
traded assets remain unchanged. The usual terms-of-trade qualification
applies: if the prices of assets previously imported (exported) increase
(decrease) when trade in additional assets is opened up, the negative
terms-of-trade effect may outweigh the gains from trade.

3. World Equilibrium and the Law of Comparative Advantage

Next we shall consider a world equilibrium with trade between the home
and foreign countries. The foreign country has access to a world market with
the same set J of assets as the home country, a representative consumer
entitled to foreign output in the two periods and with a subjective
probability distribution function \( F^*(s) \), a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function \( U^*(\cdot) \), a subjective discount factor \( \beta^* > 0 \), and a trade utility
function over period 1 goods (net) import \( m^* \) and asset (net) import \( z^* \),
\( \tilde{U}^*(m^*,z^*) \), defined by the analog to (2.4). We can then represent the foreign
country by a balance-of-payments function \( B^*(p,q,u^*) \) defined by the analog of
(2.5). A trade equilibrium for the foreign country is then, for given asset
prices \( q^t \) relative to period 1 goods, the utility level \( u^* \) and the import \( m^* \nand \( z^* \) of period 1 goods and assets that solve the equations analog to (2.6)
and (2.7). An autarky equilibrium for the foreign country is an autarky
asset price vector \( q^* \) and a utility level \( u^* \) that fulfill the analogs of
(2.6) and (2.8).
A world equilibrium is a vector \((q^t; m, z, u^t; m^*, z^*, u^*t)\) such that 
\((q^t, m, z, u^t)\) and 
\((q^t, m^*, z^*, u^*t)\) are trade equilibria for the home and the 
foreign country, respectively, and such that the world asset market and 
period 1 goods market are in equilibrium,

\[
\begin{align*}
(3.1a) & \quad z + z^* = 0, \text{ and} \\
(3.1b) & \quad m + m^* = 0.
\end{align*}
\]

(The world market for period 1 goods is in equilibrium whenever the asset 
market is in equilibrium, given the budget constraint (2.6) for the home 
country and the analog for the foreign country.)

Let \(m\) and \(z\) be the home country's import of period 1 goods and assets 
in a world equilibrium, and let \(q\) and \(q^*\) be home and foreign autarky asset 
prices relative to period 1 goods. Then the law of comparative advantage can 
be written on the form

\[
(3.2) \quad (q - q^*)z \geq 0.
\]

It states that on the average, the home country will import assets whose 
autarky prices are higher in the home country than in the foreign country. 

If only one asset is traded we have an exact relation between autarky asset 
prices and the trade pattern: The asset will be imported (and period 1 goods 
will be exported) if and only if the autarky price of the asset is higher in 
the home country than in the foreign country. If more than one asset is 
traded, the law of comparative advantage provides a "tendency" for a 
particular asset to be imported if its autarky price is relatively high,
rather than an exact relation for import in any individual asset.\textsuperscript{13}

The proof of the law of comparative advantage is as in the standard trade model (see Deardorff (1980), Dixit and Norman (1980), or Woodland (1982)). We have

\begin{equation}
(3.3) \quad m + qz \geq B(1,q,ut) \geq B(1,q,u) = 0.
\end{equation}

The first inequality follows since import \((m,z)\) gives utility \(ut\) but is not necessarily the combination of net import of goods and assets that minimize expenditure at autarky prices. The second inequality follows since we know from the gains-from-trade theorem that the home country's utility level \(ut\) in any trade equilibrium cannot fall short of the utility level in autarky \(u\), and the balance-of-payments function is increasing in utility. The equality follows from the budget constraint (2.6). An analogous argument for the

\textsuperscript{13} As Deardorff (1980) emphasizes, a positive inner product \(xy = \Sigma_j x_j y_j \geq 0\) does not exactly provide a positive correlation between the \(J\)-vectors \(x = (x_j)\) and \(y = (y_j)\), unless either \(\Sigma_j x_j = 0\) or \(\Sigma_j y_j = 0\). This is so, since the sample correlation coefficient \(\text{cor}(x,y)\) is proportional to the sample covariance \(\text{cov}(x,y)\) and the latter fulfills \(\text{cov}(x,y) = xy - \Sigma_j x_j y_j / J\).

Deardorff shows how one can construct correlations in two ways. One way is to exploit the balance-of-payments constraint. Let \(q^t\) be the asset prices in terms of goods in the world equilibrium. Then (3.2) is equivalent to the statement that the \((J+1)\)-vectors \((0,((q^*_j - q^*)/q^t_j))\) and \((m,(q^t_j z_j))\) are positively correlated, since \(m + q^t z = 0\). The other way is to restrict the vector of goods and asset prices to be in the unit simplex. Let \((p,q)\) and \((p^*,q^*)\) be the home and foreign autarky prices of period 1 goods and assets. The proof in the next paragraph of the text gives \((p-p^*,q-q^*)(m,z) \geq 0\).

Restricting \((p,q)\) and \((p^*,q^*)\) to be in the unit simplex then implies that the \((J+1)\)-vectors \(((1,q)/(1+\Sigma_j q_j) - (1,q^*)/(1+\Sigma_j q^*_j))\) and \((m,z)\) are positively correlated.

For our purpose it is sufficient to interpret (3.2) as stating that there is tendency for asset \(j\) to be imported into the home country \(z_j > 0\) when its home autarky price (measured in goods) is higher than its foreign autarky price (measured in goods) \(q_j > q^*_j\).
foreign country gives

(3.4) \[ m^* + q^*z^* \geq 0, \]

which we by (3.1) can write as

(3.5) \[-m - q^*z \geq 0. \]

Addition of (3.3) and (3.5) gives (3.2).

When discussing the determinants of the trade pattern, one can either examine the world equilibrium directly, or rely on the law of comparative advantage. In the former case, one discusses how differences between countries directly determine the trade pattern, without looking at the autarky prices. In the latter case, one looks at how differences between countries determine relative autarky prices, and then from that indirectly infers the determinants of the trade pattern. In recent discussions of the trade pattern of goods and factors in the standard trade model, the former route has usually been chosen (see references mentioned in the Introduction). In our case, it is convenient to choose the latter route, since we can then directly apply a standard theory of asset pricing.

4. The Pattern of Trade in Risky Assets

a. The current account and the capital account

Let us state the balance-of-payments relation for the home country in a trade equilibrium. We can write it as

(4.1) \[ m + q^t z = B(1, q^t, u^t) = 0, \]

stating that the sum of the current account deficit (net import of goods \( m \)) and the capital account deficit (the value of net import of assets \( qz \)) is zero.\(^\text{14}\) Hence what is being determined in a trade equilibrium is not only

\(^{14}\) Since there is no initial international debt, the trade balance and the current account coincide.
the aggregate current and capital account deficits, that is, whether the home country is a net borrower or lender (the intertemporal trade pattern), but also the components of the capital account, the disaggregate trade pattern in individual assets (the interstate trade pattern).

If we would like to concentrate on the intertemporal trade pattern, we could simplify the model by considering trade in only one asset, and even disregard the effect of uncertainty and incomplete markets by then assuming that there is no uncertainty and only one state in period 2. This gives us the simplest possible model to discuss international borrowing and lending. If we would like to concentrate exclusively on the trade pattern in risky assets, we could eliminate the first period, and assume that assets are traded before uncertainty is resolved. This then abstracts from intertemporal trade and gives us the simplest possible model of trade in risky assets, "interstate" trade.

As we shall see, in the more general model intertemporal trade and interstate trade are not independent, and, for instance, the available assets affect a country's current account. Therefore, we choose to keep the two-period framework. This also has the advantage that the expressions for asset prices to be derived are similar to those used in the asset-pricing literature.

b. Autarky asset prices

The home autarky asset price $q_j$ of a particular asset $j$ with return vector $R_j(s)$ is simply given by the marginal rate of substitution between asset $j$ and period 1 goods of the trade utility function (2.4) at zero import of goods and assets, $\tilde{U}_j(0,0)/\tilde{U}_m(0,0)$, where $\tilde{U}_j$ and $\tilde{U}_m$ denote the partial with respect to $z_j$ and $m$. It follows from (2.4) that the autarky asset price will fulfill
\[(4.2) \quad q_j = \beta E[U_c(y^2)R_j]/U_c(y^1),\]
the familiar expression of the discounted expected utility of period 2
returns over the marginal utility of period 1 consumption.

It is practical to relate the price of an asset to the real interest
rate on a sure bond, and to the risk measure for the asset. First, define
the autarky real interest rate, \( r \), from the autarky asset price of the sure
bond,
\[(4.3) \quad q_0 = 1/(1+\rho) = \beta E[U_c(y^2)]/U_c(y^1),\]
where we have substituted \((2.1a)\) in \((4.2)\). Second, let us define the autarky
risk measure for asset \( j \), \( \Pi_j \), as
\[(4.4) \quad \Pi_j = -\text{Cov}[U_c(y^2), R_j]/E[U_c(y^2)].\]
Third, use the rule \( E[xy] = E[x]E[y] + \text{Cov}[x,y] \) to rewrite \((4.2)\), and apply
the definitions \((4.3)\) and \((4.4)\). This gives,
\[(4.5) \quad q_j = \{E[R_j] - \Pi_j\}/(1+\rho).\]
We see that the asset price can be written as the present value of the
difference between its expected return and its risk measure.

The risk measure is proportional to the negative of the covariance
between the marginal utility of period 2 consumption \( U_c(y^2(s)) \) and the
returns \( R_j(s) \).\(^{15}\) Hence it is positive or negative depending upon whether
period 2 marginal utilities and returns are negatively or positively

\(^{15}\) The risk premium can be defined as the difference between the expected
gross rate of return, \( E[R_j]/q_j \), and the gross real rate of interest, \( 1+\rho \).
Then the risk premium is equal to \( \Pi_j/q_j \) and fulfills \( \Pi_j/q_j =
-\beta\text{Cov}[U_c(y^2)/U_c(y^1), R_j/q_j] \) and is hence the negative of the covariance
between the marginal rates of substitution and the ex post \textit{rates} of return
\( R_j(s)/q_j \).
correlated. The risk measure for an asset can be interpreted as a measure of how risky that asset is relative to the sure bond. If the risk measure is positive, the asset is riskier than the sure bond. If it is negative, the asset is less risky than the sure bond.\textsuperscript{16}

It is clear from (4.5) that autarky prices for a given asset may differ across countries because autarky interest rates, autarky risk measures, or both, differ across countries. If the subjective beliefs, the subjective probability distributions over states of the world, differ across countries, autarky asset prices may differ also because the expected return for a given asset differs. The analysis below consequently examines the underlying determinants of differences in autarky interest rates, risk measures, and expected returns.

c. Trade in risky assets

We shall examine the difference between the home and foreign countries' autarky asset prices of a given asset $j \in J$. We will look for conditions under which the home country's autarky asset price exceeds the foreign country's autarky asset price, and hence under which there will be a tendency in a world equilibrium for asset $j$ to be imported by the home country and exported by the foreign country. In the special case where asset $j$ is the only traded asset we will know for sure that asset $j$ will be imported.

The home autarky asset price of asset $j$ is given by expression (4.2) or (4.5). The foreign autarky asset price is given by an analogous expression,

\textsuperscript{16} Note that the sure bond has a sure return, but that the utility value of the return is risky, since marginal utility itself is risky. Hence there is nothing paradoxical with assets that are less risky than the sure bond. A sure-utility bond (in autarky) $(j = u)$ would have returns $R_u(s)$ fulfilling $U_c(y^2)R_u(s) = 1$, hence $R_u(s) = 1/U_c(y^2)$ for all $s$. 
with a * denoting foreign output and preferences. Let us now assume that the subjective probability distribution is the same in the home and foreign country,

\[(4.6) \quad F(s) = F^*(s) \text{ for all } s,\]

so the expected return for a given asset j is the same in both countries,

\[(4.7) \quad E[R_j] = E^*[R_j].\]

(Below we shall discuss also the case when the subjective probability distribution differs across countries and (4.7) does not hold.) Let us also restrict the discussion to assets with positive expected return,

\[(4.8) \quad E[R_j] > 0.\]

(If the expected return is negative, we can simply redefine the asset by changing the sign of its returns.)

If the countries are identical in all respects, the autarky asset prices will be identical, there is no basis for trade, and zero trade will be a trade equilibrium. Hence, trade here arises because of differences between the countries. The countries can differ either with regard to their outputs, or with regard to their preferences, including their subjective probability distributions. Let us first consider a situation when the only difference between the countries is with regard to their outputs.

(i) Differences in output

Thus, we assume that the foreign country is identical to the home country in all respects except the outputs, and we drop the * on the foreign country's preferences.

Let us first look for conditions under which the home autarky interest rate is lower than the foreign one,

\[(4.9) \quad r < r^*.\]

A lower home autarky interest rate implies by (4.5) that for all assets,
which do not have higher autarky risk measures at home than abroad, home autarky prices will be higher, and there is a tendency for the home country to import all such assets. For assets with a higher autarky risk measure at home, a lower home autarky real interest rate implies a higher autarky price but not necessarily higher than the foreign autarky price. Nevertheless, we may state that a lower home autarky real interest rate contributes to a tendency to import all assets into the home country, to run a home capital account deficit, and hence for the home country to be a net lender. This is true also if the sure bond does not exist. If the only asset traded is the sure bond, we have an exact result and know for sure that the the home country will import the sure bond and be a net lender.

We can examine this by looking at the difference in autarky prices of the sure bond. The difference is given by

\[(4.10) \quad q_0 - q_0^* = \frac{1}{1 + r} - \frac{1}{1 + r^*}\]

\[= \beta E\left[\frac{U_c(y^2)}{U_c(y^1)} - \frac{U_c(y^2)}{U_c(y^1)}\right].\]

We would like to know under what conditions this difference is positive. Let us first assume that the countries differ only with respect to period 1 output. We then have

\[(4.11) \quad q_0 - q_0^* = \beta E\left[\frac{U_c(y^2)}{U_c(y^1)}\right] / \left[\frac{1}{U_c(y^1)} - \frac{1}{U_c(y^1)}\right].\]

Since the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing, it follows directly that the home autarky price of the sure bond is higher, and the home autarky interest rate lower, if the home country has a higher period 1 output,

\[(4.12) \quad y^1 > y^*1.\]

This is a standard consumption smoothing result (across countries, though,
not across time).\textsuperscript{17} The home country has relatively more output in period 1, and it will export goods in period 1 and import goods in period 2, by being a net lender in period 1.

Let us next assume that period 1 output is the same in the two countries, but that period 2 output is different. Then we have

\begin{align}
q_0 - q_0^* &= \beta E[U_c(y^2) - U_c(y^{*2})]/U_c(y^1). 
\end{align}

Since the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing, it follows (see Theorem 1 in Lippman and McCall (1981)) that a sufficient condition for (4.13) to be positive is that home period 2 output is stochastically smaller than foreign period 2 output, that is, home period 2 output is first-order stochastically dominated by foreign period 2 output, denoted

\begin{align}
y^2 &\prec_1 y^{*2}.
\end{align}

First-order stochastic dominance of home output by foreign output implies that the expected value of home output is smaller,

\begin{align}
E y^2 &< E y^{*2},
\end{align}

and can be understood as a generalization of that property.\textsuperscript{18}

This result can also be interpreted as a straight-forward consumption smoothing result. If the home country has lower expected period 2 output than the foreign country, it will export goods in period 1 and import goods

\textsuperscript{17} If both countries have less period 1 output than period 2 output (average or for each state of the world), home consumption becomes more unevenly divided over time with trade in the sure bond than in autarky.

\textsuperscript{18} Let $G(\cdot)$ and $G^*(\cdot)$ denote the cumulative distribution functions for the random variables $y$ and $y^*$, respectively. We say that $y^*$ is stochastically larger than $y$, written $y^* \succ_1 y$, or $G^* \succ_1 G$, if and only if $G(x) - G^*(x) \leq 0$ for all $x$. Equivalently, we say that $y^*$ stochastically dominates $y$ to the first order. See Lippman and McCall (1981).
in period 2, by being a net lender in period 1.

Under the assumption that preferences exhibit non-increasing absolute risk aversion the third-order derivative $U_{ccc}$ of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is positive,\(^{19}\)

\[(4.16) \quad U_{ccc} > 0,\]

and the marginally utility of consumption is a convex function of consumption. Then, another sufficient condition for (4.13) to be positive (see Theorem 2 in Lippman and McCall (1981)) is that home period 2 output is more risky than foreign period 2 output, that is, home period 2 output is second-order stochastically dominated by foreign period 2 output, denoted

\[(4.17) \quad y^2 \succ y^2.\]

A special case of this is when home and foreign period 2 output have the same mean but home output has a larger variance,

\[(4.18) \quad \text{Var}[y^2] > \text{Var}[y^2],\]

or when home period 2 output is a mean-preserving spread of foreign period 2 output. Second-order stochastic dominance can be understood as a generalization of those special cases.\(^{20}\)

\(^{19}\) The measure of local absolut risk aversion is $-U_{cc}/U_c$. We have

\[(d/dc)(-U_{cc}(c)/U_c(c)) = -U_{ccc}/U_c + (U_{cc}/U_c)^2 \le 0, \text{ which implies } U_{ccc} \ge (U_{cc})^2/U_c > 0.\]

\(^{20}\) Let $G(\cdot)$ and $G^*(\cdot)$ denote the cumulative distribution functions for the random variables $y$ and $y^*$, respectively. We say that $y^*$ is less risky than $y$, written $y^* \succ y$, or $G^* \succ G$, if and only if $\int_{-\infty}^{x}[G(z) - G^*(z)]dz \ge 0$ for all $x$. Equivalently, we say that $y^*$ stochastically dominates $y$ to the second order. See Lippman and McCall (1981).
Intuitively we can understand this result the following way. If marginal utility is a convex function of consumption, Jensen's inequality implies that increased variance in consumption increases expected marginal utility, which increases the price of the sure bond and decreases the interest rate. If the third-order derivative is negative, the opposite result holds. This is an example of the ambiguity of the effect on saving on increased riskiness of future income (see the survey by Sandmo (1974)). In the literature there is general agreement that non-increasing absolute risk aversion and hence a positive third-order derivative of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is the most relevant case. Thus, the country with the riskier period 2 output will have a tendency to import the sure bond, and having the riskier period 2 outputs contributes to a tendency to import all assets and be a net lender.

The results above for the sure bond are summarized in Table 1, row (i), first column.

Let us next turn to differences in the risk measures. From (4.5) we see that, for a home autarky real interest not higher than the foreign one, a lower risk measure at home for asset j implies a higher home autarky asset price and hence a tendency for asset j to be imported into the home country. For a home autarky interest rate higher than the foreign one, a lower home autarky risk measure implies a higher autarky asset price, but not necessarily higher than in the foreign country. Risk measures are specific to individual assets and depend on the individual risk characteristics of the assets. Hence a difference in risk measures for a given asset gives information about trade in that specific asset; a difference in autarky real interest rates affect autarky asset prices for all assets and hence gives information about aggregate asset trade, the capital account.
Let us assume that autarky interest rates are the same, in order to focus on differences in autarky risk measures alone. Let us look at conditions for the home autarky risk measure for asset $j$ to be lower than the foreign one,

\[(4.19) \quad \Pi^*_{j} < \Pi^*_{j*}.\]

We assume that period 1 output is the same in both countries. From (4.3) and equal autarky interest rates it follows that $E[U_C(y^2)] = E[U_C(y^{*2})]$. Then, from (4.4) we see the home autarky risk measure then is lower if and only if

\[(4.20) \quad \text{Cov}[U_C(y^2), R_j] > \text{Cov}[U_C(y^{*2}), R_j],\]

that is, if the return is more positively correlated with home marginal utility of consumption than with foreign marginal utility of consumption.

Since marginal utility of consumption is decreasing in consumption, we might believe that (4.20) is equivalent to the simple condition that the return should be more negatively correlated with home period 2 output than with foreign period 2 output,

\[(4.21) \quad \text{Cov}[y^2, R_j] < \text{Cov}[y^{*2}, R_j].\]

This is so only in special cases, though. One interesting special case is when the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function has constant absolute risk aversion, that is, when

\[(4.22) \quad U(c) = -e^{-\gamma c},\]

with the constant $\gamma = -U_{cc}/U_c > 0$ being Arrow-Pratt's measure of absolute risk aversion. If in addition period 2 outputs and asset return are all jointly normally distributed,\(^{21}\) it is easy to apply a theorem by Rubinstein

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\(^{21}\) Note that, as usual, the assumption of a normal distribution of outputs is problematic, since it implies that outputs can take negative values with positive probability.
(1976)\textsuperscript{22} and show that the risk measure is simply given by
\begin{equation}
\Pi_j = \gamma \text{Cov}[y^2, R_j].
\end{equation}
Then, for $\gamma = \gamma^*$, $\Pi_j < \Pi_j^*$ is equivalent to (4.21).\textsuperscript{23}

We conclude that, under the assumption of equal autarky interest rates, the condition is simply that the return should be more negatively correlated with home period 2 output than with foreign period 2 output. Then asset \( j \) is less risky in the home country, its autarky risk measure is lower, its autarky asset price is higher, and there is a tendency that the asset will be imported by the home country. This result is reported in Table 1, row (i), the second column.

Let us next consider trade in home and foreign stocks. Because of symmetry we need only look at foreign stocks. Trade in foreign stocks is of course affected by differences in autarky interest rates, since these affect trade in all assets. Suppose now that autarky interest rates are the same. Then the autarky risk measure is the only source of differences in autarky asset prices. The condition for the home autarky risk measure for the foreign stocks to be low, and thus for a tendency for the home country to import foreign stocks, is, from (4.21),
\begin{equation}
\text{Cov}[y^2, y^{*2}] < \text{Cov}[y^{*2}, y^{*2}] = \text{Var}[y^{*2}].
\end{equation}
We know that $\text{Cov}[y^2, y^{*2}] \leq (\text{Var}[y^2]\text{Var}[y^{*2}])^{1/2}$. If we assume that home and foreign period 2 output has the same variance, which from our previous discussion is in accordance with the assumption of equal autarky interest rates, we get that a sufficient condition for (4.29) is that home and foreign

\textsuperscript{22} The theorem says that, if \( x \) and \( y \) are bivariate normal, under some mild regularity conditions, $\text{Cov}[f(x), y] = E[f(x)]\text{Cov}[x, y]$.

\textsuperscript{23} Other cases when (4.20) and (4.21) are approximately equivalent are discussed in a previous Working Paper version of this paper.
outputs are less than perfectly positively correlated. Thus, there is a
tendency for the home country to import foreign stocks if the two period 2
outputs are not perfectly correlated. By symmetry, there will be a tendency
for the home country to export home stocks, if home and foreign period 2
outputs are less than perfectly correlated. These results are summarized in
Table 1, row (i), third column.

Let us finally consider Arrow-Debreu securities. Let \( f(s) \) denote
either the probability of state \( s \) (if the probability distribution is
discrete) or the probability density for state \( s \) (if the probability
distribution is absolute-continuous). From (2.1c) and (4.2) the home autarky
price of Arrow-Debreu security \( s \), for all \( s \), will then be
\[
(4.25) \quad q_s = \beta f(s)U_c(y^2)/U_c(y^1).
\]
When the countries' period 1 outputs are equal, it follows directly that
there is a tendency for Arrow-Debreu security \( s \) to be imported if home period
2 output in state \( s \) is lower than that of the foreign country,
\[
(4.26) \quad y^2 < y^*2.
\]
That is, trade in Arrow-Debreu securities is simply related to the relative
scarcity of period 2 output.

Summary: Table 1, row (i), summarizes the results on output
differences and asset trade. First, in general a low home autarky interest
rate contributes to a tendency for the home country to import all assets and
be a net lender. If the only traded asset is a sure bond, it will definitely
be imported by the home country. The home autarky interest rate is low if
home period 1 output is high, or if home period 2 output is stochastically
smaller than foreign period 2 output. The home autarky interest is also low
if preferences exhibit non-increasing absolute risk aversion, and if home
period 2 output is riskier than foreign period 2 output. Second, in general
a low autarky risk measure for an asset (the product of the risk premium and the asset price) contributes to a tendency for the home country to import the asset. The autarky risk measure is low if the asset's returns are more positively correlated with home autarky period 2 marginal utility than with foreign autarky period 2 marginal utility. If autarky interest rates are equal, under some restrictions there is a more specific result: If the joint probability distributions between returns and period 2 outputs are normal and there is constant absolute risk aversion, the autarky risk measure is low if the asset's return is more negatively correlated with home output than with foreign output. Third, if autarky interest rates are equal, there is a tendency for the home country to import foreign stocks, and export home stocks, if home and foreign outputs are less than perfectly positively correlated. Fourth, there is a tendency to import an Arrow-Debreu security for a particular state if home period 2 output in that state is lower than in the foreign country.

Next, we assume that outputs are identical in the two countries, but that preferences differ.\textsuperscript{24} We shall consider differences in the rate of time preference (the subjective discount factor), the degree of risk aversion, and the subjective probability distribution.

(ii) Differences in the rate of time preference

The effect of differences in the rate of time preference is easy to see. Consider the situation when the home country has a lower rate of time preference than the foreign country. That is, the home subjective discount

\textsuperscript{24} We assume $y^2 = y^*2$, that is, home and foreign period 2 output are identical and hence perfectly correlated. This is of course not equivalent to assuming that home and foreign output are i.i.d. In the former case, claims to home and foreign output are perfect substitutes. In the latter case, they are not.
factor is larger,

\[(4.27) \quad \beta > \beta^*.\]

It follows directly from the definition of the autarky asset price (4.2) that home autarky asset prices will be higher for all assets (with positive asset prices).\(^{25}\)

**Summary:** When the home country has a lower rate of time preference, there is a tendency for all assets to be imported into the home country, and for the home country to be a net lender.

(iii) Differences in risk aversion

We would like to consider differences in risk aversion across countries. This is a bit problematic with expected utility preferences like (2.2), since in that formulation attitudes towards risk cannot be separated from intertemporal substitution. Therefore, we choose to use a formulation according to Selden (1978), which allows such a separation. More precisely, we assume that there are *intertemporal preferences* over period 1 consumption, \(c^1\), and *certainty equivalent* period 2 consumption, \(\hat{c}^2\), according to the intertemporal utility function

\[(4.28) \quad U(c^1) + \beta U(\hat{c}^2).\]

**Attitudes towards risk** are represented by the risk utility function \(V(c^2)\), by which the certainty equivalent period 2 consumption is defined according to

\[(4.29) \quad V(\hat{c}^2) = E[V(c^2(s))], \text{ or } \hat{c}^2 = V^{-1}\{E[V(c^2(s))]\}.\(^{26}\)

\(^{25}\) We realize from (4.5) that assuming that expected dividends are positive, (4.10), is not the same thing as assuming that the asset price is positive, since the risk term may positive and larger than the present value of the expected return.

\(^{26}\) Note that when the intertemporal utility function is identical to the risk utility function, \(U(\cdot) = V(\cdot)\), (4.28) and (4.22) imply the expected utility preferences (2.2).
We restrict preferences to have constant absolute risk aversion, that is,

\[(4.30) \quad V(c^2) = -e^{-\gamma c^2}.\]

The trade utility function is defined by \(\tilde{U}(m,z) = U(y^{1+m}) + \beta U(V^{-1}\{E[V(y^2 + \sum_{j\in J} R_j(s))])\}).\) It can then be shown that autarky asset prices \(q_j = \tilde{U}_j(0,0)/U_m(0,0)\) can still be written as in (4.5), with the risk measure defined by (4.4). With the risk utility function fulfilling (4.30), and under the assumption that period 2 output and asset returns are jointly normally distributed, the risk measure is indeed given by (4.23). The difference is that the autarky price of sure bonds and the autarky real interest rate are given by

\[(4.31) \quad q_0 = 1/(1+r) = \beta U_c(y^2)/U_c(y^1),\]

where the certainty equivalent period 2 output is given by

\[(4.32) \quad \tilde{y}^2 = E[y^2] - \gamma \text{Var}[y^2]/2.\]

We now assume that the countries differ only with respect to the measure of absolute risk aversion, and that the home country is more risk averse,

\[(4.33) \quad \gamma > \gamma^*.\]

First, we examine interest rates. We see immediately from (4.32) that when the home country is more risk averse, the home certainty equivalent period 2 output, \(\tilde{y}^2\), will be lower than the foreign one, \(\gamma^* = E[y^2] - \gamma^* \text{Var}[y^2]/2\) (although home and foreign period 2 outputs are identical). Therefore, the home autarky price of the sure bond will be higher and the real interest rate will be lower,

\[\text{We use that for } x \text{ normally distributed, } E[e^{-ax}] = e^{-\alpha(\mu - \alpha \text{Var}[x]/2)}.\]
(4.34) \[ r \rightarrow r^*. \]

This contributes to a tendency for the more risk averse home country to import all assets.

Next, we look at the autarky risk measures for a given asset j. In order to ensure that differences in autarky risk measures are the only reason for trade, we assume that autarky real interest rates are equal. Since, as we have seen above, autarky real interest rates differ between the countries, when the home country is more risk averse and their intertemporal preferences are identical, we now assume that the subjective discount factors differ so as to equalize the autarky real interest rates.

The difference in the autarky risk measures equals, by (4.23),

(4.35) \[ \Pi_j - \Pi_j^* = (\gamma - \gamma^*)\text{Cov}[y^2, R_j]. \]

It follows from (4.33) that the condition for the home autarky risk measure to be lower, and for a tendency for asset j to be imported into the home country, is

(4.36) \[ \text{Cov}[y^2, R_j] < 0. \]

The return should be negatively correlated with period 2 output. From (4.23) and (4.36) this also implies that the risk measure should be negative,

(4.37) \[ \Pi_j < 0. \]

Since the sure bond has a zero risk measure, this means that the asset should be less risky than the sure bond. Thus there is a tendency for the more risk-averse home country to import assets which are less risky than the sure bond.

Consider also trade in stocks (claims to period 2 output, \( R_h(s) = R_f(s) = y^2 \)). Since period 2 output is positively correlated with itself, it follows directly from the above analysis that there is a tendency for stocks to be exported by the more risk-averse home country, since they have a
positive risk measure and are riskier than the sure bond.

Let us finally consider the special case of Arrow-Debreu securities. From (2.1c) and the definition of the trade utility function it follows that the home autarky price of a particular Arrow-Debreu security $s = y^2$ (since home and foreign period 2 outputs are now identical, the state can simply be identified with the period 2 output in each country) is given by

$$q_S = \frac{f(y^2)\nu_c(y^2)}/\nu_c(\tilde{y}^2)/(1+r).$$

(4.38)

Assuming that autarky interest rates are equal and using (4.30) and (4.32) and some algebra gives the ratio between home and foreign autarky prices of the security,

$$q_S/q^*_S = e^{-(\gamma - \gamma^*)}[y^2 - (E(y^2) - (\gamma + \gamma^*)\text{Var}(y^2)/2)].$$

(4.39)

It follows that there is a tendency for the security to be imported for states for which period 2 output falls short of a given level of period 2 output $\tilde{y}^2 = E(y^2) - (\gamma + \gamma^*)\text{Var}(y^2)/2$. When period 2 output is sufficiently low, marginal utility in the home country is higher since a higher risk aversion means that marginal utility decreases more rapidly with consumption.

**Summary:** The results under the assumption that the home country has a higher constant absolute risk aversion than the foreign country are summarized in Table 1, row (iii). First, when home and foreign intertemporal preferences are identical, the home autarky interest rate is lower, which contributes to a tendency for the home country to import all assets and be a net lender. Second, when also subjective discount factors differ so as to make autarky real interest rates equal, there is a tendency for the more risk-averse home country to import assets with negative risk measures, that is, assets that are negatively correlated with period 2 output and less risky than the sure bond. Third, there is then a tendency for the home country to
export stocks, since they are assets which are more risky than the sure bond.

Fourth, there is a tendency for the home country to import Arrow-Debreu securities for states with sufficiently low period 2 output.

(iv) Differences in subjective beliefs

Finally, we consider the case when countries differ only with respect to their subjective probability distributions, their beliefs. That is, their subjective probability distributions are no longer identical,

\[(4.40) \quad F(s) \neq F^*(s).\]

For a given asset \(j\) with returns \(R_j(s)\) it is no longer true that that \(E[R_j(s)] = \int R_j(s)dF(s)\) is equal to \(E^*[R_j(s)] = \int R_j(s)dF^*(s)\). Therefore, the previous method of expressing the asset price in terms of the real interest rate and the risk measure is not applicable. It is no longer true that a low autarky interest rate increases the relative autarky price for all assets. Hence it is no longer true that a low autarky interest rate contribute to a tendency for all assets to be imported. A low autarky interest rate implies only that there is a tendency for the sure bond to be imported.

Assume that preferences are again represented by the expected utility function \((2.2)\).\(^{28}\) From \((4.2)\) it follows that the difference between the autarky prices of the sure bond is

\[(4.41) \quad q_0^* - q_0^* = \beta\{E[U_c(y^2)] - E^*[U_c(y^2)]\}/U_c(y^1).\]

We can directly apply our results on the autarky interest rates for differences in period 2 output. First, since marginal utility of consumption is decreasing, as sufficient condition for a lower home autarky interest rate is that the home subjective probability distribution over (both countries') period 2 output, \(F(y^2)\), (recall that \(s = y^2\)) is first-order dominated by the

\(^{28}\) That is, the risk utility function in \((4.28)\) is assumed to be identical to the intertemporal utility function in \((4.29)\).
foreign subjective probability distribution over (both countries') period 2 output, \( F^*(y^2) \), that is,
\[
(4.42) \quad F \prec_1 F^*.
\]
Put differently, the home country has more pessimistic beliefs about both countries' period 2 output than the foreign country. Second, if the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function has non-increasing absolute risk aversion, marginal utility is convex, and a sufficient condition for a lower home autarky interest rate is that the home subjective probability distribution over (both countries') period 2 output is second-order dominated by the foreign subjective probability distribution over (both countries') period 2 output, that is,
\[
(4.43) \quad F \prec_2 F^*.
\]
Put differently, the home country believes that both countries' period 2 output is more risky than the foreign country believes.

For an arbitrary asset \( j \), the difference between the home and foreign autarky price of asset \( j \) is
\[
(4.44) \quad q_j - q_j^* = \beta \int (f(y^2) - f^*(y^2))U_c(y^2)R_j(y^2)dy^2/U_c(y^1)
\]
(when the distributions are absolute-continuous; the analog for discrete distributions is obvious). Expression (4.44) states that there is a tendency for asset \( j \) to be imported into the home country if the probability density differences, \( f(s) - f^*(s) \), are positively correlated with the marginal-utility weighted returns, \((U_c(y^2)R_j(s))\).\(^{29}\) Thus, we have the rather obvious result that the home country has a tendency to import an asset when it assigns higher probabilities than the foreign country to the states where

\(^{29}\) We note that (4.44) being positive is equivalent to a positive correlation between the \( f(s) - f^*(s) \) and \( U_c(y^2)R_j(s) \), since \( \int (f(s)-f^*(s))ds = 0 \) (cf. footnote 13 above).
the assets pays well (where paying well means that the product of marginal utility of consumption and returns is large).

For stocks, the autarky price difference is

\[ q_h - q^*_h = \beta \left[ E[U_c(y^2)\bar{y}^2] - E^*[U_c(y^2)\bar{y}^2] \right] / U_c(y^1). \]

Let us consider the case with constant relative risk aversion \( \rho \) (and intertemporal elasticity of substitution \( 1/\rho \)),\(^{30}\)

\[ U(c) = c^{1-\rho}/(1-\rho), \quad \rho > 0. \]

We have that the product of marginal utility and output is \( U_c(y^2)y^2 = (y^2)^{1-\rho} \). This product is increasing or decreasing depending upon whether the degree of relative risk aversion is below or above unity.

Let us consider the case when the degree of relative risk aversion is above unity (\( \rho > 1 \)). Then the product of marginal utility and output is decreasing and convex, and we have the same two sufficient conditions for a tendency for the home country to import stocks as we have stated above for the tendency to import the sure bond, namely that the home country has more pessimistic beliefs about both countries' period 2 output than the foreign country ((4.42)), or that home country believes that both countries' period 2 output is more risky than the foreign country believes ((4.43)).

If the degree of relative risk aversion is below unity (\( \rho < 1 \)), the product of marginal utility and output is increasing and concave. Then the two sufficient conditions are reversed. The home country should have more optimistic beliefs about both countries' period 2 output than the foreign country, that is,

\[ F > F^*, \]

or the home country should believe that both countries' period 2 output is

\(^{30}\) In terms of Selden's formulation, \( V(\cdot) \) and \( U(\cdot) \) are identical and given by (4.46).
less risky than the foreign country believes, that is,

\[(4.48) \quad F > F^*.\]

For the special case of Arrow-Debreu securities, the difference in autarky prices for security \( s = y^2 \) is simply

\[(4.49) \quad q_s - q_s^* = \beta(f(y^2) - f^*(y^2))U_c(y^2)/U_c(y^1).\]

We see that there is a tendency to import Arrow-Debreu securities for states that are assigned larger probability by the home country

\[(4.50) \quad f(y^2) > f^*(y^2).\]

Summary: The results on differences in subjective beliefs are summarized in Table 1, row (iv). First, the home autarky interest rate will be low, and there will hence be a tendency for the home country to import the sure bond, if the home country has more pessimistic beliefs about the two countries' period 2 output than the foreign country, or (when preferences in the two countries exhibit non-increasing absolute risk aversion) the home country believes that both countries' period 2 output is more risky than the foreign country believes. Counter to previous cases, a low home autarky interest rate does not imply that home autarky prices for other assets are low, and hence does not necessarily contribute to a tendency to import all assets. Second, there is, rather obviously, a tendency for the home country to import an arbitrary asset if the home country assigns higher probabilities than the foreign country to states for which the marginal utility times returns is high. Third, the tendency to import stocks (claims to period 2 output) depends on the degree of relative risk aversion. If the degree of relative risk aversion is above (below) unity, there is a tendency for the home country to import a claim to period 2 output if the home country has more pessimistic (optimistic) beliefs about the two countries' period 2
output than the foreign country, or if the home country believes the two countries' period 2 output is more (less) risky than the foreign country. Fourth, there is a tendency to import Arrow-Debreu securities for states (period 2 output levels) that are assigned higher probabilities by the home country than by the foreign country.

5. Conclusions

We have presented a theory of the determinants of the trade pattern in risky assets, by extending the law of comparative advantage according to which trade is correlated with autarky price differences. Hence we have looked at how differences between countries with regard to technology, endowments and preferences determine autarky asset price differences and consequently the trade pattern in risky assets. We have derived results on the effect of differences in (i) output/endowments, (ii) rate of time preferences, (iii) risk aversion, and (iv) subjective beliefs on the trade pattern in arbitrary risky assets as well as the special cases of sure bonds, stocks, and Arrow-Debreu securities. The results have been summarized in highlighted paragraphs at the end of each subsection of section 4, and they are also summarized in Table 1.

We realize from our results that, when asset markets are incomplete, overall capital account deficits or surpluses depend on what assets are available for international trade. For instance, consider the case when countries differ only with respect to the stochastic properties of their output. If there is trade in claims to one country's output only, whether a country is a net borrower or lender depends on whether it is claims to its output or another country's output that is traded (as we saw above, a country has a tendency to export claims to its own output and import claims to other countries' output). It follows that in a monetary model with incomplete
markets, it will matter for the capital flows what currency available assets are nominated in, since the real return on the assets will be affected by price level risk.

The results derived have been interpreted in terms of trade in risky assets between countries. Obviously, the model and its results can also be interpreted in terms of trade in risky assets between individuals.\textsuperscript{31}

An important simplifying characteristic of our approach is that an asset is defined in terms of an exogenously given vector of next period's gross real returns across states of the world. We share this characteristic with most of the finance literature. Most assets, however, have gross real returns endogenously determined. For instance, the returns on equity, being claims to profits, are clearly endogenously determined when production decisions and goods and factor prices are endogenously determined. Even for an asset with exogenously given returns in terms of a particular good, the appropriate "real" return depends on endogenous relative goods prices when there are many goods. With many periods, the gross return in next period on a long-term asset is the sum of next period's endogenous asset price and the "direct" return/dividend (which may or may not also be endogenous).

Generally, for most assets the stochastic properties of the gross real returns are endogenously determined and part of the equilibrium, and the stochastic properties differ between trade equilibria and autarky equilibria.

\textsuperscript{31} Varian (1987) analyzes the effect on the volume of asset trade of differences of opinion between agents in a model with trade in Arrow-Debreu securities, using what we have called in the Introduction the "direct" approach. Our analysis of the effect of differences in subjective beliefs on the trade pattern in risky assets, using the law of comparative advantage, can hence be seen as complementary to his.
From the point of view of our approach, if an asset has one gross real return vector in a trade equilibrium, and another gross real return vector in autarky, it is actually two different assets.

Hence, since most assets have endogenous gross returns, it may seem that our approach with exogenously specified gross returns should have very restricted applicability. We argue, however, that our approach can be used also to predict the trade pattern for assets with endogenously determined returns. The trick is to identify a particular asset's (endogenously determined) gross real return vector across states of the world in a trade equilibrium, and then ask how a hypothetical asset with such a gross real return vector (taken to be exogenous and hence held fixed) would be priced in autarky. The home and foreign autarky asset prices of the hypothetical asset will then predict the direction of trade in the particular asset considered.

Taking the above into account, it is possible to extend the analysis to many goods and to more than two periods. As in the standard trade theory, the predictions of the law of comparative advantage are weaker for individual assets and goods, the more assets and goods there are.

The analysis has been restricted to a barter model without any money. It is clearly desirable to include the possibility of nominal assets and to analyze also the trade pattern in such assets. Extending the model to include money and other nominal assets raises several issues, though. One issue, already mentioned above, is that the appropriate gross real returns in trade equilibrium on any nominal asset considered have to be identified. We have already mentioned that the real return on nominal assets will depend on price level risk, which in turn will depend on countries' monetary policies. For instance, different exchange rate regimes and corresponding different
monetary policies will affect the trade pattern in nominal assets and hence overall capital flows. Svensson (1987) discusses these issues and the international trade pattern for nominal assets within the context of the law of comparative advantage. Persson and Svensson (1987) examine the effect of different exchange rate regimes and corresponding exchange rate variability on capital movements within the direct approach to the determination of the trade pattern in risky assets. Another issue is that the law of comparative advantage uses the gains-from-trade theorem, which does not necessarily hold if there are domestic distortions in autarky. Hence it will be crucial for the analysis how money is modeled, more precisely whether money is modeled as having real effects and possibly being distortionary, or whether money is modeled as being neutral.
References


Table 1. Summary of Results

(Import (yes or no (= export), or condition for import) of what asset under what difference.)

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<tr>
<th>Asset:</th>
<th>Sure bond ((r &lt; r^*))</th>
<th>Arbitrary asset ((\Pi_j &lt; \Pi_j^*))</th>
<th>Stocks</th>
<th>Arrow–Debreu</th>
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<td>Differences in:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>(y^1 &gt; y^1)</td>
<td>(y^2 &lt;_1 y^2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(y^2 &lt; y^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>Cov(U_c(y^2),R_j) &gt; Cov(U_c(y^2*)),R_j]</td>
<td></td>
<td>h: No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(y^2 &lt;_2 y^2)</td>
<td>(\text{Cov}[y^2,R_j] &lt; \text{Cov}[y^2*,R_j])</td>
<td>f: Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time preference</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((\beta &gt; \beta^*))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(iii)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk aversion</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Cov(y^2,R_j) &lt; 0</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>(y^2 &lt; y^2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>((\gamma &gt; \gamma^*))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(iv)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(\int (f(s) - f^*(s))U_c(s)R_j(s)ds &gt; 0)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(\rho &gt; 1:)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective beliefs</td>
<td>(F &lt;_1 F^*)</td>
<td>(F &lt;_2 F^*)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(F &lt;_1 F^<em>) or (F &lt;_2 F^</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>((F \neq F^*))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(f(s) &gt; f^*(s))</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(\rho &lt; 1:)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(F &gt;_1 F^<em>) or (F &gt;_2 F^</em>)</td>
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