EUROPEAN PARTY POLITICS AND GENDER
Emelie Lilliefeldt

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European Party Politics and Gender
Configuring Gender-Balanced Parliamentary Presence

Emelie Lilliefeldt
Milda is the crowning piece of a monument that is usually understood to represent the sovereignty and freedom of a whole state – the Latvian Freedom Monument, Brīvības Piemineklis. She has “sisters” in similarly high positions around the world, such as Britannia in the UK, Moder Svea in Sweden, Marianne in France and Libertas, the Statue of Liberty in the USA. The Latvian Freedom Monument has been interpreted and reinterpreted several times. I contend that Milda embodies a symbolic value that is particularly appropriate here: she is a woman in a politically important position, and she is not alone.

Photo: Hannes Eriksson
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>csQCA</td>
<td>Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPP</td>
<td>Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fsQCA</td>
<td>Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&lt;sub&gt;eff&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>Effective Magnitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Multi member district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional electoral system</td>
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<tr>
<td>QCA</td>
<td>Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSR&lt;sub&gt;w&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>Relative Success Ratio (subscript denotes gender)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Structured Focused Comparison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMD</td>
<td>Single member district</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR&lt;sub&gt;w&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>Simple Success Rate (subscript denotes gender, e.g., women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEur</td>
<td>Western Europe, West European</td>
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“If you are not prepared to be wrong, you will never come up with anything original”
Ken Robinson

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1. Introduction

For many years, political parties were largely all-male organisations, both in practice and in theory. For example, Anthony Downs suggested in *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957, 25) that “... a political party is a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election”, and it was not until the 1970s that women in Europe began to make up more than a small fraction of party candidates in parliamentary elections and elected members of parliament (McAllister and Studlar 2002; Raaum 2005). It was at this time that international organisations such as the UN recognised as a problem the unequal distribution of political power between women and men and recommended that women be integrated into political life (UN 1975, para. 18.3b, cf. 1995), a demand that had long since been made by the women’s movement. Gradually male dominance in party politics has been reduced as more equal proportions of women and men enter parliaments. Today political parties are less likely to be seen as male institutions (see, e.g., Sartori 1976, 52–7), reflecting changes in practice: by mid-2011, on average every fifth parliamentarian in European national parliaments (single or lower house) was a woman (IPU 2011b), and there are now ample examples of parties that send equal numbers of women and men to parliament.

It is this latter transformation that this research investigates: under which combinations of conditions do political parties in Europe elect equal numbers of women and men parliamentarians? Comparing the experience of parties in Western, Central and Eastern Europe poses the question: is the process by which parliamentary parties are becoming gender balanced in Central and Eastern Europe similar to that of parties in Western Europe, and are there differences that need to be explained?

1.1 Parliamentary presence, gender and party politics

At the onset of this study it should be acknowledged that women are not necessarily more able than men to represent women’s political needs and wishes in parliament, and vice versa. At the same time it should be recognized that systematic differences in women’s and men’s presence in elected assemblies are problematic. As its starting point this work takes the “politics of presence” approach (Phillips 1995). It thus acknowledges that elected
representatives must have a certain autonomy and freedom to decide on political issues that arise after the election or that were not part of their election manifesto. In other words, they must be allowed to use their personal judgement without having to refer back to their voters on every issue. Overall, if social groups (with their particular and unique experiences) are essentially present in parliament to the approximate extent as in the electorate, political decisions are more likely to reflect the political preferences of the electorate. But, as long as women generally do not have the same opportunities as men have and are treated differently – particularly in terms of career patterns, participation and duties in the family, personal security and participation in the public sphere – the resultant different experiences of women and men will give rise to different political preferences.

The workings of modern, representative democracy rely upon, among other things, equality among adult citizens in the political process. As Phillips notes (1995, 36), “political equality does carry with it an equal right to participate in politics – an equal right to be politically present.” In most national parliaments today, men hold a majority or a large majority of seats (IPU 2011b) and so men hold more of the formal power over political representation. For one gender to have a much greater possibility of affecting democratic decision-making – inequality in political input – is unjust, since it denies the fact that women are as capable as men of doing political work. Even though equal numbers of women and men in elected assemblies could constitute a type of “symbolic representation” (Pitkin 1972), this could also result in more equal political output and thus potentially achieve substantive representation in the form of policies that take the experiences and perspectives of women and men into account. For women and men to collaborate optimally in creating public policy, women and men should be present in roughly equal numbers in elected assemblies. To state it otherwise, while a gender-equal or gender-balanced “descriptive representation” (Pitkin 1972), i.e., equal numbers of women and men in parliament, cannot guarantee equal political output, i.e., that the interests of women and men will be equally represented in policy, unequal descriptive representation is likely to increase the likelihood of unequal political output (Phillips 1995, 54).

1.1.1 Gender balance: What is fair representation?

In this research, gender-balanced parliamentary presence is understood to approximate fair representation of women and men in parliament; lack of gender balance corresponds to lack of fair representation. Most studies of women’s parliamentary presence focus on the percentage of parliamentarians (MPs) that are women, sometimes comparing parties and parliaments as to which have more or fewer female MPs (see, e.g., Caul Kittilson 2006;

1 Gender is here understood to be equivalent to biological sex.
Siaroff 2000). Even though fair representation is usually at the heart of such studies, this way of handling the data typically results in problems in determining whether and to what extent parties or parliaments have achieved fair representation. This is a fundamental question that should be addressed directly, henceforth this research goes beyond simply calculating the percentage of women MPs by defining a standard of measurement of gender balance.

Using the exact proportions of women and men as a basis for defining what constitutes gender balance, and for identifying different degrees of gender balance as well as lack thereof, makes it possible to determine whether a parliamentary party\(^2\) is gender balanced, as well as to specify the degree to which it is gender balanced. Such benchmarks or standards of measurement serve to denote qualitative shifts\(^3\) in a concept (Ragin 2008c, chap. 4) such as full gender balance facilitate making exact statements and more meaningful comparisons.

The ratio of women to men parliamentarians required for a party to have achieved gender balance are in this study based upon four pillars: the mathematical approximation of equilibrium between two groups, the share of women and men in the world population, theoretical insights into fair representation and, finally, the reality of the particular political parties. The definition includes three ‘qualitative anchors’ that point to important, meaningful differences in the degree of gender balance: full presence of gender balance, full absence of gender balance and the mid-point between them at which it is impossible to assert whether gender balance has been achieved or not (Ragin 2008c, 29–33).

The term ‘balance’ implies a form of equilibrium. Balance or equilibrium is often intuitively understood as 50/50, which would in this case mean equal proportions of women and men MPs. This would correspond well to the proportions of women and men in the world, which is roughly equal to 50 per cent of each gender. Consequently, scholars of women’s parliamentary presence suggest that 50/50 is a useful benchmark for understanding of equal representation (see, e.g., Rosenbluth, Salmond, and Thies 2006, 181). However, defining gender balance as a perfect 50/50 ratio may be too strict, particularly in the case of small groups such as parliamentary parties. Another option would be the suggested “critical mass” level of 30 per cent (Dahlerup 1988, see also 2006), a commonly preferred level in gender quotas that has been endorsed by the UN (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008; Dahlerup 2006, 5).

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\(^2\) The term parliamentary party refers to the parliamentary group of a party, that is, its full group of elected parliamentarians. It is used interchangeably with parliamentary delegation and parliamentary group.

\(^3\) The thermometer makes a commonly used example of such shifts and standards of measurement: the 0 and 100 Celsius degree marks are not only digits, but indicate important qualitative shifts in water, namely when it turns into ice and boils, respectively (Ragin 2008c, 72–3). The use of this technique is further discussed in Chapter 3.

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Objections to this criteria regard that using three out of ten, while being more balanced than not, is substantially far less than a 50/50 ratio and thus does not provide a satisfactory definition of balance. Kanter (1977) suggests that gender balance be defined in the 40:60 per cent range, that is, no more than 60 and no less than 40 per cent of each gender. This pragmatic option not only includes the 50/50 equilibrium and permits what may be a natural variation in gender distribution, but also fits calculations of gender balance in small groups. Thus the 40:60 range here defines full gender balance.

In order for the definition of gender balance to be as useful as possible, the absence of gender balance should also be defined. Following Kanter (1977), total absence of gender balance is defined as a “gender uniform” group, meaning a group made up of only women or only men. The comparative studies of parties in Europe presented in chapters 4 and 5 provide empirical evidence for setting a “crossover point” (Ragin 2008c, 30) to mark the level at which women’s presence can be categorised as being more gender balanced or more unbalanced. In the historical analysis of 57 parties in eleven West European countries, this point of ambiguity is set at 20 per cent women, whereas in the analysis of contemporary Central and East European parties, parties are classified as more gender balanced than not when they have at least 25 per cent women MPs. The rationales for this classification are set out in detail in each chapter.

To summarize, full gender balance is here defined as 40 to 60 per cent of each gender being present in the parliamentary party; complete absence of balance is defined as having no women (or men) MPs. Parliamentary parties with more than 20 per cent (Western Europe in the late 1980s) or 25 per cent (Central and Eastern Europe, late 2000s) are defined as being more gender balanced than biased.6

1.1.2 Political parties and women’s parliamentary presence

By recruiting and fielding candidates in elections, political parties determine who can be elected to parliament. While in some countries independent candidates do get elected, the great majority of parliamentarians have a party affiliation. Political parties therefore constitute a crucial if not unavoidable step towards parliament, and are thus a key to our understanding of how gender balance is achieved (cf. Baer 1993).

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4 Parties from the following eleven countries are included: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK.
5 Parties from the following ten countries are included: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
6 The calibration is gender neutral. Cases in which the proportion of women exceeds the range of gender balance (40-60 per cent) are not full members of the set. None of the studied parties did however have more than 60 per cent women MPs.
Although the percentage of women MPs differs among countries and over time, this research shows that the difference in the proportion of women MPs among parties in one country can also be considerable (see also Caul Kittilson 2006, 8). Table 1 below shows the mean percentage of women MPs in the parliamentary parties studied and compared in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Among West European (WEur) parties in the late 1980s – when the share of women MPs had started increasing (McAllister and Studlar 2002; Raaum 2005) – and as well among the parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) of today, there are only a few cases of parties with a slight majority of women MPs. On average parties in Western Europe had 6.3 percentage points more women in their parliamentary party than parties in CEE, but the variation among parties was larger in WEur than in CEE. In order to understand what combinations of conditions lead to gender balance in national parliaments, we need to investigate the behaviour of individual political parties. More specifically, we need to know how parties decide which candidates to field in parliamentary elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Western Europe, late 1980s</th>
<th>Central/Eastern Europe, late 2000s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean (St.Dev)</td>
<td>Mean difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.8 (15.5)</td>
<td>6.3**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<0.05 (t = -2.40, df 109.22), equal variances not assumed.
Sources: See Appendix, pages 206 and 215.

Political parties choose their parliamentary candidates based on a number of different conditions and concerns and the process often involves several different actors or bodies within the individual party (Caul Kittilson 2006; Freidenvall 2006; Norris 1993). Studies of candidate selection and women’s parliamentary presence tend to focus on the preferences and organisational structures of parties.

Party preferences are commonly associated with party ideology, that is, leftist or green parties are seen as more ‘women-friendly’ (Caul 1999; see however Lovenduski 1993), and with the party’s stance on specific issues, such as gender quotas. Relevant aspects of the organisational structures of the party include the level at which candidates are selected and whether this is done in a formal, bureaucratic or, instead, in an informal way based on personal networks. Generally, studies of West European parties indicate that localised and formalised candidate selection policies that give more control over candidate selection to local party branches and individual members are

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7 The mean percentage of women MPs in the lower house of parliament in the same eleven West European countries by mid-2011 was 32.9 (St.Dev. 10.0) (IPU 2011a, author’s calculations).
more likely to produce a gender balanced group of parliamentary candidates, than do candidate-selection policies that use more centralised and informal ways of selecting candidates. The number of parliamentarians elected from party lists as well as the use of gender quotas may also affect the chances of achieving gender balance. In addition, scholars have suggested that a large share of women in party leadership positions leads to more women parliamentarians (Caul Kittilson 2006, 124; Caul 1999; Matland 1993; Norris 1993).

Internal party conditions do, however, not operate in a vacuum because, as Sjöblom (1968, 17) notes, “the behaviour of a political party is largely conditioned by the qualities of the political system wherein the party acts.” The electoral system may have profound effects upon parties’ choices of candidates: if only one candidate is elected from each district, as in the UK or France, competition for that opportunity is likely to be more fierce than for parties that can elect several of their candidates from one district to parliament, as is the case, for example, in Sweden and Latvia. In addition, if voters can alter the lists of candidates that parties present through preference voting, the proportion of women and men MPs may differ from the proportions of women and men on candidate lists (Matland 1993; Norris 2004; Rule 1987; Schmidt 2009). Furthermore, the social conditions of a country will affect the parties’ room to manoeuvre: if the general public considers women to be as capable politicians as men are, the probability of parties becoming gender-balanced increases. This is commonly studied directly, through attitudinal surveys of the electorate by asking questions about gender and politics, or indirectly by examining, for example, the presence of different religious groups as well as the degree of women’s participation in the public sphere, such as in the labour force and higher education. In the Western world, higher rates of women’s participation in paid labour and in higher education tends to coincide with more women in parliament. Studies have found that attitudes that are positive towards equal status for women (which tend to be associated with the proportion of Protestants and non-believers in the population) are related to a higher percentage of women MPs (Rule 1981; Wide 2006; see also Inglehart and Norris 2003). Thus there are good reasons to assume that party behaviour and the choices that parties make in candidate selection depend upon not only on party preferences and structures, but also upon the environment in which the parties compete for votes and seats.

1.2 Developing research about party and gender

The study of women’s parliamentary presence and its relationship with party behaviour has produced a large body of useful knowledge about politics and gender. In surveying the progress made in previous studies, the present re-
search identifies their limitations, suggests three specific ways that studies about party and gender should be developed and sets out how these could resolve the problems identified.

1.2.1 Problems, aims and solutions

The main object of this research is to develop new knowledge about how party behaviour affects gender distribution in parliamentary parties. In an effort to achieve this, the research covers three overarching topics: 1) it explores how conditions inside parties and in their environment combine to bring about gender-balanced parliamentary parties, 2) it investigates party politics and gender in the enlarged Europe covering the now democratic, former Soviet states, comparing its findings with the experience of Western European countries and 3) in so doing, it asks whether absence of combinations of conditions that lead to gender balance leads to absence of gender balance. Each of these topics are broken down into more specific aims and objectives that are attached to them.

1.2.1.1 How do conditions combine to create gender balance?

Previous research has shown that party behaviour results from a combination of party choices and the environment in which the choices are made. Students of women’s parliamentary presence have produced accounts of how actions of parties affect gender distribution in parliament, but these studies have also shown that the parties’ room to manoeuvre is contingent upon the institutions and social conditions that frame those actions. There are numerous examples of how conditions inside or outside of parties are understood as intervening variables, conditions that reciprocally contribute to the outcome, how the effect of one factor depends upon that of another, or that “the effects of structural variables are generally mediated by the party characteristics” (Birch 2003, 144; Caul Kittilson 2006, 121; Hughes and Paxton 2008, 255; Matland 2005, 104–6; Norris 2006, 204; Schmidt 2009, 194; quote from Kunovich and Paxton 2005, 532). Chapter 2 presents an analysis of what combinations of conditions we may expect.

There are, unfortunately, few systematically comparative studies of how conditions inside and outside of parties combine in causing gender-balanced parliamentary parties. Research studies that cover a large number of parties usually consider one variable at a time and do not include interaction variables (see, e.g., Caul Kittilson 2006; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; though see Krook 2010; Schmidt 2009 for studies of interaction on the parliamentary level). While studies of one or a few cases are appropriate for drawing conclusions about the effects of different configurations of conditions, the results are less generalisable when there is such small number of cases. The effect of this mismatch between theory and method is a lack of systematic
knowledge about how conditions inside and outside of political parties interact to make parties more gender balanced.

Interaction means that two or more conditions together lead to an event or outcome. In the social world, combinations of conditions that together contribute to certain events occurring are commonplace: we usually understand events as caused by several different things, and we often also include the context in which events take place. For example, we perceive the election of a president to be not only a consequence of the candidate gaining enough votes, but we also see it to be consequence of a number of factors, such as, who the candidate and the competitors were, what the political visions of the competing candidates were, how the election campaigns were run, the political climate at the time of the election, and so on. When explaining the outcome of the elections, we often include a range of conditions that together led to the election of a particular candidate. After having studied several elections, we may conclude that there is one or several distinct combinations of conditions that lead to, indeed are sufficient for, the elections of a particular type of candidate – so-called ‘recipes’ (Ragin 2008c, 23) for electoral success of candidates.

Gathering such information about parties that have reached gender balance would make it possible to gain new knowledge about how the context – electoral laws, social conditions – affects party behaviour and about how similar contexts may have different effects on different parties, and vice versa. This would also open up for examination of the question of whether gender-balanced parties can be found in more than one type of parties, which would mean that there can be different routes toward gender balance. Having more knowledge about how conditions combine and about whether there are different types of combinations of conditions would expand our understanding of parties and how fair representation can be achieved.

Finally, we need to distinguish between necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for attaining large proportions of women parliamentarians. Statements about necessity and sufficiency need to be empirically examined. Sufficient conditions are enough to cause an outcome on their own, whereas a necessary condition is required for an outcome to take place but does not by itself cause the outcome to occur (Ragin 1987, 99–100). The quotes below are examples of how the distinction between necessity and sufficiency has been evoked by students of women’s parliamentary presence.

"Having a large percentage of women in the workforce and/or college graduates, for example, is beneficial but not an absolute necessity for increased women’s parliamentary recruitment. This is because a smaller pool of potential candidates is sufficient for the limited number of seats in parliament." (Rule 1987, 493)

“In a particular context, where there are few barriers to women seeking election, these social forces bring women substantial gains in par-
liamnentary seats. Yet in most cases, social forces are necessary but not sufficient.” (Caul Kittilson 2006, 37)

"...the level of socioeconomic development and length of democracy may be important, but these are neither necessary nor sufficient for gender equality in parliaments …” (Norris 2004, 180)

"Although insufficient by themselves, the results suggest that PR electoral systems, in combination with positive action strategies, can serve to increase the diversity of legislative bodies, producing parliaments that look more like the people they serve." (Norris 2004, 208)

"Although there is a strong and consistent association, by itself the basic type of electoral system is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to guarantee women’s representation.” (Norris 2006, 204)

"... gender quotas are not a necessary condition for a high level of female representation, as the cases of Finland and Denmark indicate. Nor are quotas a sufficient condition for a high representation of women.” (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008, 12)

"Quotas do not automatically lead to the highest representation of women. Moreover, they are not the only way of increasing women’s representation, and are therefore not a necessary condition for a high representation of women in politics…” (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008, 26)

"an increase in party magnitude does not seem to be a necessary condition for an increase in the number of women elected.” (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008, 47)

“[quotas are] ... neither necessary nor sufficient for [30 per cent or more women in national parliament]” (Krook 2010, 11)

The above collection of quotes does not attempt to cover all the relevant suggestions about necessity and sufficiency, but we can see that both party attributes and the conditions in the environment in which they operate have been understood in terms of necessity and sufficiency. However, it should be noted that the last quote (Krook 2010) is the only one published in a study using a method capable of systematically examining necessity and sufficiency across a large number of cases.

The lack of comparative studies of the prerequisites for gender balance is as striking as is the lack of studies of how conditions combine to bring about gender balance. Thorough knowledge of what conditions are required or sufficient for gender-balanced parliamentary party representation would strengthen an already well-developed research field. Such knowledge would answer questions about whether a particular measure is required and power-
ful enough for gender balance to be attained. Furthermore, such knowledge could also serve to inform policy choices.

Combinations of conditions are commonly understood as essential parts of explanations of how gender-balanced parliamentary presence is achieved, but there are few comparative accounts of what conditions combine that are sufficiently systematic to allow for broader generalisation about results at the party level. Similarly, there are several examples of arguments setting out how conditions inside and outside of parties may be sufficient or necessary for attaining gender balance in the parliamentary party, but few empirical investigations of their applicability. This field of research would clearly benefit from efforts to address these issues in an empirical, comparative way that allows for generalisation.

1.2.1.1.1 Combinations of conditions: Aim and solution
In a seminal publication about party politics and gender Norris (1993, 314) concludes, “We need to understand the interaction of factors within the political system in a comprehensive model, rather than relying upon simple, deterministic and monocular explanations.” This research goes beyond monocausal explanations and instead focuses how several causal conditions may contribute to gender-balanced parliamentary parties.

The first aim of this research is to provide knowledge about how conditions inside and outside of political parties interact in such a way as to result in gender-balanced parliamentary parties. A second goal is to determine whether the various standard conditions can be understood as necessary or singularly sufficient for gender balance in parliamentary parties.

As chapter 2 will show, there are few well-specified interactions between conditions that are generally understood to affect gender distribution in political decision-making. Furthermore, previous research gives rise to expectations that more than two conditions combine in parties that are gender balanced; however, such multiple, complex interactions are even less well specified in the literature. Because of these two factors of uncertainty, this research takes an explorative approach to how party conditions and environmental conditions combine. In order to achieve a high degree of comparability with results that provide detailed knowledge about individual conditions but give little insight into interaction, this study seeks to explore how several conditions combine and will be undertaken by focusing on well-known and well-documented parties in West European democracies (for a similar approach, see Krook 2010).

The analytical technique selected in order to meet these two objectives is fuzzy-set qualitative comparative-analysis, fsQCA (Ragin 2000, 2008c; Benoit Rihoux and Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2007). QCA is a relatively new technique, one also new to the field of party and gender, having been used only sparingly in studies of women’s parliamentary presence (Krook 2010). QCA is apt for studying many cases at once, and does not
require combinations of conditions to be specified beforehand. Therefore, it is the appropriate method for studies that cover a large or intermediate number of cases and require an explorative approach to the way in which causal conditions combine. In addition, QCA is useful in studies of necessary and sufficient conditions, which makes it the ideal method here. Given the small number of previous QCA studies dealing with party politics, applying this method to gender and party politics means this research is charting a new course and thus seeks to make a methodological contribution in the development of the research field.

1.2.1.2 Is an encompassing European perspective viable?
The study of party and gender is strong in the Western world in general and in Western Europe in particular (see, e.g., Caul Kittelson 2006; Hoecker 1998; Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Rule 1987; Siaroff 2000). The field has widened into other parts of the world, such as Central and Eastern Europe (see, e.g., Galligan, Clavero, and Calloni 2007; Hoecker and Fuchs 2004; Matland and Montgomery 2003b; Rueschemeyer and Wolchik 2009). Still, comparisons between parties in Western Europe (WEur) and parties from the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are rare. Moreover, studies of CEE parties tend to rely on concepts developed for WEur. This double bias has at least two consequences for our understanding of European party politics and gender.

The deficiency in comparisons between cases in CEE and WEur risks reinforcing an East/West divide which, beyond being politically problematic, may lead us to believe that parties in Central and Eastern Europe and parties in Western Europe are fundamentally different from each other. Without thorough empirical studies comparing cases in both parts of Europe, our knowledge about the conditions or combinations of conditions that lead to gender-balanced parliamentary parties will remain incomplete. Do, for example, women stand the same chances in small parties in changing party systems than in small parties in stable party systems? Are leftist parties in CEE similar to leftist parties in WEur in terms of gender balance? Does centralisation of candidate selection in CEE have the same origins and consequences as in West European parties? In essence, the question is whether West European experience can be applied to understanding party and gender in the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Without systematic empirical comparisons, we lack evidence upon which we can answer this latter question.

Because the “Western experience” has directed much of research about party and gender – and for good reason, since WEur parties were among the first in the democratic world to reach gender balance – empirical definitions or understandings of theoretical concepts that are used in such studies may be less universally applicable than is often assumed. Would, for example, a large party be defined in the same way in WEur as in CEE? Is the definition
of gender balance stable, or should we redefine it based on the context (Krook 2010)? When Central and East European parties are compared to their cousins in Western Europe, commonly used concepts can be re-examined, questioned and developed. Doing so will enhance not only our understanding of the cases studied, but also of the research field: do the commonly used concepts mean the same thing in Western Europe as in Central and Eastern Europe and could using a Western template for studying CEE parties make us overlook certain, potentially important conditions?

Finally, there is a terminological dimension to this problem: the habit of referring to certain entities, for example, large parties, small parties, large electoral districts, small electoral districts, without there being any commonly agreed-upon definition of what makes a party or district large or small. Such verbal definitions need to be empirically grounded so as to enable us to know whether and when knowledge from systematic comparisons using concepts developed in WEur is applicable in CEE. This is, however, rarely done in larger comparative studies. Because this lack of standardised measurements and definitions of the central concepts makes studies less comparable to each other, it will impede the accumulation of the knowledge produced. Clearly, constructing empirical, standardised definitions would facilitate further developments of the research field.

1.2.1.2.1 An encompassing European perspective: Aim and solution
This research aims to investigate whether the West European experience of achieving gender-balanced parliamentary parties is applicable in Central and East European democracies. It also seeks to test whether definitions of commonly used concepts that are fruitful in the study of West European parties are equally fruitful in studies of parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Both these aims are here construed as matters of empirical rather than theoretical investigation.

With the aim of conducting systematic comparisons of whether gender-balanced parliamentary party representation is achieved in the same way in CEE and WEur, results from the study of West European parties are employed as a point of departure. To compare the applicability of individual concepts, detailed empirical operationalisations of each concept are needed, and they should ideally be developed with reference to CEE parties and to Western European parties. In addition, case level comparative knowledge about a carefully selected CEE party could bring in-depth knowledge about the temporal sequence of events that led to gender balance. Three separate methods address each of these objectives: fuzzy-set QCA, structured focused comparisons and a single case study.

Fuzzy-set QCA requires concepts to be specified with empirical, meaningful thresholds, as was done with the concept of gender balance outlined above. Thresholds should be based on transparent, empirical and theoretical criteria, and should not be ad hoc. Defining what constitutes, for example, a
large party and what are the limits for when a party can no longer be labelled large gives information about what kind of case we are considering, i.e., a large party, and it makes it possible to determine the degree to which the case fits this large-party category. This empirically exact way of comparing with reference to both kind and degree is similar to how the Celsius scale of temperature is “calibrated” with reference to the points at which water freezes into ice and at which it boils, that is, 0 and 100 degrees respectively (Ragin 2008c, chap. 4, 5). For the purpose of this research, the possibility to make comparisons between and within CEE and WEur more transparent and meaningful and to investigate whether standards that are fruitful in studies of Western Europe are as useful in CEE, are of primary importance.

The calibrations or standards of measurement developed in the fsQCA of West European parties will be tested using data from parties in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, using structured focused comparisons, SFC (George and Bennett 2005). The smaller format – six cases versus 57 – makes it possible to compare the cases to each other and investigate whether CEE parties share features that are often overlooked in studies of WEur parties and gender, and hence seek to discover what is missing in the West European template. The format also renders the SFC appropriate for analysing the combinations of conditions that have lead to gender-balanced parliamentary parties in Central and Eastern Europe, and to compare them to the results from the study of West European parties. Finally, the application of set theory – fuzzy-set standardised measurements are set theoretic – in a structured focused comparison means that this research also contributes to the development of the methodology.

Finally, the static comparisons conducted using fsQCA and SFC are complemented with an in-depth case study of a deviant case from CEE, a Latvian party – New Era (Jaunais Laiks) – that reached gender balance despite its failing to display the common conditions under which West European parties achieve gender balance. By studying a case that is different from what is known from previous work about parties with gender-balanced parliamentary delegations, the case study approach used here will explore the process by which the party reached gender balance and probe for possible new explanations or sequences of events (Gerring 2007, 106). Apart from providing new, in-depth knowledge about one case, this research’s case study includes comparisons with other Latvian parties.

1.2.1.3 What explains lack of gender balance?

While the use of knowledge about how fair representation and gender-balanced parliamentary parties are achieved is useful in many ways, it remains incomplete without knowledge about how absence of gender balance comes about. Is gender balance created by reversing the conditions under which parties remain unbalanced, or are the two fundamentally different from each other? The literature on gender and party generally focus how
gender balance can be achieved, and consequently there are fewer studies of how non-balance is sustained (see however Bjarnegård 2009; Hughes and Paxton 2008; Rule 1981). We could assume that absence of the conditions or combinations of conditions that lead to gender balance will lead to absence of gender balance, but that would be a highly debatable extrapolation from an intricate causal process. Instead, this calls for further empirical explorations of what combinations of conditions are present in the parties that did not reach gender balance while others did.

1.2.1.3.1 Lack of gender balance: Aim and solution

This research aims to explore under what combinations of conditions lack of gender balance remains present in some parties, while others reach gender balance in their parliamentary party. The logic of enquiry follows that of the fsQCA of gender-balanced parties in Western Europe and the same data sets will be used in order to achieve comparability with the study of presence of gender balance. The analysis also covers necessary and sufficient conditions for lack of gender balance.

1.3 Outline: One topic, three studies

As explained above, the aims of this research are pursued using three analytical techniques, all of which are comparative in different ways. It therefore relies on three separate but interconnected studies: a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis of gender-balanced and non-balanced parties in Western Europe in the late 1980s; a structured focused comparison of gender-balanced parties in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe; and an in-depth case study of a Latvian gender balanced party that does not correspond to the expectations about how parliamentary parties achieve gender balance. Each study presents a new and complementary piece to the overall purpose of the research, as detailed in Table 2 below.

All three studies include a component of theory development that is introduced in the theory chapter. The study of West European parties does so by exploring causal configurations and testing for necessary and singularly sufficient conditions for the presence and absence of gender balance. In the structured focused comparison of gender-balanced parties in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, theory development is sought by means of asking what aspects of explanatory factors may be missing in the template of gender balance that has resulted from studies of primarily West European parties. Finally, the case study is used to provide an in-depth exploration of new concepts.

The application of detailed, transparent empirical understandings of theoretical concepts is a common theme in each of the three empirical chapters. These calibrated standards of measurement are developed in the fuzzy-set
QCA of West European parties and are then used as a point of comparison, tested and applied in the two studies of CEE parties. Possible improvements are suggested based on the empirical distribution of data.

A major task pursued in the single case study is to provide a temporal perspective of how the parliamentary party became gender balanced. The case study seeks to track the sequence of events that contributed to equal proportions of women and men in the parliamentary delegation. Another object of the single case study is to explore new concepts. In the two other chapters, exploration is a core objective. The West European fsQCA explores which combinations of conditions lead to presence and absence of gender balance and presents analyses of necessary and singularly sufficient conditions for the presence and absence of gender balance in parliamentary parties. The structured focused comparison of gender-balanced parties in Central and Eastern Europe entails exploring necessary conditions and the combinations of conditions that are present in the studied cases.

Table 2: Contribution by each empirical study to the research aims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study Purpose</th>
<th>fsQCA WEur</th>
<th>SFC CEE</th>
<th>Deviant case CEE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop theory</td>
<td>Explore causal configurations</td>
<td>Develop the West Eur. template</td>
<td>Explore new concepts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standards of measurement</td>
<td>Develop Points of comparison Test</td>
<td>Apply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explore necessary conditions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explore singularly sufficient conditions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explore configurations for presence of gender balance</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not primarily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explore configurations for absence of gender balance</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explore temporal processes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3.1 Expected contributions to the research field

This research primarily deals with the issue of complex causality. It does so by exploring which combinations of conditions lead to presence or absence of gender balance using an intermediate number of cases. Attached to the study of how combinations of conditions can be perceived as being sufficient for gender balance or the absence thereof are explorative analyses of whether there are any prerequisites or conditions that invariably lead to the outcome. This is novel in the research field and constitutes one of the central contributions pursued in the studies presented below.

The main rationale for including cases from Western, Central and Eastern Europe within one framework is to widen the range of cases for comparison and allow scrutiny of the concepts that we use to understand party and gen-
der. This research uses theory and empirical analyses in asking whether the CEE experience should lead us to add additional conditions to the understanding of party and gender that has been developed mainly through reference to Western Europe and Western offshoots. It furthermore relies on a study of a deviant case to explore concepts that appear to be fruitful for understanding the possibilities of parties to become gender balanced. Producing new knowledge using an explicitly comparative approach to party and gender covering WEur and CEE cases is another contribution that this research seeks to add to the research field. The studies of parties in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe also make empirical contributions to the field by presenting new knowledge about the cases examined: the structured focused comparisons rely mainly on an original dataset collected for the purpose of this research, and the case study is primarily based on interview data collected solely for this project.

The aim of developing transparent, detailed and empirically based standards of measurement of concepts that are central to the research field constitutes another objective in the chapters below. Such calibrations for each concept serve as suggestions of the way the concepts can be understood in fine-grained empirical ways, and should be seen as early attempts to achieve standardised understandings of the concepts. Standardising empirical interpretations of concepts seeks first and foremost to achieve more comparable studies and, in the longer run, to enhance the possibilities of cumulative research results.

Finally, this research presents an example of a mixed methods approach in the social sciences. It includes a study of a single case, of few cases, an intermediate number of cases and analyses covering large numbers of cases. Furthermore, it offers analyses using statistical techniques, fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, structured focused comparisons and a single case study. It also draws on a wide range of different sources, from interviews to statistics and document studies. This research therefore contributes to the research field as an example of how multi-method approaches can be used to pursue a specific research objective, and seeks to show how different analytical techniques and approaches can complement one another.

1.3.2 Plan of the book
This volume is divided into six chapters. After this introductory chapter, the theory chapter gives an overview of the state of the research field. The methods chapter that follows sets out the methods and approaches used in the different analyses, outlining how they contribute to the aims of the project. Subsequently, the three empirical studies are presented. Finally, the seventh chapter draws conclusions from the preceding analyses.
2. Theory: Party Politics and Gender

Because political parties select and field their own candidates for parliamentary elections, individual parties are in a position to influence the proportion of women and men in elected assemblies. In several parliamentary democracies, parties have successfully fielded nearly equal numbers of women and men candidates in parliamentary elections. As a consequence, they have altered gender structures of parliaments (Caul Kittilson 2006; Caul 1999, 2001; Lovenduski and Norris 1993). In other words, the behaviour of individual parties may, by-and-large, determines the representativeness of elected assemblies.

Party behaviour is a function of organisational structures and preferences of the individual party and also a consequence of the environment in which the party acts. Laws, norms and social conditions can restrict or enable certain party behaviour. This study perceives parties as being the main actors and determinants of gender distribution in their parliamentary parties. Although voters may sometimes alter party lists in elections, parties choose their own candidates and thus the main responsibility for mirroring of the population rests with parties. This is the overarching theoretical approach presented in this chapter.

The objective of this chapter is to provide detailed discussions of central theoretical concepts in the field of party and gender, while also including some of the most commonly used and, for the purpose of this project, relevant concepts from general party theory. It also seeks to offer a constructive critique on previous studies. To fulfil this ambition, two of the shortcomings in the research field of party and gender that were outlined in the introductory chapter are dealt with, namely, causal complexity and Western bias. In presenting relevant theory about party and gender that structures the analyses presented in later chapters, interactions that may occur between conditions inside and outside individual political parties are pointed out. This theoretical chapter draws on previous studies of West European parties, but also includes knowledge derived from studies of party and gender in Central and Eastern Europe.
2.1 Chapter Outline

This chapter is divided into three substantive sections that discuss previous research and theory about party and gender in Europe. The first section lays a foundation for the overall approach to parties as actors within institutional and social frames. It presents assumptions about political parties that form a basis for the theoretical framework, drawing on party research and game theory.

The second part of the chapter progresses by outlining central concepts in the study of party and gender. It delivers a critique on current studies of party and gender by focusing first on the interaction between causal conditions and then pointing to inconsistencies and problems in current theory. The purpose of the second part is to develop the main theoretical points that frame and guide the empirical analyses.

In the third section the environmental context of parties is discussed. Because this work is primarily party centred, this section offers less of a critique and instead aims to highlight contextual factors that are taken into account in the subsequent empirical chapters.

Finally, the chapter is summed up with the main assumptions highlighted. The closing section also includes an overview of expectations derived from theory and previous research.

2.2 Political parties: Political actors

Research on political parties is well developed and has attracted considerable attention from scholars of gender representation. However, Strøm and Müller (1999, 5) note that “[t]he scholarly literature that examines political parties is enormous, and yet our systematic knowledge of party objectives and behaviour is still quite modest.” This work seeks to add a piece to that puzzle, namely, by developing a better understanding of the circumstances under which individual parties choose to create gender-balanced parliamentary delegations.

2.2.1 Parties as collective, purposive actors

As previous studies (e.g., Downs 1957; Harmel and Janda 1994; Harmel et al. 1995; Strøm and Müller 1999) – and everyday experience – make clear, parties can be considered as intentional, if not strategic, actors participating in electoral games. The participation of these political parties in competitive elections separates them from other interest organisations that seek to influence public policy or public opinion (Sartori 1976, 52–7). It is this factor that delineates the total population of cases considered here.
To understand better how parties function in different contexts, this study makes use of actor-centred institutionalism (Scharpf 1997). This approach allows us to conceptualise parties as collective actors that have their own strategies, preferences and internal institutional settings and additionally as actors that act within institutional and social frames set by the wider society. Incentives, opportunities and restrictions posed by the parties themselves and by their external environment are taken into account in the analysis, providing a fuller picture of party behaviour and women’s parliamentary representation. This framework is useful for enhancing our understanding of why and how certain internal institutions within the party combine with each other and/or with environmental conditions in shaping certain outcomes (Strøm and Müller 1999, 12, 19–26).

Parties are usually made up of several individuals or branches, which may have different goals and intentions (Deschouwer 1994, 180), whereas strategic agency is usually only ascribed to individuals (Scharpf 1997, 60). However, it should not be taken for granted that individual party members or activists always act to serve the interests of the collective. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that when individuals act in their roles as party members, activists, representatives or party leaders, they act on behalf of the party rather than for their own, private purposes. In other words, the collective actor, i.e., the party, is their “unit of reference” for a particular course of action (Scharpf 1997, 60–2). Hence, it is meaningful to analyse the party as a collective, strategic actor.

This research frequently returns to the role of institutions. Institutions are here understood as formal rules and laws as well as social norms whose upholding rests upon either formal, legal sanctions or social sanctions (Scharpf 1997, 38). It thus covers the party’s internal organisational rules and behaviour, as stated in its statutes or in formal or informal codes of conduct, as well as the party’s external social norms or practices and formal laws.

2.2.1.1 Defining actors

Actors are defined by their capabilities to act and their orientations. Which capabilities are relevant to the analysis depends upon which outcome is considered (Scharpf 1997, 43). While parties are capable of several different types of actions, the focus of this framework is on their abilities to determine or directly influence the proportions of women and men in parliament.

Since collective actors are composed of individuals it follows that the capacity for strategic action inevitably depends upon whether members and activists agree on the appropriate course of action. For collective actors turn-

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8 While the concept of actor applied here derives from game theory, this study merely applies the concept of actor to elucidate the possible interactions between conditions internal to individual parties – e.g., candidate selection – and conditions that are by necessity external to them, such as electoral laws.
ing internal conflicts into concerted action is critical. Given that control over action resources and the purpose of action is largely a collective endeavour, which is usually the case with political parties, internal conflict is generally resolved through internal mechanisms that rely on “institutional conditions facilitating conflict resolution” (Scharpf 1997, 56–60), be they formal or informal institutions. Formal party rules and the practices that govern day-to-day party work are thus important elements for understanding party and gender. Such intra-actor institutional conditions may be imposed from the outside (for example, mandatory gender quotas, regulations on transparency of party financing or laws on the procedures of candidate selection) or created by the party itself.

The orientations and intentions of actors derive from their own perceptions and preferences and can be either fixed or malleable. To be more specific, actors’ orientations are influenced by their identity, norms that guide their behaviour and, as is commonly assumed in rational choice theories, self-interest (Scharpf 1997, 43–4, 63–6). Given that tracing subjective intentions and orientations of actors empirically is quite challenging, the empirical applications presented here follow Scharpf (1997, 60) and thus rely on tangible, intra-actor institutional settings that signal the party’s intentions to achieve gender balance in its parliamentary party. Parties in parliamentary democracies often adhere to ideals of formal internal democracy, and hence any agreed-upon intentions to change the gender composition of the parliamentary wing usually can be traced through the various internal documents or public statements, such as articulated policies on gender quotas, positive discrimination policies and ideological stances.

In order to understand how parliamentary parties can become gender balanced, we first need to delve more deeply into the parties’ intentions and thereby investigate why any party would bother to change the status quo in the first place.

2.3 Party change: Why and how

What motivates a political party to initiate and implement changes that assure that its parliamentary wing includes reasonably equal proportions of women and men? While the answer to this ostensibly simple question might seem self-evident, the mere existence of gender-biased parliamentary parties hints at a deeper and more complex problem. Put briefly, there are two com-

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9 It should be noted, however, that everyday party work is usually carried out by a few individuals in the party leadership, who also generally tend to have power over much of the action resources of the organisation (cf. Scharpf 1997, 56; see also Duverger 1957; Michels 1915; Panebianco 1988).
ponents to the question: party changes in general, and the more specific issue of party changes that result in gender balance.

Party politics has since long been a male-dominated business. For established parties, having gender-balanced parliamentary delegations essentially means having to make changes within the party. For new parties, demands or expectations of gender balance is not as likely to mean any significant organisational change, though their actually instituting policies for gender-balanced representation goes against an almost century-long tradition of party organisation.

Previous research has made a link between party changes and party goals, emphasising the strategic element of party behaviour. In a seminal study, Downs (1957) proposed that parties are primarily vote-seeking, which suggests that party change should be seen in the light of electoral achievement (see, however, Harmel and Tan 2003, 10). More pragmatically, Harmel and Janda (1994, 278–82) suggest that parties may have several goals – votes, office, policy and intra-party democracy (see also Strøm and Müller 1999) – yet that only one of them is the primary goal of the organisation. Finally, they argue persuasively that changes in a party should be seen in the light of the primary goal of the individual party: parties with different goals may react differently to similar stimuli.

Harmel and Janda (1994) further argue that parties change under two circumstances, both of which include actual demands for change: 1) when achieving the primary goal of the party is threatened or 2) as a consequence of changes in the dominant faction. However, in the absence of unambiguous information about goals and preference rank-ordering of individual parties’ goals and intra-party factions, the pragmatic option is to deduce under which circumstances parties change in a particular direction.

Party behaviour is usually conceived as being an effect of both intra-party conditions and external, institutional conditions. Parties choose their courses of action based on exogenous institutional settings, for example, expected electoral outcomes, social issues, the behaviour of other parties, and a range of factors endogenous to the party, such as the type of organisation, power distribution, intra-party democracy (Downs 1957; Harmel and Janda 1994; Harmel et al. 1995; Panebianco 1988; cf. Scharpf 1997; Sjöblom 1968; Strøm and Müller 1999). Drawing on contingency theory, Deschouwer (1994; cf. Donaldson 2001; Galbraith 1973, chap. 1; Kitschelt 1994, 212–9) shows that the success of parties in achieving a certain outcome depends both upon intra-party characteristics and the institutional environment. Similarly, scholars of gender and party have pointed out that party characteristics and external conditions are likely to interact in forming gender-balanced parliamentary delegations (see, e.g., Caul Kittilson 2006, 37, 121; Krook 2009, 209; Norris 2004, 187–8, 208, 2006, 204). In other words, internal organisational characteristics are the main determinants of a party’s ability to achieve a particular outcome, yet they interact with external conditions in
shaping the outcome. The impact of external conditions means that one type of organisation may be successful in reaching their goals in one environmental setting, while the same combination of actor characteristics and orientations can be suboptimal in another environment or situation (Deschouwer 1994; Donaldson 2001, 5 pp; cf. Kitschelt 1994, chap. 5).

In short, there are convincing empirical as well as theoretical reasons to assume that individual parties’ responses to particular problems depend not only on their own goals and preferences but also on the institutional room, shaped by environmental conditions, in which they can manoeuvre (see, e.g., Harmel and Janda 1994; Kitschelt 1994; Scharpf 1997). Therefore, we need to take both intra-party and external factors into account when investigating why some parties achieve gender balance while others continue having gender-biased parliamentary delegations (cf. Caul Kittilson 2006; Norris 2004, 182). Even though such an investigation is needed, few large-N or intermediate-N comparative studies of gender and party take interaction into account (see, however, Krook 2010; Schmidt 2009 for studies on the aggregate level).

The idea that a similar input may result in different outcomes due to the particular characteristics of the individual party and its environment forms the first assumption of this framework. Gender distribution in the parliamentary party is thus expected to be determined by combinations of intra-party and environmental conditions. Consequently, the remainder of this section deals with how conditions that lead to gender-balanced parliamentary parties may interact.

2.3.1 Party change and women’s parliamentary presence

Significantly, conditions that facilitate women’s access to political power in one country do not necessarily have the same effect in other countries. Similarly, not all environmental, institutional conditions that have been pointed out as favourable are equally ‘women friendly’ in all countries (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 133; Norris 2004, 204). This should lead us to rethink how gender-balanced parliamentary delegations are achieved, and prompt an openness for the possibility that complex, multiple interactions between conditions may create the platform for a party’s ability and willingness to change its gender-biased parliamentary presence.

This research proposes that focus should be put on parties as actors, and that the ability of parties to achieve gender-balanced parliamentary delegations is assumed to be a function of several interacting conditions inside and outside of individual party organisations.10 The framework is divided into two parts: intra-party conditions and environmental conditions.

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10 For a thorough discussion on party organisational change and women’s parliamentary presence, see Kittilson (2006.) While her study includes both party organisational changes
2.3.2 Intra-party conditions

2.3.2.1 Candidate selection

Candidate selection is a key component of composition of the parliamentary party. Selection of parliamentary candidates is often influenced by several different conditions, including internal party rules for candidate selection. Gallagher (1988) argues that the selection process can be seen as a continuum on two axes: degree of centralisation and level of involvement from party members.\(^{11}\) In this subsection, it is argued that although centralisation/decentralisation and the inclusiveness/exclusiveness of the selectorate are useful concepts, they should be read in terms of possible interactions with other factors inside and outside of the individual party.

Centralised candidate selection means that main responsibility and power over the final party list or individual candidates rests with the national party organisation. Matland & Montgomery (2003a, 34) argue that with centralisation of the candidate selection process comes an overview of the total number of women and men candidates, an overview and responsibility that may spur party leaders to alter biased representation. Using a similar line of argument, Meier (2004, 584) writes that “in selecting candidates the central party leadership is more sensitive to general principles and less susceptible to personal considerations.” Matland and Montgomery also argue that when women need to convince only the central party leadership – as opposed to local party leaders – women’s chances of gaining representation increase (cf. Caul Kittilson 2006, 35; Hazan and Rahat 2006, 372–3).

Empirical studies suggest that centralised candidate-selection processes interact with other conditions, such as the formal or informal character of candidate selection (Matland 2003, 335–7; Norris 1993, 321–7), party ideology (Birch 2003, 144) and the willingness of party leaders to change the status quo (Ristova 2003, 199, 205). This means that for gender balance to be achieved through centralised candidate selection there must be an environment that is supportive. Along with a system of centralised candidate selection, two other conditions must be present: a party leadership that is sympathetic to change towards gender balance (as part of party ideology, external social conditions or for other reasons) and women having access to the party leadership. Given the demanding character of this interaction it is not surprising that there are few empirical results to support the idea that centralisation of candidate selection by itself is favourable for women seeking elected office.

\(^{11}\) The debate on women and legislative recruitment frequently also revolves around the extent to which candidate selection is bureaucratised, i.e., institutionalised. This latter aspect is important in several ways, and is discussed separately below.
Decentralised candidate-selection processes are characterised by regional and or local party branches having great influence, with central party bodies having little or no power. An investigation of formal rules regarding candidate selection shows that West European party organisations moved towards increasingly decentralised processes between the 1960s and late 1980s (Bille 2001; see also Norris 1993, 325). This shift occurred during the same time period that women gained (slowly) more seats in parliaments (McAllister and Studlar 2002). While not definitive evidence of a causal connection, it does deserve further attention.

Decentralisation of candidate selection, Caul Kittilson shows, is related to larger percentages of women in parliamentary parties – at least historically in West European parties. She also shows that decentralisation provides static explanations for more women MPs but that it also can account for change in gender composition of parliamentary parties. This echoes some of the pragmatically-sound arguments related to party ideology and women’s social roles in family and society: as long as women are more closely tied to family and household duties, local access to party politics is more likely to facilitate their entry into politics (Caul Kittilson 2006, 124).

Parties that promote mainly from within their own ranks – that is, require their representatives to work their way up rather than allowing for entry directly at a top position – are likely to become more policy-orientated, as opposed to vote-seeking or office-seeking. This is because “rigidity in recruitment restricts the entrance of pure office seekers” (Ström and Müller 1999, 17). In a similar vein, Kitschelt argues that “[l]ocal control of nominations for electoral office can imply either great strategic stability or high flexibility, depending upon the nature of grassroots organization” (Kitschelt 1994, 223, emphasis in original). Both lines of argument suggest that the level at which candidate selection is made may interact with other conditions, most notably ideology and participatory ideals. Legislative recruitment that relies heavily on intra-party promotion and loyal partisans is common in Swedish and German parties, where candidates for national level office are often expected to have served at the local level (Kolinsky 1993; Sainsbury 1993, 267–9). In some German and most Swedish parties this factor has returned gender-balanced parliamentary parties. The link between candidate selection and ideas will be discussed in the subsection on party ideology. For now, suffice it to note that there is a possible interaction with the level of candidate selection.

Democratisation of candidate selection or breadth of participation among party members is closely tied to the centralisation/decentralisation debate. Hazan and Rahat (2006, 372–3) hypothesise that large, inclusive selectorates will result in less representative candidates because of increased influence from dominant groups within the party. With an exclusive selectorate, the authors argue, it is easier for newcomers to become acquainted with the nominating committee – to cultivate “personal affiliations” – and so increase
their chances of getting nominated. While the argument is theoretically sound, it rests upon two assumptions that undermine its usefulness in promoting greater representativeness of candidates. First, as Hazan and Rahat (2006, 375) themselves suggest, exclusive party-selectorates are related to lower legislative turnover and thus favour incumbents. Hence, in practice, for newcomers any increased chance created by the ease with which selectors can be approached would be offset by the low turnover. Second, the two authors apparently assume that all candidates have equal access to a small, exclusive selectorate. This, however, may not be the case for newcomers or underrepresented groups: such personal contact is likely to be of an informal character, that is, rest upon patronage and or personal political capital. Both assumptions contradict results from studies of gender and political participation indicating that higher legislative turnover – as in, e.g., party list systems – and bureaucratised, formal candidate selection processes seem to favour women’s entry in party politics (see, e.g., Norris 1993, 314, 322–7). What is more, Hazan and Rahat test their hypothesis with reference to a case known for its low representation of women, which indicates need for further testing of their proposition. There is thus no reason to readily and uncritically accept the idea that non-participatory candidate selection methods can increase representativeness of party candidates.

In sum, we should expect democratised/inclusive, decentralised candidate selection processes to create more accurate mirroring of the population than exclusive, centralised processes. Still, individual conditions or causes often combine with other factors to create an outcome (see, e.g., Ragin 2008c). In addition, Tavits (2009, 809) aptly argues that “parties can be strategic about nominations, regardless of the overall level of centralization of this procedure”, a factor that should not be overlooked. Clearly, we should not assume a straightforward cause-and-effect type of relationship between democratised and decentralised candidate selection and gender-balanced parliamentary delegations. Although candidate selection is crucial, its impact on gender distribution in parliament should be understood in terms of its possible interaction with other conditions.

Finally, it should be noted that one can only expect a decentralised, democratised procedure to take place in parties that have local branches and party members. Parties, as defined above, need not have any members –

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12 The Swedish conservatives (Moderaterna) may provide a recent empirical example of how old power structures can remain even with larger selectorates (Dagens Nyheter 2010).
13 Patronage is here read as a type of support, often informal and sometimes considered illicit, to be compared to personal political capital.
14 For useful discussions on personal political capital, see Niklasson (2005) and Guadagnini (1993).
15 The case used for illustrating their propositions is the Israeli national parliament, Knesset. The proportion of women in Knesset has, however, been fairly constant and, given the ostensibly “women-friendly” electoral system, strikingly low during all of the 20th century. For further comments on women in Knesset, see Hughes and Paxton (2008, 240.)
except for candidates and possibly MPs – or even sub-national branches. This is particularly evident for new parties, in times of party decline and in countries where party membership bears connotations to lack of democratic influence. Hence, the extent to which the specific parties have active local branches and a significant number of members must be taken into account when drawing conclusions about what type of candidate selection leads to gender-balanced parliamentary parties.

2.3.2.2 Party institutionalisation and organisational instability

Bureaucratised or institutionalised candidate selection in which the rules and procedures are transparent and known to all participants, scholars of party and gender claim, grant newcomers a better chance of becoming candidates. With informal, patronage-based candidate selection where personal contacts play a more prominent role, incumbents and members of ‘old boys’ networks’ are more likely than newcomers to be placed on party lists (see, e.g., Guadagnini 1993; Norris 1993, 21–2; see also Panebianco 1988, 53–9). The arguments for bureaucratisation being a favourable condition for women seeking elected office are seemingly sound and plausible and have been supported empirically. Nevertheless, there are some theoretical and methodological problems that cast doubts on previous results concerning the effect of bureaucratised candidate-selection procedures on gender balance in parliament.

First, although historically women in European democracies have been less likely to have informal, personal political networks, as gender equality in the society increases so does the likelihood that women can rely on such contacts and thus their opportunities increase. Burt (1998) shows that women in corporations can reach high positions by borrowing social capital from high-ranked insiders, ‘sponsors’, and creating hierarchical networks. In politics, having a hierarchical network and borrowing social capital from a sponsor means getting informal support from a trusted, established insider – in other words, having a network that brings with it the social capital needed to enter politics. Several studies of party and gender in CEE show that women are frequently asked by their party to stand for election (Birch 2003, 142, 144; Ghodsee 2009, 168–70; Siemienska 2009, 76; Wolchik 2009, 118). This indicates that women do have access to political networks that result in candidacy (see, however Galligan, Claver, and Calloni 2007, 101). Furthermore, empirical evidence from newly formed parties in the new, European democracies indicate that a lack of party institutionalisation can prevent male networks from dominating organisations, thus leaving room for women (Siemienska 2003, 226). Hence, we cannot draw the conclusion that informal practices are necessarily bad for women. Instead, the impact of informal contacts on women’s political possibilities should be seen in relation to social norms – in this case, party ideology and overall social climate. When
women are accepted as legitimate political actors, it is more likely that they too can use informal networks to gain political influence and representation.

Second, to accurately determine whether selected candidates relied more heavily on rules or informal practices than those not selected requires data that are representative of both successful and failed candidates as well as the large group of potential candidates who considered entering the process but decided not to and who may not even officially have been included in the selection process. This latter group obviously is a group much harder – even impossible – for the researcher to contact and thus essentially restricts the researcher to comparing only the successful and failed participants. If the research is forced to rely simply on data about the experiences of successful candidates, then the only conclusion that can be drawn concerns whether informal networks are necessary for candidacy. While still useful, it precludes conclusions about whether well-developed personal networks are indeed sufficient for candidacy and about how they may combine with other conditions. Such a research design rules out knowing more about whether the importance of having personal networks differs between contexts and whether personal networks interact with other conditions.

Third, for purposes of our study institutionalisation is seen as bureaucratisation and adherence to a transparent set of rules and therefore it is important to be clear about what those rules are. Reliable comparisons of the degree of institutionalisation across many cases require a transparent measure to be applied in every single case. In the name of non-exclusion and justice, rules may be devoid of explicit references to gender and still rely on norms that exclude certain groups.\(^\text{16}\) During the candidate selection process, transparent rules or demands that seem to affect all prospective candidates in the same way – for example, the time required to participate or the timing of meetings (Norris and Lovenduski 1993, 43) – may discourage women\(^\text{17}\) from entering the selection process. Therefore, institutionalisation and bureaucratisation should not be read as more inclusive per se.

Fourth, party institutionalisation or bureaucratisation can be expected to have different effects on women’s opportunities to enter politics, depending on which function of the party organisation is studied. Caul Kittilson argues that pragmatic, more flexible parties are more likely to include new demands and groups – a behaviour that she relates to party ideology (2006, 28–9, 33, 47). Nevertheless, she also subscribes to the idea that institutionalised, bureaucratised and rule-bound parties are more likely to include more women on their lists (2006, 29, 56). Both arguments are sound, and yet they point to an ambiguity that needs to be addressed: lack of party institutionalisation may be both favourable (see, e.g., Siemienska 2003, 226 for a CEE example)

\(^{16}\) I am grateful to Elin Bjarnegård for pointing this out.

\(^{17}\) This may also apply to others, e.g., individuals who take a comparatively large share of responsibility for household duties, have dependants or work outside of regular office hours.
and unfavourable for women seeking political office (see Guadagnini 1993 for an example from WEur). Parties that have a forceful party whip and rely heavily on stable and formal patterns of internal decision-making are less likely to include outgroups, new ideas or strategies (Kitschelt 1994, 207–8, 212, 217, 228). In such parties, institutionalisation may work against party change towards gender balance. On the other hand, parties that are flexible and less bureaucratic may respond to new demands and groups (Kitschelt 1994, 208), yet their lack of clear rules and procedures can work against outgroups in candidate selection processes. Finally, Duverger (1957, 154) argues that “bureaucracy provides us with a type of institutionalized oligarchy”, which is here understood as doubt about the ways in which bureaucratisation can work towards opening up what may be naturally oligarchic party structures.\(^\text{18}\) For these reasons, we should not expect party institutionalisation to have a direct and enhancing impact on women’s chances to enter parliament. Rather, we need to distinguish one type of institutionalisation from another and acknowledge that, depending on how party institutionalisation combines with other conditions, what makes one party stable, rule-bound and gender balanced may make another party rigid and gender biased.

In short, the question of how bureaucratisation of candidate selection affects gender balance in parliament is multifaceted. Are there any formal guiding rules and principles? If so, what are they? Which part of the organisation do they apply to? Do individuals who do not enter the candidate selection process have different personal networks than those who do? What other conditions characterise the party organisation and its environment, in their presence or absence? When we seek to understand party behaviour and gender representation, we should pay attention to the character of the process, yet keep at least one eye on the details that tend to be circumvented, including how institutionalisation of candidate selection interacts with other conditions.

2.3.2.2.1 Organisational instability: Party splits, party mergers and gender

In Central and Eastern Europe there is considerable party volatility. For instance, looking at how many parties have consistently fielded candidates in all national election we find that in the European post-Soviet states there is an average of only two parties per country, with Latvia being the only country where no single party has stood in all national elections since the fall of Soviet communism (Rose and Munro 2009, 48–54). The main cause of the volatility of the party landscapes, Rose and Munro contend, is the instability of parties: frequent splitting, merging and party tourism have created supply-side volatility in CEE that clearly outweighs that in Western Europe. The high turnover of party organisations in CEE signals a lack of institutionalisation of party organisations. From the perspective of party organisation, party

\(^{18}\) See also Michels (1915) on oligarchy and party organisation.
splits are particularly interesting, as they indicate that the organisation was unable to resolve internal dispute and, consequently, point to a malfunctioning – if only partially – organisation. Although this is common in CEE (Grofman, Mikkel, and Taagepera 2000; Kreuzer and Pettai 2003; Rose and Munro 2009, 24–9, 47–54; Sikk 2005), scholars of party and gender have not paid sufficient attention to how it may affect gender balance in the parliamentary party.

Parties produced from party splits are more likely to be elite type of parties started by individuals who are already inside the political system, sometimes being MPs already. Therefore, the mechanisms at work in a party split are likely to be similar to newly-emerged elite parties, yet differ from those of new parties that have started in a bottom-up process in which grassroots form the core of the party. Increased understanding how party splits affect party behaviour in terms of gender distribution on electoral lists and in parliament will add to our knowledge of how elite-led processes in unstable party organisations affect gender distribution in parliament – knowledge that can broaden the picture of how party politics and gender plays out in young democracies.

Party mergers, on the other hand, need not signal instability per se, but point to organisational changes in the parties involved. Given the many mergers in CEE parties, this type of party instability should be taken into account when assessing how party organisations and their behaviour affect gender balance in parliament.

2.3.2.3 Centralisation of party power

Centralised parties are often understood as organisations that can exert comparatively stronger or more detailed control over local or regional branches, for example, by making sure that gender quotas or similar types of affirmative action are implemented. Decentralisation does, on the other hand, point to weaker control over the actions of local or regional party organisations (see, e.g., Caul Kittilson 2006, 34).

Scholars arguing in favour of centralised party organisation frequently return to how new ideas are most effectively introduced: if few intra-party actors need to be won over to the issue of gender equal representation, change could come swifter than if every local party branch has to be persuaded to include more women candidates (Caul Kittilson 2006, 35; Hazan and Rahat 2006, 372–3). Caul Kittilson (2006, 124–6) shows that centralisation of party power correlates with the proportion of women parliamentarians, both for parties with comparatively large proportions of women in parliament and for change in the proportion of women MPs. She also argues that once national party leadership in a centralised party decides to implement ‘women-friendly’ practices, local branches follow suit. This may explain why her statistical analysis also points to decentralisation of candidate selection as being favourable.
Still, implementation of a new party rule requires one or several individuals in high positions to advocate change (cf. Ristova 2003, 199, 205) – individuals who have enough power or networks to introduce it to the right, responsive persons. It remains to be empirically established that this has been the case for women and political parties: if women do indeed have less developed personal networks, as many scholars have argued, this top-down approach seems less convincing.

Conversely, party scholars have argued that a bottom-up approach to party change is more plausible. Strøm and Müller (1999, 17–8) suggest that decentralised parties that stress intra-party democracy and allow members a comparatively substantial influence over party policy can be more attractive to policy-motivated individuals. When rank-and-file members have significant opportunities to determine the party agenda, Strøm and Müller point out, the party will become more policy-orientated. In such parties, actor orientations are comparatively more influenced by ideological concerns, and consequently when ‘women-friendly’ ideas flow from grassroots to party leadership the proportion of women in the parliamentary party may be increased. This hints at a possible interaction between the degree of centralisation and ideology. In this case, social climate and influence from below, rather than the national party leadership, is the source that initiates increased numbers of women on party lists. For example, in countries where the social conditions provide women and men equal access to paid labour and equal responsibility for family duties, egalitarianism could potentially affect parties from the grassroots’ level.

Finally, party literature indicates that centralisation is linked to institutionalisation. Panebianco suggests a strong connection between centralisation of power over resources and party institutionalisation, in what seems to be a relationship of mutual reinforcement. Party institutionalisation partly depends upon the “systemness” of the organisation. A more ordered and systematised party organisation is characterised by interdependence between party branches – “a high degree of systemness”, i.e., institutionalisation, Panebianco (1988, 56–7) and is related to centralisation of control over “zones of uncertainty”, i.e., crucial power resources of the organisation.

Party rules are, in short, merely a framework for party behaviour, and they need to be coupled with ideas and strategies – party goals – to have an impact on actual party behaviour. To understand better the impact of party centralisation or decentralisation on gender balance in parliamentary parties, the possible interaction between centralisation and other conditions, such as party ideology or external conditions, should be taken into account.

2.3.2.4 Party magnitude
The number of seats in parliament belonging to a particular party can be expressed as the party magnitude. The more seats allocated to the party in elections, the larger the party magnitude, and vice versa.
The effect of party magnitude on gender distribution in parliament is most often contingent upon allocation of slots on party lists. Party leaders and members of the party leadership – often many of whom are male – are often placed high on party lists. The immediate effect in small parties is that the few seats allocated to the party are more likely to be won by male candidates. Matland (1993, 741) shows that in elections from 1953 to 1973 and in 1981, the proportion of women in Norwegian parliamentary delegations correlates with party magnitude (see also Matland 2006, 284). Sainsbury (1993, 267) notes that when Swedish parties gained enough votes to send several representatives from a district, women were more likely to get elected. Similar studies conducted during the early 2000s on Central and East European parties echo Sainsbury’s results concerning party magnitude (Rueschemeyer and Wolchik 2009; see, however Schmidt and Saunders 2004, 724).

Because party magnitude is largely a consequence of institutional settings outside of individual parties – the number of seats allocated in each district, vote share and number of competing parties in a district together determine the magnitude of individual parties – the effect of party magnitude on gender balance in parliamentary delegations should be seen in terms of its interaction with such conditions. Parties that strive to place women high on party lists, of course, more likely to achieve the goal of equal numbers of female and male MPs, which indicates that the preferences of the party likely interact with party magnitude. This may be particularly apparent in new parties that may have few seats in parliament but are nevertheless gender balanced – the most obvious examples that come to mind are the West European green parties in the 1980s.

2.3.2.5 Party ideology

Ideological orientations are overt indicators of party preferences and goals, and are frequently used in explanations of party behaviour. Scholars of party and gender have concluded that certain ideological orientations correlate with the proportion of women party representatives. In many countries, leftist and green parties have been pioneers in women’s representation, although more and more liberal and conservative parties have become gender balanced, thus blurring the ideological perspective of gender balance policies. Even so, the egalitarian values enshrined in democratic leftism seem to have had significant impact on the parties’ willingness to make changes leading towards a gender-balanced parliamentary presence (Caul Kittilson 2006, 124; Lovenduski 1993, 13; Norris 2006, 204).

There is, however, a lack of empirical studies concerning how party ideology might combine with other conditions to form conditions for gender balance. This indicates that there is still a need for further research about how ideas and party structures together condition party behaviour. Leftist party ideology may, for instance, be a more powerful indicator of a party
moving towards gender balance especially if combined with conditions that boost the power of egalitarian ideas. Conversely, the hindering effect of a less-egalitarian party ideology may be thwarted, for example, by external demands for better mirroring of the population. As argued above, following Strom & Müller (1999, 17), women may be more likely to gain foothold in a decentralised party whose membership prefers egalitarian, participatory policies. (Centralisation /decentralisation, as discussed above, can apply both to decisions dealing with party policy and to candidate selection processes.)

In short, the effect of party ideology on gender-balanced parliamentary parties may be one of interaction with other conditions, and previous research should lead us to test whether certain combinations of conditions might be more favourable for achieving gender-balanced parliamentary parties than others. The nature and extent of such interactions must, however, be subject to empirical investigation.

2.3.2.6 Party gender candidacy quotas

Party gender quotas for candidacy determine the number or ratio of women to men on party lists. Gender quotas sometimes include rank ordering rules that state the number of candidates of each sex that can be placed in the list of candidates. Formal adoption of party gender candidacy quotas is a clear signal of the preferences and, to some extent, goals of the party.

The effectiveness of party gender quotas for candidacy in election depends upon more than just good intentions: quotas may deter voters who do not approve of such measures and hence decrease a party’s share of seats, or they may prove ineffective due to electoral institutions or simply to insufficient implementation (see, e.g., Htun and Jones 2002, 33). Nevertheless, studies show that gender quotas are sometimes coupled with increased proportions of women MPs (Caul Kittilson 2006, 124; Norris 2004). Still, studies of party gender quotas commonly draw on two assumptions that complicate causal analysis of their impact of gender balance.

First, conclusions about the causal direction of gender quotas and large proportions of women MPs are not perfectly clear. For instance, it may be, as shown in the chapter below about West European parties (see also Freidenvall 2006; McAllister and Studlar 2002, 10), that parties adopt formal gender quotas after they have reached what can be termed gender-balanced parliamentary presence. That seems to suggest that parties that already have many women MPs are more likely to adopt formal gender quotas (Caul Kittilson 2006, 65), which would weaken claims on the usefulness of quotas. In that case, the causal direction is rather from women to quotas, and the new institutional rule is there to maintain and reinforce the new status quo that has been in place for a long enough time to construct and implement institutional safeguards.

Second, the definition of what constitutes a quota varies. While some scholars settle only for formally adopted rules that are also part of party stat-
utes, others consider informal gender sensitive rules a sufficient indication of a type of gender quota. The first option can be related to unambiguous data, whereas the study of less formal practices may require more challenging data collection, making data reliability a critical issue. Notwithstanding this caveat, both types of quotas signal the party’s attitude towards women as politicians. However, quotas that are not formally adopted but remain informal practices, which can lack both sanctions and implementation across the whole party organisation, may be considered as weaker indicators than formal gender quotas. Moreover, different quota levels give reasons to differentiate further between parties that have chosen ambitious quotas and parties that are content with lower minimum levels of representation.

2.3.2.7 Women in party leadership

Women’s presence within the top echelons of a party can signal the extent to which women are accommodated in the organisation. The literature stipulates two main functions of women in party leadership that are expected to lead to more women MPs: namely, actors and role models. Women who are in party leadership positions can be either actors capable of helping other women become candidates, or they may serve as role models, inspiring others and increasing the visibility of women as eligible candidates (Caul 1999; Kunovich and Paxton 2005, 521; Tremblay and Pelletier 2001, 162). While there is validity to the arguments that both actors and role model factors may be related to an increase in the number of women MPs, there are several reasons why we should proceed with caution in assuming a causal effect.

First, it should be noted that previous research is ambiguous about the effect women in party leadership roles have on the share of women MPs. In a study of party and gender in Western Europe Caul Kittilson (2006, 124) shows that presence of women in party leadership correlates with the proportion of female MPs and with increased representation of women over time. On the other hand, in a comparative study that included countries from all over the world, Kunovich and Paxton (2005, 530–1, 535–6) show that the presence of women in party leadership does not by itself have a significant impact on the proportion of female parliamentarians, rather it depends upon the electoral system. Furthermore, even though Caul Kittilson (2006, 43–4) notes a considerable increase in the percentage of women in party leadership from 1975 to the late 1990s, Kunovich and Paxton (2005, 524, 555) point out that even with the increase the overall percentage of women in party leadership was still low – the mean share of women in leadership roles being only 10 per cent, the range 0 to 46 per cent. Their results (2005, 530–1, 536) also indicate that the Scandinavian example is a strong argument for the inclusion of women in party elites, which may be part of the reason Kunov-

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19 Compare, for example, the coding for the Swedish Fp (Liberal People’s Party) made by Krook (2009, 230) and Freidenvall et al. (2006, 73).
vich and Paxton suggest the interaction between proportional electoral systems and women in party elites affects the share of women candidates.

Second, when considering the possibility that the presence of more women in the party leadership increases the percentage of women MPs, it must be taken into account that the increase in the proportion of women in party leadership and the increase in the proportion of female MPs could simply be simultaneous occurrences. Caul Kittilson (2010, 12) notes a correlation between the proportion of women parliamentarians and the proportion of women in the party’s national executive, which could make causality claims more intricate and would require analysis of the sequence. The problem is underlined by the fact that the incentives to participate in legislative work and in the party leadership can be similar, thus making the distinction between the two potentially less useful.

Third, when studying the relationship between women in party leadership and women in parliament, we need to acknowledge that women do not necessarily always act strategically on behalf of their gender (cf. Kunovich and Paxton 2005, 521; Tremblay and Pelletier 2001). For example, some career-orientated women holding a minority status in a particular group may find it to be counterproductive to their own immediate self-interests to include more women since more competition may circumscribe their own possibilities. Moreover, there is ample anecdotal evidence of women allying with men rather than supporting other women (see, e.g., Galligan, Clavero, and Calloni 2007, 102 for examples from CEE), which gives rise to further doubts that individual women can generally be expected to act according to a logic that pertains to the collective.

Finally, party leadership and the parliamentary wing of parties are likely to overlap in terms of individual members, despite the fact that party leadership is usually comprised of members from ancillary organisations and regional or local branches (Katz and Mair 1993, 611–4; see also van Biezen 2000, 403–6; Enyedi and Linek 2008, 269–71). Party rules and regulations in the various parties (Katz and Mair 1992b) diverge considerably on the issue of whether MPs are obliged, expected or forbidden to take part in party leadership meetings. Accordingly, the extent to which party leadership position and holding office as an MP overlap varies among the parties. As well, the extent to which parties avoid or seek such an overlap may vary by several factors, party stability being one. When party leadership and the parliamentary representation overlap, the risk of the party splitting may decrease (van Biezen 2005) – and this objective is likely to have priority over social representation. In addition, new and small parties may have no other recourse than to include MPs in the party leadership. Moreover, when there is a shortage of qualified women the ones that are already insiders tend to be

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20 I wish to thank Paul Webb for putting this particular argument forward.
engaged in more than one type of work, a factor that adds to the possible overlap between parliamentary party representation and party leadership.

While the other factors discussed above are mainly theoretical, the personnel overlap that results when members of parliament also occupy positions of party leadership is a strictly empirical problem. Regardless of whether women in party leadership are purposive actors or role models who increase the share of female MPs, the crucial point essentially concerns the causal relationship between the two and poses the question whether having more women party leaders/elites would produce (cause) more women MPs. To determine if there is a causal effect cannot be accomplished with data that are affected by the possible empirical overlap between the cause (women party elites) and the effect (women MPs). A more appropriate design would be either to study the sequence or to subtract the number of party elites from the number of MPs.

In sum, we should be cautious that we do not leap to explain the proportion of women MPs as being directly the result of the proportion of women in party leadership without first investigating the extent of the overlap between the two. Further investigation may show that it may be that women in party leadership have too few incentives for them to strive include more women, and thus women in leadership positions should not necessarily be counted on to work for greater inclusion of women in their own circles – be it party leadership or the parliamentary party. Finally, it bears repeating that, as Kunovich and Paxton (2005) suggest, the possibilities for women in elite positions to help other women advance in the organisation are affected by electoral laws.

2.3.2.8 Women’s organisations within the party

Some political parties have established ancillary organisations for groups such as women, youth, particular religious factions, etc., and have granted these groups formal representation at party congress or in party leadership. Such intra-party organisation is a way that can give voice to claims made by subgroups, and one notable subgroup may be women. Presence of a women’s organisation within the formal structures of party could lead to more attention being paid to women’s issues and women’s parliamentary presence (cf. Lovenduski 1993, 14). Cross-case comparison, however, shows that the mere presence of an intra-party women’s organisation does not correlate significantly with either the proportion of women parliamentarians or with a change in the share of women MPs (Caul Kittilson 2006, 124, 2010, 14).

Case studies indicate that women activists in different parties may choose different strategies and that, consequently, the effects of having a women’s subgroup within the party may differ between parties (see, e.g., Norris and Lovenduski 1993, 55–7). The influence and power of an intra-party women’s caucus may vary considerably between parties. In some parties the
women’s group or caucus exercises significant influence in various party bodies, including party leadership, and may provide peer support for women, participate in deliberations in which strong candidates are selected as well as acting as a body to which policy proposals are referred before decisions are made. But, on the other hand, in other parties the women’s subgroup could serve simply as the gender alibi of the mother organisation, an ancillary group with some rhetorical or social value but stripped of any influence on party behaviour, policy or other internal matters.

The mere presence of a women’s caucus is unlikely to tell much about its influence on party behaviour and the probability of achieving a gender-balanced parliamentary party (cf. Caul Kittilson 2006, 45). Nevertheless, it indicates the degree to which a party has organised its members, and is therefore considered in the case studies presented in chapters 5 and 6.

2.3.2.9 Party fractionalisation

Political parties can have more or less well-developed contacts with other organisations. Such contacts may include collaborations or shared perspectives concerning a particular policy or it may be the form of contributing members, activists or financial support – the more such connections in a party, the higher its degree of fractionalisation. Parties that comparatively have more connections with other organisations also have more women in the party leadership, according to Caul Kittilson (2006, 47–9). She argues that such connections “provide more points of access”, and in so doing facilitate women seeking party leadership positions. Even if, as argued above, there are reasons to re-examine critically the causal link between women in party leadership and women in parliament, Caul Kittilson’s findings are undoubtedly intriguing, and even more so when viewed through the lens of party theory.

Independence from groups other than the party itself, Panebianco (1988, 55–7) argues, indicates a higher degree of party institutionalisation. If we accept this as an indicator of party institutionalisation, Caul Kittilson’s finding may suggest that lack of institutionalisation could facilitate women’s entry into party leadership. This could then, as she notes, run counter to much of feminist party scholarship. Kitchelt (1994, 222) points out that fractionalisation, when understood as influence from outside groups on intra-party workings and strategy could be read as patronage. Some party studies that take gender into account indicate that lack of institutionalisation is a hindrance to women seeking elected office, while others show that party fractionalisation correlates with larger proportions of women in party leadership. The missing link may be found by understanding the mechanism as it is spelled out in individual cases.

21 Caul Kittilson’s analyses also show that party fractionalisation does not correlate significantly with the proportion of women in parliament.
To sort out when patronage and party fractionalisation make party leadership more diverse, we ideally need to know which external actors, and how many, have access to intra-party matters and what their priorities are and through what means they affect the party. Groups that are strongly in favour of gender equality, such as women's movements, are more likely to prompt parties to strive towards gender balance. Actors that have other priorities, such as churches or labour unions, are less likely to have that impact. Furthermore, outsiders that are asked to give their opinion on party proposals may have a different impact on intra-party workings than organisations that provide the party with financial support. Finally, the number of outsiders that influence intra-party matters and their relative influence on party strategy may also be significant, as many contacts may limit the influence of one individual outsider on the party.

Caul Kittilson's findings on the relationship between party fractionalisation and women in party leadership point towards a need for more case-sensitivity and a broader understanding of when informal networks, patronage and lack of party institutionalisation in a broad sense may indeed help women gain foothold in politics. This does not mean that we should disregard studies that show how male networks exclude women. Rather, we ought to recognise the fact that women also act strategically and ally themselves with useful actors in order to reach their goals – and that women do not necessarily act on behalf of women as a group.

2.3.3 Environmental conditions

Institutions external to specific actors can interact with and condition or shape the actors’ capabilities and intentions (Donaldson 2001, 7; Kitschelt 1994; Wilcox, Stark, and Thomas 2003, 44). In this study, the institutions selected are those that are likely to have an influence on European parties’ abilities and inclinations to achieve gender-balanced parliamentary delegations. Research shows that such institutions are mainly electoral laws, socio-economic factors and culture, and here are conceptualised as environmental conditions.

2.3.3.1 Electoral laws

Electoral systems by definition set out the rules for party competition. Studies of national parliaments have showed that proportional (PR) electoral systems with party lists are associated with larger percentages of women in parliament. Majoritarian systems, such as the French or British systems where one candidate stands in each district, often termed winner-takes-all systems, are less likely to have significant numbers of women being elected (McAllister and Studlar 2002; Norris 2004, 2006; Rule 1981, 1987; Siaroff 2000).
While the ‘women-friendliness’ of PR systems is rarely disputed, the static character of electoral systems as an explanation of how and why the share of women parliamentarians changes has prompted scholarly critique (Sainsbury 1993, 267). Hughes and Paxton (2008, 246–50) argue that the crafting of electoral laws is usually done during a “critical period” of nation building. The choice of electoral system may thus affect political outcomes in a longer perspective, rather than in the short run.

In contemporary European democracies, proportional systems outnumber the majoritarian. The variation in electoral systems, broadly defined as PR or majoritarian, between such countries is thus low. However, Schmidt (2009, 190) argues that differences within the different types of PR systems and their effects on women’s parliamentary presence need to be addressed systematically. For these reasons, this work focuses on variation within the PR family.

2.3.3.1.1 Party list systems and preference voting
In proportional electoral systems, several candidates are elected from each district, using lists of candidates provided by parties. In systems that allow for preference voting, a method often referred to as open lists, voters can add preferential votes to one or several candidates. Preference voting sometimes also involves the option of crossing out one or several candidates. Thames and Williams (2010) argue that preference voting and more focus on candidates is less likely to lead to higher representation of women, compared to party-centred systems.

The process of composing party lists for elections often requires intraparty bargaining between several actors (see, e.g., Freidenvall 2006) and is closely related to issues of intra-party democracy. Preference voting can disarm much of the strategy invested in creating party lists and thereby lower a party’s capability to control who gets elected. In analyses of party strategy and parties as actors, whether open or closed party lists are used is an important distinction: when voters cannot make any changes to party lists, full responsibility for gender composition of the parliamentary delegation rests with the party itself. Given the above, the possibility for the electorate to alter party lists is an important factor in the analyses presented in this study.

2.3.3.1.2 District magnitude
The total number of representatives sent from each district, i.e., district magnitude, may affect women’s chances to enter parliament as a larger district magnitude increases the number of MPs elected from each party list. Even if women are placed further down the list, there may be a greater chance for women to be elected as MPs than in smaller districts where winners might be drawn only from the top of the list. Empirical evidence on this issue is, however, mixed. Rule (1987, 478) shows that there may be a correlation (see also Matland and Brown 1992; Wide 2006, 107), yet others have found that
the relationship between district magnitude and women in parliament is not statistically significant (Caul Kittilson 2006, 124; Schmidt and Saunders 2004). Matland (1993, 740) argues that in Rule’s sample of 23 democracies culture, especially the Scandinavian emphasis on egalitarianism, may correlate with district size. Matland (1993, 2006) further argues that party magnitude, that is, the number of representatives from each party may be a more fruitful explanatory variable than the total number of MPs from a district.

Rule’s study was based on average district magnitude, that is, the arithmetic mean. Taagepera and Shugart (1989, chap. 12) argued that the complexity of electoral systems may make the arithmetic mean misleading and instead developed the concept of effective magnitude. Although later studies (Caul Kittilson 2006; Schmidt 2009) have looked at effective magnitude (Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Taagepera 1998, see also 2007, chap. 11), it seems the impact of effective magnitude on the proportion of women in parliament may still not be statistically significant.

Because electoral laws can be expected to interact with other conditions (Schmidt 2009, 190), the number of deputies from each district should not be disregarded. In addition, because effective magnitude is a detailed and carefully constructed measure, it can function as a proxy for the type of electoral system.

2.3.3.1.3 Gender quotas
Legislative gender quotas generally apply equally to all parties that stand in elections, and may lead to increased proportions of women parliamentarians. Krook (2009, 209) and Schmidt (2009, 193–4) argue and point out that the effect of quotas on the proportion of women in politics is likely to be based on interaction with several other conditions. In proportional electoral systems, so Schmidt asserts, simple gender quotas “may be more of an intervening variable than an independent variable.” The only institutional condition that seems to matter in a proportional system, Schmidt concludes, is rank-ordering rules (placement mandates) which, he adds, is only effective under closed or moderately flexible lists (Schmidt 2009, 198).

Parties that are subject to legislative gender quotas are in effect stripped of some of their freedom to construct their own list as they see fit. While this may be perceived as a normative issue, for the purpose of this study the practical side of it is more intriguing and problematic. Party external rules about gender structure of party lists make it more difficult to trace the effect of party orientations and perceptions on gender composition of parliamentary delegations, as we cannot readily assume that the deliberate choice of the party is spelled out in party lists – it may well be simple compliance, especially if the quota law comes with sanctions.

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22 The effective magnitude is more appropriate in studies of complex electoral systems because it also takes, for example, the use of several tiers into account.
Clearly, some quotas may lead to more balanced numbers of women and men in parliament. Still, the causal path from quota to gender balance likely interacts with many other factors, hence further complicating actor-centred analysis of individual political parties. Nevertheless, quotas should not be left out of contemporary studies of gender and parliamentary presence.

### 2.3.3.2 Socioeconomic conditions and culture

Culture and socioeconomic conditions have an important bearing on the likelihood of achieving gender equality (Lane and Ersson 2005) and gender-balanced parliamentary parties. Schmidt (2009, 198) argues that “variation in the election of women in list PR systems is largely the result of contextual differences, rather than institutional factors.” There are many possible variables to indicate social and cultural conditions. In this framework, main emphasis is on cultural or socioeconomic conditions that are usually considered conducive to party change in the direction of gender-balanced parliamentary presence.

In comparing West European cases to cases from Central and Eastern Europe, the political heritage from Soviet times should not be overlooked. This socio-political heritage can be understood in several different ways, but is here considered in terms of ideas about women’s role in politics and the public sphere that could derive from the Soviet period. Galligan et al. (2007, 62–6) show that women and men in the CEE countries are more conservative on issues related to women’s presence in politics than are West Europeans. Between the early 1990s and the 2000s, they note a clear trend towards more liberal ideas and attitudes towards women politicians. Using older but comparable data, Wilcox et al. come to similar conclusions, and point out that attitudes towards women in the public sphere have become more open in the Baltic countries, particularly in Latvia. Still, they conclude that “many of the cultural divisions in the West ... are not helpful in understanding Eastern European attitudes towards women as politicians” (Wilcox, Stark, and Thomas 2003, 60).

Galligan et al. (2007, 24, 26) argue that women politicians in CEE have a low awareness or acceptance of collective gender identities. The low awareness, they continue, is displayed in a readiness to accept problems that may be structural as individual, such as problems in combining family responsibilities and political work. Although this line of reasoning is not restricted to CEE countries but is also present in many other countries, it points to a possibly more general denial or lack of acceptance of structuralist or collectivist understandings of problems related to gender. This topic will be briefly touched upon in the case study of a Latvian party presented in Chapter 6.

#### 2.3.3.2.1 Regional differences

Some geographical regions are often seen as significantly more or less progressive than others on the issue of women’s representation. Many studies
have made use of regional dummies for classifying cases as, for example, Scandinavian or Middle East countries (e.g., Paxton 1997; Siaroff 2000). As an introductory and descriptive analysis, this practice is useful. However, in trying to explain why the proportions of women and men in parliament vary, regional dummies offer little analytical leverage. For example, the frequently discussed egalitarian Scandinavian culture may well be particularly conducive to women’s representation, but the concept tells us less than would a more tangible indicator – especially since it does not add to policy making. Because this research can draw on more detailed data, geographical region is not explicitly considered.

2.3.3.2.2 Universal adult suffrage
By being allowed to vote in elections to legislative assemblies, women passed a threshold of incorporation in the political system (Raaum 2005; drawing on Rokkan 1970, 1987). Introduction of universal adult suffrage has served as an indicator of egalitarian social structures: late introduction indicates a less ‘women-friendly’ culture (McAllister and Studlar 2002; Rule 1981, 67; Thames and Williams 2010). Using the terminology of Hughes and Paxton (2008), women gained suffrage during what can be labelled a “critical period”. Following the line of argument presented by Hughes and Paxton, the number of years following this particular critical period might not be a valid indicator of culture or egalitarianism – particularly not when there are more detailed data to rely on.

In most European countries, women were granted suffrage during the first half of the 1900s (IPU 2006). This denotes a limited between-case variation. Therefore, introduction of women’s suffrage is not part of the analyses.

2.3.3.2.3 Religion
Religion is commonly used as an indicator of culture in studies of gender and political representation or gender equality (Kunovich and Paxton 2005, 914; Lane and Ersson 2005, 176–8, 182; Mateo Diaz 2002; Norris 2004; Rule 1987; Wide 2006). While studies have confirmed that religion correlates with the proportion of women in parliament, the actual causal effect is not fully established. In an intriguing study with data from 74-179 countries from 1945 up until 2005, Wide (2006, 100–4, 138) shows that religious faith – and the lack thereof – correlates significantly with the proportion of women in parliament. She also points out that the impact of religion may not be independent from socioeconomic conditions such as education and labour market participation. Furthermore, in Central and Eastern Europe the relationship between religion and women’s presence in the public sphere differs from the West European experience (Wilcox, Stark, and Thomas 2003), and the topic should thus be approached with caution. Finally, even within the religious denominations there are many different interpretations of how to lead the good life. Religion thus serves as but a blunt indicator of culture.
Still, because it has been commonly used in previous studies of gender and politics, religious affiliation is considered here, too.

2.3.3.2.4 Women’s movement

Changes towards gender balance in parliament are unlikely to take place without the underrepresented group taking action (Lovenduski 1993, 14). In the case of gender equality, women’s movements have been identified as important actors who can put women’s issues on the agenda and increase the proportion of women in parliament. The empirical evidence is, however, mixed.

Neither the first nor the second wave of the women’s movement had any significant impact on the proportion of women in parliament, Paxton (1997, 453) shows. In a later publication, Paxton, Hughes and Green (2006, 912–4) argue that even though the international women’s movement may have contributed to suffrage as well as the first woman parliamentarian and less male-dominated parliaments, the 30 per cent or ‘critical mass’ threshold does not show any significant correlation with institutionalisation of the international women’s movement.

From a historical point of view, the impact of women’s movements on political parties is a self-evident factor. In modern-day Europe however, organisations other than women’s organisations give voice to political demands related to issues of gender equality, which complicates analysis of how women’s movements affect party behaviour. Moreover, women’s movements can choose different strategies whose efficiency may in turn vary considerably (Jenson 1985; Lovenduski 1993, 6). A separatist strategy that does not acknowledge the state or established parties as political partners is likely to have other effects on party politics than a strategy that includes close liaison with parties or other organisations. As Wilcox et al. (2003) show using data from CEE, support for the women’s movement may also go hand-in-hand with support for more conservative gender roles.

Analysing the impact of women’s movements on party behaviour in a large-N study likely requires in-depth study of the women’s movement in each country (cf. Caul Kittilson 2006, 45 on party women’s organisations). While the influence from women’s movements on party politics should not be disregarded, its influence on gender-balanced parliamentary parties should be approached with the purpose and aims of each organisation in mind. Because this is primarily a study of individual political parties, it does not include such in-depth study of the women’s movement.

2.3.3.2.5 Ideology: Attitudes towards women as political leaders

What people in general and the electorate in particular think about women and men as political leaders can have an effect on the ratios of women to men in parliament. In a comparative study of culture and gender equality, Inglehart and Norris (2003, 139–0) show that attitudes towards women and
men in politics is related to the proportion of women in parliament. Using a similar comparison, Paxton and Kunovich (2003) show that ideas about gender and politics correlate with the proportion of female parliamentarians.

There is little doubt that people’s attitudes towards gender issues and women in politics will influence the chances of party implementing changes towards gender balance: ideas and attitudes inevitably form the behaviour of both individuals and organisations.

For political parties ideas can be both internal and external. In this framework, internal ideological and attitudinal preferences are studied as party ideology, party gender quotas and women in party leadership. Although they may sometimes overlap, external ideology and attitudes are treated as analytically separate from intra-party ideas about gender. Attitudinal data are used in the case studies that are described in chapters 5 and 6.

2.3.3.2.6 Women’s participation in paid labour and higher education

To become prospective parliamentary candidates, women have to be present where party politics take place, i.e., in the public sphere. Two of the most commonly used indicators of women’s presence in public life are labour market participation and women’s participation in higher education. While the two do not correlate significantly with the proportion of women in parliament, they serve as viable indicators of the extent to which women have stepped out of the private sphere of the home. For example, Paxton (1997, 447–8) contends that women’s activity in paid labour and higher education signals women’s autonomy vis-à-vis that of men. Furthermore, there are reasons to assume that women’s labour market participation and their taking part in higher education “work indirectly, through their impact on political parties” (Kunovich and Paxton 2005, 532).

In the light of possible differences between CEE and Western Europe, Mikucka (2009) shows that couples in CEE do comparatively more household work than couples in WEur, but that the domestic work load is shared in a similar way as do couples in the more egalitarian Nordic countries: women do 69-77 percentages of hours spent on household duties. While she notes that the CEE countries do not differ from the WEur countries in this respect, Mikucka argues that the reasons for sharing the work more equally in CEE may differ from the reasons to do so in the West: she points to the Soviet legacy of forced emancipation as a possible explanation. Discussing post-Soviet CEE, Metcalf and Afanassieva (2005) argue that the transition period was a period of “remasculinisation” via new (labour) market principles, which may run counter to ideas about gender equality.

Education and labour are both advantageous from a perspective of feasibility. Data on labour and education provide the opportunity to conduct comparisons across a large number of countries, often also allowing for analysis of historical data. Moreover, data that allow for comparisons between women and men are usually available. This makes it possible to use
indicators with structures that resemble that of the outcome, that is, the proportion of women and men in the labour market and at universities, which makes the comparison more useful.

2.4 Summing up: Assumptions and expectations

This theoretical framework draws on four major assumptions about how gender balance is achieved in the parliamentary party. This final section outlines these assumptions and expectations that will be further developed in each empirical chapter.

First, political parties are assumed to be the main actors behind the composition of parliamentary parties. Parties recruit, select and field candidates for elections, and thus can exert a profound influence on who is allowed the chance to become elected. Second, the behaviour of political parties is assumed to depend upon the goals, aims and institutional set-up of the individual party as well as social and legal institutions outside of the party organisation itself. Third, party behaviour – here modelled as gender balance in the parliamentary party – is assumed to derive from interaction between conditions specific to the individual party and institutions outside of the party. Finally, it is assumed that political parties can be understood as compound, collective actors and that intra-party actors can be regarded as acting in the name of the party, rather than for their private purposes.

These assumptions lead to three overarching expectations about how parties become gender balanced or stay gender biased. First, because party behaviour is assumed to be a function of intra-party as well as environmental conditions in combination, it is expected that the outcome – gender balance and bias – can be described by one or several configurations of conditions that together are sufficient for the outcome. Second, because it is expected that the outcome can be adequately described by sufficient configurations of conditions rather than by individual conditions, no individual condition is expected to be necessary or singularly sufficient for gender balance or bias. Third, because parties differ from each other and are active in different institutional environments, they are likely to react differently to similar events or demands. Therefore, it is expected that the outcome can be achieved through different configurations of conditions. That is, gender balanced and gender biased parliamentary parties are expected to be a case of equifinality.24

23 Sufficiency and necessity of conditions as well as causal configurations are discussed in Chapter 3.
24 See section 3.3.2.
3. Methods: Comparing Political Parties

“The devil is in the details. But the level of details can be addressed only once the broad picture has been adequately laid out.”
Taagepera (2007, 184)

The literature on party and gender provides useful insights on the effect of individual variables related to the ratio of women to men in parliament. Furthermore, the various studies in this area have produced numerous accounts of how individual parties work and which combinations of conditions have been present in each case. However, a scrutiny of such research provides us with few systematically comparative accounts of combinations of conditions that lead to gender balance, especially ones using large numbers of cases (see however Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Schmidt 2009). In addition, the field displays a relative lack of standardised definitions of the concepts applied, which, apart from losing out on detail, risks leading to insufficient cumulation of results. By drawing on the comparatively large literature on West European parties, studies of party and gender sometimes display a certain bias towards Western Europe. As argued above, there is also a mismatch between theory and methods, resulting in a lack of explorative accounts of necessity, sufficiency and configurative causes. Finally, previous studies of party and gender have not dealt with the set theoretic nature of theory about party and gender and have also largely left the possibly asymmetrical nature of causation aside by not paying sufficient attention to how gender bias in parliamentary parties is sustained (see however Bjarnegård 2009; Hughes and Paxton 2008; Rule 1981). The methods applied in this research are chosen for their abilities to remedy some of these problems.

3.1 Chapter outline

The first section of this chapter provides a brief introduction to methodological issues related to the comparative study of European party politics, while the second part offers a discussion on causal inference and relationships in the social sciences. Thereafter, the contributions made by each of the three methods – QCA, structured focused comparisons (SFC) and single case
study – to the research field are outlined in descriptions of how the analyses are conducted. A fourth section discusses methods for comparing the success of women and men candidates in elections, and the chapter concludes with a note on casing, case selection and generalisability.

3.2 Cross-national party research: Methods issues

The cross-national, comparative study of party organisations entails a handful of specific, methodological problems that may be dealt with in different ways. These are, in essence, 1) data availability (see, e.g., Deschouwer 1994, 184), 2) the possible differences between party rules and actual party behaviour (Katz and Mair 1992a), 3) the issue of party change and temporality and 4) the transfer of theoretical concepts from one context to another – in this case Western Europe and Central/Eastern Europe.

3.2.1 Data availability and collection

Because there is not an abundance of detailed data about individual parties that can be used in large-N studies, party scholars often chose studying a few selected cases at once. In this research, this particular problem has been dealt with by using a mixed-methods approach and employing analytical techniques that allow for different types of data to be used. Comparative intermediate-N techniques were used in those cases where detailed, cross-case data from several countries were available or where it was possible to collect such data within the frames of the project. Because data used in the intermediate-N comparisons do not lend themselves to studies of all the central concepts and problems, this data was supplemented by data from an intensive study of one single case. Detailed information about the data is available in the Appendix (pp. 205.)

3.2.2 Official and unofficial stories of party organisation

Parties usually have written statutes that outline, among other things, the formal workings of the organisation. However, not every detail about the day-to-day activities of the party is in the statutes and hence written party rules will not tell the whole story about how parties work. Still, as Katz and Mair note (1992a, 6–8), the “official story” of a party presents a useful approximation of the frames within which the organisation can be run. While much can be said to undermine the value of party rules, the official story approach makes it possible to compare many cases at once, which is the purpose of the two comparative analyses, the fuzzy-set QCA and the structured focused comparison. An additional advantage is that since the official story approach has been partially used in previous, similar studies (see, e.g.,
Caul Kittilson 2006), it creates an important point of comparison with previous research.

As discussed in the previous chapter, several feminist scholars have pointed out that adherence – or non-adherence – to formal rules can be related to women’s chances to gain elected office. Therefore, this research also used an approach in which the unofficial story is traced: more informal workings of party life are presented using the single case study.

3.2.3 Temporality
By default, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) does not itself open up avenues that account for temporal aspects of a research problem (De Meur, Benoit Rihoux, and Yamasaki 2008, 161–3), and neither does the structured focused comparisons. The utilisation of the QCA in this study is to explore what configurations were present either before or during the selected elections, and thus this excludes a temporal perspective. Instead, it is the case study approach that allows us to account for the sequences of events by which a new party became – and stayed – gender balanced in an environment in which gender-balanced parties are few and far between. Given that in this study the temporal aspect is a central factor, it is dealt by using within-case comparisons and by relying on different types of data to address issues related to gender distribution in the parliamentary party. It thus complements the static, comparative analyses.

3.2.4 Concepts travelling through time and space
Qualitative comparative analysis is not commonplace in the field of party and gender research. Consequently, there are few other studies on which to draw when operationalising – calibrating – the theoretical concepts. For this reason, and for reasons of comparability and cumulation outlined above, this research presents suggestions on how several concepts can be understood in detailed, transparent and empirical terms. While this is part of the contribution aimed for in this research, it is also a prerequisite for the analyses.

The empirical understandings – operationalisations or calibrations 25 – are constructed using an empirical frame that draws on the practical experiences of European parties that have different historical legacies. There is considerable variation between the cases, especially in their relationship to and experience of democratic procedures but also in their ideological preferences and organisational structures. This raises the question of what is gained or lost by studying Western parties and parties in Central and Eastern Europe in one single framework.

25 Operationalisations, calibrations and empirical understandings are used interchangeably throughout this work.
Using one ‘single framework’ does not by default mean that all the concepts should be applied in the exactly the same way across old and new democracies: what is a valid operationalisation in Western Europe may not be applicable to the empirical circumstances in European democracies with a communist past, or to new democracies in general. However, part of the empirical work carried out in this project relies on testing whether concepts that were developed and tested in a Western context are useful for understanding party and gender in Central and East European (CEE) democracies, and how CEE cases can be useful for developing theory about party and gender. Throughout the book, transferring concepts from one context to another is thus perceived of as potentially problematic, and the three empirical studies will provide empirical accounts designed to provide a test of how well the applied concepts travel across contemporary Europe. The inductive element in QCA allows for careful consideration of each concept, while the case study applies Western theoretical concepts to a new case from an East European EU member state.

3.2.4.1 A note on language and party labels
This work includes cases from 21 European countries, which in practice means that party names and labels come from 21 different languages. The party labels used in the WEur study refer to the labels used in the original source (Katz and Mair 1992b); the CEE the labels are based either on the parties’ own translations or the translations used by parliaments or election authorities. Abbreviations are those that occur in the original language.

3.3 Causal inference and relationships
Making inferences is central to scientific research (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 8), and inferences can take several forms. The particular inferences pertinent to this research are causal, and the main type of causality central to this research is combinatorial causality, i.e., causes that combine in causing a particular outcome. The research presented here rests upon an understanding of causes as probability-raisers (Gerring 2005, 169; Ragin 2002). In practical terms, it means that conditions can be conceived of as “almost always” or “usually” necessary, instead of the more strictly determinist terminology (Ragin 2000, 107–109). This pragmatic approach to researching an essentially non-deterministic world makes it possible to make inferences based in the language of necessity and sufficiency, yet with a less strict understanding of deterministic causes.
3.3.1 Necessary and sufficient conditions

In the social sciences, necessary and sufficient conditions are frequently referred to. As shown in the introductory chapter, this is also the case in studies of parliamentary presence, gender and party politics. Empirical testing is, however, still rare (see Krook 2010 for a study on the aggregate level).

Necessary and sufficient conditions offer parsimonious and powerful ways to express cause-and-effect relationships. Combined with probabilistic thinking, they become more intuitive and, consequently, increasingly policy relevant as they outline what is needed for a particular outcome. Developing research about party and gender with empirical accounts of necessity and sufficiency is clearly relevant for the research field as well as potentially for policy.

A necessary condition is not enough to produce a particular outcome, yet is required – indeed necessary – for the outcome to occur. Necessary conditions can be used as scope conditions or for delineating populations, in order to aid case selection and describe the context in which the outcome occurs or is expected to occur (Ragin 2002, 194–5).26 In the social world, necessary conditions are often regarded as rare, which may be a consequence of their status as a common definition of the studied population or, as Ragin points out, because in comparative accounts of the social world it is often understood in terms of the configurations of conditions that lead to a specific outcome. When present such sufficient conditions always cause the studied outcome, but, on the other hand, they are not prerequisites for the outcome to occur.27 Their presence, however, serve as powerful predictors or explanations of an outcome. In addition, conditions can be simultaneously necessary and sufficient, in which case the condition is a prerequisite for the outcome to occur and does always cause the outcome when present (Ragin 1987, 27, 99).

3.3.2 Configurative causes and equifinality

Necessary conditions are, by definition, always singularly necessary. Conditions that are not necessary can, on the other hand, combine with other conditions and so become part of sufficient configurations. Ragin argues that such configurative causes28 are commonplace in the social world, i.e., that few social phenomena are caused by single conditions (Ragin 1987). He

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26 Necessary conditions are comparable to fuel in combustion engines: without fuel, the engine will not run and hence, presence of fuel is a necessary condition.

27 A downhill slope can be enough for bringing a car into motion, but we know for sure that cars also run uphill and hence downhill slopes can only be sufficient, not necessary.

28 There are several ways to describe configurative causes (see, e.g., Gerring 2005, 164–5), and in this work the terms configurative causes, conjunctural causes, compound causes and configurations are used interchangeably.
further argues that policy tends to deal more often with categories and combinations of factors than with the net effect of individual variables, that is, common understandings of social change and stability derive from holistic views of social phenomena and combinations of factors that result in particular outcomes (Ragin 2008c, 181). Given the complexity of the social world, this is a compelling argument.  

Moreover, the consequences for the social sciences of such a rethink of causation and logics of social enquiry are potentially fruitful (Ragin 2008c). As argued in the introductory chapter, this also pertains to studies of party and gender. While this present enquiry is based on methods that have the potential to reveal singularly sufficient conditions, focus is on configurative causes, i.e., combinations of conditions that together are sufficient for gender-balanced parliamentary parties.

Finally, the configurative approach that is adopted in this research allows for equifinality, that is, that several different conditions or configurations of conditions can lead to one outcome (Ragin 2008c, 54.) While it should not be taken for granted that there is more than one way to obtain gender-balanced parliamentary parties, the fact that gender-balanced parties are not strikingly similar to each other makes equifinality a reasonable expectation that will be empirically tested here.

3.4 QCA, party politics and gender

Although a few scholars have applied QCA in political studies of gender issues and women’s presence in national parliaments (Krook 2010; McBride and Mazur 2006), qualitative comparative analysis is new to the field of gender and party politics (see, however, Lilliefeldt 2010). Hence, this section pinpoints the specific contributions that applications of QCA can make to the research field of party politics and women’s parliamentary presence. Rather than presenting all details of the approach and analytical technique, it focuses on the reasons for and advantages of using it in this study.  

3.4.1 Previous research: Methodological problems to solve

As discussed at greater length in the introductory chapter, previous studies of party and gender have generally been marked by four methodological problems. For two of these problem areas QCA can effectively provide a solution. The first of these methodological problems arises because, even though

29 For further, intriguing writings about configurative causes, see e.g., Mackie (1965) and Mahoney (2008.)  
30 Readers who seek detailed descriptions of the approach and analytical technique are advised to consult one of the several textbooks on the topic, such as Ragin (2000, 2008c), Rihoux and Ragin (Benoit Rihoux and Ragin 2008) and Schneider & Wagemann (2007).
we have good knowledge about the “mean causal effect” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 81–2) of individual variables, and thorough knowledge about individual cases (see, e.g., chapters in Lovenduski and Norris 1993; and Matland and Montgomery 2003b), we have little knowledge about configurations of several conditions and about necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for gender-balanced parliamentary parties that is based on systematically, qualitative comparisons between larger numbers of cases. This is because the methods chosen are usually not appropriate for drawing conclusions about necessity, sufficiency and multiple conjunctural causation across a larger number of cases.

Second, while we have much knowledge about where cases are placed on continuums, that is, regular variables, we know surprisingly little about the qualitative differences between the different values that those variables assume. For example, it is commonly accepted to talk about small parties, large parties, gender-balanced parties, large electoral districts, and so on, but the exact definitions, and the context within which they apply, are often left aside. In other words, there is a relative lack of empirically anchored, qualitative understandings of the concepts used. In this thesis, I follow the QCA approach and argue that there is a distinct qualitative and analytical difference between studies of cases that are spread along a continuum and those cases whose characteristics are understood with reference to the qualitative differences between them (see, e.g., Ragin 2008c). In evaluating parties’ achievements in the area of representativeness, it is essential to make this distinction.

Finally, as Ragin (2008c, chap. 1) argues, much of social science theory is set theoretic in its nature, rather than phrased in terms of correlations. As argued in the previous chapter, even though this claim is valid for theory about party and gender, studies have hitherto not made much use of set theory in systematic, cross-case analyses.

The remainder of this section will show how QCA can be used for solving these problems, with emphasis on how to construct and test empirical understandings of concepts, i.e., set calibration, how suitable QCA is for creating a fusion between case knowledge and variable type of knowledge and, finally, how QCA offers possibilities for an explorative approach to configurations, necessity and sufficiency.

3.4.2 Operationalisation and calibration of concepts in QCA

QCA is a set theoretic method and hence does not make use of variables in the traditional sense of the word. Instead, conditions (in quantitative studies understood as independent variables) and the outcome (the dependent variable) are constructed as sets, of which each case is assigned a specific level of membership based on empirical data. The construction of sets is referred to as ‘calibration’, and is similar to how technical instruments are calibrated.
to correspond to conventional understandings of weight, temperature, pressure, etc. The purpose of the calibration is to apply or construct a standard of measurement for the concept against which each case be understood or measured. Instead of a mean or central tendency, QCA is based on theoretically and empirically meaningful operationalisations of each concept, all of which should be thoroughly and explicitly documented (Ragin 2008c, 72). When previous research does not stipulate specific, qualitative anchors for the theoretical concepts, they may be derived from the data at hand. Calibrated sets should be seen as suggestions on how to construe the concepts in empirical terms.

The calibration includes qualitatively anchored start-points and end-points, where cases are said to be fully in the set (1.0 membership) or fully out of the set (0.0 membership), for example, fully gender balanced or fully non-balanced. This makes it possible to distinguish between kinds of cases, such as large parties or non-large parties. In addition, fuzzy sets have one or several internal thresholds that render fine-grained categorisation of cases possible and so determine which case can be classed as more or less gender balanced and/or more or less a large party. The mid-point of a set (0.5, the cross-over point) marks a level at which it cannot be determined whether the case is more in or out of the set (Ragin 2008c, chap. 4). All set thresholds used in this research are displayed in Appendix.

Using transparent definitions of concepts facilitates comparison between several cases and different types of data. This is useful both in QCA and in other comparative methods, as it has the potential to provide either shared or commonly used empirical definitions of concepts. Such shared standards make small-n studies more fit for comparison, theory development and cumulation of research results (cf. George and Bennett 2005). As will be shown in this research, it also makes it possible to conduct direct comparisons of the same types of cases in different contexts.

Prior to and during calibration, QCA requires the researcher to determine which range of variation in the data is analytically useful, that is, to “distinguish between relevant and irrelevant variation” (Ragin 2008c, 83–4). In practice, this means that some sections of a continuum may be disregarded in the actual analysis. For example, while theory stipulates that large electoral districts are favourable for women seeking elected office, this claim may be valid only for a particular range and variation outside of that range can be truncated. If there are no reasons to assume that extremely large electoral districts, such as when the whole country comprises one district, are necessarily extremely favourable, such cases are considered full members of the set, as are also cases with large electoral districts that only just qualify as full members of the set. This practice injects further analytical value into each set, as it helps us understand the research problem in terms of the qualitative differences between cases, answering questions about what is required for an outcome or what is required for a case to be understood as, for example, a
large party. This should be contrasted with perceiving cases in terms of their place on a continuous variable without qualitative thresholds, which is a more common approach.

3.4.2.1 Robustness of results in QCA

Calibration means applying thresholds for categorising cases with respect to their kind of membership (member, non-member) of a set, and in terms of their degree of membership (more or less in or out of the set). While this has obvious advantages, it may also mean that the results are altered when new data or new definitions require recoding of cases. Jahn (2006, 426–35) uses binary sets (i.e., only 1 or 0 membership levels) to show that, as a consequence of this, QCA suffers from a lack of robustness.31

While from a more traditional quantitative perspective this critique is justified, this perceived lack of robustness rather indicates a lack of commonly agreed-upon, exact and empirical interpretations of social science concepts. This problem is related to what Ragin (2008c, 178) refers to as “poorly specified” theories that “offer only general characterizations of social phenomena”. Still, transparent and well-defined standards of measurement – that is, commonly agreed-upon operationalisations – of concepts are sought by most scholars. The debate about what constitutes a populist political party is a case indeed, as is the closely related debate about how to operationalise left and right in terms of party policy (see, e.g., Benoit and Laver 2006; Jahn 2010) and Kitschelt’s “comparative-static” study of social democratic parties (Kitschelt 1994, 219). The difficulties in achieving such standards are likely more or less independent from the choice of method or approach, yet the transparency and exactness inherent in QCA make the problem more apparent. This, in short, does not mean that the results are necessarily more or less robust than those of other approaches or methods. Instead, the lack of empirically and theoretically informed operationalisations surfaces more clearly in QCA, but is not a consequence of the method as such.

3.4.3 A fusion of variable and case orientated research

QCA has been understood as a middle way between case-orientated research and variable-orientated research (see, e.g., Ragin 1987): it is suited for different types of data and can handle intermediate as well as small numbers of cases. The possibility to study many cases at once means that this method is useful for generalisations of results, which has been a weakness of previous studies addressing necessity and sufficiency.

Another major advantage of QCA is that it makes it possible to use data of different characters (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2008, 13) and rely on research results from both multivariate techniques and small-n studies. The analyses

31 For another type of critique about a related matter, see Thiem (2010).
presented in the chapters below can also create a general picture and still provide insights on individual cases or groups of cases, which furthers our knowledge about which cases are similar to each other and about the circumstances under which particular cases succeed or fail. Achieving this in an intermediate-N research design is new to the research field of party and gender.

3.4.3.1 Case selection in QCA

The ambition to assess either necessity only or configurations of conditions, too, can also structure case selection in QCA. For research designs that focus on necessary conditions, selecting only successful cases is an option. Any cases in which the outcome is present and the causal condition absent will weaken claims about necessity. Cases in which the outcome is absent are not relevant for analysis of necessity (Schneider and Wagemann 2007, 38). Selecting on the dependent variable – which is far from a virtue in several other scientific methods (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) – can thus be both advisable and a pragmatic option in QCA.

When the purpose of the analysis is to explore sufficiency, the selected cases must include both successful and unsuccessful cases in which the causal conditions are also present. Cases where outcome and the causal condition are present corroborate claims about sufficiency; cases in which the condition is present yet the outcome absent contradict claims about sufficiency. Finally, cases in which the causal condition is absent and the outcome can be absent or present do not add to the analysis and can thus neither strengthen nor weaken claims about sufficiency (Schneider and Wagemann 2007, 34).

In this research both approaches are used. The study of West European parties includes successful and unsuccessful cases and is hence appropriate for drawing conclusions about necessity and sufficiency, including configurations. The study of Central and East European parties includes successful cases only – for reasons explained below – and is thus useful for analysis of necessity. The CEE cases will also be used in a comparison in which the theoretical tools from Western Europe are evaluated.

3.4.3.1.1 Case selection and data collection in the fsQCA

The cases for the fsQCA of West European parties were selected to achieve comparability with previous studies of party and gender and in order to base the analyses on as broad a set of comparable data as possible. Therefore, the Katz and Mair (Katz and Mair 1992b) data set was used, which resulted in 57 individual parties being included in the study. The same party level data have been used in previous studies that apply multivariate methods (Caul Kittilson 2006; Caul 1999), and hence it allows for direct comparisons between results. The data set was complemented with other sources, primarily
in the case of external party conditions. More details on the data collection are available in Chapter 4 and the Appendix.

3.4.3.2 QCA and temporality
Despite QCA being a fusion or a middle way between case and variable orientated methods, it is not ideal for dealing with temporality or sorting out the sequence of events that led to a particular outcome. De Meur et al. (2008, 61–3) point to a number of different solutions to this, most of which include complementing QCA with other analytical techniques that are more appropriate for studies of temporal sequences. This advice is followed in this research, in which one of the cases analysed in a static comparison is also examined using an in-depth, single case study.

3.4.4 Exploring and assessing causal configurations using QCA
As noted above, the research field of party and gender is noticeably lacking in systematically comparative studies of many cases, studies that are able to assess multiple conjunctural causation and equifinality. Using QCA, this research presents such knowledge about old and new cases.

The configurational analyses presented in this study do not rely on pre-specified combinations of conditions, as is common in multivariate techniques using interaction variables. Instead, QCA results are based on the distribution of empirical cases and theoretically informed choices of logically possible but empirically unobserved cases (De Meur, Benoit Rihoux, and Yamasaki 2008, 152–55). It is thus a partly inductive method, and the resulting configurations could benefit from being assessed using other methods, particularly case studies.

The systematic, cross-case approach to equifinality also presents new input on the topic of party and gender. Knowledge about equifinality is useful for understanding how party and gender performs outside of the mean causal effects approach and, as alluded to above, for gaining insights about possible groups or clusters of cases and the conditions that they share.

3.4.4.1 Causal (a)symmetry
Traditionally studies of women’s parliamentary presence look primarily at successful cases of women being elected to parliament, and thereby on factors that lead to more balanced male/female ratio in parliament. In contrast, by conducting analyses of both gender-balanced and non-balanced parties in Western Europe, this research seeks to provide new knowledge about this insufficiently studied area (see however Bjarnegård 2009; Hughes and Paxton 2008; Rule 1981) – namely, the conditions under which some parties remain gender biased while others become gender balanced. Its analysis is a straightforward examination of causal symmetry, capable of determining whether absence of favourable configurations is related to absence of the
outcome. Apart from achieving a greater understanding of causes and effects, analysis of absence of the outcome, i.e., gender-biased parties, may provide empirically intriguing results (Ragin 2004, 130–3; Schneider 2009, 57; Wagemann and Schneider 2007, 26; see also Lieberson 1985, chap. 4).

3.4.4.2 The QCA modus operandi

After case selection, operationalisation and calibrations are concluded, QCA is conducted in three steps. First, necessity and singular sufficiency are examined. Second, configurational analysis is carried out for presence of the outcome and for absence of the outcome. Third, results from the above software-aided analyses are contextualised and analysed with reference to cases and the conditions that form each configuration.

Configurations are interpreted without particular emphasis on individual conditions (Schneider 2009) – that is, in line with the idea of cases and configurations as meaningful wholes. A configuration does not explain the outcome in the studied cases, but describes the combination of factors that were present or absent in the individual case (De Meur, Benoit Rihoux, and Yamashaki 2008, 155). Instead, the strength of QCA lies with its pinpointing causal configurations in a comparative setting, and thus explanatory accounts belong in the third stage (interpretative and contextualising) of the analysis.

3.4.4.2.1 Assessing QCA results: Consistency and coverage

Software-aided QCA analyses produce statistics that gauge the consistency and coverage of the results. Set-theoretical consistency is a measure of the value of the results vis-à-vis theory, and can be compared to significance levels in traditional statistics. Consistency values range from 0 to 1, and show the extent to which cases that display the causal condition or configuration of conditions also display the outcome. It is hence a measure of the consistency of the set relationship that is studied, that is, the accuracy of a proposed set relationship. In addition, consistency is comparable to measures of significance of a relationship between condition/variable and outcome, but do not tell of the strength of the relationship (Ragin 2008c, 44–5). For establishing necessity or singular sufficiency, a high consistency value is usually preferred, 0.90 or higher, whereas for analyses of sufficient configurations of conditions the 0.80 level can be used (Ragin 2008b, 121, fn 7; Schneider and Wagemann 2007, 213).

Like consistency, coverage also ranges from 0 to 1 and is calculated both for solutions and individual configurations. Coverage is a measure of the “empirical relevance” of a set relationship, and shows the empirical strength of the relationship – much like a regression coefficient (Ragin 2008c, 45). When several conditions or configurations are sufficient for the outcome, i.e., the relationship is one of equifinality, they may overlap. To determine the extent to which the causal configurations overlap, coverage is partitioned
into raw and unique coverage – fairly comparable though not equivalent to partitioning explained variation in regression analysis. Raw coverage indicates the degree of coverage of an individual configuration, including any cases that are also covered by other configurations. Unique coverage, on the other hand, only includes cases that are covered by one particular configuration (Ragin 2008c, 63–8).32

3.5 Case studies, party politics and gender

The purpose of the two different types of case studies – structured focused comparisons and the single case study – in this work is related both to developing theory and method and to making an empirical contribution to the field. The studies seek to test whether empirical concepts developed with reference to Western experiences are also valid in Central and Eastern Europe. They will also explore whether the CEE cases display any characteristic that is theoretically relevant to the study of party and gender but has been little theorised, with particular emphasis on organisational instability, pointed out in previous studies as characteristic of CEE parties. The single case study is employed to explain the outcome in a deviant case while also offering in-depth knowledge about the theoretical concept(s) identified in the preceding comparative case study and providing a temporal perspective. Finally, the comparative study merges set theory with structured focused comparisons and thereby seeks to develop the latter method.

3.5.1 Structured focused comparison of gender-balanced parties

The method of structured focused comparison (SFC) is a small-n approach in which a well-delineated topic is studied using cases that are instances of the same phenomena and, most importantly, in which a well-defined range of questions is applied in the analysis of each case. Strict adherence to a set of questions corresponds to the ‘structure’ of the comparisons, whereas ‘focus’ is achieved by restricting the analyses of each case to a particular aspect or topic. The purpose of emphasising structure and focus is to make comparisons in individual SFCs transparent and so facilitate the addition of new comparisons to an already conducted comparison, as well as to achieve comparability between case studies – eventually making cumulative contributions to science (George and Bennett 2005, 67–72). George and Bennett underscore the need for rigorous and well-defined schemes for comparisons,

32 For sufficiency, where the studied causal condition is a subset of outcome, consistency is calculated $\Sigma[\min(X_i, Y_i)]/\Sigma(X_i)$ and coverage $\Sigma[\min(X_i, Y_i)]/\Sigma(Y_i)$. For necessity, where the outcome is a subset of the causal condition, consistency is calculated $\Sigma[\min(X_i, Y_i)]/\Sigma(Y_i)$, and consistency is calculated $\Sigma[\min(X_i, Y_i)]/\Sigma(X_i)$ (Ragin 2008c, 63).
but they do not explicitly refer to set theory as a possible way to enrich and make structured focused comparison more transparent and structured along possible standards of measurement.

This research contributes to the development of the method of structured focused comparison by adding set theory as a tool for structuring the empirical and theoretical data and tools of the comparison. Sets are constructed and calibrated using previous research and data from the studied cases, thereby providing a test of validity of calibrations developed in the fsQCA of West European parties – essentially forming a basis for comparing WEur and CEE cases. The comparison entails an fsQCA of necessary conditions, after which the sets are used to enhance the transparency of the CEE case comparison. The use of set theory is aimed at facilitating analysis of how each case is configured and providing a common basis for cumulation of results from each individual case. The use of sets also elevates the nature of theory about party and gender, making it possible to distinguish between cases with reference to kind and to degree. Finally, the detailed and transparent calibration of sets is expected to facilitate assessment of the study.

3.5.1.1 Case selection and data collection for the SFC

Case selection for the SFC was guided by, on the one hand, an ambition to achieve generalisable results and, on the other, practical constraints. Collecting detailed data about all parliamentary parties in 10 countries was not considered possible within the frames of this project. Instead, all successful cases were selected for data collection, which restricts the analysis to necessary conditions but still allows for case comparisons and theory development. Gender-balanced parties are relatively rare in Central and Eastern Europe – Chapter 5 shows that roughly every fifth party is gender balanced – and these pioneering parties are thus useful for testing whether the Western ‘template’ of gender-balanced parties is valid and for exploring whether the West European concepts should be developed.

Party level data were collected using a questionnaire that was sent out via email to the 14 gender-balanced parties during spring and autumn 2010. Of the responding cases, six (43 per cent of all gender-balanced parties) were studied. This part of the data set is unique, and brings new empirical knowledge to the field. Case-level data were complemented by secondary literature and statistics on the institutional and structural conditions of each country. More details on the data collection are available in Chapter 5 and the Appendix.

3.5.2 The case study: A deviant case from CEE

Because the two comparative studies are static and do not provide any temporal perspective on the outcome the single case study will add the temporal perspective using within-case comparisons.
The selected case has been gender balanced throughout several elections despite the fact that it apparently does not exhibit conditions commonly associated with gender-balanced parties and is the only such case in the country. It thus conforms to the strategy of selecting a deviant case for hypothesis generation and for explorative approaches to new theoretical concepts (George and Bennett 2005, 81; Gerring 2007, 105–8). The case study also brings in primary data and secondary sources to compare the selected case with other parties in the same country.

The within-case comparisons (Gerring 2007, 28) conducted in this single-case study deal with the process of candidate selection inside the party, using data from three instances of candidate nomination and selection, and with voting behaviour and electoral results at three points in time. It also presents data on formal and informal workings of the organisation, and engages with the issue of organisational (in)stability. Finally, it brings in data from other parties in the same country and presents between-case comparisons.

3.5.2.1 Case selection and data collection in the single case study
The selected case was chosen from the cases in the SFC, and is hence gender balanced. The characteristic that makes the case deviant is primarily its party organisation, seen in relation to the results reached in the study of West European parties. While using the same case to identify and advance new theory is not advisable, this case study adds data to the analysis that were not used in the SFC (George and Bennett 2005, 111–2) and also develops the analysis beyond the level suggested in the SFC. It refers to results from the SFC and applies the theoretical framework, using historical explanation of the case as well as comparative evidence from other cases.

Data were collected using interviews with party staff, representatives and candidates as well as experts such as political scientists, NGO activists and politicians. The primary data were complemented by secondary sources and my own analyses of statistical data. The case study data – interview data, written sources and statistics – are used for establishing empirically-informed accounts of how the party organisation was founded and how it developed and functioned. They are compared and contrasted with each other using both qualitative and quantitative analytical techniques. Details on the data collection are available in Chapter 6 and the Appendix.

3.6 Comparing candidate success rates
By comparing individual political parties and the effect of party behaviour on women’s and men’s success in elections, this work engages with a level of analysis in which comparative accounts between many cases and across time and space are necessary. This is a field that in many intriguing ways is still under development. This work includes comparisons of the success of
female and male party candidates in elections, often referred to as candidates’ success rates. As shown below, previous methods are problematic when used in comparative studies, especially when conducting cross-case and cross-country comparisons.

3.6.1 Previous methods

The most common approach to understanding women’s electoral success is typically non-comparative in terms of gender and relies on studies of data on the share of women candidates and MPs (see, e.g., Freidenvall 2006, 81). This is admissible in systems with no preference voting and appropriate when the studied parties construct lists of candidates using a zip or zebra system of rank ordering. While valuable, this approach could be enriched by looking at comparative assessments. Comparisons of women’s and men’s success in elections have previously been carried out using the success rate of each group (see, e.g., Murray 2008; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997), here referred to as the simple success rate. In addition, scholars have recently suggested other measures of the same relationship.

Hazan and Rahat (2010, 110–1, see also 2006) present two methods for calculating intra-party representation in proportional electoral systems; one refers to the share of women on “realistic positions” on ballot lists, and a second method adds a weighting to each position. The authors claim that the indexes are useful in cross-country comparisons as well as in studies of majoritarian systems. Still, the methods rely heavily on two problematic preconditions, which make them potentially unfit for comparisons across larger sets of cases.

The authors implicitly assume that there is a certain number of realistic (i.e., relatively safe) positions on each list. This means that both the researcher and the parties must be aware of this number in each district, or the calculation will be based on speculation. While it may be possible to have a reasonably good estimate, prior to the election, of how many deputies will be elected in each district from each party in a given election, it should not be assumed that the parties had that very same information when constructing their lists of candidates or that the situation had not changed after candidates were selected and lists compiled. Therefore, the calculation of “realistic positions” is bound to be hampered by a considerable error term. This problem pertains to both the index of representation and to the weighted index.

Second, while calculation of the indices in simple electoral systems would be time consuming and complicated for the reasons mentioned above, calculating them in complex electoral systems, e.g., with several tiers or many districts, would be a very laborious process. If the first problem can be solved, Hazan’s and Rahat’s indices are likely to prove useful in simple electoral systems, but too complicated for applications across more complex systems.
3.6.1.1 The simple success rate

The older but more widely-known method consists in calculating the ‘simple success’ rate of women candidates (SSR\(_w\)), that is, the number of elected women MPs (MP\(_w\)) divided by the number of women candidates (C\(_w\)). The simple success rate (SSR) is usually calculated as follows, the subscript referring to the gender of the group:

\[
SSR_w = \frac{MP_w}{C_w}
\]

The straightforward interpretation of gender-divided SSR is the proportion of candidates from each sex that get elected. The simple success rate is useful for comparing the success of women and men in one party at one point in time, as in one election, or the overall success of a group in a country, that is, on the aggregate level. For comparing across cases or across time or electoral systems in order to understand when seats are allocated in equal proportions to each gender, the simple success rate is, however, inadequate. For instance, when used on the party level, SSR measures the effect of party magnitude and the number of candidates on women’s or men’s chances to win office, thereby producing ‘noise’ or extra data in the statistic.

Party lists and the number of seats allocated to individual parties usually vary from one election to another, and almost invariably they differ between electoral systems. In a party with many seats in parliament, the simple success rate will be low if the lists of candidates are lengthy, but high if the lists are short. Conversely, in a small party with many candidates, success rates will be low, and small parties with few candidates will get high simple-success rates. The simple success rate of women candidates thus need not be related to whether the final distribution of men and women in the parliamentary party is gender balanced or not, and is an inadequate measure of candidate success in comparative studies of individual political parties. An empirical example is given below in Table 3.

3.6.2 The relative success ratio

To reduce noise in the resulting data, the success of one group should be related to the success of the other group. That can be achieved by using the relative success ratio (Murray 2008, 547; Schmidt 2003, 7, table 4; see also Freidenvall 2011; Geissel 2008), RSR, where the success of one group of candidates is assessed in relation to that of another.\(^{33}\) To produce the relative success ratio of women candidates, the simple success rate of women candi-

\(^{33}\) Murray uses the terms "relative success rate" but only reports the simple success rate. Schmidt also refers to it as the relative success rate, but the term ratio would be mathematically more correct.
dates is divided by the simple success rate of male candidates. The relative success ratio of men is calculated accordingly. The relative success ratio for women candidates is calculated as follows:

\[
\text{RSR}_w = \frac{\text{MP}_w/C_w}{\text{MP}_m/C_m}
\]

While the calculation is not independent of differences in the number of candidates or party magnitude – because such data are essential for calculating success rates – the relative success ratio is a statistic that can be interpreted as the success of women relative to that of men.

The relative success ratio is easily understandable, as it can be interpreted in much the same manner as percentages. When women and men are equally successful in elections, the relative success ratio equals 1. When men are more successful than women, \(\text{RSR}_m > 1\) and \(\text{RSR}_w < 1\). Likewise, when women are more successful than men, \(\text{RSR}_m < 1\) and \(\text{RSR}_w > 1\). That is, the relative success ratio tells whether women and men are equally successful in elections or not, given their level of participation. The relative success ratio is not a new construct, but, as shown below, in this study it is more appropriate than the simple success rate.

### 3.6.2.1 A comparative, empirical example

Using official data from the 2010 Swedish elections, Table 3 below displays the effect of using SSR and RSR for determining the success of women candidates in parliamentary elections. It shows that women can have a high simple success rate (SSR) while the parliamentary party remains gender biased. For example, women had a 20 per cent SSR in the Sweden Democrats, but the share of women MPs was a low 15 per cent. The data also show that the success rate for women candidates in a gender-balanced party can be very low, as in the Left Party (56 per cent women MPs, SSR\(_w\) = 3 per cent).

We may note that the Sweden Democrats had 92 per cent fewer candidates than the Left Party. This shows that the simple success rate does not allow for comparison between parties with different numbers of candidates and, furthermore, the differences in list lengths in different countries makes it even less appropriate for comparison across time or between different electoral systems.

By way of contrast, the relative success ratio (RSR) for women was 0.52 (1.93 for men) in the Sweden Democrats and 1.29 for women in the Left Party (0.77 for men). Both parties were small, holding about 5 per cent of the 349 seats in parliament. Still, women and men had roughly equal success in getting elected from the Left Party, while men in the Sweden Democrats

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34 The results from the calculations of men’s and women’s success ratios are multiplicative inverses of each other, i.e., \(\text{RSR}_w \times \text{RSR}_m = 1\).

35 It should be noted that the Swedish system allows for a weak form of preference voting.
were almost twice as successful, compared to Sweden Democrat women. Although the relative success ratio should not be considered on its own but in conjunction with other factors, these brief examples show how it provides a more accurate picture of the chances of women and men in each party.

Table 3: Success rates: Example data, 2010 Swedish national elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>C (C_w)</th>
<th>MPs</th>
<th>MP_w (%)</th>
<th>SSR_w</th>
<th>SSR_m</th>
<th>RSR_w</th>
<th>RSR_m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>764 (313)</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>51 (47.7)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre Party</td>
<td>754 (325)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7 (30.4)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Party</td>
<td>813 (356)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10 (41.7)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>770 (342)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7 (36.8)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>622 (288)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14 (56.0)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>739 (364)</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>54 (48.2)</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Party</td>
<td>664 (342)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11 (57.9)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden Democrats</td>
<td>59 (15)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3 (15)</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: C=candidates; MP= parliamentarians; SSR= simple success rate; RSR=relative success ratio; subscript w=women, subscript m=men.
Source: Authors calculations (except columns C and MPs) from Swedish Election Authorities (Valmyndigheten n.d.).

3.6.2.2 The relative success ratio: Contribution and caution

The analytical leverage of the relative success ratio, as compared to the simple success rate, lies in its interpretation. The relative success ratio is useful for comparing individual political parties to each other, irrespective of parliamentary size, number of candidates and electoral laws. Such knowledge aids our understanding, for example, of whether women were ‘boosted’ in a gender-biased party and given slots higher up the lists of candidates, and it can give insights into whether voters reward women or men at the polls.

By itself the relative success ratio does not point to any causal relationship, but merely presents an outcome. Comparisons using the relative success ratio should ideally include analysis of how the outcome was reached, such as accounts of which individual causal factors, combinations or chains of factors affected the outcome.

In the extreme case where no women or men are selected for candidacy or elected into parliament, that is, in a perfectly ‘gender uniform’ (Kanter 1977) party, it is neither meaningful nor mathematically possible to construct a gender-separated RSR for the party.

3.7 Casing, case selection and generalisability

Casing, the process by which the case or cases are understood in their theoretical and empirical context (Ragin 1992), case selection and the possibility
to generalise research results are closely connected. In its broadest sense, this work deals with how political power in contemporary democracies is distributed between different groups of the population. More specifically, it engages with distribution of parliamentary presence, that is, possibilities of political power via the state level legislative assembly. The distribution of this type of power is studied here as a consequence of the behaviour of the actors through which access to it is channelled, that is, political parties. The behaviour of the actors is theorised as a function of the actor’s organisation and the environment in which they act. It is thus a study of how party behaviour affects distribution of parliamentary political power between women and men in contemporary democracies.

Empirically, this study concentrates on European political parties. It does so for two main reasons. First, the West European parties chosen have already been studied using multivariate methods and introducing a new method is more fruitfully done when the results can be compared to similar studies in which other methods are used (Krook 2010). Second, the European cultural context, both in terms of societal culture and the role of political parties as such, is sufficiently similar to warrant comparison and still offer important differences in such areas, for example, as historical heritage, experience of democracy and women as political actors. Consequently, this is a study of how party behaviour affects distribution of parliamentary political power between women and men in contemporary European democracies.

The three studies, by their empirical and temporal nature, offer different scopes of generalisation. It should be noted that an underlying question in this research study is the extent to which West European experiences and theory can be generalised to CEE and vice versa. Hence, the empirical generalisability of results within the European context is to be determined in the empirical analyses. The studies also have different temporal applicability or possibility of generalisation of results. The West European study is restricted to the late 1980s, but it also covers parties that were in a sense pioneers as they were the first parties to become gender balanced. This means that the results from the WEur study serve as a reasonable point of comparison when studying gender-balanced parties in CEE, where still few parties are gender balanced.

The development and spread of gender quotas during the last two decades may circumscribe generalisability of the results from the WEur study. Because the CEE study relies on party organisational data collected specifically for this project, its results are not limited in that same sense – yet the small number of cases and the fact that it only covers gender-balanced parties should be recognised as restricting factors. On the other hand, the results from the CEE study do not necessarily only apply to CEE cases, but may also shed light on WEur parties in countries with shorter experience of democracy or more turbulent party landscapes.
Finally, although political parties are often understood as something of a sine qua non for modern democracies, there are other organisations to which the knowledge about interaction between internal organisational settings and environmental conditions may be generalised.
4. Gender Balance and Gender Bias in West European Parties

West European parties have been at the centre of several studies of how party organisations affect women’s chances to enter parliament (Caul Kittiison 2006; Caul 1999; Lovenduski and Norris 1993). The West European parties studied were among the pioneers of women’s parliamentary presence, and are hence of particular importance for understanding under which conditions political parties become gender balanced. The findings of previous research about gender and party in Western Europe thus provide crucial points of comparison in this chapter, both for operationalisation and for understanding the advantages of exploring existing cases and theories using a new method (cf. Krook 2010).

The study presented below applies fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) in exploring configurations of conditions that were present when certain West European political parties became gender balanced while others parties remained gender biased into the late 1980s. This period was one in which the increase of women’s representation had taken hold, with more and more parties including women candidates on their lists – particularly in the Nordic countries, but also in other West European countries (McAllister and Studlar 2002; Raum 2005). There were thus a sufficient number of gender-balanced cases to warrant comparative analysis, as well as a sufficient number of gender-biased cases to allow for analysis of factors that prevent or stall change (cf. Hughes and Paxton 2008).

This chapter shows that previous research about party and gender can serve as a fruitful basis for operationalising empirical understandings of concepts commonly used in the study of political parties and women’s parliamentary presence. The explorative analyses show how gender-balanced and gender-biased parliamentary parties emerge from conditions inside and outside of the party organisations, such as electoral laws and socioeconomic conditions. What is more, this chapter makes a particularly important contribution to understanding gender balance and gender bias: namely, the two are products of different configurations of conditions. This means that gender balance is not achieved by reversing the conditions that lead to absence of gender balance, and vice versa. Finally, comparing the results of the fuzzy-set analyses set out below with previously published, multivariate analyses of party and gender, the chapter concludes that the new method has the po-
tential of contributing new knowledge about how intra-party and external-party environmental conditions combine to produce gender-balanced parliamentary parties.

4.1 Aim, purpose and outline

This chapter has three major aims and is structured in three substantial sections. First, it seeks to contribute new knowledge about the combinations of conditions that have led to gender balance in West European parties. The second objective is to contribute new knowledge about the combinations of conditions that have led to gender balance being blocked in West European parties. It also seeks to develop detailed operationalisations, i.e., empirical understandings of concepts that have hitherto been central to studies of party and gender and that can be usefully be applied to comparative analyses. This objective is pursued in the first section, where operationalisations of concepts commonly used in the study of party and gender are developed using both previous research and insights from the cases under study in this chapter.

To meet the explorative and comparative aims, the second section presents two comparative empirical analyses, one of gender-balanced parties and another of parties that are not gender balanced. Both comparisons are contrasted with previous research in which multivariate methods are applied. The final section arrives at conclusions, including a discussion about the contribution of fuzzy-set QCA to the field of gender and party. Several data-set, plots and tables mentioned in the text can be found in the Appendix.

4.2 Operationalising gender and party politics

4.2.1 Data, method and case selection

The data used stem from several different sources, and cover both strictly quantitative as well as more qualitative types of data. The bulk of party organisational data and the outcome is drawn from the Katz and Mair party data handbook (Katz and Mair 1992b), or are derived from that research (Bille 2001 on candidate selection). Detailed information on sources is available in the Appendix.

All analyses presented in this chapter are applications of fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (Ragin 2000, 2008c; Benoit Rihoux and Ragin 2008). To date, few studies of women’s parliamentary presence using QCA have been published (Krook 2010) and the lack of studies that use the individual party as the unit of analysis is particularly striking (see however Lil-
liefeldt 2010). When comparing the results of the analyses presented here with those of previous research, the focus will be on research based on multivariate analyses in which political parties comprise the unit of analysis. In order to achieve as high a degree of comparability as possible, the works of Miki Caul Kittilson (Caul Kittilson 2006; Caul 1999), in which the very same cases are analysed, will be used as the primary point of comparison.

4.2.1.1 Case selection

This is an intermediate-N study of 57 political parties. To achieve a study based on comparable data on as many parties as possible, the Katz and Mair (Katz and Mair 1992b) data set served as the basis for the selection of cases: every case for which all required data are available in that data set is analysed in this research. The lack of data on certain crucial conditions – most importantly the share of women MPs – led to the exclusion of a few cases. (The full list of cases included is presented in the Appendix: Table 26, p. 206). Data on conditions that were not or only partially included in the Katz and Mair data set were then added from other sources. The cases included are those of parties elected into the single or lower chambers of 11 West European countries in the late 1980s.36

4.2.2 Set calibration

Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) necessitates detailed and transparent operationalisations of the concepts that structure the study, based on theory, previous empirical research and knowledge about the cases (Ragin 2008a). While this facilitates assessment of the study and is required for replicability of the research in question, it has another advantage, namely, allowing for detailed, empirically-based operationalisations with a strong theoretical basis. This is needed for achieving a standard of measurement for each concept, which is in turn facilitates comparative studies and cumulation of single case studies. While QCA is not the only method in which this value-added can be achieved, the requirement of transparency even on the case level in QCA makes it ideal for developing such empirically based understandings of theoretical concepts.

The sets presented here are coded so that set membership points in the expected direction of the relationship: higher membership of the set is expected to combine with higher membership of the outcome set. All plots and coding referred to in this section are found in the Appendix, which also presents the full data set in coded and raw forms.

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4.2.2.1 Gender balance: An empirical definition

Multivariate models of women’s parliamentary presence usually deal with the share of women MPs as either more or fewer women parliamentarians, without making an explicit distinction between which parties are gender balanced and which are not gender balanced (see, e.g., Caul Kittilson 2006), that is, which cases are successful and which are unsuccessful. This obscures the empirical and policy relevant question of when a sufficient, acceptable or desirable level of parliamentary presence has been reached – in other words, at what level of women’s parliamentary presence gender balance has been achieved. QCA requires an empirically and clear definition of when a case is successful (in this case gender balanced) and when it is not. This method makes it possible to distinguish cases that are more or less successful from each other. The operationalisation of a fully continuous, fuzzy set requires linking three thresholds to the definition: the upper bound, where a case is fully in the set (e.g., fully gender balanced, the 1 membership level), the lower bound at which the case is fully out of the set (e.g., fully non-balanced, 0 membership) and a cross-over point (0.5), where the case is neither in nor out of the set (Ragin 2008c, 31).

A common, intuitive definition of balance is 50/50, where every second MP is a woman/man (cf. Rosenbluth, Salmond, and Thies 2006, 181). In the case of parliamentary parties, the 50/50 definition may be too strict, particularly in the light of the mathematical problems that arise in the case of small parliamentary parties. Kanter (1977, 966–7) suggests that 40/60 constitutes gender balance, that is, no gender holds more than 60 and less than 40 per cent of the seats. This definition covers the 50/50 range, and does not punish or overestimate cases that are small to the same extent. In describing gender representation and gender balance, Kanter (1977) terms the situation when one of the sexes is absent as one which for the remaining group, is ‘gender uniform’. A gender uniform group is clearly not gender balanced, and 0 per cent of one or the other gender thus corresponds to the lower bound of the set.

Finally, the cross-over point could be placed at several levels. Kanter (1977) argues that 35 per cent marks a “tilted” representation and that 15 per cent defines a “skewed” distribution. The tilted group is mathematically close to the “critical mass” level of 30 per cent (Dahlerup 1988), which is also a common quota level (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008) and a level which the UN in 1990 expected to be reached in the mid-90s, that is, only after the designated elections (Dahlerup 2006, 515).

Figure 1 below plots all the cases according to their respective share of women MPs in the chosen elections. It indicates that 35 per cent may be too close to 40/60, as it excludes the group of cases with over 30 per cent women MPs. More likely, the low frequency of cases with just below 20 per cent women MPs constitutes a convincing cross-over point. That is, when
one-fifth of MPs are women/men, it is a case that is neither gender balanced nor gender biased. When a party has more than 20 per cent women MPs, it is understood as more gender balanced than not, or more in than out of the set of gender-balanced parliamentary parties.

The average percentage of women MPs in the parties is 22.8, the standard deviation being 15.5. While there are several parties with no women MPs, the highest value is 59.2. Given these numbers, the thresholds in this fuzzy set are 40-60 per cent (1, full membership), 20 per cent (0.5 membership) and 0 per cent (0, full non-membership).

Figure 1: Frequency plot, share of women MPs per party. Western Europe, late 1980s

Note: Data points refer to number of cases. Share of women MPs with 0 significant figures was used to calculate frequency. Source: Author’s calculations from Katz and Mair (Katz and Mair 1992b).

4.2.2.2 Environmental conditions

4.2.2.2.1 Electoral laws and parliamentary presence: a gender perspective

Electoral systems structure party behaviour in several ways. In the case of women’s parliamentary presence, the primary analytical distinction lies in the number of deputies elected from each electoral district, that is, between electoral systems with multi-member districts (MMD) and systems with single-member districts (SMD). Other electoral regulations identified in studies of women’s parliamentary presence include the possibility for voters to change the order on ballot lists at the polls, that is, open versus closed party lists, and the existence of legislative or constitutional gender quotas.
4.2.2.1.1 District magnitude

Because almost all countries from which cases are drawn use some form of proportional electoral system with multi-member districts (MMD), the distinction between MMD and SMD does not provide sufficient analytical leverage in this case. Rule (1987) suggests that there is a useful distinction to be made not between SMD and MMD, but between large and small electoral districts. Theory and research about party and gender stipulates that when districts are larger, more women will be elected. That is to say, when women are given slots further down the party list, their chances of getting elected increases with the number of MPs elected from the same list (Caul Kittilson 2006, 121–3; see also Matland 1998, 112–3; Norris 2006, 205–6; Sainsbury 1993). Evidently, candidates are selected on the district level, while country comparisons entail comparisons at the aggregate level. Adequate comparisons at the aggregate level should thus be conducted using effective magnitude, rather than average district magnitude, as Taagepera and Shugart (1989, 12) show. They also provide a data set covering the countries under study here, and this was used in operationalising the set. Caul Kittilson (2006, 160) uses data from the same source in her regression analysis, which facilitates comparison.

The next step is to distinguish between small and large effective magnitude. Because the district magnitude is more often understood in relative terms (smaller/larger) rather than the more distinct ‘small’ and ‘large’, there is little research to guide threshold setting in this case. Rule’s research (1987, 484–6, 494) suggests that 6 is a useful lower bound (0 membership of the set). However, her study draws on average district magnitude rather than effective magnitude, which makes this threshold somewhat tentative. A plotting of the Taagepera and Shugart (1989) data (see Figure 8, Appendix p. 208) shows that 16.5 and 22.5 constitute mid-points in two gaps in the data, and that may thus form the 0.5 and 1 membership levels of this fully continuous, fuzzy set. Because there is little other research to tell whether these thresholds are justified, they should be read as suggestions on how to understand effective magnitude in qualitative terms. The chosen thresholds mean that the UK and Irish parties are virtually non-members of the set, whereas all others have higher or lower set membership.

4.2.2.1.2 Electoral or constitutional gender quotas

In the late 1980s, none of the 11 West European countries from which cases here are selected had legislative or constitutional gender quotas that affected

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37 Analysis would tell that MMD is a necessary condition – a result that would be flawed because the variable hardly varies.
38 This points to an interaction between women’s list placements (e.g., candidate selection and composition of lists) and district size.
39 The Taagepera and Shugart data set holds data for Finland in 1987, and hence the Finnish cases are studied with respect to the 1987 elections, instead of the 1990 elections.
political parties (Quotaproject 2006b). There is thus no need to construct a set taking into account external-party gender quotas.

4.2.2.2.1.3 **Ballot structure: open or closed party lists**

Some electoral systems include preference voting, allowing voters to express their preferences for or against specific candidates on party lists. Although there is, as Schmidt (2009, 192) points out, no consensus about whether women candidates benefit from preference voting, closed lists tend to be understood as more women friendly. Studies indicate that the effect likely depends upon ballot structure interacting with other conditions (Matland 2005, 104–6; Schmidt 2009, 194). In order to explore which configurations are present in gender balanced and gender biased cases, this study employs a crisp set, in which closed lists (no preference voting) are coded full membership (1) while systems in which voters can alter the order of candidates are coded full non-members of the set (0). No distinction is thus made between strong or weak preference voting systems. Instead, closed lists are assumed to be more conducive to gender balance. Data were collected from the World Bank Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). The UK cases were coded as full non-members of the set of parties in open party list systems.

4.2.2.2.2 **Socioeconomic conditions and women’s parliamentary presence**

Apart from conditions that relate to elections, women’s presence in national parliament is usually understood as related to the social climate. This is often gauged by indicators of women’s presence in the public sphere, such as the labour market or their level of education relative to that of men. In addition, some studies use religion or year of introduction of women’s suffrage as indicators of women’s social status, while yet others use the political heritage of the country as an indicator of social climate (see, e.g., Lane and Ersson 2005; Norris 2004; Rule 1981, 1987; Siaroff 2000; Wide 2006). On the party level, the share of women voting for a party, the “women’s bonus”, can also form such an indicator (Caul Kittilson 2006). Below, four such indicators – labour, education, religion and political heritage – are operationalised. Suffrage is excluded from analysis because of the low variation in the year of introduction of women’s suffrage (IPU 2006), and the women’s bonus in voting behaviour is discussed in the case study chapter as part of analysis of party strategy.

4.2.2.2.1 **Religion and women’s parliamentary presence**

Scholars have suggested that particular religious brands are associated with higher or lower percentages of women MPs (Rule 1987; Wide 2006), and religion is a common indicator of culture (Lane and Ersson 2005). Catholicism, Orthodox religion and Islam are often understood as less favourable to...
women’s entry into the political sphere than Protestantism (Rule 1987, 848; Siaroff 2000, 200–1; Wide 2006, 100–4, 138). Wide’s research (2006, 101) also shows that a large percentage of non-religious individuals in a country is positively correlated with the share of women in parliament, whereas a larger percentage of religious adherents is negatively correlated with the share of women MPs. Wide also points out that religion tends to interact with other conditions, such as economic development (Wide 2006, 138).

In order to make the analyses as comparable as possible to previous research, this framework assesses the impact of Protestantism on women’s parliamentary presence. The set is constructed with focus on whether a majority of the population belongs to a Protestant church or not: full membership of the fully continuous, fuzzy set of Protestant countries is defined as 100 per cent of the population belonging to a Protestant church; 0 per cent of the population marks the lower bound of the set, whereas the cross-over point, 0.5, is set to 50 per cent, that is, every second person belongs to a Protestant church. In other words, in countries where a majority of the population is Protestant, the cases are coded as more in than out of the set. The set thus marks an empirical majority situation in each case rather than relying on the mean value of the population, which would run the risk of being biased due to the case selection. Data on membership of religious denominations were collected from the 1990 wave of the World Values Survey40 (WVS 2009).

4.2.2.2.2 Political heritage: Egalitarian ideas

The political history of a country is likely to affect politics today. In the case of women’s parliamentary presence, long-term influence of policies that favour women’s participation in the public sphere, such as in paid labour and higher education, can serve as an indicator of egalitarian ideas. Rosenbluth et al. (2006, 179, 185) show that a large welfare state is associated with more women in parliament (cf. Krook 2010; Rule 1981, 68; Siaroff 2000, 201–2), and countries with large welfare states often have a history of social democratic parties in government. This set thus follows the same logic that Siaroff (2000) applies: with a longer history of leftist government, countries are more likely to have an egalitarian social climate and policies that enhance women’s entry into the public and political spheres. Using data on the ideologies of the party/parties in government (Huber et al. 1997), the share of years with leftist government between 1946 and the outcome elections in the late 1980s was calculated. Thresholds in this fully continuous, fuzzy set were defined as 0, 50 and 100 per cent of years with leftist government. In other words, in countries where leftist governments have been in power for more

40 Data for Finland said that 85.4 per cent of the population belonged to free churches. As Finland is normally perceived of as a Protestant country, it was assumed that the free churches were Protestant churches.
than half of the time since 1946, cases are coded as more in than out of the
set. Thus, 100 per cent marks full membership of the set; 0 per cent indicates
full non-membership.

4.2.2.2.3 Gender balanced participation in paid labour and higher
education

Two of the more direct measures of whether women and men take equal part
in the public sphere are, women’s participation in paid labour and in higher
education (see, e.g., Adman 2009; Matland 1998, 113–7; Rosenbluth, Sal-
mond, and Thies 2006, 186; Rule 1987, 482). The effect of women’s equal
participation in the public sphere – as in paid labour and education – is likely
lagged, meaning that it will take some time before change in women’s par-
liamentary presence occurs. Therefore, these two conditions should be un-
derstood in a temporal perspective. Two sets were constructed to account for
women’s participation in paid labour and higher education, relative to that of
men.

Women’s employment in the civilian employment was calculated using
data for a period of ten years (OECD 2008), the last year being the outcome
election year. Because access to the labour market is less restricted than is
access to national parliament, and because the labour force usually includes
women of all ages, thresholds (0, 0.5 and 1) for this fully continuous, fuzzy
set were placed at 30 (Dahlerup 1988), 40 (Kanter 1977) and 50 per cent
(Rosenbluth, Salmond, and Thies 2006) women among the employed. A data
plot is found in Appendix, page 208.

The share of women graduating from higher education during a five-year
period prior to the outcome elections was calculated using data on the two
highest level of academic studies, ISCED 5 and 6 (Statistisches Bundesamt
2001; UNESCO 1999).41 Taking into account that most university students
are young and are hence more likely to be more progressive on issues of
gender equality, including their own participation in the public sphere,
thresholds were set higher in this fully continuous, fuzzy set: 0, 0.5 and 1
levels of set membership correspond to 40, 45 and 50 per cent women
among university graduates. The data plot is found in the Appendix, p. 207.

It should be noted that there is little variation in the data on women’s em-
ployment and participation in higher education: most cases are close to gen-
der balance. Due to the absence of comparable data on the extent to which
women work full time and the similar lack of educational data on women’s
participation in different academic disciplines, the thresholds are set higher
than in the outcome set.

41 The German data refer to both Absolventen and Promotionen. The UNESCO data refer to
two data points per country, providing a five-year average. In the cases of Norway and the
UK, data for 1983 (Norway) and 1985 (UK) were used. Data on the Swedish case are from
4.2.2.3 Intra-party conditions

The data on party organisations refer to the formal party rules, that is, the “official story” of the internal life of the organisations (Katz and Mair 1992a). While this approach has its limitations, for example, by excluding analysis of the extent to which the candidate selection is bureaucratised/institutionalised, it is well suited for cross-case comparisons of how party rules affect women’s parliamentary presence. Therefore, the comparisons carried out in this chapter do not include the otherwise commonly used concept of institutionalisation/bureaucratisation of candidate selection (Caul Kittilson 2006; Guadagnini 1993; Norris 1993). Because small-n studies are better suited for the analysis of the sometimes rapidly changing “real story” of the internal life of parties, this is instead dealt with in the single case study presented in Chapter 6.

4.2.2.3.1 Party magnitude

Studying women’s participation at the level of individual parties, Matland (1993; cf. Sainsbury 1993) suggests that when assessing how district size affects women’s chances of entering parliament, the appropriate indicator is party magnitude, the number of seats won by the individual party in each district, rather than district magnitude. In short, Matland claims that larger parties are more likely to have more women MPs. Although the present research is about parties on the aggregate level, it is reasonable to include party magnitude in the model.

In this fully continuous set, three thresholds that mark party magnitude are suggested. The upper bound of the set, which marks when a party is a full member (1) of the set of large parties, was placed at one third of seats in parliament. Full non-membership (0) was set to 15 per cent of seats, whereas 25 per cent marks the cross-over (0.5) point. The cross-over point corresponds to Norris’ (2003, 28) suggestion that large parties have more than 20 per cent of seats in parliament. Still, there appears to be lack of empirical definitions of different party sizes and hence this calibration constitutes an empirical proposition on how to identify a large parliamentary party. Data were collected from Katz and Mair (Katz and Mair 1992b, author’s own calculations). Plot is found in the Appendix, p.207.

4.2.2.3.2 Party ideology

Scholars of party and gender have pointed out that leftist or new left parties are associated with larger percentages of women MPs (see, e.g., Caul Kittilson 2006). Although this relationship may have changed over time (Løvenduski 1993, 13), it is a common method of assessing the extent to which a party can be expected to be orientated towards including more women candidates on its lists and therefore is included in this framework.
While the degree to which a party is ‘leftist’ or ‘new left’ might be applicable to a fully continuous set, there are several problems inherent in historically comparing the ideology of several parties from eleven different countries. Moreover, determining whether one leftist party is more or less to the left of another at one point in time is beyond the scope of this analysis. Therefore, employed here is a crisp, binary set based on data from the Chapel Hill expert survey 1984 and 1988 (Ray 1999; Steenbergen and Marks 2007),

with data for Norwegian cases drawn from the Comparative Parties Dataset (Swank 2008). Parties in categories ‘socialist,’ ‘radical left’ and ‘green’ in the Chapel Hill data set (‘left’ in the Swank data set) were coded full members (1) of the set of leftist parties; other parties were coded as full non-members (0) of the set. Included among members of the set are thus both ‘old’ and ‘new’ left parties, which should be noted when evaluating the results (see Caul Kittilson 2006, 124).

4.2.2.3.3 Candidate selection
Candidate selection is a major theme within the field of party and gender, and several different aspects of candidate recruitment, nomination and selection have been highlighted in the literature. This analysis is primarily concerned with the extent to which candidate selection is centralised at the top echelons of parties or whether sub-national organisations and individual members can influence who is fielded as a party candidate in elections (Hazan and Rahat 2006; Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Matland and Montgomery 2003b). There is still little consensus about whether centralised or decentralised candidate selection is conducive to more gender-balanced parliamentary parties. Matland and Montgomery (2003a), for example, argue that centralised structures allow for a favourable bird’s eye view of the gender composition of lists, whereas Caul Kittilson (2006, 124) show that decentralised candidate selection and centralised party structures are both related to larger shares of women MPs. In an earlier publication (Caul 1999, 85) she showed that centralisation of candidate selection did not increase the share of women elected. Hence, this set that is based on candidate selection is a set of parties with decentralised candidate selection.

Drawing on categorisations suggested by Bille (2001), based on data from Katz and Mair (Katz and Mair 1992b), a four-level fuzzy set on candidate selection was created. Table 4 below outlines membership levels and requirements. High membership is coded in cases where candidate selection is the prerogative of sub-national party branches and based on membership ballots; conversely, parties that have centralised control over candidate selection have lower membership levels.

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42 The Irish Sinn Fein (SFWP) was coded a full member of the set (Farrell 1999, 40–2).
Table 4: Set of parties with decentralised candidate selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set membership level</th>
<th>Mode of candidate selection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Final decision on candidacy made by sub-national branch. Membership ballot used. (Bille categories 5+6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>i) Final decision on candidacy made by sub-national branch (5) or ii) Sub-national branch decides, yet national organs can alter lists according to agreed-upon demands. Membership ballots used. (4+6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>Sub-national branch decides, yet national organs can alter lists according to agreed-upon demands. (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>More centralised candidate selection (1, 2 or 3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Categories refer to categories in the original source. Source: Author’s set construction based on data from Bille (2001, 367).

4.2.2.3.4 Party gender quotas

Party gender quotas can increase the share of women MPs in the parliamentary party (Caul Kittilson 2006, 124; Caul 2001, 1221–2) and thus provide indicators of the preferences and orientations of a party. As such, quotas are important for understanding the combinations of conditions that lead to gender-balanced parliamentary parties. In order to achieve comparability between cases and types of quotas, data on formal gender quotas were collected. It was found that fewer than one-fifth – 16 per cent – of the 57 parties in this study had adopted formal gender quotas prior to the outcome elections (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and Skjeie 2006; Galligan 1993; Guadagnini 1993; Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 2006; Leijenaar 1993; Steininger 2001). Such low variation may lead to flawed results (Benoit Rihoux and De Meur 2008, 45). Since historical data on gender quotas appear less reliable than data on contemporary, formal gender quotas, the safe track was chosen here: rather than comprising a set of its own, gender quotas will be integrated into the third, contextualising stage of the analysis.

4.2.2.3.5 Party women’s organisation and women activists

For male-dominated representation to change towards gender balance, women must demand parliamentary presence (Lovenduski 1993, 14). The question, however, is: how can women work most effectively to lobby for change and under what conditions will their efforts bear fruit? The role of women’s organisations in the party offers one possible channel but, on the other hand, separatism can also foster marginality and thus decreased influence. Caul Kittilson’s multivariate analysis shows that the presence of a party women’s organisation does not correlate significantly either with the share of women MPs or with change in the share of women MPs in West European parties (Caul Kittilson 2006, 124). There may be several reasons for this, resulting, for example, from the purpose and strategy of the women’s organisation. I argue that the impact of a women’s organisation in a particular party should be studied with respect to the aims, strategies and
integration of the organisation in everyday party work. This would require data that seem to be unavailable for the cases under study. Therefore, it is left out of this analysis, but is discussed in the analyses presented in chapters 5 and 6.

In a similar vein, previous studies have shown that the more women on the national executive board, the more women MPs elected to represent the party in parliament (Caul Kittilson 2006, 124; Caul 1999). However, the effect differs among electoral systems (Kunovich and Paxton 2005, 535–7). As noted in the theory chapter, the idea that women in influential positions can open the doors for more women to enter makes intuitive sense, yet is fraught with two major problems. First, women can be expected to be no less individually rational or strategic than men and hence cannot be expected to act on behalf of other women when it may hinder their own career advancement. Advancing to the top ranks of the party can be an equally challenging journey as becoming an MP, in terms of convincing others and building alliances, and entering the inner circle of a party may be as attractive as becoming an MP. Second, there is an apparent risk of overlap between the parliamentary party and the party executive board (van Biezen 2000; Enyedi and Linek 2008; Katz and Mair 1992a), which would mean that correlation could be due to multi-collinearity. The dataset used here (Katz and Mair 1992b) shows that some parties require their MPs to be present at the meetings of the executive board, others restrict the number of MPs while yet others do not limit the overlap between the parliamentary party and the executive board. The present dataset does not make it possible to identify cases of such overlap, and therefore the share of women in party leadership is not considered.

4.2.2.4 Expectations

Two expectations structure this study: interaction between conditions and equifinality, both of which apply to presence and absence of gender balance.

Interaction, particularly between more than two conditions, is a hitherto relatively unexplored part of the research field, but Chapter 2 showed that there may be several different, complex interactions that should be taken into account. Still, there are few specific, published hypotheses about which conditions are likely to interact. Thus the configurational analysis below provides an opportunity to explore which conditions interact, and so serves as a basis for further research into the configurations of conditions that result in gender balance. Generally speaking, interaction between both environmental and intra-party conditions is expected, both within and between the two groups of conditions. Because party behaviour is here understood as a consequence of interaction between intra-party and environmental conditions

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43 I am grateful to Paul Webb for pointing out the similarities between the incentives to become an MP and to become a member of the party executive.
(cf. Panebianco 1988, 11–14), no conditions are expected to be singularly sufficient or necessary for gender balance.

Given the many different parties that have reached gender balance and the way in which conditions tend to differ in their effect in different countries or parties, the analysis, it is expected, should show that there are several different routes to gender balance. Otherwise put, the empirical examination of cases is expected to show that equifinality is a fruitful concept for understanding under which conditions political parties become gender balanced.

There are few explicit studies of gender-biased parliamentary parties or the conditions that are unfavourable for women seeking office in which pose as the main research question how gender bias and male domination is maintained (see, however, Bjarnegård 2009; Hughes and Paxton 2008; Rule 1981). While Bjarnegård (2009) argues that lack of transparency and corruption can uphold male dominance in politics, Rule (1981) points to factors such as women having less money to pay for expensive election campaigns, and increased competition for candidacy when unemployment is high and men’s salaries are low. Rule also shows a correlation between low proportions of women in elected office and fewer women holding university degrees and fewer women professionals. Hughes and Paxton (2008) present a model in which the impact of particular events or path dependency is incorporated, adding a temporal perspective to the analysis. All approaches present important insights, yet research about these factors is not as well developed as that about factors that tend to increase women’s parliamentary presence.

Typically, expectations assume causal symmetry: absence of conditions that usually combine with gender balance is expected to be linked to absence of gender balance. As with presence of gender balance, analysis of its absence is expected to confirm expectations about configurations of conditions being sufficient for the outcome, as well as evidence supporting expectations about equifinality.

4.3 Exploring causal configurations

Because there are several different conditions and the analysis should ideally be based on a restricted number of conditions, the configurational analyses presented in this section are based on three different models. All three models include the intra-party conditions (large party magnitude, leftist party and localised candidate selection) and the electoral system-related conditions (closed party lists and large effective magnitude), but differ on the socio-economic conditions: Model A includes women’s participation in paid labour and higher education; Model B takes into account leftist political heritage; while Model C brings in the presence of Protestantism. Based on the performance of each model in the analysis of conditions that induce gender-
balanced parties, one model is selected for further analysis of cases that can be described by each configuration as well as for analysis of gender biased parties.

4.3.1 Gender-balanced parliamentary parties in Western Europe

4.3.1.1 Necessary conditions: Gender-balanced parliamentary parties

Analysis of necessity seeks to determine whether any condition is a prerequisite for the outcome to occur. The analysis is conducted with reference to the relationship vis-à-vis theory (consistency) and the extent to which it applies to the studied cases (coverage). Analyses of necessity are conducted using a 0.90 level of consistency, whereas configurational analyses instead rely on the 0.80 level (Ragin 2008b, fn 7; Schneider and Wagemann 2007, 213).

The results are presented in the two columns marked “Gender balance” in Table 5 below. The same ‘bivariate’ type of analysis can also be used for determining whether any condition is singularly sufficient for the outcome, which is shown in the columns marked “Absence of Gender Balance” in the table.

As is clear from the table, none of the studied conditions is necessary or singularly sufficient for gender-balanced parliamentary parties: none of the consistency levels reaches 0.90. This is well in line with previous, methodologically similar studies of women’s parliamentary presence (Krook 2010). These new empirical results contribute to the debate about the prerequisites for high proportions of women MPs, showing that the commonly studied indicators were not necessary for gender-balanced parliamentary parties in Western Europe in the late 1980s.

4.3.1.2 Sufficient configurations of conditions for gender balance

All three models were entered into analyses of configurations of conditions, fuzzy-set truth table analysis. For the sake of comparison, analyses of all models were conducted using a 0.80 consistency cut-off and configurations describing at least 1 case were included. A summary of the results are presented in Table 27 (Appendix, p.209). All three models returned high levels of consistency and coverage for all solutions. From a numerical point of view, any of the models would serve for further analysis. However, labour and education, the two socioeconomic conditions included in the first model, are more direct measures of women’s participation in the social sphere, which makes the results more concrete for the purpose of understanding the causal relationships. Henceforth the model including education and labour was chosen for in-depth analysis of configurations of conditions.
The results from Model A, the intermediate solution (Ragin 2008c, 173–5) in which certain non-observed cases are included in order to achieve a result that is both empirically and theoretically informed, is displayed in Table 6. Each row presents a configuration of conditions that is sufficient for gender balance in parliamentary parties. Logical AND is marked by *, whereas + signals logical OR, indicating that there are other conditions that lead to the same outcome. Upper-case letters are used for conditions that are present, whereas absent conditions are written in lower-case letters. In this intermediate solution, simplifying assumptions were made about six of the seven conditions: all conditions were assumed to be present for the outcome to occur, except closed lists, which, due to the still somewhat ambiguous results on its effect on women’s parliamentary presence, can be either present or absent. This means that any logically possible, yet non-observed, cases that are included in construction of the solution must fulfil those criteria.

QCA results are assessed using numerical measures – coverage and consistency – and the extent to which the configuration enhances our knowledge about the analysed problem. The solution presented in the table above has a high level of consistency – 0.88 – and the coverage level is at 0.71, which means that 71 per cent of the membership scores in the outcome set that are...
above 0.50 (i.e., the membership scores of successful cases in the outcome set) can be described by one or several of the configurations.

Table 6: Sufficient configurations, gender-balanced parties. Intermediate solution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Configurations</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Raw (N)</td>
<td>Unique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. large<em>LCS</em>LEFTIST*CLIST+</td>
<td>0.108844 (4)</td>
<td>0.045028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. LABOUR<em>EDUC</em>clist*LEM+</td>
<td>0.233884 (8)</td>
<td>0.104308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. LARGE<em>LCS</em>LABOUR*EDUC+</td>
<td>0.183674 (5)</td>
<td>0.034985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. LCS<em>LABOUR</em>EDUC*CLIST+</td>
<td>0.285390 (11)</td>
<td>0.139294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. LARGE<em>LEFTIST</em>CLIST*LEM+</td>
<td>0.084224 (3)</td>
<td>0.059281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. large<em>leftist</em>labour<em>EDUC</em>clist+</td>
<td>0.073858 (1)</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. large<em>lcs</em>leftist<em>EDUC</em>clist+</td>
<td>0.092971 (3)</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. large<em>LEFTIST</em>EDUC<em>CLIST</em>lem</td>
<td>0.080661 (3)</td>
<td>0.025267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solution coverage: 0.714934
Solution consistency: 0.878233

Note: Model includes closed lists (clist), large effective magnitude (lem), gender balance in education (educ) and paid labour (labour), leftist party ideology (leftist), localised candidate selection (lcs) and localised candidate selection (lcs). See Appendix, page 209, for details on selected prime implicants. Frequency cut-off: 1. Consistency cut-off: 0.824427.

The results show that several different configurations of conditions may lead to gender-balanced parliamentary parties, which confirms that gender balance in parliament is a matter of equifinality. The results also clearly show that several configurations combine conditions from party organisations and their environment: the expectation of interaction between the party level and environmental conditions is thereby confirmed. Each of the configurations also imparts empirically intriguing results.

4.3.1.2.1 Small, leftist parties

The first configuration covers four parties that were all leftist, had localised candidate selection, were not big and, in addition, were active in countries where the electoral system does not allow voters to change the order of candidates on party lists: the Swedish Left Party (V), the Austrian Greens (GA), the German Greens (Grünen/B’90) and the Norwegian Socialist Left Party (SV). These parties all shared an ideological predisposition for gender balance, and with localised candidate selection women could enter through the local level and hence draw on possible local networks when seeking nomination. Since the electoral systems in these countries did not allow voters to alter the lists of candidates, full responsibility for the outcome lies with the parties themselves. In short, their lists of candidates must have been constructed so as to allow for gender balance. All but one had adopted quotas prior to the studied elections (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and Skjeie 2006, 71–2;
Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 2006; Steininger 2001). It should be noted here that the two Scandinavian parties can also be described by the fourth and eighth configurations, while the green parties are members of only this configuration. Furthermore, the social conditions point to an important difference among the cases: the Austrian Greens and German Greens were not operating in as egalitarian an environment as the Scandinavian parties. This means that when party conditions are favourable enough, the environmental conditions are of secondary importance.

Specifically, the conditions that comprise this configuration confirm results from previous research. Leftism and green ideology have been understood as based on egalitarian principles and, thus, more equal representation by women. Such outcomes have also been associated with gender quotas, closed party lists and localised candidate selection (see, e.g., Caul Kittilson 2006; Caul 1999). The above findings show that when party lists are closed, the efforts by individual parties can bear fruit. In these cases, the gender quotas contributed towards the outcome. What is more, this configuration suggests that the positive effect of party magnitude (Matland 1993) may be substituted for by ideology, party rules favouring gender balance, and selection of candidates on the local level.

4.3.1.2.2 Egalitarian environmental conditions and contagion

The second configuration covers Danish cases only, and points to the favourable environmental conditions: egalitarian social structures with gender balance in employment and education, and large effective magnitude. Contrary to the above configuration, this one does not rely on full responsibility for gender balance with the parties but includes a component of preference voting, which means that parties are not the sole agents that can influence the outcome. Two of the cases can also be described by the seventh configuration; one case also fits the third. One of the parties – the Socialist People’s Party – had gender quotas during this time (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and Skjeie 2006). Therefore, we may conclude that while the environmental conditions constitute the common denominator in this Danish configuration of gender balance, the parties relied on different ways to reach gender balance.

These results are well in line with studies pointing to social and cultural conditions as being important for gender equality in politics (see, e.g., Inglehart and Norris 2003). Most likely, the Danish parties achieved gender balance because both the supply of and demand for women in political decision-making roles were supported by the egalitarian environmental condi-

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44 SF (Socialist People’s Party), SD (Social Democrats), RV (Social Liberals), KRF (Christian People’s Party), CD (Centre Democrats), KR (Conservative People’s Party) and FRP (Progress party) were successful cases, whereas V (Liberal) was not.
tions. All but one were part of what appears to have been a process of micro contagion (Matland and Studlar 1996).

4.3.1.2.3 Large parties, localised candidate selection and egalitarianism

The parties that can be aptly described by the third configuration all come from countries in which there was gender balance in the paid labour and higher education sectors: Swedish Social Democrats (SAP), Finnish Social Democratic Party (SDP), Danish Social Democrats (SD), Norwegian Labour Party (DNA) and the Conservative National Coalition (KOK), in Finland. While all these countries have proportional electoral systems, they vary with respect to the place given to individual candidates. When the parties are compared in this QCA however, their common characteristics narrow down to localised candidate selection and electoral success: newcomers could enter on the local level, likely drawing on their personal contacts with the local party, while, in the circumstances of large parliamentary parties, there was room for candidates who were not placed in the top slot. Though the Finnish parties did not use gender quotas, the Norwegian party adopted quotas before the elections and the Swedish Social Democrats followed suit a few years later (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and Skjeie 2006, 71–2). While this configuration covers several large social democratic parties, the inclusion of the Finnish conservatives indicates that in countries where the social structures are conducive to women pursuing a political career, party magnitude and selection of candidates at the local level can be as decisive as ideology.

This combination of conditions bears evidence of how well gender quotas can play out in large parties, but also of how, when the environmental conditions favour egalitarianism, large parties can become gender balanced without using formal gender quotas. It should thus be read as support for the idea that party magnitude matters (Matland 1993), yet that it does so under certain conditions that are also favourable for gender balance.

4.3.1.2.4 Favourable party attributes, favourable environmental conditions

The fourth configuration describes the largest number of cases, both in terms of raw and unique coverage. It is one of egalitarian social structures with gender equality in both labour and higher education, closed party lists and localised candidate selection. The closed party lists mean that the main decision to achieve gender balance has been made inside the parties, although likely as a reflection of the social structures. This configuration describes eleven cases, ten of which are gender balanced: all the five studied Swedish parties – the Left Party, Social Democrats, Centre Party, People’s Party and the Conservatives – and all the six Norwegian parties – Socialist Left Party,

\[\text{45 The three Scandinavian parties can also be described by other configurations: SAP by the fourth, SD by the second and DNA by the fourth.} \]

\[\text{46 V, SAP, C, FP, M.}\]
Labour, Centre Party, Christian People’s Party, Conservatives and the Progress Party.\textsuperscript{47} It thus covers parties from across the ideological landscapes. In these egalitarian countries, women were able to enter party politics on the local level, likely because there was a certain tolerance towards or demand for women in political decision-making roles, either from themselves or from the parties. As noted above, several of these parties – V, SAP and FP in Sweden and SV, DNA, SP and KRF in Norway – had adopted formal gender quotas or policies of gender equality either prior to the elections or a few years later (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and Skjeie 2006, 71–2), an indication of their predilection for gender balance. The parties that did not have gender quotas or similar rules thus faced competition for votes from parties that had gender balanced lists, a situation which led almost all the former toward gender balance – that is, a process of contagion between parties (Matland and Studlar 1996).

This combination of conditions bears an obvious resemblance to the third configuration, confirming that localised candidate selection and gender quotas are favourable and thus echoing the results of previous research that includes the same cases (Caul Kittilson 2006, 124). It also corroborates results from studies where culture emerges as a strong indicator (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Finally, it provides an example of how parties with localised candidates selection that operate in countries where both the social conditions and the presence of other parties pursuing gender balance will achieve gender balance, despite not adopting formal gender quotas. This, it should be noted, applies mainly to the non-leftist parties and offers one answer to how Nordic parties reached gender balance.

4.3.1.2.5 Alternative configurations and new case knowledge

The remaining four combinations of conditions have lower coverage, but nevertheless point to interesting cases. The fifth configuration covers large leftist parties in closed list systems with large effective magnitude, and describes three gender balanced non-Nordic cases: the Labour Party (PvDA) in the Netherlands, the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI). The PvDA and SPÖ had gender quotas (Quotaproject 2006a, 2007), but the data are unclear about whether the PCI had quotas in 1987 (Bardi and Morlino 1992, 596; Quotaproject 2006c). These bigger parties with leftist ideologies are comparable to the Nordic cases.

Turning to the sixth configuration, we may note that the one case covered by it – the Irish Progressive Democrats, PD\textsuperscript{48} – is also covered by the seventh. Hence it is the latter configuration that is analysed here. The three parties covered – Irish PD, Danish Christian People’s Party (KRF) and Progress

\textsuperscript{47} SV, DNA, SP, KRF, H, FRP. The Norwegian Progress Party (FRP) was not gender balanced.

\textsuperscript{48} This party no longer exists (Irish Times 2009a, 2009b).
Party (FRP) – are all counter-intuitive cases: non-large, non-leftist, non-decentralised candidate selection, non-closed lists, though gender balanced in higher education. While the Danish cases can be explained with reference to previous configurations, the Irish case presents something of a puzzle of its own and could be fruitfully selected for a historical single-case study on the internal life of the organisation. Gilligan (1993, 156) points to lack of institutionalisation and a low degree of intra-party competition in candidate selection as possible explanations. Finally, the last combination of conditions covers two cases already discussed above – the Norwegian Socialist Left Party (SV), the Swedish Left Party (V) – but also the Flemish Ecology Party (AGA) in Belgium, which was not gender balanced. This combination of conditions corresponds to an empirical pattern, yet the cases are more adequately described by the other configurations.

4.3.2 Gender-biased parliamentary parties in Western Europe

The analysis of necessary and singularly sufficient conditions for gender balance presented above (Table 5) also applies to the gender biased cases: it shows that there were no necessary nor any singularly sufficient conditions for gender-biased parliamentary parties in Western Europe in the late 1980s.

4.3.2.1 Sufficient configurations for absence of gender balance

Table 7 below displays the results from an analysis of configurations that induce gender bias or, in other words, hinder gender balance in parliamentary parties. In this intermediate solution, the conditions that were assumed to be present in gender-balanced cases are assumed to be absent. The results are highly consistent, 0.87, though they have slightly lower coverage than the solution presented above; 0.63, which indicates that although it accounts for many of the gender-biased cases, the model could be developed. In order to achieve comparability the same model is used in analysis of the presence as well as of the absence of gender balance.

In sum, the analysis confirms that although the exact opposites of configurations that lead to gender balance do not induce gender bias, some of the conditions whose presence are generally seen as favourable are notable by their absence in the configurations, especially the socioeconomic factors, effective magnitude and leftist party ideology. It also demonstrates that gender bias is not a simple matter of adding or subtracting a particular condition, but depends upon complex combinations of conditions.

The configurations also display two important facts. Absence of large effective magnitude is part of five of the six configurations, telling of a widespread lack of gender balance in cases with smaller effective magnitude. The configurations also show that localised candidate selection is only part of two configurations and, what is more, only in the absence of this condition.
The level of candidate selection may thus not be as useful in explaining absence of gender balance as of its presence.

Two of the configurations (number 1 and 4) are particularly encompassing or theoretically interesting. They are analysed separately below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Configurations</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. leftist<em>labour</em>educ*CLIST</td>
<td>0.334099</td>
<td>0.175277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. large<em>leftist</em>educ<em>clist</em>lem</td>
<td>0.036357</td>
<td>0.034443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. large<em>lcs</em>LEFTIST<em>labour</em>lem</td>
<td>0.096441</td>
<td>0.088404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. large<em>leftist</em>labour<em>CLIST</em>lem</td>
<td>0.191351</td>
<td>0.061615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. LARGE<em>labour</em>educ<em>CLIST</em>lem</td>
<td>0.081515</td>
<td>0.026406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. LARGE<em>lcs</em>leftist<em>labour</em>clist*lem</td>
<td>0.080750</td>
<td>0.078837</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solution coverage: 0.633754
Solution consistency: 0.868379

Note: Model includes closed lists (clist), large effective magnitude (lem), gender balance in education (educ) and paid labour (labour), leftist party ideology (leftist), localised candidate selection (lcs) and localised candidate selection (lcs). Simplifying assumptions: large, lcs, leftist, labour, educ and lem absent, clist absent or present. See Appendix (p. 210) for details on selected prime implicants. Frequency cut-off: 1. Consistency cut-off: 0.821138.

4.3.2.1.1 Non-leftist parties in non-egalitarian environments with closed party lists

The first configuration is the most encompassing, describing 12 parties in four different countries: the Italian Republic Party, Italian Liberal Party, Italian Social Movement, Radical Party;\(^{49}\) the Christian Democratic Appeal, Democrats '66, and People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy\(^{50}\) from the Netherlands; the German Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union and Free Democratic Party\(^{51}\); and the Austrian Freedom Party and Austrian People’s Party.\(^{52}\) These parties were non-leftist and were active in socioeconomic environments characterised by women’s comparatively low participation in paid labour and higher education. In addition, the electoral systems did not allow voters to alter party lists. This means that, both analytically and in practice, full responsibility for the outcome can be placed upon the parties. While their choice of candidates was most likely influenced by the environment, for reasons of demand and supply, they did not use their power to increase the share of women MPs to a balanced level. This is underlined by the fact that none of the parties had adopted gender quotas in the late 1980s, and only two – CDU in Germany and ÖVP in Austria\(^{53}\) – decided to do so in the mid-90s (Guadagnini 1993; Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires

---

\(^{49}\) PRI, PLI, MSI and PR. The latter was not gender biased.
\(^{50}\) CDA, D’66 and VVD. D’66 was not gender biased.
\(^{51}\) CDU, CSU and FDP.
\(^{52}\) FPÖ and ÖVP, the latter not gender biased.
\(^{53}\) The data are mixed on whether ÖVP did have gender quotas in the 1990s.
2006; Leijenaar 1993; Quotaproject 2006a; Steininger 2001). In combination, the few external incentives to alter the situation – the ideological predisposition to opt for status quo and then the lack of preference voting – meant that these parties could maintain gender bias and male dominance.

This configuration confirms that absence of leftism and egalitarian social structures are indeed connected with absence of gender balance in parliamentary parties. It confirms the effect of individual conditions on the outcome, while also identifying the configuration in which these conditions should be understood. Finally, it provides clear evidence that no causal symmetry is to be expected.

4.3.2.1.2 Non-large, non-leftist parties in unfavourable electoral systems

The other configuration that emerges from the analysis of configurations that were connected with absence of gender balance in parliamentary parties in the late 1980s combines non-large, non-leftist parties in countries where women did not participate in paid labour as much as did the men, and where electoral lists are closed and relatively few deputies are sent from each district. The cases covered are the Belgian Flemish Christian People’s Party and Flemish Party of Liberty and Progress, as well as two German parties, the Christian Social Union and Free Democratic Party. None of these parties appears to have had gender quotas for parliamentary elections in the late 1980s (Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 2006; Meier 2004). In these cases, voters could not change the order of the list made by the parties, which means that if women were placed low on the lists they were unlikely to be elected in the small districts. The relatively few women in the paid labour force in these countries suggests weak demand for gender-balanced parties, making it rational for the parties to remain gender biased.

The specific conditions that comprise this configuration are well in line with what should be expected given previous research: when the parliamentary party is small, it is especially important to get its core activists elected, which may effectively close the doors for newcomers. In these parties, the ideological predispositions were not those of leftist or green parties, but instead reflected Christian democratic or liberal values. That is, they point to rather typical, gender-biased cases. The configuration as such also indicates a particularly unfavourable combination of conditions, where the outcome rested heavily upon choices made within the parties.

54 CVP, PVV and VU. VU was later known as VLD, see Deschouwer (2004, 193) and Volkswunie, which split in 2000 (Gschwend and Hooghe 2008). CVP is not gender biased, although only with a slight margin.

55 CSU and FDP.
4.3.2.1.3 Alternative configurations and new case knowledge

The remaining four configurations have lower coverage levels, yet point to a few interesting anomalies. Configuration 2 provides the only description of a UK party, the Liberal Democrats. With unfavourable socioeconomic and electoral conditions, this non-large and non-leftist party remained gender biased. The third configuration has a low consistency level, but still deserves mentioning. It includes parties that could have been expected to be gender balanced: non-large, leftist and green parties with centralised candidate selection. The possible effect of their ideological predispositions appears to have been counteracted by unfavourable social structures and electoral laws. The covered cases are the Belgian green party AGA, today known as ‘Groen!’ (Jagers and Walgrave 2007 fn 2), and two Irish parties: ‘Sinn Fein the Workers’ Party’ and the ‘Labour Party’. None of the Irish parties had adopted gender quotas, though AGA adopted a gender quota in the early 1990s (Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 2006, 208). The consistency of this combination of conditions is however low, and it should not be over-interpreted.

The fifth configuration covers two German cases, Christian Democratic Union and German Social Democratic Party,56 the former of which can also be described by the first configuration. The sixth is apt for describing the bigger, non-leftist, Irish parties, ‘Fianna Fail’ and ‘Fine Gael’57, which used non-decentralised methods of candidate selection for elections in an electoral system – methods generally understood as unfavourable to women. The relative lack of gender balance in paid labour is also likely to have contributed to the outcome. Because two other Irish parties were described by an earlier configuration, it should be noted that the Irish cases share three conditions: absence of localised candidate selection, absence of gender balance on the labour market and absence of large effective magnitude. Although that is not a configuration of its own, it points to the factors that hindered women seeking elected office in Ireland in the late 1980s – regardless of which of these parties was selected.

4.4 Conclusions

At the outset of this chapter, three goals were set out. The first was to explore the existence of equifinality, necessary and sufficient conditions and the configurations of conditions that led to the presence and absence of gender balance in parliamentary parties in Western Europe in the late 1980s and thus generate new knowledge. The second was to operationalise commonly used concepts using fuzzy sets, and the third to compare the results to multi-

56 CDU and SPD.
57 FF and FG.
multivariate analyses that cover the same cases and so see how fsQCA can contribute to the field of party and gender.

The operationalisation of conditions included conditions that were possible to anchor with ready-made or widespread empirical understandings of concepts such as gender balance, leftism and decentralised candidate selection. Other conditions relied upon empirical analysis of the cases under study and previous research that had not produced clear-cut empirical definitions of the concepts, such as large effective magnitude or large party magnitude. All operationalisations are by necessity tied to cultural and temporal conditions, that is, seen through the eyes of the researcher and the data at hand – be it contemporary or historical. As such, they should be seen as suggestions on how to understand a theoretical concept, propositions about a standard of measurement, and should thus be subjected to debate. The studies presented in the two coming chapters are aimed at achieving that.

The empirical analyses presented above show that gender-balanced parliamentary parties were not the outcome of any necessary conditions, nor were they caused by singularly sufficient conditions. This also holds true for parties that were not gender balanced. Instead, parties became gender balanced or remained gender biased as a consequence of several conditions together forming sufficient configurations. The multitude of configurations clearly demonstrates that both presence and absence of gender balance can be attained in several different ways. In other words, this is a case of equifinality.

Analysis of the presence of gender balance produced several configurations of conditions. The substantial results provide important insights into how conditions interact with each other. For example, it was argued that the positive effect of having many deputies elected may be substituted by the parties instead striving to achieve gender balance based on ideological predispositions, and via gender-sensitive party rules such as quotas and candidate selection processes that target and recruit candidates at the local level. In addition, party magnitude was shown to combine with localised candidate selection to create a favourable external environment, making it possible to reach gender balance in the absence of ideological predispositions or institutional incentives, such as gender quotas. This points to party magnitude being an important condition in the study of party and gender, but that a similar effect can be produced by other conditions in combination.

The analyses further echoed research stressing the contagion among cases: the Danish parties provided examples of how favourable environmental conditions and how if some, but not all, parties adopt gender quotas this can lead to other parties also becoming gender balanced even without quotas. Furthermore, adding gender quotas to the analysis while not including it in the model made it possible to note that localised candidate selection sometimes combined with gender quotas. These findings support results from previous research suggesting that quotas are neither necessary nor suf-
cient (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008), but that their effect depends on how and under what conditions they are implemented.

Analysis of the absence of gender balance confirmed that reversing the conditions that led to gender balance would not provide any useful description of how some parties remained gender biased. It also showed that the level of candidate selection is not as analytically useful in explanations of absence of gender balance as in analyses of presence of the outcome. The analysis showed that absence of some of the specific conditions that are usually understood as favourable for women seeking elected office were part of the configurations connected with absence of gender balance: absence of large effective magnitude and absence of egalitarian social structures (labour, education) did correspond to the absence of gender balance. However, configurations should be understood as such, and the effect of specific conditions should be interpreted in light of the combinations of conditions that they are part of. One configuration demonstrated how lack of environmental cues such as gender balance in paid labour and higher education or the lack of possibilities for voters to move candidates up or down the lists at elections facilitated non-leftist parties’ remaining male dominated. In addition, the results of the analysis of absence of gender balance confirm that parties are the central actors behind the level of gender representation in parliament. When parties decide to act, they can make a change. When they choose not to do so, either because they lack the ideological predispositions in their own organisation or because the environmental conditions are unfavourable, parliamentary parties most likely remain gender unbalanced.

This fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis contributes to the research field in several ways. By operationalising concepts using sets, comparisons are enhanced by the transparency provided by set construction. This can be of benefit not only for large- or intermediate-N studies, but also for small-n and single case studies in which benchmarks for comparison are equally important. In empirical terms, the use of fsQCA has contributed with more case-level knowledge, enhancing our comparative knowledge about particular cases both in terms of the extent to which they can be said to fit the empirical interpretations of concepts suggested here but also how conditions are combined in each case.

Compared to multivariate analyses, this study both confirms previous findings about the effects of specific conditions – for example, leftism, electoral laws, women’s presence in the public sphere and party magnitude – and provides compelling reasons for conducting further research into the combinations of conditions that lead to presence and absence of gender-balanced parliamentary parties. The configurational aspect is new, having previously been used only in a few more traditional large-N studies. Hence the above comparative analyses of an intermediate number of cases offer new insights into party and gender.
This chapter focuses on women’s parliamentary presence in ten contemporary Central and Eastern European EU member states during the late 2000s. The discussion is centred on political parties and conditions specific to each country. The main objectives of this chapter cover four of the five specific aims set out in the introductory chapter: 1) it seeks to add new knowledge about how configurations inside and outside of parties lead to gender balance, 2) it investigates possible necessary conditions, 3) it applies knowledge gained from Western Europe (WEur) to the Central and East European (CEE) cases, and 4) it questions the empirical understandings and definitions developed in the previous chapter, which includes asking how CEE parties contribute to our understanding of gender and party politics.

The structured focused comparisons presented in this chapter demonstrate that party-level conditions in Central and East Europe exercise more explanatory power than do the common environmental conditions. Such comparative analyses indicate that looking at the practical, organisational way a party approaches the issue of gender is a fruitful complement to the general left/right frame. This study further shows that even though a party may not be actively engaged in efforts to attain a gender-balanced parliamentary presence its parliamentary party can still become gender balanced. This chapter also presents an initial analysis of how party splits and mergers affect the proportion of women in parliament. It concludes with an appeal for more research into the way in which organisational instability affects party behaviour towards representation.

Based on its analysis this study suggests that the impact of social factors should be envisioned in terms of their interaction with party level characteristics. Furthermore, it proposes that, given the low variation in women’s presence in the public sphere existing between the countries (generally there are only minor differences between participation rates of women and men in paid labour and higher education sectors) gender equality in the public sphere should be understood as a scope condition. Six political parties were selected for study in this chapter. Five of them were found to have had either formal gender quotas or a women’s organisation. In the final section of the chapter the case comparisons point to a deviant case as particularly suited for an in-depth case study.
5.1 Aim, purpose and outline

In this chapter, through the analysis of the six parties from Central and Eastern Europe, we gain new empirical knowledge about CEE parties. Its main objective is to test whether the empirical understandings of theoretical concepts constructed in the previous chapter on West European parties are useful in the study of gender-balanced parties in Central and Eastern Europe. It does so by way of comparison between West European and CEE cases. The first section of the chapter deals with operationalisations and presents a comparison between calibrations done in the previous chapter and those calibrations constructed below. Additionally, this discussion provides details about the methods and rationales behind case selection, data collection, operationalisation and calibrations.

The second objective of this chapter is to examine if there are any necessary conditions for gender balance. An additional aim is to determine how conditions are configured in each of the cases and thus investigate the extent to which we can understand with reference to parties in Western Europe the factors in CEE parties whereby gender balance is achieved. Accordingly, the second section presents a fuzzy-set QCA of necessary conditions. The third part of the chapter offers a structured focused comparison (George and Bennett 2005) of six different political parties that compares the selected CEE parties to each other and to gender-balanced parties in Western Europe. The research presented in this chapter includes applications of set theory in a structured focused comparison that aims to investigate the configurations of conditions in each of the six studied cases. This means that the chapter offers a fusion of structured focused comparison and set theory. The chapter ends with a concluding section and an outlook for the in-depth case study presented in the next chapter.

5.1.1 Expectations

The empirical understandings (set coding) developed in the study of West European parties are expected to be largely directly applicable in the Central and East European cases. However, neither the exact configurations presented in the previous chapter nor any other pre-specified configurations of conditions are expected. The theory development anticipated in this chapter relies on the possibility to add conditions more frequently seen in CEE party politics than in Western Europe, but it also includes the case level knowledge about configurations produced in the comparative analysis.

The previous chapter showed that there were no necessary or singularly sufficient conditions for gender-balanced parliamentary parties in Western Europe. Those results, and the configurational approach to causality, lead to the expectation that there are no necessary or singularly sufficient conditions for gender-balanced parliamentary parties in contemporary CEE.
5.2 Operationalising gender and party politics in CEE

Applying theoretical concepts developed from political parties that have been functioning as parties since the first part of the 20th century to cases that are, at the most, two-decades old raises several intriguing academic problems. In an edited volume in which experiences from Western Europe were applied to cases in CEE, Matland (2003) concludes that the largely Western framework used for analysis is useful, but he also assumes a more cautious and nuanced position on the usefulness of particular conditions: some explanations may be more or less useful than others, but in many cases the effect of one factor depends on the impact of another.

To deepen our understanding of which interactions are present in successful cases and to further the empirical interpretation and application of theoretical concepts, set theory is used for modelling party behaviour. Conditions outlined in the theory chapter and applied in the previous chapter are operationalised with reference to theoretical and empirical knowledge drawn from parties and countries in Central and Eastern EU states. The operationalisations provide us with the possibility to compare cases in kind and degree in a transparent manner, while structuring the data for both a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis and a small-n comparison in the second half of the chapter.

5.2.1 Data collection and case selection

Data collection was conducted in two steps. First, data on the proportion of women in all parties currently represented in the lower house of national parliaments in ten CEE former communist countries (now EU members) were collected from parliamentary web sites or by direct email contact with election authorities. The outcome set – gender balance in the parliamentary party – was then calibrated.

In the next data collection stage, parties that had a more gender-balanced parliamentary delegation were contacted. This entailed approaching an MP and/or a member of the party leadership via phone, after which a short questionnaire was sent via email. Data collection began in late spring 2010 and ended in October 2010.

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58 See Appendix for more information.
59 In some parties, contact via phone was not possible. In these cases, questionnaires were emailed to the respondent without any previous contact.
60 The questionnaire is available in appendix. In the contact with the parties, their status as a successful case was presented as the reason for approaching them. To increase the response rate, individuals that were either women and/or more likely to take an interest in gender issues, e.g., because they were members of committee that dealt with family issues, were contacted. The decision to target respondents who are more likely to answer a questionnaire about gender issues is considered unlikely to affect the answers to the rather technical and formal
The response rate for the questionnaire was an acceptable 43 per cent, which in this small group of cases amounted to six parties. Details on all successful (gender-balanced) cases are available in Table 8 below.

The six cases provide an empirical insight into gender and party in contemporary Central and Eastern European democracies, although one should be cautioned about applying generalisations to all successful cases in CEE based on a small sample from only half of the countries.

5.2.1.1 Cases
In selecting the cases for inclusion in the study, 62 cases were identified as characterised as party organisations, as opposed to being simply groups of independent candidates, and of these 14 were defined as gender balanced. To put it otherwise, 22.5 per cent of the population of all the cases were gender balanced. This is in contrast to the 56 per cent of successful cases in the set of West European parties that were gender balanced. The CEE cases stand out as being notable pioneers in attaining gender balance. It should be noted, however, that the distribution of cases is more evenly spread than in WEur during the 1980s, when most of the gender-balanced parties were found in the Nordic countries. The only exceptions are in Estonia, where we find several cases that qualify as gender balanced and in Lithuania where three small or very small parties are included in the list of successful cases.

5.2.2 Set calibrations
The case selection depends on the definition of gender balance. This subsection covers calibration of the outcome, party attributes and environmental conditions, all of which will be used in the fuzzy-set QCA and the structured focused comparison. Cases are presented in Table 10 (p. 111).

5.2.2.1 Defining gender balance in contemporary CEE
The definition of gender balance in this study has been influenced by the two ratio ranges used in the West European study: the 50/50 range suggested by Rosenbluth et al. (2006), and the 40/60 range put forward by Kanter (1977; cf. Raam 2005, 875). As in the WEur set construction, the 40/60 range marks the point at which parties are deemed as being fully gender-balanced parliamentary parties, thus ‘full members’ (at the 1.0 membership level) in the data set. Conversely, applying Kanter’s (1977) definitions, when there are gender uniform groups in which only men or women are represented the parties are defined as fully out of the set, i.e., have a 0.0 membership level. This is a meaningful definition that also has empirical value.

questions about party organisation that were covered by the questionnaire. Reliability of the data is therefore not considered to be significantly altered.
The cross-over point 0.5 – at which it is not possible to determine whether a case is balanced or not – poses a challenge here. In the previous chapter, a ranking of 20 per cent of women in parliament constituted the 0.5 membership level. As demonstrated in Figure 2 below, in CEE comparatively few cases fell into the 25 per cent range, whereas there are several cases at the 20 per cent or just below level.

Figure 2: Frequency plot, percentage of women MPs per party. CEE, late 2000s

Expectations about the level of women’s parliamentary presence have changed since the period to which the WEur in the previous chapter data refer. In 1990 the UN expected the 30 per cent level to have been reached by 1995 and indeed support for 30 per cent level of representation did increase in the 1990s (Dahlerup 2006, 515). But, as time has shown, such measures are likely to come with a certain time lag; that is to say, their effect is not immediate but often needs years to trickle down to every party or party branch. While this overall increase in the demands for what constitutes fair representation is not by itself enough to warrant changing the definition of the cross-over point, considered along with the data from the studied cases there were sound reasons to rethink the position of the cross-over point. Therefore, it was set at 25 per cent, rather than the previous WEur definition of 20 per cent.
### Table 8: Successful cases in Central and Eastern Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Election</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>MPs, total (party magnitude)</th>
<th>Women MPs, percentage</th>
<th>Case included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LV 2006</td>
<td>New Era</td>
<td>JL</td>
<td>18 (0.18)</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE 2007</td>
<td>People's union of Estonia</td>
<td>ERL</td>
<td>6 (0.06)</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ 2010</td>
<td>Communist Party of Czechia and Moravia</td>
<td>KSCM</td>
<td>26 (0.13)</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL 2007</td>
<td>Polish Social Democratic Party*</td>
<td>SDPL</td>
<td>10 (0.02)</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 2008</td>
<td>National revival party</td>
<td>TPP</td>
<td>16 (0.11)</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE 2007</td>
<td>Centre Party</td>
<td>Kesk</td>
<td>29 (0.29)</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 2008</td>
<td>Union of Lithuanian peasants and peoples</td>
<td>LVLS</td>
<td>3 (0.02)</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ 2010</td>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>VV</td>
<td>24 (0.12)</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 2010</td>
<td>Politics can be different</td>
<td>LMP</td>
<td>16 (0.04)</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 2008</td>
<td>Labor party**</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>10 (0.07)</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE 2007</td>
<td>Social democrats</td>
<td>SDE</td>
<td>10 (0.09)</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG 2008</td>
<td>Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria Party</td>
<td>GERB</td>
<td>117 (0.49)</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI 2008</td>
<td>Social democrats</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>29 (0.32)</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ 2010</td>
<td>Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity 09</td>
<td>TOP09</td>
<td>41 (0.21)</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Averages and response rate** 25 (0.15) 35.9 43%

Note: Party magnitude = share of seats in parliament. *SDPL was part of the Left and Democrats (LiD) in the 2007 elections and is included in the data for LiD in the above figures. **DP also includes MPs from the coalition Labour + youth.

Source: See Appendix.
The upper and lower bounds of the definition of gender balance as defined in the previous chapter are thus kept in this analysis, and only a slight shift in the 0.5 level is made. The interpretation of gender balance thus remains, while there is only a minor difference as to where the empirical boundary between the two lies. Therefore, we can regard this particular definition as transferrable between the two sets of cases.

The average percentage of CEE women MPs is 16.5, the standard deviation being 12.9 – that is, smaller than in the West European cases. There are several cases with no women MPs, which was also the case in WEur. The largest percentage of women MPs among the CEE parties is 55.6, which is comparable to the highest value in WEur.

5.2.2.2 Intra-party conditions

5.2.2.2.1 Party magnitude
Clearly, where list systems are used the number of seats that a party wins in elections can affect the possibility of women being elected MPs: if more MPs are elected, then candidates further down the lists have a greater chance of winning a seat (Matland 1993; Sainsbury 1993). The set construction used in the study of West European cases has worked as a base line for this set. To be precise, for ‘full membership’, a party must hold at least a third of seats in parliament, 25 per cent of seats marks the cross-over point, and to be categorised as a ‘full non-member’ of the set of large parties a party would have only 15 per cent or less MPs. The crucial question is whether this definition is applicable in Central and Eastern European countries.

In fragmented party systems, most of the parties are bound to have few seats. This is the case in many CEE countries: not only do many parties compete in elections, pre-electoral coalitions or party unions that serve as umbrella organisations for several parties are also common. This sometimes results in there being more parties seated in parliament than the election ballots would have indicated. As Rose and Munro (2009, 25–9) observe, big parties win a majority of seats in parliament. They go on to note that by the standards of one-party dominant systems, parties in CEE countries are generally small. While it is undoubtedly a fact that they are, it deserves to be pointed out that CEE countries abandoned an extreme form of one-party dominant system epitomised by the communist system in the early 1990s. Indeed, democratic systems in which parties win more than half of seats in parliament are rare and restricted to majoritarian electoral systems. For example, only once during the second half of the 20th century did the large Swedish Social Democratic Party manage to win a majority of seats in parliament (Bergman 2000, 196). In the context of proportional electoral systems large parties in majoritarian system are in a sense ‘oversized parties’. These parties are rare and their occurrence in PR systems is possible but
unusual. For these reasons, the definition of a large party in a PR system should not be set solely on these bases.

Figure 3 below displays a frequency plot of party magnitude among the 62 cases in this study. The plot reveals that there are comparatively few cases around 25 per cent, which justifies setting a threshold there. Furthermore, while there is a small cluster of cases just below one third of seats, the number of cases with even more seats is relatively low – Hungarian Fidesz is an outlier at 68.1 per cent of seats. The upper and middle anchors of the set, the 1.0 and 0.5 membership levels (corresponding respectively to 33 and 25 per cent of parliamentary seats) as calibrated using data from West European cases in the late 80s are thus useful in the CEE context 20 years later.

The lower end of the set is a more challenging threshold, especially when the sheer number of small parties in CEE is taken into account: the left part of the plot is crowded with small parties, most of them having 10 per cent or less parliamentary seats. There are fewer cases between what can be termed medium-sized parties and the small cases falling below 10 per cent. In the context of these cases, it is thus reasonable to keep the lower threshold of the set as developed in the previous chapter, 0.0 membership (full non-membership) for cases that have 15 per cent or fewer seats in the national parliament.

Figure 3: Frequency plot: Party magnitude in CEE, late 200s

Note: Data points refer to number of cases. Sources: See Appendix. N = 62.
5.2.2.2.2 Party ideology

Although the terns ‘left’ and ‘right’ are commonly used to describe parties in CEE, scholars do not agree on the usefulness of this type of differentiation. Some argue that there are several orientations that can serve to differentiate parties and that the popularity of the party leader is an important factor that should not be ignored (Jungerstam-Mulders 2006, 236–41; Rose and Munro 2009, 29–33). Lewis (2000, 49–59) suggests that the West European concept of party families could be fruitfully applied in CEE, but cautions that the concept should be adapted to the CEE situation. Hloušek and Kopeček (2010, 223) argue that the West European concept of party families is applicable “without major problems”, though note that there are both deviations and unclassifiable cases. They point out, however, that the number of unclassifiable parties has decreased.

Current CEE politics, for scholars seeking to understand the dynamics of women’s parliamentary presence, provide an interesting paradox: a party’s general ideological positioning would lead us to believe that the party is likely to be gender balanced but in reality it is not and vice-versa.61 Matland (2003, 337–9) notes that there are many parties in CEE that display the somewhat surprising combination of right-wing conservative ideas and large percentages of women MPs. However, he also points out that during the first decade after the fall of Soviet communism in CEE agrarian parties were among the parties that were less likely to have high parliamentary representation of women, while leftist parties were among the more gender-balanced parties.

The data used in this set are based on ‘self-definition’; in other words, the parties were given a number of different label choices, including the option to determine their own ideological label. Following the set construction used in the previous chapter, parties that categorised themselves as green, socialist, social democratic or communist are coded full members (1) of the set of parties with leftist party policy. All other parties are coded full non-members (0) of this binary (crisp) set.

5.2.2.2.3 Candidate selection

Many political parties in Western Europe use decentralised or democratised methods of candidate selection (Bille 2001). Many of these West European parties can draw on a history of mass mobilisation, but this is not the case for parties in many of the younger democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Parties whose roots were in the former Soviet times may have benefited from already having organisations when entering multi-party competition, but many of parties had to start from scratch when the countries became

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61 For example, the left-leaning and still perfectly gender uniform Harmony Centre (Saskaņas Centrs) in Latvia, or its counterpart gender-balanced New Era, sometimes understood as neoliberal and populist party.
independent. Decentralised candidate selection is thus less likely to be utilized. In addition, few parties that were formed in the early 90s have survived, which in effect means that it is rare for parties currently in parliament in CEE to be two decades old.\textsuperscript{62} One should thus be careful when assuming that all of the parties have local organisations and party members on which to base candidate selection processes: some parties may have only their national-level core activists and little that can be termed regional or local organisation.

In order to explore both centralisation and decentralisation, two sets were constructed, based on the same categorisation (Bille 2001) that was used in the previous chapter. Cases were coded according to the scheme developed in the West European study (see Table 4, p. 78) It should be noted that only one of the parties is fully decentralised, and that most of the parties use centralised candidate selection processes. Therefore, the second set is the set of parties with centralised candidate selection. In this set, parties in which the national organisation is in full control of the candidate selection are full members. Parties in which the national party decides and can alter the lists but where sub-national party organs can nominate candidates are 0.67 members. Cases where sub-national branches can make the final decision on lists constructed at the national level are deemed 0.33 members. Finally, parties in which sub-national branches have lesser input on candidate selection were coded as full non-memberships of the set. Empirical analysis will provide the information needed to determine whether any of the calibrations are useful.

\textbf{5.2.2.2.4 Gender sensitive rules and practices}

Political parties can use a range of tools for increasing the proportion of women among their candidates and in internal party bodies, such as committees and working groups. Such tools range from gender awareness (understanding that gender may form a legitimate and preferred basis for representation) to strict gender quotas with rank-ordering rules for election lists written into the party statutes and combined with sanctions for branches that fail to apply them. Gender awareness here also refers to whether the party strives towards recruiting equal numbers of women and men to parliament. The parties were asked to indicate about their recruitment practice and whether they had a specific target for female representation. Upon analysis the data did not lend themselves to any meaningful set construction and hence gender awareness is integrated into the structured focused comparison at the end of the chapter.

Affirmative action can be interpreted in different ways. In the case of women and political candidacy, affirmative action usually refers to actions

\textsuperscript{62} A few parties did indeed survive during the Soviet era, while others were resurrected as the Soviet regime fell apart. For the most part, however, such organisations are rare.
and training undertaken to increase women’s knowledge and experience of
different types of political work. It can also include actions to support finan-
cially, and otherwise, women candidates or newcomers or underrepresented
groups (Caul Kittilson 2006, 77, 83; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008, 22;
Erickson 1997). It should be kept in mind that the effect of different types of
affirmative action on women’s presence in parliamentary parties may be
indirect and likely varies with a large number of factors, stemming from
inside the party and from the individuals themselves. Given these methodo-
logical problems, in this analysis affirmative action simply serves as an indi-
cator of a party’s willingness to include women in their ranks. Because the
data are too diverse to lend themselves to set construction, they will be dis-
cussed in the SFC.

Gender quotas comprise a particular type of gender sensitive rules. In the
context of Central and Eastern Europe, the use of gender quotas is some-
times discussed with reference to Soviet-style quotas. Nevertheless, some
current parties have adopted and managed to implement gender quotas. At
the very least, we can assume that gender quotas are related to a willingness
to discuss women’s political participation. In parties where women’s represen-
tation is not a recognised issue, quotas are unlikely to end up on the in-
ternal party agenda, whereas parties with a more gender-aware profile are
more likely to at least discuss quotas.63 As part of the data collection, parties
were also asked about their opinion on gender quotas and the extent to which
they had had internal debates about gender quotas. This was useful informa-
tion but it should be noted that parties that do not debate quotas in their in-
ternal meetings or do not implement quotas are not necessarily less gender
aware: there are many ways to be aware of a political problem. The data
derived from these questions will be used alongside the other data in the
structured, focused comparison. The questionnaire also covered the configu-
ration of quotas in the party, including the proportion of women/men re-
quired. A crisp set on gender quotas was constructed, with parties having
quotas coded as full members and parties without quotas classed as non-
members of the set.64

The parties were also categorised as having a weak, moderately strong or
strong ‘applied gender-ideology’ based on several factors, namely, whether
they had worked to recruit equal numbers of women and men as candidates,
debated gender quotas, approved of quotas, applied quotas in candidate se-
lection, used affirmative action for women and had a women’s organisation.
This categorisation is used in the SFC and does not constitute a set.

63 Questionnaire available in appendix, see question 14 and 15. This particular question was
previously used in the PARQUOTA project (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008).
64 The most appropriate set construction would be fuzzy and continuous, with thresholds as in
the outcome set. However, converting variables into fuzzy sets in FSQCA would be mean that
even cases that had no quotas would be members of the set (see Thiem 2010 for a more elabo-
rate critique on this matter). As this would be incorrect, a crisp set was chosen.
5.2.2.2.5 Women in party leadership

Previous studies have concluded that the presence of women in party leadership correlates with the proportion of women in the parliamentary party, and have interpreted the correlation as a causal link: having women in party leadership makes it more likely that there will be women in parliament (Caul Kittilson 2006). As argued in the chapters above, this is not necessarily a correct interpretation of the correlation: MPs are likely also to be members of the executive board of the party. The correlation of female MPs and female members of the party leadership does not necessarily mean a causal connection. Furthermore, for several reasons, as earlier mentioned, women should not necessarily be expected to act on behalf of their own gender.

The data on the proportion of women in party leadership cover five of the six studied cases. If the set is constructed to mimic the outcome set we would have parties with 40/60 per cent female presence in party leadership being full members of the set, parties with 25 per cent of either sex placed at the cross-over point while gender uniform distributions in party leadership denote full non-membership. Two cases are 0.5 members of the set. With missing data on one case, this means that the fuzzy-set analysis will be based on two cases only. Therefore, the share of women in party leadership is not analysed in terms of necessity, but is included in the case comparisons.

5.2.2.2.6 Party women’s organisation

The existence of a party women’s organisation has been mentioned as a factor that could facilitate women’s entry into party politics. Kittilson’s results (2006, 124) indicate that there is little analytical leverage to be gained by including this condition, while Matland (2003, 338) argues that a party that has a women’s organisations is more favourable to women’s inclusion on party lists. Previous results have been inconclusive on the impact of women’s organisation in the party on women’s presence in parliament, which indicates that the impact of auxiliary organisations on party behaviour could be the focus of a separate study. There are several additional reasons to consider party women’s organisations separately, given the many different strategies that they may have or purposes that they seek to fill. Still, the mere presence of a women’s organisation tells at least one thing about the party: it manages to organise its women members. This could significantly affect women’s chances to become legitimate political actors within the organisation. Hence, parties with a women’s organisation or equality committee are full members (1) of the set, whereas parties that have neither a women’s organisation nor an equality committee are full non-members (0).

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65 See section 2.3.2.7 (page 32) for more developed discussions about this.
5.2.2.7 Party splits and mergers

Party organisations in the younger European democracies are often characterised in terms of organisational instability. Several of the countries under study here have experienced – and some still do – a period of rapid change marked by many new parties, frequent party splits and mergers. Furthermore, there is considerable volatility both in terms of voters’ shifting party allegiances and the supply of new choices on the party menu (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003; Rose and Munro 2009, 24–9, 47–54; Sikk 2005), factors that tend to be intertwined.

The impact of organisational instability as such is rarely assessed in studies of party and gender; party institutionalisation or the lack thereof is a more common indicator. Although it is reasonable to assume that party institutionalisation and party splits are related, the terms refer to two essentially different things. Institutionalisation is, as discussed in previous chapters, a measure of the bureaucratisation of the organisation and the transparency of party rules and their application. Party splits, however, need not depend upon the bureaucratisation of the organisation: internal fractions in bureaucratic and transparent organisations could leave the original organisation to form new parties, a process that can be prompted by several different factors.

Parties in Central and Eastern Europe provide ample opportunities to study party splits and mergers and their effect on women’s likelihood of entering parliament. While party splits are commonly mentioned in passing in empirical studies, there are few studies that deal specifically with party splits (see, however, Grofman, Mikkel, and Taagepera 2000 on the Estonian case; Mair 1990 on Western Europe) and the long and medium term effects on the parties that may result from the process. Accordingly, this particular condition will be approached in an explorative manner, starting with the case comparison in this chapter and continuing with the in-depth case study in the next.

5.2.2.3 Environmental conditions

5.2.2.3.1 Electoral laws

Electoral systems filter the intentions and abilities of parties through institutional rules and voters’ preferences. Clearly, this is an important factor in models of party and women’s representation. However, all but one country from which cases have been drawn use some form of PR system, and hence the distinction between PR and single-member districts does not add to this analysis: the variation is not sufficient to warrant investigation.

District magnitude determines the number of delegates from each district. This fully continuous, fuzzy set draws on a previous study of Western Europe (Rule 1987) as well as the calibrations developed in the previous chapter, covering average and effective magnitude respectively. Based on that knowledge, a useful definition of a large district (1.0 membership) can
be set at 25 deputies. Full non-membership, on the other hand, can be defined as six deputies per district, whereas the cross-over point (0.5) is set at ten deputies. Output-based effective magnitude was calculated (Taagepera 2007, chap. 11) using data from the outcome elections (Döring and Manow 2010a). As shown in Table 32 (Appendix, p. 218), there is considerably more variation among the CEE countries than among the WEur countries, with Latvia and Lithuania being clear outliers. This may be attributed to the mechanics of the calculation methods in which there were some differences in how effective magnitude was calculated for the WEur cases, allowing electoral results to determine the data rather than electoral laws. Although a recalibration of the set may be appropriate, all cases under scrutiny here have comparatively extreme values – Poland and Hungary extremely low, Latvia extremely high and the effective magnitude in Estonia clearly large – and at this point recalibration would hardly be meaningful, neither from an empirical nor a theoretical perspective. Rather, the impact of the output-based effective magnitude on gender balance should be more closely evaluated in time-series analyses.

None of the parties in the present data set are subjected to legislative or constitutional gender quotas. The analysis therefore does not take such measures into account.

All but one of the studied cases are active in countries where preference voting is allowed. Due to the low variation, the distinction between open and closed lists is discussed in the structured focused comparison, but is not part of the fsQCA. The case study (Chapter 6) will deal with preference voting in more detail.

5.2.2.3.2 Women in the public sphere

Having a large proportion of women in the public sphere is often taken as a sign of an egalitarian society. Between 1999 and 2008, women comprised 61.9 per cent of university graduates in the ten EU member-states in CEE, and 57.6 per cent of graduates in law, a discipline frequently seen as connected to political decision-making. The corresponding figures for law students in the EU-27 were 59.5 per cent women graduates. In addition, between the years 2000 and 2008, women comprised 46.5 per cent of the employed in CEE countries, compared to 44.0 per cent in the EU-27 (Eurostat 2010a, author’s own calculations from 2010b). The Baltic countries are often at the top of these comparisons with, for example, a mean of 49.3 per cent of women among employed persons, 66.7 per cent women university graduates, 60 per cent women law graduates – the latter outranked only by Slovenia’s

66 As Taagepera (2007) shows, the output-based effective magnitude depends upon the outcome of the specific election used for calculating it. This analysis is thus a closer examination of not only the institutional settings of each election, but also of the party system. For more on this, see Table 32, Appendix p. 237.

67 Data for ISCED level 5 and 6, i.e., Master’s and PhD students. Available in Appendix.
68.5 per cent women law students. On the other side of the scale is the Czech Republic with 56.2 per cent women graduates, a number well at parity with Ireland and the UK and higher than, for example, Germany (52.3) and Japan (49.2). As a further point of comparison, the average proportion of women graduates in the Nordic countries was 61.4 during the same time period.

In short, we can conclude that women are over-represented among university graduates and their participation rates in paid employment is about equal with men. The percentage of women among the employed ranges from 49.8 (Lithuania) to 43.5 (Czech Republic). Although it could be argued that the difference between the extreme cases affects the outcome, the variation is so low (there is only a 6.3 percentage variation) that it hardly shows a qualitatively meaningful difference between the cases. Instead, the high presence of women in the public sphere should be understood as a scope condition. Women’s percentage participation in the paid employment and higher education sectors is thus not accounted for in the analyses.

Another common way to indicate women’s social standing is to estimate the proportion of the population that belongs to the major world religions (see, e.g., Lane and Ersson 2005; Rule 1987, 480; Wide 2006, 100–4). This possible causal connection between women’s social standing and Protestantism is, however, hampered by a number of problems. First, religion can correlate with central socioeconomic indicators and furthermore religiosity can also correlate with gender representation (Wide 2006, 101, 138–9; see also Wilcox, Stark, and Thomas 2003, 60), a relationship that may be analytically more useful. Finally, there are several denominations of Protestantism, and not all of them are clearly related to egalitarianism and women in the public sphere.

To account for the social standing of women, this study employs two indicators: the proportion of Protestants in the population and church attendance (World Values Survey 2009a, 2009c), the latter read as a proxy for religiosity. Following the same logic as in the previous chapter, both sets are calibrated in terms of the majority of the population: full non-membership is defined as zero per cent Protestants, whereas the cross-over point is set at 50 per cent, and full membership of the set at 100 per cent Protestants in the population. Likewise, cases are coded as full members of the set in countries where 100 percent of the population regularly attends religious services, not just during the major religious holidays. Where 50 per cent of the population

68 Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. 2002 data missing for Denmark.
69 Women’s share of paid employment and university graduates are used in analyses of West European cases in the previous chapter, but the range of difference in women in higher education in the WEur cases in the late 1980s was also narrow. The difference between the 1980s WEur cases and the CEE cases of the late 2000s is that women were not as over represented among university graduates in WEur in the 1980s as they are in contemporary CEE, that is, the differences between countries were mainly below the 50 per cent level, rather than clearly across and above it. The differences were hence more meaningful for analysis.
reports attending church more often than a few times a year, cases are coded 0.5. Finally, where none reports attending church other than during the religious holidays, cases are coded full non-members of the set.

5.3 Necessary conditions: fsQCA of CEE parties

This section reports two empirical analyses based on the above calibrations and data collection. First, a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of necessary conditions is conducted. Subsequently, the data structured by means of set calibration are applied to a structured focused comparison between the cases, which allows for configurational thinking as well as comparisons between the cases. The structured focused comparison is carried out in the next section. Tables and outputs not presented in the chapter are available in the Appendix. Table 10 (p. 111) presents the cases and calibrated data.

5.3.1 Analysis of necessary conditions in CEE

The analysis of necessary conditions draws on a model with eight sets, two of which are crisp, binary sets, and six fuzzy sets of which four are fully continuous. Analysis of necessary conditions is logically linked to analysis of singular sufficiency, and the two are thus often analysed parallel: conditions that are necessary for the absence of the outcome are singularly sufficient for the presence of the outcome. Because there are so few cases in this study, the analysis of singular sufficiency is not used for drawing conclusions about sufficiency, but rather as an indicator of whether the set constructions are useful.

Results from the analysis of necessity and singular sufficiency are displayed in Table 9 below. In essence, the results reveal a major finding and a typical small-n, methodological problem. The two columns under “Presence of Gender Balance” indicate that, among the studied cases, no condition can be considered necessary for the outcome: no consistency score reaches the required 0.90 that was selected in the previous chapter. Consequently, we can conclude that, given the present calibrations, data and theoretical knowledge of the field, there were no necessary conditions for gender-balanced parliamentary parties in Central and Eastern Europe as of the late 2000s.

As discussed in Chapter 3, interpretation of results from analysis of necessary conditions includes two concepts that range from 0 to 1: consistency and coverage. Consistency points to the theoretical consistency of the relationship by gauging the degree to which high membership scores in the condition are coupled with high outcome scores. Coverage is measured as the proportion of outcome scores among the successful cases that are coupled with the condition at hand. In other words, the extent to which we can account for or describe the outcome using that particular condition (Schneider and Wagemann 2007, 212–5).
This result is well in line with the analysis of necessity in the previous chapter, in which no necessary conditions were found.

Table 9: Necessity and singular sufficiency, CEE parties, late 2000s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Presence of Gender Balance</th>
<th>Absence of Gender Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large party</td>
<td>0.172932</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¬Large party</td>
<td>0.853383</td>
<td>0.893701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist party</td>
<td>0.648496</td>
<td>0.862500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¬Leftist party</td>
<td>0.351504</td>
<td>0.935000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralised candidate selection</td>
<td>0.430451</td>
<td>0.978632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¬Centralised candidate selection</td>
<td>0.595865</td>
<td>0.866120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Localised candidate selection</td>
<td>0.261278</td>
<td>0.837349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¬Localised candidate selection</td>
<td>0.780075</td>
<td>0.956221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party women’s organisation</td>
<td>0.486842</td>
<td>0.863333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¬Party women’s organisation</td>
<td>0.513158</td>
<td>0.910000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large effective magnitude</td>
<td>0.674812</td>
<td>0.897500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¬Large effective magnitude</td>
<td>0.325188</td>
<td>0.865000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High church attendance</td>
<td>0.248120</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¬High church attendance</td>
<td>0.819549</td>
<td>0.931624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>0.392857</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¬Protestants</td>
<td>0.714286</td>
<td>0.971867</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ¬ marks absence of condition.

In this table “Absence of Gender Balance” displays results from analysis of singular sufficiency for gender balance. A few conditions reach or exceed the 0.90 level of consistency: absence of large party, presence of centralised candidate selection, absence of church attendance and, finally, absence of Protestants. These results can be explained with reference to two methodological problems: low between-case variation and the small number of cases.

Starting with the environmental conditions, low degree of variation is a major factor behind the ostensibly singularly sufficient conditions. With a score of 0.56 in the set of Protestant countries, only the three Estonian cases score above the cross-over point while the other three cases score below. The related set on church attendance can be characterised by low membership scores among all parties except the Polish, which scores a high 0.82 in this set. Only 31 per cent of people in CEE go to church frequently, with Poland (77.8 per cent) scoring at the top while Estonia (11 per cent), the Czech Republic (11.5 per cent) and Latvia (14.6 per cent) are among the least religious societies (see Table 35, p. 221.) Similarly, Protestant membership is low; Estonia being the CEE country with the greatest percentage of Protet-
tants (53.9 per cent). Roman Catholicism or Orthodox belief is more common in the other countries. Still, it would be erroneous to conclude that the absence of Protestants and the absence of frequent church attendance are singularly sufficient for gender balance in these cases. Doing so would clearly contradict both theory about parties as actors within institutional and structural frames and, moreover, the results from Western Europe. Instead, religion and/or religiosity must be considered unsatisfactory indicators of culture. In addition, the small number of cases in this study may have been insufficient for creating a dataset with as much variation as CEE can offer on the issue of religion.

Among the party attributes the presence of many small parties in the present data set is apparent: with a 0.8 membership, only the Estonian Centre Party (Kesk) scores above the cross-over point. Table 8 (p. 98) shows all the successful cases and indicates that among the 14 gender-balanced parties, only three of them can be classified as large using the definition derived from the previous chapter. Two other cases are more in than out of the set, but the remaining nine parties are full non-members of the set. Accordingly, a majority of the successful cases are non-large parties; but as the data presented above clearly show, so is also the vast majority of parties in contemporary CEE. Because of the numerous small parties in CEE that differ from each other in many other respects it would be premature to conclude that in CEE small parties are more women friendly. The results indicating low party magnitude as a singularly sufficient condition for gender-balanced parliamentary parties is therefore more likely a consequence of the empirical distribution of data rather than a solid cause and effect relationship. Hence, national-level party magnitude does not tell us much about the possibilities for CEE parties to become gender balanced.

The result suggesting that absence of centralised candidate selection is a singularly sufficient condition that should be approached with similar care. Three cases score 0.00 in this set, yet two of them also score low in the set of decentralised candidate selection. Candidate selection in CEE parties thus needs to be studied further, preferably with several cases covered.

71 The most curious case is perhaps Latvia, where the three religious affiliations mentioned above are distributed almost equally across the population, combined with a low degree of church attendance.
72 The Bulgarian GERB, the Estonian Centre party (Kesk) and the Slovenian Social Democrats, SD.
73 The Latvian New Era (JL) and the new Czech party TOP09.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Balanced</th>
<th>Large party</th>
<th>Leftist or green party</th>
<th>Centralised candidate sel.</th>
<th>Localised candidate sel.</th>
<th>Formal party gender quotas</th>
<th>Women’s organisation</th>
<th>Women in p. leadership</th>
<th>Large districts</th>
<th>Church attendance</th>
<th>Protestants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Era</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahvaliit</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>i.d.</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPL</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesk</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMP</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDE</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Rahvaliit: People’s Union of Estonia; SDPL: Polish Social democratic party; Kesk: Estonian Centre Party; LMP: Politics can be different; SDE: Social democrats. i.d: insufficient data. *) Estonian Kesk applies an unofficial rank ordering rule to the 20 top positions of their lists. Sources: See Appendix section 8.3.
5.4 Configurations: A structured focused comparison

This section presents the six cases in terms of configurations of conditions and extends the analysis by adding concepts and data that were not used in the fuzzy-set QCA above. The analysis is underpinned by the sets developed earlier in this chapter and carried out as a structured focused comparison.

5.4.1 Analytical scheme

Adherence to a scheme of questions and one single class of events are basic requirements in this comparative technique (George and Bennett 2005, ch 3). Each analysis is structured along the following topics: 1) environmental conditions, 2) origin and development of the party organisation, 3) current organisational structures, and 4) configurative scheme of the case.

Unless other sources are referenced, all the empirical data presented refer to material collected using the questionnaire (see Appendix). To bring in core issues from the preceding analysis, candidate selection and gender balance in party leadership are discussed. The development and history of the cases are approached in the light of party splits and mergers. The ensuing comparisons should contribute towards an analytical understanding of the current organisations and their effect on the outcome. It should be noted that they are not aimed towards in-depth historical descriptions of the cases.

5.4.2 Party I: New Era, Latvia

New Era (Jaunais Laiks) has participated in three parliamentary elections: 2002 winning 26 seats, 2006 winning 18 seats and 2010 winning 33 seats\(^{74}\) (CVK 2002, 2006a, 2010a). This classifies it as a large parliamentary party. The percentage of women elected as MPs during these elections was 35, 55 and 36 per cent, respectively. During the three legislative periods that this party has been in parliament, looking at the overall composition of legislative body, the percentage of women in the Latvian Saeima has been 18 to 19 per cent (CVK 2010a, n.d., n.d.). This means that, half or more of all women MPs elected in the last three parliamentary elections in Latvia ran as candidates either as New Era MPs or, as in the 2010 elections, were affiliated with the pre-electoral alliance Unity (Vienotība), in which New Era and a party formed by, among others, previous New Era MPs\(^{75}\) comprised two-thirds of the alliance.

\(^{74}\) The 33 seats were won in collaboration with two other parties in the 2010 elections. 12 seats were allocated to New Era MPs (see Table 11).

\(^{75}\) Pilsoniskā savienība (PS), Civic Union, formed in 2008.
5.4.2.1 Latvian politics and society

The Latvian electoral system is a proportional system with one tier and five electoral districts. The total number of MPs is 100, and the number of deputies from each district varies according to the number of voters. The average district size is 25 deputies and the size of the five districts varies marginally and in a manner reasonably predictable to the parties. The legal threshold is 5 per cent. Moreover, voters are granted a strong type of preference voting in the Latvian parliamentary elections, with which they can both add positive preferential votes and cross out candidates (CVK 2010d). Due to high fragmentation, the effective magnitude was an extreme 466 in the 2006 elections (see Table 32, Appendix p. 218) which means that the Latvian electoral system had both de jure and de facto large districts in 2006.\footnote{The output-based effective magnitude was 156 in 2002 and dropped to 37 in the 2010 elections, when the effective number of parties decreased (author’s calculations from ParlGov data, Döring and Manow 2010b).} Large districts and the straight-forward, one-tier PR structures of the Latvian electoral system can be advantageous to new candidates. The unusually strong preference voting, however, complicates the picture, as the representativeness created by this system depends upon the voters in a profound way: the parties can propose candidates, but the voters have a considerable power over who will represent them. This makes gender representation in Latvia a matter of both party goodwill – or strategy – and voters’ choices, with almost equal emphasis on the two.\footnote{Up until 2006, multi-district candidacy was allowed in Latvia, meaning that candidates could stand in several districts. This complicates the picture, and is discussed in Chapter 6.}

During the 1993-2007 period Latvia had the highest index of volatility of all the ten new EU member states (Rose and Munro 2009, 51). Parties were often formed shortly before the parliamentary elections, often by already experienced politicians, which means that the number of “genuinely new” parties in Latvia is not as large as the number of parties suggests (Sikk 2006).

The share of women MPs in Latvia has fluctuated between just below 10 per cent to around 20 per cent throughout the 1990s and 2000s (IPU 2009b), and reached 19 per cent in the 2010 elections (CVK n.d.). Seventy per cent of the Latvian population are either indifferent towards or “totally comfortable” with women as elected politicians, which is slightly more than in Germany (68.6) and just below Bulgaria (74.5 per cent) (Eurobarometer 2008b author’s calculations). Women comprised 66.5 per cent of all university graduates, and during 1999-2008 their participation in the paid labour force was equal to that of men, that is, 48.7 per cent of the employed were women (Eurostat 2010a, 2010b). Latvians are in general less religiously active than others in the CEE region, with only 14.6 per cent of the population visiting church other than on the major religious holidays. No one religious denomination dominates in Latvia: Protestants, Roman Catholics and Orthodox each
make up roughly one-third of the population (World Values Survey 2009b, 2009c). The social conditions in Latvia thus appear to provide grounds for gender equality for women and men seeking elected office.

5.4.2.2 Party structures and gender representation

New Era was formed shortly before the 2002 elections by individuals largely unknown to the Latvian electorate – with the notable exception of Einars Repše, former head of the Bank of Latvia (Sikk 2006). The party went through a party split in 2008, when a handful of well-known MPs left to form a new party. The split did not lead to gender imbalance in the upcoming elections, as together with a third party, the two former-antagonist groups sent a gender-balanced group of MPs to parliament.

New Era quickly made itself a name as an anti-corruption party, and has been described as “clearly neo-liberal” (Sikk 2006, 133), but portrays itself as conservative and is a member of the European People’s Party. The right-wing/conservative image is also echoed in scholarly studies of the party (Benoit and Laver 2006). Despite the unusually high proportion of women MPs, New Era does not work towards recruiting equal numbers of women and men to parliament. Gender quotas have not been a topic of important internal debate in the party and the party officially considers quotas in principle wrong, though not unacceptable. New Era does not use gender quotas or any type of affirmative action. To date, the party does not have any active women’s organisation or other committee dedicated to equality issues, although a women’s organisation formally exists but, because of its inactivity, it is here understood as absent. Women comprise 25 per cent of the members of the party’s executive board and the party leader is a woman. The ideological conditions for gender balance in New Era are not strong – the applied gender ideology in the formal organisational structures appears weak and the overall ideological frame of the party is not one of gender equality.

For the 2010 elections, the local branches were allowed to contribute to the lists of candidates – although without input from membership ballots – after which the final decision was made by the national party leadership. The membership figures in this still-small organisation reached almost 1,400 in spring 2010. Table 11 below displays the gender distribution in the three elections in which New Era has participated. It demonstrates that women and men were essentially equally represented on the lists, and that the success rate of women has been roughly the same as that of men with the exception of 2006 when New Era women were almost twice as successful as men, having a relative success ratio of 1.9.

The data show that Latvian voters who voted for New Era – and Unity in 2010 – apparently did not discriminate against women candidates and thus

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78 For more details on this, see Chapter 6.
79 See Chapter 6 for detailed analysis of these election results.
the proportion of seats held by women as suggested on party lists was maintained. (New Era and Unity constructed lists with equal shares of women and men on the top positions.\(^{80}\))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Women candidates, percentage</th>
<th>Women MPs elected Perc (Abs)</th>
<th>MPs elected</th>
<th>RSR(_w)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35 (9)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>56 (10)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33 (4)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 (Unity)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36 (12)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: RSR\(_w\) = women’s Relative Success Ratio.

The formal workings of candidate selection do not suggest that New Era would be averse to any particular type of candidate. Still, several of the party’s current MPs had entered parliament in the 2002 elections, which signals that turnover within the party is low. A credible answer as to the question of why this party has been an exceptionally successful case thus requires a historical account of the party. The percentage of women candidates in 2002 also testifies to this.

In formal notation, the configuration for New Era in 2006\(^{81}\) reads: LEM*large*leftist*quota*lcs*worg

5.4.3 Party II: People’s Union of Estonia

The People’s Union of Estonia, Eestimaa Rahvalitt, and its predecessor EME have moved from a gender-uniform parliamentary party in 1999 to a perfectly balanced group of MPs in 2007 and then to losing all of its seats in the 2011 elections (see Table 12 below). In the discussion below we look at the efforts to attain gender balance.\(^{82}\)

5.4.3.1 Estonian politics and society

The Estonian electoral system is a proportional system with two tiers: districts with open lists and a national tier with a closed list. The national list is used for compensation seats. With 12 districts, the mean district magnitude

\(^{80}\) This topic will be further investigated in Chapter 6.
\(^{81}\) Data were collected before the 2010 but after the 2006 elections, and therefore 2006 is the appropriate year to use in the analysis.
\(^{82}\) Official election data and the data obtained by the party differ here. The election authorities’ data says the party had 3 women and 3 men elected (50%), whereas the party says 2 of 6 MPs (33%) were women. In either case, the party reached gender balance in the 2007 elections.
is 8.4, but the picture is complicated by the much higher effective magnitude. The electoral threshold is at 5 per cent, and compensation mandates are distributed using the d’Hont formula (Rose and Munro 2009, 131; Sikk 2006; Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon n.d.). In the 2007 elections, the effective magnitude was an impressive 71.8 (see Table 32, Appendix p. 218). In essence, thus, the Estonian electoral system is comparable to systems with large districts. Although preference voting is allowed in Estonia, it has been criticised for being unpredictable (Pettai 2004, 830–1), which may have a negative impact on the possibilities of reaching gender balance.

Comparing the Estonian party landscape (1992-2007) to those of the other new EU member countries in CEE, we see that Estonia has a comparatively low degree of volatility, below the mean for the new EU countries and well comparable to that of the Czech Republic, one of the more stable CEE party landscapes. Two parties have fought in all the national elections since independence in 1991: the Centre Party and the Social Democrats (Rose and Munro 2009, 51, 136–7), both of which are discussed below.

The share of women MPs in the national parliament Riigikogu has increased by 10 percentage points since the first elections after national independence was restored (IPU 2009a) and reached 24 per cent in the 2007 elections (Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon n.d.). The confidence in women as political leaders is higher in Estonia than in most other European democracies: 82 per cent of Estonians are totally comfortable with or indifferent towards women in high-level politics (Eurobarometer 2008b, author’s calculations). Women are overrepresented at Estonian universities, and made up 49.4 per cent of the employed during 1999-2008 (Eurostat 2010a, 2010b). Moreover, with only 11 per cent of the population regularly visiting religious services. Other than during religious holiday seasons, the level of religiosity in Estonia is the lowest in CEE. Still, relative to the size of its population Estonia hosts the biggest population of Protestants in CEE: a slight majority of the Estonian population are Protestants (World Values Survey 2009b, 2009c). In short, the social conditions should thus be close to ideal and not have any negative impact via the preference voting system.

5.4.3.2 Party structures and gender representation
The People’s Union of Estonia (ERL) has a comparatively long history marked by several mergers. The party stemmed from the Estonian Country People’s Party (Eesti Maarahva Erakond, EME), founded in 1994. In 1999 the EME became ERL, and the party marks this year as its year of founding. At this time, the party was led by Arnold Rüütel, the last president of the Soviet Estonia. In 2000, ERL joined forces with two other parties, 83 and two

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83 Estonian Rural Union, Eesti Maaliit Formed in 1989 (Grofman, Mikkel, and Taagepera 2000) or 1991 (Eestimaa Rahvaliit n.d.), and Estonian Pensioners’ and Families’ party, Eesti
years later it merged again\textsuperscript{84} (Eestimaa Rahvaliit n.d.; Fitzmaurice 2001, 143; Grofman, Mikkel, and Taagepera 2000). In spring 2010, the party reported having approximately 9,500 members.

On the heels of the 2010 unsuccessful attempt to merger with the Social Democrats, SDE, (The Baltic Course 2010), ERL lost its seats in the national parliament in the 2011 elections (Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon n.d.) People’s Union of Estonia is a useful case for studying the effect of mergers on women’s electoral success. Because a party merger by definition means re-organising the organisation, we should expect periods marked by mergers to be periods of relatively low institutionalisation and bureaucratisation. Still, a turbulent organisational situation may also lead to previously powerful individuals keeping positions of power, which can hinder the influx of newcomers.

Through the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections, this has been a fairly small party with 7, 13 and 6 mandates respectively (Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon n.d., n.d., n.d.). Although the party magnitude has vacillated between elections, the bigger parliamentary party in the 2003-2007 legislative period was still male dominated and gender balance was not reached until 2007, as shown in Table 12 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Women candidates, %</th>
<th>Women MPs elected % (Abs)</th>
<th>MPs elected</th>
<th>RSR\textsubscript{w}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>15 (2)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>50 (3)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: RSR\textsubscript{w} women’s Relative Success Ratio. 1999 data refer to EME.
Source: Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon. Columns 2 and 5 author’s calculations. See Appendix for details.

People’s Union of Estonia describes itself as a social-democratic agrarian party, and in 2003 it was categorised as fairly in the middle of the left/right scale (Benoit and Laver 2006). In early May 2010 the party had not discussed using quotas in candidate selection and its official position on gender quotas was that quotas are in principle wrong and unacceptable. They did, however, report that they were working towards recruiting equal numbers of women and men to stand for parliament, but had not specified a goal in terms of proportions of each gender and did not use any type of affirmative action.

Pensionärida ja Perede Erakond. Formed in 1990 (Grofman, Mikkel, and Taagepera 2000) or 1991 (Eestimaa Rahvaliit n.d.)
\textsuperscript{84} With New Estonia Party, Uus Eesti.
As shown in Table 12 above, the number of women candidates has remained fairly stable at between 18 and 26 per cent. In the 2007 elections, women’s relative success rate increased from 0.6 to almost three times that of male candidates, which indicates that either women were placed high on the lists or, alternatively, voters preferred women candidates to men candidates.

ERL has a moderately strong applied gender-ideology. It does not have the institutional settings usually related to an active striving towards gender balance in parliament, but it may be understood as leftist. The ERL women’s organisation is represented both at the party leadership level and in congress, but the data do not reveal whether the women’s organisation had indeed increased women’s representation on its agenda. Candidate selection in this party is run largely by the national party organisation. No membership ballots are used, and while regional/local organisations could propose candidates, the formal decision about candidacy is made by the national level organisation. The party uses neither quotas nor affirmative action. In early 2010 one of the party’s three vice-chairpersons was a woman.

This case offers an empirical example of a party in organisational flux in which women and men were nevertheless elected in equal proportions. It also points towards a small party that became gender balanced as it was losing ground in elections. This indicates that electoral fortune and organisational stability may not be preconditions for gender-balanced parliamentary parties. In formal notation, the configuration for People’s Union of Estonia reads: LEM*large*LEFTIST*quota*lcs*WORG.

5.4.4 Party III: Social Democrats, Estonia

The Estonian Social Democratic Party is one of two parties that have competed in every national election since Estonia regained independence. It marks 1990 as the year of founding of the party. Like many other Estonian parties, this party is the result of a complicated organisational history: in 1998, the Moderates merged with the People’s Party, Rahvaerakond (Grofman, Mikkel, and Taagepera 2000, 344). The right-wing Moderates later rebranded itself into a social democratic party, and changed its name into Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond, SDE (Fitzmaurice 2001; Pettai 2004; Solvak and Pettai 2008).

As shown in Table 13 below, the proportion of Social Democratic women in parliament increased from a meagre 18 per cent in 1999 to 33 per cent in 2003 and then 30 per cent in 2007 but decreased to 21 per cent in 2011. While the party’s proportion of women decreased in that election the total number of seats won by the party almost doubled. This shift coincides with

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the ideological rebranding of the party. The case thus deserves closer attention.

5.4.4.1 Party structures and gender representation

This party describes itself as social democratic. However, a closer look at the history of the organisation tells the story of a right-wing party seeking a niche in which it could compete with the centre-left Estonian Centre Party, (Keskerakond) in the 2003 elections (Pettai 2004, 831). It was a member of the Socialist International before officially renaming itself as a social democratic party (Fitzmaurice 2001, 145), yet was still remarkably broad in left/right terms in 2003 (Benoit and Laver 2006).

Candidate selection in this party is localised to the same degree as many Nordic parties previously were. Candidacy is decided on the local level, and the party statutes allow for membership ballots to be used. The Estonian Social Democrats reportedly had about 3,900 members in 2010, which indicates that the decentralised methods of candidate selection may not be strictly comparable to decentralised candidate selection in mass parties.

SDE does not work towards recruiting equal numbers of women and men to parliament and, while there has been some internal debate about gender quotas, the party has no official position on the appropriateness of gender quotas. Furthermore, SDE neither uses gender quotas in candidate selection, nor does it use affirmative action. The SDE women’s organisation appears to be well integrated, that is, it is represented both at congress and in party leadership – a leadership that is also gender balanced. The leftist ideological frame of the party and the presence of an integrated women’s organisation point to a configuration of conditions that possibly have facilitated women’s entry into the party, and accordingly SDE is likely best understood as a party with a moderately-strong applied gender ideology. Moreover, the share of women in the party leadership has reached one-third, which in absolute numbers translates to 7 individuals.

Table 13: Women candidates and MPs in Social Democrats, 1999-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Women candidates, %</th>
<th>Women MPs elected % (Abs)</th>
<th>MPs elected</th>
<th>RSR&lt;sub&gt;w&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>18 (3)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>33(2)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>33 (3)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>21 (4)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: RSR<sub>w</sub> women’s Relative Success Ratio.
Source: Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon. Columns 2 and 5 author’s calculations. See Appendix for details.

The share of women candidates has fluctuated between a barely balanced 25.6 to a clearly balanced 38.4 per cent (see Table 13 above). The success
rate of women relative to that of men has also varied considerably, but there seems to be no relationship between the share of women candidates and women’s success in elections. Apart from 2003, when women had 50 per cent more electoral success than men, women in SDE have had 50-70 per cent the electoral fortune of their male colleagues.

The increased and balanced proportion of women MPs in this party relies on a small number of women since it is a small party. The success rate of women has varied considerably, and it deserves to be noted that it tripled in 2003 elections when the party lost 11 of 17 seats, but dropped down to below one in 2007 and 2011, when the party regained seats. This points to a situation in which the few women who are elected may have had positions of power within the party, and this has helped them secure good positions as candidates.

In formal notation, the configuration for Estonian Social democrats reads: LEM*large*LEFTIST*LCS*quota*WORG

5.4.5 Party IV: The Centre Party, Estonia

The Estonian Centre Party, Keskerakond has entered candidates in every national Riigikogu elections since Estonia regained independence (Rose and Munro 2009, 136). Edgar Savisaar, mayor of Tallinn, is the long-term party leader of this party, and the party dates its founding to October 12 1991. It stems from the Popular Front of Estonia87 (Fitzmaurice 2001, 143), founded in 1988. In the second half of the 90s, it experienced a party split (Grofman, Mikkel, and Taagepera 2000, 333, 344–5).

The Centre Party is one of the larger parties in Estonia. As shown in Table 14 below over the last decade it has held almost one-third of the 101 seats in the national parliament. Women in its 1995 parliamentary group held 38 per cent of the seats. A drop in women’s representation occurred in 1999 but it achieved gender balance again in the 2007 elections.

5.4.5.1 Party structures and gender representation

The Centre Party, which describes itself as “centrist/social liberal”, is often perceived as centre-left (cf. Benoit and Laver 2006). On the face of it, the data do not correspond to what one expects from a party with a strong applied gender-ideology. For instance, the party does not actively work to recruit an equal number of women and men to parliament and has had very little debate about gender quotas. Moreover, the party sees gender quotas as a tool that is principally wrong, but nevertheless says that it can be used to achieve fair representation. Although the party has a cautious approach to formal quotas, its approach to women in party politics does in fact cover campaigns to involve more women in the party as well as different types of

87 Eestimaa Rahvarinne.
affirmative action and, in addition, an informal quota not mentioned in the party statutes in the shape of rank-ordering rules. In 1997, the Centre Party ran a campaign that sought to recruit women to become active members. One of the reasons for doing so, the party states, is because women comprise about half of the party members, though their representation at the top party ranks is lower. According to the party the campaign was a success and as a result of this campaign one of the women who were encouraged to work in the party was later appointed minister of education. Moreover, this party has applied an informal quota to their party list, sharing the top 20 positions equally between the sexes, and offers training targeted at women candidates. The women’s organisation of the party is represented in congress, though not in party leadership. Of the 16 board members 25 per cent are women. Additionally, one of the two vice chairpersons, both MEPs and, finally, the floor leader are women. The Estonian Centre Party is therefore understood as a party with a moderately-strong applied gender ideology.

Candidate selection in the Centre Party is fairly centralised with no membership ballots. The final decision about the composition of lists is made by the national party organisation, but regional and local branches can suggest candidates. The party reports having about 12,000 members, which could make decentralised and inclusive candidate selection a meaningful practice. In addition, the Centre Party has been pointed out as a “highly disciplined” party, where dissenting MPs may have to leave (Tavits 2009, 803; citing Huang 2000).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Women candidates, %</th>
<th>Women MPs % (Abs)</th>
<th>MPs elected</th>
<th>RSR_w</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>38 (6)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>18 (5)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>25 (7)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>34 (10)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>27 (7)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: RSR_w women’s Relative Success Ratio.
Source: Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon. Columns 2 and 5 author’s calculations. See Appendix for details.

In the 1995 elections the party qualified as a large party and its number of seats in parliament has increased considerably since then. Women’s relative success ratio varied notably during the 1995-2011 period, but women candidates have generally had more electoral success than their male peers, as Table 14 above shows. We cannot rule out that the sharp decrease in the share of women MPs from the 1995 to the 1999 elections may have been related to the party split – either because women left the party or, alterna-
tively, because the party underwent a period of destabilisation. However, this party has had the same party leader for almost two decades. This could indicate either a very stable party or, alternatively, a party with a strong leader. Secondary data describe a party with high party discipline, and this may be one of the keys to understanding both the stability of the party and the lack of change in the very top of the party. In addition, the party splits and the large fluctuations in the share of women MPs also indicate that the party likely relies on a stable leadership rather than on a stable organisation.

In formal notation, the configuration for the Estonian Centre Party reads: \( \text{LEM}^*\text{LARGE}^*\text{leftist}^*\text{lcs}^*\text{quota}^*\text{WORG} \)

5.4.6 Party V: The Social Democratic party of Poland

The Social Democratic Party of Poland is a small splinter party that grew out of the larger Alliance of the Democratic Left\(^88\) in 2004\(^89\) (Gwiazda 2008a, 803; Jasiewicz 2008, 435; Jedras 2004; Rose and Munro 2009, 198). It took part in the 2005 parliamentary elections, though without success. In the 2007 early elections it won ten seats in the lower chamber, the Sejm, (Gwiazda 2008b; Millard 2007), four of which were women. It thus entered the parliament as a very small, though gender-balanced party.

5.4.6.1 Polish politics and society

The 460 MPs are elected in 41 districts in a PR system with open lists. Seats are distributed using the d’Hont formula. The electoral threshold for parties is five per cent; coalitions need eight per cent of the votes to enter parliament (Markowski 2008, 1055). For women’s possibilities to secure a seat, the mean district size of 11.2 is not directly negative, yet only barely qualifies as a large district magnitude. However, the effective magnitude in the 2007 elections was a very low 1.3 (see Table 32, Appendix p. 218), likely due to the electorally dominant position of two major parties.

The Polish party landscape has hitherto been slightly more volatile than the average CEE country (Rose and Munro 2009, 51). The 2007 Sejm elections were called two years early, prompted by the failure of the coalition cabinet (Gwiazda 2008b, 761). Even though the 2007 elections hinted at a possible stabilisation of the party system, the Polish party system is one of low institutionalisation, which is identified with high electoral volatility and weak linkage between party and voters. The latter could in part be associated with low levels of trust in parties, few members and low party identification (Szczerbiak 2008, 429–30; see also Markowski 2008).

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\(^{88}\) Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej.

\(^{89}\) Rose and Munro claim that the party was formed in 2005, whereas the other sources – including the party itself – mention 2004 as the year of founding.
From hovering around ten per cent during the 1990s, the share of women in the lower chamber has increased to about 20 per cent in the elections held in the 2000s, and is thus at approximately the same level as Latvia and the UK (IPU 2009c). The social standing of women in Poland is often related to the ideological stances of the Catholic Church (see, e.g., Siemienska 2009), which is sometimes regarded as a hindrance to women seeking office. The Polish population is almost exclusively Catholic and a solid two-thirds of all Poles attend church not just on religious holidays (World Values Survey 2009a, 2009c). Still, 77 per cent of the Polish population do not mind women holding elected office, which places Poland right between Lithuania’s 76 per cent and the UK’s 79 per cent (Eurobarometer 2008b, author’s calculations). Women are over-represented at Polish universities, and 45 per cent of the employed persons between the years 1999 and 2008 were women (Eurostat 2010a, 2010b). In the 2007 elections, a women’s party (Partia Kobiet) put forth candidates, although without success (Fuszara 2008, 78; Gwiazda 2008b; Millard 2007). Still, as Siemienska (2009, 72) points out, in those elections women’s issues were hardly on the agenda of the parties that won seats in the Sejm, and party discussions about the possibilities of gender quotas were notably absent.

After many years of political work (Fuszara 2008), the Polish electoral system now features a candidate gender quota of 35 per cent (The Warsaw voice 2010). In short, the attitudes towards women politicians and the large percentage of women in the paid labour force and at universities paint a picture of an egalitarian society, yet the high degree of religiosity in the almost exclusively Catholic Poland tells a different story. It remains to be seen whether the gender quota comes with a more ‘women-friendly’ social environment. The gender-biased party lists (see Table 15 below) do however suggest that the largest hindrances lie within the parties themselves.

5.4.6.2 Party structures and gender representation

The birth of the SDPL was the outcome of a parliamentary manoeuvre in which in early 2004 the speaker of the Sejm and about thirty other deputies split off from the Alliance of the Democratic Left. The party did not win any seats in the parliamentary elections of 2005 but, when they joined forces with the electoral alliance of the Left and Democrats in the 2007 elections, ten seats were allocated to the party, four of which were filled by women. Some regrouping appears to have taken place since then (Gwiazda 2008a, 803; Jasiewicz 2008, 435, 439), but this analysis covers the outcome from the 2007 elections, based on data collected during spring 2010.

Essentially the SDPL is a party that stems from an alliance of leftist parties created in the early 1990s. The alliance allegedly never set up an organisation of its own; the top ranks included names from the old communist party PZPR (Jasiewicz 2008, 428; Szczerbiak 2008, 425). The alliance and its 2001 partner UP both had gender quotas in the 30 per cent level, which
prompted the other parties to take the issue of gender representation into account. Still, the share of women in the Polish lower chamber has hovered at 20 per cent in the last three elections (Fuszara 2008).

Table 15: Women candidates and MPs in 2007 Sejm elections, Poland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Women candidates, %</th>
<th>Women MPs % (Abs)</th>
<th>MPs elected</th>
<th>Women’s relative success ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law and Justice (PiS)</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>20 (34)</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Platform (PO)</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>23 (48)</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL)</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German minority (MN)</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left and Democrats (LiD)</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>21 (11)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The number of women MPs refers to the number of women in each parliamentary club at the beginning of the legislative term. Source: Sejm information office (personal communication 2010-11-18), Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (2007). Columns 2 and 5 author’s calculations.

As shown in the table above, the success of women candidates is equal to that of men in three of the five parties that won seats in the 2007 Sejm elections. Still, all the Polish parties or alliances are gender biased. In the case of the alliance in which the Social Democrats stood, the relative success ratio of women was 0.9, i.e., women candidates had only a marginally lower degree of success than men. The gender bias among candidates in all of the parties suggests that the lack of women in the Sejm can be partly explained by the lack of women candidates.

The Social Democrat Party also describes its ideological orientation as social democratic. Jasiewicz (2008, 439) argues that the Polish left has run into trouble claiming to represent the socially disadvantaged groups – mainly because that would force them to compete with the bigger PiS party. Consequently, the question of what constitutes a leftist party in Poland remains an empirical one. Szczerbiak (2008, 427) notes that the impact of the Catholic Church is still likely weaker with a leftist party. This may partly explain why this particular party has become a successful case when the other Polish parties have not, but part of the explanation likely also lies with the gender quota.

Candidate selection in this party is clearly centralised: it is managed by the national party organisation alone, without interference from sub-national party branches. The selection procedure does not include membership ballots. Despite its lack of years, this party has already had much internal debate about gender quotas. The official position of the organisation is that quotas are both fair and a good tool for achieving fair political representation. In addition, the party works to recruit equal numbers of women and men to parliament. It also uses affirmative action tools such as training especially
directed to women and applied a 30 per cent gender quota in the 2004 local elections and in the 2007 national elections, a quota which is written into the party statutes. For internal party positions, a 20 per cent quota has been in place since 2004, the year of its founding. The party does, however, not use any rank-ordering rules. Still, this quota system is the most encompassing among the parties in this study, and judging from the gender balanced outcome, it has had the desired effect – at least in parliament. Even so, this small party does not have any women’s organisation and consequently there is no party women’s organisation present either at the party congress or in the party leadership. Contrary to what the ambitious quota programme indicates, the party leadership is heavily male dominated with a low ten per cent of women members. Still, the organisational setting means that this party can be seen as a party with a strong applied gender ideology.

Due to lack of data on party membership, the extent to which it is a party with a broad or narrow membership remains unknown. Given the fairly low age of the party and the lack of organisational success of the alliance with which the Social Democrats competed in the 2007 elections (Szczerbiak 2008, 424–5), it is reasonable to assume that this party likely does not qualify as a mass party. This could partially explain the heavy centralisation in candidate selection.

In formal notation, the configuration for the Social democratic party of Poland reads: lem*large*LEFTIST*lcs*QUOTA*Worg

5.4.7 Party VI: Politics Can Be Different, Hungary

Politics Can Be Different, LMP\(^{90}\), is certainly different from the other Hungarian parties. When this green party entered parliament in 2010, one year after its founding, it became the only gender-balanced party in the Hungarian parliament.

5.4.7.1 Hungarian politics and society

The Hungarian electoral system is a mixed system with one majoritarian and one PR component. Elections are carried out in two steps, in which the PR seats – which make up about half of the total number of seats – are allocated as remainder seats in the second round, using closed lists on district and national levels. Despite the possibly ‘women friendly’ list system with sometimes large districts, the system has a number of effects that cancel out chances for newcomers. As Montgomery and Ilonszki show, (2003, 108–13), the complicated and thus unpredictable system tends to make parties field their top candidates in more than one part of the system, which closes the doors for candidates that are not in the top echelons of the parties. Furthermore, party magnitudes produced by the system are generally low, a factor

\(^{90}\) Lehet más politika.
that usually promotes the top candidates – who are often men. Finally, the party system is volatile, which further adds to parties’ willingness to promote the central party leadership for the extremely few safe seats that are available in the system. Nevertheless, the Hungarian party system has been one of the less volatile in CEE during the first two decades after communist rule. The overall level of volatility can be compared to that of Estonia, where it is slightly lower (Rose and Munro 2009, 51).

The share of women MPs elected in the 2010 elections in Hungary was a remarkably low nine per cent, in fact the lowest in CEE. Moreover, the small number of women MPs has remained at about ten per cent during the last two decades (IPU 2010). Even so, Hungarians in general are not extremely averse towards women in elected office. Indeed, 65.3 per cent of the population claims to be either indifferent towards or totally comfortable with women holding elected office at high levels, which is somewhat higher than in Finland (62.7 per cent) and slightly lower than in the Netherlands (67.3 per cent) (European Social Survey 2008, author’s calculations). In addition, women are over-represented at Hungarian universities and comprised 45.5 per cent of the working population during 1999-2008 (Eurostat 2010a, 2010b). While 39 per cent of the Hungarian population is Roman Catholic, the level of religiosity is lower: roughly 17 per cent attend church services other than on religious holidays (World Values Survey 2009b, 2009c). In short, the data indicate that the social structures in Hungary are not easily classifiable as either facilitating or hindering a gender-balanced parliamentary presence. The share of women in the public sphere and the comparatively low religiosity suggest that Hungary could have more women MPs, but, on the other hand, it might be that the attitudes towards women in elected office is not a central factor affecting whether parties decide to put forward women candidates or not.

5.4.7.2 Party structures and gender representation
Politics Can Be Different (LMP) was founded in 2009, only one year before the 2010 elections, and did not enter into any electoral coalition but stood on its own in the elections. The party describes itself as a green party. Due to the newness of the organisation, there are few sources to support their self-assessment. The institutional set-up of the party does, however, match previous knowledge about green parties: the statutes include regulations about rank ordering that translate into a 33 per cent gender quota for both national elections and European Parliament elections. The party has gone through much discussion about quotas and the official standpoint of the party is that quotas are both fair and useful for reaching a certain level of representation. This quota is gender neutral: it does not require a certain percentage of women candidates, but includes both men and women. Given the unpredictability of the Hungarian electoral system, the rank-ordering rules should play a central part in creating gender balance. So far, LMP gives the impression
of a westernised green party and its ideological frame should be considered a facilitating factor for women seeking elected office. In all, it can be said to have a strong applied gender ideology.

Candidate selection in LMP is slightly decentralised, with local or regional organisations having the final say about candidates although with the national organisation approving the list, including the right to add or delete candidates. The process does not include membership ballots, which may be explained by the low membership figures, about 550 in spring 2010, 30 per cent of which were women. In short, the method of candidate selection further adds to the picture of a party that we should expect to attain gender balance in parliament. Although the input from members is likely small, due both to the low number of members and the lack of membership ballots, selection of candidates is decentralised and tells of a possible grass-root level impact on the outcome. Still, the low number of members likely restricts the impact from below.

This party does not only apply quotas in candidate selection for national and European parliament elections: internal party organs are also subject to a formal quota, written in party statutes, that requires the proportion of women candidates on the steering committee be equal to the share of women members in the party; in this case, 30 per cent as this is the proportion of women in the party – and indeed, even though there are no women’s organisations, women make up 30 per cent of the party leadership. In short, the quota programme in this party encompasses the whole organisation as well as candidate selection for elections. It is clearly effective and the construction of a rank-ordering rule that turns into a 33 per cent quota has had the desired effect both within the organisation and, moreover, in the 2010 elections.

Because this party entered parliament as a gender-balanced party, it should be seen in the light of women’s roles in the founding of the organisation and would likely be a useful case for scholars wishing to study women’s roles in party formation. In formal notation, the configuration for the Hungarian greens LMP reads: lem*large*LEFTIST*lcs*QUOTA*worg

5.5 Conclusions
This comparative analysis of six gender-balanced parties in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe has shown the efficacy of understanding how equal numbers of women and men parliamentarians in an individual party is achieved with reference to conditions inside the individual party. External conditions structure party competition and determine the overall conditions

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91 Because there had been no local elections since 2009, the party has not yet constructed any lists for such elections – which explains why there are no gender quotas for local elections.
of supply and demand, yet the differences between the countries in this respect are minor – in some cases women and men are equally represented in paid labour and higher education sectors, in others women are over-represented in higher education. Moreover, the electoral systems in which the studied parties compete for votes are largely similar and differ mainly with regard to district magnitude. The attitude towards women in political decision-making differs somewhat between the cases but is generally positive, which is key to understanding why they have reached gender balance. The most meaningful differences and similarities between the cases should thus be sought at the party level. None of the conditions, neither inside parties nor in their environment, can be considered necessary or singularly sufficient for gender balance. Instead, attention should be paid to the combinations of conditions.

The configurations of the six studied cases are displayed in Table 16 below. It should be noted that five out of six cases have either formal gender quotas or an active women’s organisation: these parties have created institutional means for integrating women in their organisations and the presence of either formal quotas or a party women’s organisation are important parts of these configurations. The Latvian party New Era differs from the other parties by having neither gender quotas nor any active women’s organisation, and the above analysis also showed that it does not have the ideological or institutional settings usually understood as ‘women-friendly’. The other parties are either clearly leftist or green or, alternatively, have positive attitudes towards and actively strive to achieve inclusion of women as candidates.

The configurations of the non-large leftist parties – the People’s Union of Estonia, Estonian Social Democrats, the Polish Social Democrats and Hungarian Greens – resemble the first configuration92 of the West European study, and the Estonian Social Democrats with its localised candidate selection presents a good, although not perfect, match. All these parties have a largely positive attitude towards women in politics, as is shown by their applied gender ideology. The reason why these parties do not have decentralised candidate selection probably lies with their top-down modes of creation or the generally low membership figures of CEE parties, none of which encourages localised candidate selection. This particular difference between these gender-balanced, non-large, leftist parties and their West European relatives may be due to the way party politics have developed in each part of Europe. We may conclude that leftism and institutional means that encourage gender balance comprise an important configuration that leads to gender balance in European political parties, both historically and today.

The two parties with formal gender quotas – the Hungarian Greens and Polish Social Democrats – are both active in countries with a small effective

92 large*LCS*LEFTIST*CLIST
magnitude. These two cases are both leftist, non-large parties that practice either fairly or perfectly centralised candidate selection and do not have any women’s organisation. The equal distribution of parliamentary seats between women and men in these cases can be explained mainly by the use of formal gender quotas, but it is likely that the leftist and green ideological frames of the parties contributed towards using a gender quota in candidate selection and that, as others (e.g., Matland and Montgomery 2003a) have argued, the centralised candidate selection contributed towards the implementation of the quota. Effective implementation of quotas thus appears to have counteracted the potentially negative effect of small electoral districts and relatively few MPs.

Table 16: Configurations in gender-balanced Central and East European parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Configuration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Era (LV)</td>
<td>LEM large leftist lcs quota worg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre Party (EE)</td>
<td>LEM LARGE leftist lcs quota WORG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Union of Estonia (EE)</td>
<td>LEM large LEFTIST lcs quota WORG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats (EE)</td>
<td>LEM large LEFTIST LCS quota WORG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats (PL)</td>
<td>lem large LEFTIST lcs QUOTA worg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics Can Be Different (HU)</td>
<td>lem large LEFTIST lcs QUOTA worg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: lem = large effective magnitude; large = large party; leftist = leftist/green party; lcs = localised candidate selection; quota = formal gender quotas; worg = women’s organisation. Upper-case letters mark presence of condition, lower-case denote absence.

All of the studied Estonian cases are parties without formal quotas but with women’s organisations active in an electoral system with a large effective magnitude (LEM*quota*WORG). It may be that there is a demand for higher representation of women in Estonia and that could explain why there are several gender-balanced parties in this country. Judging from the above data and this particular configuration, the large effective magnitude and the presence of a women’s organisation in the party appear to have offset the lack of formal quotas.

In essence, five out of six parties studied here became gender balanced mainly because they took different types of action to include women, either by recruitment campaigns, gender quotas, affirmative action or women’s organisations. This excludes the Latvian party New Era. If we take into account that New Era entered parliament as a large, gender-balanced party, it bears a resemblance to the Estonian Centre Party, save for the women’s organisation. Still, the Centre Party has run campaigns seeking to recruit more women while New Era reports not working to recruit equal numbers of women and men candidates for elections. Paradoxically, New Era had gender-balanced groups of candidates despite not displaying any of the usually
favourable conditions: decentralised candidate selection, gender quotas, a
party women’s organisation or leftist or centre-left ideology. The case of
New Era thus requires an in-depth study of the sequences that led up to gen-
der balance among candidates and MPs.

5.5.1 Calibrations and applications of concepts

The definition of gender balance developed in the previous chapter was ap-
plicable to the CEE data without major changes. The upper and lower
bounds remained and proved useful, but the point that marks the highest
ambiguity about how to classify each case was shifted slightly upwards from
20 to 25 per cent women MPs because the share of women MPs in CEE
parties differed slightly from that of West European parties, and because of
international norms that were published in the mid-1990s. Because this defi-
nition may change over time and as only a few qualitative comparative
analyses of women’s parliamentary presence have to date been published,
these definitions should be read as suggestions on how to operationalise
gender balance.

Leftist or new left parties in Western Europe are often referred to as
standing a better chance of becoming gender balanced (see, e.g., Caul Kitti-
son 2006). This chapter does not provide the same straightforward picture:
two of the six studied gender-balanced parties are centrist or centre-right.
The definitions of left and right in Central and Eastern Europe are, as many
others have noted, not as useful and clear-cut as they may have historically
have been in Western Europe. In addition to conscious re-branding of pa-
ties, such as in the Estonian Social Democrats, one must also take into ac-
count that party policy is not static, but changes over time.

This study includes descriptions of how each case has implemented gen-
der rules in its organisation and how gender-related issues of representation
are perceived. It gathers information about the degree to which the parties
strive for a balanced representation of women and men, parties’ opinions on
gender quotas, the extent to which the use of gender quotas have been sub-
ject to debate inside the party and whether the parties have women’s organi-
sations. The data display a diverse pattern, in which we find parties at both
ends of the pole being successful in achieving gender-balanced parliamen-
tary parties: on the one extreme are parties that do not approve of quotas,
have not had any extensive internal debates about the use of gender quotas
and do not work actively to recruit particular proportions of women and men
as candidates, and on the other end are parties that do approve of quotas,
actively recruit, and/or debate gender quotas. The Latvian New Era, the Es-
tonian People’s Union and Estonian Social Democrats are illustrative cases.
The applied and non-applied gender ideology of the organisation may pro-
provide useful input to studies of party and gender that is not necessarily acce-
sible in the overall ideological left/right frame of the party. A positive atti-
tude towards quotas and a striving to accomplish gender-balanced representation goes hand-in-hand with gender balance in these parties but remarkably it is not necessary for a gender-balanced parliamentary delegation. Still, it should be noted that parties that were more gender aware had either formal or informal gender quotas.

Centralisation of candidate selection is common in these gender-balanced parties, which contrasts with the results from the study of West European parties. Previous studies, including the one presented in the preceding chapter, have concluded that localised candidate selection increases the chances of reaching gender balance (see, e.g., Caul Kittilson 2006). However, not all scholars agree with this (see, e.g., Matland and Montgomery 2003a), and in the CEE context it is indeed useful to rethink the very foundations upon which the idea of centralised versus decentralised candidate selection is based. Parties that started as elite parties or that have few members may have few incentives to decentralise candidate selection to local branches or allow individual rank-and-file members influence in the process, not least because spreading the power may mean risking destabilisation of the party (van Biezen 2005). While the model of decentralised candidate selection is useful for understanding mass parties or former mass parties in Western Europe, new parties in general or the parties of CEE – many of which are comparatively new and often elite-based projects – may work differently. The data reported above show that there are parties with decentralised candidate selection, yet the low membership figures could mean that the input from members is nevertheless restricted to a relatively small group rather than dispersed among many different members. Therefore, the probability of becoming a candidate may at the end of the day still rest with the power of few individuals, even in parties whose statutes cede all, or almost all, power to membership ballots and sub-national party organs.

Of all the 14 gender-balanced parties in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 2000s, only three were had enough seats (>33 per cent) in parliament to qualify as large parties and nine were full members of the set of large parties. The presence of many small parties in the CEE region prompts the question of whether party magnitude as a concept could be too dependent on its applicability across both PR and majoritarian systems. An even more contextual understanding of a large party could be viable. Future research could contribute to more developed empirical understandings of the idea of a large parliamentary party, possibly with a distinction between parties in systems with, for example, different degrees of party system change and different electoral institutions. Such a definition need not depend necessarily upon the WEur/CEE distinction. Finally, the analytical leverage offered by the calibration depends upon the cases selected: in the above empirical analyses that included one clearly large party and five cases that were at times non-large parties. The results pointed towards party magnitude as potentially less
useful for understanding under which conditions parties in CEE achieve gender balance.

Five of the six parties studied above have experienced party splits or mergers. Splits and mergers indicate organisational changes and possible lack of institutionalisation. Although fluctuations in women’s representation cannot be attributed to unstable organisations alone, the effect of party splits on women’s parliamentary presence is not sufficiently studied. Clearly, there is a need for a deeper understanding of how parties deal with issues of representation while in a period of organisational change. Nevertheless, it bears repeating that the organisational instability has not hindered the studied parties in this from becoming gender balanced.

Among the environmental conditions, this chapter points to two lessons to learn. First, it shows that women can be equally represented in higher education and paid labour sectors as men are – or even over-represented in certain areas – without this translating into the same proportion of women in elected office. This is an important result and it should lead us to question the usefulness of these indicators and, where possible, use more fine-tuned data, such as data on gender segregation in the labour market (cf. Rosenbluth, Salmond, and Thies 2006) or gender distribution among part-time employees.

Second, the effect of attitudes towards women in political decision-making, often measured with reference to religion and religiosity or attitudinal data, should be understood on the party level rather than on the societal level. As Szczerbiak (2008, 427) notes in the case of Poland, religion may affect different parties in different ways. The same is likely to be true for attitudes that are not directly related to religion, such as ideas about whether women or men make better political leaders. To determine the effect of attitudes in each party we thus need to understand the extent to which the party appeals to religious or secular segments of society and the attitudes towards women as politicians among its voters. Moreover, questions about the image and political message of the individual party should be asked in conjunction with the data. It is safe to assume that parties that emphasise gender issues are more likely to win votes from a social strata that have an inclusive or relaxed attitude towards women in politics, whereas parties with more patriarchal profiles are less likely to win support from such voters.
6. Gender and Party in Latvia: The case of New Era

New Era, in Latvian known as Jaunais Laiks, is a political party formed in the early 2000s. It first entered into Latvia’s national parliament (Saeima) in 2002, and from its very beginnings as a parliamentary party was a gender-balanced large party. In that election 26 candidates from New Era were elected, of which 34 per cent were women. In subsequent elections, the share of women in New Era’s parliamentary party has remained balanced, with 55.6 and 33 per cent women respectively. Meanwhile, the share of women in the Latvian parliament has remained a low 18 to 19 per cent throughout the 2000s, with some parties being represented only by male MPs (see Table 18 below).

By being gender balanced New Era becomes a deviant case in the Latvian setting as well as, for that matter, in the setting of Central and Eastern Europe. Still, this party is similar to many other parties in CEE: it was created only shortly before the elections, is understood as an elite party with few members, has experienced a party split and has worked in an electoral coalition. On the other hand, New Era does not conform to the patterns we generally associate with gender-balanced parties: it does not endorse gender quotas, is best understood as centre-right, is centralised and started out as a party whose leader enjoyed strong public support.

This chapter demonstrates that New Era became gender balanced in 2002 mainly as a consequence of four factors: the method of recruitment, women’s own efforts, multi-district candidacy and preference voting. In 2002, many prospective New Era members answered the party leader’s open call in the mass media for participation. In a centralised process that granted much power to the party leader, applicants and their ideas were screened. The presence of many well-educated, skilled women in Latvia, some of whom had good reputations as professionals or had useful personal networks, led to balanced number of women and men candidates in 2002. Although the lists were skewed with more men than women in top positions, multi-district candidacy and, in some cases, preference voting moved women into electable slots.
6.1 Aim and purpose
The overarching aim of this chapter is to produce case-level knowledge about how a deviant case in Central and Eastern Europe has become gender balanced. It strives to develop the research field with reference to whether party organisational instability such as party splits may affect gender balance in the parliamentary party and whether the origin of the party affects the outcome. It also investigates the applicability of knowledge presented in the previous chapters, particularly concepts such as centralisation, institutionalisation and party ideology.

The empirical aim of this chapter is to explain how New Era became gender balanced. Apart from an in-depth study of the organisation and its workings in the Latvian social and political environment, this chapter includes comparative analyses of voting behaviour that assess whether multi-district candidacy and the use of positive and negative preference votes had any effect on the electoral success of women and men candidates.

6.2 Data and method
To achieve both the explanatory aim and meet the ambition of theory development, the analysis is structured along central concepts from theory of party and gender. The case is also used for investigating party splits, an investigative avenue that is new to studies of party and gender and hence includes a component of theory development.

Several different analytical techniques and types of data are used in this case study. It draws on semi-structured interviews with eleven party representatives, party staff and activists; interviews with representatives comprise a majority of the data. It also relies on ten ‘expert interviews’ with practitioners who have extensive first-hand experience of Latvian national level politics, including mainly researchers and NGO leaders. Some experts that were interviewed work with anti-corruption issues and their agenda may partly overlap that of New Era, a factor which should be taken into account. All interviews were conducted in English or Swedish, and all but one were conducted on-site in Riga during May, June and August 2010. The analyses furthermore rely upon secondary sources about Latvian party politics and the author’s own analyses of large-N datasets covering voting behaviour, electoral data and attitudinal data. Information about the datasets and calculations not presented in the chapter is available in the Appendix. Finally, this single-case study makes use of within-case analysis for comparing the party at different points in time and with reference to different theoretical concepts – candidate selection, party magnitude and voting behaviour – and cross-case comparisons for establishing whether New Era and New Era voters
differ from other Latvian parties and their constituencies in ways that may explain why this particular party became and remained gender balanced.

6.2.1 Chapter outline
The chapter starts by outlining the socioeconomic background and gender culture in contemporary Latvia. The second section deals with new parties and gender, and asks to what extent the start-up phase has any bearing on the subsequent development of the party. Thereafter, recruitment of activists and candidates for the 2002, 2006 and 2010 elections is studied, comparing New Era to other Latvian parties, to theory and to its own development in within-case comparisons. The chapter then moves on to analyses of the impact of party ideology on the outcome, asking if the case had the ideological frame commonly associated with gender-balanced parties and if the main political profile of New Era – anti-corruption issues – may attract more women as activists, candidates or voters. Then, the chapter introduces analysis of organisational (in)stability to the field of party and gender, and pays particular attention to leadership transition and party splitting. The second last section returns to cross-case and within-case analyses of environmental factors, that is, if and how electoral laws and voting behaviour affected gender balance in New Era and other parties. Finally, the concluding section presents a summary analysis of the case as a whole.

6.3 Women as political subjects in Latvia
Previous analyses of women’s representation in national parliaments and studies of party and gender point to aspects external to the party, i.e., socioeconomic environment, as important for understanding the factors contributing to women and men sharing political power equally. Such conditions usually encompass women’s participation in the labour market and in higher education, early introduction of women’s suffrage and particular religious belief or attitudes that may be less likely to be a hindrance for women seeking to enter politics. In general, gender balance in the public sphere, or at least a significant proportion of women in the public sphere, is seen as conducive to gender balance in politics, a result that has also been echoed in the previous chapters (see, e.g., Caul Kittilson 2006; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Wide 2006). This section details socioeconomic conditions that underlie the political situation for women in Latvia, including situation of women after the fall of Soviet communism.
6.3.1 Women in the public sphere

Although there are significantly more women than men above working age in Latvia, during the last two decades the working age population has been more balanced with 49.7 per cent women. The share of women of working age residing in the country has increased during this period, and at the beginning of 2010 women made up 51 per cent of the working age population (CSB 2010a author’s calculations). This would lead us to believe that there is no obvious gender bias in the Latvian working age population that would explain the small percentage of women in the Saeima.

6.3.1.1 Education and labour market participation

The previous chapter showed that women in Latvia are active in higher education and in the labour market. Between 1997 and 2009, the majority of students enrolled in higher education institutions were women, more precisely 62.5 per cent.\textsuperscript{93} In the 2006-2009 period, women comprised 49 per cent of all employed persons between the ages of 15 and 64. Women also represented 45.5 per cent of all unemployed with six out of ten of those classed as inactive on the labour market. Among employed persons who worked less than 40 hours per week, women comprised 61 per cent (CSB 2010e, 2010d, 2010b author’s calculations). That is to say, women were slightly less active on the labour market than men, yet every second employed person was a woman. In short, there is no reason to assume that women in Latvia lack formal qualifications for political work or are absent from the public sphere.

6.3.1.2 Gender equality and feminism in post-Soviet Latvia

EU accession in 2004 had a potential to put gender equality on the Latvian national agenda. Still, scholars argue that implementation of gender equality measures and gender mainstreaming practices have been met with lack of interest and funding, with insufficient coordination between organisations that implement them and, finally, low awareness and lack of knowledge about gender equality issues in the population (Novikova 2006, 107, 109; cf. Ostrovska 2004).

A male parliamentarian with personal experience in Western culture commented, in an interview conducted for this project, that in comparison to the West the category ‘feminist’ is very rarely used in Latvia. Likewise, a female respondent with extensive experience working with gender issues stated that ‘feminist’ is not a political category with positive connotations in contemporary Latvia.

\textsuperscript{93} In three areas: natural sciences, mathematics and information technologies (37.1 per cent), engineering, manufacturing and construction (22.8) and agriculture (46.9) a minority of enrollees were women (CSB 2010b, author’s calculations). See Appendix for further data.
The historical legacy of Latvia has contributed several seemingly distinct gender stereotypes in Latvia. First, the Soviet period is connected with ‘genderlessness’ and, paradoxically, patriarchy. These attitudes appear to have clashed with more traditional gender roles after the fall of Soviet communism. Ostrovska (1994, 302) argues that the dual burden of family duties and paid work “led to the strengthening of male dominance in the public sphere and to social patriarchy” during Soviet times. Zake (2002a, 635) contends that the emphasis put on the family, reproduction and traditional gender role by the People’s Party in the 1998 Saeima elections points to a political project aimed to “ensure that the political subjects of the new Latvia are not the gender-less Soviet people.” She further argues that the traditional gender roles, that is, distinct femininity and masculinity with a clear division of labour between the sexes, label women as “politically insignificant non-agents”.

Second, women in current local government are pictured as more responsible and less likely than men to become depressed or alcoholic. The stereotype of men as potential alcoholics and women as trustworthy is sometimes put forward as an explanation for why more women are elected to local government: in the local constituency, women sometimes are highlighted as more trustworthy and less likely to suffer from drinking problems (cf. Eglitis 2010, 169–0; Public Policy Institute 2004, 14, 25). A woman with experience from both NGO work and party politics interviewed for this project suggests that when voters get to know women candidates, they are more likely to vote for them in elections. Ikstens (2002, 1010) points out that local politics are “personality-based”, so adding further reason to assume that closeness to voters and the image of women as trustworthy may be the mechanism that lead to gender-balanced local government (see Table 17 below). As will be shown below, the same conclusion may be drawn for national level politics – at least in the case of New Era.

Third, the folkloric image of Latvian women as powerful, trustworthy and influential was mentioned by several female respondents as well as being reported in written sources (Public Policy Institute 2004). Despite this common image of the strong Latvian woman, in a 2001 survey cited by Zake (2002a, 638), 63.9 per cent of women and 54.5 per cent of the men participating subscribed to the idea that “men are better political decision-makers”. In addition, the idea that “men are better suited to be highly positioned officials” was accepted by 64.8 per cent of women and 54.8 per cent of male respondents.

The image of Latvian women as strong and reliable may be more appropriately understood as a product of the private sphere and the home, and less applicable to the public sphere and politics. If the historical myth about the strong Latvian woman had had any bearing on contemporary gender structures in politics and the public sphere, Latvians would likely have perceived women as more capable politicians.
6.3.2 Women in Latvian politics

Latvian women were granted suffrage in 1918. This was relatively early: Latvia was on par with, or ahead of, some Nordic countries (IPU 2006). The first female Saeima member was elected in 1931 (CSB 2010c) and following the restoration of Latvian independence the number of women elected to the Saeima has fluctuated between 8 and 19 per cent. That is, between 8 and 19 women have been elected to the unicameral parliament, in which there are 100 seats, distributed using a proportional electoral system. However, as shown in Table 17 below, there is a clear discrepancy between women’s presence at local levels and their presence at the national level: the former is gender balanced and the latter clearly is not.

Table 17: Women in Latvian national and local politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Women elected, percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saeima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (CSB 2010c, 2010f, 2010g), author’s calculations.

6.3.2.1 Latvian party politics and gender

The primary line of conflict in Latvian politics splits along ethnicity. The divide between the Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking strata of the population\textsuperscript{94} has added to the way the terms left and right are understood. In its most parsimonious interpretation, ‘left-wing’ connotes parties that turn mainly to the Russian-speaking population and ‘right-wing’ refers to parties that appeal mainly to the Latvian-speaking population. Kažoka argues that because the incentives to be as catch-all as possible are strong in Latvia – particularly for the right-wing/centre-right parties that compete mainly for the votes of the Latvian-speaking citizens – the ideological underpinnings of parties or electoral alliances are vague (Kažoka 2010). Parties that were

\textsuperscript{94} In 2010, the population was composed mainly of ethnic Latvians (about 60 per cent) and ethnic Russians (about 28 per cent). In 1935, ethnic Latvians comprised 77 per cent and Russians almost 9 per cent of the population. About 15 per cent (roughly 340,000 individuals) of the current (2010) population are non-citizens (CSB 2010h, 2010i) and are therefore not allowed to vote in elections.
elected to the Saeima in the last three elections are displayed in Table 18 below.95

The Latvian party landscape also displays a considerable variation in the share of women parliamentarians. As shown in Table 18, during the last three elections some of the parliamentary parties have been gender balanced while others have had all male representation in the Saeima. The share of women MPs has remained largely unchanged throughout the 2000s.

Between 2002 and 2010 women’s relative success ratio, RSR, increased slightly, from 0.59 to 0.67, which means that in the 2010 Saeima elections the success rate of female candidates on average was 33 per cent less than that of male candidates. In some parties, women have an even more strikingly low RSR. This is most pronounced in the two leftist or ‘Russian parties’ (numbers 10 and 11 in the table) where no women at all were elected during the last decade. Women also suffered obvious electoral misfortune in parties that attract mainly Latvian-speaking voters, for example, the First Party of Latvia had a success rate of female candidates that was just 42 per cent of the electoral success of male candidates in 2002, for the Greens and Farmer’s Union in 2006 the female success rate was 42 per cent of male success and in the Latvian-nationalist electoral union VL!-TB/LNNK in 2010 it was 44 per cent of the male candidates’ success rate.

On the other hand, in 2006 and 2010, Table 18 shows, New Era women candidates have been as successful in elections as the male candidates or, as in 2006, almost twice as successful. Furthermore, New Era/Unity, the electoral coalition of New Era and two other parties have presented gender-balanced lists of candidates in all three elections: 40.7, 39.5 and 37.4 per cent women (Unity) and 31.8 per cent (New Era). This is matched only in three other cases: Latvia’s First Party in 2002 (37.3 per cent), the coalition between Latvia’s First Party and Latvia’s Way (31.3 per cent) and For Human Rights in a United Latvia (31 per cent) in 2006. In short, women candidates generally comprise a considerably lower share of total candidates than do men, and also have roughly half the electoral success of men, except in New Era and Unity.

The table also demonstrates that New Era was gender balanced in its first elections in 2002 and has remained so, even when sharing candidate lists with two other parties in the 2010 elections. In only two instances have parties other than New Era achieved parliamentary parties that were in the direction of gender balance: People’s Party in 2002 and in 2010 the coalition For a Good Latvia! (the People’s Party was part of the coalition) had 25 per cent women MPs, corresponding to five and two women MPs, respectively. New Era thus stands out as the only contemporary Latvian party that has been gender balanced throughout successive elections.

95 The distinctions between “Latvian”, “Russian” and “oligarch” parties made below rely on several expert interviews in which the parties are referred to in these terms.
Table 18: Parties in the Saeima 2002-2010: Women candidates, parliamentarians and relative success ratio (RSR) of women candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(abs)</td>
<td>(abs)</td>
<td>(abs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties in the Saeima 2002-2010: Women candidates, parliamentarians and relative success ratio (RSR) of women candidates</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties in the Saeima 2002-2010: Women candidates, parliamentarians and relative success ratio (RSR) of women candidates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Fatherland and Freedom (Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK)</td>
<td>16.9 (11)</td>
<td>14.3 (1)</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All for Latvia!'-TB/LNNK coalition</td>
<td>20.9 (24)</td>
<td>12.5 (1)</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of the Greens and Farmers (Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība, ZZS)</td>
<td>14.5 (9)</td>
<td>8.3 (1)</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Party (Tautas Partija, TP)</td>
<td>25.5 (14)</td>
<td>25.0 (5)</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia’s First Party (Latvijas Primā Partija, LPP)</td>
<td>37.3 (19)</td>
<td>20.0 (2)</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia First Party and Latvia’s Way union (Latvijas Pirmās partijas un partijas &quot;Latvijas Ceļš&quot; vēlēšanu apvienība)</td>
<td>31.8 (14)</td>
<td>33.3 (4)</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For a good Latvia! (Par Labu Latviju!, PLL) Coalition including organisations no. 4 and 6.</td>
<td>31.8 (14)</td>
<td>33.3 (4)</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Era (Jaunais Laiks, JL)</td>
<td>40.7 (33)</td>
<td>34.6 (9)</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity (Vienotība), electoral union incl. New Era</td>
<td>37.4 (43)</td>
<td>36.4 (12)</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Human Rights in a United Latvia (PCTVL)</td>
<td>23.4 (18)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmony Centre (Saskaņas Centrs, SC)</td>
<td>15.5 (13)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data for New Era in the 2010 elections refer to candidates who stood as candidates for the Unity coalition.
6.3.2.2 Women politicians in Latvia: pictures from the inside

“I do have to say that I don’t think that many women are in the back-rooms of political parties and the government, where the real political deals are made.” Inese Birzniece, Latvia’s Way MP 1993-2002

Drawing on several years of experiences from Latvian national politics, Birzniece argues in an interview that political success of women depends partly upon which party they choose to act through. She argues that gender is not the deciding factor in pursuing a political career: what matters is the degree to which one is active. Although no women’s party has taken part in Latvian elections since 1998, Birzniece points to several “strong women” who are identified with particular political parties, some of which are connected to New Era and the Unity coalition.

Studies of Latvian politics and gender present different pictures of stereotypes of women. In an analysis of the 2002 Saeima election campaign, Pičukane (2004) notes that politics was pitched as a man’s domain and that women’s issues were absent from the campaign. In a study from 2004 the authors argue that there is a discourse on women as not being suited for political work, which is inhibitive for women. The common stereotype of women as mothers or helpmates for men is said to be at work even inside the parties, where women sometimes “serve as a support to ensure the activity of the man-politician”. Still, the same study also indicates that women politicians are perceived of as “responsible, logical and constructive” and “honest, responsible for people, with high ethical standards” by other people in governance positions. Conversely, men are pictured as “more self-confident, brutal and less sensitive than women”, all of which can be perceived as positive qualities (Public Policy Institute 2004, 22–3, quotes from p 25, 29, 30). Finally, Ostrovska (2004) points to the media as gender biased in its approach to politicians. There are thus hindering as well as facilitating gender stereotypes at work in Latvia, stereotypes that concern both women and men.

6.3.3 Analysis: Women as political subjects in Latvia

This section demonstrates that, even though the Latvian national parliament after the restoration of national independence has not been numerically gender balanced, the local government has displayed gender balance in its elected councillors. This section describes the extreme variation in women’s presence in individual political parties, where some parties are gender uniform with male MPs only, others have a few women MPs and one party – New Era – has been gender balanced since 2002. It also shows that women

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96 Inese Birzniece was one of the founders of Latvia’s Way (Latvijas Ceļš) in the early 1990s. See below for details on this party.
are not excluded from political work: there are examples of several very well-known, politically active, strong women in national level politics. Nevertheless, women may still be largely excluded from some parts of political work.

The formal socioeconomic conditions in Latvia, such as the labour market participation of women and their participation in higher education, do not point unequivocally towards a gender-balanced national parliament. If anything, they indicate that women are generally more highly qualified than many men. Still, the gender stereotypes noted in this section send a mixed message of gender relations in contemporary Latvia. On the one hand, women are perceived as more capable and responsible than men, who are pictured as vulnerable and unreliable. On the other, surveys tell of a society that puts more trust in men when it comes to politics, and the election data provide contradictory messages: gender imbalance in the national parliament but gender balance in local councils. Some of these opposing images of women and men may be squared with reference to stereotype’s place in either the private or the public sphere – women may be strong and less self-destructive than many men, but that particular stereotype may be tethered to the private sphere and have little bearing on politics.

EU accession and implementation of gender equality measures and gender mainstreaming seem not to have had a strong impact on gender relations in contemporary Latvia. A particular type of emancipation connected with the genderlessness of the Soviet period has suffered a counter-reaction from some of the central political actors after 1991. Feminism or emancipation with a collectivist touch has been perceived as a Soviet trait and hence often not judged positively in contemporary Latvia. This counter-reaction may have created obstacles to women’s roles as political subjects.

The overall situation of women in Latvia, when seen along the line of formal qualifications and participation in the public sphere, appears to provide fertile ground for the achievement of gender balance in parliament. Still, popular support for electing more women for the sake of achieving more emancipation or gender equality is likely weak – the popular images of emancipation or feminism are too negatively influenced by memories of Soviet times.

6.4 Getting the party started: A gender perspective

As pointed out above, New Era presented both gender-balanced lists of candidates and a gender-balanced group of Saeima deputies already in its first elections. This hints at the possibility of explaining the outcome in 2002 as a consequence of the party formation. The formation of party organisations is, however, not a central theme in the field of party and gender, and hence this section provides a new angle to how party matters for gender representation.
The lifespan of parties can be structured along four thresholds: declaration, authorisation, representation and relevance (Pedersen 1982, 6–7). This part of the analysis deals with events that occurred before and between the first two, in which New Era was publicly presented as a political party (threshold of declaration) and officially met the requirements for being registered as a party (authorisation), whereas the next section deals with representation in parliament.

6.4.1 Party formation in Central and Eastern Europe

Parties in new democracies, van Biezen (2005) argues, have typically been started in small groups of members of the national elite, the group sometimes though not always consisting of members of parliament. With the initial cadre originating from elite positions, these parties tend to grow in a top-down fashion and develop a very small number of rank-and-file members who are usually not formally influential within the party. Having few card-carrying members, the parties typically rely on a ‘professional’ party central office. Moreover, the party leadership or party leader often holds very influential positions in these normally highly centralised parties, sometimes exerting considerable influence over candidate selection. Party leadership and the parliamentary party may overlap, making MPs members of the party leadership and vice versa. This is likely due to the small membership organisation, but centralisation and tight control over who can be elected to parliament may work to counteract party splits. This “tendency towards personalization” created by influential party leader or leadership can also result in “highly personalized networks around the party presidents” (van Biezen 2005, 165–8).

Centralised party structures with strong and personalised influence over candidate selection suggest that anyone who wishes to become a party candidate in elections has to enter the inner circles of the party, either by being an original member of the first elite cadre of party founders or, alternatively, by being accepted by the party leadership. It thus matters who the party founders are and how they recruit to their party. If they select from their own personal networks, being part of those networks is crucial. If they, on the other hand, recruit outside of their own circles, personal contacts are less important.

6.4.1.1 Party formation in Latvia: Adding gender to the story

Political parties are central to Latvian politics. The election law stipulates that only political parties may present lists of candidates, though party membership is not required by law (CVK 2010d). Despite the centrality of parties, Latvia is one of the few European countries in which parties do not
receive any state funding. While state funding of parties will be introduced in 2012, parties have hitherto attracted financial resources from donations. All donations are required to be registered with the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau, yet whether all party incomes are in fact disclosed is questionable (interview with Kalniņš, 2010) and transparency experts interviewed for this project admit that corruption is a serious problem in contemporary Latvia. When World Bank researchers classified Latvia as a case of state capture in 2000, close relationships between political parties and business interests were pointed out as one of the central causes behind the high and serious degree of corruption (World Bank 2000, 70).

Several of the contemporary Latvian political parties are openly referred to as “oligarch parties” or as the “party of the party leader(s)”, who is in turn categorised as an oligarch, both in the media (see, e.g., Baltic Reports 2010; The Baltic Times 2004, 2010) and by experts interviewed for this project. Parties frequently termed oligarch parties in the 2010 elections included the right/centre-right parties and electoral coalitions are listed as numbers 3-7 in Table 18 (page 140), not including New Era and the Unity coalition. Latvian parties are also referred to by experts as “sofa parties”, that is, parties in which all members – sometimes including party funders – can fit on one sofa (interviews with Kažoka, 2010 and Stafecka, 2010; see also Runcis 2002, 47; Wyman et al. 1995, 542). The parties have traditionally had few members (Auers and Ikstens 2005, 90–1), and are understood to be elite parties (interview with Čigane, 2010). While they differ with regard to their oligarchic or more democratic structure, the general composition of Latvian parties corresponds well to the picture of CEE party formation that van Biezen (2005) describes.

The frequent party splits, mergers and formations in Latvia have created a volatile party landscape (Rose and Munro 2009, 50–4). If volatile party landscapes tend to foster more tightly controlled and centralised parties (van Biezen 2005), we should expect that Latvian parties are likely highly centralised and largely controlled by the national executive. Indeed, Pabriks and Stokenberga (2006, 63) confirm that new parties in Latvia are made up mainly of individuals that are also in the parliamentary party and that the parties are centralised with a small group comprising the party elite.

Oligarchic structures and overlap between business and politics have had specific consequences for women who wish to enter national level politics. An empirical Latvian study published in 2004 reported that interest groups are said to use their “financial resources and informal relations” to achieve particular results. A new trend at this level of politics is pointed out, one that benefits women:

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97 State support currently includes a limited amount of air time in broadcast media and distribution of party programmes (Ikstens 2008).
98 In Latvian abbreviated to KNAB.
“The weaker the presence of corporate ties in a party, the more possibilities there are for a woman to move forward and to cooperate with other participants of politics on the basis of equal rules. Not all issues are decided in a closed manner, thus equal rules of the game appear for both genders in politics.” (Public Policy Institute 2004, 13)

Such corporate ties, the authors suggest, may have dated back to the Soviet era and along with the informal relationships (“closed politics”) are identified as a significant barrier to women’s entry into party politics at the national level. It is also noted that older parties have hierarchical orders that are harder to enter, whereas new parties – meaning, at that point in time, New Era and Latvia’s First Party – are seen as less closed to women (Public Policy Institute 2004, 15, 18–9). The examples below recount the founding of two Latvian parties and provide supporting evidence in the case.

6.4.1.1.1 Political recruitment in Latvia: Business merging with politics

Although the exact details of how business and party politics go together are usually hard to pin down, Nissinen (1999, 201–5) argues that business interests and Latvian party politics sometimes verge on the inseparable. By way of comparison, this subsection sketches the founding and development of two Latvian parties that present clear examples of mergers between economic and political elites. Then the process by which New Era was founded will be studied in detail.

6.4.1.1.1 Latvia’s Way (Latvijas Ceļš)

Formed in the early 1990s, Latvia’s Way is one of the longest-standing Latvian parties. In an interview conducted for this project, one of the founders of Latvia’s Way, Inese Birzniece, informs us that the initial core of the party consisted of roughly ten people from about three different groupings, including returned Latvian emigrates, people from the independence movement and some with experience from the Supreme Council. Birzniece, a Latvian émigré, was the only woman in this group, yet says that she “didn’t feel discriminated”.

Bennich-Björkman (2006, 298, 300; see also Nissinen 1999, 130) describes the formation of Latvia’s Way in similar terms and mentions Club 21, a small group that accepted members by invitation only. The most central members were business people, but it also included intelligentsia and political entrepreneurs. Granting business people a political platform, Bennich-Björkman (2006) argues, constituted a path that was also followed by later parties – some of which were created because Club 21 was conceived of as too closed – and that may explain the high level of political corruption.

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99 The party entered the 2002 elections together with Latvia’s First Party as LPP/LC, and was then part of the electoral coalition between LPP/LC and the People’s Party, For a good Latvia!, (Par labu Latviju!) in the 2010 elections.
in Latvia. This manner of establishing a party results in business interests having direct contact with the highest levels of political decision-making. In the case of Latvia, Bennich-Björkman describes the “initial core” of Club 21, mentioning four men and then in reflecting further on the relationship between Club 21 and the Soviet nomenklatura, she added three other men to the core group of Latvia’s Way. Of the 36 MPs who became members of the first Latvia’s Way fraction created in July 1993, four were women (Saeima 2010a author’s calculations, 2010c), that is, 11 per cent. Notwithstanding the fact that in 2001 the party had a woman party leader (The Baltic Times 2001), its gender-biased parliamentary party suggests that women may have been few and far between in the top ranks of the groups that formed Latvia’s Way. Bennich-Björkman (2006, 298) suggests that the influence from business in Latvia’s Way later continued in other parties.

6.4.1.1.1.2 People’s Party (Tautas Partija)

A case that upholds the merit in Bennich-Björkman’s claim is the People’s Party, formed by businessman and previous prime minister Andris Šķeles. According to Davies and Ozolins, (2001, 139–0), this party was formed by the party leader “gathering” people who had already been ministers and other “senior figures”. Ostrovska (2004, 48) notes that People’s Party was formed based on the party leaders’ own financial resources, and was built like a regular business enterprise. She further describes the party as closed and with a strongly authoritarian leadership.\(^\text{100}\)

The connection between business and politics is also part of its rhetoric. For example, the People’s Party “suggests that heading the state or family is very similar to managing one’s private business. Therefore the party argues that successful businesspeople and managers of capitalist enterprises are the best political decision-makers” (Zake 2002b, 126).

Germeten argues in her Master’s thesis that the People’s Party used a comparatively localised candidate-selection method, yet that it did not result in gender balance (Germeten 1999, 60–1). The lists of People’s Party candidates presented in the 1998 Saeima elections – 13 of 66 candidates were women (CVK n.d.), that is, 20 per cent women – indicate that the initial core of the party may also have been male dominated. Out of the 24 elected MPs, 5 were women (CVK n.d.; Saeima 2010b); hence, the parliamentary party can be classified as gender biased. The data presented in Table 18 (page 140) show that while the party was not gender uniform, it was clearly not gender balanced either.

\(^{100}\) Ostrovska further argues that the comparatively large share of women MPs in the People’s Party is due to the closed, authoritarian structure, because the women ”are used to not objecting” (my translation from German).
6.4.2 The founding of New Era

The picture that emerges from the founding of political parties in Latvia is one in which a few men, many with a background in business, team up with other men to start a party. Occasionally women are involved, although women are not mentioned as frequently as the male party founders. When formed in the early 2000s, New Era followed the same pattern.

In 2000 a group of friends conceived the idea of New Era. This small group, no more than a handful of men, set out to establish the grounds for a new party. During the 80s and 90s, the ‘pre-founders’ of New Era were active in the independence movement though not in any other political party. They did however have experience in organising both civil society organisations and international business. Taking ideas from those who had directly experienced the Soviet period and from repatriates who had been outside the country during that period, these men merged these ideas together.

The pre-founders of New Era were concerned about the risk of Latvia not being sufficiently integrated into the Western political sphere, i.e., NATO and the EU, as a consequence of what they perceived to be a potentially increased influence of leftist, Russia-leaning parties on the national level.101 This was a major motive for forming the party, one of the group says in an interview. Another member of the group reveals in an interview that there was dissatisfaction with the privatisation process and habits of the Soviet times. Working with people from the US and repatriates from different countries102 over several years the pre-founders concluded that to change the situation required a new way of thinking. To achieve change, they believed it would be necessary to find people who were young enough not to have internalised the system of blat and the old pattern of problem solving though informal networks. Anti-corruption quickly became the leitmotif of New Era.103

The recruitment of a party leader, interviews with the pre-founders confirm, was carried out through their personal networks: Einars Repše, the first party leader, was a personal friend. At the time he was governor of the Latvian Central Bank, but had previously been active in the independence movement and served in the Supreme Council, the transitional parliament in place from 1990 to 1993 (Saeima 2011, n.d.). Repše was one of the most popular figures in Latvia at the time, and interviewees said a major reason for recruiting him was that his personal history had not been tainted by corruption scandals.

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101 According to a survey cited by Ikstens (2003, 1009), the Latvian population of Latvia was “much more positive” towards NATO membership that other ethnic groups in the population.
102 With restoration of independence, emigrate Latvians started to repatriate. The peak in repatriation occurred in 1997. Between 1995 and 2008, more than 5 600 people returned to Latvia (PMLP n.d.).
103 The Latvian name of the party can be traced to a poem by the Latvian national poet Rainis, a pre-founder says in interview.
In August 2001 the intention to form a new party with Repše as the chairperson was made public. By mid-September 2001, Repše and five others appeared on television. The group of five was described in the media as people unknown to the public, yet “highly qualified professionals in their spheres of occupation” (Latvian Centre for Human Rights 2001a). An interview with a New Era member of parliament suggests that people joined even before the idea was picked up by the mass media. Collected press reports (Latvian Centre for Human Rights 2001b, 2001c) indicate that the number of party supporters had by then moved beyond the handful of men who had originated the organisation, and had extended beyond the business sphere.

In the light of business merging with politics, it deserves to be mentioned that the three pre-founders also played a direct part in the party organisation, although to varying degrees. One interviewee reported that he held the post of party general-secretary from 2002 to approximately 2004. In 2010, another pre-founder was a member of the party ethics committee, the internal organ for solving disputes that relate to the party workings (Jaunais Laiks 2010d). However, none of the three pre-founders stood as New Era or Unity candidates in the 2002, 2006 or 2010 Saeima elections and do not appear to have had other central positions in the party.

A New Era staff member states in one of the interviews that the party is today funded by individual donations.\(^{104}\) In interviews conducted for this project with political experts, New Era was described as a party that was not based on an oligarchic structure (interview with Čigane, 2010), and Unity\(^ {105}\) described as an organisation that does not work along oligarchic lines (interview with Muižnieks, 2010). Still, it deserves noting that New Era has not remained untouched from allegations of illicit funding (interview with Kalniņš, 2010). The fact that New Era and Unity are known for their internal disagreements and factions\(^ {106}\) points in the direction of organisations that allow for internal opposition.

**6.4.2.1 Active and passive recruitment in New Era**

In the initial phase, before New Era was elected to the Saeima, recruitment of activists and participants took primarily two forms: active and passive (on active/passive recruitment, see Herrnson 1988, 48–51). Active recruitment in New Era consisted of recruitment of experts from various subject areas. Two male interviewees with experience from the early days of the party mention

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\(^{104}\) With a somewhat spectacular demand for support, Repše asked for a large sum of money for himself to leave the position as governor of the central bank and become a party leader, and another, larger amount for funding the party. The money was supposed to stem from small, individual donations and make the party leader independent from corrupt money networks, but was criticised by other political leaders (Sikk 2006, 136–7; The Baltic Times 2001).

\(^{105}\) In the 2010 elections, New Era formed Unity (Vienotība), an electoral coalition with two other parties.

\(^{106}\) The term faction here refers to internal subgroups within the party (Olson 1998, 439).
that initially specific individuals – the key word being ‘professionals’ – were asked to contribute with their expertise, which is confirmed in an interview with a woman MP. While some professionals had personal and/or professional connections with Repše himself, data gathered through the interviews do not allow us to know the precise extent to which the active recruitment rested upon personal or professional networks or whether particular professionals were recruited without any prior contact with Repše or the pre-founders. Still, Latvia is a small country and the circles of intelligentsia and other high-level professionals are bound to be made up of a relatively small group of people.

New Era also used passive recruitment. The interviewees speak of a recruitment process in which the party leader made an open call in the mass media, asking people to join the nascent party. Several interviewees confirm that this open call was one of the main avenues into the party at this time and that it attracted both people who had personal ties to Repše and those who only knew him as a public, trustworthy figure: both types of persons are among the interviewees. The passive recruitment included applicants sending their ideas and CV’s to the informal grouping that by then constituted the core of the party. After the ideas were screened by this small group of people, Repše himself contacted applicants via phone.

The first party executive board was small, fewer than ten members. According to two male parliamentarians with early and extensive experience in the party, the members of the first party executive board were hand-picked by the party leader and approved by the founding congress on February 2nd 2002. A male parliamentarian who held a central position in the party at the very beginning named one woman among the members of the first executive board in interview. She was by her profession well-known to the electorate and was given favourable positions on the lists of candidates in the 2002 elections.

6.4.2.2 A “genuinely new” party of professionals

When MPs were asked in interviews to name individuals who were active and central in the very beginning, most of the named persons are men, though not exclusively. Women and men with professional backgrounds from various fields are mentioned as initial members, many of whom are still central figures of New Era. Interviews with both male and female parliamentarians tell of a party that places much emphasis on professionalism in the broad sense, encompassing academics both from humanities and natural sciences, medical doctors of different specialisations, people with educational background in law and, to a certain extent, business people. Professionalism was a keyword for New Era in the 2002 election campaign (Davies and Ozolins 2004, 837; Pičukāne 2004, 89), and a male parliamentarian confirms what an analysis of lists of candidates also shows: the vast majority of New Era Saeima candidates have some form of higher education. Finally,
in the wake of the 2002 elections the party leader was quoted in the media saying that if ministers felt their allegiances should lie elsewhere than with their position as ministers, “There are professional alternatives, qualified people out there who can take up these posts” (The Baltic Times 2002). This signals that their professional backgrounds and skills were central in the recruitment, their personas being secondary.

What everyone but Repše had in common was their previous non-involvement in party politics. New Era was a “genuinely new” (Sikk 2006) party that did not contribute to elite recirculation (Steen 1997).107 The many new faces may have contributed towards the image of New Era as “Repše’s party”, an image mentioned by several interviewees. Still, referring to parties by their primary leader is common practice in Latvia, an MP states in an interview. Whether this practice imparts a le parti, c’est moi situation (Michels 1915, 138–40) for individual party leaders, these data do not reveal. The factions that developed in New Era indicate that if this was the case in New Era, the party appears to have grown out of it.

6.4.3 Analysis: Getting the party started

New Era shares some of the characteristics that other parties in Latvia have displayed, most notably the initial way that party founding took place: among a small group of businessmen. Different types of data do, however, indicate a party that, while still being an elite party with very few members and a top-down process of development, did not have the backing of a typical oligarch.

The pattern of recruitment in the start-up phase is of particular importance here. Initially, New Era used active recruitment in which particular individuals were recruited on what appears to have been a mix of informal networks and their known expertise in a broad range of areas, including what seems to have been considerable influence from the party leader. This can be compared to how oligarch parties are said to recruit: by pinpointing specific individuals. We cannot rule out that New Era was initially formed based on informal networks, yet they did not exclude women from the process. Still, none of the interviewees indicate that New Era actively recruited with the aim of achieving gender balance. Thereafter, the New Era path takes a new direction, different from what is known about recruitment in closed parties: recruitment that allowed anyone to come forward with their ideas. Seen in sheer numbers, passive recruitment was likely the most important channel of recruitment during the start-up phase. The reliance upon passive recruitment and the written ideas of applicants as well as the party emphasising professionalism are the keys to explaining how New Era turned into a gender-

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107 The interview data are contradictory on whether people from other parties were simply not let in, or whether they were allowed in but later left.
balanced party. The open call may have attracted more women than would recruitment based on personal networks. Still, even this passive form of recruitment was centralised and governed by the ones who had formed the initial, informal core in which the party leader played a pivotal role.

In essence, the difference between New Era and parties in which personal networks determine who becomes part of the organisation is the open call for participation. It may have allowed women to be accepted into the party because they had ideas that were considered useful, that is, they were accepted based on their abilities to present political ideas and solutions. Combined with the party’s emphasis on professionalism and the many highly qualified women in Latvia, the open call for activists may have contributed towards gender balance. Still, recruitment in New Era was centralised, allowed much power to the party leader and included a screening of candidates, and hence largely resembles that of other Latvian parties. To broaden this picture, we need to know how candidate selection and construction of lists were carried out in the 2002, 2006 and 2010 Saeima elections.

6.5 Party members and parliamentary candidates

Party membership is sometimes required for candidacy. Understanding the extent to which New Era corresponds to how other parties deal with the issue of party membership is thus important for understanding how the party became gender balanced.

Scholarly studies of the impact of candidate selection on women’s parliamentary presence typically rest upon two related concepts: centralisation/decentralisation and institutionalisation or bureaucratisation of the candidate selection process. Literature on candidate recruitment and gender suggests that localised or decentralised candidate selection may lead to more women in parliament (Caul Kittilson 2006, 124), but also encompasses the idea that centralised selection of candidates may lead to the same outcome (Matland and Montgomery 2003a). Previous chapters in this volume show that decentralised candidate selection was favourable in West European parties in the late 1980s – although in conjunction with other conditions – while parties in Central and Eastern Europe tend to be more centralised. When decentralised, the low membership figures in CEE parties make decentralisation different from that of decentralisation in mass parties. Benchmarks for determining what constitutes a centralised or decentralised type of candidate selection were presented and evaluated in the two previous chapters, and are used accordingly here.

Scholars of gender representation often claim that more bureaucratisation and less use of informal networks mean more women in parliament, a type of candidate selection sometimes referred to as ‘institutionalised’. A higher degree of bureaucratisation of candidate selection means that personal politi-
cal networks are less useful, and that the process of candidate selection is transparent (see, e.g., Guadagnini 1993; cf. Public Policy Institute 2004). The extent to which formal criteria and working orders structured the selection of candidates is subject to analysis below, based on the answers provided by respondents. First, however, we look at how parties deal with membership requirements.

6.5.1 Becoming a member of a Latvian political party

In general, Latvian parties have a small number of rank-and-file members: in 2003 party members made up less than one per cent of the electorate, which, by European standards, is very low. Registering a political party in Latvia requires at least 200 founding members, and 200 members is thus a natural low. According to data published in 2004 New Era then had 400 members (Auers and Ikstens 2005, 89, 90–1; Mair and van Biezen 2001). By June 2010, the number of members had increased to 1,358 (New Era staff, personal communication June 2nd 2010).

The process of becoming a party member is, however, more complex than the sheer number of registered members might indicate. An investigation published in 2005 shows that a majority of the bigger parties then required two or three references from party members for new members to enter and, in a few cases, an interview with the person applying for membership. Two parties only accepted Latvian citizens. Most parties required members to pay a membership fee, either a fixed sum or a percentage of either the minimum wage or the income of the member (Auers and Ikstens 2005, 89–0). Janušauskienė (2011, 146) shows that Lithuanian parties have similar requirements.

A connection between the extent to which a party is closed to new members and its status as an oligarch party is sometimes made by transparency experts and social scientists (interview with Čigane, 2010, see also Ostrovskis 2004). It may be true that these parties are more cautious about including any one new. Still, even parties that are comparatively closed will need a certain influx of new people, a need that is underlined by the many reconfigurations of the party landscape between elections. The question is, of course, who may join.

6.5.1.1 Membership requirements in New Era

In the early 2000s, New Era required two references from party members and an interview with a panel in order to evaluate whether the applicant was “ideologically ‘suitable’” for the party, but did not ask for any membership fee (Auers and Ikstens 2005, 89). Looking back at the recruitment during the

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108 The nationalist TB/LNNK and the Greens.
109 I am grateful to Jānis Ikstens for pointing this out.
start-up phase described above it seems that the informal core of the party, according to a member of that group who was interviewed, consisted of about ten persons, including the party leader. The screening process that was already in place during the start-up phase was thus developed in the years to come and now appears to be a norm. Furthermore, it corresponds to how other parties deal with membership.

New Era cannot be said to have higher formal thresholds for entry than the other parties. Still, as Auers and Ikstens note (2005, 89), the small number of party members effectively limits entry possibilities by requiring two references. In fact, any new member must have a personal relationship to two existing members and therefore who actually becomes a member depends upon personal networks. It is important to note that although New Era is said to lack the oligarchic structure that some other parties are said to exhibit, their formal membership requirements are similar. The question remains, of course, whether the party required formal membership for candidacy.

6.5.2 Parliamentary candidacy in Latvia: A gender perspective

While studies of Latvian parties are few and far between in the larger, international and comparative studies of candidate selection and gender, a few studies that focus on Latvian politics shed light upon gender and party politics. In this section New Era is examined with respect to theory as well as new empirical data about candidate selection in Latvian parties.

6.5.2.1 Centralisation and bureaucratisation of Latvian parties

As established above, Latvian parties are generally small in terms of their number of members, and we see that even parties that are not regarded as oligarch parties may be understood as elite parties (interview with Čigane, 2010). Regardless of internal structures of the parties, the low membership figures make internal primaries less useful as a tool for candidate selection. This should lead us to expect centralised or even heavily centralised processes, with little or no influence from rank-and-file members, to be the dominating forms of candidate selection in Latvian parties. Different types of evidence point in one and the same direction: centralisation and a generally low degree of bureaucratisation.

Recruitment of parliamentary candidates in Latvia depends largely upon the central organs of the party. Ostrovska and Koroleva (1997, 42) note that “[p]arty leaders fully control the behind-the-scenes process, and women are usually excluded from it.” Germeten (1999) reaches a similar conclusion. A more recent study tells that the general procedure of candidate selection meant that “party chapters” nominated persons for lists of candidates that were later approved by the party board, yet suggests that the procedure often relies upon an agreement already made between the local organisation and
the party board (Public Policy Institute 2004, 19). The same study states that “[a]n open procedure for the approval of nominees is not typical” and notes that candidate lists are drawn up by “rating commissions” on the basis of “the popularity of each nominee and the potential benefit for the party list” (Public Policy Institute 2004, 13, 19). In addition, Germeten (1999) argues that Latvian parties mostly recruit candidates in an informal manner.

One Latvian party – unfortunately not named – allegedly has adopted quotas for internal party positions (Public Policy Institute 2004, 21), yet the Quotaproject website notes that, by 2009, none of the Latvian parties had applied gender quotas in candidate selection (Quotaproject 2009).

In short, we should expect recruitment of parliamentary candidates in Latvian parties to be centralised. In general, it should also be expected to be relatively informal, that is, little institutionalised or bureaucratised.

6.5.2.2 Candidate selection and gender in Latvian parties

One possible explanation for lack of gender balance lies with the allocation of slots on lists of candidates presented in elections. If women were placed in less visible positions, that is, not first or last\(^\text{110}\) on the lists, their chances to enter parliament may be decreased. In order to arrive at a valid comparative account of how Latvian parties construct their lists, lists from parties elected into the Saeima in the 2002, 2006 and 2010 elections were collected. A summary of slot allocation between the sexes is presented in Table 19 below.

The parties were selected to provide insights about the causes of total absence of women MPs and about how gender-balanced party lists can return low shares of women MPs.

In the two gender uniform parties, Harmony Centre (SC) and For Human Rights in a United Latvia (PCTVL), the share of women candidates has ranged from 15.5 to 31 per cent. Still, none of the 25 PCTVL deputies elected in 2002 were women and neither were any of the six elected in 2006. Similarly, all of the 17 MPs elected from SC lists in 2006 and the 29 elected in 2010 were men (CVK 2002, 2006a, 2010a). In general, both parties have placed women candidates in the middle or lower sections of lists, which has not only made them less visible to voters, but has also lowered their chances of moving to an electable slot when candidates higher up the lists were elected. These parties have also consistently avoided placing any women at all in the top slot. Although on three occasions women have been given the very last slot in a district, it has not led to them being elected.

Latvia’s First Party, LPP, and the coalition between LPP and Latvia’s Way, LC, presented gender-balanced lists in the 2002 and 2006 elections. Upon closer inspection, LPP lists from 2002 resemble the lists presented by

\(^{110}\) The Latvian electoral system includes a strong form of preference voting, which is discussed below. Because of the preference voting, the last slot on a ballot list may be as useful as the top slots.
the gender uniform, leftist parties, although the share of women in the top 15 slots is higher. The two LPP women elected in 2002 were elected from the 4th and 7th list positions, largely because they moved to electable slots when male candidates in the top 5 were elected from other districts. Both also benefited from preference voting. In 2006, the one woman placed last in her district was elected on preference votes, whereas another woman, placed fifth in her district, moved to an electable slot when candidates higher up the lists won seats (author’s calculations from CVK 2002, 2006a).

In addition to being a minority in two of the four cases, women have lacked the highly visible slots needed to become elected. This may signal a general lack of visibility of women in these parties and, in the case of LPP and LPP/LC, presence of only a few women candidates who were able to draw on popular support and preference votes.

Table 19: Share of women candidates by party and list position, selected Latvian parties in the 2002, 2006 and 2010 Saeima elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women candidates, percentage</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women MPs, percentage (abs.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20.0 (2)</td>
<td>20.0 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last slot (abs)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40 (2)</td>
<td>20 (1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20 (1)</td>
<td>20 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data refer to average share of women. The Top 15 category for PCTVL and LPP cover four of the five electoral districts.

Party labels: SC Harmony Centre; PCTVL For Human Rights in a United Latvia; LPP Latvia’s First Party; LPP/LC union with LPP and Latvia’s Way.

Source: Share of women candidates and MPs, see Table 18, page 140. Slot allocation: Author’s calculations from CVK data, (CVK n.d., n.d., n.d.). See appendix for details.

6.5.3 Candidate recruitment and selection in New Era

Understanding recruitment, selection and ranking of candidates in New Era in the 2002, 2006 and 2010 elections requires analysis of the procedures that eventually led up to formal agreed-upon lists of candidates. It also necessitates keeping an eye on the wider events that the party went through, including leadership transition, party splitting and electoral collaboration.
6.5.3.1 New Era lists of Saeima candidates 2002, 2006 and 2010
The number and share of New Era women parliamentary candidates remained equal to that of men as well as reasonably stable from the 2002 to the 2006 elections. Still, the slots allotted to women in the 2006 elections differed notably from the slots in which women were placed in the 2002 elections. When the absolute number of New Era slots on the electoral rolls decreased in 2010, as a consequence of the formation of the electoral coalition Unity, gender distribution was kept balanced. While the presence of gender balance in 2002 is of primary concern, these two shifts shown in Table 20 below tell of important events in the history of the party.

The five lists presented by New Era in the 2002 elections were gender balanced. There was a total of 81 candidates, 33 of which were women (40.7 per cent). The party leader was placed in the first slot on all five district lists and there were no women in the top three positions. Women were placed further down the lists, comprising on average every fourth candidate in the top five and close to every second candidate in the top ten and top fifteen (authors’ calculation from CVK data, see Table 20 below). In short, the 2002 New Era lists resemble the lists of gender uniform parties, although the overall share of women candidates is substantially larger.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010 (Unity)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage, average (abs.)</td>
<td>Percentage, average (abs.)</td>
<td>Percentage, average (abs.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40.7 (33)</td>
<td>39.5 (34)</td>
<td>37.4 (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100 (5)</td>
<td>40 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 10</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 15</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last slot</td>
<td>60 (3)</td>
<td>40 (2)</td>
<td>20 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Top 15 for 2002 does not include the Kurzeme district, in which only 14 candidates stood for New Era.
Source: Authors’ calculations from CVK data (n.d., n.d., n.d.) and personal communication with New Era staff (2011-02-07).

Closer examination of the lists shows that the elected women benefited from the fact that several of the male candidates in the top positions stood in several districts: when they were elected in one district, other district lists were in effect shortened. This worked towards offsetting the skewed allocation of slots, and was likely also facilitated by the fact that New Era won a substantial 26 out of 100 seats in the Saeima. Although most New Era candidates
were not well-known to the public in 2002, several of the elected women also benefited from the preference voting system.

The 2006 lists presented a noticeable shift in gender composition: the top slot in all five districts were granted to five different women and the overall composition of the lists became considerably more gender balanced, with women candidates in the top five increasing from an average of every fourth to just over every second slot (see Table 20 above). As will be discussed in the section on nomination below, this shift came about not by an influx of women in 2006, because the absolute number and the share of women candidates remained almost unchanged, but by significant events within the organisation. Still, the 2006 lists featured a considerable renewal of the lists: candidates who stood in the 2002 elections comprised only 40 per cent of those standing in the 2006 elections, with every fifth candidate being an incumbent MP. Furthermore, half of the incumbents selected for the 2006 lists were women (author’s calculations from CVK data).

In 2010, a law was passed putting an end to the practice of multi-district candidacy, i.e., candidates standing in more than one district. In addition, New Era was in an electoral coalition, Unity, which effectively restricted the number of New Era candidates. The Unity lists included 37.4 per cent women, and the average share of women candidates on the lists varied from 37 to 60 per cent. The vast majority of candidates had at least some higher education. Of the 44 candidates from New Era, 32 per cent were women, and three of the five top candidates on the Unity lists were women (CVK and New Era, personal communication, author’s calculations). In terms of gender distribution and allocation of slots, the Unity lists did not bring any major changes compared to the lists presented by New Era in 2006. Indeed, the very top slots returned to gender balance.

6.5.3.1.1 Strategic list composition and gender

None of the lists was composed using a systematic zip or zebra system, in which every other seat is allocated to men/women. Instead, several slots in a row were allocated to women or to men. This echoes the attitude toward gender quotas expressed in interviews with male and female MPs who either have or used to have direct influence over the composition of lists: New Era does not use any type of formal gender quotas when selecting or ranking candidates on ballot lists.

In the 2002 and 2006 Saeima elections candidates could stand in as many as all five districts. Candidates standing in several districts are here understood as top ranked within the party. Analysis of the lists of candidates shows that in the 2002 elections nine candidates were placed on more than one list, four of which were women. Two men and one woman were on all five lists. In 2006, 20 candidates appeared on more than one list, nine of which were women. In both 2002 and 2006, thus, every second candidate who stood in more than one district was a woman, and hence we should con-
clude that women were not excluded from influential positions in New Era – not even during the first years after the founding of the party.

While in many other electoral systems being last on the list of candidates would ensure not being elected, in the Latvian system being last can be as effective as being placed in a top position. For New Era, this was confirmed on at least one occasion, when a woman who was placed last in her district was elected into parliament. Likewise, in the 2010 elections a well-known male candidate in the Unity coalition placed last and was (re-)elected into parliament.

The 2006 lists indicate that the party was well aware of the possibility of attracting preferential votes – or even votes overall – by placing strong candidates last. This strategy was used for women and men alike: of the five women who were given the top slot, two also held the last slot on a list in another district. Moreover, two male candidates simultaneously held the last slot in one district and more high-ranked slots in other districts. This strategy was made possible because of multi-district candidacy, though none of these candidates were elected in the districts where they were placed last. Nevertheless, it provides clear evidence of a type of strategic list composition that was used for both male and female candidates.

6.5.3.1.2 New Era election results: The 2002, 2006 and 2010 elections

As noted in the introductory section, New Era has had a gender-balanced group of MPs elected in the 2002, 2006 and 2010 Saeima elections. As shown in Table 21 below, the share of women MPs has varied between the elections, as has total the number of New Era MPs.

The success rate of women candidates relative to that of men did not decrease when the party lost seats. On the contrary, women candidates were comparatively more successful than male candidates in 2006, while women and men from New Era had equal electoral success in 2002 and 2010. In order to move towards an explanation of the initial level of women’s participation in 2002 and electoral success in all three elections, the remainder of this section deals with candidate selection.

Table 21: New Era Saeima election results and women MPs, 2002-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>MPs elected</th>
<th>Women MPs, percentage</th>
<th>RSR_w</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: RSR_w = Women’s Relative Success Ratio.
Source: Authors’ own calculations from CVK data and personal communication with New Era staff (2011-02-07). 2010 data refer to New Era candidates only, excluding other candidates standing in the Unity electoral coalition. See Appendix for further information on the data.
6.5.3.2 Nomination of candidates in New Era: 2002-2010

Throughout the 2002, 2006 and 2010 Saeima elections, candidates have been nominated in several ways: volunteer when the executive board asked for candidates (2002), be nominated by local chapters (mainly 2006, 2010), gain informal support from other activists in the thematic working group(s) in which they were active (2002), have priority as an incumbent MP (2006, 2010) or, alternatively, be nominated by the executive board. These different avenues toward nomination were confirmed by several interviewees who held central but different positions within the party. Sometimes, they stated, individuals were invited to join the party. In some cases, this was part of the political career history of the interviewees themselves. Such invitations included both women and men, but the interview data are not sufficient to determine whether there was any gender bias among the invited candidates.

The thematic working groups of activists that were set up early on were central to the candidate nomination process in 2002, according to respondents active in the start-up phase. Active participation was key, yet a male parliamentarian called attention to the difficulties for some activists to be on site in Riga to take part in the working groups, pointing specifically to family responsibilities as restricting participation. Still, interpersonal relationships and active support from others in the working groups helped activists move forward and become nominees and candidates.

In all three instances, the party required formal applications; the screening process in 2002 was discussed in the section on membership. In 2006 and 2010 formal applications stating the background and intentions of the candidates were used. One MP suggests that this may have meant that those seeking candidacy could overstep the local level by applying directly to the executive board, but another MP stresses the active role taken by local chapters in sending lists of nominees to the executive board.

According to party statutes111 adopted in 2007, candidates may be nominated by local branches or support groups, the latter of which corresponds to a small local branch. In addition, incumbents were given priority for the 2010 elections, which resulted in 12 incumbent112 MPs returning, seven of which were women.113 One interviewed MP with experience in all three elections reports that in 2010 the nomination procedure included filing a formal application that covered previous work and political ideas for the future. Hence, the nomination procedures in 2010 closely resembled those of 2002 and 2006.

111 This refers to an interview with party staff, in which the statutes were discussed.
112 Incumbent here refers to all MPs elected as New Era MPs in 2006, regardless of whether they later left the party.
113 Every second of the 6 incumbents not standing for election in 2010 were women. The choice not to stand for re-election may however have many reasons. One of the new Era MPs elected to the Saeima in 2006 was, for example, later elected to the European Parliament.
In sum, nomination procedures and screening of aspirants appear to have followed the same pattern throughout the period. While there is a difference between the 2002 procedure and the 2006 and 2010 formal applications, the latter two may be correctly understood as repeating the process by which the party screened and interviewed prospective aspirants during the start-up phase. The main procedures followed in 2002 have continued and now appear to constitute a norm, both in practice and on paper, for nomination procedures for New Era candidates in Saeima elections. This norm includes a notable degree of centralisation and considerable powers vested with the party executive board.

The nomination phase appears to be relatively non-bureaucratic, particularly so in 2002, when the open call for party activists was followed by an open invitation for activists to come forward as candidates. In addition to reliance on networks and support from the thematic working groups, there was also a less transparent recruitment route, one that targeted particular individuals. It is likely that this pertains particularly to recruiting or inviting experts and professionals to the working groups. This indicates a mode of nomination in which ‘face recognition’ and professional reputation of the recruited as well as interpersonal networks between the recruited and party activists are hard currency, factors usually understood as typifying a less institutionalised/bureaucratised model. The data do not indicate any change in 2006 or 2010. Hence, we should assume that nomination has remained fairly reliant upon informal support and interpersonal networks, mainly within the group of already active members and supporters.

New Era has hitherto never been a mass party. The number of members has been small and, especially when local branches are involved in nominating candidates, thus the process likely involves relatively few people. While candidate nomination is not the prerogative of the executive board alone, which consequently rules out a perfectly centralised nomination procedure, the influential position of the initial core in 2002, the party leader and later the party executive board, still marks recruitment in this party as a centralised process. Still, knowing that local-level politics in Latvia is clearly more gender balanced than the national level is, we must assume that at least some nominations may have been influenced by women’s comparatively strong positions locally. Moreover, particularly salient in the case of New Era that presents itself as an anti-corruption party, the image of women is that they are more trustworthy and reliable. This stereotype – whether true or not – may have been advantageous for women at both local and national levels. The analysis below explores to what extent this is true.

**6.5.3.3 Selection of candidates in New Era: 2002-2010**

The process by which candidates were selected from among nominees and allocated a slot on the ballot lists has remained fairly stable since 2002, yet a few changes merit attention.
In 2002, a working group of three constructed the candidate lists for the Saeima, according to an interviewee who was a member of the group and on the first executive board. The lists were then presented to the executive board, where the formal decision was taken with only minor changes. Another member of the first executive board says the board decided on the lists following discussion in the party.\(^{114}\) MPs who were not active in this process in 2002 suggest that probably the party board put together the lists and one MP reported that the party leader might have had substantial influence over the lists of candidates, which supports the picture laid out above. In sum, the interviews point towards the working groups having a say, but that the main power over candidate selection in 2002 lay with an informal process that included very few people, the formal decision being made by the executive board – which was in effect selected by the first party leader.

Several interviewees tell that, in 2006, the party executive board voted on the ranking of candidates. In 2010, the individual voting procedure in the executive board was replaced by discussion, a member of the executive board asserted. Furthermore, the party statutes grant the regional council, Dome, the right to approve candidate lists. In 2006, this function was filled by the party congress (New Era staff, personal correspondence 2011-02-23). The regional council is a representative organ composed of local chapters. It has the prerogative to return candidate lists to the executive board for revision, one of the party staff said in an interview. Both staff and MPs when interviewed indicated that the lists presented to the congress/regional council were unlikely to be changed: the executive board is portrayed as the locus of power in the party.\(^{115}\)

6.5.3.3.1 Criteria and considerations in candidate selection

Apart from being active in the party, being well-known to the electorate should be advantageous for those seeking candidacy. In 2002, however, this asset applied to few candidates. Both male and female interviewees mention abilities such as being able to present, analyse and create political ideas and working in teams among the important skills. Still, specific experiences and critique from within the party tell of a candidate selection process in which there are few formal requirements.

An interviewee with a central position in the party explained that in the 2010 elections all candidates were party members. This indicates that party membership might not have been required – formally or informally – for candidacy in earlier elections. In addition, another interviewee, an MP, sug-

\(^{114}\) An interviewee who was then a leader of a working group says that an informal group, consisting of leaders of the working groups and others who were particularly active, ranked nominees using an individual voting procedure.

\(^{115}\) The formal process was discussed with party staff, in which the regional council was mentioned. In other interviews, the congress/council part in the decision of candidate lists is not mentioned.
gested that in everyday party work party membership is not as important as taking an active part.

New Era and Unity are characterised in the experts’ interviews as open, compared to other (elite) parties (interviews with Kalniņš, 2010 and Čigane, 2010), meaning that they rely less on old boys’ networks and similar informal personal contacts. Although in comparative perspective they may be, this study indicates that candidate selection in New Era cannot be characterised as relying upon clear, formal criteria for candidacy. An interviewee with direct influence over the process of candidate selection in 2002 characterised the process as an “extremely subjective evaluation of colleagues.” In much the same vein, two interviewees who were at some point either involved in candidate selection themselves or have been active in the party since its early days expressed concerns about what may be understood as subjective and non-transparent candidate selection. For instance, the executive board de facto formally made the decisions about their own list positions and the voting system used in 2002 and 2006 precluded debate, hence making the choice of candidates less transparent. One of the interviewees clearly identified candidate selection as potentially being a matter of who was having good relations with the executive board.116 In addition, the same MP mentioned that the party did not have sufficiently structured knowledge about the skills and abilities of its active members, and that in spite of formal applications for candidacy it may not be obvious to everyone why one person and not someone else was chosen to stand for election. Although criteria for candidacy had been discussed, the interviewee expressed criticism towards the relative lack of formal criteria. This critique was put forward in the light of the 2010 elections at a time when candidate selection was underway and is thus understood as a critique that applies to the 2002 and 2006 elections.

Finally, an interviewee knowledgeable about the formal structures of the party stated that while local branches formally nominate candidates, well-known persons or others who may be competitive candidates may bypass the local branch. This shows that the influence from local branches may be less important than recruitment of well-known candidates. It furthermore gives reasons to believe that being on good terms with the party executive board may be more important than having a local affiliation and support from other personal networks.

The actual ranking of candidates in 2002 was, an interviewee who worked on the ranking process stated, a matter of “informal sense”: the lists had to be competitive, and voters would notice if they were biased. Hence age, gender and the background of candidates were taken into account, and lists were also constructed with reference to which individuals would be strong

116 It should be noted that in April 2011, three of the twelve New Era executive board members were women. All but three of the members of the party executive board were either members of government or the national parliament (Jaunais Laiks 2010a, 2010b, 2010c).
competitive candidates in each region. Still, the lists were constructed in a small group, without membership ballots or other direct influence from rank-and-file members after the nomination stage.

6.5.3.3.2 Explaining the 2006 shift in gender distribution on ballot lists
While the 2002 lists of candidates were gender balanced in terms of numbers of women and men, the analysis presented above shows that women were more often placed in the middle or lower sections of the lists. In the 2006 elections, New Era presented even more evenly distributed lists of candidates in which women and men were roughly equally placed. Moreover, all five lists were headed by women. A specific sequence of interconnected events led to this outcome.

After the New Era-led Repše cabinet lost parliamentary support and resigned in early 2004, the party was invited to join an over-sized government coalition in late 2004. That government was shook by a major corruption scandal connected to one of the other parties in government, the so-called Jūrmala gate. In addition, a criminal investigation, allegedly politically motivated, was opened against Repše, who then resigned from his post as minister of defence. Following the 2006 elections the investigation was suspended (Ikstens 2006, 2007). The remaining New Era ministers resigned a few months later, stating as a reason, among other things, suspected corruption on the part of one of the coalition parties. At this point, another – also allegedly politically motivated – investigation against another New Era minister was opened (Freedom House 2008; The Baltic Times 2006). According to a New Era MP and a party scholar (Ikstens 2007), Repše himself pressured the New Era ministers to resign from government. Interviews indicate that this event caused dissent both inside the party and among New Era voters. During this time, it appears that Repše may have withdrawn, if only partially, from his role in politics as media attention was paid to his personal life. Consequently, as several interviewees note, there was a marked fall in his approval ratings: from being one of the most respected and liked persons in Latvia to being one of the discredited politicians. This fuelled the emerging intra-party factions, and led to leadership transition and a subsequent party split in 2008.

The 2002-2006 legislative period meant that several of the New Era women (or women who later affiliated with the party) were appoint to ministerial positions including the ministers of defence, culture, justice, foreign affairs and education and science (Ikstens 2003, 2005). In addition, a woman who had been a constitutional court judge joined New Era during this period. Hence, at that time there was a considerable number of women with significant political experience in the party. Some of these women were also associated with factions inside the party that had developed during this legislative period; one woman was assumed to be a leader of a faction, according to
two male MPs who were interviewed. This assertion is supported by the events that led to the party split in 2008 (see below).

One raison d’être for an anti-corruption and anti-oligarchs party like New Era would be to promote democratic ideals and this necessitates a profile that rests upon a credible image of teamwork rather than a one-man party. In the 2006 elections, New Era needed to show that there were credible politicians in the party other than Repše. This need grew stronger as he lost popular support. In interviews with both male and female respondents there was agreement that the party has sought to move towards collaboration between equals and away from being and appearing like a party known by its leader. While this need for a new image and leadership transition would still have appeared at some point, it was likely fuelled by the fact that the party leader could no longer be expected to attract as many votes as in the 2002 elections. There was thus a need for new, visible New Era personalities to step forward.

While the party was well-aware of the negative rating the party leader had in opinion, it also knew that some of the women had strong support, according to a male MP who was knowledgeable of the candidate selection process. Although the interviewees differ on who came up with the idea to put the party leader second and women first, one concept is repeated: gentleman. By having the party fronted by five women, it would appear, so the reasoning went, that the male party leader was not being discredited or rebuffed by his own party, but that as a “gentleman” he was giving women greater credit. The upshot of this strategy was the party could benefit from the women being more popular than the male party leader while at the same time the women would not be seen as a major threat albeit they had extensive political experience. This is an example of how gender stereotyping may fuel clear-cut outcomes in politics. It deserves to be pointed out, however, that the gentleman strategy would not have led to gender balance if there had not been a sufficient number of other women candidates.

6.5.3.3.3 Formal and informal power over candidate selection in New Era
As described above, New Era candidate selection for the 2002, 2006 and 2010 Saeima elections relied on personal networks and support from colleagues as well as good relations with the party board or others who were central in the party. It was also a process that included centralised screening of candidates, yet with very few formal criteria for candidacy. These factors could allow the candidate selection process to be influenced by personal networks and the likes and dislikes of the individuals making those decisions.

The regional approval of candidate lists by the congress/regional council is only mentioned in interviews in relation to the formal rules of candidate selection, and it is thus understood here as a formality. Instead, the executive board is seen as the primary and most powerful body of the party. This ech-
oes what has been voiced in the experts’ interviews about candidate selection on the local level (interview with Stafecka, 2010). There, the executive board is presented as exercising the most power in the selection process – although formal power may be vested with other party bodies, having good relations with the executive board is key to candidacy.

The first party leader is sometimes referred to as powerful, despite consensus decisions being the norm. Two male interviewees with experience since the early years of New Era stated that the party leader usually had strong sway over decisions made. One of them said that during the first years creating a more participatory culture was something the party actively sought, and, according to this interviewee, was achieved after a while. The infighting that preceded the party split in 2008 and the image of a party with internal factions indicate that the powerful position ceded to the first party leader was likely not granted to his successors. Still, the party executive has remained a powerful body.

6.5.3.4 Gender as strategy I: New Era voters 2002 and 2006

If, as one interviewee contends, gender was taken into account in order to achieve a list that was competitive, it must be assumed that the party expected their potential voters to be inclined to vote for women. Given the paucity of well-known candidates on the New Era lists in 2002, we can rule out the possibility that voters were attracted to high-profile candidates other than the party leader, regardless of gender. Instead, we are left to look at the gender issue per se. If we hypothesise that women have an interest in voting for women, then New Era should have gained more votes from women than from men and should have attracted more female voters than did gender biased parties. This proposition is examined below.

Every second (52 per cent) New Era voter in 2002 was a woman, a post-election survey\textsuperscript{117} shows (BISS 2002, author’s calculations). The share of women among New Era voters increased to 60.4 per cent in the 2006 elections.\textsuperscript{118} Most parties in Latvia have a larger percentage of women than men among their voters (ESS4-2008, ed 4.0 2011, author’s calculations) and should hence have the same incentives to field women candidates. As shown in Table 18 on page 140, this does not have the same effect across the Latvian party system, at least not on the national level. The data cited above also show that two other parties – Latvia’s First Party (LPP) in 2002 and the Greens and Farmers’ Union (ZZS) in 2006 – attracted 70 and 72 per cent women voters. LPP did have a gender-balanced group of candidates in 2002, but the “women’s bonus” (Caul Kittilson 2006, 124) may also have been due to the ideological profile of the party. In 2006, ZZS presented lists of candidates that were, in terms of gender, on a par with several other parties, that

\textsuperscript{117} N=900, sample including citizens (eligible voters) only. Data collected November 2002.

\textsuperscript{118} N=869. Unclear whether sample included citizens only. Data collected 2009.
is, with a good 20 per cent women (see Table 18, page 140). Thus, the women’s bonus could have gone to any other party, especially to the more gender-balanced lists presented by New Era, For Human Rights in a United Latvia or the coalition between Latvia’s First Party and Latvia’s Way in 2006.

We may conclude that women do vote for women, though not necessarily for parties with gender-balanced lists of candidates. This was evident in the 2006 elections, when the New Era lists were headed by women but still only attracted roughly as many women voters as did the other parties.

6.5.4 Analysis: Party members and parliamentary candidates
The 2002 Saeima elections returned a gender-balanced parliamentary party for New Era. They did so despite the skewed allocation of slots on the lists of candidates in the 2002 elections, lists that were in fact as skewed as the lists presented by parties that achieved perfectly gender uniform, all-male parliamentary parties. The above analyses reveal that three factors worked towards offsetting women’s comparatively unfavourable positions on party lists: party magnitude on the aggregate level, multi-district candidacy and preference votes. The many seats allocated to New Era meant that although women held slots in the middle or lower sections of the lists, they were able to overcome this due to the list shortening effect of multi-district candidacy and also due to particular women benefiting from preference voting. Still, none of these environmental factors explain why there were balanced numbers of women and men on New Era lists. To understand how the lists of candidates included as many women as men, understanding the internal workings of New Era in comparative perspective is crucial.

The formal process of becoming a member of New Era does not differ significantly from that of other Latvian parties. Requiring references from potential members indicates that a network inside the party is needed. Even in a small country like Latvia, requiring references from a small circle of people restricts entry to those who have the right personal network.

In comparison to the gender-biased parties New Era does not differ much from those parties in either candidate recruitment or selection procedures. The major route into the party in 2002 included passing through the eye of the needle consisting of screening by the informal original core of the organisation and the party leader. This was a centralised process and the effect of screening of aspirants’ CVs and ideas should not be underestimated. Neither can it be overlooked when assessing the centralisation and selectiveness of New Era. Still, the group of people who sent their ideas to the party following the open, public call for participation was likely more diverse than would be a group selected purely from the personal networks of party leaders. The call for participation is therefore the strongest difference between recruitment practices in New Era and other parties in Latvia. Still, the rela-
tively informal, non-institutionalised and centralised selection process contradicts previous research on the way gender-balanced parties are achieved.

From the earlier process in which a small, centralised group selected candidates and composed lists, New Era has developed formal mechanisms that are slightly more decentralised by requiring that lists of candidates are accepted by the party congress (in 2006) or the party council (in 2010) in which local branches and support groups are represented. This does, however, appear to be more of a formality, since the congress or party council are unlikely to oppose lists suggested by the party executive board. Consequently, most of the power over candidate selection rests with the executive board, making candidate selection in New Era centralised in practice.

Although candidate selection processes in New Era are evolving towards possibly producing formal criteria for candidacy in the future, the impression of the selection process hitherto is that the criteria for candidate selection have not be formalised very much. Becoming a candidate in 2002 depended upon gaining support from one’s working group (where few knew each other previously), which speaks of a non-bureaucratic, informal process. Previous informal networks were not as useful in this setting as they might have been if, for instance, the party’s pre-founders and leadership had turned solely to their own networks when recruiting members and candidates. After 2002, nomination of candidates included input from local branches as well as from a significant, though apparently limited, influx of well-known people on the national level. The local branches are in principle important for nomination of candidates, yet incumbency, good networks on the national level and high ratings in opinion polls are more decisive.

Although only 40 per cent of candidates in the 2002 elections stood in the 2006 elections, the share and number of women candidates did not change significantly. When the number of candidates declined in 2010, it still remained gender balanced. This indicates a party that either strives to accomplish gender balance or, alternatively, has a more-or-less gender-balanced group of active members. Following this question up, the next section will deal with the ideological frames of New Era.

6.6 Party ideology and gender

Previous research suggests a link between party ideology and the share of women MPs. Leftist ideas, particularly the new left, are associated with larger proportions of women in parliament in Western Europe (Caul Kittilson 2006, 124). Although the reliability of this relationship over time has been questioned (Lovenduski 1993, 13), ideology does provide an important benchmark for comparing parties.

The Latvian party system is not primarily associated with leftism versus right-wing ideology, but rather with ethnicity. Nevertheless, some parties are
understood as right or centre-right, whereas others are known as centre-left or leftist. From the data presented in Table 18 above, it is also clear that neither the leftist parties nor the rightist party are gender balanced, rather they are generally gender biased or gender uniform, meaning there are few or no female MPs. The connection between left/right and women’s parliamentary presence is thus weak or possibly insignificant in Latvia. Nonetheless, understanding the case at hand also means comparing it to cases in other countries, in this case via theory about party ideology and gender. The main question is whether the party’s appeal to women was based on the party program’s position on gender issues, or whether it was the New Era campaign on the central issue of anti-corruption.

6.6.1 The ideological frame of New Era: a gender perspective

Interviews with New Era MPs and pre-founders reveal that the main programmatic issue during the start-up phase of the party concerned anti-corruption. Another central issue was EU and NATO membership, which was in effect achieved during the early 2000s. New Era has also argued that Latvian should be the only official language of Latvia and, engaged in issues of health care, research and education, minority education and issues of agriculture. One MP interviewed mentioned issues of social justice as part of the party programme and two interviewees frame the party as conservative on economic issues. New Era has also dealt with issues of family benefits and child support, another MP pointed out. When asked about the political issues that were central during the start-up phase, gender issues or gender equality per se were not mentioned by the interviewees.

Information gleaned from the interviews do, however, reveal that some New Era MPs do engage with issues closely related to gender equality and are aware of problems of gender stereotypes and domestic violence: one female MP has worked with gender issues and gender budgeting; two of the New Era women who were elected in 2006 are listed as supporters of Marta, a women’s NGO (Marta 2005). The party also fielded the founder and leader of that NGO as a candidate in the 2004 EP elections and 2010 Saeima elections. Still, gender equality as such does not appear to be a central political concern for New Era, neither during the start-up phase nor in the years up until 2010.

As shown in the previous chapter, New Era uses neither gender quotas in candidate selection nor affirmative action. The party leadership is not in favour of gender quotas, a female member of the executive board said in interview. A female parliamentarian and party staffers recall that during the 2002-2006 phase a women’s organisation, Ceriņš (Latvian for lilac), was initiated. It purportedly did not find much support from the top party women. One reason cited for the lack of interest among top party women was that the party was seen as needing unity rather than ancillary organisations. By 2010,
the women’s caucus still formally existed, but was not active. New Era should thus be considered an organisation in which the applied gender ideology does not overtly support women in seeking elected office specifically.

**6.6.1.1 Short party programmes 2002, 2006 and 2010**

For the Saeima elections, Latvian parties present short party programmes of 4000 characters. Content analysis\(^{119}\) of the short programmes shows that in none of the three short programmes that New Era have presented – 2002, 2006 on their own and 2010 in the Unity electoral coalition – are women mentioned as a social or political category. Pičukāne (2004, 88) draws the same conclusion based on data from the 2002 elections.

In all three, public support for families and increased fertility rates is put forward in terms of increased child allowances and availability of kindergarten for all families, as well as public financing of nursery school teachers. In addition, New Era also proposed increased pensions and keeping pensions above the poverty level. Because Latvian women make up the largest number of the elderly, pensions affect women directly and can be interpreted as a way to improve situation for elderly women.

Naturally, the abbreviated party programmes do not give a full picture of the programmes, but do contain the core messages of the parties. The Unity programme of 2010 does cover issues of gender equality, a party activist and candidate with interest in gender issues points out in an interview. Still, the lack of explicit reference to women as a political category or gender issues in the short programmes indicates that New Era has not identified gender issues as one of the core issues of the party.

**6.6.1.2 Gender as strategy II: Anti-corruption and gender**

The main political message of New Era, anti-corruption, is sometimes understood in gendered terms. For example, women are sometimes thought to be less corrupt or corruptible than men. Even though this may be just a popular myth (Goetz 2007), the stereotype gives rise to whether Latvian women think differently about corruption than do Latvian men and this question warrants enquiry.

In a World Bank survey report of corruption in Latvia, Anderson (2001, 28) concludes that, in 1998, there was no correlation between gender and the tendency to pay bribes.\(^{120}\) Eurobarometer (2008a) data collected in 2005 show that 83.9 per cent of the women and 81.6 per cent of the male respon-

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\(^{119}\) The programmes were translated into English using Google translate on March 1st 2010, after which mentioning of women or women’s issues were sought. Checked for accuracy with a native Latvian speaking political scientist, though the author takes full responsibility for the analysis. Due to the language issue, this content analysis is treated as a complement to the other analyses of the ideological underpinnings of New Era.

\(^{120}\) N=1100.
dents considered corruption a major problem in Latvia. That is, the gender difference the Latvian perception of corruption is negligible and women and men are equally likely, or unlikely, to pay bribes. In the light of political parties, a 2008 survey of Latvian citizens (Kalniņš 2008, 28) showed that women were only slightly more likely than men to disagree with the statement “I would support a politician who steals, but who also works for the good of the rest of society” – 60.4 per cent of women and 56.1 per cent of men disagreed with the statement; 27.9 per cent of women and 35.2 per cent of the men agreed. New Era stands out as one of the parties in which most voters would disagree with the statement (71.4 per cent), surpassed only by Civic Union (91.5 per cent), the party created by former New Era MPs.

Although New Era clearly presented itself as an anti-corruption party, the Latvian electorate does not appear to be gender biased in its perception of corruption as a problem, neither in general nor in relation to party politics. This would lead us to believe that New Era would not have perceived gender-balanced lists as being primarily a strategy to attract corruption-averse voters, especially if they were aware of the empirically weak connection between gender and support for anti-corruption. In addition, analysis of gender in the 2002 Saeima election campaigns does not indicate that New Era used this particular stereotype in its election campaign (Pičukāne 2004). We may conclude that in 2002 New Era likely did not try, at least, overtly to benefit from the myth of women as inherently less corrupt or corruptible than men.

6.6.2 Analysis: Party ideology and gender

The above analysis of party ideology and gender in the case of New Era displays three main results. First, the salience of left and right as political categories may not be directly applicable in the case of women’s parliamentary presence in the Latvian national parliament – the ethnic divide is likely more prevalent. Future analyses of gender and Latvian politics should take this into account.

Second, it shows that a party which has been understood both by itself and by others as conservative or centre-right is not necessarily gender biased. Neither the short party programmes nor interview data depict a party in which gender equality is phrased in terms similar to that of any Western feminism. Although there is undoubtedly a certain level of gender awareness among centrally placed individuals in the party, New Era has not placed issues of gender equality high on their agenda at any point in time. Moreover, it does not use institutional measures such as gender quotas in candidate recruitment or selection.

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121 N=449 men and 505 women. Respondents who answered “totally agree” or “tend to agree” to “Corruption is a major problem in [Latvia]” are included here. Author’s calculations.
Finally, the prospects of attracting votes by using the myth about women politicians as less corrupt or corruptible or the idea that women voters are more concerned about corruption have been weak in Latvia during the last decade, and is not mentioned as a rhetoric or campaign strategy of this party. For these reasons, we should consider New Era to be a party in which the programmatic or ideological frame does not contribute towards a gender-balanced parliamentary party.

6.7 Organisational (in)stability: Party splits and gender

Similar to many other parties in Central and Eastern Europe, New Era has experienced a party split. In 2008, a number of MPs and members of the executive board left the party and formed a new parliamentary fraction and party together with MPs from the Latvian-nationalist TB/LNNK.\footnote{Because New Era lost members of its executive board, this is understood as a party split. The new party was formed by both defecting MPs from two different parties, and is thus understood as a new party rather than a splinter party.} While previous research has focused on the lack of party institutionalisation in the light of candidate selection, this section deals with how party splits, a special but common type of lack of party institutionalisation, interacts with gender. The bulk of this analysis seeks a tentative answer to how party splits may affect women’s parliamentary presence. Understanding the split in New Era in 2008 requires understanding the events that led up to it. The events include leadership transition, the shaping of internal factions and government formation.

The first leader of New Era, Einars Repše, has been portrayed as having an “authoritarian” leadership style (Ikstens 2004, 1055). Five men and women with personal experience in different central positions within the party who were interviewed for this project mention the centrality of the former party leader in similar terms. While one interviewee commented on Repše’s centrality as party founder and first party leader, several others described his leadership as being marked by a certain lack of deliberation or insufficient communication between the party leader and the rest of the party. During the initial phase of party formation, a parliamentarian who at the time was active argued, the party was primarily focused on policy; a democratic modus operandi within the organisation was developed later as a consequence of the active work of party members. Another interviewee who was with the party from its early days mentioned the collapse of the Repše government in 2004 as a breaking point, after which party leadership and internal workings became increasingly deliberative. In 2007 Einars Repše was replaced by Arturs Krišjānis Kariņš, who stepped down and was re-
placed by Solvita Āboltiņa in 2008. Thus, New Era currently has a female party leader.

New Era also developed internal subgroups, factions, during its first term in office. One MP outlined three factions, one of which corresponds to the group of MPs and members of the executive board who left New Era in early 2008. The faction included three of the women who were top candidates in the 2006 Saeima elections (see also Ikstens 2009). While the inability to form a coalition cabinet with Godmanis was the official reason for leaving the party, secondary sources (The Baltic Times 2008) hint at the split as having roots in earlier events. This is also supported by interview data, in which the increasingly malfunctioning of the executive board following New Era’s departure from the Kalvītis government in 2006 and the influence from a grey cardinal are cited. To be succinct, informal power appears to at least partly and temporally have moved away from the formal power locus of the party, i.e., the executive board.

Among the MPs and board members who split off to form a new fraction in parliament and a new party, named Civic Union, there were three women and one man. Their parliamentary fraction was joined by MPs from For Fatherland and Freedom (TB/LNNK). A female New Era MP, who was one of the most successful New Era candidates in the 2006 elections, assumed party leadership in Civic Union, and a male MP from TB/LNNK accepted the vice chairperson of the new party.

As shown in Table 18 (page 140), New Era still presented a gender-balanced group of parliamentary candidates in the 2010 elections. Analysis of the lists shows that Civic Union fielded 45 candidates, 21 of which were women, that is, 46 per cent women candidates. Every third New Era MP elected in 2010 was a woman, while 53 per cent of the Civic Union MPs were women\(^\text{123}\) (CVK staff 2010; CVK 2010a; New Era staff 2011). Obviously, the party split did not result in either the new or the original party becoming gender biased.

### 6.7.1 Analysis: Party splits and gender

Party splits clearly point to party instability and to a potential lack of party institutionalisation. As previous research has suggested, reliance upon transparent application of formal rules, so-called party institutionalisation, can be favourable for women seeking elected office. For rules to be applied in a non-transparent way, formal power loci have to remain or there will be no formal power to sanction the rules, that is, the formal rules will not be backed by formal power to enact them.

\(^{123}\) Civic Union won 15 seats in the 2010 Saeima elections, eight of which were won by women.
The split in New Era in 2008 was preceded by an extensive period of leadership transition, which an interviewee cited above said had already started in 2004, and the emergence of internal factions. In addition, informal power within the party caused discontent, which further tells of an organisation in which the formal power vested with the executive board may have been undermined. In short, New Era presents itself as a party in which, at this point in time, the balance of power was tipped in favour of informal power, a party with a low degree of institutionalisation. Still, it presented gender-balanced lists of candidates and had a gender-balanced parliamentary party. Because women were already well positioned within New Era in 2008, this particular lack of party institutionalisation did not lead to their exclusion from candidacy or parliament, neither in New Era nor in the splinter party.

6.8 Electoral laws, voting behaviour and gender

One of the main assumptions made in this research project is that party behaviour and women’s parliamentary presence are contingent upon conditions both internal and external to the party. This last analytical section therefore returns to environmental conditions, more specifically the electoral laws. Electoral systems and voters’ reactions to the parties and candidates largely determine whether gender balanced and strategically composed party lists will return a gender-balanced parliamentary party.

Previous studies have suggested that district magnitude and party magnitude are useful in explaining the effect of electoral systems on women’s parliamentary presence. Large electoral districts from which many delegates are sent are seen by some as more beneficial for women seeking elected office (Rule 1987), while others contend that it is rather the number of seats won by the individual party in each district that matters: with more candidates elected from each party, women are more likely to be elected (Matland 1993, 2006). The previous chapters have shown that party magnitude tends to combine with other conditions, both in its presence and absence. For example, in the study of West European, gender-balanced parties the four configurations with high coverage included either party magnitude or district magnitude.

Another debate revolves around whether women benefit or lose out from preference voting, which allows voters to alter the order of candidates on party lists (see, e.g., Schmidt 2009; Wauters, Weekers, and Maddens 2010). As shown in the study on West European parties presented above, it is the combination of conditions that determines whether women benefit from or are disadvantaged by preference voting. This analysis goes towards understanding more of the details of these conditions by comparing individual cases to each other and the overall situation in Latvia.
Finally, Latvian cases from 2006 and earlier provide an opportunity to consider the effect of multi-district candidacy on the composition of the parliamentary party. This has rarely been approached in the study of party and gender, and the brief analyses presented below thus provide tentative conclusions about how multi-district candidacy may affect gender composition in parliamentary parties.

6.8.1 Party magnitude and gender

The Latvian electoral system is a proportional system with five districts from which a total of 100 candidates are elected to the unicameral parliament, Saeima (CVK 2010d). The average district size is 25, but the actual district size may differ slightly between elections. The effective magnitude has fluctuated between 156, 466 and 37 in the 2002, 2006 and 2010 elections (author’s calculations from ParlGov data, Döring and Manow 2010b), which reflects the large number of parties in parliament as well as notable fluctuations in the effective number of parliamentary parties. Still, the system is one of large districts. If party magnitude matters for the share of women elected from each district (Matland 1993), we should expect the party to have more women elected in districts where it won more seats. Election results and gender distribution in districts for New Era are presented in Figure 4 below.

As shown in Figure 4, in the 2002 and 2006 elections New Era MPs were predominantly elected from the bigger districts of Riga and Vidzeme, whereas the party has had less electoral success in Latgale and Zemgale, Kurzeme being in-between. In Latgale, where New Era won only 1 and 2 seats in 2006 and 2002, the elected MPs have been women. In the electorally more successful districts of Riga and Vidzeme, the share of women elected has differed between elections, from a minority of women in 2002 to gender balance and a majority of women in 2006.

In the case of New Era in the 2002 and 2006 Saeima elections, there is no empirical basis for claiming that larger district-level party magnitude led to a larger share of women among the elected deputies. The picture is, however, complicated by multi-district candidacy and preference voting.

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124 In the 2002, 2006 and 2010 Saeima elections, the Riga and Vidzeme districts have been the larger districts, with 26-29 deputies respectively, while Latgale (16-17 deputies), Zemgale (15) and Kurzeme (13-14) have been somewhat smaller (CVK n.d., n.d., n.d., author’s calculations.)

125 Output-based effective magnitude (Taagepera 2007, chap. 11).

126 Due to the shared lists of candidates in the Unity electoral coalition in the 2010 Saeima elections, data from 2010 are not part of the analysis. See Appendix for figure including data on 2010 elections.
6.8.2 Preference voting and gender in Latvia

In Saeima elections voters can cast their votes for only one party list and may add a preferential vote – positive or negative – to as many candidates as they wish. This means voters may cross out some candidates and give others a plus, that is, a positive preference vote (CVK 2010d). This strong form of preference voting can considerably change the party list by, for example, moving the very last candidate to an electable slot. The Latvian electoral system can thus effectively offset the impact of strategic list compositions, but it may also increase the strategic component, particularly when combined with multi-district candidacy. From a gender perspective, preference voting provides an intriguing possibility to investigate whether women and men are treated differently by voters who make use of the option to add a positive preference vote or cross out candidates from the list.

This section deals with preference voting and gender in a comparative perspective. The overall situation in the 2002, 2006 and 2010 Saeima elections is analysed by comparing the individual parties. Particular attention is paid to whether New Era women candidates benefited more from the preference voting system than did women from other parties. The five district lists for parties that were elected into the Saeima were pooled for the 2002, 2006
and 2010 elections respectively. The mean plus and minus votes for men and women were then compared for each of the elections using an independent samples t-test.\textsuperscript{127}

The data presented in Table 22 below show that Latvian voters tend to cross out women candidates in Saeima elections to a greater extent than they cross out men. Women standing in Saeima elections during the 2000s received more negative preference votes than did male candidates. Moreover, women were also less likely than their male colleagues to win positive preference votes.

Table 22: Preference voting and gender, Saeima elections 2002, 2006 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saeima elections</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive, mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2338.4</td>
<td>2010.6</td>
<td>2736.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>3178.8</td>
<td>2131.4</td>
<td>3035.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s votes as percentage of men’s votes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s votes as percentage of men’s votes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive, mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>73.4*** a</td>
<td>94.3* e</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>94.3* e</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>100.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative, mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>861.8</td>
<td>996.7</td>
<td>2934.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>750.1</td>
<td>857.3</td>
<td>2388.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s votes as percentage of men’s votes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s votes as percentage of men’s votes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Independent samples t-test
a) Equal variances not assumed. t=3.10, df=511.
b) t=-1.9843, df=598. One outlier (woman)
c) t=-2.1037, df=788. 2 man (twice) and 1 woman outliers.
d) Equal variances not assumed. t=-2.3113, df=190.5.
e) t=0.5292, df=788. 2 men, 1 woman (twice) outliers.
See Appendix for standard deviations.
Source: Candidates and MPs, see Table 18, page 140. Preference votes, author’s calculations from CVK data, (CVK n.d., n.d., n.d.)

In the 2002, 2006 and 2010 Saeima elections, women candidates were crossed out 15 to 23 per cent more often than male candidates. Women standing in the 2002 Saeima elections received 25 per cent fewer positive preference votes than did male candidates; the gender difference was a lower 5.7 per cent in 2006. The gender differences in number of positive prefer-

\textsuperscript{127} Pooling the lists creates an overlap of candidates who stood in more than one district in 2002 and 2006. In 2002 and 2006, N refers to the number of cases, not the number of individual candidates. Still, voters are only faced with one of the five district lists of candidates, and hence pooling the lists creates the most accurate picture of how preference votes were allocated from the perspective of the electorate.
ence votes in the 2010 elections were not statistically significant, but indicate that women generally received fewer positive votes than did male candidates.\textsuperscript{128}

This begs the question of whether preference voting has a similar effect across the party landscape, or whether some parties are more affected by gender discrimination by the electorate. The remainder of this section therefore contrasts two gender-biased parties with the gender-balanced New Era.

\textbf{6.8.2.1 Preference voting in two gender-biased, gender-uniform parties}

The two left-wing parties For Human Rights in a United Latvia (PCTVL) and Harmony Centre (SC) have had all-male parliamentary parties in the Saeima following the elections in 2002, 2006 and 2010, despite fielding women candidates. The data reveal only minor differences in the number of times that female and male candidates were crossed out (negative votes), but large differences in the number of positive preference votes. On average, women candidates from PCTVL received only 65 per cent as many positive votes as did the male candidates. Women in SC won even less, only 56 per cent as many positive preference votes as their male colleagues. We may thus conclude that although women have not been systematically crossed out in these two strictly gender uniform parties, they have not benefited from as many positive votes as their male colleagues.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party, Saeima elections</th>
<th>Women candidates, percentage</th>
<th>Women MPS elected</th>
<th>Women’s votes as percentage of men’s votes</th>
<th>N (women)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCTVL, 2002</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64.7 a</td>
<td>99.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCTVL, 2006</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65.4 b</td>
<td>107.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC, 2006</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48.7 c</td>
<td>102.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC, 2010</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64.2 d</td>
<td>100.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a) \( p=0.12, t=1.5626, df=98 \). Male outlier. When removed, ratio = 69.8, \( p=0.05, t=1.98, df=47.12 \), equal variances not assumed)

b) \( p=0.12, t=1.5881, df=98 \). Male outlier. When removed, ratio = 70.6, \( p=0.12, t=1.56, df=97 \).

c) \( p=0.11, t=1.59, df=103 \). Male outlier. When removed, ratio = 52.6, \( p=0.09, t=1.69, df=112 \).

d) One outlier (male). When removed, women’s/men’s votes = 72.4, not significant.

Source: Candidates and MPs, see Table 18, page 140. Preference votes, author’s calculations from CVK data, (CVK n.d., n.d., n.d.)

The absence of women in these two parliamentary parties was not due to women being crossed out more often than men. In fact, PCTVL and SC voters were less inclined to cross out women than were the Latvian voters in

\textsuperscript{128} There are a few outliers in each of the elections. When removed, results are only slightly altered, but only differences in positive votes in 2002 and negative votes in 2006 and 2010 are still statistically significant. See Appendix, Table 38, page 225 for details.
general, but they were also less likely to add a plus next to the name of a woman candidate. The main explanation for why these two parties became gender uniform thus lies elsewhere, most likely in the skewed allocation of slots and in some cases in the low percentage of women candidates.

6.8.2.2 Preference voting and gender in the case of New Era

Mean positive and negative votes for women and men who stood for New Era (2002, 2006) and Unity (2010) in the Saeima elections are displayed in Table 24 below. The data show that in 2002 and 2010, preference votes for New Era and Unity candidates followed the same pattern as did preference votes for other parties in the same elections: fewer positive and a larger number of negative preference votes were given to women candidates. In 2006, the pattern was reversed and women gained more positive and fewer negative votes than did men standing for New Era.

There were three occurrences with considerable differences in the casting of preference votes for male and female candidates: in the positive and the negative votes in 2002 and the positive votes in 2006. In 2002, New Era women candidates received only 63.7 per cent as many positive votes as did men, which was similar to that in the gender uniform parties PCTVL and SC. In contrast, New Era women received almost 50 per cent more negative votes than did the male candidates, the difference being statistically significant.

The within-group differences in 2002 are noteworthy, particularly for positive votes for men and negative votes for women. In four instances the male party leader received enough positive votes to count as an outlier relative to the pooled data set. When removed, the difference, though not statistically significant, in positive preference votes is 6 per cent in the favour of women. As was noted in Table 18 (page 140), New Era female candidates had a 27 per cent lower electoral success than men in the 2002 elections. Still, female candidates were elected to a greater extent than their original list placement would have allowed, partly because multi-district candidacy by top ranked candidates effectively shortens the lists, and partly because they received positive preferential votes.

In 2006, female candidates from New Era attracted 71.7 percentages more positive preference votes than did male candidates, a difference that is statistically significant. The difference reflects the situation in the party at this time – women were put forward as top candidates in all five districts. There were major differences within the group of female candidates, biased in favour of the top female candidates – all but one was on the ballot in at least two districts, including a well-known actress who stood in two districts. The five women who stood as top candidates in each district were all in the top ten candidates who receive the most positive preference votes. Interestingly, four of them were also in the top ten of candidates with negative preference votes, as were three of the men with the most plus votes (CVK n.d.). One of
the women received enough positive votes to qualify as an outlier in two districts. When the two outliers are removed, the difference between women’s and men’s positive preference votes drop to 41 per cent, but is no longer statistically significant. Still, we may note that when well-known women are placed on visible slots in several districts they can become top vote-getters and be considerably more successful than male candidates in the same elections. This is underscored by the success ratio of New Era women candidates in 2006: women candidates had 90 per cent more electoral success than the men on New Era lists (see Table 18, page 140).

Table 24: Preference votes and gender, New Era and Unity in 2002, 2006 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saeima elections</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010 (Unity)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive, mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s votes as percentage of men’s votes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>63.7 a</td>
<td>171.7** b</td>
<td>93.4 c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>5731.1</td>
<td>5352.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative, mean</td>
<td>1128.1</td>
<td>763.4</td>
<td>1548.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s votes as percentage of men’s votes</td>
<td>147.8*** d</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>104.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05. Independent samples t-test
a) 4 outliers, see text for details. When removed, significance does not change.
b) Equal variances not assumed. t=-2.12, df=79.17. Data include 2 outliers, see text for details. When removed, gender diff. drops to 141 per cent and is no longer significant.
c) 4 outliers (3 men, 1 woman), see text for details.
d) t=-2.76, df=98.
See the Appendix for standard deviations.
Source: Author’s calculations from CVK data (CVK n.d., n.d., n.d.)

In the 2010 elections, women candidates on Unity lists received on average 6.6 per cent fewer positive preference votes and 4.1 per cent more negative votes compared to male candidates, but the differences were not statistically significant. In other words, Unity voters distributed their preference votes in a slightly more gender equal manner than did the average voter in the 2010 elections. The spread within each group is considerable, with three male candidates receiving more positive votes than others, essentially being outliers. New Era women candidates had a relative success ratio of 1.07, and the success ratio for all women candidates on Unity lists was 0.96 (see Table 18, p. 140). The difference in electoral success between male and female candi-
dates in the 2010 elections was negligible, both in terms of the difference in preference votes and in terms of relative success ratio.

6.8.3 Multi-district candidacy and gender

Multi-district candidacy (MDC) means that individual candidates can stand in more than one district. MDC has three major consequences for the composition of parliamentary parties. First, it can help the party attract voters who recognise well-known candidates. Second, it shortens the lists of candidates, increasing the probability of candidates further down the lists to becoming elected into parliament. However, in Latvia this can be offset to a certain extent by the option to add positive and negative preference votes for individual candidates. This also makes the list-shortening effect of MDC less predictable. This research has showed that in some parties, multi-district candidacy has been one of the keys to a parliamentary seat for women who were placed in the middle or lower sections of ballot lists. In some cases combined with preference votes, the list shortening effect of MDC helped individual women to enter parliament. Whether this was a conscious strategy of the parties, the data do not reveal. Future research into the strategies of parties may provide evidence to ascertain whether the ones elected in this way were elected mainly due to party strategy or to happenstance.

Finally, as stressed in the experts’ interviews (Stafecka, 2010), MDC can also encourage centralisation and restrict power to a small circle of candidates, potentially lessening the need to democratise the top party echelons by including a larger group of party activists. This may hinder leadership change when needed, for example, when old party leaders no longer attract sufficient public support, hence making parties less electorally stable. The abolishment of multi-district candidacy in the 2010 elections could mean that party leadership in Latvian parties may become more diverse and more gender balanced. This research indicates that such a process also depends heavily upon factors other than this particular institutional incentive. Personal networks within the party leadership, women’s presence in the political sphere in general and strong women candidates in particular are all important in driving change towards a broader and more diverse party leadership. In the case of New Era, none of these factors appear to have been absent.

6.8.4 Analysis: Electoral laws and voting behaviour

The above empirical analysis has produced four results that are of particular importance in this case study. First, analysis of party magnitude across two elections and five electoral districts showed that in the case of New Era district level party magnitude does not contribute towards explaining gender balance in the parliamentary party.
Second, this section also demonstrated how the Latvian electorate uses the strong preference voting system for crossing out women candidates to a larger extent than men. Women candidates also receive comparatively fewer positive preference votes. This pattern was clearly displayed in the New Era case in 2002, but was reversed in the 2006 elections when the party was fronted by five women. The women outperformed men by receiving fewer negative votes and considerably more positive preference votes. Because New Era fielded mainly political newcomers in 2002, we may conclude that when men and women who are new to politics stand for election, women are more likely to attract more negative preference votes than their male colleagues.

Third, comparisons between New Era and the all-male PCTVL and SC showed that allocation of list slots for candidates is a crucial explanatory factor. When there are few women candidates in less visible slots, they tend to become crossed out more often. Conversely, when the names of women candidates are alternatively placed on ballot (every other name being a woman’s) and when women have visible positions, women can also attract large numbers of positive preference votes.

Finally, multi-district candidacy may have the effect of attracting votes to the party as a whole and shortening the lists, but in combination with both positive and negative preference votes, the overall effect on women’s parliamentary presence is less predictable. Results presented in a previous section point towards individual women moving to electable slots because of the election of male candidates higher up the lists, but this effect must also be understood in the light of preference voting. In short, MDC and preference voting added unpredictability into the Latvian electoral system, and separating the effect of MDC from that of preference voting might not be meaningful. The 2010 elections were more predictable as MDC was not allowed, but the analysis of New Era strategy in candidate selection is complicated by the collaboration in the three-party Unity coalition.

6.9 Conclusions

The Latvian national parliament, Saeima, has been male-dominated since its instigation. New Era is the only Latvian party whose parliamentary group has remained gender balanced throughout successive elections, and the party has presented gender-balanced lists of candidates in all national elections in which it had taken part up until 2010. New Era therefore merits attention, both with reference to how it manages the inner life of the organisation and how it interacts with environmental conditions.

This analysis has showed that Latvia exhibits the socioeconomic factors that are usually seen as conducive to gender-balanced national parliaments, such as large percentages of women in the paid labour and higher education.
sectors. It has also identified stereotypes of women and men that apply to the private and public spheres. Although stereotypes emerging from the private sphere talk of women as strong and reliable and men as vulnerable and less trustworthy, the public opinion and images of women and men in politics tell the opposite story: women are perceived by a large share of Latvians as less fit than men for political decision-making. These mixed images may contribute towards explaining why local government is gender balanced in Latvia but that at the national level different mechanisms are clearly at work.

The Latvian party system is not a clear-cut case of leftism versus right-wing politics, and the proportions of women MPs in each of the parties do not demonstrate that leftist parties produce more women MPs. In fact, parties labelled as leftist have had gender-uniform parliamentary parties, with men MPs only. By virtue of being a centre-right party, New Era does not prima facie present characteristics that lead us to expect a gender-balanced parliamentary party. More thorough analysis confirms this picture, adding that New Era is not in favour of using gender quotas in candidate selection and showing that issues of gender equality have not been part of the core message of the party programmes in 2002, 2006 and 2010. Analysis of attitudinal data showed that gender differences in attitudes towards the core issue of the party, i.e., anti-corruption, are not large enough to add to explanations of why New Era achieved gender balance. Moreover, the anti-corruption message that the New Era programme was based upon only attracted just a slight majority of female voters. In short, the programmatic frame of the party does not explain why it became and remained gender balanced.

New Era was founded in a manner similar to other parties studied here: a small group of male friends recruited a man to be the first party leader via their personal networks. The popular support and high levels of trust in the first party leader played an important, if not crucial, role for the party. Recruitment of members and candidates in New Era then followed two routes: active and passive recruitment. The active mode of recruitment included inviting people with expert knowledge to the party, and women also benefited from being considered professionals and/or having personal networks. The passive form of recruitment included an open call in the mass media for participation, and resulted in a situation where few of the activists knew each other. This was the opposite situation to the way other elite-based parties have been started as the open call results in de-emphasis on informal, personal networks. When candidates were nominated in 2002, nominations were made in a milieu in which personal networks had to be rebuilt from discussion and active contributions to the party work, in other words a relatively non-institutionalised situation. Still, before entering the party prospective activists were screened by the organisation’s informal core, and in this

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129 Ostrovska (2002, 58) explains this differently, referring to the private sector as more lucrative than local level politics and hence more attractive to men.
group the first party leader played a vital role. Even the open call and passive form of recruitment thus entailed a central element of selectiveness and control of who was allowed to participate. Evidently, these women were ambitious enough to enter politics and passed though the eye of the needle with their ideas and CV’s. This may be partly contributed to the presence of many well-educated and qualified women in Latvia. The fact that almost all New Era candidates have higher education does point in this direction, as does the party’s emphasis on professionalism.

Selection of candidates in New Era has been clearly centralised with much power in the hands of the party leader and the party executive board. Furthermore, it has been a comparatively non-bureaucratic process with few formal criteria for candidacy, and a closed, centralised voting system for ranking of candidates used in 2002 and 2006. Although the party does not use gender quotas per se, the competitiveness of candidates and lists has been assessed with, among other things, gender in mind. In 2002, this resulted in gender balanced lists with 40.7 per cent women candidates, but the allocation of seats was skewed, allowing the upper sections of the lists mainly to men. Numerically, the only thing that differentiates the 2002 New Era lists apart from the lists of the all-male, left-wing parties is the total share of women: the skewed allocation of list positions to candidates is strikingly similar. In contrast to women candidates from the parties whose lists returned parliamentary parties with men only, women standing for New Era in 2002 benefited from the otherwise largely unpredictable electoral system that, first, allowed candidates to stand in all five districts and, second, included a strong type of preference votes. When male candidates with top slots in several districts were elected, New Era women could move to electable slots. While most won a seat on a narrow margin of preference votes, one woman could rely on face recognition while another was placed in the favourable last slot of the list and so was elected based on her many positive preference votes.

In 2006, the lists of Saeima candidates were constructed in favour of five strong, female candidates who were placed number one on the ballot in each electoral district. Moreover, the slots were now evenly distributed between male and female candidates – this time, too, without any gender quota. With the popularity of the male party leader plummeting, the top candidates being women likely contributed significantly towards keeping gender balance in the parliamentary party. Still, the women selected were all well-educated; many of them were incumbent MPs and several had served as ministers of, for example, defence, justice and foreign affairs in the first New Era-led cabinet or had other long-term experience of non-partisan politics. They were thus strong or very strong candidates. Their receiving many positive preference votes and, in some cases, later holding positions as party leaders lend support to this. These five women cannot be regarded as mere figure heads or proxy women, although their replacing the first party leader by
occupying the top slot on all district lists is evidence of a need for the party to rebrand itself and present more popular candidates.

Comparative analyses of preference voting and gender demonstrated how Latvian voters in general tend to cross out women candidates, which was the case for New Era in 2002, but a pattern that was completely reversed in 2006, when New Era lists of candidates were headed by women. The overall picture that emerges from the Latvian case is one in which women generally lose out from the preference voting system, primarily because they receive larger numbers of negative and fewer positive votes. Still, the New Era case also clearly demonstrates that strong or well-known female candidates can be as successful as, or even more successful than, male candidates when allowed visible positions. It cannot be ruled out that the success of the strong women candidates in 2006 saved New Era from becoming a one-term party, an otherwise common fate for parties in CEE.

The events that led to a party split in 2008 showed that New Era was not a stable political party in which internal conflict and factions could be dealt with without organisational change. Still, the gender-balanced parliamentary parties in both New Era and the new party Civic Union showed that lack of party institutionalisation is not always detrimental to women’s parliamentary presence.

The factors that together contributed towards sustained gender balance in New Era – on party lists as well as in parliament – include environmental and internal party conditions. The presence of many well-educated and skilled women, some with useful networks and/or good reputations as experts, contributed towards a large share of women becoming candidates when New Era, a party that valued professionalism, was first created. For individual women who stood for the party in the 2002 Saeima elections, the preference voting system and possibility of multi-district candidacy helped counteract the otherwise unevenly allocated list positions and moved women to electable slots. When the 2006 elections approached, the party had several strong or even very strong women candidates with experience from parliament, government or other highly visible political but non-partisan positions. In addition, the party needed to distance itself from its leader with whom it had in the past been primarily identified – a man who could at this time no longer rely on the immense popular support he had in 2002 – and needed to become a party that relied upon teamwork. This situation opened up for women from the different internal factions that had developed by then to step forward and front the party in the elections. This would likely not have happened if these women had not had good popular support and important political experience. However, New Era would not have had a sufficient number of women candidates, neither in 2002 nor in 2006, if there had not been ambitious, well-educated and diligent women with political ideas seeking to enter national level politics and who fitted the image of a new, honest
and professional generation of politicians that the pre-founders of New Era sought to achieve.
7. Conclusions: Party Politics and Gender in a Comparative European Perspective

Three overarching research questions have structured this research. First, it has asked how conditions combine in creating gender-balanced parliamentary parties, which included investigating whether any conditions are necessary or singularly sufficient. Second, it asked whether an encompassing European perspective that includes both Western Europe and the newer democracies of Central and Eastern Europe is viable. The third enquiry asked what combinations of conditions lead to the stalling of gender balance in a parliamentary party.

This research goes beyond “monicausal explanations” (Norris 1993, 314). Instead of studying the effect of individual conditions on gender distribution in parliamentary parties, focus is on how conditions inside and outside of the individual party combine with each other. The explorative accounts presented in previous chapters consist of studies that examine how gender balance is achieved, as well as stalled, as a consequence of specific configurations of conditions. Parallel with this explorative ambition, the studies investigate if any individual conditions are necessary or sufficient for parties to become gender balanced or stay gender biased. These studies are based on fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis and structured focused comparisons.

The studies presented here also explore the extent to which a common perspective on parties in different parts of the democratic Europe is fruitful. This involves exploring the applicability of concepts and definitions developed with reference to West European parties. They also ask how party politics of contemporary Central and Eastern Europe may serve to develop the research field. This objective has been pursued using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, structured focused comparisons and an in-depth, single case study.

This concluding chapter will put the substantial results in comparative perspective, discuss the shortcomings of the present research, offer further discussion on selected individual conditions and, finally, suggest how the research field may be developed. It does so in three substantial sections. The first covers configurations that have lead to gender balance in Western, Central and Eastern Europe, and it discusses the contribution made by studying CEE cases and asks whether one single framework is viable. The second
deals with how absence of gender balance has been configured, while the third presents an outlook.

7.1 Configuring gender-balanced parliamentary parties

In the West European cases presented in Chapter 4, all configurations rely on at least four different conditions. Three of the configurations include both environmental conditions and internal party conditions. The Central and East European cases display a similar pattern in which conditions inside and outside of parties combine in descriptions of the cases. This underscores two of the main arguments of this research. It shows that gender-balanced parliamentary presence is a case of equifinality, that is, there is more than one configuration of conditions that can provide convincing and appropriate descriptions of gender-balanced parliamentary parties. It also lends support to the assumption that party behaviour is conditional upon both internal functions of the party and external environmental conditions.

The analyses confirmed that there were no necessary or singularly sufficient conditions for gender-balanced parliamentary presence in Western Europe during the late 1980s, a result that was repeated in the analysis of CEE parties. This means that there were no ‘quick fixes’ for inducing gender balance, but that the effect of each condition or strategy was contingent upon other factors. In the Central and East European cases of today the between-country variation in women’s presence in the public sphere was so low that gender-balanced participation in paid labour and higher education were seen as scope conditions, conditions that affected all cases in the same way. This may mean that gender equality in the public sphere is necessary but not sufficient for gender balance in parties, but it is too early to draw such far-reaching conclusions. Further studies including both gender balanced and non-balanced cases are required for such conclusions to be drawn on a broad and deep enough basis.

7.1.1 West European parties, late 1980s

The West European parties were studied using fuzzy-set QCA. The study was based primarily on data from the Katz and Mair (Katz and Mair 1992b) data handbook of party organisation, complemented with data from other sources. The study included 57 parties, of which about half were defined as more gender balanced than not (56 per cent of cases). Parties with no female parliamentarians were defined as fully non-balanced and parties that had 40 to 60 per cent women MPs were categorised as fully gender balanced,
whereas the crossover point\textsuperscript{130} was set at 20 per cent as a consequence of the empirical distribution.

The four most important configurations of conditions that led to gender-balanced parliamentary parties in Western Europe were:

1) Leftist, non-large parties with localised candidate selection, active in an electoral system that does not allow for preference voting,
2) Parties active in an egalitarian\textsuperscript{131} social climate with an electoral system of large effective magnitude and preference voting,
3) Large parties with localised candidate selection in egalitarian countries,
4) Parties with localised candidate selection in egalitarian countries with closed party lists.

The results confirm several results produced in studies of women’s parliamentary presence that use other methods. They show that leftist party ideology or egalitarian social climate matters for gender balance, that large party magnitude and large district magnitude play parts, and that decentralised candidate selection matters, as do closed party lists. Although individual conditions that form a configuration should be understood in terms of their interaction with other conditions, comparison with previous results and perspective on each condition are useful for understanding the present results.

By and large, the West European experience of gender-balanced parliamentary parties is shaped by two factors: parties with egalitarian philosophies (as in the first configuration that covers leftist parties) or a social climate that is receptive to equal participation of women in paid labour and higher education sectors. This means that even when the environmental conditions are not enough to induce gender balance, parties can attain gender balance on the strengths of their own internal organisational settings and priorities. This lends support to the party-centred approach to parliamentary presence, but also underscores that internal and external conditions are of importance in the study of gender distribution in parliamentary parties.

Large effective magnitude is included in one configuration, the second, which only covers Danish cases. This means that the other cases differ in this regard and that a large effective magnitude may not have been an important condition. Instead, large party magnitude is included in two of the other configurations, both in its presence (third configuration) and absence (first configuration). There are likely several reasons why party magnitude can be beneficial in both its presence and its absence, but the closer look at the indi-

\textsuperscript{130} The crossover point marks the difference between cases than are more gender balanced than non-balanced, and parties than are more non-balanced than balanced. It thus denotes the point at which it is not possible to determine whether the case in more in or out of the set (Ragin 2008c).

\textsuperscript{131} The term egalitarian here refers to two conditions present in combination: gender balanced labour market participation and gender balanced participation in higher education.
idual cases presented in Chapter 4 revealed that it may here depend upon ideology: some of the gender-balanced leftist parties are reasonably small, but on the other hand there is a group of large parties that are gender balanced and spread across the ideological landscape.

The use of closed party lists that do not allow for preference voting is part of three of the four configurations with high coverage: twice in its presence and once in its absence. The two configurations (the first and fourth), where it is included in its presence, cover parties from several different countries, whereas its absence includes Danish cases only. In addition, the third configuration does not include this condition at all. Looking at the other configurations (five to eight), a similar pattern can be noted. Therefore, the impact of closed lists depends upon the overall configuration in which it is included – whether the condition itself is included in the configuration in its presence or absence.

7.1.1.1 Shortcomings of the West European comparisons

The study of the West European cases displays a few methodological shortcomings. Due to lack of data on the priorities and goals of the party women’s organisation as well as the potential overlap of persons that were both parliamentarians and members of the party leadership, the study was not able to take into account the effect of the party’s women’s organisations, or the presence of women in party leadership, on the proportion of women MPs. Consequently, this resulted in a certain bias towards party formal rules and external conditions, and less emphasis on women’s own efforts inside the parties. Furthermore, because there were so few parties that had implemented formal gender quotas for candidate selection by the end of the 1980s, there were not enough cases upon which the QCA could be based. Gender quotas were instead included in the analyses of each configuration, focussing on individual cases.

The data on participation in the public sphere suffered from a similar shortcoming, resulting in low between-country variation. With more modern data sets, this could be remedied with a more developed set, such as women’s relative share of part time labour and details of gender distribution in particular academic disciplines. This problem is related to the issue of calibration and the robustness of qualitative comparative analyses. Small changes in the calibration of a set can have consequences on the overall results, which can be seen as a lack of robustness of the results. This critique is indeed justified, yet it is not unique to QCA. Instead, as standards of measurement are developed to guide set calibration there is a possibility to formulate a critique on each standard based on detailed operationalisation. This is one of the method’s important advantages as it can lead to more developed, transparent and comparable studies. The calibrations presented here are suggestions on how to operationalise empirical understandings of the chosen
theoretical concepts, and hopefully future studies on the same topic will contribute to developing them further.

7.1.2 Central and East European parties, late 2000s

The structured focused comparison of parties in contemporary democracies of Central and Eastern Europe was derived from a unique set of data that was collected for the purpose of this research from the parties under study. It was complemented with secondary sources and statistical data. It was found that just under one-quarter (22.5 per cent) of the CEE cases was gender balanced; out of these 14 gender-balanced cases, six were included in the study. Parties with no women MPs were categorised as fully non-balanced; parties with 40 to 60 per cent women parliamentarians were understood as fully gender balanced. Due to the empirical distribution and the presence of international norms about what constitutes an acceptable lower level of women’s presence in political decision-making, the crossover point was shifted slightly upwards to 25 per cent women MPs. This difference in the level of the mid-point of the set marks differences between Western Europe in the late 1980s and Central and Eastern Europe in the late 2000s. Expectations and norms as well as the actual gender distribution in parliamentary parties differed slightly and therefore the point at which parties tip over into or out of gender balance was defined differently. In the calibration of this set, as in the calibration of all of the other sets used in the study, the West European cases were used as points of reference rather than a standard against which the newer cases should be measured. The difference was so small that it cannot be considered to be fundamentally different, particularly not when the upper and lower thresholds of the set were kept.

All of the studied cases were active in countries where women and men participate equally in higher education and paid labour sectors. Moreover, in none of the studied countries are party lists perfectly closed. These three conditions were thus seen as scope conditions and removed from the analysis. The analysis instead included several conditions that were, for different reasons, omitted from the study of West European parties, such as presence of a party women’s organisation, the use of affirmative action for women, and attitude towards and use of formal gender quotas.

Out of six gender-balanced parties, five used institutional measures to include women or had debated using gender quotas; two of the parties used formal gender quotas and three of the parties had a women’s organisation. Not all of them had a positive stance towards or even an official opinion on gender quotas, but they had nevertheless debated using it. Although the data did not reveal whether the women’s organisation worked to have more women elected into parliament, the presence of a women’s organisation indicates that the female members of the party are organised. While a party women’s organisation may not be a precondition for women getting elected,
it can serve as a supporting network for women seeking elected office. In essence, the presence of institutional means for the inclusion of women in five of the six parties clearly speak of the important role that party preferences play in achieving gender balance in parliament. When parties seek to include more women in parliament, they can succeed in doing so even when gender balance is not commonplace in the party landscape.

The CEE cases almost exclusively used centralised candidate selection. The Estonian Social Democrats proved to be an exception that more closely resembled West European, leftist, gender-balanced parties. This result differs from those reached in the study of West European parties, and is perhaps most adequately explained by the top-down way in which parties are often created in CEE. While this could mean that centralised candidate selection is favourable for women seeking elected office, it may also indicate that the party leadership circles represent the only part of the party that is big or organisationally developed enough to handle the strategically important and sometimes laborious process of recruiting and selecting candidates. In addition, some cases, particularly that of New Era (Latvia) and the green party Politics Can Be Different (Hungary), should lead us to look into the role of women in party formation, asking whether women are active in forming new parties or whether they enter the organisations as newcomers. If women are key players from the start, the impact of which organisational level selects the candidates on gender balance is less critical as women will have already been self-evident candidates.

Four of the studied CEE parties are social democratic or green parties, the fifth being a centre party and the sixth a centre-right party. The first five cases proved to have a positive approach to women’s parliamentary presence, as evidenced in their having women’s organisations, using gender quotas or actively seeking to recruit women, even to top positions. This mirrors the results from Western Europe, showing that although leftism is central in explaining which parties become gender balanced, parties that are not clearly leftist and that do not have a clearly positive approach to equal representation can become and stay gender balanced.

7.1.2.1 Shortcomings of the Central and East European comparison

The structured focused comparison of Central and East European parties was based on six gender-balanced cases. The consequence of using successful cases only was that no solid conclusions about sufficiency could be drawn, and hence it was not strictly comparable to the West European study. Still, it provided important new insights on several cases that had reached gender balance. By using set theory it also allowed for comparing the applicability of concepts and laid an empirical foundation for future fuzzy-set studies of CEE parties. Although from a large-N perspective the study relied on few cases, it nevertheless included almost every second gender-balanced party in the region.
For the calibration of sets, calibrations in the West European study were treated as points of reference. Two conditions proved to be complicated: party magnitude and effective magnitude. The calibration of effective magnitude relied upon a measure slightly different from that used in the West European study which indicated that it could be worthwhile studying effective magnitude as a dynamic concept and examine developments in the output-based effective magnitude and their effect on gender distribution. As regards party magnitude, future comparisons covering both WEur and CEE cases from the same period of time will likely be more apt to provide new definitions of party magnitude.

7.1.3 The case of New Era (Jaunais Laiks), 2002-2010

The deviant case singled out for the in-depth case study was the Latvian party New Era (Jaunais Laiks), a centre-right, anti-corruption party created just shortly before the 2002 elections. New Era entered parliament as a gender-balanced party and has remained so throughout several elections without using gender quotas or other institutional means supporting women specifically. The balanced proportions of women and men candidates and MPs from New Era can be attributed to four factors that have played different roles in the life of the party: women’s own agency, the party seeking an image of professionalism, multi-district candidacy and leadership change.

Although New Era was created by a small group of men, its open but centralised and selective mode of recruitment in which professionalism was emphasised meant that women could benefit from being not only ambitious, but also well educated and skilled in their professions. Some candidates — including women — were also invited to join the party based on their professional qualifications. The centralised and selective way in which people were allowed in as activists in New Era thus combined with a focus on professionalism, a process that led to gender balanced lists of candidates in the 2002 parliamentary elections.

The New Era lists of candidates were, nevertheless, skewed in terms of slot allocation: women were placed further down the lists than men. Still, because the Latvian electoral system allowed for multi-district candidacy in 2002 and 2006, women could move to electable slots when men heading the lists were elected. A few women were also elected via preference votes, although Latvian voters in general use their preference votes to cross out women candidates in parliamentary elections.

In the 2006 elections New Era lists of candidates were gender balanced and no longer skewed, apart from the five top slots that were all filled by strong women candidates. They included several women who were strong, or very strong, candidates who could rely on popular support as well as possessing important experience in parliament and government. The party’s need for replacing the first party leader, who had then lost much of his popu-
lar support, led to women fronting the party and heading party lists. By this time, women had already gained important roles and positions within the party, and this continued throughout a party split in 2008 and in the 2010 elections.

The case of New Era can thus be explained with combinations of conditions inside and outside of the party: the many well-educated women in Latvia and women’s equal presence in paid labour paved the way for women to become high-level professionals, and when New Era sought this kind of activists and candidates, a window of opportunity opened. The electoral system, furthermore, evened out the otherwise unbalanced allocation of slots to women and men candidates in 2002, and women’s strong merits as well as the need for new visible faces in 2006 together created sustained gender balance in the parliamentary party.

7.1.3.1 Shortcomings of the single case study

The case study relied primarily on interviews, none of which were carried out in the Latvian language. The interviewees included several individuals who were early or very early members and activists, and the fact that the interviews were not conducted in their mother tongue is thus unlikely to have caused any considerable bias.

In the case selected for this part of the study there was not an active women’s organisation and from the interviews it was indicated there was formerly an existing but now inactive group but it had never played any significant role in New Era. While the lack of focus on the women’s organisation can be read as a shortcoming, it is more accurately seen as empirical evidence on the insignificant role of the women’s organisation in New Era.

7.1.4 Lessons learned from Central and Eastern Europe

Party politics and gender in contemporary Central and East European EU member states bring new knowledge to the table. The CEE cases clearly demonstrated that organisational instability need not lead to women’s exclusion from elected office. The New Era case showed how women did not lose ground because they were already well-positioned within the organisation. However, it is important to note that New Era women did not lose out from the split in any way: the lists of candidates were gender balanced in 2006 as well as in 2010, and the party that former New Era members created together with MPs from other parties also became gender balanced. If we accept party splits and mergers as a type of lack of institutionalisation, this indicates that stable organisations and institutionalisation of the organisation is not required for women’s equal participation and, in addition, that lack of party institutionalisation does not always return gender-biased parliamentary parties.
This is underlined by the newness of both New Era and the Hungarian
green party Politics Can Be Different, both of which were started just shortly
before their first elections and still returned gender balance in parliament. In
that short period of time, the organisations and working orders are unlikely
to have settled and the parties must therefore be considered to have been
relatively non-institutionalised when selecting parliamentary candidates. The
lack of institutionalisation is further underlined by New Era, where inter-
views revealed that in 2010 the party still did not have formal requirements
for candidacy that were clearly formulated. In spite of this organisational
newness and, in the case of New Era, lack of formal guidelines on whom to
field in elections, both New Era and Politics Can Be Different created gender
balance.

New Era’s choice to stress professionalism is key to understanding why
there were so many women candidates despite the lack of institutionalisa-
tion. The many well-educated and skilled women in Latvia meant that there
was a large pool of eligible women professionals from which the party could
choose as candidates in the 2002 elections. The women’s own efforts in
achieving successful professional careers were crucial in this case, but the
choices made by the party presented a catalyst for gender balance.

The study of Central and East European parties showed that women’s par-
ticipation in higher education and paid labour is high throughout Central and
Eastern Europe and that women often outnumber men at universities. Fur-
thermore, because there is little variation between the countries these two
conditions were seen as scope conditions. The case of New Era shows how a
significant integration of women in professional life can combine with party
preferences, but not all parties have such a strong focus on professionalism.
As previous research has shown, however, a larger presence of women in
public life increases the chances for women to enter politics. Although some
parties may recruit via, for example, labour unions present at workplaces, the
chances for anyone to enter politics are likely to increase when he or she can
forge personal networks with co-workers and fellow students. This pattern
could apply to many cases, yet the study of West European parties showed
that gender equal presence in the public sphere was not a necessary or singu-
larly sufficient condition for gender balance. Instead, parties were able to
create gender balance even in countries where women’s participation in
higher education and paid labour was lower than that of men, and gender
equal presence in the public sphere combined with other conditions in mak-
ing parties gender balanced. In CEE women are not newcomers, neither in
politics nor in the public sphere, and still a majority of parties fail to achieve
gender balance among their candidates and MPs. We should therefore under-
stand gender equal participation in the public sphere as a factor that can
combine with the preferences and goals of parties and contribute towards
gender balance, but not as required for parties to reach gender balance. We
should also keep in mind that the crucial decisions are still made by individ-
ual political parties who may prefer a particular type of candidates – which may include both very well-educated professionals, persons from the unskilled labour force or candidates who do not have any type of gainful employment. Therefore, the effect of women’s overall level of presence in the public sphere on gender balance in parliamentary parties should be studied with reference to its possible interaction with party goals and preferences. This was demonstrated in the study of West European parties and in the case study.

Most of the studied gender-balanced CEE parties had centralised candidate selection in which the national party organisation decided upon which candidates to field in elections. It was suggested above that this type of candidate selection is a consequence of top-down party building processes and the volatility of CEE party landscapes. In each of the studied parties, it was combined with different measures or strategies that either aimed to include or organise women or that resulted in gender balance without women’s equal presence being an objective. If centralised candidate selection is indeed negative for inclusion of women, as previous studies have suggested (Caul Kittilson 2006), the effect was offset by gender quotas, party women’s organisations or party strategy that led to recruitment of equal proportions of women and men candidates. In the case of New Era, however, it is more correct to conclude that closeness between activists in the initial thematic working groups and the core of the party who later decided on candidacy in the 2002 elections combined with the relative lack of pre-forged alliances and personal networks allowed women and men roughly equal chances to become candidates. The skewed allocation of list slots in 2002 does, however, indicate that female and male candidates were still treated differently, but the data also show that good relationships with the party leadership are useful for individuals seeking candidacy. The case study thus lends support to Hazan’s and Rahat’s (2006) suggestion that a small, exclusive selectorate can be favourable for women seeking candidacy, yet under the condition that there is a match between party goals and women’s CVs as well as a relative lack of previous personal networks.

Electoral systems that allow for voters to alter the order of candidates on party lists by using preference votes are common in Central and Eastern Europe. The case study revealed that preference voting can be both favourable and negative for women candidates. In the Latvian system, where voters can give both positive votes to and cross out different candidates on one and the same list, women generally obtain slightly fewer positive and more negative votes than men, but this pattern can also differ between elections and parties, depending on women’s positions in the parties. In the leftist parties that presented sometimes clearly gender-biased party lists, women did not get significantly more negative votes but received about 35 per cent fewer positive votes. This pattern was similar for the gender-balanced New Era in 2002, when the party was fronted mainly by men. In 2006, however, the
Tables were turned: strong women candidates were placed first on all party lists, and women received a good 70 per cent more of the positive votes and 25 per cent fewer negative votes than did men standing for New Era. In the 2010 elections, there were no significant differences between women and men standing in the Unity coalition, in which New Era candidates comprised one-third of all candidates. At this point, women and men both held prominent positions. The main lesson that can be learned from this is that when women are granted similar or better positions than male candidates, women benefit from preference voting, but when women are placed in less visible positions preference voting tends to be negative for them. In sum, therefore, it is still the choices that individual parties make that determine whether women in general will benefit or lose out from open list systems.

On the face of it, the number of parliamentarians from each party – party magnitude – does not appear to have played a major role in the studied CEE parties: four of them are small or very small, while two had, or had previously had, enough MPs to qualify as large. This pattern corresponds to the results from the West European study, where party size was present and absent in different configurations and excluded from others, so indicating that parties of different sizes become gender balanced depending on what other conditions they exhibit. For example, the use of gender quotas or rank-ordering rules ought to cancel out the effect of party magnitude.

The study of New Era included analyses of district level party magnitude, which is the logically correct level of analysis when different lists are presented in each district (Matland 1993). The analyses demonstrated that district level party magnitude provided little analytical leverage. Upon closer inspection of candidate lists, it did however become evident that the fielding of candidates in several districts, multi-district candidacy, had more profound effects in the case of New Era: although New Era had enough MPs to qualify as large in the 2002 elections, the party did not have more women elected in the larger districts. Rather, women benefited from male top candidates standing in several districts although they could only be elected from one district, which shortened lists enough to get women – who were placed further down the lists – elected into parliament, in some cases based on preference votes. In short, it was multi-district candidacy rather than district-level party magnitude that contributed to gender balance in New Era. This points to a need for analyses that are more sensitive to the effects of multi-district candidacy, which is indeed a different mechanism than large electoral districts.

7.1.5 An encompassing European perspective

This research essentially asks whether parties in Western, Central and Eastern Europe are similar enough to warrant comparison: is an encompassing
European perspective viable? There is little doubt that it is, but a few points of comparison merit special attention.

The analyses presented in chapters 4 and 5 tell of equifinality: there are several ways of achieving gender-balanced parliamentary parties. Because this is one of the very first attempts to gauge which configurations of conditions lead to gender balance in individual parties, future studies are required to determine the exact extent to which they can be developed. To date, they present different ways of configuring gender balance, that is, strategies based on experience from different parts of Europe. They indicate that parties themselves have the ability to create gender balance, and that they can do so by including women via localised candidate selection, gender quotas, affirmative action or make sure that women members are included through party women’s organisations. This process is clearly facilitated by women’s own efforts to take part in public life: gender-balanced labour market participation and gender balance at universities can lower the thresholds for women’s entry and make it easier to enter parties that do not stress gender equality or collective means for achieving women’s political inclusion in their party programmes. When parties deliberately seek candidates with higher education or individuals from a particular segment of society, women’s presence there will help them to enter politics, an effect that is equally likely to apply to men who seek to enter politics. Depending on how parties construct their lists of candidates, gender balance may be both helped and hindered by preference voting.

Party system volatility is a recurrent theme in studies of party politics of Central and Eastern Europe. When comparing parties from both the older and the newer EU member states, one should keep in mind that there are older EU member states in which the party system also fluctuates. Fluctuating party systems can be seen in terms of new parties and previous studies have suggested that new parties may be more likely to include women in their ranks. This research as well as evidence from some other CEE cases (Ghodsee 2009; Siemienska 2009) suggest that the non-institutionalised environment of newly created parties can be conducive to the inclusion of more women. However, whether lists of candidates and groups of MPs become more gender balanced when new parties are formed shortly before every election is something that remains to be investigated empirically, using many cases. Until then, lack of an institutionalised party organisation should not be seen as per se less likely to yield gender balance.

Related to the issue of party system volatility, this research has presented studies of how party splits may affect social representation. The study of New Era demonstrated that in parties where women are well-integrated in parties, this type of lack of party institutionalisation is not detrimental to gender balance in parliament. While party splits are more frequent in newer democracies, they are by no means native to CEE and there are cases from
Western Europe and other parts of the world that can be studied in comparative approaches to how organisational instability affects gender balance.

Not all gender-balanced parties use gender quotas. Quotas often come with different connotations, not all of them positive. Negative connotations may derive from party ideology that stresses the individual rather than group representation, or bear with them an air of non-democracy or Soviet-style politics. The effect of such attitudes can be that parties avoid formal quotas, and therefore it can be useful to examine attitudes to quotas or other types of ‘positive discrimination’ as a complement. The Estonian Centre Party is indeed a case where gender quotas are seen as principally wrong but useful in reaching fair representation. The party does not have formal gender quotas for candidacy, but has worked actively to recruit, train and encourage women to seek elected office. Parties’ attitudes towards the issue of gender or social representation and their own responsibility to achieve it can also provide clues to why some parties without quotas nevertheless reach gender balance.

When party lists are closed and voters cannot alter the order of parliamentary candidates by preference voting, full responsibility for gender distribution in the parliamentary party can be put with the party itself. This research has showed mixed results about when closed lists lead to gender balance. In Western Europe we may note that in small, leftist parties that were not always active in egalitarian environments women benefited from the parties being able to decide the order of their candidates themselves, which was also the case in egalitarian countries where parties used localised candidate selection. In Denmark, an egalitarian environment with large effective magnitude, preference voting was allowed in the late 1980s and although the exact level of gender balance differs between parties, most of the Danish parties had achieved gender balance by this time. In Latvia preference voting was shown to be negative for women candidates when they were largely unknown to the public or placed in disadvantageous list positions and, conversely, positive for women and men alike when they were high-profile candidates. The impact of closed/open list systems throughout Europe is thus most accurately studied at the level of each party or even on an individual level. The combined effect of social norms and voters’ tendency to use preference votes in general would also strengthen such analyses, regardless of which part of Europe is studied.

The case of New Era presented preliminary evidence on a possible connection between party preferences, attitude to representation and women’s professional backgrounds. Anti-corruption was the primary issue for New Era and the party emphasised professionalism. This approach to representation may thus partly downplay social representation, but still lead to gender balance. In a time when parties appear to become more professionalised, similar patterns may be present in other cases, too. Analyses of what individual parties include in their role as crucial actors in representative democ-
racy can therefore provide further important evidence on why parties that do not stress group representation may still reach gender balance.

The studied parties from Central and Eastern Europe varied in their share of the total number of seats in parliament: some were large, others were not. The West European parties also varied in this respect: large party magnitude was included in two of the four configurations with high coverage, once in its presence and once in its absence. It should however also be noted that the number of seats that parties win in elections tends to vary. The effect of securing a large number of seats should thus ideally be studied with a temporal perspective and include investigations of whether the share of women in the parliamentary party increases and decreases with the total number of seats won by the party. If the proportion of women MPs increases with increased number of seats in parliament, but does not decrease with decreased party magnitude, the effect of party size on gender balance is likely not reversible (on reversible causes, see Lieberson 1985, 66).

In sum, there are good reasons for an encompassing European perspective on gender and party politics to take the above into account. Acknowledging and understanding how several different configurations of condition may lead to the same outcome can enhance not only academic knowledge about gender and party, but can also increase the policy relevance of the research field. While detailed knowledge of which individual conditions are likely to increase or decrease the share of women in political decision-making is undoubtedly useful, this research has showed that multiple interactions can be central for understanding why some conditions are sometimes favourable in their presence and at other times in their absence. In addition, this research has indicated that an encompassing European perspective in which parties are not seen as either West European or Central/East European is not only viable, but also potentially fruitful as it can lead to reconsidering the interaction between contextual factors and internal party matters.

The configurational approach means that the results and knowledge produced are not as parsimonious as they tend to be in models where interaction is not explicitly studied. However, when taking multiple interaction and equifinality into account our research may reflect the studied cases more accurately: the social world is indeed complex and although making it more comprehensible is a central task for social scientists, we should remain cautious not to oversimplify it. Sometimes that may mean stepping back and recognising that there are indeed complex relationships that can nevertheless help us reveal patterns and create insights about causes and effects in important social matters.
7.2 Configuring absence of gender balance

The study of configurations of conditions that lead to the stalling of gender balance in West European parties demonstrated that reversing those configurations will not yield gender balance. The knowledge produced in these analyses furthermore point to an important difference in how candidate selection guides presence and absence of gender balance. The two configurations with high coverage presented in the study were:

1) Non-leftist parties in non-egalitarian\textsuperscript{132} environments with closed party lists;
2) Non-large, non-leftist parties in partly non-egalitarian\textsuperscript{133} countries with closed party lists and non-large effective magnitude.

These results confirm central results from previous research and underline the role of parties. Both configurations point to parties that are non-leftist and hence not expected to put particular emphasis on egalitarianism or gender equality as a problem of a collective nature. In addition, the environments point to conditions that are also commonly connected with a relative lack of women in political decision-making. The closed party lists furthermore mean that the lack of gender balance in the covered parties is a consequence of the choices of the individual party, and not an effect of voting behaviour. In the second configuration, the non-balanced choices of candidates may have been further fuelled by the parties’ status as non-large and the few candidates selected in each district. In essence, the configurations point to lack of supply and demand for women in political decision-making, both on the part of the electorate and the parties themselves, as central for understanding under what conditions political parties remain male-dominated.

The most striking difference between the high-coverage configurations that describe gender balance and those that deal with the lack thereof is how they address the level of candidate selection. For gender balance, localised candidate selection plays a part in several configurations whereas it is not included in configurations for non-balance – not even in its absence, as the two configurations discussed here show. While localised candidate selection is useful for understanding the conditions under which gender balance is created, absence of localised candidate selection was atypical for non-balanced parties in Western Europe in the late 1980s. This could require a rethinking of why different levels of candidate selection are considered to correspond to different levels of ‘women-friendliness’. In addition, the frequently-used centralised candidate selection in Central and East European

\textsuperscript{132} The term non-egalitarian here refers to two conditions \textit{absent} in combination: gender balanced labour market participation and gender balanced participation in higher education.

\textsuperscript{133} “Partly non-egalitarian” refers to lack of gender balance in higher education.
parties should be taken into account when the impact of the level of candidate selection is reconsidered, as should the contextual conditions that surround gender balance in centralised and decentralised parties. Factors such as women’s own agency, mode of party creation, geographical penetration of the organisation and formal laws, if any, that direct party organisation and candidate selection should also be considered. Rethinking under what combinations of conditions which level of candidate selection is conducive to gender-balanced parliamentary presence may change our view of how power concentration and gender interact, a work that will potentially touch upon the law of minority attrition (Taagepera 2007, chap. 13).

7.3 Changing European party politics and gender

This research has shown and argued that there are several reasons to consider parties from Western, Central and Eastern Europe as similar enough to warrant comparison, and to avoid separating the two as different types of cases. Including both WEur and CEE cases in our case selection may help us to recognise new patterns and re-evaluate old knowledge about how gender balance is achieved. It is also important to consider how party behaviour is contingent upon the party organisation, the goals and preferences of the party and external conditions. Such dependencies of one condition upon one or several others are fruitfully approached with equifinality in mind: gender balance can be achieved in more than one way. Although some individual conditions may be more useful than others in explaining what leads to gender balance in the statistical sense, it is important to acknowledge that conditions that appear to have a weak impact overall can be crucial in particular groups of cases. It is furthermore important to continue studying why and how gender balance is stalled or hindered, because, as was demonstrated above, the combinations of factors that can be used to describe how non-balance is created differ from those that describe gender balance. Without knowledge about both balance and non-balance, a major part of the causal relationship is left aside.

As argued at the outset, scholars of party and gender or women’s parliamentary presence often classify important conditions or variables with qualitative measures, such as large parties or large electoral districts. While this research and other recently published, similar research (Krook 2010) has begun the journey towards standardised, empirical measurement of such concepts, much remains to be done. Recognising and acknowledging when such transparent and detailed definitions of commonly used concepts enhance comparability between studies and cases is the first step. The research field can benefit from more accumulation of results, and this requires comparability. The issue of comparability has been central throughout this research. In the structured focused comparison and the case study, Schmidt’s
(2003) way of relating women’s electoral success to that of men, here referred to as the relative success ratio of women/men, was chosen as an attempt to understand the individual cases and elections in a way that allowed for comparison across cases, time and countries. Comparative studies of electoral success of women and men could be developed with emphasis on this type of mathematical comparability.

In Central and Eastern Europe, women make up a majority of university students, a development which is currently underway in Western Europe, too. Still, having a large pool of well-qualified women has not led to gender balance in political decision-making, although we must conclude that it has facilitated women’s entry into democratic politics. This research has not tapped into all of the debate and empirical data on how personal networks influence who gets to stand in elections, but it points to more detailed data needed to research whether women’s participation in higher education and paid labour in general is conducive to gender balance in parliament. Gender segregation at universities and in professional life may provide important information about when women’s education and labour market status matter for political recruitment, for example, by outlining where and which types of personal networks are tied: do women and men construct different types of networks at university and at work, are there any differences between how women and men from different academic disciplines tie their networks and how does gender segregation in either place affect women’s and men’s chances to enter politics?

A central topic in research about party institutionalisation is the issue of interpersonal networks. This research has suggested (see also Siemienska 2009) that lack of party institutionalisation need not be negative for gender balance, mainly because the lack of pre-forged personal networks can create a more level playing field for women and men who enter the new and non-institutionalised party. It was further suggested that lack of institutionalisation in the party landscape, that is, a volatile party landscape, need not be negative for gender balance. This is mainly a question of women’s own agency and participation in the creation of new parties. Combining the study of party formation with knowledge from the field of party and gender appears to be a fruitful way forward.

The size of electoral districts is often perceived as a constant. With the help of the output-based effective magnitude (Taagepera 2007), it was recognised above that the effect of a given set of electoral laws on the election of candidates from a particular party into parliament may differ considerably between elections, depending on party competition. Future scholars of party and gender are therefore well advised not only to take a temporal perspective on women’s parliamentary presence (Hughes and Paxton 2008), but also to consider how the impact of seemingly stable electoral laws can have dynamic effects over time – depending on factors other than the electoral laws as such.
Party goals and the attached perception of representation may reveal how gender balance can be achieved in parties that, on face value, are not likely to become gender balanced, as in the case of New Era. Research into party and gender would benefit from asking which perception(s) of representation a party subscribes to and how this affects candidate selection. This can entail asking whether personal mandates, party centred approaches to representation and a more professional, somewhat technocratic perception are more or less tied to perceptions of gender and in what context each leads to more or fewer women in parliament. This may be extendable to studies of actual minorities and could also be useful for creating strategies for individual candidates seeking election or for parties to develop their internal functioning.

Much of research about party and gender refer to how adherence to formal rules tends to be favourable for the creation of gender balance. This research has relied mainly upon the “official story” (Katz and Mair 1992a) of how the studied party works but also included some information on the informal workings of New Era. However appealing we may find adherence to formal rules and workings, and however feasible the presence of official rules make the study of party organisation, rules will never tell the whole story. Humans are social beings that form networks and alliances based on personal preferences and strategies as well as on happenstance – all of which may have very little to do with formal rules.
8. Appendix

These appendices cover additional data and information from four chapters: the methods chapter (pp. 205), the study of West European parties (pp. 206), the study of CEE parties (pp. 215) and the case study (pp. 228).

8.1 Methods

8.1.1 Software

All country codes refer to the ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 codes. Data were stored and calculations and simple calibrations were conducted in Microsoft Excel, FSQCA 2.5 (Ragin, Drass, and Davey 2009). FSQCA 2.5 (Ragin, Drass, and Davey 2009), Weft QDA 1.0.1, PSPP 0.7.6 and R were used for analysis of interview and statistical data.

8.1.2 Additional tables and data

Table 25: Set thresholds in crisp and fuzzy sets used in this work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership level</th>
<th>Crisp set</th>
<th>Four-value fuzzy set</th>
<th>Continuous fuzzy set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Fully in</td>
<td>Fully in</td>
<td>Fully in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>More in than out</td>
<td>0.5 &lt; X_i &lt; 1 = More in than out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>Cross-over point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>More out than in</td>
<td>0 &lt; X_i &lt; 0.5 = More out than in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>Fully out</td>
<td>Fully out</td>
<td>Fully out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: na = not applicable.
Source: Adapted from Ragin (2008b, 91)
8.2 West European parties

8.2.1 Data sources

Party labels: Katz and Mair (Katz and Mair 1992b).
Outcome and party magnitude: Author’s calculations from Katz and Mair (Katz and Mair 1992b).
Social democratic government: Author’s calculations from Comparative Welfare States Dataset (Huber et al. 1997).
Participation in civilian labour force: Author’s calculations from OECD Annual Labour Force (OECD 2008).

8.2.2 Cases

Table 26: Cases in the study of West European parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country, Election year</th>
<th>Parties (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria, 1990</td>
<td>(4) FPÖ, SPÖ, ÖVP, Grünen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium, 1987</td>
<td>(4) CVP, PVV, VU, AGA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark, 1988</td>
<td>(8) SF, SD, RV, KRF, CD, V KF, FRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland, 1987</td>
<td>(5) KESK, KOK, SDP, VAS, SFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, 1987</td>
<td>(5) CDU, CSU, FDP, SDP, B’90/Grünen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland, 1989</td>
<td>(5) SFWP, LAB, FF, FG, PD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy, 1987</td>
<td>(8) DP, PCI, PSI, DC, PRI, PLI, MSI, PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands, 1987</td>
<td>(4) PvDA, CDA, D’66, VVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway, 1989</td>
<td>(6) SV, DNA, SP, KRF, H, FRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden, 1988</td>
<td>(5) V, SAP, C, Fp, M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK, 1987</td>
<td>(3) CON, LAB, LIB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Katz & Mair (Katz and Mair 1992b)
8.2.3 Additional tables and figures
Sources: See section 8.2.1 above.

Figure 5: Frequency plot, party magnitude: West European cases.

Figure 6: Frequency plot, education: West European cases.
Figure 7: Frequency plot, employment: West European cases.

Figure 8: Frequency plot, effective magnitude: West European cases.
8.2.3.1 Additional data from fsQCA: Presence of gender balance

Table 27: Summary of configurational analysis: presence of gender balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solution</th>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
<th>Model C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education, Labour</td>
<td>Social democracy</td>
<td>Protestantism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex Coverage</td>
<td>0.678005</td>
<td>0.697441</td>
<td>0.748947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex Consistency</td>
<td>0.886489</td>
<td>0.882739</td>
<td>0.855346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsimonious Coverage</td>
<td>0.880466</td>
<td>0.810496</td>
<td>0.800130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsimonious Consistency</td>
<td>0.785549</td>
<td>0.832890</td>
<td>0.806926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Coverage</td>
<td>0.714934</td>
<td>0.737609</td>
<td>0.661484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Consistency</td>
<td>0.878233</td>
<td>0.864137</td>
<td>0.857983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency cut-off</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency cut-off</td>
<td>0.824427</td>
<td>0.809896</td>
<td>0.814634</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Simplifying assumptions made in intermediate models: large, lcs, leftist, lem and social conditions present; clist present or absent.

8.2.3.2 Prime implicants: analyses of presence of gender balance

8.2.3.2.1 Model A (lem, clist, labour, educ, leftist, lcs, large)
Complex solution: No prime implicants required. Parsimonious solution, data: lem clist, lem educ, lem labour, ~clist lcs large, educ labour large, educ lcs large, labour lcs large, ~clist ~leftist ~lcs ~large, ~clist ~labour ~leftist ~large. All selected.

8.2.3.2.2 Model B (lem, clist, socdem, leftist, lcs, large)
Complex solution, data: lem ~clist socdem ~leftist ~large, lem ~clist socdem lcs ~large, lem socdem leftist lcs ~large, clist socdem leftist lcs ~large. All selected. Parsimonious solution, data: ~lem socdem, socdem leftist, socdem lcs. All selected.

8.2.3.2.3 Model C (lem, clist, prot, leftist, lcs, large)
Complex solution, data: clist ~prot leftist lcs ~large, ~lem clist leftist lcs ~large. Both selected. Parsimonious solution, data: prot leftist, ~clist leftist lcs.
8.2.3.3 Additional data from fsQCA: Absence of gender balance

Table 28: Summary of configurational analysis, absence of gender balance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solution</th>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
<th>Model C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education, Labour</td>
<td>Social democracy</td>
<td>Protestantism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex</td>
<td>0.618829</td>
<td>0.579411</td>
<td>0.598546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>0.922419</td>
<td>0.902265</td>
<td>0.892694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>0.750478</td>
<td>0.674703</td>
<td>0.674703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>0.792003</td>
<td>0.811321</td>
<td>0.850458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>0.633754</td>
<td>0.616533</td>
<td>0.511672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency cut-off</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency cut-off</td>
<td>0.821138</td>
<td>0.819048</td>
<td>0.835200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Simplifying assumptions made in intermediate models: large, lcs, leftist, lem and social conditions absent; clist present or absent.

8.2.3.4 Prime implicants: analyses of absence of gender balance

8.2.3.4.1 Model A (lem, clist, labour, educ, leftist, lcs, large)
No prime implicants required

8.2.3.4.2 Model B (lem, clist, socdem, leftist, lcs, large)
Complex solution: No prime implicants required
Parsimonious solution, data: ~leftist ~lcs large, ~clist ~lcs large, ~lem ~lcs large, lem ~leftist large, clist ~leftist large. All selected.
Intermediate solution, data: lem ~clist ~leftist ~lcs ~large, lem ~clist ~socdem ~leftist ~large. Both selected.

8.2.3.4.3 Model C (lem, clist, prot, leftist, lcs, large)
Complex solution, data: lem clist ~prot ~leftist ~lcs, lem clist ~prot ~leftist large. Data: ~clist leftist ~lcs, ~clist ~prot leftist. All selected.
8.2.4 Data sets and FSQCA outputs

Table 29: Raw data, study of West European parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Women MPs</th>
<th>Seats in parliament</th>
<th>Seats in parliament - women</th>
<th>Closed lists = 1</th>
<th>Effective magnitude</th>
<th>Effective years</th>
<th>Leftist cabinets, percentage</th>
<th>Leftist cabinets, percentage</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Party family</th>
<th>Party family</th>
<th>Candidate selection</th>
<th>Candidate selection</th>
<th>Total seats in parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria, 1990</td>
<td>FPÖ</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28.06</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>183</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPÖ</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28.06</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>183</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ÖVP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28.06</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>183</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grünen</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28.06</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>183</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium, 1987</td>
<td>CVP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.37</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>212</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.37</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>45.1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VU</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.37</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>212</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AGA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.37</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>212</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W Germany, 1987</td>
<td>CDU</td>
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Note: lem = large effective magnitude; clist = closed party lists; socdem = social democratic heritage; prot = protestant country; educ = gender balance in higher ed; labour = gender balance in paid labour; leftist = leftist party; lcs = localised candidate selection; large = parliamentary large party.

Sources: See page 206.
Table 30, continued.

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8.3 Central and Eastern Europe

8.3.1 Data sources

8.3.1.1 Intra-party conditions
Author’s own data collection, see questionnaire below. Other sources referenced in case comparisons.

8.3.1.2 Party level electoral data
When no reference to the notes on data collection is provided, all election data refer to election day figures.

Czech Republic: CZSO election server (volby 2010), accessed June 1 2010.
Hungary: Personal communication with election authorities 2010-05-12.
Latvia: Personal communication with election authorities 2011-05-26. See also section 8.4.1.1, page 228.
Lithuania: Personal communication with election authorities 2010-05-17.
Slovakia: Personal communication with election authorities 2010-06-21.

8.3.1.3 Country level election system data
Electoral system: European Election Database (2010).
District magnitude: calculated from European Election Database (2010).
Effective magnitude: calculated from the ParlGov database 10/11 (Döring and Manow 2010a).

8.3.1.4 Notes on the collection of party level electoral data
When election day figures could not be obtained via direct contact with parliaments or election authorities, the number of women and men in each party group or parliamentary club were counted, using lists and photographs on parliamentary web sites. This procedure was used for Bulgaria, Slovenia and Romania. Data from the Slovenian cases are election day figures, whereas
the Bulgarian and Romanian data include changed affiliations that took place after the elections. The gender distribution in the Polish cases are based on election day figures (number of candidates) and data on the share of women in each parliamentary club at the start of the legislative term (personal communication with Sejm information office, 2010-11-18).

Clubs or groups that were not clearly associated with a particular party or party union, i.e., independent candidates or groups of unaffiliated MPs were not counted as parties. No “corrections” of candidates who were elected from a particular party list, but later left their original party parliamentary group for a non-partisan group or for a different party, were made.

The groups of independent or unaffiliated MPs come from the Hungarian parliament (1 MP), Lithuania (4), Romania (2 groups, 15 independents and 7 MPs that were not part of any parliamentary group). MPs from minority groups are often reported as one parliamentary club or group, both in parliaments and in the official election data set. When such groups were present, they were thus counted as one party. One Hungarian MP who was elected under the label Fidez-KDNP-MVMP was counted as a Fidez MP.

Data from the countries in which data were collected in this way – Bulgaria and Romania – therefore are not of election day figures, but instead reflect changes after the latest elections. Because few of the successful cases studied were from these countries, it does not put into question the reliability of this analysis. The degree of party-switching or “party tourism” in CEE (see Shabad and Slomczynski 2004, 155 for an early example) should also be mentioned here. Some parliamentary websites give details on switching of party groups, although the exact extent to which party-switching has occurred in the cases under study here is not known.

The questionnaire included a question about the gender distribution in the parliamentary party (“In the last national elections, how many were elected to represent the party?”) that prompted the parties to state the number of women and men elected. When data supplied by the parties did not match the data from election authorities, data from the latter were used. When no party-level data on the share of women and men could be obtained from authorities, information from the parties was used. This happened only once: the Polish party SDPL, which was part of an electoral coalition, itself supplied the data.

---

134 This common but problematic practice is also used by the Inter-parliamentary Union, IPU.
135 This occurred in two instances: the Lithuanian Homeland Union-Christian Democrats (TS-LKD) and the Latvian party Latvia’s First Party – Latvia’s Way (LPP/LC). Both parties reported one more woman elected than did the election authorities in both countries. The choice to rely on data from election authorities classified both parties as gender biased (20 per cent women MPs instead of 21.7 and 30 per cent respectively.)
8.3.1.5 Socio-economic conditions

Women’s share of employment: Calculated from Eurostat (2010a).
Women graduates from higher education (ISCED 5 and 6, general programmes and law): Calculated from Eurostat (2010b).
Attitudinal data: European Social Survey, ESS4-2008, ed 3.0, “Trust in political parties” (European Social Survey 2008).

8.3.2 Data set

Table 31: Raw data, CEE parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Share of women MPs</th>
<th>Church attendance</th>
<th>Protestants</th>
<th>District magnitude</th>
<th>Party magnitude</th>
<th>Party family (self-evaluation)</th>
<th>Quota level</th>
<th>Women in leadership (%)</th>
<th>Women’s org = 1 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Era</td>
<td>55,55</td>
<td>14,6</td>
<td>28,6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERL</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>53,9</td>
<td>7,46</td>
<td>5,9</td>
<td>Agrarian/farmer’s party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPL</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11,22</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>Social democratic</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KESK</td>
<td>34,48</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>53,9</td>
<td>7,46</td>
<td>28,7</td>
<td>Centrist/social liberal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMP</td>
<td>31,25</td>
<td>17,4</td>
<td>14,8</td>
<td>7,3</td>
<td>4,1</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDE</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>53,9</td>
<td>7,46</td>
<td>9,9</td>
<td>Social democratic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Questionnaire and sources listed in section 8.3.1.
### Additional tables and figures

**Table 32: Output-based effective magnitude at the studied elections, CEE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>EnPP</th>
<th>Assembly size</th>
<th>(M_{\text{eff}})</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>5,4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>41,5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>71,8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>1,6</td>
<td>Mixed system and one oversized party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5,8</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>270,0</td>
<td>Many small parties and mixed system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>466,6</td>
<td>High fractionalisation due to ethnic split</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>Two major parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3,7</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>7,7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80,6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>27,3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** \(M_{\text{eff}}\) (output-based effective magnitude) author’s calculation. Calculation follows the guide by Taagepera (2007, chap. 11).

**Source:** EnPP (effective number of legislative parties) and assembly size from ParlGov 10/11 database (Döring and Manow 2010a), collected from ParlGov.org April 5 2011.

**Figure 9: Frequency plot: output-based effective magnitude, CEE cases**

![Frequency plot: output-based effective magnitude, CEE cases](image)

**Source:** See Table 32.
### Table 33: Women MPs in contemporary CEE parties late 2000s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Party/Parlt group</th>
<th>% WMPs</th>
<th>Election year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LV JL</td>
<td>New Era</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE Rahvaliit</td>
<td>People's union of Estonia</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ KSCM</td>
<td>Communist Party of Czechia and Moravia</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL SDPL</td>
<td>National Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT TPP</td>
<td>Centre party</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE Keska</td>
<td>Centre party</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ VV</td>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT LVLS</td>
<td>Union of Lithuanian peasants and peoples</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU LMP</td>
<td>Politics can be different</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE SDE</td>
<td>Social democrats</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT DP</td>
<td>Labour party (incl coalition labour + youth)</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG GERB</td>
<td>Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria Party</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI SDS</td>
<td>Social democrats</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ TOP09</td>
<td>Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity 09</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL PO</td>
<td>Civic platform</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK SDKU-DS</td>
<td>Slovak Democratic and Christian Union</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL PiS</td>
<td>Law and Justice</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG RZS</td>
<td>Order, Lawfulness, Justice Party</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT TS-LKD</td>
<td>Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV PLPP/LC</td>
<td>LPP/LC</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI LDS</td>
<td>Liberal democracy of Slovenia</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT LRLS</td>
<td>Liberals Movement</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK SaS</td>
<td>Freedom and Solidarity</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG KB</td>
<td>Coalition for Bulgaria</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV TP</td>
<td>People's Party</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ ODS</td>
<td>Civic democratic party</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE Greens</td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL LiD</td>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE Reform</td>
<td>Reform party</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK SMER</td>
<td>Direction - Social democracy</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT LSDP</td>
<td>Lithuanian Social democratic party</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Ataka</td>
<td>Ataka Party</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO Indep</td>
<td>Non-affiliated MPs</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK KDH</td>
<td>Christian democratic movement</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV TB-LNNK</td>
<td>For Fatherland and Freedom</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>% WMPs</td>
<td>Election year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO PD-L</td>
<td>Democrat-Liberal Party</td>
<td>12,1</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO PSD+PC</td>
<td>Social democrats + conservator Party</td>
<td>11,6</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO PNL</td>
<td>National liberal party</td>
<td>11,5</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV ZEZS</td>
<td>Union of greens and farmers</td>
<td>11,1</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO Minorities</td>
<td>National minorities</td>
<td>11,1</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI Z</td>
<td>Party For Real</td>
<td>11,1</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK SNS</td>
<td>Slovak National Party</td>
<td>11,1</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG DPS</td>
<td>Movement for Rights and Freedoms Party</td>
<td>10,8</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE IRL</td>
<td>I-RPL</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO UDMR</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania</td>
<td>9,1</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ CSSD</td>
<td>Czech Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>8,9</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU MSZP</td>
<td>HSP</td>
<td>8,5</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU Fidesz</td>
<td>Fidesz - Hungarian civic union-kdnp</td>
<td>8,4</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI SDS</td>
<td>Slovenian Democratic Party</td>
<td>7,1</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG SK</td>
<td>The Blue Coalition</td>
<td>6,7</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT TT</td>
<td>Order and Justice</td>
<td>6,7</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU Jobbik</td>
<td>Movement for a better Hungary</td>
<td>6,4</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL PSL</td>
<td>Polish People's Party</td>
<td>3,2</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% WMPs</th>
<th>Election year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HU indep.</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT LiCS</td>
<td>Liberal and Centre</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT AWPL</td>
<td>Lithuanian Poles Electoral Action</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT NS</td>
<td>New Union (Social Liberals)</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT indep.</td>
<td>Nominated by himself</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV PCTVL</td>
<td>For Human Rights in United Latvia</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV SC</td>
<td>Harmony Centre</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO NoGroup</td>
<td>No parlt group</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI DeSUS</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Slovenian Pensioners</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI minorities</td>
<td>National Communities</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI SNS</td>
<td>Slovenian National Party</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI SLS-SMS</td>
<td>Slovenian People's Party (SLS) and Youth Party of Slovenia</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK MOST - HID</td>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Country and party column refers to country (e.g., LV for Latvia) and the party label in the original language. NB: This table includes cases that were not counted as parties in the analysis, e.g., groups of independents and parliamentarians that are not members of any parliamentary fraction.

Sources: See “Central and Eastern Europe Data sources” above.
Table 34: Women’s in higher education and paid employment, CEE late 200s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia (1998-2007)</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia (1998-2006)</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (1998-2007)</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>57.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>61.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>46.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data refer to ISCED level 5 and 6, i.e., the highest levels of post-compulsory education. Bulgarian data missing for university graduates (1999) and law school graduates (2002), employment (1999).
Sources: Eurostat (2010a, 2010b).

Table 35: Church attendance and religious denominations in CEE, late 2000s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Attends religious services more often than on special rel. holidays (%)</th>
<th>Protestants, percentage of population</th>
<th>Roman Catholics, percentage of population</th>
<th>Orthodox, percentage of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>82.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech rep.</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>87.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>30.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>53.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>26.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data refer to 1999 and comprise three categories: “More than once a week”, “Once a week”, “Once a month”.
Sources: World Values Survey (2009b, 2009c)
Table 36: Electoral systems in Central and Eastern Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country, Year</th>
<th>Districts (PR)</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Mean district magnitude (PR)</th>
<th>Threshold</th>
<th>Preferential votes</th>
<th>Gender quota, legislated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BG 2009</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ 2010</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE 2007</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 2010</td>
<td>20+1</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 2008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV 2006</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL 2007</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO 2008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>5**</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK 2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI 2008</td>
<td>8 with 11 SMD each</td>
<td>90 PR/SMD ***</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Yes: 35 %, but 25% in 2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Mean district magnitude refers to PR districts only. *The number of PR seats depends on the number of deputies elected in SMD system. ** Other thresholds apply for party alliances. *** In practice, the Slovenian PR system works like an SMD system (Antić Gaber 2008, 83), and hence calculating a mean district magnitude would be misleading.
Sources: IPU Parline database (n.d.), Quotaproject.org (Quotaproject 2010), Rose and Munro (2009).

8.3.4 Questionnaire

The following questions were emailed to all successful cases.

Section 1 of 5: About the party
1. In which country is the party active?
   Please select

2. Which is the official name of the party?
   Please enter the official name of the party, in the original language
   Enter party name here

3. Which is the official abbreviation of the party?
   Please enter the official short name of the party, in the original language
   Enter party abbreviation here
4. When was the party founded?
Please enter the year in which the party was founded.
Enter year of founding here

5. Which is the primary ideological position of the party?
Please select one (1) of the following options:

- green
- socialist
- social democratic
- communist
- liberal
- conservative
- agrarian/farmers’ party
- minority-group rights
- pro national
- confessional/religious
- other: Please specify

6. How many members does the party have?
Please enter the (rough) number of party members.
Please enter the (rough) number of party members here

Section 2 of 5: Electoral Results
7. When were the last national elections held?
YYYYMMDD

8. In the last national elections, how many were elected to represent the party?
Please enter the number of women and men who won seats in the last elections to the national parliament.
Number of women
Number of men

9. Was the party part of an electoral alliance in the last national elections?
☐ Yes ☐ No

Section 3 of 5: Candidate Selection
This section asks about the rules and practices of candidate selection in the party.
10. Who can stand as a party candidate in elections?
☐ Party members only
☐ Anyone who sympathises with the party goals

11. Which part of the organisation decides who can stand as a party representative in national elections?
Please choose the one (1) description that fits the formal rules of the party best.

☐ Selection of candidates is managed by the national party organisational alone, without any influence from other parts of the organisation.

☐ Regional or local party organisation can propose candidates. National party organisation decides about the list of candidates.

☐ The national party organisation suggests candidates. Local or regional organisations make the decision about who will become party candidates.

☐ Local or regional party organisations decide about candidate selection. The national party organisation approves the list and may add or delete candidates from the list.

☐ Local or regional party organisations are in full control of candidate selection, and make the final decisions about candidates.

12. Does the party use membership ballots in candidate selection for national elections?
Some parties let party members vote in internal primary elections to decide who will be party candidates in elections. Do the statutes of the party allow that in candidate selection?

☐ Yes. ☐ No.

13. Does the party work to recruit equal number of women and men to parliament?

☐ Yes, we work for recruiting a specific number or proportion of women. Please specify the proportion

☐ Yes, but we have not specified the number or proportion.

☐ No.

14. Has the party discussed using gender quotas in candidate selection?

☐ Yes, there has been much discussion about gender quotas.

☐ Yes, a little.

☐ No.

15. What is the party’s position on gender quotas for candidate selection?  

☐ Gender quotas are principally wrong and unacceptable.

☐ Gender quotas are principally wrong but can still be used to achieve fair representation.

☐ Gender quotas are a fair and good way to achieve fair representation.

Section 3b of 5: Gender Quotas and Affirmative Action
This section includes questions about party rules that help achieving gender balance in parliament.
16. Does the party use gender quotas or affirmative action in candidate selection?

---

136 This question was used in the PARQUOTA project, see Dahlerup & Freidenvall (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008).
We would like to know, if the party uses gender quotas or other types of affirmative action (positive discrimination) to achieve equal proportions of women and men in the parliamentary delegation. Please select one or more of the following:

☐ Yes, the party uses gender quotas.
☐ Yes, the party uses other types of affirmative action for women (e.g., training)
☐ No, the party does not use gender quotas or affirmative action.

If No, please continue to section 4, page 6.

17. At which level(s) does the party use gender quotas? Please select one or several options.

☐ In candidate selection for national elections.
☐ In candidate selection for local or regional elections.
☐ For positions inside the party, e.g., party congress, committees, boards or other groups.
☐ The party does not use gender quotas.

18. Are party quotas mentioned in party rules or statutes? Please select one or several options.

☐ Yes, gender quotas for national elections are mentioned in party statutes.
☐ Yes, gender quotas for local or regional elections are mentioned in party statutes.
☐ Yes, gender quotas for positions inside the party, e.g., party congress, committees, boards and other groups are mentioned in party statutes.
☐ No, gender quotas are not mentioned in the party statutes or party rules.

19. National elections to the lower house
19a. Since when has the party used gender quotas in national elections? Please enter election (year)
19b. What level of representation does the quota require? Please enter percentage level

20. Local and regional elections
20a. Since when has the party used gender quotas in local/regional elections? Please enter election (year)
20b. What level of representation does the quota require? Please enter percentage level

21. Party-internal positions
21a. Since when does the party use gender quotas for internal positions? Please enter election (year)
21b. What level of representation does the quota require? Please enter percentage level

22. Are there rank-ordering rules?
Do the quota rules require a specific order on party lists? Such rules can be, e.g., alternation between women and men on the list or both women and men on the top positions.
☐ Yes Please specify
☐ No.

23. Does the party use other types of affirmative action?
If the party uses other ways to promote women candidates, please indicate which type.
Please select one or several options.
☐ The party does not use any other types of support specifically for women.
☐ Financial support for women.
☐ Training specifically for women.
☐ The party encourages women to seek candidacy and elected office.
☐ Other: Please specify

Section 4 of 5: Women in the Party
Please fill in the following questions about women inside the party organisation.
24. Does the party have a women’s organisation or equality committee?
☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don’t know.
If No, please continue to question 27 below.

25. Is the women’s organisation represented at the party congress?
☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don’t know.

26. Is the women’s organisation represented in the party leadership?
Please indicate if the women’s organisation is represented in the highest executive organ or committee of the party.
☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Don’t know.

27. Are there any women in the party leadership?
Please indicate if there are any women in the highest executive organ or committee of the party.
☐ Yes, please enter the percentage of women in party leadership here
☐ No ☐ Don’t know.

Section 5 of 5: Your comments
In this final section, we will ask a few questions that will help describing the material. If you wish to receive a copy of the final report, please indicate so in the text box below (28.)
28. Your comments
If you have any comments, please let us know by entering them in the textbox below.

Your questions or comments

29. Contact details
We may need to contact you for further questions of clarifications.
Please enter your contact details below.
Name  Please enter your name here
Title (position in the party) Please enter your title or position here
Email  Please enter your email address here
Phone number  Please enter your phone number here
8.4 Gender and Party in Latvia

8.4.1 Data sources
The case study also relies on data collected for the comparative study of CEE parties, listed in above.

8.4.1.1 Electoral data
Official election day data and gender distribution: Latvian election authorities (Centrālā vēlēšanu komisija, CVK) via personal communication May 26 2010 and CVK online election archive (CVK n.d.) New Era staff (personal communication 2011-02-07) supplied lists of candidates including data on gender of candidates in the 2010 elections.
Preference voting and gender: CVK online election archive (CVK n.d., n.d., n.d.) after instructions from CVK staff, who also supplied lists of candidates sorted by party and gender for the 2010 elections.
Historical election data and data on local elections: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (CSB 2010f, 2010g).

8.4.1.2 Socioeconomic conditions
Attitudinal data on corruption: Eurobarometer 64:1 (2008a) and Kalniņš (2008).

8.4.2 Interviews
The interviewees include party representatives, candidates and bureau staff as well as academics or practitioners not affiliated with New Era, who contributed different types of information about Latvian party politics.

8.4.2.1.1 Party representatives, staff and activists
Valdis Lokenbahs. New Era pre-founder, member of New Era ethics committee. Riga, August 24th 2010.

8.4.2.1.2 Expert interviews
Jānis Ikstens. Associate professor, University of Latvia. Riga, August 12th 2010.
8.4.3 Additional tables and figures

Table 37: Enrolment in higher education in Latvia, 1997/98-2009/10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Women, percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineering, manufacturing and construction</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural sciences, mathematics and information technology</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social sciences, business and law</td>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities and art</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and welfare</td>
<td>82.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>83.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CSB (2010b), author’s calculations.

Figure 10: New Era and Unity MPs per district in the 2002, 2006 and 2010 elections

Source: Author’s calculations based on CVK data (2002, 2006a, 2010a). Data for 2010 refers to MPs from the Unity electoral coalition and hence refers to both New Era MPs and MPs from the other parties in Unity. The two MPs elected from the Unity list in Latgale in 2010 were men from parties other than New Era.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive, mean</td>
<td>2338.4</td>
<td>3178.8</td>
<td>1805.7</td>
<td>2011.5</td>
<td>2695.2</td>
<td>2733.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StDev</td>
<td>2054.7</td>
<td>4458.3</td>
<td>2257.8</td>
<td>2291.6</td>
<td>3493.4</td>
<td>3540.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s votes as perc. of men’s votes</td>
<td>73.6***a</td>
<td></td>
<td>85.6 e</td>
<td></td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative, mean</td>
<td>826.6</td>
<td>750.1</td>
<td>955.1</td>
<td>828.7</td>
<td>2812.9</td>
<td>2391.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StDev</td>
<td>499.7</td>
<td>564.2</td>
<td>831.0</td>
<td>582.6</td>
<td>2174.6</td>
<td>1868.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s votes as perc. of men’s votes</td>
<td>110.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>115.3**d</td>
<td></td>
<td>117.6**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Independent samples t-test
a) Equal variances not assumed. t = 3.1031 df = 511
b) t = -2.0103 df = 236.768
c) t = -2.0659 df = 211.81
d) Equal variances not assumed. t = -1992 df = 271
e) Equal variances not assumed.
Outliers removed (refer to cases, not individual candidates): 2002, negative: 1 woman; 2006, positive: 2 women, 2 men; 2006, negative: 2 men, 1 woman; 2010, negative: 1 woman; 2010, positive: 2 men.

Table 39: Standard deviations for data presented in Table 22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Type of vote
| Positive votes, StDev | 2140.9 | 4458.3 | 3000.6 | 2743.5 | 3515.6 | 5707.2 |
| Negative votes, StDev | 650.9 | 564.2  | 971.6 | 753.1 | 2608.1 | 1865.4 |

Source: Author’s calculations. See Table 22, page 176.

Table 40: Standard deviations for data presented in Table 23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th></th>
<th>2010 (Unity)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Type of vote
| Positive votes, St.Dev | 2287.5 | 7135.2 | 5050.4 | 3117.2 | 5167.4       | 9909.9 |
| Negative votes, St.Dev | 932.4 | 309.8  | 832.5 | 1525.4 | 3520.3       | 2873.7 |

Source: Author’s calculations. See Table 23, page 177.
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