An analysis of the potential of local stewardship as a management mode for increasing and enhancing ecosystem services in the urban landscape

Three case studies in Stockholm Municipality – Igelbäckken Allotment Garden, Akalla Allotment Garden and the Vinterviken Garden

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An analysis of the potential of local stewardship as a management mode for increasing and enhancing ecosystem services in the urban landscape.


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Abstract

The capacity of urban areas for generating quality of life is largely dependent on the ecological processes and the green spaces of the cityscape. The ecosystem services supported and generated by urban green spaces are fundamental to human well being in cities. Hence, this master thesis explores the possibilities of local stewardship as a possible management mode for enhancing ecosystem services in the urban landscape. It does so by an analysis of management rights to state-owned lands in the municipality of Stockholm and through evaluating to what extent the institutional structure of the management enables local stewardship. Further, by choosing three case studies comprised of Igelbäcken Allotment Garden, Akalla Allotment garden and the Vinterviken garden, all three located on state-owned land in Stockholm Municipality, this thesis explores how the rules in use are fashioned and followed and what role leadership plays in this process. Finally, the motivational drivers for getting involved in local stewardship in all three case studies were explored.

The study is of a qualitative nature primarily utilising semi-structured interviews with gardeners at the case studies, employees at the municipality and direct observation as a means to gather data. The key findings of this study suggest that the possibilities of local stewardship of green areas owned by Stockholm municipality are limited. The resources for the municipal districts’ administering of local stewardship initiatives are insufficient and the institutional structure is complicated and unclear.

The rules in use in the respective case studies are dependent on the leadership in the gardens and this thesis suggests that a mix of planning-led and visionary-led leadership could be employed in order to maintain a resilient institutional structure. The motivational drivers for the engagement in the case study areas differ but are dominated by practices within cultural, recreational and provisioning ecosystem services. Hence, the local stewardship examined in the three case studies indicates that the green-area management is not based on biodiversity conservation but is primarily oriented towards nurturing cultural and provisional ecosystem services. However, these practices contribute to enhancing additional ecosystem services.

The results of this study have indicated the importance of exploring the interplay between institutions, leadership and motivational drivers in order to design more efficient urban management designs that involve local stewardship groups.
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1. Introduction

1.1. Background, purpose, and overall structure of thesis

This master thesis explores the possibilities of local stewardship as a possible management mode for increasing and enhancing ecosystem services in the urban landscape. It does so by an analysis of management rights to state-owned lands in the municipality of Stockholm. Firstly, the study is framed by an overall analysis of state-owned green-areas in the capital of Sweden, focusing on the various governmental bodies and actors that are responsible for maintenance and management of Stockholm’s public green spaces.

Secondly, and as the major contribution of this thesis, an in-depth analysis of state-owned lands that are managed collectively is conducted. I characterize these landforms as examples of common property systems in urban settings. I analyse three examples of such landforms in the municipality of Stockholm by way of in-depth case studies. They include The Vinterviken Garden, Igelbäcken Allotment Garden, and Akalla Allotment Garden. The overall purpose for the analysis is to gain knowledge on how local stewardship on state-owned land could promote important social and ecological functions in the urban landscape.

A range of theoretical approaches and methods have been employed in this thesis, including property rights analysis, theories related to leadership and organization, the Biophilia approach, and in-depth case study interviews with respondents and informants. These are further elaborated on in the theory and method sections (i.e., parts 2 and 4).

The thesis is structured as follows: Part 1.2 serves to put the thesis into the relevant context and to introduce the readers to the major issues that form the rationales behind the thesis. Here, I emphasize that a broadened public participation by way of property rights schemes is critical in order to tackle an increasing loss of ecosystem services and associated extinction of experience among burgeoning urban populations. In part 1.3 the specific research questions of the thesis are outlined. Part 2 presents the various theoretical frameworks used to answer the research questions. Part 3 discusses methods used and part 4 describes the case studies conducted. This is followed by results obtained, presented in part 5. Results of case studies are elaborated on and further discussed in relation to providing answers to the three overarching questions that frame this thesis (part 6). The thesis ends by summarizing the major conclusions of what potential local stewardship of state-owned land holds in the wider context of making cities more sustainable (part 7).
1.2 The loss of ecosystem services and the risk of extinction of experience in urban areas

The debate on Climate Change has been prevalent in the research community as well as in the media of late. However, the detrimental use of natural resources has been paid less attention. In 2005 the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment reported an alarming loss of ecosystem services (ESS), showing that we are overusing 60% of the ESS available to us (MA 2005). In an increasingly urbanised world where 60% of the population will be living in cities by 2050 (McDonald, 2008) the pressures on the urban landscape is of considerable magnitude (Borgström et al, 2006). The capacity of urban areas in terms of quality of life is largely dependent on the ecological processes and the green spaces of the cityscape. The services generated by urban green spaces are fundamental to human well-being in cities, since they provide a number of essential services, such as recreation and cultural values, noise reduction, nutrient retention, biodiversity, insect pest regulation, surface water drainage, regulation of microclimate, air filtration, pollination, and seed dispersal (Barthel et al, 2005, Bolund and Hunhammar, 1999).

There is also another aspect to the loss of ecosystems and their services in urban areas that is rarely raised in the current scientific debate, i.e. the accelerating speed in which urbanites are being separated from nature (Miller, 2005, Pyle 1993). This seriously affects the ability of urban residents to relate to and actively engage in green area management (Colding et al 2006). This arguably could diminish citizens’ motivation to care for nature in and outside cities and contribute to the “extinction of experience” (Miller, 2005) as modern life-styles are adopted and as access to green areas is reduced. The questions of “what is there to protect?” or “why do we need these spaces?” arise. This constitutes a positive feedback loop (Berkes, 2007) that is, a vicious circle, of issues leading to ‘extinction-of-experience’ of nature in cities (Pyle 1978).

For urban planners the use and location of physical places represent key determinants in environmental planning as, for example, witnessed in systematic land-use planning approaches, smart growth development, and green infrastructure planning (Colding 2011). However, it is only recently that physical places on their own terms have received interest for their potential to promote civic environmental learning and local stewardship of land (e.g. Boyer and Roth 2006, Colding et al. 2006; Krasny and Tidball 2009; Barthel et al. 2010). While some city inhabitants have access to dwellings in the countryside and some may undertake regular excursions to the “wild”, the city’s ecological richness is formative to the experience of nature on a day-to-day basis for an urbanite. Such frequent experience with
nature in cities includes a range of services including aesthetics, recreation, education, and so on. People use green areas differently depending on interest and preferences. Hence, city green areas need to be available for urban residents both in ecological and social terms. To more actively counteract extinction of experience in cities and to promote a wider interaction of city inhabitants with nature, the development of different types of property rights regimes that facilitate a multitude of usage rights and management opportunities, could be a useful approach worth testing for cities (Colding 2011). Not the least, it can be of instrumental value for planners in making cities more sustainable. As argued in this thesis, it may encourage city dwellers to more actively engage with the green areas of their choice and to actively manage them in a sustainable manner to increase and enhance ecosystem services (Elmqvist et al, 2004). In the case of Stockholm, for example, the Stockholm Municipality owns 70 % of the land. This includes the majority of the city’s green areas including public parks. Therefore, it becomes relevant to explore what role state-owned land holds in terms of combating extinction of experience and engaging urban residents in active green area management.

1.3 Study objectives, research framework and questions

The major objective of this thesis is to explore the possibilities of local stewardship of green areas that are owned by the Stockholm Municipality. In this analysis I describe how the green areas of Stockholm city’s state owned land currently are governed and managed, as well as provide examples of green areas that are managed in cooperation between the municipality and local stewardship groups. This is done in order to illustrate the possibility for integrating local stewards in the present management of state-owned land.

Next, I analyze a subset of state-owned lands that is solely managed by so called “green-area user groups”. These include local groups that manage land individually or in cooperative form, such as in associations or similar organizational units (Colding et al. 2006). Three cases were selected for this analysis, two focusing on the allotment areas of Igelbäcken and Akalla allotment gardens, respectively, and one focusing on the Vinterviken garden. All gardens are located within the municipality of Stockholm and represent examples of where gardeners manage state-owned land.

In each case dealt with I analyse (1) institutions and property rights arrangements, (2) organization of leadership, and (3) the motives behind why green-area user groups partake in green-area management. In addition to the case studies, I investigate the institutional challenges encountered by the municipality districts and the green-area user groups when devolving management rights from the state-level down to local levels.
The thesis is guided by the following overarching research questions:

1: *What are the institutional possibilities for citizen participation in local stewardship of land owned by the municipality?*

2: *How do the institutional framework and the leadership in the selected case studies shape the rules-in-use employed by the green-area user groups?*

3: *What motivational drivers drive the green-area user groups in the three selected case studies?*

In order to provide answers to these questions, I conducted a broader institutional analysis to establish the most critical factors that appear to drive or counteract local initiatives for managing state-owned land in Stockholm. Because the selected case studies represent examples of local stewardship by way of collective management of green areas in Stockholm, the theories related to resource management in common property systems (e.g. Ostrom 1990; Berkes et al. 1998; Hanna et al. 1996) were chosen for analysis, coupled with theories on political and economic institutions developed by Douglas North (1990).

In investigating organization of leadership, I foremost employed Frances Westley’s model on Governing Designs (Westley 1995). My underlying assumption for this investigation is that leadership is fundamental as it determines how institutions will be interpreted and operationalized into rules-in-use by the different green-area user groups under study.

For my exploration of the different motives that drive the selected green-area groups, I used the theories related to local stewardship (Tidball and Krasny, 2007) and the Biophilia hypothesis coined by Edward O Wilson (1984). The motivational drivers were explored in order to understand why the members in green-area groups engage in the areas of their choice and to explore what these motivational drivers mean in terms of development of a broader framework for management of ecosystem services involving a greater set of the urban populace.
2. Theoretical framework

This thesis is based on the underlying recognition that nature provides us with a range of critical services that we fundamentally depend upon for our well-being. These services are labelled ecosystem services (Daily 1997; MA 2005) and constituted the focus in the UN-supported Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, which was a global assessment of the current status of the world’s ecosystems and their capacity to generate ecosystem services (MA 2005). Figure 1 describes a categorization of these services, as used in the MA, and what they provide in terms of supporting human well-being.

![Figure 1. Categorization of Ecosystem services from the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005.](image)

Ecosystem services are of grave importance at a planetary level as well as in urban settings. While urban areas cover only less than 3% of the Earth’s terrestrial surface, urban populations pose strong impacts on ecosystem services both in the local vicinity and at considerable distances from the cities. For example, 78% of carbon emissions, 60% of residential water use, and 76% of wood used for industrial purposes have been attributed to use by urban populations (Grimm et al. 2008). Whereas per capita greenhouse gas emissions from cities are lower than the average for the countries in which they are located (Dodman 2009), cities claim ecosystem support (including waste absorption) that sometimes is 500-1000 times larger than their own area (Folke et al. 1997).

While urban dwellers depend on ecosystems well beyond their city boundaries, they also depend on the presence of ecosystems within and near the city limits. Urban parks and other
urban green spaces provide spiritual, aesthetic, educational, and recreational benefits as well as regulating the microclimate, secure pollination, air filtration, water purification, and food provisioning. In order to safeguard the future generation of these services there is a need to manage the green areas available in a city in a sustainable manner. This entails, among others, keeping a mosaic of green areas to ensure connectedness for species for seed dispersal, genetic diversity and suitable habitats (Andersson et al, 2007, Colding et al, 2006). The areas should also ideally cater a diversity of flora and fauna in order to sustain the ecological processes necessary to generate ecosystem services more broadly and to promote ecosystem resilience.

While the demand for aesthetically pleasing natural landscapes has increased in accordance with increased urbanization, there has been a decline in the quantity and quality of such areas (MA 2005). A reduction in the availability of and access to natural areas for urban residents may have important detrimental effects on public health and economies. Of immense importance to reverse the degradation of ecosystem services, is to broaden the general public’s understanding and appreciation of its dependence on well functioning ecosystems. Local governments have a crucial role to play in facilitating opportunities for urban residents to engage with urban ecosystems and even to manage them. In this context it is crucial to explore what role institutions play for governing green areas in cities and what opportunity they offer in terms of sustaining ecosystem services more optimally, as discussed next.

2.1 Institutions

Institutions define and limit the set of choices of individuals. Institutions include any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction and comprise written and unwritten rules that shape human conduct (North, 1990). The written rules are commonly labelled “formal” and the unwritten labelled as “informal” and include social norms, modes of conduct and different values that humans hold (Colding and Folke, 2001). Political and economic rules as well as contracts are examples of formal rules. They define constraints from general rules to particular specifications. Political rules define the structure of the polity, the basic decision structure and set the agenda.

Informal rules are, however, equally important as stated by North (1990:36) “That the informal constraints are important in themselves (and not simply as appendages to formal rules) can be observed from the evidence that the same formal rules and/or constitutions imposed on different societies produce different outcomes.” Informal rules derive from socially transmitted information that is part of culture. Culture defines the way we process
and use information and hence may affect the way informal constraints get specified. One of the most important types of institutions are property rights regimes, which structure rights to land and resources, and the economic benefit streams generated from property. Property rights regimes also determine the ability to alienate a resource or prevent others from accessing it (Ostrom and Schlager 1996). There are generally three kinds of property rights regimes, including private-, state-, and common property rights regimes, although a combination of ownership arrangements to land and resources is common in both rural and urban settings (Hanna et al. 1996).

In the context of this thesis, the institutions that are actually in use by the green-area user groups analysed, are here referred to as “rules in use” (Berkes, 2004). Rules in use are most commonly about use, allocation and conflict resolution and less about conservation practices which may be more relevant for protection of ecosystem services. The rules in use may be comprised of formal rules or informal rules. The important factor here is that the rules in use are effectively sanctioned, formally or informally, by the members of the user-groups analysed and/or by the various governmental bodies that facilitate management of state-owned land in the municipality of Stockholm.

North (1990) argues that we must conceptually distinguish between the rules of the game and the players. The incentive of the players is to “win the game”, that is, to use the rules to meet their own objectives. Hence, it is important to separate the analysis of the underlying rules from the strategy of the players when building a theory of institutions.

Human behaviour is of course an essential part of the functioning and evolvement of institutions. Choices that individuals have to choose from are constrained by institutions, which in turn will ascertain whether the institution is functioning in a sufficient manner to meet the objectives of its players. This is not to say that institutions are necessarily created to be socially efficient, they are often created to serve the interests of those who hold the bargaining power to devise new rules.

An essential part in the analysis of institutions dealt with in this thesis, is the monitoring and sanctions of rules, which ensure that rules are followed and abided to (Becker and Ostrom, 1995). If transaction costs, representing the costs for protecting rights and for monitoring and enforcing agreements, were irrelevant; the efficiency of the institutions would be the dominant force. However, this is seldom the case and therefore transaction costs is of considerable importance in the design and effectiveness of institutions. How high the costs are is measured by a series of attributes that are dependent on the exchange in question. In this thesis the focus lies upon the exchange that is played out between the state actors (i.e. local municipalities) and the green-area groups that manage state-owned land by way of contracts.
Hence, in the dynamics of institutions and particularly crucial for this thesis, the transaction costs shape the “game” being played in terms of how costly an exchange or behaviour is for the constituent players. The general rule is that the players will choose to act in the manner that is least costly to them. For the system to work, however, it also becomes essential to devise rights. Otherwise self-interested behaviour will prevent exchanges that ensure that both parties are satisfied.

2.2 Property Rights

A property right can be defined as “an enforceable authority to undertake particular actions in a specific domain” (Ostrom, 2000:339). The rights of this authority, in the form of a group or an individual, must be observed by others.

Ostrom and Schlager (1996) have identified 5 categories of property rights that are useful for identifying user-rights in relation to common-pool resources (see Table 1). The term common-pool-resource (CPR) is defined by Ostrom (1990) as a natural or man-made resource system that is extensive enough to generate costs for excluding other beneficiaries of the resource. Moreover, the benefits consumed by one individual are capable of subtracting from the benefits available to others (Ostrom, 2000).

Table 1. Bundles of Rights Associated with Positions (Schlager and Ostrom, 1996:133).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Proprietor</th>
<th>Claimant</th>
<th>Authorized User</th>
<th>Authorized Entrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alienation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The categories defined in the table are explained as the following:
Access: The right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy nonsubtractive benefits (for example, hike, canoe, sit in the sun).
Withdrawal: The right to obtain resource units or products of a resource system (for example, catch fish, divert water).
Management: The right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource by making improvements.
Exclusion: The right to determine who will have access rights and withdrawal rights, and how those rights may be transferred.
Alienation: The right to sell or lease management and exclusion rights

For the purpose of this thesis, the bundle of rights associated with the position of green-area user groups is that of the claimant. It is, however, a fine line to distinguish between the right of a proprietor and that of a claimant as it depends upon what is withdrawn from the resource.
base. Claimants have the operational rights of access and withdrawal as well as a collective-choice right of managing a resource, which includes decisions regarding withdrawal rights (Ostrom and Schlager 1996).

In all of the three case studies employed in this thesis, people cannot harvest the vegetables and flowers without membership; however, the members have no right to exclude visitors and “users” for recreational purposes. Hence, in this study I label the active participants in management as claimants, and consider this characteristic of management to be a key feature in systems that can be classified as, a common property rights regime even though the rights of exclusion and alienation often are parts of such systems (Ostrom 1990).

In common property rights regimes, management rights to natural resources are in the hands of an identifiable community or group of users that may craft their own institutions for management of their resources within given legislative forms of society (Ostrom 1990; Berkes and Folke 1998; Berkes et al. 2003). These institutions and rights may look differently depending on the resource, such as the size of the group, the dominating culture and the social, economic and political climate influencing the tenure of the particular resource. Tenure here means the conditions under which the land is held including the obligations of the holder. Having tenure or having access to a resource is not the same as owning it. However an owner, such as the Municipality of Stockholm which owns an extensive amount of land within it’s borders, can grant the rights to manage the land to other users such as allotment gardens or others, thus granting them tenure and the rights to the products of that land without legally owning it. Such devolution of management rights from state-levels down to local levels have been proposed in several ecosystem management approaches (McNeely, 1993)

The case studies in this thesis are all situated on state-owned land. This can according to Hanna and Jentoft (1996) be important in the design of management institutions to prevent overuse of the resources available as the state plays an integral role in the relationship between humans and nature through the property rights it devises. However, this aim can backfire as the state often fails to account for the complexities of economic and social spheres. The issue under investigation in this thesis is whether the property rights are clearly stated and whether the operationalization of rights is efficient in regards to the local stewardship occurring in the cases analysed.
2.3 Leadership in organization

In order to interpret the role of leadership in the three case studies, Frances Westley’s model on Governing Design (1995) has been selected. The focus is on the Planning Mode and Vision Mode leadership as they are best represented in the case studies. All three of them are briefly accounted for in Table 2.

Westley (1995) differentiates between three types of organisational leadership: Planning Mode which originates from a government initiative, Vision Mode which is born from an inspirational visionary leader and Learning Mode which originates from the grassroots level where organization spring up from a joint concern such as citizen movements. Some pros and cons of the different leadership modes are argued by Westley to be the following: Planning Mode is efficient in mobilizing resources and structuring but may be less adept at issue definition which entails deciding on what the problem is and deciding on a course of action, and further it may be less adept at action mobilization that is, generating enough resources to set the course of action in motion. The issue definition is hampered by politicians’ difficulty or unwillingness to act outside the public arena where they are constrained by media coverage and the public. This also affects the action mobilization as without support from the public this is very difficult to achieve. One could argue that public support should be of interest in any case however, necessary but uncomfortable issue definitions are not uncommon.

Vision Mode is efficient in issue definition, action mobilization and often creative at resource mobilization. The difficulty for Vision Mode leadership is the institutionalization of the collaborative effort.
Westley has compiled a table that illustrates these points rather clearly:

**Table 2. Issue Definition, Mobilization of Actions and Resources by Mode of Organizational Change from Frances Westley (1995:411).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Issue Definition</th>
<th>Action Mobilization</th>
<th>Resource Mobilization</th>
<th>Structuring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>“Public arena” dynamics may force early closure of issue definition without sufficient data</td>
<td>“Public arena” dynamics immobilize stakeholders making coalition cooperation difficult</td>
<td>Resource channels secured often in advance of issue definition</td>
<td>Procedures/normal task allocations often limited to pre-existing structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning</td>
<td>Incremental issue definition through individual initiative or negotiations</td>
<td>Commitment in advance of issue definition</td>
<td>Need to “piggy-back” on other institutions to mobilize. Resources may be co-opted in process</td>
<td>Lack of resources may make structuring difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vision</td>
<td>Visionary particularly skilled in issue definition process</td>
<td>Link between affect and action fully utilized</td>
<td>Creative resource mobilization</td>
<td>Overdependence on visionary leader. Failure to institutionalize process or assure resource flow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of an organisation’s ability to maintain momentum for action, one of the difficulties is emotion. Energy is mobilized through emotion, not logic (Hochschild, 1993) and if there is no emotional attachment to an issue, it is hard to gather resources for action to address it. Resources do not automatically fall into the lap of organisations but are allocated through the group’s ability to claim and control the distribution of resources. This is made easier if the organisation shares the same paradigm or value definitions (Costanza and Folke, 1997) that they care about and can identify. In Planning-led organisations the emotional factor is often missing as planning is a rational and linear process that avoids irrationalities that may have emotional value. Planning-led organizations hence often divide into two groups of actors, “thinkers” and “doers”. The thinkers are the formulators and the doers are the implementers. The thinkers often assume that their strategies are enough to motivate the doers. This is rarely true as the strategies are often devoid of meaning to the doers and thus the power to generate
emotion and consequently action, is diminished when the strategies are presented to them. The doers often react with confusion and a sense of alienation. Unless the loss of meaning in the strategies is supplemented with strong values and ideologies or a strong visionary leader, they are unlikely to engage the doers. The vision must be communicated to all levels within the organization and should seem meaningful to all the stakeholders internally as well as externally (Danter, 2000) All actors within the organisation should know about the goals and visions of the organisation for it to work efficiently and reach the desired organizational change. For example, information must be passed horizontally face-to-face between all levels of the organization in order to generate a more efficient and creative knowledge generation as learning often occurs in informal settings and on the field-level in which the organization is operating (Westley, 1995).

2.4 Local Stewardship

Local stewardship recognizes managers as part of the system that they manage, which also implies a sense of ownership and responsibility (Chapin & Folke in press). In this thesis, local stewardship is discussed on the level of active participation, that is, hands-on involvement in management of the green areas in contrast to organizational participation that involves delegating management to other actors. Active participation (Tidball and Krasny, 2007) is occurring when the individual participating in collective management is committing to a “hands-on” engagement in the management of the green area and not solely providing, for example, funding for others to manage the area. Examples of active participation include the gardener who is planting flowers and vegetables on her lot in an allotment garden, and a person who holds a user-participation contract allowing her to plant a small herbal garden in a city flowerbed. Previous studies have shown that ecosystem services may be enhanced by active participation through local stewardship in urban areas (Colding et al, 2006; Bendt, 2010; Barthel et al. 2010; Colding 2011) and that it presents different management modes of land that is often ignored by state planners and urban land managers (Colding et al. 2006).
2.5 Motivation and Biophilia

Edward O Wilson coined the Biophilia hypothesis in 1984 when he sought to investigate the innate relationship between humans and nature. The hypothesis can be divided into two propositions. The first suggests that humans tend to respond positively to nature and the second that this tendency is genetically conditioned. This thesis focuses on the first proposition as the second so far only bears circumstantial evidence to support it in current research.

The proposition that humans respond positively to nature is a broad assumption that may be categorized into several subgroups. Not all individuals react positively to the same natural sceneries or organisms. Some may react violently towards, for example, snakes, spiders and so forth. However, the first proposition of the Biophilia Hypothesis argues that unthreatening natural environments have a positive effect in terms of emotional status both in stressed and un-stressed individuals (Ulrich, 1993, Hartig et al, 1991). For example, the recreational aspect of dwelling in parks has been found to create states of “relaxation” and “peacefulness” in the individuals where studies on urban parks and other urban natural settings have found that stress relief is one of the most prominent perceived benefits (Ulrich and Addoms 1981, Kaplan, 1983, Schroeder, 1989, Ottosson and Grahn, 2008)

Research has shown that restorative responding to natural settings has resulted in a positive emotional state, which in turn benefits the physiological state. A few studies show that in prolonged high-stress situations, biophilic positive responses may generate positive health-related influences (Ulrich, 1993).

In Stockholm excessive densification dominates the current planning structures (Stockholm Masterplan, 2011). This constitutes the solution to the housing shortage in the city and the idea that urban sprawl must be avoided. However, we know very little about the long-term monetary and non-monetary values that are lost due to this, such as spaces for restoration resulting in positive health-related issues. Research on biophilic responses may contribute to the mapping and understanding of monetary and non-monetary values of nature, which in turn may provide more accurate estimates. It has been shown that in the case of visual or aesthetic values even mediocre natural scenes are preferred over built views lacking nature. This preference is consistent over a diverse array of groups and cultures (Ulrich, 1993)
3. Method

This thesis is an example of a descriptive, explorative and comparative study that attempts to describe the possibilities of local stewardship of green areas within the Stockholm Municipality. The approach taken for gathering data is qualitatively based where data has been gathered through semi-structured open-ended interviews from respondent interviews (Kvale, 2009) as well as from informant interviews. A document and article search was performed in order to obtain information based on prior research dealing with local stewardship management as well as for gathering documents for the institutional analysis, including sources derived from Föreningen Stor-Stockholms koloniträdgårdar (FSSK), the Stockholm Municipality, and information concerning bylaws at Igelbäcken Allotment garden, Akalla Allotment garden and the Vinterviken Garden.

3.1 Data sources

In order to collect relevant data I conducted a qualitative study through semi structured, in-depth interviews, open-ended with respondents and informants (Esaiasson et al, 2007). The respondent interviews were conducted for the institutional part of this thesis in order to gather information on the gardeners’ perceptions of the rules. I wanted to explore if the rules that were actually in use in the three gardens fit the formal rules and recommendations set by the Municipality, FSSK and the association boards. The respondent interviews also aimed at determining the motivational drivers of users of the case study areas. The respondent interviews were 20 in total and conducted with the gardeners in all three case studies in order to establish their thoughts on bylaws and rules-in-use as employed in the gardens, as well as their reasons for engaging in local stewardship. The respondent interviews were predominantly two-hour face-to-face interviews. The interview guides are presented in Appendix 9.1. The interview guide for the Vinterviken Garden asks the same questions but slightly modified as this case study is different than the former ones in terms of structure and organisation. All interviews were recorded on tape, and in one instance an interpreter was used.

The informant interviews conducted with employees at the Municipality were 6 in total and conducted in order to establish what the institutions actually mean at the municipal level for control and regulation of the green area management performed by the green-area user groups under study. These interviews addressed the institutional workings of the municipality. The informant interviews were also used for triangulation purposes, as it was often unclear to the respondents what rules were to be followed. The informant interviews were organised more as
discussions and an interview guide was not used as different questions were asked depending on the role of the informant. Examples of questions asked were: What does the Municipal District’s (MD’s) interaction with the allotment garden look like? What is the MD’s view of how the institutions work at the garden/allotment garden? Are more initiatives like Vinterviken likely to happen?

In addition, I also conducted several telephone informant interviews with civil servants at the municipality in order to gain information on the relationships among all the agencies and organizations that make up the municipal structure.

While conducting respondent interviews with board members in all three cases, informant interviews were also conducted for triangulation purposes of the respondent interviews, as the individual member’s perceptions of the rules, even on the association level, represented interpretations of them and were not always accurately interpreted.

The reason for the numbers of interviews conducted and for the selection of respondents was based on the snowball selection where relevant respondents emerged as the interview process proceeded over time (Esaiasson et al, 2007) and where the information obtained started to show a clear pattern, hence the need for further interviewing ceased.

Most interviews at Igelbäcken were conducted in the allotment garden but in some cases in the respondents’ home. This was to ensure an informal setting where the interviewee could relax and hopefully share information more freely. The same conditions for interviewing were performed with members in the Akalla allotment, however, management in this garden proved more homogenous, resulting in fewer interviews needed to achieve theoretical saturation (Esaiasson et al, 2007) At the Vinterviken Garden the interviews were conducted in the garden, at the respondents’ workplace, at cafés and in one case in the respondents home. In addition to the respondent interviews, direct observations (Esaiasson et al, 2007) were made by way of numerous visits to the case study areas, which contributed to the build up of information concerning what the case studies looked like, what persons were there and other relevant observations.
3.2 Why interviews

In terms of the Biophilia hypothesis it has been popular to engage in quantitative research where reactions to nature in varying guises have been measured aiming at statistical significance. I would argue alongside Ulrich (1993) that the method in which this is done is rather limited as reactions to stimuli via a computer in the short-term is not equal to long-term engagement in an actual natural space. In-depth interviews therefore seem more appropriate to gain insights into individuals’ feelings and motives for participating in green area management. The majority of prior Biophilia research is also primarily focused on the activity of viewing nature (Ulrich, 1993, Heerwagen and Gordon, 1993, and Kellert, 1993) have here instead attempted to investigate what drives people and their opinions about actively participating in managing nature.

3.3 Data analysis

In order to structure my overall analysis of the possibility for broader local stewardship of state-owned land in the Stockholm municipality, interview results were divided into three categories that each relate to the overarching research questions addressed in the thesis (Esaiasson et al, 2007:189). The categories chosen are presented in Figure 2.

I use these categories due to that they each provide valuable analytical clues for successful local stewardship based on the theoretical perspectives outlined in part 2 of this thesis. Based on the interviews I devised a bottom-up coding system where I related the interview data to the theoretical perspectives and with interview transcripts divided into the three categories presented in Figure 2 by way of manual coding. This was possible because the interview guide was clearly structured in accordance with the three, overall research questions. Key interviews were transcribed from the recordings in full while others were listened through carefully with key statements extracted.
3.4 Selection of cases

The case studies were selected for a number of reasons. As a common criteria, all three case-studies were selected based upon that there were no commercial interests involved in green-area management on behalf of the different stewardship groups analysed. Moreover, Igelbäcken Allotment garden was chosen because it is situated in an area with low priority on the public agenda. This area houses people with high unemployment rate and low income. A substantial amount constitutes immigrants residing in small apartments and due to that the majority of them come from rural conditions in their home countries the transition of living conditions can be an arduous affair. The role of the Igelbäcken allotment garden is therefore interesting from recreational, therapeutic and cultural perspectives, and to investigate whether the institutions framing this garden match the values and needs of its users.

The Akalla Allotment garden was chosen in order to compare it to Igelbäcken as its physical appearance fundamentally differs from this garden even though it is situated only a kilometre away from Igelbäcken and located within the same habitual area. Hence, it represents a good case showing that preferences could vary even within the same geographical area.

Vinterviken was chosen in order to ascertain whether the values generated were different from that of the allotment gardens as it is organised differently and used by a different demography. The income level in the area can be argued to be fairly affluent and the population is predominantly Swedes.

3.5 Limitations of study

The interviews in this study are subject to the same problems as faced in any qualitative study. I have interpreted to the best of my ability the underlying and direct meaning of the information from the interviews. Interpretation is a clear deviance from objectivity but it is not possible to be entirely objective in my role as a researcher as I already have an agenda. The categories I have chosen to explore may have narrowed my interpretation of how the cases actually function. If someone else was to undertake the same study though devising different categories for analysis, other results may well be obtained regarding the possibility of local stewardship.

In order to minimise misinterpretations of the data set, I attempted to interview as many respondents possible to establish the probability of that pattern being accurate. Further, in regards to the interviews, some misinterpretation of the data is possible especially in cases where the respondents spoke poor Swedish or English. Therefore, some nuances of the respondents’ replies may be oversimplified or misinterpreted. However, when the
respondent’s meaning was unclear during the transcription process, that data was ruled out as useless and excluded from the coding.
In terms of the institutional sections of this thesis it is fairly straightforward as the formal rules are written down and difficult to misinterpret. However, the respondents’ interpretation of them may be difficult to establish as he/she may simply not be aware when and if he/she is complying with more subtle informal rules, such as norms or codes for conduct. For this purpose, only the most clearly stated rules were focused on in this study in order to weed out the general patterns of leadership and institutional organisation in all three case studies.
4. Case study descriptions

The case studies performed in this thesis are all located on land owned by the Stockholm Municipality. Rinkeby-Kista municipal district, in which Akalla and Igelbäcken allotment gardens are located, is placed in the northern part of Stockholm Municipality. It hosts 45,000 residents with various cultural backgrounds and religious orientation. Akalla and Husby are the residential areas closest to the allotment gardens where Akalla’s residents consist of 66.9% of foreign origin and Husby of 83% of foreign origin (www.stockholmsstad.se). Rinkeby-Kista Municipal District was part of “The Million Programme” (Miljonprogrammet) that was Stockholm Municipality’s investment to solve the housing crisis in the 1970’s. One million homes were built where Akalla and Husby were among the last areas to be completed. These areas are dominated by apartment blocks and narrow streets. Hence, the residential areas around Akalla and Igelbäcken allotment gardens are heavily urbanised areas however with a close proximity to the Järva field which is a large area of park and farmland housing eleven allotment gardens.

Hägersten-Liljeholmen in which the Vinterviken garden is located is in the middle of the municipality and houses 73,300 residents dominated by Swedes. The area consists of both apartment blocks and smaller areas with villas. It is not as heavily urbanised in terms of high apartment buildings placed close together as in Akalla and Husby but the feel of the area is still urban.

Figure 3. Map of Stockholm Municipality with the three case study areas marked out.
4.1 Igelbäcken Allotment Garden

Igelbäcken Allotment garden is situated in Järvafältet under Rinkeby-Kista Municipal District and consists of 160 lots which amount to 23.168 m$^2$ of land. The basic yearly fee to the Municipal District (MD) is 25.948 SEK (Contract between Igelbäcken Allotment garden and Stockholm Municipality, 1996). The allotment garden is run by a board of 10 members. The garden was founded in 1978 by Stockholm Municipality as a place for the inhabitants in the Rinkeby and Kista area to cultivate flowers and vegetables. This was in an era called “The Green Wave” when it was trendy to grow your own food and take an active interest in nature. Hence the allotment garden was very popular at this time. Since then the popularity of the garden has varied over time. In the 1980’s, for example, there were several vacant lots, but currently it has become increasingly popular. The garden has a queue for the first time and the area is full of activity. The gardeners who are active in the garden are from a wide variety of countries. This is due to the fact that immigrants mostly populate the residential areas surrounding the garden. There are people from Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Turkey, Pakistan, Greece, Brazil, Guinea Bissau, Cap Verde, Finland, Senegal, Chile and probably others, currently in the garden. The dominating nationalities are Turks and Iranian curds.

Igelbäcken is a garden with gardening lots, which are the smaller variety of allotment lots without small cabins. However, at Igelbäcken the prohibition of building cabins has been ignored and the area is scattered with small sheds of various designs (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Sheds at Igelbäcken Allotment Garden.
There are very few common activities in the allotment garden apart from the cleaning days twice a year, once in autumn and once in spring, which both are compulsory. Moreover, the board organised a course in organic gardening once but it was not very popular. It also organises a vegetable market in Akalla where the gardeners sell their produce once a year late in the season and a crayfish party in late August is organised for all the gardeners. The two latter occasions are usually well frequented by the gardeners.

4.2 Akalla Allotment Garden

Akalla Allotment Garden is approximately 1 kilometre northwest of Igelbäcken Allotment garden in Järva:fältet under Rinkeby-Kista Municipal District. The garden consists of 164 lots which amount to 9840 m². The basic yearly fee to the MD is 11.120 SEK (Contract between Akalla Allotment Garden and Stockholm Municipality, 1996). The garden is run by a board of 10 people.

Akalla allotment garden was founded in 1976 by Stockholm Municipality for the same reasons as Igelbäcken (see above) and the garden now also boasts a queue of 5 people. The garden hosts gardeners from Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Korea, India, Ethiopia, Russia, Sweden, Finland and Albania. The dominating nationality is, however, Swedish. Akalla is also a garden with gardening lots, the smaller variety of lots without houses. The difference here however is that the rule is followed and no unwanted building constructions of any kind

Figure 5. Map of the Järva Field with Igelbäcken and Akalla Allotment gardens marked out.
appear (see figure 6).

There are no common activities apart from the two compulsory cleaning days in autumn and spring except some one-off occasions of minor gardening courses.

![Figure 6. View of Akalla Allotment Garden.](image)

4.3 The Vinterviken Garden

The Vinterviken Garden is an area of approximately 1300 m² located in Vinterviken in the municipal district of Hägersten-Liljeholmen of Stockholm (Lease hold contract with the Exploitation Office, 2009). The garden currently has approximately 200 members and a board of 7 members and with a varying number of deputies organising the work in the garden. The board is elected every year at the annual member’s meeting. The garden is managed by a group of 15-20 people, consisting mainly of middle-aged, retired women. Originally the land was an industrial area harbouring a dynamite factory and an enterprise producing hydrochloric acid. The dynamite factory used to perform test shootings there and the area was closed to the public. In 1976 the land was purchased by the city. The soil was cleaned from waste and allotment gardens were established. However, the exact location of the current garden was mainly brushwood at this time. In 1997-1998 the city decided to arrange an organic show garden at the time Stockholm was to host the Capital of Culture in 1998. The garden was designed to offer a place for learning about organic gardening and ecological processes at large. That is, how to grow plants, how to create handicraft from the gardens produce and so on. It became a popular site for the city’s inhabitants and when the Capital of Culture event ended and the garden was to be demolished
numerous protests occurred (Landscape Architect at the Exploitation Office). A handful of people including two landscape architects at the city and some local enthusiasts formed an interim board. Soon after, the current chairman took charge and since then the garden has steadily grown into what it is today. In 2009 they acquired the current leasehold of 60 years. The leasehold was a major goal but the garden’s organisation had to prove its ability to run the garden before a contract could be signed – a process that took ten years.

The current design of the garden is still in line with what it was in 1998. It is primarily a show garden for organic cultivation. It aims at being an aesthetically pleasing place to visit and learn about garden practices and at displaying a wide selection of flowers, herbs and vegetables. It also aims at being a place for recreation and socialising. It has a large café with an orangery, a greenhouse, an allotment garden house and a variety of different flowerbeds and arrangements. It has a stage for a yearly music festival called “Ljummen i Gräset” and a smaller stage for poetry recitals and more. The garden arranges a Christmas fair where other actors within crafts and organic produce rent tables to sell their products. In the summer the garden arranges a harvest fair where they sell their own produce as well as invite other actors, such as the Farmers Market to sell their products. Both markets attract a large number of visitors each year. In addition the Vinterviken garden arranges smaller cultural events such as acoustic concerts, poetry recitals, plays and similar cultural activities.

Figure 7. Design sketch by the garden’s chairman from 1999. The sketch is close to the current actual design except there is no dancing area and a few other smaller differences.
Figure 8. Example of one of the flowerbeds in the Vinterviken Garden with the orangery in the background.
5. Results

5.1. Institutional framework at the municipal level

The figure 9 describes the areas of responsibility of the green areas owned by the Stockholm Municipality. It further illustrates the relationships among municipal agencies and their institutions. The colour shading indicates the level of power and significance with darker colours signifying which institutions have deciding power and which ones are most central in terms of management of green areas.

Figure 9. Institutional framework at the municipal level.
5.2 Local Stewardship of land owned by the Municipality

There is a limited diversity of management modes of the municipal land in Stockholm. Most of it is managed by Stockholm Entreprenad which is a gardening company employed by the municipality. However there are some examples of cooperation involving local stewardship, accounted for in the following.

5.2.1 User-contracts

User-contracts are a form of contract where a person may after agreement with the Municipality, most commonly through the municipal district (MD), manage a piece of land belonging to the Municipality. User-contracts do not ensure participation where the users are involved hands-on but are purely a commitment of management. That is, the contract holders may employ a gardening company to tend to the area in question. This contract is usually based on a 5-year agreement, which can be discontinued by the user-contract holder or the municipal district respectively. These contracts are based on handing over management responsibility to local user-groups to maintain the basic level of management that would otherwise have been performed by the municipal districts but most commonly the users are likely to invest more resources into the area in order to enhance its recreational qualities (Parkmanager at Södermalm Municipal District).

5.2.2 User-participation-contracts

User-participation-contracts are a more “hands-on” commitment where the contract-holder(s) are active on a personal level. The Allotment Garden is often an example of this type of contract. This entails continuous meetings with the park manager at the relevant Municipal District where e.g. members of allotment garden organizations meet and exchange knowledge and discuss conflicts, projects and future commitments together as far as the resources on the MD level allow. These contracts are longer and most commonly span over a 25-year period. The management of the green areas involved is often but not always more pro-active for ecological purposes compared to the user-contracts (Parkmanager at Södermalm Municipal District).
5.2.3 The Årsta Field
At the traffic office there is co-operation with “Årstafältets vänner”, which is a grassroots organization that actively works towards the possibility that the area should become protected. Further, Årsta allotment garden helps with monitoring the area and also helps arrange The Day of Årsta fältet. Another example of cooperation in this area is one individual who has had a long relationship with the traffic office in Årsta fältet. He grows plants in order to enhance biodiversity and the traffic office pays for his expenses. This is very similar to the user-contracts at the municipal districts accounted for above. The main criterion for cooperation is that the organization or the individual must be free of political bias.

5.2.4 Other examples of co-operations between the state and local actors
In regards to cultural activities, in Kungsträdgården, which is a large park in the very heart of Stockholm, the company Kungsträdgården Park och Evenemang AB holds ownership rights to all cultural engagements. Further, there are coalitions (samfälligheter) where private actors such as homeowners together care for a piece of land owned by the municipality. In addition, there is a community garden in Skarpnäck MD which started in 2010 and is the only one within the cities limits apart from Vinterviken that has a leasehold of the land and is not exactly a community garden as it is more focused on being a show garden than anything else.
5.3 Property rights, institutions, leadership and motivational drivers

5.3.1 Property Rights

Firstly, the property rights that enable local stewardship in the selected case studies are illustrated in the table below.

Table 3. Property rights of the case studies based on Ostrom & Schlager (1996).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Managed Land area</th>
<th>User-participation-contract-holder</th>
<th>Associated Property right</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Vinterviken Garden Community Garden</td>
<td>Lease hold with the Exploitation office of land owned by the municipality</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>Claimant</td>
<td>Has no right to sell land but has the right to manage the land unless it is managed poorly or the land is needed by the municipality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igelbäcken Allotment Garden</td>
<td>User-participation-contract of municipal land with Rinkeby-Kista MD</td>
<td>Claimant</td>
<td>25-year contract. Individual allotments are renewed every year</td>
<td>Has the right to manage land under user-participation-contract</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akalla Allotment Garden</td>
<td>User-participation-contract of municipal land with Rinkeby-Kista MD</td>
<td>Claimant</td>
<td>25-year contract. Individual allotments are renewed every year</td>
<td>Has the right to manage land under user-participation-contract</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The property rights defined in the table are explained as the following:
Claimant = Implies the management right of the area but not the right to alienate it.

5.3.2 Institutional framework from the Municipality and FSSK regarding Igelbäcken and Akalla allotment gardens

The agreements between the allotment gardens and the Municipal District (MD) are that of 25-year user-participation-contracts, which are currently under discussion (Appendix 9.2) regarding how long they should be renewed when they run out in 2021. The agreements are identical for both gardens. The rules in the agreements from the MD are presented in Appendix 9.3, as they are too extensive to account for in detail here. Furthermore, the rules-in-use in the gardens are the ones dictated by the board and the recommendations from
Föreningen Stor-Stockholms Koloniträdgårdar (FSSK). The rules from the MD are not referred to in the everyday workings of the gardens, as they are not obtainable for the gardeners. Rather, the rules from the board reflect what is stated in the MD agreements. The responsibility of the MD however, is to ensure that these agreements are followed. Further, if conflict arises, the MD acts as consultant or enforcer if the rules of the agreements are broken. Apart from this, the MD leaves the allotment associations to deal with their members on their own.

The recommendations of FSSK (See Appendix 9.4) to which membership is voluntary, are largely addressing the formal management of the garden such as board meetings instructing on how to manage an association etc. However there is a small section in the general bylaw document that addresses practical management of the garden. These are merely recommendations and are not binding by any judicial force. The benefits derived from membership in FSSK are insurance and judicial assistance for the association, not the individual members. FSSK also publishes a member’s journal. However FSSK is claimed to be an old organisation that has become rigid in its administration (Respondent 1). The contact with its members suffers from this and there is no dialogue. However, there has recently been a renewal of members of the board and a new interest from FSSK is taken in Igelbäcken at least. FSSK board members have recently reached out to Igelbäcken and arranged for Igelbäcken members to visit Tanto Allotment garden where most members of the FSSK board have their lots. The only Igelbäcken members who went were the secretary and the treasurer. This visit nevertheless resulted in that FSSK are now propagating towards the Municipal District for allowing the building of small cabins at Igelbäcken. In the case of Igelbäcken’s other problems, FSSK will only interfere if they are of a judicial nature however only providing advice and monetary support via insurance.

5.3.3 Institutions at Igelbäcken Allotment Garden
A selection of the existing bylaws of the association has been made due to their relevancy to the questions posed in this thesis. The rules have been selected in terms of the actual management of the area and not the intricate rules surrounding association assemblies, board meetings and so forth. The rules in full for each case study respectively are attached as Appendices 9.5 Igelbäcken, 9.6 Akalla and 9.7 Vinterviken.
## Table 4. Formal rules from the board of Igelbäcken

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RULE</th>
<th>FOLLOWED Yes/No *</th>
<th>INTERVIEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is absolutely forbidden to dispose of litter in and around the allotment area.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>“Three years ago, we were given funding from the MD to build a compost for the allotment area. That summer the entire board went on vacation and when we came back the compost was littered with junk like old refrigerators and so on. We had to pay thousands of kronor to have it removed. After that we tore the compost down. It was impossible to keep it.” Respondent 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composting of weeds, branches and vegetables must be situated within the individual lots.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>“I think (...) and I are the only two people with composts on our lots.” Respondent 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All are responsible for the clearing of weeds on the pathways in front of their own lots</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>“Every member is responsible for clearing weeds in front of their lots but if you’re new at the lot and the previous lot-owner hasn’t done this then the first thing you do is start cultivating the lot and not weeding the path outside I guess. There is a lot of negligence of the paths”. Respondent 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building structures must adhere to the rules stipulated by the Municipal District</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>“We tell everybody that joins the allotment that they are here to grow flowers and vegetables and not to build, but the first thing they do is build a cabin! We tell them that they can build a pergola without permanent walls and roof but they all ignore it. They ALL build permanent roofs and walls. It’s fascinating. But we can’t keep fighting with everyone. As soon as we go on vacation they all build like crazy and then refuse to take it down anyway.” Respondent 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not build adjacent to your neighbours building. Talk to the board if you are uncertain how you are allowed to build.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>“They (the board ... sic) can’t talk to people here. Many people don’t know the language and don’t understand. If they do understand they pretend not to and do it anyway. This way it becomes allowed to build so to speak.” Respondent 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You must participate in the spring and autumn cleaning days. If you are unable to attend you must report this in advance to the board. If you do not participate you must pay 300 SEK each time</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>“Last year one gardener was evicted from his lot. The reason was that he hadn’t come to the cleaning day and refused to pay the fee you have to pay if you are unable to attend. He tore the bill in the ear of the chairman on the telephone. This was too much for the chairman so he evicted him. This is one of the rules that we are very strict with and apart from that gardener almost everyone is cooperative and attends. Nobody wants to pay the fee for unattendance”. Respondent 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambling about money is strictly forbidden within the area.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>We have added to our rules that it is prohibited to play cards for money as we had a lot of trouble with people doing that. We think they have stopped now. Respondent 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think about showing respect to your neighbours. Treat them as you yourself wish to be treated.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Nobody has ever been beaten-up (apart from the knife-incident) but it happens that they sabotage for each other when they fall out. For example, one man’s cabbages were drenched in waste oil. Sometimes these arguments stem from conflicts from their countries of origin. Respondent 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is strictly forbidden to sell vegetables or other produce within the allotment area.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There are some people that sell produce from their lots and people come and complain to the chairman that lots of strangers enter the garden area to purchase it. I only discovered this a couple of weeks ago so now we have added to the rules that it is forbidden to sell from the lots. Respondent 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The rule is regarded followed if the majority of the gardeners follow it
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RULE</th>
<th>FOLLOWED Yes/No</th>
<th>INTERVIEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A member can be evicted from His/her lot if:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The member hasn’t paid the yearly fee.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The gardeners are evicted if they do not pay the fee. Respondent 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The member violates the rules stated by the municipality.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>It is absolutely prohibited to build on the area but they don’t listen! If I had a say I would take a bulldozer and tear it all down! The board is too weak. Respondent 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The member challenges the association’s purpose, obstructs the association’s and the board’s work or by not following the rules of the association.</td>
<td>No, but in some extreme cases Yes.</td>
<td>We tell everybody that joins the allotment that they are here to grow flowers and vegetables and not to build, but the first thing they do is build a cabin! Respondent 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The member must:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay the admissions fee as well as the yearly fee, the user-participation-contract fee and additional fees decided by the board.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>We have to pay, otherwise we are kicked out. Respondent 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep his/her lot in neat and good condition.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The lots look horrible with all the waste they use for planting and building. Old doors, old curtains to protect the crops and so on. It’s horrible. Respondent 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take part in activities regarding the upkeep of the allotment area.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Nobody wants to pay the fee for unattendance. Respondent 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow the bylaws and rules from the Municipality</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>People don’t care here. They are not used to rules and everybody acts each to their own. It’s a cultural thing. Swedes are used to associations, in the middle east for example, they are not. Respondent 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rules and relationships between the board, FSSK, the users, and the Municipal District are unclear and confusing to most users. The rules are used and construed by the gardeners to meet their own needs and the excuse used for this behaviour is most commonly that of language barriers. The users claim to not understand the rules linguistically. However, there are interpreters available and the rules are available in multiple languages. Hence the validity of this excuse is questionable.
5.3.4 Leadership at Igelbäcken Allotment Garden

The allotment association is headed by a board of 10 members. The Chairman, the deputy Chairman, the Secretary and the Treasurer are the most central positions on the board and most decisions are made by them. Included in the board are two positions that are not specified by FSSK that is the one of machinery technician who is responsible for all the associations commonly owned tools and machines and a translator who is consulted during conversations with non Swedish or English speakers in the association.

The leadership of this organisation would be labelled Planning-led according to Westley (1995) as the rules are established and monitored by the municipality. However, the level of observation of the rules is what defines the leadership.

The leadership at Igelbäcken has according to several of the respondents been too lenient when it comes to certain rules in the garden. The result of this is that it is now very difficult to enforce existing rules such as the prohibition of building the cabins mentioned above. In addition to this, the board members have internal conflicts regarding the appropriate enforcement of the rules. The chairman is not in accordance with the secretary for example. An example of one such conflict is that the chairman recently allowed a couple to jump the queue for acquiring a lot, which is strictly against the rules of the allotment garden. The secretary is adverse to this violation of the rules and the conflict is further infected as the couple themselves have delivered threats to the secretary. These types of conflicts are difficult to solve as they complicate the leadership, however they are not really received by the MD, as they simply do not have the enforcement resources to solve them. In this particular case the secretary had to give in due to sheer pressure on a personal level, as she felt uncomfortable to even venture into the allotment area due to the threats against her person.

There is no common vision for the allotment garden and the gardeners seem to reason that one is each to one’s own.
5.3.5 Motivational drivers at Igelbäcken Allotment Garden

The table below accounts for identified reasons that motivate people to keep a lot in the allotment garden.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Resources</th>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Culture &amp; Recreation</th>
<th>Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The cultivation of food as the</td>
<td>The vegetables are tasteless and I worked as a warehouse worker at Ica and</td>
<td>To relax</td>
<td>When I am here I forget all my problems. It is like being in a safe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vegetables at the supermarket</td>
<td>I saw apples with a thick white surface on them sit in storage for TWO</td>
<td></td>
<td>place where you can just relax and look at things growing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are deemed tasteless and</td>
<td>YEARS! It’s disgusting. If I grow my own I know they are ok. Respondent</td>
<td></td>
<td>Respondent 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unreliable quality wise</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheaper organic food</td>
<td>The organic produce in the shops is very expensive. It’s cheaper to</td>
<td>Something to occupy oneself with</td>
<td>I have been on sick leave for a long time now because of my back and I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>grow your own. Respondent 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>come here to have something to do and to talk to my friends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The respondents cultivate</td>
<td>I grow this type of cabbage from Kenya that I make soup from and serve</td>
<td>Used to having a garden in country of</td>
<td>I had a garden and some land at home that I had inherited from my parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vast amounts of food from their</td>
<td>my friends! It’s a very common dish back home and it’s delicious. It is</td>
<td>origin</td>
<td>who were farmers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>countries of origin. Examples</td>
<td>(the cabbage…sic) very rare here so I grow my own. Respondent 6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Almost everybody at home (Turkey) had houses with gardens so it is what</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encountered are Pak Choi,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>we are used to.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese chives, specific</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Respondent 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>varieties of Coriander and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsley, Kenyan cabbage, Grapes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in order to use the leaves for</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dolmas, mangold for the same</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reason, specific varieties of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beans, radishes and much more.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivating vegetables and fruit</td>
<td>Spend time with friends and family at the lot and barbequing. The lots</td>
<td>We bring the whole family here on</td>
<td>We bring the whole family here on weekends to spend time together,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from country of origin</td>
<td>at Igelbäcken especially, can be described as social platforms where the</td>
<td>weekends to spend time together,</td>
<td>barbeque and discuss things. We sometimes barbeque with other friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>users bring their family and friends and barbeque, drink tea, chat and</td>
<td>barbeque and discuss things. We</td>
<td>and family who also have lots here.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>spend time together. It is also a place where primarily the men who are</td>
<td>sometimes barbeque with other friends</td>
<td>I am here almost everyday and sometimes I stay the night in my cabin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>retired or out of jobs spend their days. Some respondents call the allot-</td>
<td>and family who also have lots here.</td>
<td>Respondent 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ment garden an “old-man’s day care centre”.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                                             | It is nice to be able to eat things from home. Respondent 6 |
Table 7. Formal rules from the board of Akalla

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RULE</th>
<th>FOLLOWED Yes/No*</th>
<th>INTERVIEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your lot must be held neat. You are responsible for the removal of weeds and waste in and around your lot. The weeds should be composted on the lot or in the communal compost in the little area. Waste and junk may not be stored on the lot. Non-compostable waste must be removed from the lot and disposed of by the lot-“owner”.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>We are pretty strict with the rules here. We all want it to look nice and we have to make sure we follow the rules from the MD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 15th of June at the latest, the majority of the lot should be planted and on the 1st of November at the latest, the lot should be tidied and arranged for the completion of the planting season.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sometime the week before midsummer the board walks around the garden and takes note of the lots where nothing has happened. They get a letter of warning where we ask them why they aren’t taking care of their lot. The point is to plant on the lot. We can’t have lots that just sit around and collect weeds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ball playing is prohibited within the area.</td>
<td>Uncertain**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a member in the association it is prohibited to let the lot to another party unless approved by the board.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The gardeners are responsible for their lots as long as they rent them and if they want to discontinue the lot goes back to the association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The common land within the area should be kept clean and managed during the entirety of the year.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>It is included in being a gardener here to take care of the common areas as well. Nobody has cut the grass here in a while but I don’t have to because I am allergic and I’d collapse if I tried.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I am the only one who cuts the grass. People don’t care about the common areas. They are so lazy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a fence is erected around the lot, it may not exceed 50cm in height and must be painted in red, green, brown or natural paint. Sitting area must not exceed 15 m² and grass or paving-stones may not exceed 20cm over ground level. Trellis around the sitting area may not exceed 1,5m in height and may not be clad in plastic, wood or other. Pergola may not exceed 1, 8 m in height and may not exceed an area of 6 m². Roofing is not permitted unless it is non-permanent such as an awning.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>We have rules of how high the constructions are allowed to be. It has become harder to enforce these restrictions over the years but mostly people relent after a couple of warnings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The board must approve all building activities in the area.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>We don’t allow anything apart from what is stated in the rules. However, sometimes people build temporary mini greenhouses and they are OK.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The rule is regarded followed if the majority of the gardeners follow it

** As the interview guide for this study did not ask these questions directly it is unclear whether ball playing is occurring or not.
### Table 8. Recommendations from FSSK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RULE</th>
<th>FOLLOWED Yes/No *</th>
<th>INTERVIEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A member can be evicted from His/her lot if:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The member hasn’t paid the yearly fee.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>We all have to pay every year otherwise we are evicted but that’s not hard to understand really. We rent the lots. Respondent 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The member violates the rules stated by the municipality.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>We evict gardeners who are unable to tend to their lots. It is harsh if they are old but we cannot let the garden disintegrate. The purpose of having the lots is to garden it. Respondent 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The member challenges the association’s purpose, obstructs the association’s and the board’s work or by not following the rules of the association.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>We had one woman here who used to abuse the other gardeners, threaten them, scream at them and so on. It all ended with her assaulting the treasurer of the association and injured her so much that she had to be hospitalised. We evicted her after that having given her far to many chances already. Respondent 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The member must:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay the admissions fee as well as the yearly fee, the user-participation-contract fee and additional fees decided by the board.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>This is the way it is, all the tools we use here we have to pay for, the paint we pay with the fees from the lots. Then we have to pay the rent and also water fees. We have a market every year where we sell vegetables from 6 lots in the garden that we use to cultivate crops for the market. The income from the market and the fees that the gardeners pay make ends meet in the association but only just. If they don’t pay. We don’t make it. Respondent 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep his/her lot in neat and good condition.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>If the gardeners don’t tend to their lots they are evicted. Respondent 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow the bylaws and rules from the Municipality</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>We have a contract with the MD and we have to follow the rules otherwise they can terminate the garden and we don’t want that. Respondent 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take part in activities regarding the upkeep of the allotment area.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>You can pay to not have to come on the joint cleaning days or you can send someone else in your place. I have done both things myself. Also its not like the chores are overwhelming, you are also allowed to do something else later in the year if you are unable to attend, like paint the fence or something. Respondent 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3.7 Leadership at Akalla Allotment Garden

The allotment association at Akalla is as in Igelbäcken headed by a board of 10 members. The Chairman, the deputy Chairman, the Secretary and the Cashier are the most central positions on the board and most decisions are made by them. Included in the board is one position that is not specified by FSSK that is the one of machinery technician who is responsible for all the associations commonly owned tools and machines. This type of leadership is as for Igelbäcken Planning-led organisation (Westley, 1995).

The leadership at Akalla is by the book where the rules from the MD and the recommendations from FSSK are followed precisely. The current chairman at Akalla says that in the last couple of years the rules have been harder to reinforce as the communication between the board and the gardeners from foreign countries falters at times. However, after some monitoring and repeated reprimands the rules are generally followed.

The chairman before the current one was very strict. She did not allow music to be played on the lots and she didn’t approve of children or other family members on the lots. There are several users at Igelbäcken who had lots at Akalla and changed to Igelbäcken, as they preferred a more liberal take on the rules. The ones that stayed don’t seem to have a problem with the stringent leadership of the garden as most users spend time there to tend to their plantations. The rule that prohibits buildings on the lots is enforced and followed without exception.

At Akalla, the rules are somewhat different internally than those of Igelbäcken however; the significant difference is that they are followed.

Akalla is picture perfect of how this type of allotment garden “should” look like in terms of the regulations from the MD. The fences are painted and most paths are cleared of weeds and the lots are well looked after and largely homogenous. The plants that are cultivated vary of course but the layouts of the lots are similar with organised rows of vegetables and well-managed flowerbeds.
### 5.3.8 Motivational drivers at Akalla Allotment Garden

**Table 9. Motivational drivers at Akalla Allotment Garden.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Resources</th>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Culture &amp; Recreation</th>
<th>Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The cultivation of food as the vegetables at the supermarket are deemed tasteless and unreliable quality wise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When you see stuff in the supermarket you think “I can probably grow those better” Respondent 15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To relax</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheaper organic food</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firstly, I love nature a lot and secondly I am a vegetarian, a lettuce eater so to speak and lettuce is more expensive than meat. Respondent 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Something to occupy oneself with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The respondents cultivate vast amounts of food from their countries of origin. Examples encountered are Pak Choi, Chinese chives, specific varieties of Coriander and Parsley, Grapes in order to use the leaves for dolmas, mangold for the same reason, Sukat (Korean), Aok (Korean), specific varieties of beans, radishes and much more.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I also cultivate a lot from my own culture, which consists of a lot of salads beans and peas. Respondent 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An opportunity to be able to be outside in the fresh air and watch things grow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sit around on my lot and watch things grow. It is a miracle and we have a lot to learn from plants. You get a sense of what is important. Respondent 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend time with friends and family at the lot and barbequing or just relaxing.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People spend time here and barbeque with friends or they come here on their own just to relax and read a book. It depends. Respondent 11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivating vegetables and fruit from country of origin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I grow pumpkin because it is good for the stomach also aok is good for the stomach. Sukat is another thing I grow from my country. Respondent 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3.9 Ecosystem services found at Igelbäcken and Akalla Allotment Gardens

The gardeners have no joint vision for the allotment gardens and they do not manage any areas outside the allotment area. They seem to lack any management ambitions to improve surrounding areas based on biological conservation rationales. None of the respondents has expressed any intentions of growing plants beneficial to the animal life in the area or for biodiversity reasons. However, two respondents said that they grow sunflowers for the birds but when asked if they would have grown them regardless of the birds, the answer was yes. Hence the ecological benefits emanating from the allotment seem rather to be a spillover effect from the gardeners’ cultivation preferences. A large variation of plants, herbs, berry bushes and fruit trees are grown which is inherently beneficial for the local ecosystem. The only conscious choice the gardeners make that is explicitly beneficial to the local ecosystem is their wish to grow their vegetables and flowers organically. This means that they don’t use any pesticides although there is some use of chemical fertilizer but these users are primarily those who grow vegetables to sell produce from their plots and are dependent on multiple harvests during the season. There are also some examples of when the term organic is misunderstood as some gardeners think that this merely means that they grow their vegetables themselves.

Nevertheless, the diversity of vegetation within these areas is rich where some gardeners choose to grow vegetables of different origins and varieties, whereas others prefer flowers such as dahlias and tagetes. The latter is very popular amongst the Kurds while the Iranians prefer sunflowers and roses. The Arabs and the Turks are the most ardent vegetable growers.

As was pointed out in part 5.3.8 the gardens are used as social platforms to engage with friends and family. They are also used as a means to cultivate the gardeners’ diverse cultural backgrounds through planting native produce.
5.4 Institutions at The Vinterviken Garden

The rules at Vinterviken are on a different level than that of the allotment garden cases. The formal rules accounted for below are the rules set up between the Exploitation office and the garden and are used as the gardens bylaws as well. The rules signify a vision and not a set of formal rules of individual conduct. Furthermore, the MD does not interfere with the institutions of Vinterviken as the agreement is with the Exploitation office.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10. Formal rules at The Vinterviken Garden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>RULE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The association The Vinterviken Garden is a non-profit organisation whose activities shall aim to develop and manage the show garden in Vinterviken in the Municipality of Stockholm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Vinterviken Garden shall be managed in an organic manner partly as show garden and partly as an educational garden. There should be cultural activities of a diverse nature taking part in the garden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The association shall conduct the activities in the garden through association assembly, member meetings and the board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The association shall work together with other interest groups in the Vinterviken area in order to develop and preserve it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rules at Vinterviken on an individual level seem to be that of a laissez-faire variety. The chairman of the board is adamant that the garden is a haven for freedom and creativity. The structure of the garden is that the gardening itself is voluntary and is carried out by whomever chooses to join the gardening group. The only requirement is that you are a member of the garden, which anyone can become unless the board deems you a threat to the garden. The threat issue is a new rule that came about after a coup in 2008.
The gardeners who are active in the gardening group are not required to attend to the garden on a regular basis. They can join in whenever they please. This creates a rather fluid however uncertain management mode. The only people required to attend every weekend are either of the two leaders of the gardening group, in order to supervise the work.

This is where it becomes interesting as the rules are, apart from the formal by-laws stated by the Exploitation office together with the garden (see Appendix 9.7) and the contract between the two (see Appendix 9.8), based on an informal understanding rather than a stated regulatory framework.

For example, you are not allowed to plant whatever you like in the garden as a member of the gardening group, rather you are required to follow a plan devised by the two leaders of the group which is laid out during the spring of every year. Hence, the unwritten rule from the board is that if you wish to plant something specific, or if you have ideas that you would like to realise, you must go through the board or the leaders of the gardening group depending on the scope of the idea.

However, according to the chairman of the board the garden is free to interact with on a reasonable scale. Hence, the actual rules and the vision of the garden are mismatched.

When asked the respondents most often do not see it as a problem that they are told what to do, many rather welcome it. However, it seems that there are underlying currents of discontent that they did not share in the interviews. That is, they would not claim to be dissatisfied themselves but would point out that “others” may be.

For me it is so liberating and lovely to be in this garden and I assume I contribute something even though I am not in charge of anything or have to decide anything. I mean even if I had the authority to make decisions about what to plant and so on, I wouldn’t know what to do. However, I think many of the others would like more responsibility but that is the privilege of the leaders of the gardening group and that’s the way it’s always been. (Respondent 3, Vinterviken)
5.4.1 Leadership at the Vinterviken Garden

The board of the garden has 7 members with a varying number of deputies. The sitting chairman has been the same the last 8 years and is central to the garden's leadership. It is very clear that the chairman is a strong, visionary leader that the members of the gardening group are very dependent of. Hence, this type of leadership is an example of Westley’s (1995) vision-led organisation. No decisions on the larger scale are made without consulting him even though they are not on the level of any business of the board. The chairman formulates the vision of the garden. It is a strong and defined vision describing the garden as being a place for people to meet and feel part of something as well as having a place to relax and recharge. However, the vision of the garden on paper has ecological goals but they are not as visual in practice in terms of gardening for biodiversity. The chairman is very much the glue that holds the garden together in terms of people getting along and doing what he wants them to. All respondents except one said that they thought the garden would disappear if he did, as he has knowledge within so many fields in the garden. He is the one dealing with the contact with the Exploitation office regarding the leasehold and he is also well educated in development as he is an architect by profession.

*I think a lot about the possibility of (… the chairman) disappearing and I think there would be a huge loss to the garden if he did. It doesn’t seem natural for someone to take his place, as he is so knowledgeable in so many areas. I think we could keep the vision going without him but it would be hard to continue without him based on his knowledge.* (One of the leaders of the garden group)

Apart from the chairman’s strong position in the leadership, the garden is run on a day to day basis largely by the two leaders of the garden group and one other person who is a member of the garden group but very much a strong presence in the garden. She sometimes helps to supervise the gardening days if the leaders or the chairman are unable to.
5.4.2 Motivational drivers at the Vinterviken Garden

Table 11. Motivational drivers at the Vinterviken Garden.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Resources</th>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Culture &amp; Recreation</th>
<th>Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Products from the garden such as a variety of vegetables, flowers and berries are sold at the beginning and the end of the summer in the garden</td>
<td>At the early summer market in June we sell plants mostly. We even invite other plant schools to sell here. At the harvest market in late August we scrape together what vegetables we have and we also invite professionals to sell here like “Bondens Marknad” and others. We have approximately 10 stalls here then with different produce. Respondent 16</td>
<td>To relax and to retrieve energy. Many respondents were either ill, out of work or lonely and used the garden for therapeutic purposes. Two daycare centres for disabled persons are also active in the garden for the same therapeutic purposes.</td>
<td>Two day care centres for disabled people come here a couple of days a week and tend to two flowerbeds. This is for restorative and recreational purposes so they get outside and get fresh air. An escape from their confinement at the centre. The Municipal Committee pays for it. Respondent 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berries are picked by children at their leisure and at a moderate level by adults throughout the season</td>
<td>The children and of course some adults pick the berries as they please. It’s ok as long as they don’t “harvest” the bushes deliberately. Respondent 16</td>
<td>Something to occupy oneself with</td>
<td>For me it has become very important as I am without work and spend most of my days here. I think I would probably feel pretty worthless if I didn’t have a place to go and work during the days. Respondent 19</td>
</tr>
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5.4.3 Ecosystem services found at the Vinterviken Garden

The members of the gardening group come there to work with their hands and to meet each other and visitors to the garden. It is an important social activity for all the respondents and the cultural activities in the garden are also popular with the respondents but also for the visitors to the garden.

The variation of plants is extensive and thus biodiversity is promoted through a vast amount of diverse flowers, vegetables and herbs cultivated. The service of pollination is also supported through the cultivation of herbs and other plants that key functional insects prefer. Lastly, the garden’s pond provides an important habitat for frogs and insects in the area. None of these benefits are intentional as the focus seems to be more on growing things organic and displaying a pretty garden, that is, the larger scope of how the area functions in the ecosystem where it is located is not considered, but are a result of the management practices as a bonus effect. As an example of this unawareness, the pond in the garden was emptied for cleaning one year and the frog populations in it were lost. Visitors who used to visit the pond to look at the frogs with their children were outraged. The protests were numerous and the board of the garden learned not to make the same mistake the year after.
6. Discussion

The results conveyed in this thesis suggest that the institutional framework on the municipal level regarding the management of state owned land in Stockholm constitutes a complex sharing of responsibility. For one thing this is evident in the areas of responsibility that the different municipal agencies hold and their power and significance related to green-area management. While there is a limited diversity of management modes of municipal land for local green-area user groups, it is also an awkward task to find the accurate decision maker when initiating such projects. Moreover, such involvement depends on the willingness of the municipality of approving local initiatives considered to be “serious” enough and even whether there are resources to administrate such an application.

In exploring the possibilities of local stewardship of green areas owned by the Stockholm municipality, I analysed a subset of state-owned lands managed by green-area user groups, assessing the institutional possibilities for citizen participation, the role of leadership in enforcing rules-in-use, and what values determine local stewardship groups’ motives for participating in such management. In the following I discuss each of these factors in more elaborate terms.

6.1 The institutional possibilities for citizen participation

The institutional organisation on the municipal level is comprised of an intricate web of cooperations and monitoring. This is not necessarily negative if the hierarchy were not top-down driven to the extent that it currently is. There is some interesting research on the benefits of polycentric institutions (Ostrom, 2010) however these benefits are only acquired if the institutions are equal in legislative power.

In the case of Stockholm Municipality the top of the hierarchy consists of elected politicians. The result is inevitably that the rest of the chain of decision makers in the remaining institutional units is bound to the aims of politicians. The political incentives may not regard ideology and vision but may merely be a question of priorities. If local management of green areas is viewed as an investment, then the question will arise, is there money for it? Here the issue of transaction costs become highly relevant.

In addition to the financial issues of management, the sheer volume of transactions among the institutions in the decision making process becomes an obstacle in new local management initiatives. As the responsibility for the green areas in the city is divided among the different agencies, with a whole chain of legislative power upwards in the hierarchy, the administrative
process becomes a tiresome and time-consuming process. New projects are difficult to initiate from a grass-roots perspective as the process of finding the correct people to speak with on the municipal level will discourage most aspiring green area users. In addition to this, the agencies such as the Municipal Districts themselves are reluctant (with exceptions of course) to include grassroots projects as it means more work and complicated administrative procedures:

There have been so many reorganisations between all the offices that it is difficult to keep track of all the logistics and responsible entities within the offices. This makes it very difficult to allow larger projects such as Vinterviken as the organisation of the contracts take up too many resources. (Landscape Architect at the Exploitation Office)

Transaction costs then seem to be high to start with but could be potentially be lowered in the long run in terms of reducing future healthcare costs, for facilitating integration activities, to lower crime rates, and for providing a richer set of habitats for sustaining ecosystem services. Thus, the limited amount of local/municipal co-operations in Stockholm is potentially explained by the lack of resources and administrative difficulties. This likely results in the larger establishments of public parks as it is likely that transaction costs are lower for their control and management compared to local stewardship projects. Smaller local initiatives such as user-contracts and user-participation-contracts are dependent upon interested park managers at the MDs. Currently only one person at Södermalm’s MD is the driver for this form of cooperation which makes it dependent upon a key individual (Olsson et al, 2007). This creates a vulnerable situation, as there exist few incentives for the user-contracts at the MD and the Municipality at large if and when the key individual is gone or replaced. Furthermore, there is no money to administrate user-contracts after the discontinuation of Agenda 21.

6.2 Rules-in-use at Akalla and Igelbäcken allotment gardens
The institutions from the Municipal Districts set the agenda in terms of what is allowed on the land to be managed. In Rinkey-Kista MD they wish for example to keep the land clean from building structures apart from the one specifically designed, which is the “pergola”. These rules were, however, found to be interpreted differently in the two allotment gardens investigated in this thesis, therefore the rules in use in effect differ. Due to the lack of clear joint vision that motivates the users to behave in a certain way as in
the case of Vinterviken, the rules at the allotment gardens are used to coerce the members to behave in a specific manner by telling them what they can and cannot do, threatening with sanctions rather than providing them with initiative to behave in a certain manner. The gardeners who are dissatisfied with how the rules are interpreted by the board at Akalla have in many cases moved to Igelbäcken where the rules are interpreted more freely. However, those who wish to garden in a more structured and organised way will choose Akalla. The gardeners simply choose the allotment garden that best meets their own needs. The rules and recommendations set by the municipality and FSSK are identical, however, the interpretations of the rules clearly vary greatly between the two allotment garden cases of this thesis. There are also rules from the board that correlate to the gardens’ individual needs as for example the anti-gambling rule at Igelbäcken.

The rule against building structures on the lots is subject to multiple speculations at Igelbäcken especially. Some respondents seem to think that they are only a step away from buying little houses from Bauhaus to place on the lots, others think they are allowed to build their own huts. The actual truth is that nothing is allowed apart from the pergola but the board is now trying to get a trial area with little houses on the area to see how it works. This has been suggested to the MD through FSSK but has yet to be decided. It is curious why this misunderstanding has arisen but it is possibly symptomatic of the miscommunication at large between the garden’s leadership and it’s gardeners.

One of the results from this is that Igelbäcken is scattered with little sheds built with whatever has been available to the gardeners, old doors serve as walls and all sorts of debris and wood parts comprise the building stones of the little houses. Greenhouses made of plastic sheaths and sticks are also common. The whole area resembles a shantytown with an extensive amount of ingenious solutions for shelter and growth.

North’s argument that the rules are played by the players to win the game is hence a telling description of the two gardens. The gardeners at Akalla seem to be happy with the rules and largely obey them. The question should however be posed, should the rules at Igelbäcken change? The gardeners there have already in effect changed them and it is now up to the Municipality if they will accept this development of the rules. This of course depends on the objectives of the Municipality. Do they wish to continue to attempt control over Igelbäcken or will they listen to the needs of the users? As the gardeners at Igelbäcken spend so much time there, it is natural they should want some sufficient shelter from imposing weather conditions.
6.3 Rules-in-use at the Vinterviken Garden

At Vinterviken the rules are on a different level than the allotment gardens and do not make claims on individual behaviour. The individual behaviour seems to be led by the chairman at the garden who is the person most responsible for the garden’s vision in accordance with the rules from the exploitation office. Such a vision is absent at the allotment gardens. This creates a situation where the rules aren’t really consulted at Vinterviken and they rather organise themselves under the unspoken/informal rule that the chairman knows best. He is the one consulted, rather than a set of formally stipulated rules. While most members of the gardening group seem satisfied with this, some respondents did express a wish to contribute more to the planning of the garden. The bottom line seems to be that the members of the garden are motivated to behave in a certain manner due to their trust and share in the chairman’s vision.

6.4 Property rights

6.4.1 Igelbäcken and Akalla allotment gardens

Due to that the gardeners are claimants (Ostrom and Schlager, 1996), they cannot exclude visitors to the allotment gardens or sell their lots. This poses problems, especially at Igelbäcken where outsiders go into the area to buy and even steal vegetables. Furthermore, there have been occasions when gardeners have attempted to sell their lots to people who wish to jump the queue or trying to sell sheds and decorative stones, path material and so on to the next gardener. These problems are exclusive to Igelbäcken and do not occur at Akalla. The issue of ownership therefore becomes somewhat problematic due to that specific and strict rules for usage of the land set by the MD are not enforced, monitored, and sanctioned properly. When asked if the gardeners felt they owned their lots, the majority of them said yes. However, the apparent frustration with the rules suggests that they at least feel restricted in this supposed ownership. The fact is that they do not own the lots at all and the MD has the right to evict the association after 25 years. The current contract runs out in 2021.

In terms of exclusion it is an interesting fact that the allotment gardens are supposed to be available to all the citizens in the city. Management rights are exclusively in the hands of the green-area user group members, but access to the area is open to the public. How this right of access is interpreted by the public is however arbitrary. On all the fieldwork visits to both allotment gardens, I could only observe people belonging to the user group in the area, including their friends and family. Most respondents claimed that they had no problem with
visitors but they knew exactly when and why people visited the area. Hence, these allotment gardens do not provide an easy recreational place to access if one doesn’t “belong” to the stewardship group.

6.4.2 The Vinterviken Garden

The garden association of Vinterviken is also claimant oriented. However its leasehold lasts for 60 years and the garden is included in the detailed planning of the city (detaljplanen). Hence, members are not worried about not being allowed to stay in the area. They are only evicted if the city plans to exploit the area, which is unlikely as they are included in the plan, or unless the garden does not comply with the rules set up by the Exploitation Office.

The issue of individual sense of ownership is reflected in the gardeners’ attitude towards the garden. They feel that they are part of it but not that they as individuals own parts of it as in the allotment gardens. They welcome visitors as they enjoy to showcase their work and feel like they contribute to the well being of others. The issue of exclusion is thus not a problem here as they are open and welcoming. Vandalism occurs sporadically and on a small scale.

6.5 Design principles for managing long-enduring common pool resources

The principles described below are argued by Ostrom (1990) to be potentially critical for institutions to manage common pool resources in the long-term. Here I use them for discussing additional institutional mismatches in terms of the present situation for the broader involvement of the local stewardship groups assessed in this study.

Table 12. Design principles for managing long-enduring common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990:90)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design Principle</th>
<th>Yes/No/NA</th>
<th>Yes/No/NA</th>
<th>Yes/No/NA</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Igelbäcken</td>
<td>Akalla</td>
<td>Vinterviken</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Clearly defined boundaries. Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td></td>
<td>No withdrawal or usage is permitted without membership. The lots are clearly defined.</td>
<td>No withdrawal or usage is permitted without membership. The lots are clearly defined.</td>
<td>Membership is needed in order to participate in the gardening activities. However, withdrawal of resource units is not clearly defined.</td>
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<td>2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions. Appropriation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The allotment garden and the rules from the MD are designed to</td>
<td>The allotment garden and the rules from the MD are designed to</td>
<td>The garden is designed to fit the intended use of its</td>
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rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labour, material, and/or money.

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<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>The formal rules appropriated by the MD are non-negotiable. They are also reflected in the rules of the board. Therefore there is very little leeway to alter them.</td>
<td>The formal rules appropriated by the MD are non-negotiable. They are also reflected in the rules of the board. Therefore there is very little leeway to alter them.</td>
<td>The formal rules from the Exploitation office are non-negotiable. However, in terms of which land may be cultivated, the Exploitation office has heeded the needs of the garden and expanded the area. The gardeners themselves have very little say in terms of the other rules.</td>
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<td>Yes and No</td>
<td>Yes and No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>The gardeners are accountable to their own association board, which in turn is accountable to the MD.</td>
<td>The gardeners are accountable to their own association board, which in turn is accountable to the MD</td>
<td>There is no monitoring in that sense within the garden management practices. The collective norm is that “we do what the Chairman says.” The Chairman in effect then becomes the one accountable to the Exploitation office.</td>
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<th>5. Graduated sanctions.</th>
<th>5. Graduated sanctions.</th>
<th>5. Graduated sanctions.</th>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>There are sanctions but they are not carried out efficiently due to disagreements and exaggerated leniency within the board. Further, the MD is not efficient in sanctioning the</td>
<td>The sanctions are efficiently designed and executed by the board.</td>
<td>There are no visible violations of the rules, however the Garden board cancels the membership of any member who actively works against the interests of the Garden.</td>
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offices.
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<th>Violation of building rights in the area.</th>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Conflict-resolution mechanisms.</td>
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<td>Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials.</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>The conflict resolution mechanism is not efficient but occurs haphazard by the association board when conflict arises in the garden. However, if there is conflict in the garden association board, there is no mechanism to solve it as the MD has no resources for this purpose and the FSSK are not providing this service. Conflicts between the garden and the MD are not negotiable as the MD has the bargaining power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>The conflict resolution mechanism is not efficient but occurs haphazard by the association board when conflict arises in the garden. However, if there is conflict in the garden association board, there is no mechanism to solve it as the MD has no resources for this purpose and the FSSK are not providing this service. Conflicts between the garden and the MD are not negotiable as the MD has the bargaining power.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes and No</td>
<td>As there are no apparent conflicts there is no mechanism for solving them. Conflicts that have arisen in the past have been resolved by the Chairman. This is not represented by an arena for conflict resolution but rests on the judgement of one person. This may be efficient but not very democratic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Minimal recognition of rights to organize. The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>The self-organisation possibilities are present as the boards are responsible for their members but the rules of the board are very close to those of the MD (apart from the gambling rules and such) so this presence should be investigated further for clarity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>The self-organisation possibilities are present as the boards are responsible for their members but the rules of the board are very close to those of the MD so this presence should be investigated further for clarity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The rules from Exploitation office are the same as the gardens overarching rules. However, the rules address general objectives and leave the garden to organise itself freely as long as those objectives are met.</td>
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</table>
As illustrated by the table above the criteria for well functioning and long-enduring institutions are not met in a satisfactory manner. There is room for improvement in all three cases if relying on Ostrom’s theory.

### 6.6 The role of leadership in enforcing rules-in-use

*From Table 2. Issue Definition, Mobilization of Actions and Resources by Mode of Organizational Change from Frances Westley (1995:411).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Issue Definition</th>
<th>Action Mobilization</th>
<th>Resource Mobilization</th>
<th>Structuring</th>
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<tr>
<td>Planning Mode</td>
<td>“Public arena” dynamics may force early closure of issue definition without sufficient data</td>
<td>“Public arena” dynamics immobilize stakeholders making coalition cooperation difficult</td>
<td>Resource channels secured often in advance of issue definition</td>
<td>Procedures/normal task allocations often limited to pre-existing structures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vision Mode</td>
<td>Visionary particularly skilled in issue definition process</td>
<td>Link between affect and action fully utilized</td>
<td>Creative resource mobilization</td>
<td>Overdependence on visionary leader. Failure to institutionalize process or assure resource flow</td>
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Based on the results of the case studies respectively, it was shown that the formal institutions and recommendations from the MD and from the association board to its members differed quite markedly. Rather than interpreting this as a lack of rules-in-use, it likely signifies a lack of communication of rules due to inefficient leadership.

The leadership in Igelbäcken Allotment Garden has a lenient internal leadership while Akalla is rather strict in its enforcement of the rules. This is reflected in the problems now facing Igelbäcken with for example uncontrollable building activities in the area. However, while the formal rules are identical at both Akalla and Igelbäcken, the difference in interpretation reflects the importance of the leadership for interpretation and enforcement of stipulated rules.

Vinterviken on the other hand is reliant on a visionary leader to make decisions, which makes the garden wholly dependent on him.

The excerpt from Table 2 portrays the relevant modes of leadership in the selected case studies, i.e. the planning and vision modes. Igelbäcken and Akalla allotment gardens are
products of a planning led process where the terms for management are set by the Municipality. The problems with this type of leadership are apparent in Igelbäcken. That is, the politicians in the highest tier of the hierarchy ultimately decide what is to happen to the land. The politicians in turn are influenced by the political climate and will more often than not act upon what is currently in fashion. The gardeners have no say in how the land should be used and therefore problems that arise such as the building epidemic at Igelbäcken are difficult to solve. The issue is not defined in a manner so that it becomes a solvable problem on the agenda at the municipal level. The association board is left to its own decisions and as illustrated by the two allotment gardens in this thesis the leadership is of great importance on the local level. Igelbäcken has faced internal problems within the board partly due to cultural clashes and they have been lenient in terms of the allowance of building structures in the area. Furthermore, Igelbäcken is more than twice the size of Akalla, which may add to the difficulty in supervising. Akalla, on the other hand, has had a strict board with a more homogenous group that may be easier to handle.

The rigidity of this institutional structure at the municipal level appears to be counterproductive for the gardeners in Igelbäcken who are not satisfied with how the institutions function. It has been argued that local institutions should be nested in a broader network of medium-to larger-scale institutions to ensure in order to adequately address smaller as well as larger problems (Becker and Ostrom, 1995). The structure of the institutions at the allotment gardens, however, is nested in this fashion with the municipality at the top, FSSK at the intermediate level and the boards’ local rules on the lowest level. However, there is little and poor communication between these levels and with decisions only taken at the top-scale. Hence this system appears to be functionally inefficient as it is rigid and less receptive to changes at local levels, as exemplified by the needs of the gardeners at Igelbäcken. At Akalla, however, this problem seems not to exist as their needs better fit the institutions determined by the municipality district. However, this may still be a vulnerable institutional design if the needs of allotment holders change since there is no mechanism to cater to such change.

Westley discusses institutions in relation to redundancy in collaborative initiatives on a macro level where the resilience of a social system can be increased if there is a redundancy of mechanisms for sensing and responding to change. The social system may seem more efficient if it is explicit in its focus and rationale in how it should function but may in fact be more vulnerable than if it was more dynamic and diverse in the functional process. That is, if the system is overly consensual and focused, it is less flexible and less responsive to change and new influences. This proposition likely has significance for the cases investigated in this
thesis. For example, if the current trend of allotment gardening in the urban landscape suddenly changes to the demand of community gardens, where people wish to engage with each other more as exemplified by Vinterviken and there is no redundancy in collaborate efforts, organisations and institutions, this shift is extremely difficult to achieve and the management of urban green areas may be negatively affected. Westley (1995:417) argues “It is preferable to have redundancy if that allows creative individuals multiple avenues to reach their ends and increases the amount of energy in the system.”

The positive factor with planning-led leadership, however, is that there are usually sufficient resources provided by the state or local governments. This is largely the case with both Igelbäcken and Akalla as they have sufficient funds to buy what they need in terms of the upkeep of the respective areas. However, in order to develop, solve problems and improve the areas, more resources are needed.

There is so much to do and so many positive things that can be done with the land (Järvafältet) but there are simply no resources for it. I have been on sick leave for exhaustion for a while now and only work two hours a day. I basically worked three jobs. (Parkmanager at Kista-Rinkeby Municipal District)

In contrast to Igelbäcken and Akalla, the Vinterviken gardens appears to be vision-led. While the initiative for the garden was taken from the municipality initially, the chairman, who may be labelled a visionary leader, runs the continuation of the maintenance and management of the garden. The Exploitation office does not have the means to manage the garden should the garden association dissolve. It does not get involved in the garden unless it is a matter of negotiating lease fees and contractual matters. The negative issue with this type of leadership is that it creates a vulnerable institutional structure as it depends on a single, strong leader who may be difficult to replace if needed.

According to Westley (1995), economic determinants often constrain a vision-led organisation. This has not been the case at Vinterviken in monetary terms yet, as they run their own café and charge member fees. If the café, however, ceases to be profitable, the activity will most probably become strained. The management of resources in terms of people willing to take on more responsibility of the garden are also vulnerable as there are few active participants in the garden willing to be part of the board or feel responsible for any larger issue or area in the garden. There is also very little support from the MD and the Exploitation office in that respect.

The positive side of this type of vision-led organisation is that the members are often creative
and the chain between idea and action is very short. It is a dynamic environment where the development of the garden is an ongoing process. Problems that arise are dealt with immediately and more frequently thanks to the Chairman’s ability to solve them. The shared vision of the garden results in a common sense of responsibility and all the members feel they wish to contribute to keeping the garden in line with that vision.

Ljummen (the festival ....sic) is for example deemed impossible to hold anywhere else than here. It sort of represents the spirit of the garden. I think this is where the leadership comes in. I don’t exactly point with my whole hand but the difficult task is to have a vision while simultaneously letting people do a little as they please and not appear disgruntled when things don’t turn out as I want them to. THAT is hard. You have to accept that it turns out as it turns out. If you can introduce that into an organisation it’s good. (The Chairman at Vinterviken)

An efficient way of overcoming the shortcomings of the different modes discussed above could then be to combine them. As Hanna and Jentoft (1996) argue, there is not enough response to the social complexity of the areas’ users on state-owned land. In for example the case of Kristianstads Vattenrike (Olsson et al, 2007) (Hahn et al, 2006) the municipality and local stakeholders embarked on a collaboration, which successfully combined planning, learning and vision mode. The municipality was responsible for the planning whereas an individual, however employed by the municipality, provided the vision while simultaneously gathering grassroots action momentum. This mode of collaboration has been labelled adaptive co-management (Olsson et al, 2007) (Folke et al, 2007) in recent research and is argued to be an optimal form of ecosystem management. Adaptive co-management is the result of learning by doing on a local scale in the management process and also combining legitimate action on a multilevel scale.
6.7 Values determining local stewardship groups’ motives for participating in green-area management

The analysis of motivational drivers were found to differ in the selected cases. At Igelbäcken and Akalla, members display a strong need for conducting gardening for recreational purposes and for cultivating garden produce from their native countries. The lots therefore become important for them, comprising a large part of their everyday activity during the planting season. The gardeners at the allotment gardens appear less concerned with socialising with each other as a group although they are keen in spending time with their fellow countrymen in the garden and with families and new friends outside the garden. Visitors are not welcomed without close scrutiny.

The Vinterviken garden is equally important for its members with an emphasis on recreation through spending time outdoors and getting one’s “hands dirty”. The social aspect of the garden is however different from the allotment gardens as they socialise as a group and willingly so also with visitors to the garden.

6.7.1 Igelbäcken and Akalla

As revealed in the results section of this thesis the majority of the people with lots in both Igelbäcken and Akalla enjoy spending time at their lots, barbequing, socialising with friends and family. Another of the dominant reasons for having a lot is to cultivate vegetables, fruits and herbs from their home countries. The general sense derived from the interviews is that the gardeners are not so much concerned with being a part of a community or the garden at large. Rather, the gardeners keep to themselves or to smaller groupings often defined by their home countries. At Igelbäcken Iraqi curds stick together, the Turks stick together, the Greek, the Latin American, the Swedes and so on.

At Akalla the majority of the gardeners are dominated by Swedes and Finns but there are also groupings of Somalis and Iranians. Cultivation of native produce also occurs here at the lots with gardeners from different countries of origin. There is also socialising at the lots but not to the same extent as in Igelbäcken. People come to tend to their gardens and relax.

One fundamental difference form the Vinterviken Garden is that the gardeners at the allotment gardens choose to socialise on their lots within smaller groups of friends at the allotment or family and friends that are not part of the allotment garden.

The lots mean a lot to the gardeners where some have expressed a love so strong that they call their plants their “children”. A common belief among the gardeners is that they believe that
the lots have a huge impact on their well-being. Some say that they would not have known “what to do with themselves” had they not had the lot as a refuge.

6.7.2 The Vinterviken Garden

At Vinterviken the motives for joining the garden are in some fundamental ways different from those of the allotment gardens. Here the dominant motivating factor seems to that of being part of something in a community fashion. The majority of the respondents claimed to enjoy coming to the garden to meet the other gardeners and visitors to the garden. The drive here is to contribute to the community they are part of and act together as a group. The group does not exclude anyone and there is a general sense of openness and sharing of the common experience of the garden. The majority of the respondents even claimed they had no interest whatsoever in keeping a lot in an allotment garden as it seemed lonely and also time-consuming.

Vinterviken has multiple users who are ill or out of work, retired or lonely and the garden provides an important refuge from the destructive feelings these individuals may have due to their individual situation. They are also free to participate when they choose which enables them to part-take when they have the time and feel like it. This is contrary to the allotment management, as the association requires the individual lots to be cultivated, which is a whole different level of responsibility and commitment.

The other dominant force was to be able to occupy oneself outdoors and get ones “hands dirty”. All the respondents expressed a strong love for the garden. They feel proud of it and of their work there.
6.8 Biophilia and Ecosystem Services

*Nature is on the inside*

– Paul Cezanne

If Biophilia or a love of nature is a driving factor in the willingness to protect it, maybe the love of nature itself is not the key but perhaps the space created by the presence of nature. The knowledge of the complex ecological processes may not be the crucial mechanism to motivate people to care but rather creating space to let people create and maintain the space of their preference. This could potentially create the diversity needed for ecological functions with some supervision from the park managers of the relevant municipal district. Once the spaces are created, platforms of knowledge sharing and social activities that maintain the dynamics of the space can thrive.

There should also be allowed a certain self-regulating process in the space creating in terms of allowing space that has lost its purpose for the users to “die-off” and let new ones emerge. This can be related to the heuristic model of the adaptation cycle (Hollings and Gunderson, 2002) where in order to create resilient green city spaces, one must allow for flexibility, whether it be creation or destruction.

When discussing Biophilia and desired nature, the example of the varied choices of aesthetics and use at Igelbäcken show preferences depending on culture. For example, the South American gardeners prefer grass and the Iranians prefer flowers and food and little houses for them to socialise in.

In terms of transaction cost this aspect is very much relevant in regards to the Biophilia argument. If the hypothesis is taken seriously and nurtured accordingly in the current urban setting, there is probably a vast amount of capital to be gained in terms of health, recreation, and resource management amongst other things.

It may be argued in the light of the results section of this thesis that all three gardens provide provisional, regulating, supporting, recreational and cultural ecosystem services. Other studies have also found that local stewardship may play a significant role in generating and sustaining valuable ecosystem services (Barthel et al 2005, Borgström et al 2006)

The ESS of an ecological nature such as pollination and biodiversity at all three gardens, are generated as positive spill over effects from the ESS that are purposefully generated by the participants. The ESS services managed for from the participants’ perspective are predominantly cultural, recreational, and provisional.

The issues raised by the Biophilia hypothesis are arguably very important in this regard.
Ecological knowledge which has been a focused on lately in the research community seems to matter less here as the participants are managing with different motivational drivers that actually benefit ecological functions without active intent. It therefore becomes important to spend more time on investigating motivational drivers in urban green area management, as this seems to be the key in creating more diverse landscapes in the city and hence supporting key ecological processes. It can be argued that even if the local stewardship is different depending on the motivational drivers of its managers, the ecosystem services are often the same but may be different in character. This does not make them any less valuable.

If the green areas in the city are disappearing and the management of those remaining continues as a municipally centred largely generic way then we are probably facing some real problems in the future.

Conservation then or rather in this context, managing for the continued generation of ESS, can be argued to be an act of self-interest above the altruistic aspect of saving species for the species themselves. As Kellert borrows by Hardin: “Never to ask people to do anything they consider to be contrary to their own interests”(1993:60). Hardin’s tragedy of the commons (1968) may be accused for oversimplifying in current research (Dietz et al, 2003). However, he does have a point in the above statement. Collective management for a resilient cityscape most probably requires incentives for most people to participate rather than solely altruistic motives of “greening the city” or maintaining biodiversity for the sake of “nature”. The social values then, derived from participation in local green area management play a crucial role in its existence. Arguably, people need to want to participate not merely feel compelled to and it is most likely that the basis for this motivation varies on an individual level.

There seems to be a need for recognition that Stockholm is a culturally diverse city with a probable vast variety of preferences. In order to maintain ESS in the cityscape a plethora of management modes should arguably be available.
7. Conclusions

In conclusion, this thesis has demonstrated that the possibilities of local stewardship of green areas owned by Stockholm municipality are limited. This is to a significant extent due to that the resources for the municipal districts’ administering of local stewardship initiatives are inadequate and the decision-making processes between the numerous official agencies is unclear and complicated.

The communication among actors at different organizational levels needs to be improved, as well as the decision-making power could ideally be distributed more evenly throughout the institutional scales. Instead of the current top-down approach the Municipality currently employs, there could be more legislative power given to the local stewardship initiatives providing they adhere to basic regulations such as not managing the land in a detrimental manner for generating ecosystem services. The property rights associated with the case studies are clearly defined as they are subject to specified contracts. However in practice, the right of the claimant at Igelbäcken and Akalla is complex, as it seems unclear to the users what this right entails. However at Vinterviken, the right of the claimant seems sufficient. Moreover, according to the design principles for managing common-pool resources from Ostrom (1990), few of the necessary principles are met for either case study in terms of managing them in the long-term.

The results of this study indicate the importance of exploring the interplay between institutions, leadership and motivational drivers in order to design more efficient urban management designs that involve local stewardship groups.

In terms of enabling local stewardship the results of this study suggest that a mix of planning-led and visionary-led leadership could be employed to support a resilient institutional structure.

Further, the local stewardship examined in the three case studies indicates that green-area management is not based on biodiversity conservation but is primarily oriented towards nurturing cultural and provisional ecosystem services. These practices however contribute to the generation of other ecosystem services. For example, it may be argued that ecosystem services such as pollination, seed dispersal, climate regulation, and biodiversity are supported by these practices even though they are unintentional.

The results of this thesis also indicate that the gardeners examined in the case studies develop strong feelings towards managing nature in cities and the motivational drivers for people to engage in local stewardship appear to be instrumental to the actual existence of such
practices. This forms a negative feedback loop rather than a positive one as discussed in the introduction where people may question what there is, in terms of nature, to protect in the first place.

That is, local stewardship may partly counteract the extinction of experience caused by the separation of humans from nature in cities while simultaneously maintaining the generation of ecosystem services for their enhancement by way of management and use resulting from local stewardship. Hence, planners and policymakers should develop more designs that integrate local stewardship groups in green-area management.

If urban citizens are encouraged and allowed in an easily accessible manner to engage with the green areas of their choice and allowed to manage it with the incentive to ensure the continued generation of ecosystem services and not for commercial gain and exploitation purposes, there could potentially be an increase in spaces for recreation and cultural activities with spill over effects beneficial to the local ecosystems. This could in turn potentially result in lower transaction costs in a long-term perspective as costs are cut for the upkeep of parks and natural resources needed for public health purposes are maintained.

Therefore, it can be argued that when natural areas in urban settings are replaced with buildings or parking lots, it may constitute a non-substitutable loss of natural scenery for aesthetic and restorative preferences and for ecological processes.

That is, if there were more resources to allow for more self-organising, active participation in managing the green areas in Stockholm there would be more opportunities for increasing the social-ecological resilience of the city in terms of both creating platforms for social interactions and also for supporting biodiversity and associated ecosystem services.
8. References


Contract between Igelbäcken Allotment garden Stockholm Municipality, 1996. ID no: 54117-059

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Föreningen Stor-Stockholms Koloniträdgårdar (FSSK), 2002. Stadgar med Kommentarer, FSSK


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Lease hold contract between Vinterviken Garden and the Exploitation Office (Tomträttsavtal), 2009


Ostrom, E., 2010. Nested externalities and polycentric institutions: must we wait for global solutions to climate change before taking actions at other scales? Published online, *Economic Theory*. DOI: 10.1007/s00199-010-0558-6
URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/723452714082113q/


Stockholm Masterplan (Stockholms Översiktsplan), 2011

9. Appendices

Appendix 9.1

Interview guide for Akalla and Igelbäcken Allotment Gardens.

Basic facts:
How long have you had your lot?
Why do you think people keep lots in an allotment garden?
Who do you keep a lot?
How come you have one in this garden? Do you live in the area?
How often do you come here?
What do you grow? Why?

Social factors:
Are you here on your own mostly or do you bring anyone when you come here?
Do you know any of the others in the garden/the association? If so, whom?
Are there occasions when you meet outside the garden area?
Is there a trend of who keeps lots here? Age, cultural origin?
Do you have association meetings? If so, how often?
Do you attend these meetings?
How many people attend these meetings?
What do you discuss at these meetings?
Do you engage in any common activities within the garden area?
What do you gain from your lot?
Is there anything about keeping a lot that you consider difficult?
What does your lot mean to you?
How do you feel about visitors coming to the area who do not have a direct connection to the garden?
Do you have problems with stealing here? People stealing your produce?
Are you subject to vandalism here?

Do you feel there is interest for what you are doing here from society?

Do you feel you are given attention by the Municipal district? Are they involved in the garden in any way?

**Rules and norms:**

What do the common rules for the garden look like? Do you decide yourselves how to manage common resources such as the clubhouse, etc?

Do you have the right to decide what to do with your individual lot or are there rules on how to manage it?

Who decides what you can and cannot do?

Who has decided the rules? Have they grown from common consensus, through representative democracy, the municipality? Is there conflict around the rules? For example, is there conflict between the rules of the garden and the rules of society?

How long have the existing rules existed?

Have the rules changed?

Are the rules followed? If no, which ones do?

Are there other rules that are followed but are not officially a formal rule?

What happens if you break the rules?

How do you solve conflicts?

What happens if you break external rules as a member of this garden?

Who decides who breaks rules and who decides what happens to them?

Can anyone enter the area?

Can you lose your lot against your will?

**Ecology:**

Do you have a common vision for the garden?

If so, would you have preferred another?

Do you care for the natural areas surrounding the garden as well?

Are there rules or agreements connected to learning about nature? What animals do you see in the area?
Do you together decide what to grow in the garden?

Do you feel like you own your lot?

Does it feel like you can use this lot for as long as you like?

How long is your contract?

Has this affected what you grow?

Do you ever talk about nature around and within the area? That is, there are many or few bumblebees this year and so on?

Do you help each other with your plots and your gardening? Do you discuss manure and so on?

Are you interested in what the others grow?

If something is destroyed within the area due to vandalism, a plant disease or so called murderer-snails are invading, do you help each other to fix it or how is it done?

Do you help each other with your gardening or is it mainly each to one’s own?

How did you learn what to grow here? Who taught you?

Do you teach others? If so, whom?

Other:

What is your profession?

How long have you lived here?

Which country are you from?

Did you garden there?

If so, was it different from what you grow here?
Interview guide for the Vinterviken Garden.

**Basic facts:**

How long have you been involved in the garden?

Why do you think people get involved in the garden? Why do you think people become members?

Why are you involved in the garden?

How come you chose to come to this garden? Do you live in the area?

How often do you come here?

What do you grow? Which projects are of particular interest to you? Why?

**Social factors:**

Are you here on your own mostly or do you bring anyone when you come here?

Do you know any of the others in the garden/the association? If so, whom?

Are there occasions when you meet outside the garden area?

Is there any trend in who is a member of the garden or is involved in the gardening group?

Do you have association meetings? If so, how often?

Do you attend these meetings?

How many people attend these meetings?

What do you discuss at these meetings?

Do you engage in any common activities within the garden area?

What do you gain from your involvement in the garden?

Is there anything you consider difficult with your involvement in the garden?

What does the garden mean to you?

What do you think about visitors entering the area?

Do you have problems with stealing within the area?

Does vandalism occur here?

Do you feel there is interest for what you are doing here from society?
Do you feel you are given attention by the Municipal district? Are they involved in the garden in any way?

**Rules and norms:**

What do the common rules for the garden look like? Do you decide yourselves how to manage common resources?

Do you have the right to decide what to do in the garden or are there rules on how to manage it?

Who decides what you can and cannot do?

Who has decided the rules? Have they grown from common consensus, through representative democracy, the municipality? Is there conflict around the rules? For example, is there conflict between the rules of the garden and the rules of society?

How long have the existing rules existed?

Have the rules changed?

Are the rules followed? If no, which ones do?

Are there other rules that are followed but are not officially a formal rule?

What happens if you break the rules?

How do you solve conflicts?

What happens if you break external rules as a member of this garden?

Who decides who breaks rules and who decides what happens to them?

Can anyone enter the area?

Can you lose your membership in the garden against your will?

**Ekologi:**

Do you have a common vision for the garden?

If so, would you have preferred another?
Do you care for the natural areas surrounding the garden as well?

Are there rules or agreements connected to learning about nature?

What animals do you see in the area?

Do you together decide what to grow in the garden?

Do you feel like you own the garden?

Does it feel like you can come here for as long as you like?

Has this affected what you grow in the garden?

Do you ever talk about nature around and within the area? That is, there are many or few bumblebees this year and so on?

Do you help each other with your plots and your gardening? Do you discuss manure and so on?

Are you interested in what is or should be grown in the garden?

If something is destroyed within the area due to vandalism, a plant disease or so-called murder-snails are invading, do you fix it together or how is it done?

Do you help each other with your gardening or is it mainly each to ones own? Do you work as a group?

How did you learn what to grow here? Who taught you?

Do you teach others? If so, whom?

**Övrigt:**
What is your profession?

How long have you lived here?

Which country are you from?

Did you garden there?

If so, was it different from what you grow here?
Appendix 9.2 Referral document for new agreements for allotment gardens within Stockholm municipality

*Reservation* anfördes av tjänstgörande ordföranden Abebe Hailu (s) till förmån för förvaltningens förslag till beslut, *bilaga 1.*

*Reservation* anfördes av ledamot Jakob Dencker (mp) och ledamot Gunilla Bhur (v) med hänvisning till eget förslag, *bilaga 1.*

**Rinkeby-Kista stadsdelsförvaltnings** tjänsteutlåtande daterat den 6 maj 2009 har i huvudsak följande lydelse.


Förvaltningen delar stadsledningskontorets bedömning att arrendeavtalen, medlemsavtalen samt ordningsföreskrifterna behöver preciseras, uppdateras och ses över i flera avseenden – bland annat vad avser avgifterna.

Förvaltningen anser att den föreslagna **arrendetiden** om fem år är väl kort och risikerar att motverka önskemålet att föreningar och arrandatoror investerar/reinvesterar i verksamheten. Arrendetiden bör, enligt förvaltningens uppfattning, omfatta minst tio år. Vid längre arrendetider skulle arrendeavgiften kunna omprövas med kortare intervaller – exempelvis var femte år.

Förvaltningen anser att de rekommenderade **arrendeavgifterna** – 5,50 kronor per kvadratmeter lottytta för kolonilotton (nu 1,60 kr/kvm) respektive 1,30 kr per kvadratmeter lottytta för odlingslotton (nu 0,50 kr/kvm) – är väl avvärda; dels mot bakgrund av föreningarnas större ansvar för gemensamhetsanläggningar, dels mot bakgrund av att avgifterna reelit får samma nivå som vid den nuvarande arrendetidens början.

Ansvaret för **driften och underhållet av gemensamhetsanläggningarna** inom områdena, bland annat ledningarna, bör förtydligas i avtalen. Det bör än tydligare framgå att det är föreningarna som har ansvar för reinvesteringar. Stadens ansvar för investeringar bör endast gälla vid anläggande av nya koloni- och fritidsträdgårdssområden.

Förvaltningen har inget att erinra mot det förslag av **definition av begreppet Storstockholm** som föreslås. Syftet är att fastslå vilka som får bli medlemmar i en kolonialfritidsträdgårdssöenning. Det geografiska avståndet mellan bostaden och kolonialfritidsträdgårdssöenning får inte vara för stort.
Appendix 9.3 User-contract between Igelbäcken Allotment garden and Stockholm Municipality

Kontraktssummer 541H7-652
Fastighetsbeteckning Akalla 4:1, del av
Stadsdel Kista

Mellan Stockholms kommun, här kallad kommunen, och Igelbäcken Koloni-
förening, här kallad föreningen, har, med upphävande av arrendekontrakt av
parterna, tecknats följande

ARRENDEKONTRAKT

§ 1

Kommunen upplåter till föreningen det område som på bifogade karta har
markerats med röd linje och som är beläget vid Husby Gård i Stockholm.
Området omfattar ca 23.168 kvm lottmark och får endast användas för
fritidsträdgårdar.

§ 2

Upplåtelsen avser tiden 1 oktober 1996 - 30 september 2021. Upplåtelsen
upphör utan uppsägning vid kontraktsperiodens slut. Kommunen är dock
berättigad att efter varje femarsperiod återtags sådan mark som kommunen
finner vara erforderlig för annat ändamål. I sådant fall skall uppsägningen av
markområdet ske senast ett år före femarsperiodens utgång. Innan uppsä-
gning sker skall ärendet underställas kommunens koloniträdgårdsråd för
ytrande.

Den utgående arrendeavgiften skall från och med dagen för återtagandet
minskas med vad som därav belöper på den återtagna marken.

§ 3

Om marken efter kontraktsstidens utgång även i fortsättningen skall användas
 till fritidsträdgårdar har föreningen företädesrätt till ny upplåtelse. För-
handlingar om nytt kontrakt skall upptas senast femton månader innan
kontraktsstiden utlöper.

§ 4

Den årliga arrendeavgiften utgör 25.948 kronor för det första arrendeåret.

Avgiften för efterföljande arrendeår ökas eller minskas i proportion till
förändringen av 60 % av konsumentprisindex. Beräkningsexel och definiti-
oner finns i bilaga 1 till detta kontrakt. Basavgiften är 25.948 kronor.

Avgiften skall utan anordran inbetalas förskottssvis till kommunen med halva
beloppet vardera den 1 oktober respektive den 1 april med början den
1 oktober 1996.
Den överenskommna avgiften kan, om kommunfullmäktige så skulle besluta, sänkas även under pågående arrendeperiod.

§ 5

Föreningen skall upplåta lotterna inom området till medlemmar i föreningen att nyttjas som fritidsträdgårdar. Upplåtelsen skall ske enligt arrendekontrakt som godkänts av kommunen.

Upplåtelse av lotter får endast ske till medlem som har fast bostad i Stor-Stockholm och som inte har arrenderat till annan kolonilott inom av kommunen eller annan Stor-Stockholmskommun upplätat område.

§ 6

Byggnad eller annan fast anläggning får inte uppföras inom området utan godkännande av kommunen.

§ 7

Föreningen förbinder sig att:

a) ombesöja underhåll av samtliga inom området för fritidsträdgårdens verksamhetens direkta behov anlagda ledningar, gemensamma byggnader, inbäggnad, gångvägar och övriga anläggningar,

b) erlägga avgift enligt gällande taxa för förbrukat vatten, erlägga hyn av mättare samt kostnad för denna uppsättning och nedläggning och för uttappning av rörledning,

c) hålla eventuella uthus och övriga anläggningar försäkrade till belopp som har godkänts av kommunen,

d) i sin verksamhet följa av kommunen godkända stadgar,

e) följa av kommunen godkända ordningsregler för området,

f) följa de av miljö- och hälsoskyddsämnet utfärda bestämmelserna,

g) följa av Gatu- och fastighetskontoret upprättade miljörekomendationer enligt bilaga 2,

h) ej tillåta enskilda vatten- och avloppssedningar utan att kommunen lämnat tillstånd i varje enskilt fall,

i) svara för latrin- och soppbägning samt för erforderlig renhållning,

j) hålla området i städad och vårdad skick,

k) lämna kommunen eller av denna utsedd person erforderliga upplysningar och tillfälle till besiktning av området,
1) inte bortлага träd eller buskar utan kommunens tillstånd samt

m) ej inskriva eller på annan överlåta detta kontrakt.

§ 8

Föreningen medger att Stockholms kommun eller annan, som fått kommunens tillstånd därtill, får framdraga och vidnámthälla ledningar i eller över området med erforderliga ledningsstolpar och infästningsanordningar på byggnader. Föreningen är pliktig att utan ersättning ta åt härröd föremat intrång och nyttjande men är berättigad till ersättning för skada.

§ 9

Kommunen fritar sig från allt ansvar för skada på området eller där befintlig egendom av vad slag det vara må som icke har förensakats av ägärd från kommunens eller dess befattningshavarens sida.

§ 10

Föreningen skall till kommunen årligen översända protokoll utvisande styrelsens sammansättning samt vem som äger teckna föreningens firma under verksamhetsåret.

§ 11

I övrigt gäller vad som i lag har stadgats om jordägares och arrendatorers rättigheter och skyldigheter varvid särskilt de i § 8 kap. 23 § jordaklen angivna bestämmelserna om förverkande skall beaktas.

Detta kontrakt är upprättat i två likalydande exemplar av vilka parterna har tagit ett vardera.


För Stockholms kommun genom För Igelbäcken Koloniförening
dess gatu- och fastighetsnämnd

[Signatur]

Bevittnas

[Signatur]

Bevittnas
MILJÖREKOMMENDATIONER

1. Våra om vilda växter och djur inom koloniområdet och dess omgivningar; gynna attrikedomen genom att behålla diken, stenrösen, äldre träd och buskage.

2. Bekämpningsmedel bör användas i så liten utsträckning som möjligt bl.a för att de skadar nyttiga "medhjälpande" som bin, humlor, fåglar mm.

3. Handelsgödsel bör användas i så liten utsträckning som möjligt för att undvika övergödning och syrebrist i vattendrag.
Gödsel skall lagras så att läckage inte sker till marken vattendrag eller luft.

4. Kompostering är nödvändig och bör ske både både på de enskilda lotterna och i gemensam kompost.

5. Källsortering skall genomföras enligt anvisningar av kommunens avfallsbolag, SKAFAB.

6. Rn miljövänlig hantering av latrin skall eftersträvas.


9. Informera medlemmarna om miljöfrågornas betydelse bl.a genom att lägga denna bilaga som ett komplement till medlemsavtalet.

* * *
Appendix 9.3 User-contract between Akalla Allotment garden and Stockholm municipality

Kontraktstam 54117-059
Fastighetsbeteckning Akalla 4:1, del av
Stadsdel Akalla

Mellan Stockholms kommun, här kallad kommunen, och Akalla trädgårds-
förening, här kallad föreningen, har, med upphävande av arrendekontrakt av
mellan parterna, tecknats följande

ARRENDEKONTRAKT

§ 1

Kommunen upplåter till föreningen det område som på bifogade karta har
markerats med röd linje och som är beläget vid Akalla Gård i Stockholm.
Området omfattar ca 9840 kvm lottmark och får endast användas för fritids-
trädgårdar.

§ 2

Upplåtelsen avser tiden 1 oktober 1996 -30 september 2021. Upplåtelsen
upphör utan uppsägning vid kontraktsperiodens slut. Kommunen är dock
berättigad att efter varje femårsperiod återtaga sådan mark som kommunen
finner vara erforderlig för annat ändamål. I sådant fall skall uppsägningen av
markområdet ske senast ett år före femårsperiodens utgång. Innan uppsä-
gningen sker skall ärendet underställas kommunens koloniträdgårdsråd för
yttrande.

Den utgående arrendeavgiften skall från och med dagen för återtagandet
minskas med vad som därav belöper på den återtagna marken.

§ 3

Om marken efter kontraktsperiodens utgång även i fortsättningen skall användas
till fritidsträdgårdar har föreningen företrädesrätt till ny upplåtelse. För-
handlingar om nytt kontrakt skall upptas senast femton månader innan
kontraktsperiod utlöper.

§ 4

Den årliga arrendeavgiften utgör 11.120 kronor för det första arrendacäret.

Avgiften för efterföljande arrendeår ökas eller minskas i proportion till
förändringen av 60 % av konsumentprisindex. Beräkningsregler och defini-
tioner finns i bilaga 1 till detta kontrakt. Basavgiften är 11.120 kronor.

Avgiften skall utan anfordran inbetalas förskottvis till kommunen med halva
beloppet vardera den 1 oktober respektive den 1 april med början den
1 oktober 1996.
Den överenskommna avgiften kan, om kommunfullmäktige så skulle besluta, sänkas även under pågående arrendeperiod.

§ 5

Föreningen skall upplåta lotterna inom området till medlemmar i föreningen att nyttjas som fritidsträdgårdar. Upplåtelsen skall ske enligt arrendeavtalet som godkänts av kommunen.

Upplåtelse av lott får endast ske till medlem som har fast bostad i Stor-Stockholm och som inte har arrenerats till annan kolonilott inom av kommunen eller annan Stor-Stockholmskommun upplåtet område.

§ 6

Byggnad eller annan fast anläggning får inte uppföras inom området utan godkännande av kommunen.

§ 7

Föreningen förbinder sig att:

a) ombesörja underhållet av samtliga inom området för fritidsträdgårdens verksamhetens direkta behov anlagda ledningar, gemensamma byggnader, inhägnad, gångvägar och övriga anläggningar;

b) erlägga avgift enligt gällande taxa för förbrukat vatten, erlägga hyra av mättare samt kosnad för dennes uppsättning och nedtagning och för uttagning av rörledning;

c) hålla eventuella uthus och övriga anläggningar försäkrade till belopp som har godkänts av kommunen;

d) i sin verksamhet följa av kommunen godkända stadgar;

e) följa av kommunen godkända ordningsregler för området;

f) följa de av miljö- och hälsoskyddsämnet uttäckta bestämmelserna;

g) följa av Gatut- och fastighetskontoret upprättade miljö- rekommendationer enligt bilaga 2,

h) ej tillåta enskilda vatten- och avloppssedlingar utan att kommunen lämnat tillstånd i varje enskilt fall;

i) svara för latrin- och sopbäckning samt för erforderlig renhållning;

j) hålla området i städad och vårdad skick;

k) lämna kommunen eller av denna utsedd person erforderliga upplysningar och tillfälle till besiktning av området.
1) inte borttaga träd eller buskar utan kommunens tillstånd samt
2) ej inskriva eller på annan väg anlåta detta kontrakt.

§ 8

Föreningen medger att Stockholms kommun eller annan, som fått kommunens tillstånd därtill, får framdra och vidmakhålla ledningar i eller över området med erforderliga ledningsstolpar och infästningsanordningar på byggnader. Föreningen är pliktig att utan ersättning tala härmed före detta intåg och nyttjande men är berättigad till ersättning för skada.

§ 9

Kommunen friar sig från allt ansvar för skada på området eller där befintlig egendom av vad som det varat må som icke har försakats av åtgärd från kommunens eller dess befattningshavares sida.

§ 10

Föreningen skall till kommunen årligen översända protokoll utvisande styrelsens sammansättning samt vem som äger teckna föreningens firma under verksamhetsåret.

§ 11

I övrigt gäller vad som i lag har stadgats om jordägares och arrendatorers rättigheter och skyldigheter varvid särskilt de i 8 kap. 23 § jordabalken angivna bestämmelserna om förverklande skall beaktas.

Detta kontrakt är upprättat i två likalydande exemplar av vilka parterna har lagit ett vardera.


För Stockholms kommun genom För Akalla trädgårdsförkning
dess gatu- och fastighetsämnid

[Signature]
[Signature]

Bevittnas

[Signature]

Bevittnas

[Signature]
ARRANDEAVGIFTEN FÖR KOLONITRÄDGÅRDER

Arrendavgiften förändras varje den 1 oktober under arrendetiden och framräknas enligt följande:

\[
\text{Avgiften} = \text{besavgiften} \times \left[1 + 0.6 \times \frac{(framräkningsindex-basindex)}{basindex}\right]
\]

där
- \(\text{besavgiften}\) = den avgift som gäller 1 oktober 1996
- \(\text{basindex}\) = konsumentprisindex 1 juli 1996
- \(\text{framräkningsindex}\) = konsumentprisindex 1 juli för respektive arrendéår
MILJÖREKOMMENDATIONER

1. Värna om vida växter och djur inom koloniområdet och dess omgivningar; gynna arterikedomen genom att behålla diken, stenrösen, äldre träd och buskage.

2. Bekämpningsmodell bör användas i så liten utsträckning som möjligt bla för att de skadar nyttiga "modhjälpars" som bin, humlor, fåglar mm.

3. Handelskigsdel bör användas i så liten utsträckning som möjligt för att undvika övergökning och syreshit i vattendrag.
   Gödsel skall lagras så att läckage inte sker till marken, vattendrag eller luft.

4. Komposterings är nödvändig och bör ske både både på de enskilda lotterna och i gemensam kompost.

5. Källsortering skall genomföras enligt anvisningar av kommunens avfallsbolag, SKAFAR.

6. En miljövänlig hantering av latrin skall eftersträvas.


8. Målafärg, tråskyddsmodell och vissa rengöringsmedel innehåller miljögifter som inte får spridas i naturen. Otillåtna bekämpningsmodell och restprodukter av miljöfarliga produkter skall inlämnas på miljöstation.


* * *

[Signature]
STADGAR

MED KOMMENTARER

FÖR

Antagna

Stadgarna godkända av Stockholms Stad år 2001.

FÖRENINGEN STOR-STOCKHOLMS KOLONITRÄDGÅRDAR (FSSK)
NORMALSTADGAR
FÖR FÖRENINGAR ANSLUTNA TILY.
FÖRENINGEN STOR-STOCKHOLMS KOLONITRÄDGÄRDA
(FSSK)

Stadgarna godkända av Stockholms Stad år 2001.

Stadgar för................................................................. antagna på ordinarie
årsmöte den...............................................................  

§ 1. Föreningens namn och uppgift

1.1. Föreningen........................................................... är en ideell allmännyttig förening som har till uppgift
       att ansvara för skötsel och underhåll av den mark föreningen arrenderar av
       Stockholms Stad och av de anläggningar föreningen och dess medlemmar
       brukar, oavsett om de ägs av föreningen eller Staden
       att upplåta det arrenderade området till föreningens medlemmar för att brukas
       av dem som koloniträdgårdar, samt
       att verka för ökad samarbete mellan medlemmarna och ökat intresse för
       koloniträdgårdsrörelsen.

1.2. Föreningen är ansluten till FSSK och till dess huvudorganisation Svenska
       Förbundet för Koloniträdgårdar och Fritidsbyar. Föreningen skall arbeta en-
       ligt dessa organisationers målsättning och stadgar.

1.3. Det åligger föreningen att följa lokala miljö- och hälsoskyddsföreskrifter.

§ 2. Medlemmar

2.1. Till medlem i föreningen kan den antagas som är myndig, manövrerbar
       inom Stor-Stockholm och inte har arrende- eller nyttjandeät till annan koloni-
       eller fritidsnärbild.

2.2. Ansökan om medlemskap skall göras skriftligen på av FSSK fastställt form-
       lår. Styrelsen avgör om medlemskap skall beviljas. Som ägare till koloni-
       stuga kan flera personer registreras dock ska endast en person anagas som
       medlem. Vid dödsbo ska styrelsen underrättas om vem som ansvarar för döds-
       boet och vara ansvarig inför styrelsen.
§ 3. Avgifter

3.1. Årsmöte eller extra årsmöte fastställer inträdesavgift, årsavgift, arrendesavgift eller övriga avgifter.

3.2. Föreningens möte som utlysats enligt dessa stadgar kan besluta om extra uttaxering om sådan erforderas för föreningens verksamhet.

§ 4. Föreningssmöte


4.2. Årsmötet skall hållas årligen före.................................månads utgång. Kallelser skall tillsättas varje medlem senast sex veckor före mötet.

I kallen kan in ne vilka ärenden som skall behandlas på mötet.

4.3. Vid ordinarie årsmöte skall följande ärenden förekomma:
1. Mötets öppnande samt fråga om kallelse skett enligt stadgarna
2. Fastställande av röstlängd och dagordning
3. Val av ordförande att leda mötet
4. Val av protokollförare
5. Val av justerare tillika rösträttsnära
6. Styrelsens förvaltningsberättelse
7. Fastställande av balansräkning och resultaträkning
8. Revisorernas berättelse
9. Fråga om ansvarsfrågor för styrelsen
10. Beslut i anledning av föreningens över- eller underskott enligt balansräkning
11. Behandling av motioner och förslag
12. Fastställande av ersättning till styrelseledamöter, revisorer och suppleanter
13. Framläggande av budgetförelag och fastställande av avgifter
14. Val av ordförande, kassör och övriga styrelseledamöter och suppleanter enligt § 6.1-4
15. Val av revisorer och suppleanter enligt § 7.1
16. Val av ledamöter i välberedningen enligt § 9
17. Övriga ärenden.

4.4. Vid årsmöte får beslut inte fattas i andra frågor än de som har angivits i kallelserna. Årsmötet kan dock med 3/4 majoritet besluta om komplettering till dagordningen. Frågor som gäller stadgeändring, avgift, föreningens likvidation, eller beslut enligt § 2.5 c måste ha angivits i kallelserna.


4.6. Årsmötet fastställer ordförandas förordningar för det område föreningen disponerar.


§ 5. Omröstning


§ 6. Styrelse

6.1. Föreningens verksamhet leds av en styrelse som väljs av årsmötet bland föreningens medlemmar. Valbar är också den som ingår i medlemshusställ eller är nära anknyttande och deltar i brukandet av dennes lott därav årsmötes godkänner valbarheten samt i övrigt uppfyller vilkoren i moment 2.1. Flera från en och samma lott kan inte samtidigt ingå i styrelsen.

6.2. Styrelsen består av ordförande och kassör, vilka väljs särskilt, samt ytterligare det antal ledamöter som ärsmötet fastställer, dock minst tre. Styrelsens ordförande är ordförande även för föreningen.


6.4. För styrelsen välja erforderligt antal suppleanter för en tid av ett år.

6.5. Styrelsen skall hålla konstaterande sammanträde inom 14 dagar efter årsmötet. Vid sammanträdet skall firmaocknamn uteses och övriga uppdrag inom styrelsen fördeles.


6.7. Styrelsen skall:
- ta önskningar/försäkring för föreningen och särskild garantiförsäkring för kassören,
- tillse att arrendaavtal, stadgar och ordföransföreskrifter efterföljs och att årsmötes- och styrelsebeslut verkställs,
- upprätta förteckning i tijordning över sökande till medlemskap och koloninlott samt
- tillse att föreningens och av Staden arrenderad egendom sköts och underhålls samt att erforderliga medel avses för detta.


6.9. Styrelseledamot som reserverar sig mot beslut är fri från ansvar.
§ 7. Räkenskaper och revision

7.1. Föreningens räkenskaper och förvaltning skall fortlöpande granskas av två revisorer, valda av års mötet för en tid av ett år, räknat från års möte till års möte.

För revisor skall uteses minst en supplant.

7.2. Föreningens räkenskapsarbete utfärdar tiden.............................................
Av styrelsen upprättade balans- och resultaträkningar samt
förvaltningsberättelse skall vara revisorerna tillhanda senast den

7.3. Revisorerna skall avge revisionsberättelse årligen senast den........................
I berättelsen skall även anges om ansvarsfrihet för styrelsen tillstyrks eller av-
styrks.

§ 8. Föreningens medel

8.1. Överskott som har uppkömts under räkenskapsarbete till, sedan från tid-
gare år balanserat underskott har täckts, tillföras föreningens kapital eller fö-
ras i ny räkning enligt års mötets beslut.

§ 9. Valberedning

9.1. Val av styrelse och revisorer samt supplanter skall förberedas av en val-
beredning med minst tre ledamöter, vid flera skall antalet vara udda, som ut-
ses av års mötet.

§ 10. Föreningens upplösning

10.1. Beslut om upplösning av föreningen skall fattas av två på varandra föl-
jande möten varav ett årsmöte. Beslutet skall fattas med minst 3/4 majoritet
vid vardera mötet. Föreningens tillgångar skall användas för att gagna kolon-
nutlägnsreformen inom FSSK.

§ 11. Stadgeändring

11.1. Beslut om ändring av föreningens stadgar fattas av års mötet med minst
2/3 majoritet. För att stadgar och ändringar i dem skall gälla fördras Stadens
godkännande samt att de inte strider mot förbunds normalstadgar. Års mötet
avgör från vilken tidpunkt ändring skall gälla.

§ 12. Tolkning av stadgar

12.1. Tyvärr om tolkning av dessa stadgar skall i första hand avgöras av FSSK:s
styrelse i andra hand av förbunds styrelsen och i tredje hand förbundsrådet,
kvarstår tveksamhet skall frågan avgöras av en skiljsam nämnd på två ledamöter.
Vardera parten utsöker en ledamot i denna nämnd. Dessa båda ledamöter utser
egenom antalet den tredje ledamoten som skall vara ordförande i nämnden.

§ 13. Utträde ur FSSK och Förbundet

13.1. Föreningen skall skriftlig anmäla sitt utträde ur FSSK och Förbundet
till FSSK och förbundsstyrelsen, sedan beslut däröver fattats med 2/3 majoritet
på två av föreningen stadgenligt kallade föreningens möten, varav det ena skall
vara årsmötet.

13.2. Till föreningens mötet där utträdesfrågan avses behandlas ska medlemmar-
na erhålla personal kallelse där det av kallelsen framgår att utträdesfrågan ska-
tas upp. Kallelse ska även sändas till FSSK och Förbundet minst tre veckor
före respektive möte. Representanter för kallad styrelse har yttrande- och
förslagsrätt på dessa möten.

13.3. Utträde beviljas om medlemsföreningen upptäckt i § 13.1 angivna vill-
kor. Uppsägningstiden är 12 månader och utträdet sker vid det årsställe som
följer närmast efter det uppsägningstiden löpt ut.

13.4. Förening som utträder ur FSSK och Förbundet har inte rätt till någon del
av FSSK:s eller förbundets tillgångar.
**KOMMENTARER TILL STADGARNA FÖR FÖRENINGARNA**

I arréndekontraktet mellan koloniträdgårdsföreningen och Stockholms stad anges att föreningen skall följa av Staden godkända stadgar. Normalstadgar har utarbetats av Föreningen Stor-Stockholms Koloniträdgårdar (FSSK) i samarbete med Staden.

En förening som antar dessa normalstadgar har därmed uppfyllt arréndekontraktets krav på godkännande. Om föreningen gör ändringar i eller kompletterar normalstadgarna måste den nya skrivningen godkännas av Staden.

I ingressen till stadgarerna införes föreningens namn och tidpunkt för det årsmöte då stadgarna antogs.

§ 1. I paragrafen anges att föreningen är en ideell allmännyttig förening.

Koloniträdgårdsföreningarnas verksamhet är inte av den art att det är motiverat med en ekonomisk förening. Även ideella allmännyttiga föreningar kan ha viss ekonomisk verksamhet utan att föreningens ideella syfte kan ifrågasättas.

Vid förhandlingar och överläggningar med Stockholms stad företrädes FSSK både de ansluta föreningarna och dess medlemmar.

FSSK är en region inom Svenska Förbundet för Koloniträdgårdar och Fritidsbyggnad (Förbundet). Förening som erhåller medlemskap i FSSK har enligt såväl FSSK:s som Förbundets stadgar skyldighet att vara anslutet till Förbundet.


§ 2. Observera de krav som ställs för medlemskap i föreningen. De grundar sig på de krav som redovisats i medlemsavtalet.

Förtydligande: på grund av att stagnen är lönsamma och kan ägas av annan än medlemmen.

I det formulär för ansökan om medlemskap, som FSSK tillhandahåller, finns villkoren angivna. Genom att undersöka ansökan beslutar medlemmen att hon/han uppfyller villkoren. Skulle det visa sig att detta inte stämmer har medlemsskapet beviljats under felaktiga förutsättningar och föreningen kan utse ut en medlem avlång och efterlångar arvingar. Arrende- eller nyttjanderätten till medlemmens lott kan övergå till arvinge men under förutsättning att denne fyller villkoren för medlemskap i föreningen.

Om en lott brukas av en familj eller ett sammanboende par kan problem uppstå vid en skilsmiss eller separation. En av parterna kan tilldelas lotten vid bokskällningen och får då rätt att fortsätta bruka den om han eller hon uppfyller villkoren för att vara medlem. Nytt medlemsavtal skall upprättas.

Moment 2.6 anger en medlems skylldighet. Observera att momentet anger en skyldighet för varje medlem att delta i gemensamma arbetssuppgifter. Varje medlem har ett medansvar för att arbetet inom föreningen sker efter bestämmelser i stadgarna och de beslut som fattats i enlighet med stadgarna. Sådana gemensamma arbetssuppgifter kan vara städning och ogräsmärgning, vakt och tillsyn inom det arrénderade området och reparation av gemensamt ägda redskap m. m.


Moment 4.2 och 4.5 har viss koppling till varandra. Vid ett årsmöte skall sådana frågor behandlas som är väsentliga för föreningen. Därför måste medlemmarna dels få veta i god tid vilka frågor som skall behandlas, dels få möjlighet att påverka behandlingen genom att inkomma med motioner.
De tidpunkter som anges i stadgarna ger en tid av åtminstone två veckor mellan kallelse, insändande av motioner och utsändande av styrelsens yttrande och förslag. De angivna tiderna är minimiutrymte. En styrelse kan givetvis utlysa ett årsmöte i mycket god tid och ange större tidsspannor.

Observera att årsmötet endast kan besluta i sådana frågor som har angivits i kallelsen till mötet. Dagordningen för mötet kan kompletteras, dä förordas en majoritet på 3/4. Meningen är att bara sådana frågor skall kunna tas upp som är mycket viktiga för föreningen och som har kommit upp i sista stund före mötet.

Moment 4.6 är en följd av att föreningen enligt arrendekontrakten är skyldig att följa ordförandens regler som har godkänts av Staden. FSSK har utarbetat allmänna ordförandsföreskrifter som en hjälp till föreningarna och dessa allmänna föreskrifter har Staden godkänt. En förening som tillkämpar dessa har därmed uppfyllt kraven i arrendekontrakten. Önskar föreningen göra kompletteringar skall dessa godkännas av Staden.


En förutsättning är att hon/han är med och arbetar på lotten och på så sätt är insatt i föreningens verksamhet. Dessutom måste villkoren för medlemskap uppfyllas, d.v.s. myndig ålder och bosatt i Stor-Stockholm. Observera att bara en person per husställ kan inga i föreningens styrelse under viss period. Både sammanboende, man och hustru får således inte sitta i styrelsen samtidigt. Däremot kan den ena ha styrelseuppdrag och den andra ha annat föreningens uppdrag utanför styrelsen.

Moment 6.2 reglerar styrelsens sammansättning. Av praktiska skäl bör man välja udda antal ledamöter i styrelsen: 3, 5, 7 o.s.v. Årsmöte skall välja föreningens ordförande respektive kassör. Enligt moment 6.3 är mandatperioden två år. Valet sker dock så att halva antalet ledamöter uteses vid varje årsmöte, eller 2 respektive 3 ledamöter om styrelsen består av 5 ledamöter (3 respektive 4 vid 7 ledamöter o.s.v.) Ordförande och kassör skall uteses vid olika årsmöten för att det alltid skall finnas någon i styrelsen som har god erfarenhet av styrelsens tidigare arbete.

Moment 6.4 Suppleanter väljs för ett år i taget, Antalet är inte begränsat utan årsmöte väljer erforderligt antal.

Enligt moment 6.5 skall styrelsen hålla konstituerande sammanträde inom 14 dagar efter årsmötet. Vid sammanträdet fördelas arbetsuppgifterna inom styrelsen, med undantag av ordförande och kassör som har utsetts av årsmötet. Styrelsen skall också utse firmatecknare. Vanligen blir ordförande och kassör firmatecknare, d.v.s. de företräder styrelsen i två från företagets eller svarande o.s.v. När det gäller ekonomiska frågor, t.ex. uttag från postig- ro- eller bankkonton i föreningens namn, kan man uppdra åt kassören att sköta det upp till ett väst belopp. För större summor brukar kassören och ordförandet tillsammans underteckna uttagshandlingarna. När föreningen byter kassör eller ändrar formerna för uttag av pengar skall posten eller banken ha en bevilnad fullmakt eller ett protokolladtrukt som visar vem som har rätt att teckna föreningens firma. För de olika arbetsuppgifter eller uppdrag som skall fördelas på styrelsens ledamöter kan följande ge anvisningar:

Ordförande: svarar för kallelser och föredragningslistor till sammanträdena, leder styrelsens möten, företräder föreningen utsätter gentemot andra föreningar m.fl. Vanligen fungerar ordföranden som korrespondent eller ledamot.

Sekreteraren: sänder ut kallelser, skriver protokoll över styrelsens möten enligt moment 6.6, ser till att revisorerna får erforderliga handlingar, hjälper till att upprätta skrivelse och förvaltningsberättelser. Sköter arkivförrådet m.m.

Kassören: sköter föreningens ekonomi, kräver in och tar emot avgifter från medlemmarna, svarar för medlemsregistrat, sammanställer ekonomiska rapporter o.s.v.

Värderingsansvarig: ser till att medlemmarna följer byggnadsvårdsansvariga eller motsvarande som utförats av Staden.


En "kolist" eller förteckning över intresserade som vill bli medlemmar och brukar vara av föreningens lotter bör upprättas. Någon i styrelsen brukar få uppdrag att svara för den listan.

§ 7. Föreningens räkenskapsår är inte angivet i normalstädgarna. Oftast föredrar man att lata räkenskapsåret sammanfalla med kalenderåret, d.v.s. 1 januari–31 december. Föreningen kan givetvis välja annan tid t.ex. 1 juli–30 juni, om det anses bättre.

I stadgarna skall anges den tidpunkt då revisorernas berättelse skall vara klar. Likaså skall stadgarna ange när styrelsens berättelse skall vara sammanställd. De båda tiderna skall väljas för att revisorerna skall få god tid att göra revisionen.

Revisorernas uppdrag innebär inte att de vid ett tillfälle skall göra sitt arbete. De bör följa arbetet inom föreningen förlopende och läsa styrelsens protokoll, studera den ekonomiska förvaltningen vid olika tillfällen o.s.v. för att de skall kunna låta lära sig styrelsens förvaltning ser ut att gå snett i något avseende.

Revisorernas arbete skall inte ses som ett misstroende mot styrelsen, lika litet som en garantiförsäkring är ett misstroende mot en kassör. I båda fallen gäller det att ge trygghet både gentemot föreningen och styrelsen respektive kassören.

En förlopende revision kan vara en mycket god hjälp för en styrelse, framför allt om styrelsens ledamöter inte är så föreningsvana.


Valberedningens förslag bör om möjligt sändas ut till medlemmarna tillsammans med övriga handlingar inför åremötet.

§ 11. Om åremötet skall ändra stadgarna för föreningen måste 2/3 av de medlemmar, som deltar i åremötet, rösta för ändringen. Om man inte uppnår den majoriteten faller förslaget till ändring. Då arrendesavtalet kräver Stadens godkännande av stadgarna måste åremötets beslut fattas på sålunda sätt att det gäller under förutsättning att Staden godkänner ändringen. I beslutet skall anges från vilken tid ändringen skall gälla.


Ordningsregler för Igelbäckens koloniförening

1. Det är absolut förbjudet att slänga skräp inom och utanför området.

2. Kompostering av ogräs, kvistar och grönsaksavfall måste ske i kompost på den egna lotten.

3. Alla ansvarar för att gången framför den egna lotten hålls fri från ogräs.

4. Byggnation måste ske efter de regler som Stadsdelsnämnden har gett tillstånd till.


6. Vi betalar för allt vatten, låt inte vattnet rinna i onödan och låt inte heller barnen leka med vattenposterna.


8. Kortspel om pengar är inte tillåtet inom området.


10. Du ansvarar för att dina gäster följer de ordningsregler som gäller inom området.
Ordningsregler
för
Akalla Koloniträdgårdsförening
Ordningsregler
För Akalla koloniträdgårdsförening

Allmänt

Tänk på att:

• senast den 15 juni ska större delen av lotten vara odlad och senast den 1 november skall lotten vara städad efter avslutad odlingssäsong.

• buskar och andra höga växter får inte skugga grannens odlningar.

• sopor som inte går att kompostera tar var och en hem till sig.

• sällskapsdjur får medföras till lotten och då skall djuret vara under sådan uppsikt att andra odlare inte utsätts för obehag.

• barn liksom sällskapsdjur ska hållas under uppsikt och får inte vistas på annans lott utan lottområdets godkännande. Du ansvarar för vad ditt barn eller sällskapsdjur eventuellt trampar sänder eller förstör.

• bollspel är inte tillåtet inom området.

• som medlem i föreningen har man inte rätt att överlåta eller upplåta lotten till annan person utan styrelsens medgivande. Som medlem har man inte heller rätt att för eget syfte helt eller delvis bruka annan lott än sin egna.

Tillsammans ska vi hålla de allmänna ytorna inom området städade och snygga under hela året.

Kompost
Eldning
På lilla området vid komposten har föreningen en plats för att bränna ris från buskar och träd. Den högen eldas upp under den tillåtna vår-, höstvecka (vecka 18 och 40). Brädor får inte läggas på brännhögen, utan dessa ska läggas i containern som finns vid området under städdagar.

Grillning

Vattning
Var sparsam med vattnet. Vattna inte när solen skinner från klar himmel och det bläser, vattnet hinner då inte sjunka ned i jorden utan dunstar bort. Gå inte ifrån påslagen vattenspridare eller slang. Du får inte hindra dina grannar att hämta vatten i kanna. Tänk på att flera odlare delar på en vattenpost. Eller avslutat vattning se till att vattenposten är avstängd!

Redskapsskjul

Växthuset
Vill du bygga växthus måste du kontakta styrelsen för ett godkännande. Växthuset ska monteras ned till vintern (krav från Stockholms Stad). Väggar och tak ska vara av plast. Växthuset får vara max 5 kvm till ytan och max 1,8 m till taknock.

Staket/sarg
Sätt du staket runt lotten måste det vara tillverkat i trä, välgjort och vara max 50 cm högt och i färgerna rött, grönt, brun eller impregnerat virke. Lägt (50 cm) Gunnebostångar är även tillåtet. Alla andra typer av staket måste tas bort annars riskerar du att bli uppsagd. Sarg kring odlningar på lotten får vara max 20 cm över markytan.

Sittplats
Sittplatsen får vara max 1,5 kvm och gräsyta, plattor eller trädgolv får vara max 20 cm över markytan. Sittplatsen ska hållas städad.
Spaljé/pergola
Spaljé runt sittplatsen får vara max 1,5 m hög och får inte kläis in med plast, bräder eller liknande. Pergola får vara max 1,8 m hög och max 6 kvm till ytan. Tak är inte tillåtet dock får markis användas som kan rullas på och av.

Byggnader
Kontakta styrelsen för godkännande vid all typ av byggnad. Växthus, spaljé, pergola och staket får inte utföra något hinder för andra odlare.

Medlem som medvetet bryter mot dessa ordningsföreskrifter riskerar att uteslutas ur föreningen och mister därmed arrenderätnen till lotten.

Om du är osäker över något eller har några frågor så kontakta styrelsen för svar!

Styrelsen för Akalla Koloniträdgårdsförening
2009-08-21
Appendix 9.7 Bylaws for the Vinterviken garden


Med anledning härav har mellan Stockholms stad genom dess gatu- och fastighetsnämnd, nedan kallad staden, och föreningen Vintervikens trädgård-Odlarglädje, nedan kallat föreningen, under de förutsättningar som anges nedan träffats följande

ÖVERENSKOMMELSE
om visningsträdgård i
Vinterviken
i Liljeholmen
inom fastigheten Aspudden 1:1

1 Förutsättningar
Staden har tagit fram ett program för Kulturpark Liljeholmen som redovisar stadens ambitioner för stråket mellan Trekanten och Vinterviken/Mälaren. Programmet bygger på en samverkan mellan odling, skulptur och historia. Föreningen har tagit del av programmet och kommer att verka inom programmets ramar.

2 Verksamhet
Staden och föreningen är överens om att föreningen långsiktigt avser att inom området (enligt bif karta) bedriva en sk visningsträdgård på ekologisk grund. Verksamheten avses bestå av odling, kafeverksamhet, kurser och utställningar. Kafeverksamheten ska ekonomiskt stödja föreningens övriga verksamhet.
Staden och föreningen är överens om att verksamheten ska vara utåtriktad både lokalt och regionalt. Föreningen ska verka för att aktivt engagera olika grupper av medborgare i närområdet. Föreningen ska aktivt söka stöd hos och vid behov samarbeta med organisationer inom föreningens verksamhetsområde.
Verksamheten och dess drift ska , utöver vad som anges i detta avtal, finansieras utan bidrag från staden.
3 Första upplåtelseperiod 3 år
För att föreningen ska kunna bedriva verksamhet ska staden verka för att upplåta området till föreningen mot lägsta avgift för offentlig platsupplåtelse (ca 3000 kr/år) under 3 år.
Föreningen ska svara för inhämtande av och kostnader för polistillstånd för upplåtelsen.

4 Utvärdering och fortsatt upplåtelse 3 år
Staden kommer under första upplåtelseperioden att utvärdera föreningens verksamhet och vid periodens slut pröva förutsättningarna för en fortsatt upplåtelse på 3 år med oförändrad upplåtelseavgift. Vid en fortsatt upplåtelse ska staden och föreningen tillsammans, för att trygga områdets användning på sikt, verka för att under den andra upplåtelseperioden ta fram en ny detaljplan för området/verksamheten. Om ny detaljplan fastställs ska staden och föreningen tillsammans verka för att efter den andra periodens slut sälja eller upplåta marken/området med tomträtt till föreningen och överlåta de tillhörande byggnaderna till föreningen mot ersättning. Villkoren för en försäljning eller tomträttsupplåtelse fastställs i en ny överenskommelse mellan staden och föreningen efter den andra upplåtelseperiodens slut. Om överenskommelse ej kan träffas ska upplåtelsen upphöra och marken inklusive anläggningar, planteringar mm överlåtas till staden utan ersättning. Om staden så begär ska marken återställas i det skick den hade vid tidpunkten för första upplåtelseperiodens början.

5 Byggnader och drift/underhåll
Staden avser att förvärva på området belägna byggnader bestående av kafe och kolonistuga och hyra ut byggnaderna till föreningen. Föreningen erlägger hyra till staden på max 12.000 kr/år under max 6 år.
Staden bekostar och ansluter byggnaderna till vatten, rotozsanläggning samt el och föreningen svarar för drifts- och underhållskostnader.
Staden står för kostnader för ny detaljplan och föreningen står för alla kostnader i samband med nya eller förlängda bygglov.
Föreningen svarar för försäkringar mot skadegörelse, brand el dyl.

6 Villkor
Överenskommelsen gäller endast om staden kan förvärva på området belägna byggnader bestående av kafe och kolonistuga.

Denna överenskommelse är upprättad i två exemplar. Parterna har tagit var sitt.

Stockholm 1999-08-16

Pågatu- och fastighetsnämnden

För Vintervikens trädgård-Odlarglädje

Avskrift upprättad av: Anders Rosenschea, Gatu- och fastighetsnämnden, Region Västmanland 2001-01-01
Appendix 9.8 Contract between the Vinterviken garden and the Exploitation office

Mellan Stockholms kommun genom dess exploateringsnämnd, nedan kallad Staden, och Vintervikens trädgård, ideell förening (org.nr.802408-0015), nedan kallat Föreningen, har under de förutsättningar som anges i § 4.4 nedan träffats följande

Överenskommelse om exploatering med tomträttsupplåtelse inom del av fastigheten Aspudden 1:1 vid Vinterviksvägen

§ 1

MARKANVISNING OCH DETALJPLAN

1.1 Markanvisning
Gatu- och fastighetsnämnden har, enligt beslut 1999-08-31, lämnat markanvisning till Föreningen inom del av fastigheten Aspudden 1:1 i Vinterviken. Parterna har med anledning av detta träffat överenskommelse 1999-08-16 om visningsträdgård med tillhörande verksamheter såsom café m m. Denna överenskommelse fullföljer och ersätter detta avtal.

1.2 Detaljplan

§ 2

FASTIGHETSBILDNING OCH TOMTRÄTTSUPPLÅTELSE

2.1 Fastighetsbildning
Staden skall vidta och bekosta de åtgärder som ankommer på Staden i egenskap av fastighetsägare för bildandet av en fastighet, nedan kallad Fastigheten, med i huvudsak det läge och gränser som anges med streckad begränsningslinje på bilagd detaljplanekarta, Bilaga 1. För område som markerats med blå begränsningslinje ska staden bilda en fastighet då Föreningen har möjlighet att genomföra byggnation av växthus inom den blivande Fastigheten, dock senast 2019-04-01.

Föreningen ansvarar för och bekostar beställning av nybyggnadskarta.
2.2 Tomträttsupplåtelse

Staden och Föreningen skall efter det att beslut om fastighetsbildning enligt § 2.1 ovan har vunnit laga kraft, träffa tomträttsavtal för Fastigheten på i huvudsak de villkor som anges i bifogat förslag till tomträttsavtal, Bilaga 2. Upplåtelsedagen skall i tomträttsavtalet bestämmas till ett kvartalsskifte som infaller senast sex månader efter det att fastighetsbildningen enligt ovan har vunnit laga kraft. För område som i Bilaga 1 markerats med blå begränsningslinje ska tomträttsupplåtelse ske i anslutning till fastighetsbildningen och på de villkor som gäller vid tidpunkten för upplåtelsen.

Den i bilagda förslag till tomträttsavtal uppgivna bruttoarean (BTA) baseras på ett utnyttjande enligt detaljplanens bestämmelser.

Inom Fastigheten finns ett område som på detaljplanekartan, Bilaga 1, markerats med T1. Stadens rätt att nyttja detta område för allmän gång- och cykeltrafik, skötsel av fordon för stadens anläggningar samt belysning och ledningar kommer att regleras i tomträttsavtalet, Bilaga 2.

2.3 Överlätelse av byggnad och anläggning

Staden överläter till Föreningen i samband tomträttsupplåtelsen på Fastigheten befintliga byggnader och andra anläggningar mot en ersättning av 40 000 kronor. Ersättningen skall erläggas i sin helhet kontant till Staden på upplåtelsedagen.

Föreningen, som har besiktigat Fastigheten, förklarar sig härmed goda Fastighetens skick och avstår med bindande verkan från alla anspråk mot Staden på grund av fel och brister i Fastigheten inkluderande även eventuellt förekommande markförreningar.

2.4 Nyttjanderätt

Om Föreningen behöver nyttja Fastigheten innan det är möjligt att upplåta den med tomträtt skall Föreningen äga rätt att teckna nyttjanderättsavtal för marken med i princip samma villkor som gäller första året i det blivande tomträttsavtalet.

§ 3

GENOMFÖRANDE AV EXPLOATERING

3.1 Samordning och tidplan

Föreningen förbinder sig att genomföra exploatering på Fastigheten och intilliggande allmän plats i enlighet med Detaljplanen och denna överenskommelse, enligt en av Föreningen, i samråd med Staden, upprättad huvudtidplan.

Föreningen är skyldigt att samordna sina entreprenader med de ledningsdragande bolagen.
3.2 Byggnader och trädgårdsanläggningar
Föreningen skall inom Fastigheten uppföra byggnader för café, växthus, kolonistuga m.m i enlighet med detaljplanens bestämmelser och för verksamhetens direkta behov. Föreningen förbinder sig att bibehålla och fullfölja de intentioner om en visningsträdgård på ekologisk grund samt övrig odling, caféverksamhet, kurser och utställningar i enlighet med överenskommelse daterad 1999-08-16.

3.3 Bygg- och anläggningskostnader

3.4 Befintlig vegetation och park
Park- och naturmark samt gatuplanteringar
Föreningen ansvarar för att gatu-, park- och naturmarksträd samt annan vegetation på allmän platsmark intill Fastigheten inte skadas under den tid exploateringen genomförs. Föreningen skall skydda träd och vegetation på ett betryggande sätt genom att avgärna Fastigheten med ett stabilt två meter högt staket. Föreningen anser att Föreningen, eller något företag som Föreningen anlitar, inte på något sätt nyttjar denna mark utan skriftligt tillstånd från Staden.

Vid överträdelse skall Föreningen utge vite med 100 000 kronor per skadat träd, (gäller när stammens diameter > 10 cm mätt 1 m ovan mark). Vid annan skada anser Bolaget att reparera skadan, eller för att bekosta Stadens reparation av skadan. Om Föreningen nyttjar park- och naturmark samt gatuplanteringar intill Fastigheten utan tillstånd skall Föreningen utge vite i enlighet med § 3.6 nedan.

Kvartersmark
Föreningen är berättigad att bevara de vid tillträdet befintliga träd inom Fastigheten, som angivits med n1 på detaljplanekarta, Bilaga 1. Om något eller några av dessa träd, på grund av Föreningen, eller något företag som Föreningen anlitar, allvarligt skadas, avlägsnas eller dör före 2014-03-01 skall Föreningen vid vite med 100 000 kronor per träd, plantera motsvarande antal nya relativt fullväxta träd.

3.5 Krav på tillgängliga anläggningar under utbyggnadstiden
Föreningen skall säkerställa tillgängligheten till parkstråk och intilliggande koloniområde och tekniska anslutningar under hela utbyggnadstiden. Samråd med Staden skall ske.

3.6 Byggytor och byggetablering
Föreningen förbinder sig att i god tid före byggsstart samråda med Staden om vilka ytor, som behövs för bygget och byggetablering och under hur lång tid dessa behövs. Upplåtelse av allmän plats för byggetablering kräver polistillstånd och debiteras enligt taxa.
Föreningen skall med ett stabilt två meter högt staket avgränsa Fastigheten och av Staden anvisade byggetableringsyta. Föreningen skall tillsa att Föreningen, eller av Föreningen anlitad entreprenör håller sig inom Fastigheten och av Staden anvisad byggetableringsyta. Om så ej sker och detta har påpekats av Staden skall vité utgå med 100 kronor per påbörjad vecka och kvadratmeter mark som Föreningen eller dess entreprenörer nyttjar utanför Fastigheten och av Staden anvisad byggetableringsyta.

3.7 Dagvatten

I enlighet med Stadens dagvattenstrategi (KF 2002-10-07) förbinder sig Föreningen, genom val av byggnadsmaterial att inte förorena Fastighetens dagvatten med tungmetaller eller andra miljögifter, samt att omhänderta detta dagvatten inom Fastigheten genom exempelvis infiltration i marken. Är det enligt Stockholm Vatten AB:s bedömning inte möjligt eller lämpligt att infiltrera dagvattnet, får detta efter fördröjning enligt Stockholm Vattens AB:s anvisningar, avledas från Fastigheten.

3.8 Tillgänglighet i utemiljö


Föreningen skall skriftligen anmäla och motivera eventuella önskemål om avvikelser från programmet. Avvikelserna skall godkännas av Staden.

3.9 Inrapportering av geotekniska utredningar

Bolaget skall sända in resultatet av alla geotekniska undersökningar som genomförs inom Planområdet till stadens geoarkiv.

3.10 Avfallshantering

Föreningen har tagit del av Stockholms stads riktlinjer ”Projektera och bygg för god avfalls- hantering”.

§ 4

ÖVRIGA VILLKOR

4.1 Viten

Föreningen förbinder sig vid vite av 396 000 kronor, i penningvärde 2009-01-01, att senast 2019-04-01 ha uppfyllt samtliga åtaganden enligt denna överenskommelse. När tomträttsavtal enligt § 2.2 ovan träffats skall detta vite sättas ned till 132 000 kronor, i penningvärde 2009-01-01. Detta vite skall gälla jämte det i tomträttsavtalet föreskrivna vitet.

Om Föreningen inte håller tidsfristen ärvitet omedelbart förfallet till betalning. Om försening uppstår och detta ej beror på Föreningen förskjuts tidpunkten då vité ska utgå med tid som motsvarar förseningens omfattning. Förseningen ska därvid definieras enligt AB 92 kap 4 § 3 punkt 3-6.
Vitet skall omräknas till penningvärdet vid den tidpunkt då vitet förfaller till betalning genom användning av konsumentprisindex eller det index som kan komma att ersätta det.

4.2 Överlåtelse av överenskommelse

Innan tomträtt upplåtits får Föreningen inte utan Stadens skriftliga medgivande överlåta några rättigheter eller skyldigheter som följer av denna överenskommelse.

När tomträtt upplåtits förbinder sig Föreningen, vid vite av 528 000 kronor i penningvärde 2009-01-01, att vid överlåtelse av tomträtten tills den nya tomträttshavaren övertar samtliga förpliktelser enligt denna överenskommelse genom att i respektive avtal angående överlåtelse införa nedanstående bestämmelse. Om Fastigheten delats upp i flera tomträtter får vitesbeloppet fördelas i proportion till den totala byggrätten inom Fastigheten. Vid överlåtelse av sådan tomträtt åger Föreningen rätt att i nedanstående bestämmelse i avtalet angående överlåtelsen ange detta lägre vitesbelopp. Föreningen skall samråda med Staden om fördelning av vitesbelopp enligt ovan.

"Köparen förbinder sig att i av Stockholms stad påfordrade delar efterkomma mellan Stockholms stad och Vintervikens Trädgård ideell förening träffad överenskommelse om exploatering med tomträttsupplåtelse inom Aspudden 1:1 daterad ............... Överenskommelsen bifogas i avskrift. Köparen skall vid överlåtelse av tomträtten tills det också efterföljande tomträttshavare binds vid överenskommelsen, vilket skall fullgöras genom att denna bestämmelse, med i sak oförändrad text intages i överlåtelsehandlingen. Sker ej detta skall köparen utge vite till Stockholms stad med 528 000 kronor i penningvärde 2009-01-01. Motsvarande ansvar skall åvila varje ny köpare.

Vitet skall omräknas till penningvärdet vid den tidpunkt då vitet förfaller till betalning genom användning av konsumentprisindex eller det index som kan komma att ersätta det."

Om Föreningen skall utge vite enligt denna punkt skall vitet omräknas till penningvärdet vid den tidpunkt då vitet förfaller till betalning genom användning av konsumentprisindex eller det index som kan komma att ersätta det.

Föreningen skall i god tid innan överlåtelse sker underrätta Stockholms exploateringskontor om den planerade överlåtelsen samt, sedan överlåtelse skett, snarast översända en bestyrkt avskrift av överlåtelsehandlingen.

4.3 Fullgjorda åtaganden

För sina samtliga åtaganden och övriga överenskommelser enligt denna överenskommelse har Föreningen erhållit full och slutlig ersättning. Parterna är överens om att någon belastning i dessa hänseenden inte skall anses föreligga vid avgäldsreglering.

4.4 Överenskommelsens giltighet

Denna överenskommelse är till alla delar förfallen utan ersättningsrätt för någon otra parten om inte dels exploateringsnämnden senast 2009-03-01 godkänner förslag till genomförandebeslut för del av Aspudden 1:1, genom beslut som senare vinner laga kraft.
Föreningen är medveten om

att stadsbyggnadsnämnden eller kommunfullmäktige beslutar om att anta detaljplan. Beslut om att anta detaljplan ska föregås av samråd med dem som berörs av planen och andra beredningsåtgärder. Föreningen är även medveten om att sakägare har rätt att anföra besvär mot beslut att antaga detaljplan och att beslut om antagande av detaljplan kan prövas av länsstyrelsen och regeringen samt bli föremål för rättsprövning.

att detta avtal inte är bindande för kommunens organ, med undantag för exploateringsnämnden, vid prövning av förslag till detaljplan.

* * * * *

Detta avtal har upprättats i två likalydande exemplar av vilka parterna tagit var sitt.

Stockholm den

För Stockholms kommun genom dess exploateringsnämnd För Vintervikens Trädgård, ideell förening

........................................ (........................)
........................................ (........................)

........................................ (........................)
........................................ (........................)

Bevittnas:

........................................ (........................)

........................................ (........................)

BILAGOR
1. Detaljplanekarta med den blivande tomträttsfastigheten markerad.
2. Förslag till tomträttsavtal med Bilaga A.