The role of ‘perspective’ in epistemic marking

1. Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to discuss the overlooked function of perspective-taking in different forms of epistemic marking and how an “epistemic perspective” may feature more than one point of view (cf. Evans 2005; Section 3, below). In evidentials, for instance, aspects of meaning other than the speaker’s ‘information source’ appear important both conceptually and grammatically. Such aspects of meaning concern inter-personal components of the speech situation, with special reference to the modeling of mental representations of other minds (see e.g. Givón 2005). Consider the example below from Willett’s (1991) description of Southeastern Tepehuan where there are two reported evidentials, sac and sap that differ in terms of whether the addressee is familiar with the report (sac) or not (sap; see also Section 2.1, below):

(1) a. Añ mi'ñi dyir ja'c jim
    1S there-PRE from DIR come
    na sac Járax Cham
    SUB REK EXS-crab place
    ‘I’m coming from a place over there called “Crab Place”. [as you already know]\n    (Willett 1991: 165 [author’s added glosses in brackets])

b. Ma'n mu-pai' sap quio gu ma'ncam
    one there-where REU live ART person
    ‘(It is told that) there once lived a man in a certain place.’ [informing] (164, [author’s added glosses in brackets])

A traditional account of the reportative forms in Southeastern Tepehuan would fail to capture the “known to hearer”/”unknown to hearer” contrast as described by Willet. Although the

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presence of the hearer’s/addressee’s perspective in evidential forms must be separated from
the notion of “information source”, as such, the relatively high degree of pragmatic influence
on the interpretation of evidential meaning (see Curnow 2003; Faller 2002, Murray 2011,
Mushin 2001, *inter alia*), means that this intersubjective component of the context should be
considered in research on evidentials.

This paper argues for the relevance of ‘perspective’ as an important notion in attempts
to analyze epistemic marking systems, like evidentiality. The presence of more than one
perspective in some forms of epistemic marking motivates this proposal and ‘perspective’ may
even be used to bridge apparently separate systems as interconnected within a larger
functional domain (see Section 5). Given this stated focus, other comparisons between
epistemic systems will be less of a concern. For example: the long-standing argument over the
precise relation between epistemic modality and evidentiality is not crucial to the arguments
made and will consequently be largely skirted in the general discussion. Also, given the early
stage of investigation of the systems discussed in this paper, it seems premature to outline the
diachronic development of some of the forms discussed in the course of the paper. A basic
separation between encoded and conveyed meaning is adhered to throughout the paper,
although a clear distinction between the two is difficult to make in some cases (e.g. evidentials
in interrogative contexts; see Section 2.3). The semantic content of a form is usually discussed
using the term ‘meaning’ since some of this content is pragmatically anchored and not
propositional in nature.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 accounts for the addressee’s perspective in
evidentials, which may be separated into forms that occur with declaratives and ones that occur
in interrogatives. Section 3 discusses epistemic marking systems that allow the speaker to
situate information from the speaker’s or the addressee’s perspective. These and other
systems typically operate side by side with evidentials (or in place of them) and are linked to
evidential expressions in which meaning depends on inter-personal aspects of the context. In
Section 4, the notion of scope is discussed in relation to illocutionary/propositional meaning,
along with a consideration of mitigation and illocutionary modification as important components
of some epistemic marking strategies. In Section 5, the notion of functional domain is
introduced in order to provide the present investigation with a means to explicate the
relationship between different categorizations of epistemic marking. Section 6 summarizes the paper with some concluding remarks.

2. **Addressee-perspective/perceiver in evidential systems**

The present paper departs from typologically informed schematizations of evidentiality, such as Willett (1988), regarding basic conceptual divisions of evidential notions and the subsequent classification of evidential systems in Aikhenvald (2004). The investigation acknowledges the primary role of signaling ‘information source’ in evidential systems and regards evidentiality as conceptually separate from epistemic modality (but see Section 5, below). However, it also agrees with Babel (2009) in that evidentials cannot be satisfactorily described without taking into account the context of their use in a communicative and social sense. The original contribution of the present paper is to relate evidentials to lesser-described forms of epistemic marking by focusing on the crucial role of inter-personal context in the analysis of both. In this section, the perspective of the addressee in evidentials is discussed using examples from the literature. It is found with distinct kinds of evidentials, ones that signal ‘general knowledge’ (Section 2.1) and ones that include/focus on the perspective of the addressee in declarative (Section 2.2) and in interrogative (Section 2.3) contexts.

2.1 ‘**General knowledge**’

Mamaindê (Nambikwaran, Brazil) has a ‘general knowledge’ marker, -nĩnta/-ĩnta/-nta/, which signals information that “any adult native member of the community would know” (Eberhard 2009: 463), including myths and world-knowledge that is considered beyond questioning. Consider example (2):

\[(2) \hspace{1cm} ta-tukwinʔi-tu \hspace{1cm} ?aik-tu \hspace{1cm} tau-Ø-nta-wa\]

\[\text{PS1-father.in.law-FNS} \hspace{1cm} \text{field-FNS} \hspace{1cm} \text{chop-S3-GKN-DECL}\]

‘My father-in-law is clearing a field.’ (everyone knows this because he’s been doing this every day now for a month; 463)

According to Eberhard (p.c.), the general knowledge marker can only occur in declarative contexts and may not be used to qualify events as shared specifically by the speaker and the addressee to the exclusion of others. In such cases, a specific evidential must be used to
indicate how the event was perceived, but then only encoding the perspective of the speaker. A feature of the general knowledge marker that follows from this, is that it is comparable to the reportative evidential, -satau, in denoting events that were not perceived, but which may nevertheless be regarded as true. However, Eberhard states that reportatives convey a sense of doubt that is lacking in the general knowledge marker. Grammatically, the reportative marker also occupies a different slot from the general knowledge marker, which aligns with the other (non-reportative) evidentials, following the person marker. The reportative marker (somewhat unusually) directly follows the verb stem:

(3) ta-tukwin?ni-tu ?aik-tu tau-satau-Ø-nha-wa

PS1-father.in.law-FNS field-FNS chop-RS-S3-PRS/NVIS-DECL

‘My father-in-law is clearing his field.’ (and I know this because someone told me; 460)

While the general knowledge marker makes reference to the knowledge of the addressee in stating something known, it does so without any specific calculation regarding what the addressee may or may not know, but only what is “there to be known” and what may be accepted as (generally) true. The crucial point here is that the evidential value of the marker extends beyond the perspective of the speaker to include others, including the addressee.

Other languages with evidential systems that feature corresponding markers are Central Pomo (Pomoan, California), where there is a general knowledge clitic, =‘ma, that refers to “established facts” (Mithun 1999: 181) and Southeastern Tepehuan (Uto-Aztecan, Durango, Mexico), which has two reportatives, sap, which denotes information “reported to speaker, [but] unknown to hearer”, and sac, denoting information “reported to speaker, [and] previously known to hearer” (Willett 1991: 162; see example 1, above). García Salido & Reyes (2011) provide ample examples of sap/sac, but make no clear distinction between the distribution of the two markers. It is possible that the reportatives of Southeastern Tepehuan feature a measure of “inter-personal calculation” in the mind of the speaker to indicate whether the addressee has actual knowledge of the reported event, or not, but they may also be more like the general knowledge markers in Mamaindê in lacking such a component.
While general knowledge markers extend the perspective of the speaker to include the perspective of other(s), it appears that this inclusion is *ad hoc* in the sense that contextually specific assumptions about the knowledge-state of the addressee (in the moment) are not required for the use of such markers. This is, however, a separation that remains to be confirmed and it will serve only as a hypothesis at this stage.

2.2 Addressee-perspective: declaratives

Some evidentials are reported to attend specifically to the perspective of the addressee as an evidential value in qualifying an utterance. For example, in Aymara (Aymaran, Peru/Bolivia) there is a ‘reconfirmational’ marker *-pi* that is “used when the addressee knows or ought to know, through personal knowledge, the matter referred to as well as the speaker” (Hardman 1986: 121). Similarly, in Jaqaru (Aymaran, Peru) *-ishi*, denotes “a fact [that] is directly within the personal knowledge of both speaker and hearer” (122). The stated meaning of *-pi* and *-ishi* is regarded as conceptually separate from the ‘general knowledge’ markers in Section 2.1 because they appear to concern a more restricted availability of information focused on the addressee.

Similar addressee-oriented forms have been reported for languages spoken in Papua New Guinea. San Roque (2008: § 9.2.7, 9.3.4) describes evidentials in Duna (Duna-Bogaya, Trans New Guinea), where a ‘potential observation’-marker, *-noko/-naoko*, focuses on the perspective of the addressee.²

(4) A: Petrusi *ho-naoko*  
PSN come-POT.OBS  
‘Petrus came {you could have seen}.’

B: *hutia*  
come.PFV.VIS.P  
‘Yes that’s right, Petros came {I saw}.’ (San Roque, presentation at Stockholm University, Dec. 2010 [partial adjustments to glossing])

² The specific variant of the ‘potential observation’-marker depends on the class of the verb to which it attaches (San Roque 2008: 358).
In Pole (Engan, Trans New Guinea) there is a “referential aspect” marker, -\textit{nde}, that is “used with the near and far past tenses when referring to, or reminding the person spoken to, of an event which they [i.e. the speaker and the addressee] both saw.” (Rule 1977: 80). Similarly, in Mendi (Angal, Trans New Guinea), there is a suffix -\textit{nda} that is described as a form belonging to a set of (tensed) “aspect[s] of perception”, which denotes events that “both the person speaking and the person spoken to saw” (Madden, no date [c. 1960]: 6).

While some of these reports are accompanied by few examples of relevant markers in actual discourse, such markers are attested in genealogically diverse languages and are defined (at least preliminarily) by their capacity to signal the inclusion of the addressee’s point of view as a form of evidential marking (see also Hintz and Hintz, this volume).

2.3 Addressee-perspective: interrogatives

Separate from addressee-evidentials found in declarative contexts are evidentials that shift perceiver from the speaker to the addressee in interrogative contexts. Aikhenvald (2004: 242) states that evidentials in questions “may relate to the source of information available to the addressee, or to the speaker, or to both”. An example of a perspective-shift in interrogative evidentials comes, again, from Duna where the speaker’s perspective is the default in a declarative context (5a). This becomes the addressee’s perspective in the interrogative example in (5b):

\[(5) \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{no rakare-\textit{yarua}} \\
& \quad 1S \text{ cold-SNS.C} \\
& \quad \text{‘I am cold (I feel).’} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \text{ko roro-\textit{yarua}=pe} \\
& \quad 2S \text{ hot-SNS.C=Q} \\
& \quad \text{‘You are hot (you feel)?’ (San Roque 2008: 427 [partial adjustments to glossing])}
\end{align*}\]

For Qiang (Tibeto-Burman, Sichuan, China), LaPolla (2003: 73) states that evidentials are non-obligatory in questions, unless the speaker makes assumptions about the source of the
addressee’s information, with respect to the expected answer. He states that in the case of evidentials in questions, “it is the action that is questioned, not the source of the information”.

(6) the: ha-qe-u ngua
    3S OR-go-VIS Q

‘Did he go? {you saw}’ (73, [my adjusted orthography and translation])

A form of epistemic marking that has been compared to evidentiality is *egophoric* or *conjunct/disjunct* marking (cf. Hale 1980, Bickel & Nichols 2007: 223; Bickel 2008). Egophoric systems feature a (primary) contrast between two forms, ego/conjunct and non-ego/disjunct where the ego/conjunct form is exclusively found with first and second person subjects in declarative and interrogative contexts, respectively. This contrast is exemplified in (7) with data from Kathmandu Newari:

(7) a. ji ana wanā
    1S there go.EGO

‘I went there.’

b. cha ana wanā lā
    2S there go.EGO Q

‘Did you go there?’

c. cha ana wana
    2S there go.NON.EGO

‘You went there.’

d. wa ana wana
    3S there go.NON.EGO

‘He went there.’

(Hale 1980: 95)
Cross-linguistically, it appears to be the case that the involvement of the speaker is a salient value in ego/conjunct forms and that this is reflected in language specific restrictions as to the combination of egophoric marking with volitional/controllable predicates (e.g. Hale 1980, Creissels 2008). The use of the ego/conjunct form to signal speaker/addressee involvement with first and second person subjects parallels the perceiver-shift with interrogatives in some evidential systems, although egophoric and evidential systems may have distinct origins (see Floyd et al. forthcoming, and the articles therein for a comprehensive discussion of the relationship between egophoricity and evidentiality).

It is evident from existing accounts of evidentiality that the perspective of the addressee plays a role in the analysis of some forms. Evidentials relevant to this aspect of meaning may be separated into forms that mark information as ‘general knowledge’ or as ‘known to the addressee’, and in interrogative perceiver-shifts with evidentials that reflect the perspective of the speaker in unmarked, declarative contexts. These speech-act/person effects in evidentials are also a defining feature of egophoric systems.

3. ‘Perspective’ as epistemic marking
In addition to the stated reports on evidentials, above, there has been a steady output of grammatical descriptions in recent years featuring markers whose primary function is to situate the perspectives of the speech participants with regard to some object of reference. For Andoke (isolate, Colombia), Landaburu (2007: 25) reports on what he calls “engagement marking”, which is formally separate from evidentiality, and which serves to signal events as accessible/inaccessible to the speaker and the addressee, partly taking into account the addressee’s awareness at the moment of utterance. Kroeker (2001) describes what he calls “verification marking” in Southern Nambikwara which marks utterances as either individually or collectively “observed”. San Roque (2008) details the interaction between two separate sub-systems: evidential marking (see Section 2.2) and a formally distinct set of markers called “information status” that situates events with regard to both the speaker and the addressee in past and present contexts.

4 The notion of observation is in turn subject to modification by available evidential contrasts in the language.
Each of these accounts describes what appear to be related systems, but using separate labels that may reflect subtle differences in function and meaning. A closer look at such systems reveals similarities that stem from a shared function to signal *symmetric/asymmetric access* to information in an epistemic sense. The use of the term ‘epistemic’ in this context differs from some other treatments of the term that specifically refer to systems for marking modality and evidentiality (cf. Boye 2012). Systems like the one described for Kogi in Section 3.4 would not qualify for this use of the term, but given the presence of the speaker’s commitment in making an assumption about the commitment of the addressee, the use of ‘epistemic’ appears useful in this context also. The challenge of analyzing such epistemic marking systems lies in how to account for access to knowledge as *shared* vs. *non-shared* between the speaker and the addressee. A great amount of linguistic research has focused on this aspect of the context, e.g. work on definite reference and (pragmatic) presupposition. While it is impossible to survey even a fraction of the literature on this topic, we will briefly discuss some important conceptual notions that may help in the ensuing analysis of “perspectivized” epistemic marking systems.

3.1 Complex perspectives of the common ground

Clark (1996) explores social (shared) experience from a cognitive-psychological perspective in an attempt to identify its component parts. The concept ‘common ground’ is defined as the sum of two persons’ “mutual, common, joint knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions” (Clark 1996: 93). Competing notions that have been used to define shared information, such as (shared) belief, knowledge, assumption and awareness, are regarded by Clark as subtypes of the common ground in any relevant linguistic structure whose explanation requires a measure of context. Clark proposes a primary division between communal and personal common ground where the former ties into the addressee’s socio-cultural status whereas the latter has a stronger basis in the (shared) perception of events and inter-personal relationships that exists between the speaker and the addressee. The features that define these two kinds of common ground are of different granularity, but originate in the speaker’s assumptions about how the knowledge of the addressee may be placed with regard to some event.

When it comes to analyzing epistemic marking systems, we may consider communal and personal aspects of the common ground as part of the analysis. This separation was hinted at in the previous section in the difference between ‘general knowledge’ and ‘addressee-
perspective’ evidentials. A relevant question is if such a distinction is visible in epistemic marking that signals shared/non-shared information, or if it conflates in such markers. The results of this investigation suggest that while both distinctions are visible in the distribution and use of specific forms, they are also asymmetrically distributed in a way that is analogous to a separation between declaratives and questions; i.e. the use of addressee-perspective forms (interrogative) is more restricted than ones that primarily encode the speaker’s perspective (declarative; see Section 3.4). It appears that a common ground in this sense is not “equally common” to both perspectives. This inequality is what Kamio (1997) explores using the concept “territory of information”. Kamio argues that the speaker and the addressee occupy distinct territories with respect to information and that these have grammatical consequences, as demonstrated for Japanese. A typical example of the addressee’s (i.e. hearer’s) territory of information is information obtained through the addressee’s “internal direct experience” (39) meaning that an utterance like *you have a headache* must be accompanied by the appropriate sentence final particle in order not to be ungrammatical.5 There are obvious parallels to English where it is appropriate to hedge similar utterances using *seem, look like,* or *appear* (i.e. *you look like you have a headache*). Another possibility is to shape the utterance in the form of a tag-question, e.g. *you have a headache, don’t you?.* In English, these considerations are pragmatic, whereas in Japanese they are grammatical requirements.

To resolve the problem of how to assign values to the fleeting distribution of knowledge between the speaker and the addressee, we introduce the concept of “complex perspective” as a specific type of “multiple perspective” constructions (see Evans 2005; Bergqvist 2012, 2016). Crucially, a complex perspective consists of one perspective embedded in another, as applicable to forms that signal e.g. shared access to some information (see ex 3, Section 2.2; ex 7, Section 3.2, below). When an event is marked as part of the common ground, the speaker makes an assumption about the state of mind of the addressee that underlies the use of such expressions. The fact that the speaker’s assumption may differ from the addressee’s expressed point of view, means that the two perspectives have unequal status. The assumed perspective of the addressee is subordinate to the speaker's perspective. However, it is appropriate to analyze the inter-positioning of these two perspectives in terms of

5 Other kinds of information that belong to either speech participant’s territory are: detailed professional/expertise knowledge; information obtained through direct experience; information about persons, objects, events and facts close to one of the speech participants, including personal information (Kamio 1997: 39)
(a)symmetries, despite the fact that there exists a hierarchical relationship between the two perspectives to begin with. The concept of access (a)symmetry will be explored in Sections 3.4 and 4 (cf. Bergqvist 2012).

In the sections below, we will briefly survey how the epistemic positioning of the speech-participants’ perspectives is signaled in a familiar language such as German and in the lesser-described languages Aweti (Tupian, Brazil) and Kogi (Arwako-Chibchan, Colombia).

3.2 German modal particles
The literature on “modal particles” is mainly focused on Germanic languages, but recent accounts allow for a comparative look at e.g. Japanese to define the grammatical and semantic properties of such markers (e.g. Endo 2012). The use of the term “particle” suggests that modal particles do not form a homogenous group. They may be combined to form composite functions/meanings and are non-obligatory as well as syntactically peripheral, although their syntactic properties restrict their distribution to asserted clauses that carry “illocutionary force” (cf. Abraham & Leiss 2012, for details concerning the separation between asserted and presupposed subordinate clauses, and factive vs. non-factive complement clauses). An example of the German modal particle ja, is in (8):

(8)  Haider war ja betrunken
    PN be.PST MP drunk
‘Haider was obviously drunk.’/’Of course, Haider was drunk.’ (Abraham & Leiss 2012: 7 [my adjusted glossing and translation])

Example (8) could for example be uttered when discussing the actions of the subject (Haider) against the background of his drunken state. For ja to occur, the fact that the subject was drunk must already be established knowledge, albeit not explicitly stated. Abraham & Leiss analyze modal particles as markers of a “twofold deixis” that accommodates the deictic center of the addressee as part of the referential ground (8): “The speaker makes an estimate about the knowledge awareness of the Addressee while letting the Addressee know about this estimate and giving him a chance to relativize, or correct, this estimate about p.” (7). The function of ja to signal a search for a common ground in the expression of speaker origo (cf. ‘speaker stance’) is a functional property that is exclusive to modal particles when compared to German
modal verbs and evidentials (8). Comparable analyses apply to the cognate *ju* in Swedish (Lindström 2008) and *jo* in Norwegian (Andvik 1992).  

3.3 "Clause marking" in Awetí  
A less well-known language that features an epistemic marking strategy analogous to modal particles is Awetí (Tupian, Brazil). Drude (2005) describes what he calls “clause marking” in Awetí, featuring two particles, *a’yn* and *me*. Examples of these markers are in (9):

(9)  
a. \( o\)-\( to \)  \( me \)  
3S-leave CM.1  
‘He left (as you may know).’  

b. \( oto \)  \( a’yn \)  
3S-leave CM.2  
‘He left (this will be unknown to you).’  

(Drude 2005: 26 [my glossing])

From the glossing translations and the general discussion of the forms, it is clear that the key meaning component of both markers is to mark information as either shared by the addressee, or exclusive to the speaker. Clause markers can also combine to produce compositional meaning, a property shared by modal particles (cf. Endo 2012 for Japanese). This is illustrated in example (10):

(10) \( o\)-\( to \)  \( a’yn \)  \( ne \)  
3S-leave CM.2 CM.1  
‘He left (this will be unknown to you, but you expected it to happen).’ (Drude 2005: 26 [my glossing])

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6 Data on Awetí is archived with the DoBeS initiative (www.mpi.nl/DOBES)  
7 The clause marker *me* has an allomorph *ne* resulting from phonological assimilation to the preceding nasal. The scope properties of individual, or combined, “clause markers” in Awetí are not detailed in Drude 2005. Their label as clause markers suggest propositional scope, but it is not clear how they relate to modal particles in this regard.
Like modal particles, clause markers are non-obligatory and do not contribute to the propositional content of the sentence (26). They are highly frequent, however, and accompany most clauses in the available materials.

In regard to the distribution of modal particles and the clause markers of Awetí, a rough comparison between the two may serve to illustrate differences in terms of grammatical function, albeit not in terms of their apparently similar meaning. For the purposes of this comparison a small corpus of spoken Swedish and Awetí narratives was used. The results show that the four most common Swedish modal particles, *ju*, *väl*, *nu*, and *nog*, appear in 25% of lines in a sample of 50,700. The corresponding number for Awetí clause marking is 92% in a sample of 20,985 lines. Using a word count, Swedish modal particles make up around 2.5% of all tokens, while Awetí clause markers constitute around 15%, or every sixth word, a result that aligns with the label "clause marking" in that the markers accompany most clauses, either separately or combined. The distributional comparison between Swedish and Awetí is not to be taken as a diagnostic for the grammatical status of the two types of markers, but may illustrate how markers that appear highly similar in meaning may serve different discourse functions.

Clause marking in Awetí appears to share several features with the well-studied modal particles of Germanic languages. At the same time, clause markers are much more frequent than modal particles, suggesting a higher functional load despite their non-obligatoriness, a feature that is a consequence of modifying an utterance on the illocutionary level. Illocutionary modification is discussed further in Sections 4 and 5.

3.4 Complex epistemic perspective in Kogi

In Kogi, a language spoken by around 10,000 people in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta region of northern Colombia, there is a form of epistemic marking with finite auxiliary verbs that

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8 A line in the “Samtal i Göteborg” corpus corresponds roughly to a turn, which means that there is only a superficial correspondence between line and clause. As stated, this is an impressionistic estimation of occurrences.

9 One reviewer commented on the distributional differences between modal and “clause” markers as indicative of socio-cultural differences in terms of “society of strangers” vs. “society of intimates” (Givón 2002). While the present investigation considers this a possibility, it is not possible to pursue a discussion of the effects of such societal differences on grammatical sub-systems in the present discussion due to space restrictions.

10 The Kogi data discussed in this paper was gathered during three trips to the field in Santa Marta between 2009 and 2013. The examples included here are elicited utterances aimed to resemble a “minimal pair” contrast in order to highlight the meaning feature under discussion. While the analysis of the Kogi system remains tentative awaiting a more comprehensive documentation of the language, it should be mentioned that other researchers also have noted the function and meaning of the forms under discussion (see e.g. Hensarling 1991; Ortiz
signals the simultaneous, epistemic perspectives of the speech participants. In Bergqvist (2016) this is called “complex epistemic perspective” (cf. “multiple perspective”, Evans 2005). The epistemic component of these markers concerns the attention, knowledge, expectations, beliefs, and opinions of a speaker who commits to some state-of-affairs. Complex epistemic perspective-marking consists of a set of five prefixes found with the finite auxiliary verb, which are divided into *speaker-perspective*, *addressee-perspective*, and *non-speech participant perspective* forms. Consider example (11) featuring the speaker-perspective forms *ni*- and *na*-

(11) a. *kwisa-té ni-nu(k)-kú*
   dance-IMPF SPKR.SYM-be.loc-1S
   ‘I’m dancing (evidently).’ (BUN_090824)

b. *kwisa-té na-nu(k)-kú*
   dance-IMPF SPKR.ASYM-be.loc-1S
   ‘I was dancing (not presently).’ (JM_130618)

The sentence in (11a) portrays the speaker performing an “observable action” (i.e. the act of dancing), as stated by the speaker. This act is assumed to be open to observation by the addressee and is therefore marked by the speaker symmetric form *ni*. (11a) could e.g. be uttered when the addressee comes into a room where the speaker is dancing. (11b) by contrast, requires a change in the context of the utterance, such as dancing in a separate room from the addressee, or dancing while talking to the addressee over the phone. The past tense reading in (11b) is provided in the absence of a specific context for the utterance, but is defeasible and not an encoded feature of the form (see Bergqvist 2016). It would be incongruent to use the speaker asymmetric *na* in an utterance denoting a (present) public act that is open to observation and comment by the addressee. As shown in (12), such use can convey an assumption on behalf of the speaker that the addressee has failed to notice something that should be obvious:

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Ricaurte 1994, Olaya Perdomo 2000). Several speakers have contributed with data and commentary regarding the meaning and use of forms. The examples are referenced using an abbreviation of the speaker’s name and the date of the recording session. A more comprehensive account of Kogi epistemic marking is in Bergqvist (2016).
The meaning contrast between **ni-**/*na-* in terms of (a)symmetry is reflected in the two addressee-perspective forms **shi-** and **sha-**. The former, **shi-**, may be compared to a “tag” or some other rhetorical device, where there is a high degree of expectation attached to an utterance that has the function of a question but the form of a statement. **sha-**, on the other hand, is reserved for utterances that concern the (private) inner states of the addressee; these are restricted with regard to explicit assumptions from the perspective of the speaker. Consider example (13):

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<td><strong>shi-</strong>-ba-láw</td>
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<td>2S.IND</td>
<td>dance-IMPF</td>
<td>ADR.SYM-2S-be</td>
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<td></td>
<td>‘You are dancing (you look like you are)?’</td>
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<td>b.</td>
<td>nas</td>
<td>hanchibé</td>
<td>**sha-**kwísatuk-(k)u</td>
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<td>1S.IND</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>ADR.ASYM-dance=be.loc-1S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘I am dancing well (in your opinion)?’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(BUN_090824)

Example (13a) concerns the presently observable actions of the addressee and encodes symmetric access like **ni-**, but with a focus on the addressee’s perspective. (13b), by contrast, requests the opinion of the addressee concerning the speaker’s dance performance (as signaled by subject person), signaling asymmetric access from the addressee’s perspective. **shi-** and **sha-** emphasize the epistemic perspective of the addressee and are therefore called “addressee-perspective” forms. The circumstances for their use may be compared to that of the speaker-perspective forms, as detailed above. The non-speech participant form **ska(n)**-signals ‘doubt’, or ‘uncertainty’, and is mostly found with utterances that refer to the actions and intentions of third parties as in (14):
(14) nak $\textit{ska(n)}$-gua-li
come NSP-do-FUT

'He may come.' (Olaya Perdomo 2000: 784 [my translation])

Utterances like (14) are not designed to elicit an answer from the addressee; it is perfectly acceptable to “reply” to an utterance such as (14), by also using $\textit{ska(n)}$-, as illustrated by the exchange in (15):

(15) A: yuri $\textit{nei-hi}$ $\textit{ska}$-gua-tôx
PN go-PRS.PRTC NSP-do-PROG

'(I don’t know if )Yuri is going?'

B: saki $\textit{ska}$-gua-tôx
what NSP-do-PROG

'(I don’t know) what he is doing [let’s ask him].'

(ARR_120515)

The use of the terms speaker-perspective, addressee-perspective and non-speech participant perspective is functionally and formally motivated. Firstly, the markers are paradigmatic in the sense that they occupy a privileged position with the auxiliary verb, a property that separates them from other TAM qualifications (Bergqvist 2016). Complex epistemic perspective-marking is also only possible in declarative contexts (i.e. may not combine with the interrogative suffix -$e$), thereby putting into doubt a competing declarative/interrogative labeling of forms. The definition of meaning properties inherent to the forms focuses on their encoded content. This consists of the binary contrast between shared/non-shared and the choice of perspective to either originate with the speaker or the addressee, as visible in the glossing of the forms. Comparisons to more familiar constructions like tag-questions and rhetorical devices are functional analogies used to illustrate how the forms may be used, not to define their semantic properties.
The Kogi CEP-markers are analyzed as illocutionary modifiers based on the observation that the markers are entirely non-propositional with scope over all other grammatical categories (see Section 4 and 5, below). Complex epistemic perspective-marking does not signal a certain speech act, but modifies it by situating the perspectives of the speech participants with respect to one another. The markers encode a modification of the communicative intentions of the speaker to accommodate the view of the addressee in the negotiation of interactive positions.

The speaker’s calculation that motivates the use of one of the available markers consists of a context-dependent estimation regarding the attention and knowledge-state of the addressee, but also depends on what has been called “information status” (cf. Heritage 2012) and “territory of information” (Kamio 1997) where one speech participant may be more entitled to knowledge of some state-of-affairs than the other. This conventionalized component of what a speaker is allowed to assume and comment on, is most evident with the sha-form, which is more restricted distributionally than the corresponding speaker-perspective na-. The interdependent processes of alignment between the contextually situated estimation of the addressee’s attention and the status of information results in an adopted speaker-stance vis-à-vis the addressee and the eventuality talked about.

Epistemic marking systems whose primary function is to signal the perspectives of the speech participants with regard to some event raise the question of how they relate to evidentiality. While evidentiality mostly has been compared to (and separated from) epistemic modality in terms of “degree of certainty”, it is argued here that some attested features of evidential systems relate them to lesser-described epistemic marking strategies that focus on the distribution of knowledge between the speech-participants.

4. Illocutionary modification as epistemic marking

The Kogi forms in the previous section were analyzed as illocutionary modifiers and in this section we take a closer look at how this notion has been used in the analysis of epistemic expressions. Faller (2002, 2003) argues that Cuzco Quechua evidentials should be analyzed as illocutionary modifiers “which add to, or modify the sincerity conditions of the act they apply to” (Faller 2002: v-vi). She uses a speech-act theoretical approach to analyze the three forms -mi (‘direct’), -si (‘reportative’), and -chá (‘inferential/conjectural’), and concludes that these have no influence on the propositional content of the utterance that they modify. The scope
properties of Cuzco Quechua reportative evidentials are in line with this analysis (cf. Faller 2003).  

Faller is not alone in analyzing evidentials as illocutionary modifiers. Hengeveld & Dall’Aglio Hattnher (forthcoming) propose a division of evidentials into four types based on data from 64 native languages of Brazil; ‘reportativity’, ‘inference’, ‘deduction’, and ‘event perception’. These four types are defined by their scope properties and are consequently placed on separate semantic layers. Reportativity is placed on the “interpersonal” level as a marker of communicated content. The other three evidentials are analyzed as “representational” level markers and are as such part of the proposition. Hengeveld & Dall’Aglio Hattnher propose that event perception, deduction, and inference are hierarchically ordered within the representational level, allowing a marker to acquire the value (and scope) of the one to the right of it, thus predicting that a visual evidential may come to signal (visual) inference. The separation between the representative (propositional) and the interpersonal (illocutionary) level, also allows for unidirectional transfers, where a representational marker may become an interpersonal marker. The unique status of the reportative (being on the interpersonal level) is that it may occur with any speech-act and takes scope over all other categories, in agreement with Faller (2003). A detailed discussion of scope as an important feature of the proposal in Section 5 is postponed to that section.

For evidentiality and related forms of epistemic marking that were introduced in Section 3, above, we may ask what illocutionary modification instantiates in the different systems. Functional grammar posits the grammatical function of “illocutionary satellite” for expressions and forms that “specify or modify the illocutionary value of the clause” (Dik 1997: 304; cf. Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008). This grammatical function is well illustrated by modal particles in German and other Germanic languages, including Swedish (e.g. König et al. 1990; Abraham & Leiss 2012; Lindström 2008). Proposals to explain their functional properties have been put forth that assigns them a grammatical status as illocutionary satellites. Jacobs (1991) analyzes modal particles in German as “modifiers of the illocutionary type”, a proposal that allows for

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11 Boye (2012) points out deficiencies in Faller’s analysis that concern the formulation of claims regarding scope properties of evidentials in Cuzco Quechua. While Boye clearly has a point in this critique, it does not undo the central claims of Faller’s argument, which is to point out (grammatical) scope differences in evidential systems and place Cuzco Quechua evidentials on a grammatical tier above the proposition. The arguments presented by Faller to support her claims in this regard are convincing and although some of the tests used to pin-point scope differences are problematic, they do not negate her overall claims.
the notion of illocutionary modification to be applied to functionally equivalent forms, and is as such not restricted to modal particles *per se* (Waltereit 2001: 1394).

However, the concept of illocutionary modification remains vague with respect to what aspects of the speech act are subject to modification. For a finer granularity of meaning accompanying this notion, we may turn to the pragmatic concept of "speech-act mitigation" in an effort to account for epistemic marking strategies that are analyzed as illocutionary modifiers (see Section 3.4). Holmes (1984: 346-347) follows Frazer in defining *mitigation* of illocutionary force as something that is found in speech-acts that are "unwelcome to the hearer". However, she also proposes an opposite strategy, namely the "boosting" of illocutionary force. Thus, according to Holmes, modification of the speech act "involves increasing or decreasing the strength with which the illocutionary point is presented.". How, then, is the concept of "softening" (mitigating/attenuating) and "boosting" the illocutionary force of an utterance relevant to epistemic marking strategies?

Holmes list two reasons for the need to modify illocutionary force, namely in order to "convey modal meaning or the speaker’s attitude to the content of the proposition" and "to express affective meaning or the speaker’s attitude to the addressee in the context of utterance." (348, [my italics]). Crucially, the speaker chooses either strategy based on assumptions of how the utterance is going to be received by the addressee, thereby situating the force of the utterance at an appropriate level depending on what is being said and the identity of the addressee.

Holmes proposes a division into *speaker* and *hearer-oriented* boosters/softeners for which different structural devices (prosodical, lexical, syntactic) are associated. Identified lexical resources are mostly modal expressions that figure in investigations of epistemic modality. Examples of speaker-oriented boosters are *in my opinion* and *I’m certain*; addressee-oriented boosters are *of course* and *as you know*; speaker-oriented downtoners (i.e. softeners) are *in my opinion* and *I suppose*; addressee-oriented downtoners are *you know* and *if you like*. From these few examples it is evident that mitigating and boosting expressions directed at the speaker him/herself as well as the addressee, overlap a great deal with expressions that have been analyzed as English equivalents of modal particles in Germanic languages, such as Swedish (see Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 182, for a discussion of the correspondence between Swedish *ju* [Ger. *ja*] and English *of course*). It is also apparent that
the context is the deciding factor in labeling an expression (e.g. *in my opinion*) as booster or softener.\textsuperscript{12}

If we consider the general pragmatic strategy of mitigation as a form of modification of illocutionary force, we may observe that a language like Kogi encodes differences in access to information, analyzable as access (a)symmetries. In Holmes investigation of pragmatic mitigation strategies in English, this defining meaning component is suggested by the lexical forms identified, e.g. *as you know, in my opinion*, along with a number of co-dependent notions that may be drawn from an instance of communicative interaction (e.g. counter assertion, acknowledgement, agreement, etc.). A reduced set of encoded meaning-components in conventionalized resources for illocutionary modification is to be expected. This point has also been raised in the discussion of evidentiality and is reflected in the “narrow”/”wide” dichotomy (cf. Willett 1988). Grammaticalized forms display a more restricted number of encoded meaning components when compared to lexical means for stating “the same thing”. Such grammaticalized forms may, however, also convey additional meaning. In example (12) from Kogi (repeated here) the co-presence of attitudinal and epistemic meaning is seen in the use of *na-*:

\begin{verbatim}
(12) (nas) kwisa-nuk-ku-gé na-klá
   1S.IND   dance-PROG-1S-HAB   SPKR.ASYM-be

   ‘I am dancing! (don’t disturb me)’ (ARR_120520; CM_130621)
\end{verbatim}

The conveyed meaning of “speaker’s impatience” is not an encoded feature of the form, but is produced by using the speaker asymmetric *na-* in a context where asymmetric access in unexpected and un-wanted from the speaker’s perspective. Example (12) thus illustrates the link between pragmatic mitigation strategies and a more strictly defined notion such as knowledge asymmetry, as encoded in *na-*.

\textsuperscript{12} It is clear that an expression like “in my opinion” can be used as a “booster” to assert the speaker’s point of view in the face of a contradictory stance by someone else (e.g. the addressee). An example could be constructed where A and B are discussing a course of action and A comments on a proposal put forth by B by saying “In my opinion, that is not an option.”. Conversely, A might use the same expression as a “softener”: “In my opinion, another course of action would be possible.” The context and the expressed stances of the speech participants are the deciding factors when it comes to interpreting the use of an expression like “in my opinion” as a “softener” or a “booster”,
Given the aim of the present paper, which is to relate attested forms of epistemic marking such as evidentiality to systems that primarily attend to the inter-personal distribution of knowledge, observations regarding illocutionary modification strategies found in work by Holmes (1984) and Jacobs (1991) appear as useful starting points for the discussion. In the following section, a functional domain is proposed where categories such as evidentiality and complex epistemic perspective occupy distinct, but connected spaces.

5. The functional domain of ‘epistemic perspective’
Givón (1981) proposes the concept of “functional domain” in an effort to explore the prerequisites for typological comparison of syntactic structures (see also Givón 2001). This notion may be viewed as a tool to distinguish and relate individual functions, and in this case, meaning dimensions, to larger conceptual structures that house several functions/features, and which may also be located on separate layers of meaning, as well as intersect with other domains. This section outlines a functional domain called “epistemic perspective”. The reason for naming the proposed domain as such follows from the specific aim of the present paper, viz. to relate an epistemic marking strategy such as the one found in Kogi to available descriptions of evidentials on the assumption that they share a functional space in the grammar of languages that feature such systems. We propose this domain partly on formal grounds, i.e. the existence of distinct forms of epistemic marking, such as evidentiality, but also based on the uncontroversial observation that a speaker of any language can adopt different perspectives with regard to his/her interlocutors and information/knowledge (cf. ‘stance’, Du Bois 2007; Mushin 2001). The categories and expressions that were detailed in Sections 2 and 3 constitute the background for the discussion in this section, which focuses on aspects of meaning that define the proposed domain.

The cross-linguistically attested form-function correspondence between grammatical operators of tense, aspect, mood, evidentiality, and speech-act (e.g. Bybee 1985; Foley & Van Valin 1984) serves as a starting point for the present proposal. The strong tendency for verbal operators/inflections to be placed in an order that reflects their scope properties supports the formulation of the proposed domain. A tense marker, for example, is expected to occur closer to the verb stem than an epistemic modal marker. Cinque (1999) provides the following cross-linguistically grounded schematization of verbal operators starting from the outermost operator (wide scope) to the one closest to the stem (narrow scope):
Figure 1. The order of grammatical operators on the verb (after Cinque 1999: 55)

\[
\text{Mood}_{\text{Speech-act}} > \text{Mood}_{\text{Evaluative}} > \text{Mood}_{\text{Evidential}} > \text{Modality}_{\text{Epistemic}} > \text{Tense}_{\text{Past}} > \text{Tense}_{\text{Future}} > \\
\text{Modality}_{\text{Root}}/\text{Tense}_{\text{Anterior}} > \text{Aspect}_{\text{Perfect}} > \text{Aspect}_{\text{Progressive}}/\text{Aspect}_{\text{Completive}} > \text{Voice}
\]

From the schematization in Figure 1, we may observe that speech-act markers are placed at the edge of the verb/clause, a position that is iconic to the wide scope properties of such markers. There is also a tendency for evidentials to be placed outside of epistemic modals, although this will to some degree depend on the kind of evidential. As stated in Section 4, a reportative evidential commonly has wider scope than a direct, sensory evidential, which by comparison is expected to occur closer to the verb stem. A comparable (but distinct) differentiation is found with modals where root modals are found closer to the stem than epistemic ones. Essentially, a form that has wide scope properties interacts very weakly with the propositional content of the clause and remains unaffected by changes to other categorical markers that have a more narrow scope and are closer to the verbal core.

The precise properties of markers with wide scope are difficult to test in terms of how the propositional content of a clause is affected by the presence of the marker. For example, a marker that does not signal a certain sentence-type, but which is restricted to appear with a certain sentence-type, such as the German modal particle *ja*, arguably has illocutionary scope in that it allows for a modification of the sentence-type and the speech-acts associated with it. Such markers function as a "meta-commentary" to the proposition, but in a way that differs from some reported speech markers that are unaffected by changes to sentence-type and thus may be regarded as having scope over sentence-type. There is thus a multi-layered structure to the illocution (or the "interpersonal" level in Hengeveld's terms) as well.

The dimensions of meaning that form part of the proposed functional domain are in Figure 2. These correspond to categorical labels that are provided along with the primary notional label:
Figure 2. Dimensions of the ‘epistemic perspective’ domain

**SCOPE**

(wide)

- **KNOWLEDGE (A)SYMMETRY**
- **SPEAKER-HEARER LINKS**
- **SPEAKER INVOLVEMENT**
- **INFORMATION SOURCE**
- **POSSIBILITY**

(narrow)

- **NECESSITY**

Complex epistemic perspective (CEP)
Illocution Modality
Egophoricity
Evidentiality
Epistemic Modality

The feature that shapes the ordering of notions and corresponding categories in Figure 2 is scope, thus building on the cross-linguistic observations regarding scope properties of verbal operators. The placement of ‘possibility’/’necessity’ and ‘information source’ follows this postulated order and may prototypically be regarded as propositional operators. However, an increase in the scope of a marker is equivalent to a drift towards illocutionary status, where some evidentials are analyzed as propositional and others as illocutionary (cf. Hengeveld 2004, Section 4, above). ‘Knowledge asymmetry’, as instantiated by the Kogi data, is hypothesized to be a form of illocutionary modifier with wide scope properties and should according to the same hierarchical ordering be placed on the level of the speech-act operators. This positioning is also hypothesized to apply to ‘speaker-hearer links’ (modal particles). ‘Speaker involvement’ (egophoricity) is placed above evidentiality, given the sensitivity that markers belonging to this notion have to sentence-type and subject person.\(^{13}\)

The ordering of dimensions/categories along a continuum defined by scope, suggests a minimal overlap between epistemic modality on the one end, and complex epistemic perspective on the other. The ‘epistemic perspective’-domain, however, provides a bridge between these seemingly disparate categories and also suggests possible pathways of grammaticalization, although the details of such diachronic developments await more work on how e.g. CEP-marking in Kogi compares to similar systems in other languages (see Section 13)

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\(^{13}\) As stated in Section 2.3, it is not entirely clear that egophoric marking constitutes a category separate from evidentiality, although there certainly are arguments in favor of this view. Egophoricity is included here due to (partly) differing properties in egophoric markers as compared to evidentials, but also because of an increased focus on the speaker-addressee nexus as part of the encoded meaning of forms.
Observations that appear relevant in this regard are provided by Traugott & Dasher (2002) who argue for “intersubjectification” as a process of grammaticalization that consists of a gradual development from a subjective perspective to an intersubjective one, which includes attention to the perspective of the addressee. The intersubjectification of the speaker’s (subjective) perspective could be applied to analyzing the reportative forms in Southeastern Tepehuan, which have developed an intersubjective meaning component (known vs. unknown to the addressee) while sharing an identical evidential value. The positioning of epistemic notions along the domain continuum should therefore include the parameter of epistemic perspective, which may be present in evidentials, but which is defining of a category like CEP-marking.

Figure 3, below, adds the notion of perspective to a speaker’s evaluation in terms of possibility/necessity (epistemic modality), a perceiver’s source of information (evidentiality), a speaker’s involvement (egophoricity), and a speaker’s assumptions regarding the perspective of the addressee (illocutionary modality/CEP). The exact positioning of the categories within the domain may be adjusted according to language specific analyses of forms and is meant as a starting point subject to empirical evaluation:

Figure 3. Epistemic categories in the ‘epistemic perspective’ domain continuum

\[ \text{SPEAKER-PERSPECTIVE} \quad \longleftrightarrow \quad \text{SPEAKER-ADDRESSEE-PERSPECTIVE} \]

\[ \text{ILLOCUTIONARY LEVEL OF MEANING} \]

\[ \text{EPITHETIC MODALITY} \quad \text{EGOPHORICITY} \quad \text{ILLOCUTIONARY MODALITY} \quad \text{CEP} \]

\[ \text{PROPOSITIONAL LEVEL OF MEANING} \]

The two criteria used for positioning the dimension points of the domain in Figure 3 are then: 1) meaning-level assignment in terms of propositional vs. illocutionary meaning (vertical), and 2) the semantic component of a single/complex perspective(s) (horizontal). The combination...
of these parameters results in a two-dimensional space where attested forms of epistemic marking may be placed.

Scope properties associated with the categories that form part of the proposed functional domain are the following: epistemic modality and evidentiality display relatively narrow scope and sometimes scope under negation (Lee 2006: 246; Aikhenvald 2004: 96-97, 256). Indeed, negation is sometimes analyzed as a form of modality, suggesting a partial overlap between the two categories. Egophoric marking has not been attested to scope under negation, to my knowledge, and while the notion of speaker-involvement sometimes results from the use of direct evidentials in utterances with first person subjects (see Curnow 2002b, 2003), this is a pragmatic inference in such systems, whereas it is encoded in egophoric marking. The speaker's involvement as defining of egophoric marking arguably has scope over 'person' by signaling a first or second person participant, depending on sentence-type (see Section 2.3). Epistemic modals and evidentials do not necessarily interact in a comparable way with the category of person.

Modal particles and CEP-markers have scope over all other categories. In Example (16) from Kogi, the marker na- ('speaker asymmetric') has scope over both modality and negation, as instantiated by -gasā:

(16)  
kába-gasā  na-ba-kú  
sleep-NEG.POT  SPKR.ASYM-2S-do  
‘You can’t sleep anymore.’ (because I say so, or for reasons unknown to you)  
(ARR_120520)

In (16), the negated part of the utterance is the event of sleeping, and not the speaker's expressed assumption that this is information exclusive to the speaker. -gasā does therefore not scope over the speaker asymmetric na-. Other traditional scope tests such as ambiguity in wh-questions and embedding in conditional sentences (see Bosse et al. 2012; Faller 2003) are not applicable to CEP-marking because the markers only occur on finite auxiliaries and in declarative constructions; CEP-markers do not permit embedding and are excluded from occurring in interrogative sentences (Bergqvist 2016). This is, however, an interesting fact in

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14 “The murder didn’t have to take place in the study. It could have happened in the garage.” is an example sentence provided by Lee to illustrate how the epistemic modal use of have to may scope under negation.
itself, since the function of the CEP-markers to produce different speech-acts, such as requests and questions in Example (13); statements in Example (11); and exclamatives in Example (12) while remaining declarative by form, could be used as an argument that CEP-marking scopes over sentence type (i.e. speech act mood, see Figure 1, above). If a distinction should be made between modal particles and CEP-marking, it is not primarily in terms of scope differences, but the obligatory presence of two perspectives. While some, but not all, modal particles feature this meaning component it is a systematic feature of CEP-marking.

Figure 3 illustrates the correlation between meaning-level assignment (as iconic to the scope properties of forms) and epistemic perspective-taking. Note that these dimensions of meaning are not defining of the categories that are positioned within the domain; these have been previously defined as encoding different aspects of the speaker’s epistemic perspective (see Sections 2 and 3). The attention to propositional/illocutionary meaning and simple/complex perspective in the present proposal stems from a desire to situate CEP-marking in Kogi to a better explored notion like evidentiality by attending to aspects of meaning that allow for a comparison between systems. While the two dimensions that define Figure 3 are not defining of e.g. evidentiality, they are applicable to the analysis of that category. This observation entails a hierarchical structure to the separate categories where certain aspects of meaning may be present, but subordinate to the primary, defining meaning. The primary meaning of the discussed categories is explicitly stated in Figure 2. Under-specified features of meaning that may play a role in comparing these epistemic marking systems are e.g. the presence of more than one perspective in evidentials systems, the “degree of certainty” in egophoric marking, or “type of access” in epistemic modals. Such meaning features may be implied or attributed to pragmatic circumstances, but are nevertheless possible to accommodate under the notion of epistemic perspective.

6. Summary and conclusions

The speaker’s positioning of the epistemic perspectives belonging to the speech participants is an important but elusive part of grammar. The pragmatic consideration of “who-knows-what” is deeply rooted in the inter-personal context, and while it is evident that there are resources

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15 The dimension points represented by categorical labels could e.g. be subject to fewer groupings. Epistemic modality, evidentiality, and egophoricity could make up one “point” and modal particles and CEP-marking, make up a second grouping. One reason for lumping epistemic modality, evidentiality, and egophoricity together would be that it is not an uncontested fact that they possess defining differences in their respective scope properties. However, the present paper argues that they do (see Section 4).
on all levels of grammar that attend to this, it is far from clear what role different contextual considerations play, or what aspects of epistemology are encoded in a given grammatical structure. An important point raised in the present paper is that some languages express the intersubjective positioning of knowledge through grammatical means and that this consideration is distinct from subjective qualifications such as epistemic modality, which so far has received most of the attention in the literature. Observations to the effect that evidentials allow for perceiver-shifts and that illocutionary meaning is relevant to their analysis raises the possibility that evidentiality and the related category of egophoricity are bridging dimensions between epistemic modality and complex epistemic marking systems where the epistemic dimension is defined as a form of illocutionary modification with asymmetric access to knowledge as its core meaning-feature.

This paper has demonstrated that evidential systems attend to (assumptions about) the perspective of the addressee in different ways; some encode this in declarative forms, i.e. “shared knowledge”-markers; in other systems, evidential forms are placed in interrogative contexts where a perceiver-shift results from a change of sentence-type rather than the evidential value itself. Some evidential systems have been analyzed in terms of illocutionary modification with little propositional interference resulting from the presence of a specific evidential marker. This is not the case for all evidential systems, but there is reason to consider evidentiality as a multi-level system where e.g. direct perception-markers are propositional and reportatives are illocutionary.

A related kind of epistemic marking is found in Kogi, which emphasizes a separation between the perspective of the speaker and the perspective of the addressee in terms of access (a)symmetries. The analysis of the system in Kogi parallels other attested qualification systems found in Andoke (Landaburu 2007) and Southern Nambikwara (Kroeker 2001), and shares functional motivations with modal particles in some Germanic languages and “clause marking” in Awetí (Drude 2005).

Having established that an intersubjective configuration of the “ground” is relevant to analyzing some evidential and complex epistemic perspective systems, the claim was put forth that a grammaticalized form of illocutionary modification primarily expresses (a)symmetries in knowledge access, leaving other contextually salient parameters aside. A final proposal outlined ‘epistemic perspective’ as a functional domain in an effort to relate the different
categories (dimensions) to each other. While the proposal must be regarded as tentative, it serves as an invitation for empirical evaluation and may ultimately reveal meaningful patterns of inter-categorical positioning and correspondences between grammatical status and functional load in a categorical expression.

The analysis of some evidentials (and evidential systems) as illocutionary modifiers allows for a comparison to complex epistemic perspective-marking in Kogi. However, this raises questions about the role and status of speech-act distinctions in such systems; it appears that a definition of what counts as an interrogative from the point of view of language use is essential to mapping out available strategies for epistemic perspective-shifts and placing these on an appropriate level of grammar.

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**Abbreviations:**

1, first person; 2, second person; 3, third person; ABL, ablative; ADR, addressee perspective; ASYM, asymmetric; C, current evidence; CM.1, clause marker 1; CM.2, clause marker 2; COND, conditional; DAT, dative; DECL, declarative; DEM, demonstrative; DEP, dependent; DER, derived; DIM, diminutive; DUB, dubitative; DUR, durative; EGO, egophoric; FNS, final nominal suffix; FOC, focus; FUT, future; GKN, general knowledge evidential; HAB, habitual; IMPF, imperfective; INCP, inceptive; IND, independent; INF, infinitive; IRR, irrealis; LINK, linker; LOC, locative; MP, modal particle; NEG, negative; NOM, nominalizer; NON.EGO, non-egophoric; NSP, non-speech participant perspective; NVIS, non-visual evidential; O, object; OBLIG, obligation; OBS, observation; OR, orientation prefix; P, previous evidence; PFV, perfective; PL, (generic) plural; PN, person name; POT, potential; PROG, progressive; PRS, present; PRTC, participial; PS, possessive; PST, past; Q, interrogative marker, REDUP, reduplicative; REV, reverential; RS, reported speech evidential; S, subject; SNS, sensory; SOC, socialis; SPKR, speaker perspective; SYM, symmetric; VIS, visual evidential