Denna digitala version är tillgängliggjord av Stockholms universitetsbibliotek efter avtal med upphovsmannen, eller i förekommande fall då upphovsrätten har upphört. Får användas i enlighet med gällande lagstiftning.

This digital version is provided by the Stockholm University Library in agreement with the author(s) or, when applicable, its copyright has expired.
May be used according to current laws.

Stockholms
universitet

G.Dahl

SUFFERING GRASS

**Subsistence and Society
of Waso Borana**

Suffering Grass

Subsistence and society of Waso Borana

Akademisk avhandling som för
avläggande av Filosofie doktorsexamen vid
Stockholms universitet, offentligen
försvaras i hörsal 9, hus D, Frescati,
lördagen den 10 november 1979
kl 10.00

av

Gudrun Dahl

fil. kand.

Socialantropologiska institutionen, Stockholm 1979

Abstract

This study is concerned with a Cushitic pastoral people, the Waso Borana, who live in the dry lands of northern Kenya. It is organized according to two major themes. The first concerns primarily the conditions for animal husbandry in the area, its organization and consequences for social structure. Both male and female perspectives are accounted for. The second theme concerns local effects of two major changes: a) the integration of the Borana community into the independent Kenyan political and economic structure; and b) a severe cut in the primary subsistence resources (livestock, pastures and labour) which followed the secessionist so called *shifty* war during the 1960s.

The basic aim of the study is to draw attention to the extent to which the integration into a wider political and economic context has changed the opportunity structure of various sections of the society in a way that has led to a more marked internal social stratification. One expression of this development process is the fact that also the ability to withstand the hazards of animal husbandry have become unequally distributed. Any attempt to distinguish between groups which might be termed more or less traditional or to establish regional boundaries within the Waso society as a whole would be artificial and would prevent a proper understanding of the dynamics of social life and the processes of change affecting it.

SUFFERING GRASS

Subsistence and Society
of Waso Borana

Gudrun Dahl

Stockholm Studies in
Social Anthropology

STOCKHOLM STUDIES IN SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY

© Gudrun Dahl 1979

Cover and illustrations by the author

Department of Social Anthropology, University of
Stockholm

All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof,
may not be reproduced in any form without written
permission of the author.

ISBN 91 85284-14-9

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Preface	7
1. Introduction	9
The study of East African pastoralism	11
The Waso people and their background	16
<u>Gada</u> and Boran ethnography	19
A community undergoing change	21
PART I: A PASTORAL PEOPLE	29
2. Three with sweet milk	30
The climate of Waso	30
The alternatives to pastoralism	31
A changing subsistence economy	34
Production and reproduction under uncertain conditions	39
Adaptive mobility	40
Subsidiary strategies of risk-reduction	49
3. The rhythm of pastoral life	56
A day in Sora's camp	57
The change of seasons	62
4. Livestock and labour	68
Household viability	69
Task-sets in Boran production	71
The family of Qadubo Korreisa - a case	72
The importance of a large family	75
The dominance of domestic labour	76
Solutions to unviability	79
Tacho and Gababo - a case	79
Labour margins and protection	81
5. From herding to husbandry - the road to elderhood	88
Realms of decision making	88
Building up a herd	92
Marriage and the delay of autonomy	99
Fathers, sons and property	101
Wards, guardians and property	105

	Page
The client son-in-law	107
Resources and control in the male sphere	109
6. Mothers and milk-managers	113
The female sphere in livestock management	113
A cow to milk...	116
...and children to nurse	121
Post-marital life	126
Child care in old age	131
Sexual stratification: a summary	133
7. Kin and camp	137
Introduction	137
Camp cooperation	140
The development of Ola Ilman Kotele - a case	143
The background of the core family	143
Nyencho the brother-in-law	146
Abdi the clansman	147
Gurach and Dima	147
Waqo	148
The ideal of fraternal co-residence	149
Clanship and residence patterns	150
Friends-in-law	153
Chains, moieties and network clusters	158
Conclusion	164
8. Resources and redistribution	167
The ethos of egalitarianism	167
Control over vital resources	169
Alternative objects of investment	170
The nature of wealth	171
Forms of redistribution	172
Taka: the Muslim "tax"	175
The criterion of capital care	176
Giving and getting	180
Bigmanship and title	183
Conclusion	185
PART II: STRATIFICATION THROUGH INTEGRATION	189
9. Becoming Kenyans - the history of integration	190

	Page
Colonialism at the periphery	191
Early administration and the growth of market towns	192
A market for livestock	195
The creation of a new elite	198
The <u>shifta</u> conflict	200
Post- <u>shifta</u> trade	204
10. The new economy of Waso	210
Taking a job	211
Digging a garden	213
New forms of diversification	214
The combination of "élite" assets	219
Borana as traders	220
The emergence of a salariat	224
Politico-administrative resources	226
Stabilized inequality	227
11. Patterns of modern leadership	231
Clanship and the structural heritage	231
Affinity and political support	235
The cultural model of leadership	237
Patronage	239
12. Town life	245
A pastoral centre	246
The town wives	248
In the <u>manyattas</u>	250
13. Conclusion	254
Differentiation and stratification	254
A peripheral élite	256
The pastoralists as peasants?	257
A shrinking resource base	259
Pastoralism at a loss	261
Appendix 1 In the field	266
Appendix 2 Details of clan structure	269
Appendix 3 Glossary of indigeneous terms	271
Bibliography	273
Index	281

<u>LIST OF MAPS</u>	Page
1.1: The Waso area	10
1.2: Borana and other ethnic groups mentioned in the text	14
1.3: Borana and Oromo in Kenya and Ethiopia	17
1.4: Abyssinian expansion and colonial powers in the Horn of Africa	24
2.1: Boran grazing lands	46
9.1: Cattle trade from or via Isiolo District	196
9.2: "Northern Frontier District" and pre- <u>shifta</u> limits of Somali areas	202
10.1: Some directions of Boran labour migrations	212

<u>LIST OF TABLES</u>	
2.1: Total annual rainfall	30
5.1: Concepts for herd units	94
6.1: Sources of a Boran woman's milking rights	122
7.1: The internal differentiation of a camp	139
8.1: Normative rules for gifts of <u>Taka</u>	175

<u>LIST OF FIGURES</u>	
4a: The family of Qadubo Korreisa	73
4b: Relations between size of domestic group and herd size	82
5a: Sub-divisions of Godo Golo's herd	96
7a: Adult "owners" of stock in the corrals of Ola Ilman Kotele and their relations to corral heads	143
7b: Outlay of the Ola Ilman Kotele camp	144
7c: Hokkoba's homestead	145
7d: Nyencho's homestead	146
7e: Abdi's homestead	147
7f: Dima's homestead	148
7g: Waqo's homestead	148
7h: Bilateral joint family chain	158
7i: Moieties and bilateral family chains	160

PREFACE

This book is the outcome of research financed by the Scandinavian Institute for African Studies, The Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), the Swedish Research Council for Social Sciences and The Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries (SAREC). I would like to acknowledge my gratitude for generous assistance offered by all these agencies.

For intellectual stimulation I have enjoyed advice and encouragement from professor Karl Eric Knutsson, who has been my main tutor, and who, at an early stage in the development of our Department, directed our interests to local-level life conditions in the third and fourth world. I have also received many valuable comments from Ulf Hannerz, who, as its Acting Head, has continued to cultivate the Department's status as a free arena for many different schools of thought. A constant source of ideas and criticism has been my husband and sparring-partner Anders Hjort. His exceptional loyalty to the ideal of egalitarian marriage relations merits special mention. Without that, this work would probably have taken much longer time to carry through. During their sojourns at the Department, Robert Paine and Harald Eidheim have been of great help. Other friends who have devoted much time and energy to my manuscripts at different stages have been Gunilla Bjerén, Ann Lilljequist, Lasse Krantz, Irene Svensson, Aud Talle, Håkan Wahlquist and Wilhelm Östberg. Stephen Sandford of the Overseas Development Institute, London, has been a valuable sounding board for testing some of my thoughts.

During my stay in Kenya, the personnel of the Institute of Development Studies, University of Nairobi, the National Archives of Kenya and the office of SIDA contributed with substantial help. Jürg Mahner was instrumental in arousing my interest in the Isiolo area, and also, like Johan Sanne and Anders Karlsson, hospitably allowed me and my family to use his flat in Nairobi. In Isiolo, the company of Fatuma Sheikh Omar and her daughters has always offered me a pleasant retreat from the duties and strains of fieldwork.

Among those who have worked as my field assistants, I would particularly like to mention Adhan Fugicha Jillo and Fatuma Aga Holate as two very pleasant people with whom much of my fieldwork hardships have been shared. Abdi Boru Duba, Hassan Diba Miyo and Ismail Dadacha were also, during shorter

spells, very helpful in fieldwork. Apart from my assistants and their families, there are lots of Boran men and women whom I would have liked to mention individually for their great hospitality when I was in the field. However, it is impossible here to give proper thanks to all those who have become dear to me. Also, in the book, all names (except those of a few tribal leaders) have been fictionalized for the sake of personal integrity. For the same reason, I have chosen not to include any photographs.

I have been given invaluable help by Mrs Margaret Cornell who checked my Swenglish and edited the manuscript and by Harriet Palm who typed it.

The period during which I have worked with this book has been on the whole a very happy time. This is not least due to the cheering influence had on me by Viktor and Ivan, our children. It has, however, also been a time of great loss - that of some people who were close to me and to whom I would have liked to show the end result of my toil. In April 1979 my father Sven Dahl died, and so, in July, did my friend and teacher Erich Jacoby. Earlier I had received the news of the death of two people whom I, during my first fieldwork, had learnt to love and respect - aberra Tinde Halake and mwaliimu Gubala Adhan Roba. To their memory I dedicate this book.

Stockholm, in September, 1979

Gudrun Dahl

1. INTRODUCTION

In the arid lowlands just north and east of Mount Kenya, in an administrative part of Kenya called Isiolo District live the Waso Borana with their herds and flocks. Through the district flows the small river Euaso Nyiro, from which the Borana have taken the name they give to their area, Waso¹⁾. In years when the rains are good, the river floods its banks, destroying the irrigation channels dug by impoverished ex-pastoralists, but leaving the surrounding plains full of lush green pasture. When the rains fail, which happens every three to four years, the river turns into a tiny brook and may dry up altogether at its lower reaches. Only at its edges is coarse fodder then to be found for the cattle. North and south of the grassy floodplains are vast stretches of dry bush, arid lava fields and scorched grass

Map 1.1 The Waso area

savannah, where camels and goats browse all the year round and cattle and sheep also find good grazing in the wet seasons. The Borana are traditionally a semi-nomadic people living mainly on the produce of their livestock. This book is about them, their livelihood and their community and household life. At the same time, it has a wider aim, namely to portray how the local culture and community of the Borana are affected by externally generated changes, and the nature of these changes. Thus, while the analysis in the first part of the book is more ethnographically limited, dealing with conditions specific to the Borana, the second part is concerned with problems of a more generalised nature, parallels to which can probably be readily found in any pastoral society today.

THE STUDY OF EAST AFRICAN PASTORALISM

It was during the 1950s and early '60s that East African pastoralism became a subject for serious social anthropological research, if by that we mean research through a long period of close observation and participatory field-work. Studies of the Maasai, Turkana, Samburu, Borana, Somali and Karamojong were then undertaken by researchers such as Jacobs, Gulliver, Spencer, Baxter, Lewis and the Dyson-Hudsons²⁾. The work of these anthropologists not only yielded a lot of interesting regional ethnography, but also had a great impact on the general theoretical study of nomadism and pastoralism - together with the contributions made by Barth³⁾ in his studies of Iranian pastoralists, Stenning's⁴⁾ work on the Fulani of West Africa and Paine's⁵⁾ work among the Sami nomads in Scandinavia.

The period during which these researchers collected their data was one in which the livestock peoples of East Africa appeared to lead lives largely unaffected by the changes that in the colonial days had completely transformed social conditions in the nearby agricultural areas. The background of the anthropologists involved in British 'structure-functionalism' and American 'cultural ecology' also encouraged study which concentrated mainly on the local system of pastoralism as a self-contained system. Ecology became a prominent explanatory factor, partly perhaps because an ecological adaptation such as pastoralism appears to "limit and condition to a greater extent than does another adaptation such as agriculture"⁶⁾ and also because pastoralism in large areas of East Africa has remained the only possible form of resource extraction. However, as I and Anders Hjort have argued in Having Herds⁷⁾, the ecological understanding that has been assumed to be a basis for the analysis of East African pastoral society has often been of a rather shallow and schematic nature - the work by the Dyson-Hudson team⁸⁾

and by Torry⁹⁾ being important exceptions. There is still a need for much more research on the system of production practised in these societies. Nevertheless, in dealing with the lives of pastoralists today and the changes that they will undergo in the future, ecology can provide only partial answers to our questions. There is already considerable evidence that it is not so much ecological change in itself that causes crises in pastoral systems, but that political and economic changes frequently express themselves in ecological effects. Pastoral systems are no longer self-contained but are in a process of articulation with a multi-dimensional "western" capitalist economy. Asad¹⁰⁾ has suggested in a recent article that anthropologists should devote less attention to the differences between cultivators and pastoralists as such and concentrate more on the critical relationship between direct producers and those who appropriate or attempt to appropriate their surplus labour. Such an approach would reveal that in the present situation of expanding capitalism there is much more in common between free peasants and subsistence-oriented pastoralists than there is in differentiating them. This exhortation is well justified, for there seems to be no communication between those researchers dealing with social and economic change among peasant cultivators and those studying livestock people, nor any explicit attempt by specialists in pastoralism to break out of the isolation of their field - with the notable exception of Bonte's¹¹⁾ essay on the penetration of market forces in Maure society.

The process of integration and economic transformation of a local community ultimately takes its strength from factors which are beyond that community's control. However, the form that this process takes locally can only be understood through consideration of the social and ecological conditions of production at the local level: the character of the natural resources that are exploited, and the existing inter- and intra-domestic forms of control over such resources and over the products of human labour.

The researcher who sets out today to study the pastoralists of East Africa, the Borana for example, finds him- or herself in a quite different situation from the researchers working in the last decade of colonial rule. The Sahel crisis did not hit East Africa as hard as West Africa, but it nevertheless impressed on anyone interested in pastoralist studies an awareness of the precariousness of the pastoral adaptation particularly when it is in confrontation with a market economy. It is impossible even analytically to wish away the changes that have taken and are still taking place in these societies, and it is becoming increasingly apparent that many seeds of the

transformation of pastoral life were planted already before the time when Spencer wrote about the Samburu

"I find it inconceivable that the people I describe in these pages can change substantially in the foreseeable future: while all evidence suggests that the changes taking place elsewhere in Kenya will continue to bypass them for many years to come and may even encourage them to take several more steps in the direction of a return to traditions.."12).

Anthropological treatises on change in African pastoral societies have concentrated on one major theme - the conservatism shown by pastoralists versus technical innovations deliberately introduced by governmental agencies. Early attempts to explain it related it to "cultural values", notably the "East African Cattle Complex"¹³⁾, and later ones emphasize the ecological irrationality of many of these projects and the "rationality" of pastoral subsistence production¹⁴⁾. Anthropology has not paid much attention up to now to the more subtle transformation of the material base of pastoral society which lies in its integration into the framework of a centralized state or to the long-term significance of even a limited involvement in paid jobs, marketing of produce or the creation of "reserve activities".

For example, although Spencer in his book on the Samburu and Rendille¹⁵⁾ devotes some space to the role of Samburu headmen employed by the British colonial administration and the extensive recruitment of young Samburu warriors into the King's African Rifles during World War II (as well as subsequently into the police), he does not dwell on the role of such employment in the context of the Samburu economy in general.

Even though in the case of the Samburu these changes affected only a minority of the population directly, I should like to argue that they might signify an important transformation of the foundations of the pastoral economic system, the implications of which will not be clearly seen until the society concerned is faced with a crisis. Among the Borana, as we shall see, similar factors created imbalance in resource control which became evident only through the crisis caused by their involvement in the north Kenyan secessionist war of the 1960s.

In the East African context virtually nothing has been written on the implications for pastoral nomads of labour migration on the one hand and of urbanization in all its various forms on the other. One reason is that the migrants from pastoral communities tend to be in a minority in those great cities which have attracted most attention from researchers interested in rural-urban migration. Their number, even when large in absolute terms, is

Map 1.2 Borana and other ethnic groups mentioned in the text

always insignificant in comparison with the masses of migrants deriving from the more numerous cultivating groups, such as the Kikuyu, Luo or Ganda. According to the 1969 census of Kenya¹⁶⁾, there are no centres or towns outside northern Kenya, where the population of "Western Hamitic" people - Rendille and Galla (including Borana) - exceeds 1 % of the total urban population.

In the arid areas, urbanization on a wholly different scale takes place in

the small market towns and administrative centres. Many of these places deserve the name "town" mainly from the way they stand out physically from the rural surroundings and because of their commercial and administrative concerns rather than because of their size - perhaps 30 to 100 permanent and semi-permanent buildings which in other places would not even warrant the name of "village". Their inhabitants refer to them as towns, and I shall stick to that practice. In these centres people of pastoral extraction make up a more dominant part of the population than they do in large cities, but, unfortunately, these small towns have not yet been the focus of many studies. Pastoral studies in general and those of East Africa in particular, have tended to draw the analytic boundary of the pastoral society just outside the town gate, mentioning the small administrative centres or market towns as if they were not parts of the pastoral society but anomalous to it. Many essays and monographs contain brief references to such places but only Lewis¹⁷⁾, Baxter¹⁸⁾ and Hjort¹⁹⁾ make a major point of the integration of market towns in pastoral life, and of the fact that semi-sedentarization in towns on the part of wealthy pastoralists is not a renunciation of pastoral life but rather a sort of commuting²⁰⁾.

But perhaps pastoral researchers should not be the only ones blamed for this shortcoming. There is a general paucity in anthropological writings on tropical Africa on the character of small towns. In Vincent's words: "All too often, it comes as a surprise to a reader later to discover the presence and political significance of small towns within a tribal area as its ethnographer turns from the structural analysis of 'the tribe' to a more descriptive, journalistic and slighter account of 'alien elements'²¹⁾. In the pastoral studies, to the extent they are mentioned at all, traders and civil servants are seen as a category distinct from pastoralists²²⁾, townsmen are regarded as "partially detribalized"²³⁾ and women and young men are described as lured into the town by the prospect of low social control and the spread of western consumer ideology²⁴⁾ for example, rather than as pushed into town by the unviability of pastoralism or as acting in economic niches supplementary to pastoralism.

My aim has been to draw attention to the extent to which integration into a wider political and economic context has changed the opportunity structure of various sections of the society in a way that has led to a more marked internal social differentiation. In this context the arena of small "market towns" is important, for new opportunities are often centred on such places. All too often the pastoralists have been seen as passive recipients or re-

jectors of change: change is seen as something deliberately introduced by agents higher in the power hierarchy and then either stubbornly rejected or graciously accepted at the local level. Nevertheless, market expansion and "development" always bring new resources into the local scene, where actors within the pastoral society make active use of them. The same is true of national integration - as Bates has written

... "no matter how tenuous the state's suzerainty, its formal claim to rule makes it amenable to manipulation by local political, often tribal, forces, each eager to tap what sources of power are available.. As often as not, the local power structures at a village or tribal level are concerned with transforming public force in the name of the state to personal or narrow community ends..."²⁵⁾

Hence the present study is not restricted to the "pure" areas of Waso Boranaland but covers also the "semi-urban" aspects of their socio-ecological world. As we shall see later, any attempt to distinguish between groups which might be termed more or less traditional or to establish regional boundaries within the Waso society as a whole would be artificial and would prevent a proper understanding of the dynamics of social life and the processes of change affecting it.

THE WASO PEOPLE AND THEIR BACKGROUND

The Borana²⁶⁾ of Isiolo District consists of three major sections. One, the Borana Gutu, are an offshoot of the major Borana people in Ethiopia, and the second, the Sakuye, claim descent from Somalia but have for about 150 years been the allies of the Borana. The third is a hunting-gathering sub-caste of Borana, the Wata. They all speak Borana, which is a dialect of the Oromo or Galla language spoken by about ten million people in Ethiopia and Kenya²⁷⁾. The Sakuye have until recently maintained their cultural distinction vis-à-vis the cattle oriented Borana Gutu by specializing in camel industry. In the middle of the 1960s they lost all their camel herds during the war in northern Kenya that followed Kenya's independence. The Borana Gutu also suffered heavy losses of livestock, but whereas there are almost no Sakuye who live from camel pastoralism today, many Borana still depend mainly on their traditional livelihood. For that reason, this book deals mainly with the Borana Gutu of Isiolo District as far as pastoralism is concerned, since only second-hand information is available about Sakuye practices.

The Borana Gutu have been the subject of several anthropological studies, while almost nothing has been written about the Sakuye. The heartland of the Borana is not in Kenya, but in Ethiopia in a region called Dirre, where they

Map 1.3 Borana and Oromo in Kenya and Ethiopia

live mainly between the small town of Yavello and the Kenyan border. On the Kenyan side of the border a smaller number occupy areas close to Marsabit and Moyale. The Waso Borana constitute a quite distinct unit, separated from these other Borana by a number of other ethnic groups, such as Samburu, Rendille, Gabbra and Somali. The fission of the Waso Borana from the main body of Borana is of relatively recent date, some fifty to seventy years ago. They still maintain contacts with relatives in Ethiopia, and although they have all converted to Islam from their old religion²⁸⁾, they identify themselves strongly as Borana and share with their Ethiopian kinsfolk a number of structural and cultural traits.

Borana in the Waso area, like their Ethiopian relatives, regard pasture land as a gift from God, Wag, to all Borana. The fertility of the land and the livestock is closely related to a good relationship between God and man, and this in turn depends on the peaceful settlement of conflicts within the Boran community²⁹⁾, and between themselves and all their allies, the Warri-libin, or people of Liban³⁰⁾. Liban is the area from which Borana came to Dirre around two hundred and fifty years ago and to which they are still emotionally attached. As the human link with God stands the highest symbol of peace, the gallu or priest-king. There are two major gallu, representing the two Boran moieties, Sabbu and Gona, and both living in Ethiopia. The two moieties are exogamous units, consisting of a number of patrilineal clans. They stand in a relation of balanced opposition and alliance to each other. The clans are segmented into lineages and sections. The adult male members of these segments living in any particular area form local lineage councils to deal with the welfare of clan members, and act as political units. Feuds are not waged between Borana; as a rule conflicts are settled by peaceful arbitration between lineages. Although the structural setup of the Borana and their general beliefs as described here are by no means unique in character, Borana regard them as central to their cultural identity, and to their definition as an ethnic group.

Between the traditional Boran areas and the Waso region there are differences both of an ecological and of a macro-political nature. The findings presented in this book refer to the Borana of Isiolo District and the conditions I met during my fieldwork there in 1973-74 and in brief visits in 1977 and 1978. Due to the differences mentioned, their applicability to Ethiopian circumstances is probably limited.

A strong attachment to livestock and a once almost total dependence on them mark the Boran society in many ways. It is this relation between subsistence

form and social organization that is the focus of the present study. Live-stock, labour, pastures, water, information - these are the central assets in a pastoral subsistence. In the first section of this book we shall deal mainly with such aspects of Boran culture as are likely to have implications for the exploitation, distribution and control over pastoral subsistence resources. Chapter 2 delineates the way the Borana try to adapt to their environment and in particular how they attempt to solve the problems of unpredictability and discontinuity through such techniques as mobility, herd diversification and herd dispersion. In chapters 3 and 4 we shall see how this ecological adaptation is mirrored in the routine of Boran daily life, and in the organizational requirements of a Boran family from the point of view of labour allocation. In chapters 5 and 6 I shall try to identify realms of authority and resource control within the Boran household as defined in relation to the separate worlds of men and women. I have chosen to put more emphasis on intra-domestic relations of resource control than I think has been done hitherto. Perhaps this is a reflection of the fact that as a woman, I have been in a better position than my male colleagues when it comes to freeing myself from the popular illusion that a society is egalitarian when all those who control capital are each other's structural equals - a pastoral fiction that the anthropologist should avoid. Chapters 7 and 8 deal with inter-household cooperation and some aspects of Boran resource distribution and redistribution. Chapter 8 in particular relates the apparent lack of permanent stratification in the traditional Boran social structure to the Borana's ecological adaptation, and discusses the relation between control over material resources, pastoral security and prestige.

GADA AND BORAN ETHNOGRAPHY

Rather unfortunately for comparative purposes, much of the literature on the Ethiopian and Marsabit Borana does not deal specifically with their system of subsistence and the topics treated in the present book. Glimpses of their economy and management practices can be gained primarily from the works of Baxter, notably his later articles³¹⁾. It is not until recently that the ecological adaptation of the Dirre Borana and the closely related Gabbra at Marsabit have become the focus of special studies - by Helland³²⁾ and Torry³³⁾ respectively. Apart from a few brief articles by Torry, their work has not yet been published but is available only as mimeographed papers. Most of the published sources concentrate on cultural values such as the Boran peace, the formal kinship patterns and the gada system³⁴⁾. It is in respect to the latter that the Waso Borana differ most obviously from their Ethiopian

relatives, for they are only peripherally involved in this organization, which among the northern Borana is the main agent for tribal-scale rituals which symbolically convey the values of cohesion and peace. The gada system consists of a number of generation classes, which succeed each other to "office" every eight year. Membership in these classes does not depend on biological age as in age-set system but, in theory at least, on the class membership of one's father so that each person belongs to a class initiated 40 years after that of his father. Various authors have interpreted the functions of the gada system and its associated offices differently. In a recent article, Baxter³⁵⁾ claims that the gada system was an exclusively ritual apparatus, while Asmarom in his book on the subject, tends to stress also the political and juridical aspects, stating that the gada officers had to solve conflicts between clans or households over the use of pastures and settle claims to water resources³⁶⁾.

However that may be, it is clear that among the Waso Borana, who are isolated from the main contingent of Borana, there is little attachment to the gada system. It exists as a frame of reference for oral history, for marriage preferences and for forecasting future events by reference to fortunes met by Borana during ancient gada reigns. It does not exist as a political reality or a framework for important rituals. Among Oromo groups in Ethiopia, who have a tradition of breaking away from the ancestral Borana, one often finds a duplication of the gada system³⁷⁾. There is nothing like that among the Waso Borana and the reasons for this have to be sought on a number of levels. First, water is generally easier to obtain at Waso and one can speculate that this may have lessened the need for large-scale organization and also made sanctions against deviants more difficult to carry out. Second, many of the first immigrants to Waso appear to have been men who were peripheral to the gada system. Under ideal conditions, the life career of a Boran man, as governed by the gada system, approximates to his biological life career. As Asmarom has shown, demographic processes lead to a situation where an increasing number of men are born too late to have a chance of joining their own class during its reigning period. A number of men are thus continuously excluded from the system, and it appears that many of the original leaders of the Waso community were born too late to have any chance of active participation in gada ritual and politics. Third, the local Boran polity at Waso came to be dominated at an early stage by contacts with the British colonial administration. We cannot know what kind of overarching political structure the Borana would have created if they had been left alone at Waso, but it can be said that the circumstances of their colonization

of Waso, the introduction of new offices such as chief or headman by the British, and the conversion of the Borana to Islam were all factors which ruled out a new Waso version of the gada system. Accordingly, the gada system which has contributed to the Borana's ethnographic fame in the past, is not a central subject of this book, but I hope that it will instead draw attention to other features of Boran social organization which have been afforded less notice. Many readers will probably feel that there is too little about ritual in this book, and I admit that much more could have been said about symbolic expressions of meaning. However, it is always necessary to make some kind of limitation of one's field, and I feel that the type of understanding I have attempted to reach (i.e. of the factors which make survival possible) is a necessary basis for an analysis of ritual life, to which I hope to be able to return on a later occasion. It is also my opinion that if anthropologists wish to reach out from their own limited circles and open up a dialogue with representatives of other economic, social or natural sciences they gain a lot from anchoring their analysis in the concrete material conditions of human life. This is not, however, to underrate the value and necessity of other types of approach.

A COMMUNITY UNDERGOING CHANGE

As we have seen, the local community of Waso Borana has a relatively brief history. What we see today is not the result of a long and unbroken adaptation to nature by a society in isolation. The history of the Borana at Waso is not only marked by a struggle against the whims of an untrustworthy natural environment but is also a history of increased subordination to political and economic powers outside the Boran community. This subordination has involved events for which the traditional forms of assurance have had no solutions.

In the second section of this book, I want to discuss some of the consequences of Boran involvement in a wider context of national and international politics and trade relations. The main concern here is the trend towards increased stratification that we can identify in today's Boran society. One word of caution: although the book is divided into two sections, this is not intended to represent any temporal sequence or idealized "before" and "after" model. Instead it is intended to represent a gradual expansion of the horizon of the presentation, from the individual and household to the community at large in its macro-setting. Models showing the "before" situation as static are almost always false, for there is change in any society, and apart from that, when the Boran community at Waso was established seventy years ago,

it was in the context of colonial politics. The immigrants were Borana who sought protection under the British while escaping from drought and over-population in southern Ethiopia, and from the miseries associated with the expansion of the Ethiopian Empire³⁸). Almost immediately, the agents of change were present in the form of colonial administrators and traders, even though the real impact of change on the Boran economy and institutions was not sensed until the 1940s.

Part II opens with a historical outline of the development of the livestock trade and the growth of local administration. It is these processes that have created the basis for the integration of the Boran community into the national political system and permitted the initial steps of capitalist penetration into the traditional economy. The study is thus an attempt to see the effects of colonialism, independent national integration and an expanding market economy from the local horizon. The focus is placed on the expression of these forces at the local level rather than on the nature of the forces as such. By doing so, I hope to provide a useful case-study of change in a livestock-oriented society, for many of the problems met by Borana are common to a wider category of pastoral people who see their resource bases being diminished through the intervention of external forces.

On the level of household subsistence, the Borana's first contacts with the British and the agents acting as middlemen for the colonial power led only to slow changes, for the initial British policy was to isolate the northern pastoral peoples from participation in the wider Kenyan economy. In the 1940s and '50s after this policy had been revised, the impact of the market economy became more clearcut as particular Boran families involved in the British administration started to invest in small shops and to engage in the cattle trade. These and other changes are spelt out in chapter 9. A basis was created for new risk-reducing strategies among those who could combine assets within the new spheres with those pertaining to pastoralism. The most drastic change in the Boran economy came after independence, when a number of events totally disrupted living conditions in the district. When Kenya was given independence, many Borana joined with the pan-Somali secessionist guerrillas who wanted the union of the former Northern Frontier District (NFD) with Somalia instead of Kenya. The war that followed is usually referred to in Kenya as the "shifita" war. (The term "shifita" is originally a word denoting "banditry" and is therefore rejected by Somali nationalists, but its common use in Kenya even among ex-guerrilla members causes me to retain it for convenience.)

The shifta emergency lasted from 1964 to 1969. After initial Somali successes, the war ended with Kenyan victory in so far as the boundaries remained unchanged. For the Borana, the losses they had met in the war meant poverty and humiliation. Talking about the period, the Borana often refer to themselves as having been deceived by several parties, namely by the British who had promised the inhabitants of the Northern Frontier District more or less a free choice between Kenya and Somalia, and by their Somali allies who had exaggerated the dangers of a "Bantu" government and who in the end gained a lot from Boran losses. After the war, the Somali pastoralists of North Eastern Province, the Borana's eastern neighbours, were allowed to bring back stock from Somalia, where they had taken refuge. As tribal boundaries were abolished, the Somali were able to take over de facto control of areas that the Borana had left empty after the extinction of their camel herds. A series of droughts following after the lifting of the emergency have made it difficult for the Borana to recover. Their cattle herds are too small to rely on in drought, while the Somali immigrants to the district cope well with these droughts since they depend on their camels.

Within the Boran community itself, latent divergencies in economic security became apparent after the shifta and during the droughts. Families who had already before the war invested in activities safer than pastoralism were able to get a quick start back into cattle herding. Those who were less well off, particularly the Sakuye, were forced into new activities such as irrigated agriculture or wage labour. Middle-range categories of herdowners who were left with cattle but with herds of insufficient size became directly dependent on the market economy rather than simply making an opportunistic use of it, as had been the case during the forties and fifties. In time, the impact of the new activities on Boran social structure and culture is likely to increase. Although pastoralism is the focus of this book, I shall try to show also how these new income sources are integrated with each other in the present subsistence strategies of households and kin groups. That is the theme of chapter 10.

The new divergencies within the Boran community between households with varying access to wealth and capacity to meet climatic risks have consequences for the modern political structure of Boran society. In chapter 11 I shall deal with the significance of traditional values such as affinity and clanship in the context of new political forms, and with the development from "big-manship" to modern patronage. Chapter 12 endeavours to illustrate the micro-level consequences of change by giving a picture of domestic life

Map 1.4 Abyssinian expansion and colonial powers in the Horn of Africa

in the small market towns of Waso. The chapter considers both the integration of pastoralism and "town life" in wealthy families and the role of towns as a last resort for impoverished ex-pastoralists. In particular, I shall deal with the position of those groups, who suffer not only from being members of a "marginal" society but also from being "marginalized" in relation to that society - a category which an account centred on the pastoral system could easily forget or wish away. Finally chapter 13 is an attempt to bring the discussion back to the place of the Waso area and the Boran community in a wider Kenyan context, and to a more general consideration of change in pastoral societies.

Talking about their experiences during the last fifteen years several Borana have quoted to me the saying "When two bulls fight, it is the grass which suffers". This expression refers specifically to the fact that the Waso Borana today, squeezed between the central Kenyan government and the nationalist interests of the Somali, have no wish whatsoever for a new war in which they again would be the main losers. It also reflects a feeling that the changes to which they have been subjects have been largely beyond their control. Nevertheless, even if many of the stalks of the suffering grass have been broken, its roots have so far shown a certain resilience. The traveller passing through Garba Tula or past a Boran camp can easily be misled by the sight of the cattle herd passing along the road or the milk pot generously offered to him into thinking that he is meeting a society which time has not touched. The cattle economy is still, despite the tragedies, a link of continuity which we have to understand if we want to grasp the nature of Boran society.

Footnotes to Chapter 1

1. In the following text, Waso will be used as an expression denoting that part of Isiolo District which is situated east of Gotu - i.e. the area regularly used by Borana. Waso does not include the pan-handlelike appendix to the district in which the district capital, Isiolo Town, is situated.
2. The major monographic works emanating from the research of this period are Baxter 1954; Dyson-Hudson 1966; Jacobs 1963, 1965; Gulliver 1955; I.M. Lewis 1961; Spencer 1965 and 1973
3. Barth 1961, 1964
4. Stenning 1958, 1959
5. Paine 1964, 1970b, 1971, 1972
6. Salzman 1967:121

7. Dahl and Hjort 1976
8. Dyson-Hudson R. 1960; Dyson-Hudson N. and R. 1970
9. Torry 1973
10. Asad 1979:422
11. Bonte 1972
12. Spencer 1965:xxi
13. Herskowitz 1926
14. See, for example, Rigby 1969b; Baker 1975; Dyson-Hudson 1962; Jacobs 1975; Spencer 1973:179ff; Dahl and Hjort 1976
15. Spencer 1973 esp. 163-4
16. Kenya 1970
17. Lewis 1965
18. Baxter 1972
19. Hjort 1979
20. Baxter *op.cit.*:210
21. Vincent 1975:117
22. See, for example, Frantz 1978:103
23. Spencer *op.cit.*:170
24. Frantz 1975:347, 1978:104
25. Bates 1971:117
26. It is extremely difficult to get trustworthy data on the size of the Boran population at Waso. In 1937 the colonial government estimated it at 13000; in 1950 and 1953 at 15,000. The 1962 Census reported a total district population of 55,000. At the end of the secessionist war, the 1969 Census reported a district population of 30,000 of whom some 10,000 were found in Isiolo Town, situated in a panhandle-shaped appendix to the district, and the remaining 20,000 in the Boran area proper, east of Chanler's Falls. Aerial sample surveys carried out by Murray Watson have an estimate in 1970 of 51,000 and in 1978 75,000 people in the district as a whole. There are inconsistencies in Watson's 1973 report which might be interpreted as giving an alternative estimate of 38,000. The proportions of Sakuye to Borana in 1958 were approximately 1:3 and by the 1969 Census 1:5
Sources: Isiolo District Annual Report (IDAR) 1937 PC NFD 1/4/2, Kenya National Archives; IDAR 1950 PC NFD 1/4/4; IDAR 1958 PC NFD 1/4/5; Baxter 1954; Kenya 1962; Kenya 1970; Watson 1973
27. Oromo in Ethiopia repudiate the use of the term "Galla" as non-vernacular. Borana, however, recognize neither the term Galla nor Oromo as valid concepts for themselves. They see Oromo as a category opposed to themselves, associated mainly with the Tana River Orma. Popular etymology at Waso derives Oromo from an expression which is used for a person who is in opposition, a traitor or somebody who cannot be trusted in the best interests of the community. "Borana" is similarly associated with "people who refuse to move away". I shall use the term Oromo only to apply to groups who regard themselves as Oromo, and use Galla to denote the larger category which includes both Oromo and Borana.
28. Conversion to Islam took place between 1922 when almost no Borana at Waso were Muslims (Garba Tula Annual Report (GTAR), PC NFD 2/4/1 and

- Handing Over Report Garba Tula (HOR GT) 1922) and 1952 when almost all had been converted (Baxter 1966a:235, Northern Province Annual Report (NPAR), 1952, PC NFD 1/1/10
29. For the concept of Boran peace, see, for example, Andrzejewski 1962
 30. Borana are thought to have come from Liban either during the periods 1657-65 or 1713-21 or even earlier. See Haberland 1963:25. The population of Liban is now predominantly Guji. There is some debate over where Borana lived before coming to Liban, the confusion emanating from the expression "bahargammo" which can be interpreted either as "beyond the Red Sea" or "at Lake Abbaya" (the "Gammo lake"). Recent historical writings tend to support the latter interpretation (which was launched by Beckingham and Huntingford 1954:229) rather than the former one. See Haberland 1963:24 and H.S. Lewis 1966:35
 31. Particularly Baxter 1966b, 1972
 32. Helland 1977. This paper, part of Helland's thesis, will be published as a forthcoming Occasional Paper from the Institute for Social Anthropology, Bergen.
 33. Torry 1973
 34. Knutsson 1967:156-184; Haberland 1963:167-223; Asmarom 1973; Baxter 1954:264-352
 35. Baxter 1978a:152
 36. Asmarom 1973:85
 37. Baxter 1978b:284; Hultin 1975:276; Knutsson 1967:156 ff
 38. On Menelik's campaigns at the end of the last century see H.S. Lewis 1965:44 and Ståhl 1974:39-42. Borana became allocated group by group to Amharic officers who obtained their pay by extracting it from the newly conquered subjects. The latter were supposed to deliver tribute in the form of cattle, transport camels and ivory, and to dig gardens and build houses for their masters. See Correspondence Lieut Dickinson to DC Moyale 8/4/1913 and Correspondence DC Moyale to Chief secretary 23/4 1913 PC NFD 4/3/1

PART I

A Pastoral People

2. THREE WITH SWEET MILK

THE CLIMATE OF WASO

In this chapter, my main concern will be the technical aspects of Boran pastoralism, as governed by the nature of their pastures and the still primarily subsistence-oriented practices followed by the Boran pastoralists. Any description of the conditions under which Borana seek their livelihood has to depart from the fact that the Waso area, like the whole of northern Kenya, has very unpredictable climatic patterns. More as a rule than as an exception, the weather conditions are "extreme" in one way or another. It may therefore be misleading to talk about a "normal" pattern for in a sense abnormality is what one should expect. Rainfall tends to be concentrated

into two seasons, but one or both may fail, and occasionally, as was the case in 1975-6, there is virtually no rain for two years.

According to the "normal" pattern rain should come during the ganna season from March to May and the haggaya season from October to November. These rains are usually referred to in English as the long and the short rains respectively. The ganna rain is followed by a dry season called addolesa, when cool winds tear up clouds of dust from the ground. The haggaya rains often come in the form of narrowly localized squalls and are followed by the hot bon or bonagaya when occasionally there are more small showers. The total amount of rain that can be expected in any year is always smaller than the potential evaporation (See table 2.1).

Table 2:1. Total annual rainfall

<u>Place</u>	<u>Approximate Altitude</u>	<u>Mean of annual total</u>	<u>No. of recorded years</u>	<u>Potential Evaporation</u> E ₀ mm/year
Isiolo ¹⁾	1100	613 max 1279 min 375	27	2561
Garba Tula ²⁾	460	408	19	-
Habbaswein ¹⁾	200	218 max 493 min 67	12	3120

Sources: ¹⁾ Gwynne and Pratt 1977:64, 70

²⁾ UNDP-FAO 1971:58

The arid character of the area has a very restrictive effect on the range of forms of food production open to the Borana. Before entering into the details of pastoral resource extraction, I will give some short consideration to its alternatives, particularly to the opportunities for cultivation, trying to show how pastoralism and hunting/gathering until recently were the most reasonable ways of ensuring a continuous production of food in the given Waso ecology.

THE ALTERNATIVES TO PASTORALISM

In the Waso lowlands, such farming as relies entirely on rain can succeed only in very good years. Sufficient rains are too rare to justify annual attempts to plant. Instead, rain-based farming is done only on a trial basis

when prospects for rains are good. The opportunities for irrigated farming have been very limited until recently, in spite of the fact that the soil in some places is extremely favourable to cultivation. There is only one known instance of agriculture being practised in the Waso area before the shifta emergency. That was in Kinna, where during the 1940s the colonial administration supported attempts by some local Borana to grow maize. In the fifties these were taken up again and by the end of that period between one and two dozen households were engaged in cultivation at Kinna. Along the Euaso Nyiro, the water in many places cannot be led directly from the river into simple channels, but has to be pumped up from the river canyon to ground level. Where the river runs closer to the ground surface so that irrigation by gravity is possible, the risks of flooding are also high and the river frequently changes course. Generally, these areas have been shunned by the pastoralists during the rainy season, for fear both of health hazards and of being isolated by floods. In some places, the riverine vegetation is dense and harbours a rich wildlife. Any colonization of these areas for farming would require a large-scale effort and involve skills that are not usually activated in herding animals. It should also be pointed out that in an area such as Waso, where there are two rainy seasons, there is a less definite need for subsidiary agriculture than there is in pastoral areas with one season only, like those, for example, of southern Sudan.

Since the end of the shifta war a number of irrigation schemes have been started in the river zones in response to impoverishment which left many Borana with no alternative other than high-risk farming. The innovation had also become more feasible with the help of modern pumping techniques. Some of these schemes were initiated by local people, others by the Kenya Government, the National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCCK), or FAO. Some spontaneous cultivation had originally taken advantage of the abundant rains in 1968 "Mafuriko". Other cultivators used sites at wells that had filled up with water and flooded during the years when pastoral movements were restricted for security reasons. Many such sites then had to be abandoned when the land dried up again. The schemes using the areas along the banks of the Euaso Nyiro and the Bisanadi-Kinna rivers were more successful, though some of them have today been abandoned or moved as a result of soil salination. In particular the "unaided", low-technology schemes have suffered repeated setbacks such as lapsing canal walls or changes in the direction of the river. A variety of crops are grown in the remaining schemes. Maize is the dominant crop, but sweet potatoes, pawpaw, cassava, beans, bananas, sugarcane, sorghum and chilies can also be found. A very limited number of farmers have more

than 5 acres, most holding between half and 3 acres, with average yields of about 3 bags (90 kg) of maize per acre. In 1977, 666 acres were under irrigation in the district east of Gotu¹). These shambas were looked after by about 1200 families. The definition of "family" is vague, however, and likely to comprise both fractions of pastoral households and complete independent units. It is therefore hard to say how many people do in fact subsist from the produce of these rather small holdings. For many of the stockless destitutes, particularly Sakuye families, the shambas are today of overriding economic importance; they also form an important supplementary source of food for several pastoral households as well as a significant object of investment for some of the wealthier members of the Boran community. The lasting consequences of this new involvement in agriculture on Boran society and culture are a topic about which it is difficult to make forecasts, but to which we shall return in later chapters of this book.

Given the difficulties of cultivation, it is safe to say that until the shifita war the land-use pattern of the Waso Borana was based more or less exclusively on pastoralism and hunting-gathering. The latter was practised by the endogamous Wata "caste" which was concentrated particularly in the tsetse-infested southeastern corner of the district where they used to hunt giraffe and elephant and gather honey, fruits, roots and berries. High black-market prices for ivory and efficient hunting weapons have now seriously threatened the elephant stock, and subsequent wildlife preservation measures have made it difficult for the Wata to pursue their traditional form of subsistence. In earlier days, however, hunting-gathering was not necessarily an inferior way of obtaining food in northern Kenya, even if it was one which could only with difficulty be combined with pastoralism - the long hunting expeditions undertaken by Wata men being hard to combine with the demands of livestock care. The two adaptations, hunting-gathering and pastoralism, were alternative and more or less mutually exclusive ways of exploiting the same areas. Today, many of the Wata from the Jilodima /Bisanguracha/Bisanadi area have become settled as farmers at an irrigation scheme at Rapsu, organized by NCKK. Small game hunting may remain a subsidiary source of subsistence for some of them, but the extent to which there is still a particular "Wata" form of adaptation is hard to ascertain.

In an ecologically restrictive setting such as that exploited by the Borana, where there has in the past been no alternative to nomadic pastoralism except hunting and gathering and where pastoralism is still dominant, a comprehension of the technical aspects of pastoralism is essential for an

understanding of domestic and community organization. However, in a situation of development where the subsistence economy is no longer a self-contained unit but is increasingly integrated in the politico-administrative framework of a modern state and in a worldwide capitalist economic system, there are risks involved in giving too much weight to ecological factors. Not even drought, which to the layman may appear as a fairly uncontroversial concept relating to the incidence of rain, can be treated as a purely ecological event, for it is social, political and economic factors that decide what areas can be exploited by pastoralists in the dry seasons, and what precautions they can take against losses. For instance, it is now widely recognized that the severity of the Sahel drought in West Africa was a direct consequence of the pastoralists' heavy losses of dry season pasture due to the expansion of commercial agriculture and ranching²⁾.

Technological changes may confer new resources on pastoralists, or, far more commonly, concentrate important assets in the hands of a few pastoralists at the expense of others. In the process of national integration, and the economic change that goes with it, the availability of livestock to feed people and of the labour to look after the livestock may undergo drastic changes that will upset any time-tested ecological adaptation. Nevertheless, when trying to grasp the mechanisms which lead to the continuation or transformation of a pastoral society and its particular life patterns, we will have to outline first the basic features of its traditional forms of production and resource extraction, and the weaknesses and critical points of these systems.

A CHANGING SUBSISTENCE ECONOMY

The Waso lowlands are open for exploitation by a wider range of livestock species than the central Boran areas. Camels and goats thrive well. While the typical Boran adaptation in southern Ethiopia is very much oriented towards cattle and sheep it is possible for a wealthy Waso family to have "all three with sweet milk" - i.e. herds of both cattle, camels and small stock. This opportunity to combine different types of stock is one of the good things that Waso Borana mention when they compare the advantages and disadvantages of the two areas. Another difference which is seen as important, is that Borana in Ethiopia are dependent on water from very deep wells cut out in the rock, the use and maintenance of which require a lot of disciplined labour. In Isiolo District in the dry season any family can either use the rivers, or dig a temporary well in a canyon or a permanent one at one

of the well-complexes. In the wet season, water is available in pools, puddles and man-made or natural dams. It is very seldom that watering or well maintenance requires more labour than a family or a camp can provide. When water is dug for, it is either not available at all or found by fairly shallow excavation.

Nevertheless, Isiolo District is even more arid than the area from which the Waso Borana originate. Northern Boranaland, situated in the hills below the Bale-Sidamo massif, is on higher ground than the Waso area, between 1500 and 1000 m. above sea level as contrasted with 700-200 m. for the bulk of Isiolo District. The adollesa season is less severe and ends earlier. Despite the fact that the rainfall situation is better in Southern Ethiopia³⁾, it appears that it is easier for the Waso people to get water for their herds to drink, and for the one who has a herd with several species, Waso is a wealthy land.

When Borana settled in the Waso area, the livestock they owned were their main source of food. Milk (annan) from cattle, goats and camels provided the basis of their diet but, since the amount of milk varies with changes in pasture conditions during the year, it was necessary to supplement this staple food with other products. Blood from live animals was an important addition in the dry season, and meat played the dual role of a reserve food and a luxury. The pastoral products were also supplemented by grain from agricultural neighbours. In Ethiopia the Konso had supplied the Borana with millet at critical periods, and in Kenya the Borana were able to take advantage of the coincidence between the Meru maize harvest and the height of the dry season and Meru's willingness to exchange some maize for goats. Today the importance of such imported grain has increased but it is still mainly the availability of milk which governs Borana's access to food.

When there has been a consecutive number of "normal" years with no failure in either of the two rainy seasons, the Boran cows bear calves all the year round. Consequently, the number of lactating cows is more or less constant throughout the year. On average about half the mature female stock in the region will be in milk at any particular time⁴⁾, although individual herds are vulnerable to chance fluctuations and may have a less advantageous spread of calf-births so that their owners suffer a milk shortage while other herds have plenty of milk. In such years there can be a continuous supply of milk. The lactation lasts long enough - about six months - to give milk from one rainy season to the next. In the rainy season, each lactating

cow produces 1-1.5 kg of milk per day for human consumption; but when the grass becomes scarce in the dry season the physical condition of the cattle deteriorates and they produce less, often below 0.5 kg each. Even during normal years, therefore, there is a seasonal slack in total milk production, due to scarcity of fodder. If the rains fail, a more serious scarcity results. The milk supply will then also suffer during the year to come, for the following reasons. Fewer cows conceive during the drought, and when those which were impregnated before the drought run out of milk, there will be no newly lactating dams to take over from them. The pause in calving may cause milk production to vanish altogether, recovering again only nine months after the onset of the next rains. The irregularities in access to milk created by the drought tend to continue even after the rains, for when the rains return all the cattle conceive at the same time, calve nine months later, and run out of milk simultaneously after another six months. In such years the availability of reserve pastoral foods and imported grain takes on an increased significance. During a season of good milk yields, Boran housewives endeavour to store as much as possible in the form of clarified butter or curds. Curdled milk can be kept for three to six months, i.e. from one rainy season to another if the rains occur at the scheduled times. There are, however, many practical difficulties in storing milk in large quantities over extended periods of time, and it is not likely that any household can protect itself against rain failure by storing milk produce. The most common form of storage is therefore storage "on the hoof", i.e. keeping a number of stock purposely for blood-letting or slaughter during drought. Aged cows and oxen can be tapped for 2 kg of blood twice a month. The blood may be drunk fresh mixed with a little milk or eaten after the solid parts have been separated from the liquid and fried. Ox-blood is frequently used as a reserve source in long dry seasons when there is little milk. The milk production of camels does not fluctuate in the same way as that of cattle. Camels supply a greater and steadier amount of milk, except in very prolonged droughts after which their delay in producing calves and milk may be even more extended than that of cattle. However, a camel dam in milk gives around 4 kg milk per day, after a peak of production when she may deliver up to 12 kg. This milk cannot be stored, but there is less reason to try to do so, for the lactation of camels lasts almost one year, so that there are less marked seasonal slacks. Camels are bled in the same way as cattle, but more in order to satisfy specific human demand for iron, salts or other nutrients than as a substitute for milk.

Meat from cattle and camels is mainly consumed on ritual occasions or when

the animals have to be slaughtered for emergency reasons. A limited amount of dried meat is usually kept by the housewife, stored in fat in a gourd. Today less meat is consumed domestically within the Boran community, except in "elite" families who can afford some luxury consumption. Instead, the aged and male animals that traditionally provided meat are sold. The proceeds from such sales usually have to cover a wide range of expenses but, to the extent that they are spent on food, it is normally on maize, tea leaves and sugar. With the price-levels of maize and meat obtaining in Isiolo during the 1970s, the most profitable transaction, from the point of view of calory efficiency, has been to swap meat for maize⁵⁾, and this has been necessary for many households with small herds.

In addition to large stock, many Boran herdowners keep sheep and goats, and these provide the most readily available source of meat for secular consumption. The rapid reproduction of small stock means that the gap left in a flock when an animal is slaughtered or sold can quickly be filled. The small size of the animal also makes it more manageable for household consumption. Goats' milk is less highly valued than camels' or cattle milk but is important for children's diet. The she-goat is at times almost as efficient a milk-producer as the cow, yielding up to 2 kg per day in the rainy season. Sheep are less frequently milked, since they are said to be difficult to milk and the normal yield of a ewe only ranges from 200-250 g. per day. Neither the blood from small stock nor milk from sheep are significant parts of the Boran diet.

Apart from the produce already mentioned, Borana and Sakuye use the fat from the humps of camels and the rumps and tails of sheep. This is either fried or prepared into liquid fat for sale or domestic use. Bottles of such fat and ghee, single skins and hides and pits of milk are frequently sent with household members who have an errand to the market town in order to pay for small expenses during their stay in town, or for purchases of consumer goods to be brought back to the camp.

As we have said, the pre-shifta Boran diet consisted mainly of produce from the herd. Wild berries were, however, collected and eaten by small children and also brought home for the old people. It is hard to evaluate the nutritional contribution of this to the diet, but it probably made some valuable addition of vitamin C to the milk base. It might also have been of importance to the herdsman who followed the dry cattle to distant pastures. Together with wild game, its greatest significance was as a resource to be used mainly in times of scarcity. In normal times, Borana Gutu did not hunt for sub-

sistence. Most wild game fell under a ritual taboo, and it was thought that to eat such food was to provoke misfortune. The meat of elephants, rhino and wild boar and the eggs and meat of wild birds were food reserved for the Wata. However, in drought, when pastoral produce is running scarce, the large game gather round the permanent waters and become easy to hunt. Assuming that the Wata under normal climatic circumstances profited by food from the Borana Gutu, the food resources that the Wata controlled through their expertise in hunting and gathering must have provided a security for the Borana Gutu also. It is conceivable that disasters from time to time have forced the Borana Gutu to turn to food from the forest and to require Wata assistance.

Forest products had another important part to play in the context of pastoralism, viz. as raw materials for household utensils. Although Borana do use skins and horns from domestic animals to make some of their tools, ropes and vessels, they also maintain a vast lore about the vegetational resources of their habitat, and rely heavily on wood and fibres for their domestic equipment⁶⁾. Some of the vital skin items needed by a Boran household (milk buckets, shoes, whips) used also to be prepared not from cattle or goat hides, but from the skins of giraffe and buffaloe, which had to be bartered from the Wata in exchange for pastoral products or livestock.

Manufactured goods and agricultural products today play a growing role in Boran life. This can be explained partly by the development of transport facilities and trade, partly by the insufficiency of stock holdings after the shifita time. A main agent in changing dietary habits is, of course, the initiation of the irrigation schemes. In 1971, when the Kinna scheme was fairly new, Wisner⁷⁾ found in Kinna that "the majority of the sample seems to live on a diet primarily of maize, milk products and tomatoes". At the time of Wisner's study, as is the case now, many pastoral households had close links with people in the irrigation schemes, exchanging milk products for maize as well as shuffling family members between the cattle camps and the shambas.

In the irrigation schemes that have been organized by agencies external to the Borana, such as aid organizations or government departments, there is usually a wide range of crops, but most Boran farmers have a preference for maize as a subsistence crop, and in the "spontaneous" irrigation settlements maize is universally dominant. Maize in the form of meal, posho, loosely pounded kernels or whole cobs has increasingly become a second

staple in the diet of pastoral households.

PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION UNDER UNCERTAIN CONDITIONS

Of great importance for an understanding of subsistence pastoralism are the distinctions between reproductive and non-reproductive stock, and between production aspects of animals on the one hand and capital aspects on the other. Although, admittedly, it can be disputed whether "capital" is an appropriate term to be used in a non-market context, several anthropological writers on pastoralism have talked about livestock as "capital"⁸⁾ and I shall stick to this controversial term in the absence of any other suitable formula for the concrete property in which reproductive value is vested. By the capital aspect of livestock I thus refer to the fact that animals do reproduce themselves⁹⁾. Female animals not only produce milk and eventually meat for consumption, but also give birth to new producers of milk and meat. Obvious as this distinction between animals as capital and animals as producers of food may seem, it is important to keep in mind that animals are not like land, or tools, but production factors with very particular characteristics. We shall have to come back to the distinction on several later occasions, particularly in the context of property rights within the household and forms of stock transfer.

In the introductory chapter it was remarked that the unpredictability of nature has put its stamp on the history of the Waso area and led to a continuous reshuffling of ethnic groups during the last century or so. Ecological hazardousness also affects the strategies of individual households, who continually have to expect the unexpected and gear their activities towards risk reduction rather than gambling for maximum profits at any particular time. The hazard of the Boran environment threaten the continuity of the family economy both at the level of immediate food production and at the level of access to capital. In their household strategies the Borana have to cope both with avoiding temporary slacks in milk production and with avoiding losses of capital: they must cater for a ready access to alternative food and for sources from which lost capital can be renewed.

In the following sections of this chapter, I shall concentrate on practical aspects of herd management. Proper attention to one's stock obviously refers to both the herd's productivity and the continuity of access to capital. As we shall see later, a general strategy of insurance and care of livestock capital has wider implications, involving also the management of social relations. This will be the topic of later chapters, however, and we shall

now deal rather with such technical aspects of herd care as mobility, diversification and dispersion.

Adaptive mobility

The stock breeds kept by the Borana are all animals specifically adapted to an arid climate. Their grey, largeframed cattle are of a type considered by husbandry specialists as the best Zebu breed of East Africa, and they have been honoured by the ethnic name of their owners, "Boran". The few remaining camels are of the type common to north-eastern Kenya and referred to in the literature as "Somali"¹⁰⁾. The same name applies to their black-headed sheep with fat rumps and tails¹¹⁾. The goats are generally of the big "Deghier" type¹²⁾. All these breeds are typical desert animals, but nevertheless they are able to survive only when continuously brought from one pasture to another; the grass and browse of any particular area can generally not feed them for any longer period of time. One reason is the fact that the rains are not only unreliable, but also patchy and may bless one particular narrow area this year and another the next. In order to make the best use of the available resources, herdowners strive to facilitate the mobility of their stock. But pastoral migrations are not a simple matter of finishing all the pasture in one area and then move on to the next. As the seasons change, different zones become open to exploitation and in others conditions deteriorate - independently of whether they are grazed or not.

In the judgement of outside observers¹³⁾, the blame for scarcity of grass is often put on the Borana themselves, for overstocking and overgrazing their areas. Borana, however, particularly after the stock reductions of the last fifteen years, are very reluctant to admit to any general degree of overstocking. Under the Boran form of resource extraction, all animals are not necessarily productive at the same time, but this does not render them less important from the point of view of food continuity as defined by the Borana. When outside observers talk about the "necessity" of introducing stock limitation measures it is often implied that there are "unproductive" stock in the Boran herds. From the Boran point of view there is no such category of inherently unproductive stock. It can be reasonable even to keep fully-grown oxen if prices are low. Should the animal not grow fatter and accordingly produce more beef, there can always come a time when the household has a greater need for its meat or blood. Even though they are not willing to admit that there are any superfluous stock in their herds, Borana are, however, concerned about the state of certain specific pasture areas. The severe effects of droughts during the past decade are referred to causes

such as loss of dry season areas, scarcity of personnel and herd sizes with no risk margins. The shortage of grass experienced is seen not as necessarily created by bovine over-consumption but as a direct reflection of lack of rain. The growing season in Waso is short, from three to five months in the best areas and from one to two months in the more arid zone. As drought proceeds, the grass becomes drier, its quality deteriorates, and termites and other small animals compete with the cattle for the remaining straw¹⁴). According to the Boran view over-stocking, to the extent that it exists, only accelerates a process of fodder degradation which is outside Boran control.

Whether the Boran interpretation of past droughts is true or not, the fact remains that only by continuously moving their stock in accordance with seasonal changes and with the spatial incidence of rain can they assure their animals of the quantity and quality of fodder and water that is necessary both for the milk production and for the survival and regeneration of livestock capital. However, Borana are not nomadic in the sense of being permanently on the move with their camps following the livestock, and particularly not the cattle people who are in an absolute majority among the Boran pastoralists. The animals are kept mobile, but the main camps are stationary as long as conditions allow. Sometimes this means that the main camp is moved once or twice every season, but in other cases the household may remain in the same place for a couple of years or even a decade if conditions are favourable.

Minor changes in camp site are undertaken in order to avoid the health hazards brought about by residing in an area where cattle and people have been defecating over a long period, or in order to lessen the distance that firewood or household water must be carried. Camel camps in the area (now mainly belonging to Somali incursors) are usually moved more frequently than the cattle camps, even twice or three times a month in order to avoid tick infections spread by camel dung. Among the cattle people there is sufficient permanency in the composition of a group using a particular area to allow for the vague notion of a grazing community, a deda¹⁵) which comprises the households habitually using the same permanent pastures. Long-distance camp migrations from one location to another are made mainly in response either to social considerations - such as a death or a new marriage - or to large-scale climatic irregularities (I shall ignore here such reasons for migrations as warfare and subjugation by foreign powers and hostile groups, and the factors behind the Borana's migration to Kenya).

One primary strategy of Boran range and herd management is to divide the flocks and herds into sub-units of fora and hawicha animals. The hawicha herd is a herd of milk animals kept close to the main camp. The fora herd, mainly a "fallow" herd consisting of dry stock, is more or less constantly on the move so as to exploit available pastures to the maximum, even if they are further away than one day's trekking from the main camp. Normally, the fora contains most of the male stock, the aged cows, the immature ones, all the cows currently out of milk and a few milk cows to provide food for the herdsmen. Sometimes there is a further division of the fora stock, so that the oxen graze in areas favourable to body growth, while the female stock are herded into zones promoting fertility and milk production. The fora herd can be more or less permanently away from the main camp, in the rainy season exploiting grasslands that have only temporary waterpools, and in the dry season the riverine zone; or it may be specifically organized for one of these purposes only. The young men who follow the fora herds usually make only makeshift shelters or sleep in the open using their time and energy on fencing the cattle with thorn bushes to protect them against predators rather than providing for their own comfort.

The mobility of hawicha cattle is limited not only by the human desire to avoid laborious camp shifts, but also by the dams' need to stay close to their rather immobile young calves, and to have access to water regularly every one to two days. A couple of oxen and bulls may be kept with the hawicha to provide for breeding and slaughter. At night, the hawicha are kept in a thorn enclosure inside the camp itself. They are taken out to graze early in the morning. When there is little grass, the herdsmen take these milk animals to the water only every other day, alternating between going to the well or river and to pastures in the opposite direction. The area that can be exploited from the camp is limited by the time it takes to travel back and forth with a cattle herd and by the time they need to graze. The maximum distance of each daily journey is probably around 12 km, although cattle can in exceptional circumstances walk up to 30 km per day¹⁶⁾ and some distance can be gained by driving the animals to the water during the cool of the night. The water point is usually situated closer to the camp, for on watering days cattle must be allowed time both for grazing and drinking.

Flocks of small stock and camel herds can be split in the same way as the cattle herds. Sheep and goats are generally handled together and referred to as re, and these flocks are divided into fora and hawicha only if they

are very large. A small flock which is important for family subsistence can be kept undivided in the vicinity of the camp, while a person rich in cattle who also has a large flock of sheep and goats is likely to send it all out as fora.

On a general level, the daily circuits of hawicha stock and the far-reaching routes of the fora are governed by the manager's judgement of the availability of fresh grazing and water. The operation of this pasture concept is, however, much more intricate than is apparent from such an over-simplified statement, and the decision on itineraries implies complex considerations concerning the various nutrients embedded in different plants and the health hazards associated with their habitats.

In the dry zone of Kenya, there is generally a close correlation between soil and vegetation¹⁷⁾. When talking about different pasture areas, the Boran herdowners express themselves in terms of soil; soil texture and colour provide the points of reference for their classification of the district into ecological units¹⁸⁾. Each soil concept also has connotations concerning the availability of salt licks, the mineral content of water and vegetation, the presence of insects and other parasites, and so on.

In areas where water is not rapidly drained off the soil surface, and which thus become muddy in the rainy season, small stock easily develop foot rot. Ticks, fleas and flies breed in the rainy season in such areas and endanger the health and reproduction of the livestock. Small stock and camels¹⁹⁾ are said to be particularly vulnerable since their young may die from tick attacks, but cattle suffer too, and the presence of certain breeds of ticks make them fail to go on heat. Similar problems occur close to rivers and small streams where liverfluke and horseflies threaten the well-being of the animals, and where mosquitoes make the area unhealthy for humans.

Certain zones are better than others because of their access to salt. In the case of camels and small stock this is a critical matter²⁰⁾. Salt is used to provide a special cure for parasital infections, and also to raise the general nutritional condition of the animal. Too much salt leads to stomach troubles, so periods of high salt intake must be alternated with periods of access to fresh water and pasture with little salt content. With too little salt, camel bulls do not "rut" and cattle also do not reproduce properly. As we have said, certain areas are also recognised as good for fattening and others for fast reproduction and milk production²¹⁾; this makes it sensible to separate oxen and cows for grazing purposes. Soil

distribution particularly complicates the stock migration patterns of camels, which have to be alternated between salty and non-salty areas more frequently than every dry and wet season. Camel owners have to keep the state of their herds under constant observation and move in relation to the particular requirements of each moment in time, whereas there is at least a trend towards seasonal regularity in the patterns of cattle movements. But even the owners of cattle, sheep and goats need to adjust their movements of stock with reference to special health hazards and symptoms of discomfort in the animals. Borana have a vast knowledge about particular trees, herbs and grasses and their effects on animal health. The dietary preferences of different animal species, and the nutritious content, veterinary utility, and development cycle of each plant are things observed and transmitted as part of the Boran cultural heritage.

Hawicha cattle sometimes have privileged access to the type of water that Borana regard as most nourishing in terms of salt and minerals²²), that is, the water of permanent wells. On the whole, however, the conditions under which the hawicha are tended are more precarious and less healthy than those prevailing for fora animals. Areas in permanent use are more congested, and consequently the risks of infection and the competition for grass are higher there than in the more peripheral areas used by the fora stock. The fora animals on the whole get a more varied diet. When a cow in the hawicha herd at the main camp is impregnated she is at once sent out to the fora and only brought back just in time for calving. The competition over pastures that can be used by the milk stock at times makes it necessary to protect such areas for their exclusive use. All cases that I have heard of involving open conflicts between Borana over the use of pasture have concerned the intrusion of fora stock on pasture close to the home camps. This should not be taken as a sign that the best pastures are reserved for the milk cattle, but rather that mobile cattle which can exploit good grass which is difficult to reach should not be allowed to compete for the scarce resources available for stationary stock.

In years with adequate rainfall, Boran migrations have generally been confined within the district. The policy of the British administration was that each tribe should have its own clearly defined grazing area, and that the district boundary should define the limits of Boran pastoral movements. It does so even today, when tribal boundaries have formally been abolished, if for no other reason than the Boran fear of hostile neighbours.

During drought years, however, these boundaries have been transgressed both in colonial times and since Independence. In July 1939, for example, cattle people from Merti and the northern banks of the Euaso Nyiro went far north to the lagas (dry river beds) of the Chera plains in Marsabit District, where they were found to stay up to the end of December because they were cut off from their usual route by drought. The rains of 1938 had been scanty, and in 1939 there were no rains at all²³). To the west, in the same year, the Igembe Meru had to share grazing grounds with Borana from Kulamawe, and the Kinna Borana were concentrated in the otherwise tsetse-infested Bisanadi area. A couple of years later, Boran herdowners took their stock en masse over Tana River as well as into Tharaka areas and there were serious clashes with the people living there. The extreme migration patterns of around 1940 were repeated in 1976, when Borana from Kulamawe, Kinna and Gachuru took refuge with their cattle at Mutuati, Lare and Kiengu in Meru District, and some Borana from Merti migrated as far north as to Buna in Wajir District.

To sum up: There are a number of types of stock mobility among the Borana:

- a/ the daily movements for grazing and water back and forth from the main camp or the fora enclosure;
- b/ the wider movements of fora herds to use temporary resources of grass and water;
- c/ transfers of stock between the fora and hawicha herds;
- d/ definite shifts of people, stock, and home camps in response to seasonal fluctuations or the condition of the hawicha animals.

Apart from these types of movement, we have also mentioned the physical reallocation of camps and animals, with which we need not concern ourselves much in the present context but which should be included for the sake of completeness:

- e/ the minor movements of camps and associated stock for hygienic and labour-saving reasons;
- f/ migrations that are included by social considerations, involving the shift of a household and its associate stock to a new camp;
- g/ the physical reallocation of stock through the transfer of property rights or rights to use a particular animal.

To exploit the natural resources of the Waso area efficiently, flexibility is essential. The aggregate effect of the movement patterns summarized above - particularly a/ to d/ - is to redistribute livestock (and people) over the natural resources available at a particular time, in response to

Map 2.1. Boran grazing lands

A. Topography and administrative position of Waso

B. Seasonal land use

Legend

Dry season grazing

Directions taken in severe droughts

Pastures available in wet season only

Areas which can be used permanently by cattle in normal years

C. Tsetse infestation and ecological zones

Legend

Tsetse infestation

Ecological zone boundary

Source: Atlas of Kenya, 1970:29,45

D. Limitations to grazing

Legend

Recommended for use by group or company ranch

Presently used by Meru Ranching Society

Game Reserve

Avoided by Borana for reasons of security or scarcity of labour

the uncertainties of rainfall and access to water. In this way Borana have been able to avoid over-exploitation of particular areas. The commonage landrights of the Borana can be seen as an adaptation to a situation of patchy and unpredictable rain and an uneven spread of pasture.

The general pattern that emerges from the combination of stock movements is one of a dry-season contraction of stock to certain specific areas closer to permanent wells (ela) and to the river zones along the Euaso Nyiro, Galla, Bisanadi and Kinna watercourses, followed by a wet season expansion into areas that have only temporary water, such as rainpools (hare) or dams (dambala). Priority is always given to the use of temporary water, permanent water points being left as a "last resort". Areas with permanent open water, such as rivers, are deliberately avoided in the moist seasons due to health risks associated with mosquitoes, flies and parasital infections.

Once again it should be stated that this general pattern of expansion and contraction does not mean that all households follow the same seasonal routes from one year to the next. Regular transhumance patterns can be identified at certain locations, such as the northern bank of the Euaso Nyiro at Dadach Latta and Boji-Malka Galla. The river zone has perennial fodder crops, but of a low quality: some 3-4 km. north of the river is an intermediate area with annual grasses, called the Cher Daba plains, and north of this are vast plains of good perennial grasses but with little water in the dry season. The "normal" pattern here is that the main camps with the hawicha stock reside in the southernmost part of the perennial grass plains during the rainy season, whereas the fora stock and their herdsman roam far to the north. In the dry season, the hawicha retreat to the riverine zone, followed by the fora who move on to the Cher Daba. Even in this area, however, extreme droughts have interrupted the pattern at times and caused families to change their habitual routes.

Thus, seen over a longer period of time, such as that spanned by the life-history of a particular household, the spatial irregularity of the rains tends to create a pattern intermediate between proper "transhumance" along fixed routes and what Salzman terms an "epicyclical" movement pattern²⁴). The latter is characterized by erratic and unpredictable movements, "catch as catch can" responses to micro-climatic changes. The main directions are predictable, but itineraries always have to be adjusted more or less to meet emergencies. Large-scale irregularities in the climatic pattern have sometimes caused a large part of the Boran population to change locality altogether. Judging from colonial records from Isiolo Town (which is situated

at a higher altitude than the bulk of the Borana area - 1100 m. - and thus has a better pattern of rainfall) there were serious droughts in 1934, 1939, 1942-5, 1950, 1954-5 and 1961, and more recently 1965, 1970, 1973, and 1976 have been particularly harsh years. The Borana of Waso have a system of naming years by the combination of a name from the Muslim weekdays and some important event in the particular year. Several years are named after places, indicating an extreme concentration of population in a particular location that year, due to an uneven spread of rain and grazing. Thus 1945 is named "The Saturday year when people went to the Euaso Nyiro Swamps" and 1972 "The Saturday year when Borana moved to Kinna".

SUBSIDIARY STRATEGIES OF RISK REDUCTION

Mobility is probably the most conspicuous of the risk-reducing tactics that Borana herdowners can apply. But there are other, partly interdependent aspects of pastoral strategy that should be mentioned, namely herd dispersal and herd diversification.

By dividing a family's holding into spatially separate units, losses due to narrowly located causes can be minimised. It is not only the rainfall that is patchy and unpredictable, other hazards to the herd are also local in their incidence. Some relate to the Borana's interaction with neighbouring people, such as the risk of raids from the Samburu, in whose cycle of age-grade customs and ceremonies cattle-rustling is important. Others are "ecological" such as the risk of predator attacks, or of infection by diseases. If the herdowner can place his animals in territorially distinct units he can avoid having all of them stolen or hit by the same disease. A total dispersion, in the form of the complete scattering of a man's herd never takes place, of course. Rather than being a practice in its own right, herd dispersion is an aspect of many of the considerations that a herdowner has to bear in mind. Marrying a new wife in order to establish a new secondary household enables the herdowner to increase the spread of his animals, and the separation of a son's household from his father's camp can be seen by the old man more as a spatial subdivision of a herd held in common than as a split-up of property. The initial division between fora and hawicha animals has this element in it, and the combination of several species within a holding may similarly enable the livestock owner to reduce risks by exploiting different areas.

Let us now turn to diversification, which is more of an independent strategy. By herd diversification we mean the combination of different species of

stock in the property holding of one household. The Waso Borana say "It is better to have a few goats, a few sheep, a few cows and a few camels than to have one thousand cattle". The advantages of different species complement each other. Regardless of sub-tribe, most herdowners would like to have one sub-herd of each category of animals - cattle, camels and small stock. A combination of a herd of one of the larger types of animals and a mixed flock of small stock is quite common. Then what are the advantages of such a combination²⁵⁾?

Over the years a camel herd is likely to be subject to fewer and smaller fluctuations in size and composition than a cattle herd. Once started, their lactation is relatively insensitive to drought, and the long lactation period gives continuity in production throughout the year. If the greater part of the camel herd is wiped out for some reason, such as by war, disease or very prolonged drought, it takes a longer time for it to regain its former numerical strength than would be the case with cattle, and it also initially takes a longer time before one can get milk from it when a prolonged drought has upset reproduction. Cattle are less resistant to drought, but on the other hand recover faster, and start to produce milk faster. Even better from this point of view are goats, which are fairly resistant to drought and which can produce milk four or five months after the onset of rains. Goats and sheep reproduce rapidly, but tend to be more vulnerable to disease than the larger stock.

By keeping a combination of stock types, a household can protect itself against drought, and secure both a continuous supply of food and sources for capital recuperation. Epizooties also tend to hit selectively among cattle, camels and small stock, so that a man with a combined herd has a better point of departure for recovery when his herds or flocks are struck by disease. Finally, as we have already seen, each species has its own pattern of production of meat, milk and fats, and a combination of different types gives access to a wider range of products and a more even supply of food over the seasons. Herd diversification thus both reduces the risk of total loss and ensures a more complete use of environmental resources.

In Dirre and Liban, Borana Gutu had an adaptation almost entirely based on the rearing of cattle and sheep. Camels are not suited to the central Boran areas, and even the introduction of the goat is said to be a rather recent innovation²⁶⁾. In his description of the Marsabit Borana, who live in an environment more similar to Waso than to Dirre, Baxter²⁷⁾ presents a para-

digm for the typical adaptation of a group of brothers. The eldest brother stays with the cattle, the next one with the camels, and the youngest with the small stock. Fraternal groups with this type of adaptation are not found today among the Borana of Isiolo District but occur among their Somali neighbours. There is, however, a general recognition of the value of diversification, and leaving aside the Gutu preference for cattle milk and their symbolic enhancement of cattle, Waso Borana, irrespective of sub-tribe, commonly acknowledge the relative ecological merits of camels. This is stressed for example in such a saying as "The one who has a camel heifer will never become poor".

Much as they would like to have independent herding units of "all three with sweet milk", there are very few Borana Gutu who can boast such wealth today - perhaps no more than ten families, if so many. This is of course to be expected since most of the camel holdings of the Waso people were lost during the shifta period. However, informants tend to give the impression that, even in the years immediately before the shifta war, the general picture was the traditional one, with Sakuye primarily tending camels and Borana living from cattle. Both groups supplemented their large stock with small stock. The two groups utilized different, but partly interlocking, regions.

Although there are certain areas, such as Matasara, where a favourable mix of soil, vegetation and water resources makes it possible to keep small stock, cattle and camels, there is a tendency for certain areas to be "pure" cattle areas and others to be exploitable mainly by camels. Camels and cattle do not have the same pasture habits; cattle graze while camels browse from trees and bushes. Camels of course are able to sustain themselves without water for a longer time than cattle, and because of this they can use areas that are closed to cattle. Cattle, on the other hand, cope better with the parasites thriving in moist areas and can thus use riverine zones that are closed to camels. From the point of view of veterinary hygiene, cattle can stay in the same enclosure for a long time without many problems, but she-camels whose young are vulnerable to ticks have to move away both from their own dung and from that of cattle. All these factors contribute to keep camels and cattle apart - and to explain why there was in the pre-shifta time a certain division between Sakuye and Borana Gutu territories. The alliance of the two groups can be partly explained by the fact that they did not compete for the same pasture resources²⁸). The permanent use of certain areas by Sakuye camelkeepers actually protected the wet-season

grazing rights of the cattle-keeping Borana²⁹⁾. This was the case at Yamicha and Bule, for example. The gains from such an alliance in wet-season grazing, and also in the provision of transport animals, tended to balance the problems that could arise from time to time over the use of waterpoints. There is always a latent friction between cattle- and camel-herders over dams and ponds, for, unless subject to strict discipline, camels tend to enter the water, muddying it and fouling it so much that cattle refuse to take it.

Since the secessionist war, Somali groups have taken over the "camel niche" but there is not as yet any new form of cattle-camel keeper symbiosis. The friction over such matters as the use of waterholes is less easily solved with the Boran-Somali language barrier than within the old Boran-Sakuye alliance. The Somali use of pasture formerly exploited by Sakuye inevitably makes the recovery of Sakuye pastoralism even more difficult than it would have been had they only lost their stock. Borana, too, feel that they have lost grazing grounds in this way, for they fear to bring their cattle into traditional wet-season pastures which now instead tend to be taken over by Somali cattle.

It is interesting to speculate why there has been no large-scale transition of Borana Gutu into camel pastoralism when they recognize the relative advantages of camels in some of their areas. One set of factors has to do with the allocation of labour. Even if the two types of livestock are to be combined within the property of one family, they still must be managed in separate units and this means either that the family must be wealthy and large enough to maintain distinct households or herding units, or that the camels can be left with allied, specialized camelkeepers such as the Sakuye.

Another related problem is that of expertise. Camel pastoralism demands a very specialized knowledge of soils, fodder and symptoms of well-being or discomfort in the camels. Sakuye claim that many of the Borana Gutu lack the specialized secular and ritual knowledge needed to give camels the right care. In reply to my question, a Sakuye elder summarized the Sakuye attitude to Boran camel-keeping "... yes, some of them bought camels, but in the end they do not have the right interest. They sell them perhaps or just let them die through carelessness." It appears that experience gained by a camel-herder or somebody tending small stock can more easily be transferred to cattle-keeping than vice versa.

A third set of factors relates to difficulties in acquiring breeding stock³⁰⁾. Camel reproduction and calf survival are very precarious, and therefore

there has never been a great market supply of female camels. Those who have breeding she-camels tend to hold on to them. Male loaders, on the other hand, are put on the market, although Borana find it more difficult to obtain them now than before the crisis. During the latter half of the 1970s there has been an increase in prices offered for camels intended for export to the Arab world and this may also affect obversely the local supply of transport animals and breeders.

Baxter³¹⁾ mentions that in 1952-3 the Isiolo Borana Gutu sold sheep and goats in order to invest in camels, but it is possible that he happened to visit Isiolo at a rather atypical time. The British administration had just confiscated large numbers of camels from the Rendille who had overstepped the border of their grazing areas. The Borana eagerly took advantage of this opportunity. However, even many of the wealthier Borana who could afford both the necessary labour and the investment in a reasonably large breeding herd, of say 10 dams, failed despite serious attempts to get into this niche and dropped the idea of camel-keeping. Only a small number of Borana Gutu succeeded in maintaining and enlarging their herds. Like the Sakuye, they suffered substantial losses in the shifta war. Now, even without the disrupting results of the war, one can expect only a slow transition, for it takes a considerable time for a camel herd to grow - a normally composed herd of camels can double in size only in 15 years under really optimal conditions, while the corresponding period for cattle would be 6 1/2 years³²⁾.

The shifta war led to large losses not only of milk and transport camels but also of donkeys and mules. This created a total shortage of transport animals with serious consequences of the Borana's ability to maintain a mobile system of livestock care. Borana claim that it was normal before the war for a family to have at least a couple of donkeys or loading camels, the choice of species partly depending on whether the particular household used to stay on the open floodplains or in the scrub area (charri) during the dry seasons. There are now few cattle-owning families with even this minimal number of transport animals. That the problem is serious can be understood from the fact that four donkeys are needed to carry a single mat-house and that the Boran donkeys are too weak to be used for heavy loading every day.

Even in the floodplains area, where there are large flocks of donkeys roaming around, the distribution of these resources is very uneven over the population as a whole. Lack of loading animals makes camp shifts extremely

difficult, and also restricts the distance from a source of domestic water that a family can camp. According to the Borana themselves, the lack of transport animals has led to an over-exploitation of certain areas with permanent water, such as the Cher Daba mentioned above, and has made it difficult to avoid settlement in the malarious riverine zone.

Footnotes to Chapter 2

1. Ann.Rep.Dept. of Agriculture, Isiolo 1977
2. See e.g. Diarra 1975; Ormerod 1976:818; Copans 1975
3. Helland 1977:5; In the northern Boran areas, the yearly rainfall spans from less than 500 mm to above 700 mm.
4. Dahl and Hjort 1976:148-53
5. One kg of maize meal gives approximately the same amount of energy as 1 1/2 kg beef or 4.2 kg cattle milk
6. Pastoral societies differ in the way they exploit natural resources other than their animals - the Maasai for example, are more dependent on cattle by-products than the Borana appear to be. Very little is known about the organisational consequences of such differences or how they influence migration patterns. Torry (1973:176) in his study on the Gabbra points out that the latter have to adjust their movements in order to ensure access to fibres for water containers. Like the Borana, the Gabbra have a vast knowledge of the utility of different plants, herbs and trees, and depend on forest products for many parts of their material equipment.
7. Wisner 1972:5
8. Barth 1964; Paine 1971; Schneider 1957:284.
In a recent paper, Schneider (1978) notes that "Students of East African pastoralism are increasingly leaning towards capitalistic rather than subsistence explanations". Schneider challenges theories that see pastoral production as designed to provide a regular food supply, contrasting them with theories which emphasize that cattle can be managed for profit because of their self-reproductive capacities. In my opinion, there is no real contradiction in these two approaches. It should be recognized that in "pure pastoralism" (as traditionally practised by Borana) a regular food supply can only be ensured by continuous herd reproduction and that attempts to reduce household risks in most cases involve an ambition to make the management unit of labour and livestock larger and more viable (See chapter 4). As long as there is risk of recurrent reduction, profit must be built into the system. In agro-pastoral systems, however, the "capital" aspect of cattle tends to become predominant.
9. Cattle are also in Schneider's terms (1968:15) "a strong, hard currency and can act at the same time as a medium of exchange, store of value and standard of deferred payment..."
10. Bremaud 1969:41
11. Mason and Maule 1960:95
12. Rossetti & Congiu 1955:113

13. UNDP/FAO 1971a:15
14. Widstrand 1973:51
15. AGROTEC 1974, vol.2 appendix 1:26
16. Dahl & Hjort op.cit.:238-41
17. Pratt 1962:348. For a classification, see Pratt 1961 and UNDP/FAO 1971b:63
18. Cf. Chambers 1969:4-6 and appendix C
19. Gwynne & Pratt 1977:179,183; Torry 1973:82. The ticks that particularly disturb cattle are Rhipicephalus Evertii and those attacking camels are Rhipicephalus Pulchellus
20. Bremaud op.cit.:73f; Dahl and Hjort op.cit.:250
21. Chambers op.cit.:5
22. Helland 1977:13
23. Isiolo District Annual Report 1939 PC NFD 1/4/2
24. Salzman 1967:122
25. For a more detailed discussion, see Dahl & Hjort 1976:223 ff
26. Haberland 1963:65
27. Baxter 1966b:120
28. Spencer (1973) describes the link between cattle-owning Samburu and camel-owning Rendille as one where an intermediate group, the Ariaal, forms a channel for excess population from the stagnant, non-growth camel economy to become absorbed into the cattle economy. People pushed out of the camel adaptation - particularly younger brothers who do not inherit sufficient herds of camels to establish viable units - turn to the Ariaal areas where they maintain herds of small stock and at the same time try to build up herds of cattle and camels. In a second generation, the sons of successful Ariaal may return to Rendille, or make use of affinal links to Samburu and "become" Samburu. Unfortunately, there is little evidence as to whether the alliance between Sakuye and Borana worked in the same way. Marriage prohibitions were an obstacle to any total absorption of Sakuye into Borana, but poor Sakuye who could not maintain themselves as specialized camel herders had probably the chance of attaching themselves as clients to Boran cattle owners for an intermediate period. Perhaps it is through the frequency of such arrangements that one can explain the reason that Sakuye today are much more similar culturally and linguistically to the Borana than the Rendille are in relation to the Sakuye, though they claim the same Somali descent.
29. Similarly, the Wata permanently exploited areas which Borana could only use in extreme drought.
30. Torry 1973:91 mentions that Gabbra are reluctant to sell or give she-camels to other people than "camel people"
31. Baxter 1966a:262
32. Dahl & Hjort op.cit.:259,261

3. THE RHYTHM OF PASTORAL LIFE

The previous chapter dealt with the general principles of the Borana's adaptation to the Waso environment. This chapter will present another perspective and we shall see how this adaptation is expressed as a way of life in daily and seasonal routines.

The core of a Boran cattle-owning homestead can be a simple family unit consisting of a man and his wife and children, or an extended one including the sub-households of several wives, of married sons and daughters and of various female dependants related to the herdowner through other affinal or agnatic links. Each adult woman has a house of her own: hence, sizes of homesteads vary with the number of female dependants attached to the homestead head,

but most contain between two and eight houses. As a rule, the homestead is not an isolated unit but part of a larger camp which usually consists of two to six homesteads: in all, perhaps thirty houses if the camp is situated in the scrub "charri" areas, and even more in some floodplain settlements. The camp may in turn be part of a larger rera, a cluster of camps. In that case, the next camp is perhaps only a few hundred meters away: less frequently, one will have to walk some kilometers to reach the nearest neighbour.

Let us make an imaginary wet-season visit to such a camp, that of Sora Halake, in order to get a general picture of Boran life, and then see what changes there are in living conditions during different seasons.

A DAY IN SORA'S CAMP

For the alien visitor approaching a Boran camp from a distance, the camp is almost indistinguishable from the savannah surroundings. Coming closer, a number of dome-shaped, mat-covered houses can be seen, rather like grey haystacks from the outside, forming a semi-circular row around the thorny fences of the livestock corrals. In order to avoid the wind blowing directly into the houses from the cattle enclosure, houses are normally erected on the windward side of the camp. This also enables a livestock owner to keep an eye on his animals from the entrance to his house.

A day in Sora's camp starts just before dawn, when it is still chilly. The women hurry to make up fires in the small kitchen huts - simple, grass-covered sheds - and smoke filters up through the kitchen roofs. The wives and adolescent daughters of Sora and his camp-mates have to prepare tea for their families, paying special attention to the youngsters who are to take out the cattle for dawn grazing, ware. As soon as these have had their tea, they remove the butume from the opening in the corral fence. The butume is a thorny branch of particular symbolic significance: it should always be a freshly cut one, and represents the herdowner having a sufficient nucleus of cattle from which to breed future herds. Sora Halake's sons and young brothers carefully clean the gateway from any loose thorns that can hurt the cattle's feet. Then the animals pass through the gate one by one under the watchful eye of Sora himself after he has finished his morning prayer, the salad, the first of five daily prayers that a Muslim Boran elder has to read. Sora checks all the animals for particular needs, and those which show signs of disease are separated from the herd for treatment in the camp.

While the cattle are away on morning grazing, Sora's wife Asha and his mother

Qaballe continue their chores in the camp, cleaning their mat-houses and kitchens and preparing the milk-pots by fumigating their interiors with smouldering charcoal pieces of aromatic wood. Around ten o'clock the cattle are brought back from the pastures to be milked. Only in the rainy season are they taken out to graze before the first milking. This practice allows them to take advantage of the fresh grass shoots and the moisture of the dew and is thought to increase both the quality and the quantity of the milk yield.

Milking is the women's responsibility, and they have milking rights to particular cows. When there are many cows to milk Sora's wife asks one of the herdboys or a younger girl to do the milking for her. The milker observes the behaviour of the cattle to see which animal is ready for milking, enticing one cow at a time by calling out the name to which it responds, often a name which indicates the way in which it was brought into the herd. During milking, the calf is tethered close to the cow or controlled by a child assisting the milker. When a cow has been milked, it is up to Asha or Qaballe, whoever owns its milk, to decide how much should be stored and how much should be distributed for immediate consumption. If Sora is present he is offered a sip of the milk and a ceremonial blessing is said to express the patrilineal continuity of the herd's ownership. After this, milk is given to the children.

In the wet season, there is often enough milk to cater for all the inhabitants of the camp, and all who are still around at milking time get a share of the fresh milk. If there is a limited amount of milk, young children, particularly toddlers up to the age of three years, have absolute priority rights according to Boran custom, and adults and older children have to content themselves with maize, tea and other substitutes.

When they have had their breakfast, some children are sent out with the calves or with such small stock as are kept at the camp. Lambs and kids which have slept shut up with their mothers are separated from them and penned. The larger sheep and goats spend their day grazing and browsing not far from the camp. If there is plenty of fodder, they will not be watered at all, otherwise only every second or third day. The children take them to some pond or dam, perhaps where the cattle are watered in the afternoon, in which case they go early to avoid the big animals scaring the small ones. The large cattle leave the camp again having rested some time after milking, while the herdboys have their meal. Outside the camp the herd and the boys who are to

follow it during the day join the cattle and herders from other homesteads in the camp. They keep together for part of the way and then drift apart when they reach the pasture chosen for the day.

There is great need for helpers on the way to the pastures, and the herd may be accompanied by extra people until it has reached its destination. If there are no predators around, and if the herd has arrived at a good area with plenty of nice grass or nourishing acacia pods, some of the senior youths who have followed the herd on its way out return to the camp, leaving the younger boys to look after the cattle.

During the afternoon, the herd is allowed to graze its way slowly towards the waterpoint. In the wet season, cattle watering is not heavy, for it can be done from open stretches of water. The main work involved is in keeping the herds separate. The cattle go down to the water's edge and drink by themselves.

After the cattle herders had left the camp in the morning to accompany their stock to grass and waters, the other campinhabitants turned to their own tasks. Some men and women with errands to faraway camps, to the nearest "town"¹⁾ Kinna, or to the irrigation gardens had already left at dawn after a breakfast of curdled milk. Abdirahman, one of Sora's younger brothers, and Simpirre, Asha's widowed aunt hurried off to their maize shambas, over 7 kilometers away from the home camp, to do some weeding before the day became too hot. In the late afternoon, there will again be some time for working in the garden, but Abdirahman and Simpirre are eager to finish their work in time to have left the shamba when the wild buffaloe and elephants come to drink from the river. Some of the women and young girls went to Kinna market to sell handicrafts, milk and clarified butter, and to buy tea, sugar and other commodities in Hajji Wako's shop. A couple of senior men, Sora's camp-mates, took the chance of a lift to Garba Tula in a passing Landrover, in order to take part in an informal meeting in preparation for the next parliamentary election, to do some business and to see friends for an amicable exchange of news about weather, pasture and animal health conditions both in the neighbourhood of Garba Tula and in more distant areas.

For those who remain in and around Sora's camp there is also important work to be done particularly by the women. Excess milk from the morning milking must be stored as curds or ghee, and the curds being processed must be taken care of. Asha, Qaballe and their daughters have to look after the needs of the herds and flocks. Some of the cattle remain in the camp and the women

are responsible for their care. While veterinary cures are usually administered either by Sora or by Asha's brother who is a "traditional veterinarian" (chirresa), it is Asha and her mother-in-law who have the task of feeding and watering the sick animals and who must collect grass and water for them. They also have to look after the smallest calves which are left in separate calf pens within the cattle enclosure during the day after having suckled from their mothers in the morning. Motherless calves are reared in the house, being fed with the help of a skin funnel. Newborn and weak kids and lambs may also be tethered in the shadow of the mat-house and demand special attention. The sheep and goat enclosure has to be swept out so that lice, ticks and fleas do not breed in the dung.

Apart from these tasks related to the welfare of the herd, the women have a lot of domestic work to do before the day becomes too hot. The mat-house floor must be sprinkled with water against dust and the litter swept up, tea glasses cleansed, clothes washed. Water must be brought home from the well; Sora's eldest daughter Addi carries it on her head or on her back. Other luckier families manage to fetch water with the help of a donkey or loading camel. Firewood and aromatic branches for the milk-pots must be collected, and bark-fibres, palm-leaves and roots for the manufacture of house-mats, ropes or milk basketry must be gathered and dried.

In her household work, Asha gets help from her own daughters or from her young sisters-in-law. From the age of seven, a girl takes on more and more of the domestic tasks - cooking tea and fetching firewood. Since Asha has a couple of very young children, her attention is continuously interrupted by childcare, though she gets help in babysitting from the old men and women of the camp, and even from her five-year old daughter. When resting or talking, Sora and other elders often have a child on their lap which they joke with or fondle. The small ones need constant surveillance so that they do not walk into the fires or leave the safe courtyard and run into the bush with all its dangers for children. Children under seven spend all their time inside the camp, often "hunting" insects or lizards or playing herdowner and housewife. The small boys build thorn enclosures for stone or clay cattle or jawbone camels, and the girls erect small dollhouse huts, loading the toy camels with nutshells, small pieces of cloth etc. During their childhood, boys and girls often play together, until at the age of ten their real training for adult roles begins, when herding and household care is no longer play but they are expected to be responsible for their tasks.

In the middle of the day, between noon and around three o'clock, the sun is hot and Sora's camp is very quiet, seeming almost deserted. Some old men who have retired from cattle management or who live in the camp as impoverished dependants rest in the shade of a grassroof "verandah" or engage in rope-making, small carpentry or leatherwork. These are all male jobs. Sora takes a nap in the cool mathouse and afterwards asks his daughter Addi to fetch water for him to wash himself before the aldhuhor prayer. Asha, Qaballe and the other women remaining at home spend the early afternoon mending household utensils. Asha is making a new housemat to replace one which is worn-out and Qaballe has begun one for Addi, who will soon be married. There is always a demand for such work. It takes about a week to make one mat¹⁾ and as about 40 are needed for one hut it can be seen that a substantial amount of work is invested in the hut equipment. The completion of all that is needed for a hut would take a single person more than a year to carry out, so cooperation is necessary. At her wedding, Addi will receive her first equipment from her female relatives and friends, but although a mat can last for ten years if treated with care, she has continually to repair and replace her own mats for the rest of her life, as well as assisting those who are about to marry.

Women take a great pride in their huts, mats and pots and when there is time for this type of handicraft they are usually happy, for it compares favourably with other work and is associated with seasons of plenty. Another task connected with abundance is the churning and boiling of butter.

In the late afternoon, after "four o'clock tea" the people of Sora's camp again start to prepare for the return of the cattle. The milk pots to be used for the evening's milk have again to be smoked and the young men must hurry away to meet the herdsmen in order to help them as they head homewards. The calves and their mothers arrive at the camp from different directions, the calves being led into the right enclosure by the children, who like everybody else in Sora's camp recognize all the cattle of the different herdowners. Once again, Sora as the "father of the cattle" (abba loni) inspects his stock. The cattle are allowed to rest before it is time to milk them again, just outside the corral. Then the small calves are allowed to rejoin their mothers, but are prevented from sucking until two of the udders have been milked. All the people in the camp are engaged in one way or the other in the evening milking and the tasks connected with it. The shade of the hut, which was a pleasant resort during the hot day, is now a ritually dangerous gloom, the gadis galgalla in which nobody is allowed to idle.

When the milking is over and the calves have again been penned separately from their mothers, it is rather dark and little more manual work can be done. Evening, wari, has its own important activities however, for this is the time when different family members meet and when Sora can interrogate the herdboys about their experiences during the day. It is also the time for gossip, storytelling and entertainment. This evening moonlight makes it possible to walk between camps, and a couple of men arrive from the ola next to Sora's to hear the news from Garba Tula. One of the elders who has returned from Garba has brought some miraa²⁾ leaves from the market and the other men congregate around the fire in front of his hut, for miraa should not be taken in solitude, but be part of an evening of stimulating talk between friends. Children and women hang around and listen to the talk of the men without taking any very active part in the conversation. Sora's own family, who are not hosts to the gathering, drop off one by one and go to sleep.

THE CHANGE OF SEASONS

The types of activity that have to be undertaken in a cattle camp remain essentially the same throughout the year. As the dry season lingers on, however, many of them become more and more arduous, and at the same time the family's milk supply diminishes making the household increasingly dependent on subsidiary, non-pastoral sources of food. The daily rounds of cattle and small stock become longer and longer, involving more and more exhausting trekking. The distances covered by the cattle when leisurely grazing in the wet season can be as short as 3 or 4 kilometers a day, including their journey to the watering place. In the dry season, they may go without water for two or three days and then on the watering day be taken to wells even fifteen or twenty kilometers away. To follow the thirsty and fast-moving stock such distances is a tiring task. At the height of a drought, cattle are sometimes trekked to water during the night in order to reduce the losses of bodily water that can be the result of long journeys in the hot sun. It is also in the dry season that cattle become dependent on wells rather than dams, pans and ponds, particularly in the scrub regions in the southwest of the district. North of the Isiolo-Garba Tula road, it is frequently the Euaso Nyiro that provides dry season water. Compared to watering in the wet season, dry season watering from a well is hard work. When Borana water from a well, it has to be done with great speed, so as to avoid the loss of valuable grazing time while queuing for water or during the watering itself. Boran technology knows no faster way of watering than by manual hauling.

If the well is deep, there is no other way of solving the problem than by long chains of people handing each other giraffe-skin buckets or old kerosene drums. In Isiolo District, no wells exceed a depth corresponding to a four or five man chain, and most are shallower³⁾. At a couple of places, the Kenya Government has installed mechanical pumps, but even there some water is hauled manually to supplement the pump and to avoid hold-ups due to mechanical breakdowns⁴⁾.

Ola Fugicha, a camp with a total herd of about 90 cattle, can provide an example of the time and labour involved in this task. In the dry season of 1974, the cattle of this camp were watered at the Bule wells. All the cattle were grazed and watered together. It took two hours to drive them from the grazing to the wells, and the same time to take them back. A couple of adult herdsmen followed the herd, and two of the camp-head's daughters arrived at the well some hours in advance in order to prepare for the watering. Apart from hauling there were additional tasks to be carried out. The watering trough had cracked in the sun and had to be repaired⁵⁾. The cattle were tired and anxious to get water and had to be disciplined and hindered from hurting each other or trampling into the trough. Five adult people were involved in the operation. The herdsmen and the young girls took turns, and it took 1 1/2 hours to haul water for all the cattle⁶⁾. In such a dry season, cattle which are watered every two or three days drink about 40 litres of water each before their thirst is slaked⁷⁾. This means that the total amount of water to be manually hauled in this case was 3 600 litres.

On days when they are only going for grass, the cattle do not have to walk neither as far, nor as fast as when they are heading for the well. Even so, a dry season grazing round may be one of seven to ten kilometers. The distances covered by small stock similarly increase. When there is little grass, it is important that the stock get enough time for grazing and that no unnecessary transport tasks are undertaken. On extreme occasions they are brought back to be milked only in the morning. The regular dry season pattern is, however, that cattle are milked twice, but with no ware grazing.

Drought also affects the women's work. One change is caused by the type of food that supplements pastoral produce in the dry season. Wheat flour is baked into chapati or anjera pancakes, maize meal is cooked into posho, and maize cobs, which are preferred by the Borana, must be pounded and then boiled for an hour and a half⁸⁾. These jobs tie the women and the children helping them more closely to their kitchens than does the preparation of

milk. Another dry season problem for the Boran women is the fact that the more arid the general conditions become, the more frequently do the Borana have to move their main camps. Any move is a strain on labour and may affect the proper attention to other tasks. Women are responsible not only for the production of most of the household equipment but also for the erection and dismantling of houses⁹⁾ and for loading and unloading the donkeys and camels. To build even one mat-house is a full day's work for three or four women. The transport itself can become very irksome if there is a scarcity of donkeys. With one donkey one may have to return several times in order to move a single house. Frequent moves tear the housemats, but in the dry season the women have little time to repair them or make new ones. After a long drought like that of 1975-6, the houses are in a very bad state. Instead of attending to the maintenance of household equipment, women become absorbed during the dry season in providing for the young, sick and feeble animals. Of all female tasks, cutting grass in the dry season is the least popular one. Moreover, the number of sick animals which have to remain in the camp increases during dry periods, when the resistance of the stock is low for lack of nourishment. The recently born calves which cannot follow their mothers become increasingly dependent on grass and water as the dry season proceeds, while supplies of these are available only at greater and greater distances.

As stated in chapter 2, cattle births in Boran areas can occur at almost any time of the year as long as there only has been a good pattern of regularly recurring rains during the preceding years. Drought frequently causes the births to cluster at particular seasons. Even during "normal" years, however, there is a peak of births during the later period of the rains and at the beginning of the dry season, which adds to the intensity of calf-care activities during this period. At the same time, the small stock tend to produce their young some four to five months after the onset of the rains. The births of calves and kids often require special attention and help from adult people.

The degree to which the reproductive cycle of cattle or small stock influences the yearly routine seems, however, to be much less than that experienced by specialized camel pastoralists. As this is largely now a historical phenomenon as far as the Borana are concerned, I shall comment on it only briefly. The life of the camel-based homestead differs from that of the cattle camp in that it has to be more frequently on the move, so that camp shifts once or twice per season are normal all the year round. Another difference

is that, in normal years, seasonal shortages of milk are less severe than in a cattle herd (see p. 50 above). Torry¹⁰⁾ writes about the camel- and cattle-owning Gabbra, a neighbouring group closely related to the Sakuye:

"During the long dry seasons the domestic labour force is parcelled among a number of different herding units each separated in space... Stock are taken long distances to the wells and women travel with pack animals far from the main camps to fetch water. Almost every able-bodied person, including children from the age of seven, is pressed into service..."

Sakuye pastoralism, as it was practised, was akin to that of the Gabbra. In the wet season, their area, like that of the Gabbra, was restricted by the vulnerability of camels to conditions of moist soil; the population contracted to areas with good drainage, where all the camels and human members of a household came together and there was a peak of very intense and concentrated work. Both the mating of camels, which is triggered off by good access to fodder, and the subsequent births that take place one year later, require the help of experienced adult herdsman. As soon as possible after mating, the she-camels and their impregnator have to be moved from the vicinity of other bulls so as to avoid bull fights or premature calf droppings and other accidents which can be caused by alien rutting bulls attempting to approach the camel dams¹¹⁾. The bull and his dams then of necessity go on fora while the herd kept close to the camp consists of leading camels and newborn calves and their mothers. Sakuye and Gabbra veterinary practice and beliefs about ritual pollution demanded that the calves were given very special treatment and kept in seclusion under the care of selected chaste herdboys¹²⁾. The difficulties peculiar to camels necessitated large herdsmen working out a carefully regulated schedule for all stages of reproduction. Among the few Borana and Sakuye who have camels now, the small size of holdings has made such regulation superfluous and traditional practices are not applied very strictly.

The new elements in Boran life related to an increased dependence on grain imports have also changed the seasonal rhythm of life among the cattle and small stock pastoralists. The opportunity to leave the camp to go down-country to the district towns or irrigation schemes and the severity of pastoral food shortages have led to a depopulation of the pastoral camps during the dry seasons. The composition of the homesteads correspondingly changes. Poor dependants with only a marginal link to the household start to feel awkward relying on the hospitality of people whose food resources are dwindling. Family members who are not immediately engaged in the care of herds leave the camp and gather in the permanent villages and small towns

where it is easier to provide them with supplementary foodstuffs. Even if one can afford to buy grain with the proceeds of livestock sales or the bartering of skins and milk, it is still convenient to have family members stationed close to the shops that distribute meal rather than to have to transport bulky sacks of grain to the camps. For poor families, living in the town during the dry season also makes it possible to share in the famine relief operations that have become a regular feature of life in Isiolo District since the shifita emergency. Even the mobility of pastoral camps in the dry season is unlikely to remain unaffected by the attraction of trading settlements. Nearness to schools, shops and relief centres are taken into consideration as well as the access to pasture and water. The irrigation schemes provide other such centres of attraction that in the long run will change the pattern of mobility, although no clear system of agropastoral transhumance can yet be identified.

When the prospects of getting a good rain appear bright, we noted before that many Boran households dig "take-a-chance"-gardens relying wholly on the luck of the weather. With such a rainfed maize garden, there is usually no absolute necessity for the farmer to stay in his shamba continuously through the rainy season although he has to visit it regularly for weeding during the period when the maize stalks are short and do not shade the ground. If there is rain, the maize will grow irrespective of the farmer's help and if there is none, there is nothing he or she can do about it. In the dry season, however, an adult person must be permanently stationed in the garden for this is the time when the maize ripens and the garden has to be protected day and night from hungry baboons, birds and trampling buffaloes and elephants. People who have irrigation gardens, on the other hand, tend to give their cultivation more constant attention, labour depending upon their turns in the watering rotas. Particularly in the centrally organized schemes at Rapsu and Malka Daka the crop pattern is more varied and necessitates more continuous work. These schemes usually require from their members to live constantly within the scheme or no more than walking distance from it. This is of course also necessary in the more "spontaneous" irrigation schemes like Gafarsa. The need to stay close to the shamba and the unsuitability of riverine zones for livestock tend to create a situation where only those with rather few cattle can exploit both their herd and the shamba from the same residential unit - often situated as far as an hour's walk from the garden. Those who have larger herds either post individual household members or sub-households at the garden, while maintaining their head residence elsewhere, or employ labourers to take care of the cultivation. On the whole, the irrigation

schemes have saved very many families from starvation, but at the same time they have increased the wet season use of riverine pastures. For a household which tries a combination of the two, the maize harvest is a welcome supplement to dry season food but also a drain on the already strained supply of pastoral labour.

Footnotes to Chapter 3

1. The type of mat used today is normally the gela mat made from leaves of the dome-palm - Hyphaene Crinita. It is inferior in quality to another type, dase, which used to be made from wild sisal. Doroge Dase are said to have been common before the shifta war, when many huts were burnt down. The dase mats take approximately one month to prepare, but last longer than the gela.
2. Miraa are the stimulant leaves of Catha Edulis. See Hjort 1974.
3. In northern Borana, wells can be much deeper - up to 22 man-steps at Melbana.
4. A vivid illustration of this is provided in the film "Kenya Boran" produced in 1976 at Marsabit by the American Universities Field Staff.
5. In a nearby well, a mother elephant had slipped down on top of her young and killed it in an attempt to come to its rescue. The big elephant was now stuck in the well - a strange sight but unfortunately not an extraordinary event, for it was the third baby elephant that had fallen in during that season. Destruction of the wells by wild animals is not rare and creates more work for the herdspeople.
6. Cf. Church et al. 1957, who estimate that the rate of drawing water by the traditional Boran method is 40 litres per minute and "chain".
7. Dahl and Hjort 1976:238-9.
8. Chapati are flat, Indian thin-breads of a rather dry consistency; anjera are pancakes made with egg and milk and derive from Ehtiopia, and posho a dish of lumpy, boiled maize meal drier in consistency than porridge, and widely eaten in Kenya.
9. A description of how this is done is given by Brayne-Nichols 1953 "Some Notes on the Borana" DC ISO/4/1 Political Record and Anthropological, and by Blegvad-Andersen 1977:45-62
10. Torry 1978:186
11. Camel mating is regulated by the availability of fodder. The male normally "ruts" (goes on heat) twice a year, in the rainy seasons. During that period he can become very violent and difficult to control. Sakuye claim that they used to mate all she-camels in a herd on the same day if possible, and with the same bull. This claim can be questioned on the grounds that such a custom does not appear to exist among any neighbouring or closely related group of camel herders. After mating, there is a period of one to four months before the rutting males - and the herd owners - can see whether a dam is pregnant or not. Sakuye are of the opinion that a second mating of an already impregnated dam is dangerous to the foetus and its mother, so the mated she-camels must be kept at a distance from the male camels until their condition is known. The bull which has been used for the mating does not threaten the dam by going on rut again, but can be used as a leader bull for the herd of mated camels, keeping other bulls at a distance.
12. Torry 1973:73

4. LIVESTOCK AND LABOUR

We have seen that the effort that must be spent on the tasks which are part of the Boran form of production varies greatly with the seasons. While work in the dry season is exhausting and full of drudgery, visitors to the Borana in seasons of plenty often express surprise over the leisurely life apparently led by the pastoralists. Many of the tasks appear not to involve particularly heavy work as compared with some of those associated with farming. However, they do demand a large number of people. In chapter 2 we described how the unpredictability of rainfall, the scarcity of fodder, and the need to maximize mobility are dealt with by Boran households through the establishment of residentially separate production units of fora and hawicha

stock and sometimes by letting distinct sub-households manage different species. A herd tended by such a spatially distinct unit may be further differentiated into even smaller units requiring specialized care. For instance, the cattle herd associated with the main camp frequently comprises large milch stock which can move considerable distances during the day, small calves which must be looked after in the camp itself, and medium-sized calves which are taken out to graze in the vicinity of the camp. To the tasks of herding are then added domestic tasks that require special personnel. It is the incompatibility of all these tasks together rather than the gravity of any particular ones that creates a proliferation of "task-roles" to be fulfilled. Nursing infants, trekking large cattle to the pastures, and looking after the small stock are tasks that cannot simultaneously be carried out by one person.

HOUSEHOLD VIABILITY

In an article on the Fulani cattle herders of West Africa Stenning¹⁾ has developed the concept of "pastoral household viability" defined as follows:

"When the size and increase of the herd is adequate for the subsistence of the family and the size and composition of the family are suitable for the control and deployment of the herd, then family and herd may be said to be in equilibrium and the unit as a whole is viable.."

Stenning's discussion raises the problem of co-variance between the number of people available in a household, the number required for the care of the herd (as defined by a minimal set of "task-roles" to be performed) and the number which can be fed by the products of the herd. To use his concept of viability and minimal role-set approach is somewhat problematic in the Boran context, mainly because neither "herd" nor "household" lend themselves to any easy definition.

The herd comprised by all the livestock capital belonging to a herdowner (his property herd) does not necessarily correspond exactly to the aggregation of stock under his immediate care (his access herd²⁾) as we shall see in chapters 5 and 8. The animals in the latter herd may include some animals that are "borrowed" and, in other cases, he may himself have offered the temporary use of some of his reproductive stock to other herdowners. Such loans are a response to problems of viability. In a short time-perspective, it is the size of the "access herd" that is critical for household viability. Over a long period, on the other hand, the size of a herdowner's "property herd" becomes decisive for his recuperative power in the context of droughts and other emergencies that may hit him. If the distinction between "property

herd" and "access herd" is kept in mind, this need not create great difficulties, however.

In discussing minimal labour requirements, one must also avoid the trap of regarding the minimal role-set as a norm for the necessary composition of a pastoral household rather than as a list of types of labour to which the household should have access. "Household" in itself is a difficult concept, which in the Boran context is perhaps best applied to the smallest group of people which can take independent decisions over the allocation of its members' domestic and herding labour, and over the use, allocation, and location of their livestock capital. The core of a Boran household in most cases consists of a man, his wife or wives, his junior siblings, children and aged female dependants. Sometimes it also includes a second generation, of sons and daughters-in-law and grandchildren. A further complication is introduced by the spatial dispersion of "sub-households" that occurs among the Borana. As a matter of convenience, "household" will be retained here as the term for the residential local unit, and we shall refer to the scattered households under the authority of a specific head as his (or more rarely her) "household confederation"³).

The concept of household viability in a way presupposes that the household is the minimal herding unit. This is true for many Boran households, but even those that are unviable from the point of view of labour and livestock resources can continue to exist as independent units of property and consumption while they have to merge with other units for herding purposes (i.e. entering into daha with somebody else). The daha unit of two herding partners and the formally autonomous household, are, however, rarely fully self-contained with respect to labour and food. A certain amount of swapping always takes place within the larger context of the pastoral camp. Given that there is no overall shortage of particular types of labour, it is not so much the exact composition of the household that is crucial for its capacity to maintain a minimal level of autonomy. What matters rather is that there is a sufficient number of people to allow for egalitarian exchanges of labour between households in order to balance out biases in the age and sex structure of the family. However, the Borana's concept of a worthy life rests heavily on the ability of the household head to take independent decisions over the care of his herd, and to influence such decisions as are taken communally. In the long run, the household's own access to labour of the relevant categories is decisive for its bargaining power vis-à-vis other households.

TASK-SETS IN BORAN PRODUCTION

Despite the above-mentioned constraints, the exercise of constructing a tentative minimal role-set may be illuminating enough to make it worthwhile. The picture that emerges clearly demonstrates both the rationale of living in camps composed of several households and the importance of household size for the specialized care of animals and the reduction of risk by a diversification of economic activities. What then would the minimal role-set look like in the Boran context? Like the Fulani, the Borana find it necessary to make an initial distinction between the executive herding roles and the managerial role. Following the herd in the bush is not easily combined with the necessary collection of information on pasture and health conditions in other areas, or with the management of a family's social and political relations with the larger community. Our paradigmatic household - the role-set - would thus have to contain both a senior herd-owner/manager and subordinate herding personnel.

As we have said in the preceding chapter the domestic tasks of fetching water and firewood, processing food, baby care, maintenance of utensils and collection of grass and water for the animals remaining in the camp are all the responsibility of the adult women. But a Boran wife rarely has time to handle all these tasks by herself, and she usually requires the help of at least one young girl. Thus we already have four roles, corresponding to Stenning's role-set paradigm for the Fulani: herdowner and housewife, herdsboy and milkmaid⁴). In the developmental cycle of the Fulani household, this set of roles is first fulfilled when a married couple have a son of seven to nine years old and (implicitly in Stenning's analysis) a similarly mature daughter. The optimum viable unit among the Fulani, according to Stenning, is the nuclear household with this minimal composition. For the Borana, however, this role-set is insufficient and the number of necessary task-roles soon exceeds that presented for the Fulani. To begin with, there is in Boran production not one single herding role, but a multiple set. Big cattle require their herder and small cattle theirs. Furthermore, Borana tend to have very specific ideas about what type of labour is ideally suited for each category of livestock, and what tasks can be undertaken by persons of different sexes and ages, depending on levels of agility, prowess, physical strength and experience. Herding is frequently a task for which the competence of an adult is needed.

While the small calves in the camp are left to the adult women, the yabiye or six-months-old calves are ideally herded by an agile boy in his mid-teens.

If the family is short of labour, younger boys and girls of ten to twelve can be allowed to do this job if they are strong and good at running. With adult cattle, a herd of up to a hundred head can be both watered and herded by a couple of ten-year old children during the wet season. In the dry season, the task requires both more strength and more experience and at least one adult or youth older than fifteen has to accompany the stock. During such periods, younger children can only assist. If the herd has to be watered at a well or riverbed, a couple of adults may also be required. Even for a family with hawicha cattle only, there is frequently a need to involve more than one adult or nearly-adult male. If the family's stock is divided into fallow and milk herds the labour demands are further increased. At least two adults or responsible youths must cooperate in the herding and watering of a fora herd of some hundred animals. If the cattle herd is supplemented by other forms of stock there are even more labour demands. Sheep and goats can be trusted to children over 7 years of age when they are herded in the vicinity of the camp, but in the long run they need the regular attention of skilled and responsible adults. A mobile fora flock of sheep and goats - called arjara - must be herded by grown-up men; two men can manage a flock of 150 to 200. Camels raise particular demands. A youth of around 15 is normally considered able to look after a grazing fora herd of camels by himself, but at watering two or three strong young men have to cooperate. While the newborn camel calves remain in the vicinity of the main camp, they need special attention and Borana believe that their care must be trusted to a person who is ritually uncontaminated by human sexuality. Normally this task is allocated to a young man who tends the calves and milks their mothers. Milch camels with calves can be left to graze by themselves or be watched by a small child of seven: they do not move far from their young. The newly mated she-camels and the camel bull must be herded by grown-up people in the mating season, however, in order to avoid the intrusion of other bulls into the herd, which will upset its regulated reproduction cycle.

The family of Qadubo Korreisa - a case

As a concrete example of labour division within a family with several types of stock, let us cite the case of the household confederation of Qadubo Korreisa. Qadubo in 1978 had about 300 small stock, 10 camels and 150 cattle, of which 45 were small calves born in a successful post-drought season. His wealth was the result of a skilful application of the "small stock strategy" - i.e. investing in rapidly reproducing sheep and goats and then exchanging them for cattle which are less vulnerable to risks of disease. Qadubo had a large family. His first wife had borne him six children and his second eight. Due to

Figure 4a The family of Qadubo Korreisa

conflicts between the two women, the senior wife had left him and was now living with the Boran settlement of cannery workers in Thika. The second wife had taken her role as senior woman in Qadubo's primary homestead in the cattle camp.

Of the fourteen children, two sons were permanently away, working in a garage in Nairobi. One daughter was married to a County Council employee and lived with her husband elsewhere. Two sons were in a primary boarding school, but used to come home during holidays, when they only very reluctantly agreed to take part in herding. The rest of the sons and daughters were all living either in Qadubo's primary homestead or with his goats and camels.

Qadubo had his small stock in a *fora*-like secondary camp in the bush terrain some hours' walk from his cattle homestead, in the care of his eldest son Buke. Buke was a twenty-six-year old widower, old enough to take on responsibility for both camels and small stock. He hoped to marry again soon, and to be allowed to turn the *fora* camp with its makeshift shed into something more like a proper homestead with a mat-house for his wife, himself and his brothers. He was assisted in his work by two of Qadubo's younger children, Abdullahi and Roba who were fourteen and twelve. Buke and Roba used to herd the small stock together, while Abdullahi looked after the camels in company with camel herders from the family of a Sakuye friend of Qadubo.

At the time of my visit, much of the routine herding of cattle was done by another twelve-year old son, Boru, together with Adhan, the adolescent brother of the son-in-law of Qadubo. This was in the rainy season, when the family's calves were still too young to be taken out of the camp and when herding the big cattle did not entail much work. When there were heavy tasks to be done, assistance was given by the young adult men in the camp: two resident sons-in-law, and one unmarried son of Qadubo, Demo. It was envisaged that these young adults would have to take a larger share of the cattle work during the dry season. When the 45 calves were ready to be taken out to graze by themselves, Boru and Adhan would have to look after them, and Demo and his brothers-in-law would herd the big cattle. The two sons-in-law of Qadubo were poor men, with little more than ten or fifteen cattle in their own herds, which they kept in the same corral as Qadubo's animals. No *fora* had been organized at the time of my visit, but discussion was going on as to whether it would not be better to send off Demo, Adhan and a herdsman from a neighbouring camp with some of the heifers and oxen. Boru and the two sons-in-law would then be left with the remaining cattle.

Qadubo's youngest child was a girl of ten, who alternated between helping her mother in the house and checking on the small camp flock of goats. Her mother had no toddler of her own, but spent much time looking after her two grandchildren. The married daughters milked their own milk cows, and some of their mother's. Only the elder daughter had yet had children, and the younger sisters helped their mother extensively, apart from doing the housekeeping for their husbands.

Qadubo also had a small building in the nearby village, a shop for which he held a trader's license, where he used to reside in the dry season, but which was now deserted. He had recently married a third wife, the widow of his clansman, but that household was still only very loosely integrated into his larger family. The leviratic wife and her children were living half an hour's walking distance away.

Their household had been partners in a daha arrangement and Qadubo had not yet seen why he should coordinate the herding of his own herd with the wards' herd, apart from transferring a couple of milk cows to his new wife.

Qadubo's arrangement required at least three adult junior men to be engaged in herding in the dry season. This was possible, despite the fact that two of his own sons had migrated, largely because the households of his sons-in-law were viable neither from the point of view of labour nor from that of food production. Any technique of diversification or specialization of care that Borana practice in order to reduce risks and increase production tends to make new demands on the labour of the family. Two general conclusions can be drawn from this. One is that collaboration between households is a necessary solution to the problem of task proliferation. When the labour resources of several households are pooled, specialization of care and diversification can be possible even for a household with limited resources. (Thus, one of Qadubo's sons-in-law had one camel and a couple of goats with his father-in-law's camel and goat camp.) Another conclusion that can be drawn is that "viability" is not only a question of balancing herd-size and size of household but also of the level at which this is done: the richer in stock and people, the more viable is the pastoral household. This is one of the themes of the following sections of the present chapter. We shall also discuss how the advantages of a larger unit can be turned into social assets and how wealth makes it possible to mobilize low-cost labour in a way that further enhances the viability and recuperative power of a household.

THE IMPORTANCE OF A LARGE FAMILY

In the traditional livestock economy of the Borana, most production relations are based on kinship. The labour that a particular herdowner and his household utilize for their exploitation of herds, pasture and water is provided by the family members themselves, and a large part of the routine tasks are carried out by young men, boys and girls, who are at the same time being socialized into their adult roles, and gradually getting more and more responsibility within their respective spheres of work. Although temporary adjustments to problems of labour scarcity can be made through exchanges with other households⁵⁾, each family strives to be a unit in itself. A herdowner must apply demographic foresight to his herds and ensure that there are enough calves to provide milk cows in four years' time: similarly, the household must also ensure that it will have access to herdsboys and milkmaids in the future.

Rather than striving to achieve viability for the family-herd enterprise based on a static balance between human and animal resources, the Boran family head endeavours to attain an evenly balanced growth. A big herd with a human family of appropriate size certainly has a greater survival value than a small family with a small but adequate herd. The smaller the herd and the family, the greater is also the likelihood that one or the other will have a biased age- and sex-structure. Thus, although the amount of milk produced by a herd is a direct function of the number of milk cattle in it, the probability of milk scarcity or total loss of stock lessens with an increased herd size. Larger holdings make it easier to reduce risks by specialization of care and increased mobility. Access to more labour makes it possible to diversify the subsistence basis of the family: both in the traditional pastoral context and in a situation where there are new alternatives such as paid jobs and farming, Borana do not have any folk concept of "the limited good". Muslim Borana say that "since God is providing every little ant with food, he is sure also to provide food for our children. To everyone that he has given life, he has allotted a share - Alhamdulillah". When territorial expansion is possible, this point of view has a certain economic validity in pastoral society, for access to labour is critical to a family's opportunity to expand its holdings. Most East African pastoralists seem to share this view, the exception possibly being the Rendille, who see their resources of camel pastures and their opportunity for herd expansion as limited⁶⁾. Accordingly, their goal is rather an evenly balanced status quo. Among the Borana, on the other hand, fertility and the proliferation of one's flock of children are cherished values. A wealthy Boran man converts an accumulated surplus of animals into labour resources by marrying a new wife or allowing his son to marry. The bridewealth cattle are transformed into a labour resource, consisting of the immediate extra labour that the woman represents plus the children that she will bear. Families with no children are eager to adopt from other prolific families, but the rather reluctant acquiescence to such requests is more the result of the ritual sanctions backing them up than of a need on the part of the biological parents to get rid of surplus children.

THE DOMINANCE OF DOMESTIC LABOUR

When there are children or other subordinate household members available for a certain task, it has till recently without exception been cheaper to use the labour of family members than to employ extra-domestic herdsman. In the past there have been few other profitable uses of the labour and

time of the members of a pastoral household than to invest them in pastoralism. In more recent years, new opportunities have opened up, at least for some families, and these households may well prefer to send their children to school and engage older sons in trade or administrative jobs that make use of these opportunities. At the same time, the drastic reductions in the livestock holdings at Waso have led to a large number of people not being able to be supported by their own herds, and many of these are willing to accept less favorable conditions than those which were traditionally valid for herdsmen employed outside the household.

There are, however, still many reasons for a herdowner to continue to depend mainly on people with whom he has close links of kinship or affinity. These reasons have to do with the character of livestock property - primarily that animals are both mobile and edible⁷⁾. During earlier periods, when communication over tribal and linguistic boundaries was less well developed, and when the police service had less infrastructure at its command, an alien employee could easily abscond with animals from his employer's herd. In many cases, the people who sought outright employment with the Borana were individual stragglers from poor Somali tribes. Though it is easier to trace stolen animals today, theft is still a problem, particularly in its more subtle forms. Potentially productive animals are generally not slaughtered by Boran herdowners except in critical situations when it may be necessary to consume part of one's capital in order to survive⁸⁾, or when the animals appear likely to die in any case. The herdowner who entrusts his animals to others not under his immediate control, however, runs the risk that animals may be falsely declared sick and eaten. With small stock, the problem is even greater. "Sheep and goats are like already boiled meat" and can be consumed or sold with little risk of disclosure. Milk can also be misappropriated: if too much milk is consumed at the expense of the calves, the regrowth of the herd may be endangered⁹⁾. Problems of supervision and social and moral control are easier to solve within the context of kinship and household obligations.

Apart from the direct risk of theft or overconsumption of milk, there is also the cost of a herdsman's salary. In northern Kenya the traditional wage of a herdsman employed to look after cattle was one heifer per year, a norm accepted by both Somalis and Borana. Among the camel-rearing Rendille¹⁰⁾ it was one heifer camel every second year. The difference reflects the relative values of cattle versus camels, which from the point of productivity are worth as much as 2 1/2 times a cow¹¹⁾. To the heifer was

added the milk the herdsman needed for his personal consumption during his term of employment. Although it is very difficult to make a realistic assessment of the situation in pre-shifta times, this form of contract suggests that there was no great supply of people who were constrained to resort to employment as herdsmen in order to survive. Today (1978) herdsboys are employed at rates of about 50 K.Sh. per month plus food and occasionally some clothes. A year's salary in cash corresponds fairly well to the price of a heifer, but is undoubtedly a less reliable resource. Traditionally the norm for this type of contract was that labour should be exchanged not merely for "means of consumption" but directly for "means of production". In this context it is important to think of the cow not just as a milk producer but also as a reproducer of capital, one aspect of this being that the poor herdsman, with a certain amount of skill and luck, could establish himself as an independent herdowner. During the colonial period client-herdsmen, who affiliated themselves on an individual basis with wealthy herdowners of other tribes, caused continuous trouble to the British administration by simply not remaining as clients¹²).

By expending a reproductive animal on the employment of a herdsman, the herdowner loses the animal and her offspring and gains only a temporary solution to his labour problems. From the point of view of the family's continued economic viability, animals are better spent in building up family labour resources through bridewealth than in employing herdsmen. One exception to this general rule would be if the herdsman were more or less "adopted" and incorporated into the herdowner's household perhaps even as a clan-member or a son-in-law. This seems to have occurred quite frequently, especially when the employee was recruited from another ethnic group. In fact, the status of a herdsman who receives reproductive stock from his employer is not very different in character from that of a son vis-à-vis his father. However, one of the reasons why the British administrators concerned themselves with the problem was that they feared that if sufficient numbers of alien people were incorporated into a particular group, they might join forces later on and expel their former masters, thereby spoiling the neat British division of the Northern Frontier District into separate tribal areas. The social control that could be exercised by this practice was thus limited.

Due to the costs and risks of employing herdsmen, the most common way of recruiting labour is by entrusting the herds to people over whom the herdowner has direct control - either presumptive heirs or people with whom he

stands in a reciprocal relationship of obligation and solidarity. In the post-colonial situation, however, contacts with the new central administration or the police may have contributed to making it easier for a privileged minority to use employed labour.

SOLUTIONS TO UNVIABILITY

Stenning's discussion of household viability, referred to above, namely as a function of the food production of the herd and the labour requirements for its care, is illuminating and draws attention to crucial matters. We shall deal with some general problems of viability, particularly with respect to the effects of differences in wealth and viability on the relations between households. While the production of milk from a herd is directly related to the absolute number of adult female stock in it, the relation between herd size and labour requirements does not describe an even linear slope. A cattle herd of even a very limited size consists of animals with particular needs, requiring specialized care and thus the involvement of several people. There is a minimal level below which the food supply produced by the herd cannot feed the labour needed for its proper care. Below this level, the herd can only be maintained and grow if there is either an additional supply of food for the herdspeople - such as remittances from household members engaged in irrigation farming or wage labour, or gifts of food from better-off neighbours - or if the herding unit can be supported by labour fed by other households.

Since the shifita war, very many families who had acted as independent herding units before the emergency have been left with herds which cannot support a minimal level of labour. Some households manage by joining their herds with others in a similar situation, so that the total number of animals is enough for a viable herding unit. "Excess" family members from these households are then sent to look for food in other places, migrating downcountry or entering a "scheme".

Tacho and Gababo - a case

Tacho and Gababo decided to share camps after the last drought of 1975-6. Before that they lived in different camps, half an hour's walk from each other, but spent much time together even then, regarding themselves as very close friends. They had both been associated with the same set of families since a long time, sharing camp with each other's relatives and both having close links with the same set of Boran leaders during the exodus from Ethiopia. Tacho had married the daughter of Gababo's father's brother's son, a girl who had once been Gababo's ward.

Before the shifita war, Tacho had had approximately 230 cattle and Gababo 200. At the end of the emergency, Tacho had only 12 and Gababo 20. By 1975, natural increase, purchase and bridewealth had brought Gababo's number to 93; Tacho had 80. Then there was the drought, and again both men again suffered serious losses, through starvation and through disease. In 1978 Tacho's herd consisted of 4 cows in milk, 5 pregnant cows, 7 heifers and oxen and 4 small calves. Gababo had 5 cows in milk, 6 pregnant cows, 3 heifers, 2 heifer calves and 2 small bull calves. Neither of them had cattle deposited with other people, or claims that they could raise on unreturned loans or unrealized inheritance.

Gababo had three married daughters living elsewhere, and one, his favourite daughter, who was very good at calf-care who remained in his homestead with her husband. The son-in-law had even fewer cattle than his father-in-law, only six or seven, but still enough to feed his small family in the rainy season. In the dry season he hoped to get a job, but had so far found nothing except to work as a loader of lorries in the "work gangs" of Isiolo. Two of Gababo's own sons were married and had been more successful than their brother-in-law in finding jobs. They were living with their families "downcountry". One was a ranch herdsman, the other a driver for a merchant. Another son boarded with the Catholic mission in Merti. Left in Gababo's household was his wife, a small child that she had "adopted" from one of her migrant sons, Gababo's twelve year old son Ahmed and fourteen year old son Dadacha. Ahmed went to the local village primary school, built on the Harambee basis but Dadacha had vehemently refused to go to school¹³).

Tacho on the other hand, had married three wives during the time he was rich, but had not yet any grown-up children. His first wife lived in the cattle camp and had a girl and a boy in the primary school and a small girl of two at home at her side. His second wife lived at his secondary camp, where he had his goats and had two girls of eight and twelve. And the third wife stayed in Garba Tula town, where Tacho had a job as an administrative policeman (AP). Besides having his first wife in the camp, Tacho also had three elderly female relatives living in mat-houses of their own in his compound. One of them had brought along a number of milk-cows to support herself with but the others were completely dependent on Tacho.

Tacho and Gababo solved the problem of their cattle shortage by a combination of "traditional" methods and more "modern" adjustments. By encouraging his sons to look for work and placing one in boarding school, Gababo avoided a drain on the food resources of the family and ensured a small source of extra cash since now and then he would hitch-hike to his sons to ask for a share of their wages or they would visit the home and bring some gifts of clothes, tobacco and food. At the same time he had recruited his son-in-law to come and reside with him, which added both to the labour resources and the productive stock of the herding unit. He continued to use the services of his daughter, who had not yet had any children, and this made it possible for his wife to make extensive visits to her absent sons.

The two men kept their cattle in the same corral, for there were too few of them to make any division necessary. They had all the stock in the same place, and no fora. In the case of a serious drought, they hoped to be able to move both their herds closer to the wetter and higher areas nearer Mount Kenya to be looked after by Gababo and leave only the schoolboys, one of the old women and two or three milk dams to be supported by the village well and the scanty remaining grass.

Tacho would then cover the extra needs of these family members by sending them maize meal from Garba Tula.

In addition to their cattle herds, the two men had joined their herding units of sheep and goats. A few such animals were kept at the main camp, where they were looked after either by the old women of Tacho's homestead or by Gababo's children when they came from school. Most of the flock was put with Tacho's second wife. For some time, part of Tacho's salary as a policeman had been used for employing a herdsman, but when he absconded from his job, it was decided that the two daughters should instead look after the flock. Their mother was given considerable responsibility of supervision, but Tacho also tried to visit the camp every two or three days. Gababo "did not like goats" and thought he did not know how to manage them: he hoped that they would increase so that he could swap them for cattle. On the other hand, he was given more or less full responsibility for the actual daily management of the cattle, even though Tacho returned home whenever he was on leave.

LABOUR MARGINS AND PROTECTION

Tacho and Gababo provide an example of two men who have formalized herding cooperation on an equal footing. Although this is a desirable solution from the poor Borana's point of view, the relation between people sharing a corral is frequently more like that between patron and client. To understand why this is so, one must note that, above the minimal level where access to people and the food to support them is enough to cater for the proper fulfilment of the fundamental herding tasks, labour requirements do not increase evenly. Above that level, the labour required to herd a group of animals is more or less the same regardless of the number of animals in the herd, up to a second "threshold" where a duplication of the unit becomes necessary. It makes no great difference whether fifty or a hundred and fifty cows have to be herded: more than a hundred and fifty or two hundred cannot be herded together as a unit because then they trample the grass, waste too much time at watering and are difficult to control in bushy terrain. Only in respect of certain tasks does the amount of energy that has to be expended or the number of people that have to be involved, increase linearly. Watering from a well is such a task. As we have said, it is mainly during the dry season that such watering takes place. During periods when the stock can be brought to ponds and dams, a larger herd size does not necessarily imply that more people are needed. Milking is another task which would appear to increase with herd-size, but shortage of labour for milking is seldom a problem. It is carried out at a time of day when all members of the family living in the camp are present and anybody can milk cattle with which they are well acquainted. If there are too many cattle to milk at the peak of production in the rainy season, half are milked in the evening and half in the morning: the residual milk is left entirely for the calf.

As we have seen, once labour has been allocated to look after the needs of a particular herd or sub-herd, there is often a "margin" where more stock can be brought into the unit at little cost. This "margin" is a social asset for the wealthier pastoralists, for it can be used to offer help and protection to poorer families.

In figure 4b¹⁴⁾, the relation between the size of the domestic unit and the herd is illustrated schematically. The reader is asked to take this as an illustrative abstraction only, for it rests on some simplified assumptions. The "herd size" in the figure represents an "access herd" rather than a "property herd". The figure does not consider seasonal fluctuations and treats the whole herd managed by a household as a productive unit, irrespective of its age and sex structure.

Figure 4 b Relations between size of domestic group and herd size

In the figure the straight line shows a linear relationship between the number of people and animals, representing the number of persons who can be fed on the produce from a domestic herd. The curve represents the labour requirement for varying herd sizes from the management point of view. The steep slope A/ represents the fact referred to earlier that even a small

number of stock may demand the involvement of several people if proper standards of herd care are to be maintained. The flat slope B represents the fact that (with the exception of well watering) an increase in herd size does not necessarily lead to demand for more people.

The shaded zone represents households that are viable in the sense indicated by Stenning. X and Y are unviable households. While family X cannot be fed by the herd, it can restore viability if it can find an extra-pastoral source of food for its surplus members or send them to work as herdsmen for another family. There are sufficient family members to give their herd adequate care. "Getting rid of" surplus members means a movement in the direction of the arrows in the figure. Family Y, likewise has too few animals to support it but the viability of this household can only be restored by increasing its herd, since the family is already minimal. As a temporary solution it can take livestock loans to cover its food deficiency: a movement in the figure in the direction indicated. Its only alternative to this is to send away the family members that cannot be fed, affiliating the remainder with a wealthier household in order to depend in part on the labour provided by that household. $z/$ can be seen as a herdowner's "margin for offering help to others" and $q/$ the surplus food that he has access to. $z/$ and $q/$ represent surplus assets that can be used to enhance a more specialized and refined herding practice, or be invested in "bigmanship"¹⁵⁾, or contribute to both. Slope C represents the increased need for labour which is created when new herding units have to be introduced. The assumption implied by the figure is that new units are not established until necessary. In practice, as we have seen, splitting herds has many advantages from the point of view of herd insurance. The concept of "household viability" has to be qualified by a recognition that there are many different levels of "adequate care". Even if a household is not absolutely forced to split its herds into separate units, there are advantages in doing so when there is enough labour available. A more labour-consuming practice which ensures a better risk margin may be preferred to one which cuts down the number of people involved to a minimal level. The addition of a client's herd and household of course increases the input of labour without necessarily diverting much food from the wealthier herdowner's household. The addition of a client household to the homestead of a wealthier man implies only marginal, if any, disadvantages for the latter, while it has crucial advantages for the client. By "helping" the poorer household with herding tasks, the richer household also gains social esteem. This is even more true of help with food. Borana have several institutionalized forms of food redistribution which all bring social merit

or obligations of solidarity. Outright sharing of meat and milk is part of the hospitality shown to visitors whether they come for celebrations, meetings or just casual visits. Milk is also redistributed covertly, for example when children from families that are apparently less well-off come into the mathouse of another household. The child who assists a woman when she is milking a particular cow is also entitled to a share in the milk, regardless of whether he or she is a member of that woman's family. In the fora camp, the milk is always pooled and shared equally among the herdsmen, irrespective of their family's share in the milch stock. Apart from such redistribution of the products, milch stock are frequently loaned as dabarre between families, the conditions of dabarre loans being that if the creditor gets into a critical situation with respect to his own supply of food, while the debtor has overcome his shortage of milk, the latter must repay the loan, or rather, return any female offspring of the cow that was originally given. The recipient of a dabarre loan can keep all the milk produced by the first cow, and all its male offspring. Such dabarre loans can be made between households living in the same camp and be part of a larger package of services that tie a poor household (and its labour) to a richer one. Dabarre loans are also made to people living in other places. In my view the latter case should be regarded not so much as a means whereby the owner of too large a herd can make use of the labour of poorer herdowners but rather as a way for him to build up links of social, political and economic obligation. What he gains from an economic point of view is not directly "labour" but enhanced security of access to capital since he can spread his animals. For the recipient, the arrangement of course solves some of the problems of providing food for necessary personnel.

If a Boran herdowner has plenty of stock he may place animals in a friend's or relative's herd without counting them as dabarre. In such cases the animals are usually accompanied by dependent members of the herdowner's family, who for different reasons wish to live in that particular camp, and they are there primarily to support these family members rather than as a means for the herdowner to take advantage of somebody else's labour. As an example, an old woman is usually the responsibility of her eldest son, but sometimes prefers to stay with her daughter; she is then allowed to bring along stock from her son's property herd to provide her with milk. Or the junior wife of a wealthy herdowner may prefer to live in the camp of her brother rather than with her co-wife in her husband's primary household. Such people, particularly if accompanied by children, do in fact also provide labour for their warden.

In the case of a wealthy herdowner actually experiencing problems in making his family labour stretch to care for the number of animals he has, he is more likely to recruit more labour to his camp by encouraging clients and junior daha-companions than by putting out stock. A man with a very limited number of stock of a particular type - say two or three camels - may temporarily deposit them with another man as a solution to his labour problems. Normally, however, distribution of stock is for other reasons and the exceptions to this are mainly on the below-viability side. A very small herd with virtually no adult stock may be left wholly for the use by and in the care of relatives and friends while the household who formally own it seek their fortune downcountry, in the irrigation schemes or in the "shantytowns" of Isiolo, Garba Tula, Merti or Madogash. When large communal losses in live-stock occur, the animals of inadequate units - such as family Y in the figure - are regrouped into herds of manageable size under the direction of those fortunate herdowners who still have enough to support sufficient labour or who can successfully link together a sufficient number of unviable households.

A Boran real-life family will rarely develop according to any paradigm of a minimal role-set. Although ideally, it might be true that "a family must attain a certain size commensurate with its responsibilities towards its herd"¹⁶⁾ many families in fact do not achieve this. The traditional social system of the Borana has contained many elements that have contributed to a levelling out of differences between families. Imbalances have been adjusted in crisis situations by shuffling around productive animals and milk by loans and adoptions. But such a levelling-out is possible only if there is in the pastoral system as a whole a certain balance between the number of animals and the number of people who expect to subsist on these animals, and a sufficient supply of labour in the right categories. The Boran losses of stock during the '60s and '70s have led to a substantial emigration of labour, which has also unfortunately been selective. It has predominantly involved young men who have not yet established independent households and who have gone downcountry to find employment. This category includes those who have the best prospect of finding alternative means of survival - who can get jobs as nightwatchmen, factory workers or farmhands - and at the same time have the highest motivation to find an alternative, since their likely achievement of autonomy as herdowners is indefinitely delayed by the scarcity of stock.

Shortage of labour for pastoral work is the result of this selective emigra-

tion. It leads both to changes in the traditional domestic division of labour, and sometimes to detrimental changes in management practices - including a reduction in the maintenance of specialized herd units, spatial dispersion or species diversification. Particularly, it affects the division of livestock into fora and hawicha units which is the basis of stock mobility in the Boran system. This increases the problems mentioned in chapter 2 of encroachment on pastures by competing Somali pastoralists, which is caused not least by the defence problems that arise from the young men's absence. The relative shortage of young men also leads to an increased involvement of women, both older girls and young wives, in the herding and watering activities outside the camp. This takes place at the expense of important camp work, such as the maintenance and production of domestic utensils, storage pots and mats, and may ultimately also lead to a decrease in the mobility of the main camps and their associated hawicha stock.

Footnotes to Chapter 4

1. Stenning 1959:100
2. Cf. Torry 1973:72 and Baxter 1966b:121 ff, on the differences between "access herds" and "property herds"
3. See Smith and Canott 1978:174
4. Stenning op.cit.:105.
5. Such inter-household cooperation has to solve the problem of discontinuities due to illness or the temporary absence of family members. Even if the composition of the household should approach the paradigmatic role-set associated with their type of stock, so that there is in the family one ideal incumbent for each role, that does not ensure the continuous enactment of the role. The household must either be larger than the minimal set appears to indicate or live in close interaction with other households willing to exchange services.
6. Spencer 1965:293
7. Barth 1964:71
8. Spencer op.cit.:4
9. Dahl and Hjort 1976:145
10. Spencer 1973:40
11. Dahl and Hjort 1976:224 ff
12. For the concept of shegat, see for example Pease, Notes on the Gurreh 12/4 and 5/6 1927 and DC Telemugger 21/11 1930, Reply to Questionnaire from Lord Passfield of Passfield Corner on Tribes and Tribal Custom both in PC NFD 4/1/8
13. Harambee means approximately "Let's make a joint effort!" and is the Kenyan word for a self-help project, whether it is a matter of a few neighbours coming together to dig a field or a national-scale collection of funds for a polytechnic school or a hospital.

14. The figure is reprinted from Dahl and Hjort 1976:26
15. Baxter 1975:217-8
16. Stenning op.cit.:100

5. FROM HERDING TO HUSBANDRY

REALMS OF DECISION-MAKING

The way that the Boran workday is organized reflects not only a division of tasks, but also a division of authority or legitimacy with regard to different kinds of decisions relevant to household subsistence. In order to understand the power structure within the family, and the fundamental conditions of men's and women's life careers, it is necessary to try to identify the spheres of decision-making that are most important to the household. Since animals are generally the basic resource of Boran households, the important decisions are mainly those relating to the care and use of livestock. "Livestock management" has several different components. We can easily distinguish

three realms of decision-making which are relevant for a pastoral family:

- a/ Decisions relating to the well-being of stock, to actual herd movement practices, to watering and to animal health care.
- b/ Decisions relating to the longer term planning and management affecting the composition of the family's livestock holdings.
- c/ Decisions relating to the management and distribution of continuing and renewable produce from the herds.

The first category corresponds closely to the content Paine has given to the concept of "herding", and the second comes close to his characterization of "husbandry"¹⁾. The third could perhaps be summarized as "housekeeping". In this chapter, we shall be concerned with the first two concepts, which are central axes in the realm of male activities and decision-making. Authority over "housekeeping" is by and large relegated to the female sphere, and we shall discuss that further in the following chapter.

Paine, who writes about the Sami reindeer pastoralists of northern Sweden, notes that "herding" concerns the day-to-day work with the herd on seasonal pastures and on migration²⁾. It involves studying the terrain and the weather so as to anticipate the "natural" movements of the reindeer (who wander more at will than cattle do). Noting how the reindeer herd represents a complex aggregation of assets, Paine goes on to show how "husbandry" involves careful observation and management of its age and sex structure and the allocation of different animals for different purposes. The role of the "husbandman" is the deployment of capital assets³⁾.

Among the Sami, herding is a task which in itself demands great skill, and herding capability confers prestige on its possessor. It is difficult to herd reindeer - which are only half domesticated - through the mist, strong winds and snow that characterize winter in Lappland. Herdowners engage in the practical tasks of herding, and "personal withdrawal from herding duties is very likely to lead to a steady diminution of health..⁴⁾. Among the cattle pastoralists of northern Kenya, on the other hand, herding is regarded as a menial task. But skill and knowledge are necessary when decisions have to be taken as to where to go with the cattle, how many days they can stay without water, and so on. The concept of herding can thus be further clarified by distinguishing between "herding tasks" and "herding tactics", the latter being the decision and planning of how to carry out "herding tasks", the actual handling of the cattle.

While in the Sami context the two are sufficiently closely related to justify their being subsumed into one analytical category, they are often separated in East Africa. Among the Borana in particular, the practical handling of the cattle can be carried out by fairly inexperienced men or boys following the decisions of the elders. Boran herdowners will detach themselves as soon as they can from herding tasks and duties and engage in herding tactics. In a Boran context, herding tactics involve not only the planning of stock movements, but also the collection and consideration of various kinds of information on such matters as salt, soils, diseases, and the growth and quality of particular plants, and not least, the allocation and planning of labour rota for the junior members of the household.

Normally, the responsibility for herding tactics rests with the senior male head of a homestead. As with the Sami, the decisions within this sphere are often carried out in cooperation with the heads of other homesteads within the same camp. Such consultations with particular reference to herding, are called "mala marri" - discussion and decision. When a large fora expedition is undertaken, often jointly organized by the camp elders, the authority to take part in such consultations on fora movements etc. is delegated to trusted relatives or clients of the herdowners. Even in that context, "herding tasks" and "herding tactics" are commonly recognized as separate, and each is considered to demand its own personnel. A small number of experienced senior men must always join the junior herdsman to carry out the mala marri.

The second major sphere of decision-making, "husbandry", relates to problems with regard to the acquiring and disposal of livestock: gifts and sales, slaughter and castration, the exchange of one species for another, and so on. In short, it comprises all the deliberate changes that can be made in the composition of a herd, either by the addition or removal of animals. From the individual herdowner's point of view, good husbandry is primarily oriented towards a minimization of risk by safeguarding the family's continued access to livestock capital. This means, above all, that he has to maximize the number of female breeding stock which he has in his herd or, alternatively, to maximize his own rights to claim such stock from others in the event of a loss. This principle is probably universally held where individual access to land is not a constraint, and is equally valid whether the pastoral economy is market and meat-oriented, like Sami pastoralism, or basically subsistence and milk-oriented like the Boran one. Differences in subsistence emphasis reveal themselves mainly in a variation in the strategies followed with regard to the proportion of male animals that are kept. When it is mainly from

oxen that food is obtained in drought times, decision-making over the most profitable disposal of male stock is an important feature of husbandry which comes close to housekeeping.

However, apart from general efforts to create good breeding conditions by always keeping a carefully selected bull where there are unmated cows and heifers and by taking the cattle to areas that increase their fertility, Borana do not have any methods of influencing when and how often cows calve. Maximizing the female herd is therefore to a large extent a question of minimizing all expenditures of female stock that do not directly contribute either to the process of building up the labour pool, or to the possibility of regaining capital in the event of a major loss. An example of the former type of transaction is the payment of bridewealth; an example of the latter type is contributions to lineage subscriptions. To some extent, an understanding of the basic principles of good husbandry is taken for granted among the Borana: it is an insight shared by all and, unlike wisdom in herding matters, not the result of experience individually accumulated during a herdowner's professional career. Bad husbandry, for example wastefulness with breeding stock, is considered as both unethical and stupid. It is mainly when somebody departs from the commonly accepted rules that husbandry ability is publicly commented upon. A man who mismanages his capital is classed as a nyatu, i.e. an eater. Such a man becomes the subject of popular jokes and will have difficulties in acquiring new stock if he loses his last animal.

One such, rather tragic, case was that of Dabasso, a man who lived in the same camp as his younger brother when I met him. The younger brother, Halake, had left secondary school two or three years before and had already established himself as an important, wellrespected and rich elder. Dabasso constantly stressed to me the importance of fraternal love, the beauty of his cooperation with his younger brother and his brother's need to get his agreement on all major decisions. However, I had hardly arrived at the camp before I was aware of the popular verdict on Dabasso, who had sold too much of his paternal inheritance. The younger brother assured me that Dabasso was a "useless" person and that his wife had left him because he was no real man. Dabasso was destitute, and had become dependent of his younger brother, who held him in contempt.

While herding considerations are primarily concerned with the immediate state of the herd, and only implicitly with its long-term viability (survival today being a direct condition for survival tomorrow) husbandry considerations are oriented towards a long-term perspective, which does not end with the herdowner's death. It is this that gives them their ethical weight. A man should never endanger the future reproductive capacity of his herd, not

only for his own sake, but also because it is a patrimony of which he is only temporary the trustee and which he has to hand on to future generations.

The ultimate legal authority for husbandry decisions lies with the Boran father/husband, although, as we shall see, his rights are limited by those of his agnatic lineage, who can force him to part with stock for the purpose of supporting poor lineage members. He does not involve his camp-mates and herding companions in decisions in this sphere, but may consult junior members of his own family who have claims to particular animals in the herd. One crucial point to be made in the context of husbandry rights is that it is mainly these rights, particularly as regards slaughter and giving away cattle, which define a Boran jurat person. In the traditional Boran legal system a son remains his father's minor since the father is the only person who can pay fines. Similarly, the Wata hunters, who in old times had little property of stock, used to be obliged to seek jurat protection from Gutu herdowners. A woman, who as we shall see in the next chapter, in most cases has little or no stock of her own, is also as a rule a jurat minor.

The authority and autonomy to carry out herding and husbandry decisions constitute the culturally prescribed goal towards which most Boran men brought up in a pastoral family would strive. In pre-shifta times, the career expectations of any young Borana would be dominated by a concept of success based on becoming an abba kara, a "father of the stock gate". An abba kara has a corral of his own, can decide on husbandry matters himself, and is accepted as an equal partner in the discussion of herding tactics.

BUILDING UP A HERD

The core of livestock which will form a man's herd when he establishes himself as an independent herdowner is bred from stock that he has already acquired in his childhood. Similarly, to many other pastoral people, such as the Kgatla of Botswana⁵⁾ or the Humr Arabs of Sudan⁶⁾ the Borana have a system of property devolution whereby "anticipatory inheritance" or provisional allocations of stock made by a father during his lifetime are as important as inheritance at the father's death.

At various times the Boran father allots specific animals which are part of his herd as individual gifts (gahawa) to individual children. This is done with all forms of milch stock, whether camels, cattle, sheep or goats. The animals that a child receives from his father, and all their offspring, form the nucleus of his future herd. Among the Waso Borana, all such stock

tend to be conventionally referred to as handura although this term more precisely refers to a particular animal given to a newborn baby. Many of these gifts are customarily prescribed gifts at life-cycle ceremonies, like the two cows, one with a bull calf and one with a heifer, which are given at the Muslim name-giving ceremony, the waqalal, or the cattle given at circumcision. Handura animals are given primarily to boys, but in many families favoured girls also receive such stock, though never as many as boys. The first-born son, the angafa, is likely to get more than his younger brothers, particularly through extra gifts given to him by relatives other than his father.

As long as the child remains under his father's authority, the ultimate rights of husbandry and herding relating to his handura rest with the father, although the latter will encourage the son to take an interest in his own stock from the age of ten or so when he becomes increasingly involved in herding tasks. As the son grows older, he is allowed to make concrete suggestions about the care of the stock, but always subject to the authority of his father. For instance, it is the father who decides whether his son's stock will be inoculated or not, a question on which the senior generation of today and their adult sons tend to have opposing ideas. The male offspring of the allotted cows can be sold or slaughtered by the father, and milking rights to such cows can be temporarily given to any woman. The father does not have to use the stock primarily for the needs of the particular child to whom he has given it. If he wants to alienate female stock outside the family, by giving it away or lending it to somebody, he can also do so, but in that case he is generally required to justify his action and to replace the animal with another of the same or higher value at the first available opportunity. If there is no dire need for cash or meat, it is difficult for a father to withdraw stock from his son's herd unless he can point to filial disrespect. Greater liberty is taken by the father with respect to stock allotted to his daughters while the stock rights of his wives have an intermediate status and are likely to be defined in one way by the husband and in another by the wife. The child holding the handura rights can himself not alienate the animal outside his family, but is entitled to give it to other family members.

If the individual animals acquired by a boy in his childhood multiply at a normal rate, their number can be sufficient to form the nucleus of a herd for him when he reaches his twenties⁷⁾. On the other hand, irregularities, especially in the early stages of development of a child's handura herd,

Table 5:1. Concepts for herd units

Ownership

- A. Property unit - the aggregate of animals to which a man and his children have unalienable rights (halaal rights) irrespective of where these animals are cared for. A man's property unit consists of B and C
- B. Allotted herd - animals to which a child or woman has subordinate rights, e.g. rights of "anticipated inheritance"
- C. Residual herd - animals to which a man has exclusive rights, having not yet handed over subordinate rights to any of his children or dependent women

Management

- D. Management unit - The total aggregate of animals for whose daily care a man is ultimately responsible
or Access herd
- E. Herding unit - a practical subdivision of a man's management unit for herding purposes, for example into one group of dry stock to be kept mobile (fora) and one group of milch stock to be kept at the main camp (hawicha); or several groups of hawicha or fora of different species
- F. Corral unit - two or several men may decide to herd and corral their management units together: the aggregate is a corral unit

often delay its growth considerably.

In figure 5a the provisional sub-allocation of stock within the herd of one Boran herdowner, Godo Golo, is shown⁸⁾.

Godo had originally allocated the prescribed number of waqalal animals to each of his 5 sons and 4 daughters. He had given two cows with calves to each of the boys and one heifer to each of the girls. By 1973, none of the stock that had been given to the girls remained in their hands. Most of it had died during the shifita war, and two cows, belonging to the second daughter, had been given by her to her eldest brother. The holdings of female stock owned by the different sons were very unequal. Godo's eldest son Waqo had acquired two extra cows from his junior sister, and had been given part of the bridewealth for another sister; otherwise he had not been allocated more stock than his brothers. He now owned 16 cows and female calves. His next brother, who was only two years younger, had only 2, and the younger boys had 2, 3 and 2 cows respectively. By 1978 Godo's cattle were heavily reduced in numbers due to the drought of 1975-6. The 20 female animals in his residual herd were almost all dead. One he had given away as bridewealth for his son's wife; now only two remained. The allotted herd of Waqo had shrunk to 7 cows, the next eldest son had only one left, and the youngest brothers had 0, 2 and 0 respectively. Godo contended that he had always striven to be just and to equalize the holdings of his sons, though Fortune seemed not to favour some of them. His third son, Kosi, always tended to get only male calves from his cow, and those given to the fifth boy, Dido, "die as soon as he gets them". In this particular situation, the father controlled only a minor part of the herd, and could do little to rectify the distribution between his sons except by appealing to the women to part with their stock.

According to Boran thought, as we have said, the father is a trustee on behalf of his ancestors and has the duty to transmit livestock capital to future generations⁹⁾. Part of this duty is to reconcile the needs of all sons and to balance the possible biases in the development of handura herds by extra gifts beyond those prescribed by the life-cycle ceremonies. For herdowners like Godo who do not have many animals in their herd this aspect of husbandry is almost impossible owing to the disturbances of drought and war which have upset the normal development cycle of households and their property. However, as opportunity arises, herdowners do strive to even out the differences between the allotted herds of their children by giving them additional gifts. Such gifts can be given as the father pleases, often as rewards for childish accomplishments, such as being able to say abba (Daddy) or when the child has killed his first two mice.

At the father's death there are usually still some cattle which have not been allotted to any wife or child, the father's "residual herd"¹⁰⁾. According to Boran custom these animals are inherited by the eldest son, the angafa.

Figure 5a. Sub-divisions of Godo Golo's herd

Godo Golo's family

Lines of cattle belonging to different family members

Godo's own residual herd

1st son Waqo

2nd son Dera

3rd son Kosi

4th son Bagaja

5th son Dido

Mother

Wife's mother

Legend:

- Slaughtered or died after 1974
- Slaughtered or died before 1974
- Sold or given away
- Male stock
- Female stock
- Present in 1974 herd
- Present in 1978 herd

The household and herd of a man who has no adult sons are affiliated to those of the dead man's brother or, if he has no brother, those of some other close agnate who will act as a guardian for the children and their stock. If the widow has sons who are reasonably mature, say fifteen years old or more, the husband's lineage elders will allow the household to remain an independent unit headed by the angafa. In fact, the Boran father often consciously trains his eldest son for this role. He is sent, rather than his younger brothers, on errands involving contacts with people outside the household and is also encouraged to feel particularly responsible for the family's cattle. The angafa should herd them himself without being told to do so if there is nobody else around to do it. He is also given authority to delegate tasks to his younger brothers and after his father's death he acts in his father's place towards them. The inherited stock are formally his, but he has some duties towards his younger brothers whom he should supply with stock if their allotted herds are too small. The actual fulfilment of this "duty" is voluntary, however, rather than prescriptive.

According to Muslim law, which is now followed in Isiolo, the residual herd of a man is split into equal shares between all the sons. Muslim law also recognizes the rights of daughters to a share, a rule Borana know about but do not appear to observe (see below p. 116). Although the Boran inheritance tradition is stated in terms of primogeniture, it is difficult to say whether there is very much difference in practice between the two systems when it comes to the relative share that brothers end up with. The inheritance of the younger Muslim brother is in the trust and care of the senior brother until the younger one marries. Any increase in the number of such stock accrues to the younger man, whereas the old Boran system does not grant him anything. On the other hand, if the father's residual herd is very small, the Muslim practice may give the younger brothers less protection than the Boran system does. Whichever system obtains, a younger Boran son whose father dies while he is still young always risks getting less than his elder brother. Neither system makes any provision to compensate for this except by voluntary reallocation of stock on the part of the elder brother. The difference between the two forms of inheritance may sound more important in theory than it is in practice, since inheritance is only one part of the system of property transfers between generations. In colonial records from the 1940s there are vague notes about conflicts over inheritance but at present there are no such clashes between Muslim and traditional law, and it is difficult to get any clear evidence from the Borana whether there ever used to be many such clashes or not.

When those who are now senior herdowners were young, they were usually provided with a herd of allocated livestock which grew in numbers as they themselves grew in age. Nevertheless, even at that time, it was common for young men to add to their herds by livestock acquired through their own achievements. Such animals could be gifts of cattle as rewards for bravery and skill in hunting large game, or the booty from raids against the Samburu, for example. In the herds of many elders there are still animals descended from such stock, bearing names like Boju (raid), Marasa (bought for elephant's tusks) or Galda (reward to a rhino-killer). The young men of today tend rather to increase their herds by stock bought with cash earnings or the profits of trading, and name their stock accordingly - Noti (money), Obru (exchanged for farm produce) or Hoyo (work).

MARRIAGE AND THE DELAY OF AUTONOMY

Building up enough property is only part of the problem for the young man striving for autonomy for he also has to assert his own identity and independence vis-à-vis the senior man in whose care the herd has been kept during his adolescence, whether it be his father, uncle or elder brother. We shall now consider some aspects of this problem.

In the Boran community, the major ritual indicating that a young man has come of age is his first marriage. An important symbolic and practical aspect of this is the fact that he is no longer required to live in somebody else's hut¹¹), which implies an inferior status, but has a house-building wife of his own. Marriage also marks the beginning of his attainment of a pool of labour that he can control himself. First-born sons heading households together with their mother can achieve a similar status to married men, but by and large it is marriage that defines a man as an adult, somebody seriously listened to in discussions of communal affairs. In the eyes of society, a married man is mature enough to carry out both herding tactics and husbandry decisions.

Does marriage then also mean independence? Let us first consider the relation between a man and his father. Asmarom, in his description of the northern Borana, tends to see filial independence mainly in terms of the father's providing a son with livestock for his bridewealth:

"One of the major sources of strife in Borana is the fact that there are no hard and fast rules for the transmission of the family estate from generation to generation. There are a great many adult Borana who never get the opportunity to marry and to become independent household heads. A jealous father who is not willing to give up part of his

estate so as to allow his children to marry can effectively prevent them from becoming adults, regardless of their age. The father may continue to marry younger and younger brides and deprive his aging children of bridewealth cattle..."¹²⁾

Hence, in the situation depicted by Asmarom, there appears to be a conflict between fathers and sons over the use of the father's estate either for the benefit of the son's independence or for the satisfaction of the father's desire for more wives. I do not agree with Asmarom's proposition, or at least, I want to relegate its relevance to a situation prevalent among the northern Borana but not among the Borana as a whole. I would claim that the timing of independence among the Borana is not determined by the matter of bridewealth. Nor do I think that adult bachelors abound among them. The size of bridewealth is comparatively small: in Isiolo, the normal rate under post-shifta conditions is four cattle, one or two of which are generally "forgiven" (as educated Borana express it in English), i.e. they either never leave the corral of the groom or are immediately returned to him.

For a man sufficiently eager to marry, it would not be difficult to raise such a small number of cattle by means of temporary employment or by gifts from more distant agnates if he has a "mean" father. The real problem is that the establishment of a new household is more a matter of having enough cattle to feed it with (or an alternative source of livelihood) rather than merely of having enough cattle for bridewealth. It is the provision of subsistence herds for the sons who marry that can make "fathers feel that the marriage of each son cuts deeply into the family estate"¹³⁾. To say, as Asmarom does with reference to the northern Borana, that fathers consider bridewealth as a serious threat to the family's economy would not be appropriate for the southern Borana. One point should be borne in mind however: the portion of a father's estate which must be set aside for the purpose of a son's marriage is not just any part of it but generally has to be taken from a specific set of animals within the herd, to which particular rights apply. Such stock can come from the son's allotted herd and from the father's residual herd. The same applies to the bridewealth that the father pays for his own marriages. The Borana do not have any system of stock-associates which could allow for the manipulation of the residual and allotted herds in the way described by Spencer¹⁴⁾ with regard to the Samburu. The Samburu husband withdraws stock from the sub-herds of his wife and children in order to give it to friends outside the family, thereby creating debts of reciprocity which can be exploited later in order to get new cows for the residual herd. In contrast, individual exchanges of stock among the Borana tend to

be in terms of loans of specific animals, which ultimately have to be returned to the family member who owned them to begin with. Thus the Boran father is largely constrained to use unallocated stock if he wants to marry again, and it is perhaps in the context of this residual herd that the impact of bridewealth expenditure is most bitterly felt. However, a new marriage by the father may also be seen as a more general threat since it will lead to new heirs with whom older sons must share allotments and inheritance, and thus will slow down the process of stock accumulation for the sons of the first wife.

The herd which provides the basis of subsistence for a newly-wed couple is also the sub-herd of specific animals which have already been allotted to the young man. When a young man marries, this allotted herd should ideally have grown to a size where it can support his household, and the remainder of the father's herd, including stock allocated to younger children, should be more than enough to provide for the father's household. This is, however, not the whole truth about household independence. The stock shortage in Isiolo District makes such an ideal situation very rare; but young people continue to marry and form new nuclear families. A closer look at the system shows that marriage does not transfer the full rights to allotted stock from the father to the son. The duty of a father to his married son is only to provide him and his wife with a sufficient number of milch animals. If the son has excess cattle in his allotted herd, the father can use them for his remaining household dependants, and in the case where there are too few cattle for the new family, the father should make a temporary allocation of extra milk stock to his daughter-in-law. As a married man, the young man has added weight in his influence in herding matters vis-à-vis his father, but ultimate herding authority remains with the latter, and this is also true as regards the right to undertake husbandry decisions. Marriage as such therefore does not necessarily confer independence¹⁵). One of the problems of Asmarom's approach to Boran independence is that he fails to draw the distinction between the formation of a nuclear family and the attainment of autonomy from the point of view of herd management.

FATHERS, SONS AND PROPERTY

The relation between fathers and sons may be more easily understood after a general consideration of the views on property held by the Galla/Oromo-speaking peoples. It is instructive to compare Boran stock-rights with the land-right system of agricultural Oromo, for example the Macha Oromo de-

scribed by Hultin¹⁶⁾ in a way which can easily be translated to Boran cattle rights:

"...what is involved here is rather a certain association between a lineage group and a specific territory. Two brothers for example who were tilling their respective pieces of masi were each one abba lafa to his particular piece of land, but their father was abba lafa not only to the land he tilled himself but also to the land his sons were tilling. And if their grandfather was living he was abba lafa not only to the land he himself was tilling but also to all the land that his sons and grandsons were abba lafa to as well..."

Thus, property is regarded, from an ideological point of view, as a hierarchy of fractions. There is also

"yet another principle of hierarchy, merging or overlapping with the former. All the present estates of the different lineage segments are included in the estate of the man who first took land, and the senior member in the senior descending line from the lineage founder is still, in a way, regarded as the abba lafa of the whole lineage estate ... however this hierarchical tendency did not... imply an hierarchical arrangement of authority and prerogatives..."

The father does not forfeit his abba-ship to the herd until his death (in fact, not even then, for he continues to be represented by the collective of all his patrilineal descendants). While he is the rightful abba to the herd as a whole, his sons may be abba to fractions of it at the same time, and their sons in turn abba to still smaller fractions. To own an animal and its reproductive capacity is in the Boran language to own it as halaal. A man always has a share in the halaal of his sons, irrespective of whether the animals emanated from his herd or not, and at the same time his father in turn has a share in his halaal. Thus, in the herd of Godo, the small son of Waqo Godo "has" a cow, but both Waqo and Godo will refer to it as "my cow". At the same time, Godo's herd is seen as a continuation of the property of a fictitious and anonymous set of ancestors of the Surkanna, a section of the Karayu clan, and thus of the clan as a whole. These ancestors are represented by the local Karayu lineage council, which consists of all Karayu lineage elders (jailaba) in the Waso area. The capacity to act as ancestral representatives allows these lineage elders to make decisions on questions of stock redistribution and they, and nobody else except a man's father, can intrude on his halaal rights.

It is perhaps logical to find that, among the northern Borana, a Boran man was not traditionally allowed to slaughter cattle, nor to have his own enclosure for his cattle, until his father either died or went through the gadamoji ceremony, which in the gada system marks retirement from political

and husbandry-oriented activities¹⁷⁾. The timing of this ceremony was decided by the gada ritual cycle which prescribed the ideal moment for the members of each generation class to retire. Participation in the ceremony on the ideal occasion was not mandatory, however, but could be postponed, though Borana elders would "make every effort to do it before becoming too old"¹⁸⁾.

Asmarom claims that extended families consisting of a father and his son would be most common in families outside the gada system, since in such families there was no scheduled timing for the transfer of property. But this argument seems to lose some of its validity because of the optional character of the retirement ritual which apparently enabled men to retain their stock as long as they pleased. According to the ideology of the Borana at Waso, where life is not regulated by the gada system, there is a definite occasion when a man should obtain full rights to all his stock and be able to establish an autonomous herding unit. That occasion is at his father's death: until then, he should keep his allotted livestock under his father's authority and care, "fearing his father like God". Senility or dwindling physical vigour can speed up the process, so that in practice a man who feels that age is making itself felt may pass increasing responsibility to his eldest son, while still retaining the legal right to veto slaughter, sales or other alienation of stock.

No Borana whom I asked could quote any Borana man who had separated amicably from a father who was still in his full vigour, in order to establish a unit of his own, nor did I meet any such person myself. Several cases were referred to, however, where the lineage elders had decided upon a formal separation of father and son. The typical pattern would be that a father would become more and more irritated over a recalcitrant son and would withdraw the milk stock from his sons household. The son would then call on some influential lineage elder and explain his problem. Then a number of lineage jallaba would meet and discuss the problem, and settle it by allotting to the son a share of stock depending in size upon his household needs. Even a bachelor son can be driven out; he would then have a formal right only to claim a share of five cows and a bull - the minimal unit needed for a start, referred to as a "butume" after the branch with which the cattle corral is closed. A married person would have a right to a larger share. In practice, some of the sons that had been bluntly told to leave by their fathers had also been allowed to take along all their allotted stock. Separation cases were exceptional enough to be the topic of popular gossip. A formal separation

relieves the father of his remaining responsibilities for maintaining the son, but if he himself runs into subsistence problems, the son is still obliged to help him.

In the chapter on Boran ecology, we referred to the strategies of diversification and dispersion. One of the reasons why the Boran father retains authority over his married son is, of course, because it is favourable to have several separate sub-units under the same head. An easy way to organize such sub-units is by placing a son with his wife or an unmarried son with his mother in another camp. In the context of an economy where the most secure and profitable family management unit is one consisting of several spatially separate units, the continued dependence of a son on his father does not necessarily lead to residential groups that can be classified as extended families. It should therefore be no surprise to learn from Asmarom that such families are relatively rare among the northern Borana¹⁹). The son who is posted by his father to care for a particular category of stock, say the sheep and goats, the camels, or a subordinate herd of cattle, is not "independent", and the father continues to regard the stock as his own as long as he feels strong enough to take part in herd management. Among the southern Borana, confederated households are a common pattern, the pastoral "dispersed extended family" providing a special case. Rich men tend to have one or two married sons that are placed in this way, with subordinate pastoral units. Today, however, the Waso herdowner of some wealth has a wider range of choice when it comes to the question of allocating the labour of married sons, and there are new forms of household confederations.

Wealthier Boran herdowners often try to engage in retail trade, with the help of their sons, and either post the son with the herd while they themselves take care of the shop or vice versa. They also send their young sons to school in order to ensure profitable jobs for them in the central and district administration, i.e. as chiefs, clerks, teachers or agricultural and medical extension workers. For the father this is often nothing but a new form of "diversification" of his estate, bringing prestige, political influence, and a drought-resistant cash reserve. The sons of poor herdowners also tend to live away from their fathers but their absence is more immediately caused by scarcity of livestock and the urgent need for cash to cover seasonal food shortages. One can find them working like Jacob for Rachel herding for their more affluent fathers-in-law or as irrigation farmers, or as labour migrants downcountry. When a Boran son is more or less permanently away, working for a wage, his father still tends to think of the son's

property as part of a common estate. A Boran father expects a share in his son's salary, and if a migrant son does not accede to this traditional definition of the relation between them by remitting money to his father, the latter frequently pays him visits to fetch his due, even if the son lives far downcountry. Sons who are directly involved in the "modern" economy of Kenya, particularly successful civil servants, often of course develop alternative ideas about the goals of their life and the nature of their filial duties. In many cases, the focus of father-son conflicts has shifted from a concern with the use of livestock in which they have joint claims to a concern about the son's complete lack of interest in livestock and his unwillingness to support his father.

The case of Gayo Dima will illustrate many of the aspects of filial independence that we have touched upon:

Under the present conditions of stock shortage, Gayo Dima is a rather successful man. He has about 120 cattle, 300 goats and even 10 camels. The cattle are kept in a camp to the east of Merti, and that is where Gayo spends most of his time. Gayo's father is alive, but is very senile and takes no active part in stock management, being looked after more or less like a child. Gayo's elder brother, who would normally have been the one closest to his father, had been an obstinate son who refused to take orders from his father when it came to unpleasant things such as going out to look for lost cattle. He had been formally separated from his father by the lineage elders. A younger brother, whose few cattle were still in Gayo's herd, worked as a policeman in Eldoret. Gayo's sons were also scattered: two of them who were not yet married worked in Nairobi as nightwatchmen. At the time of my visit, Gayo had just returned from a tour to Nairobi and Eldoret during which he had been able to raise some cash that he needed for buying iron sheets for his shop building. At his shop, he planned to station his second wife and a son who now attended standard 7 at school. His eldest son was married, and lived with his wife in a camp just north of the Merti plateau, where he looked after the goats and camels with the help of some sister's sons. When I met him, his father Gayo had just removed some ten goats from his son's herd, since they were sick and Gayo considered that the son was not skilled enough to give them proper care.

WARDS, GUARDIANS AND PROPERTY

So far we have been concerned with the relations between sons and fathers. However, since Boran men continue to marry and beget children to a great age, a substantial proportion of men have not yet reached marrying age when their fathers die. For such men, it is frequently against their elder brothers or paternal uncles that they wish to assert themselves. When a boy stands in the position of junior brother under the protection of the angafa, or of young ward to a senior agnate other than his father, this has implications slightly different from the status of a son vis-à-vis his father. The

guardian, whether an older brother or an uncle, holds only temporary rights in relation to the ward's stock; namely, the authority to take herding decisions and to practice husbandry rights on behalf of the ward until the latter comes of age. "Coming of age" usually means the time of the young man's marriage.

For a first-born son under the guardianship of an uncle or senior clansman a critical question concerns the relation between his mother and the guardian. If she is married to him and has children by him it is unlikely that the son can activate his rights earlier than at his marriage. If a young man has a capable mother, and one who is not formally tied to his guardian, the break with the guardian may come earlier. Generally, however, marriage marks the time when a ward has the formal right to take his animals and depart if he pleases. After the young man's marriage, the guardian has no continuing right to interfere in his affairs. Only as a member of the corporate lineage can he lay claims to the young agnate's herd.

A guardian's husbandry authority over the cattle belonging to junior wards is ideally subject to their consent. Yet there is ample room for conflict both over the herding of shared stock and over discriminatory husbandry policies followed by the senior man who may choose his junior's animals for slaughter rather than his own, or take one of them when he is requested to lend a cow to a friend. Any Boran chief will testify to the frequency of conflicts over actual or alleged mismanagement of stock on the part of the guardian.

Dissatisfaction over the final outcome of the allotment and inheritance systems is also likely to create dissent between brothers, even though Boran ideology extols fraternal unity as an important virtue. Although the marriage of a younger brother may meet with resistance from his senior brother, once the marriage is concluded there are no formal ambiguities in the rights that the young man has to stock that was formerly allotted to him or that he inherited from his father. However, for such men, whose fathers are dead, neither the opportunity to establish an autonomous household nor to fulfil the role of a respected elder is regulated by formal rights alone. Practical considerations are also crucial, namely the quantity of stock one has, the labour one can support with it, and the capacity one has to recruit such labour. Marriage, while it gives a young man the hopeful beginning of a labour pool, does not immediately give him access to junior herdsman. Only when a man can afford herdsman to do the "herding tasks" for him, can he himself engage in dependent "herding tactics" and in the discussion of matters

of interest to the community at large. Only then can he spend his day with elders, visiting other camps or going to the market to exchange news about weather conditions or political affairs. Up till that time, even if he has the societal sanction to act as an adult and mature herdowner, he is obliged to follow his livestock in the bush and spend his energy on herding and watering²⁰). Such work does not permit him to collect the information he requires, nor to spend much time at meetings. In practice he may have to remain under the protection of a senior herdowner for a long time after his formal assertion of stock rights. This goes also for the mother-son units that have not been placed under the protection of the son's senior agnates: as a rule, such units have to attach themselves to the homestead of a mother's brother.

THE CLIENT SON-IN-LAW

After marriage, there is another residence pattern which offers an alternative for men who are not in the position to establish and maintain independent herding units. That is to settle with their fathers-in-law. While extended families based on a co-resident couple of son and father occur only rarely, residential unions between a father, his daughter and his son-in-law are more frequent. For instance, among 23 extended families based on father-child co-residence which I found in seven different camps, only four were father-son-units while the rest were uxori-local units based on father-daughter co-residence. How do these units come about?

Borana traditions recognize two symptoms of reason for a man to stay in the same camp as his father-in-law. The first is related to the need for the continued domestic education of a very young wife, and the second to the respective access that the father-in-law and the son-in-law have to cattle and labour. In order to give a young wife the opportunity to learn household work and hut-building from her mother, the husband often camps with his in-laws for some years²¹). To have to accept a prolonged residence with parents-in-law is not regarded as desirable, however. When the girl has developed her skills, the newly established family should leave. There seems to be a difference between the Borana and the closely related Gabbra in this respect, for Torry²²) states that there is an explicit rule among the Gabbra that

"... the groom must live in the camp of his wife's family for at least one year after marriage. During this uxori-local, post-marital residence, the groom performs brideservice for his in-laws".

Isiolo Borana claim that in the "good old times" it never happened that Warrilibin people stayed on with their in-laws for more than a short spell; ideally they should leave on the seventh day after the wedding. A man who had no sons could, however, demand that his son-in-law stay with him in order to help with his labour problems²³). The normal way of doing this is said to be by the son-in-law providing his wife's father with an employee, a young unmarried man (kero)²⁴) who earned one cow for a year's work. This practice of employing a kero seems to be rare today, probably due to the general shortage of cattle in the area. Cases of prolonged uxori-locality are very common, however, and often involve a reduced brideprice. To move away against the wishes of the father-in-law is regarded as a serious breach of the rules of behaviour, requiring settlement by the lineage elders. When cattle are scarce, or the family wants for some other reason to get a foothold outside the cattle-keeping sphere, it is more profitable for a father to send his own son away to take a paid job and to recruit his son-in-law as herdsman. A man named Bagaja provides an example of this:

Bagaja had a small allotted herd of 10 cattle. When he married, he gave only two cattle as bridewealth, and moved to live with his father-in-law who claimed that, since his adolescent son was at school, he needed the help of the son-in-law. After seven years Bagaja expressed his wish to leave, in order to join his own parents. This was only grudgingly granted after some months of repeated requests. The burden of providing food for the young family during this stay was shared between the two herds, belonging to Bagaja and his father-in-law. Most of Bagaja's own animals were left in his father's corral, but the father had allowed him to take along a couple of milk cows to support his family. Bagaja's absent brother-in-law had left his allocated herd behind in the camp and was "living on his wages".

A son-in-law, who has no legal claim to the property owned by the man whose cattle he helps to herd, does not threaten the latter's position of authority and is also possibly less likely to resent it than the son would be. At the same time, the herdowner retains control over the labour of his daughter - whom he may like to have in his camp anyhow, for Boran elders are often very fond of their daughters and are glad to be able to see that they are well treated by their husbands.

One consequence of the practice of recruiting sons-in-law in place of absent sons is, of course, that the ownership of the livestock capital is still concentrated in the hands of the patriline, while the work connected with the care of the herd and the use of its products, are divided outside it.

Staying on with the father-in-law reflects badly on the economic status of the groom as well as of his agnates, who appear not to be able to afford

to employ a kero or to pay a proper brideprice. The derogatory connotations of a man staying on with his father-in-law seem partly to emanate from this. Today this despised form of residence is the rule rather than the exception, and occurs both among young men whose fathers are still alive, and among formally independent, but poor, herdowners. For the father of the young man, if there is one, the arrangement does not only have drawbacks. He can make use of it in order to increase the spread of his own stock, solve some of the problems of maintaining his son's family during a transitional time, and perhaps also reduce some of the tensions of father-son co-residence. The relation between a man and his father-in-law is regulated by well-sanctioned respect and also does not bring about the conflicts that arise from shared claims to property. Similarly, a man may place a married son and some stock with his wife's brother with whom he has a bond akin to that between him and the father of his daughter-in-law.

My impression is, however, that sons-in-law coming to live with wealthy herdowners mainly come from poor families who have lost most, but not all, of their stock. They are often the elder sons of such families; young men who have "at least a butume", a small nucleus of a herd, either as property under their own control, or less often as allotted stock within their father's herd. In a group of brothers, they are the ones who perceive that they have a fair chance of settling themselves up as herdowners within a reasonable time. Younger brothers and sons who have perhaps only one or two cows and no great hope of ever getting any more do not relinquish their rights at once, but tend to turn to shambas and paid jobs for their subsistence rather than going to live with their fathers-in-law. The present shortage of stock in Isiolo District does not favour sons, younger brothers or wards. It militates against any voluntary redistribution of stock from senior agnates and makes it necessary for younger agnates to seek their fortunes elsewhere and deposit remaining cattle and small stock with elder relatives who can maintain more viable units of labour and livestock.

RESOURCES AND CONTROL IN THE MALE SPHERE

We have approached the male career towards autonomy mainly from the point of view of formal and material constraints on the initial achievement of independence in herding and husbandry matters. Let us now consider the problem from another angle, that of the resources that make it possible for some men to maintain such independence.

The basis of a career developing towards autonomy and elderhood is the growth of a man's property herd, consisting of the animals to which he has halaal rights, that is, animals emanating from his father's herd, and animals that he has acquired by his own efforts. When a man reaches middle age, some of the stock that he got from his father will have passed out of his hands, into the herds of his in-laws and clan-mates, and to the remaining core that derives from his father he will have added a large proportion of stock from other sources: bridewealth given for his daughters and sisters, booty from raids, heifers given in exchange for the temporary loan of a bull, cattle bought for wage earnings, animals exchanged against goats or for the proceeds of maize sales and so on. His herd therefore tells both the important achievements of his life and his relations with other people, for each cow is named either by how she herself was obtained or by how her first ancestress came into the herd. Thus, the herd is not only generally symbolic of a man's identity, but is also a "biography on hoofs".

I have called the herd under a senior herdowner's care his "access herd". For this he decides on "herding tactics", and its produce supports the people in his "labour pool". In this herd there are also animals to which he cannot himself claim halaal rights. A minor portion may be cattle to which his wife has exclusive rights, another part may be the stock that has accompanied aged female relatives, the adolescent sons of his widowed sister, the small children of his dead brother's wife and so on. He ties these units together into a viable whole, with an inner core of household dependants and their stock and sometimes with an outer collecting of more loosely related unviable units. From a formal point of view poor sons-in-law and daha-associates may be equal partners in herding matters but in practice they are often nothing more than dependants whose stock add to the general resources of the richer partner. The successful Boran herdowner is the man who can act as a link between several unviable units and profit from the fact that the value of the whole is larger than the sum of its parts. The capacity to provide such linkage is partly decided by livestock wealth, and partly by the stage where one finds oneself in relation to the development cycle of the family. Thus, for example, we have seen how access to adult sons makes it possible for a herdowner to diversify his economic activities. In this context we see how daughters are also a resource, not only for the labour they can provide, but also for the connections they create with other property units.

1. The distinction between herding and husbandry is most clear in Paine's argument as it is presented in a preliminary version, published in Folk (1964), whereas in the later version, given in Perspectives on Nomadism (1972) it is somewhat blurred. Dyson-Hudson states in his introduction to the latter volume that Paine's distinction is inapplicable to East African subsistence because "it is precisely the job of a herdowner to reconcile the needs of livestock and humans" (p. 14). This refers to a sentence in Paine's later version of the article: "Herding is concerned with the herd/pasture relationship as directed to the welfare of the animals, and ideally to the exclusion of the comfort of the herders themselves. Husbandry on the other hand, is concerned with the herd as the harvestable resource of its owner..." (Paine, 1972:79). But the main difference is not that one is oriented towards the wellbeing of a man and the other towards that of his beasts, but that one implies the care of the physical state of the animals seen as individuals and the other implies the care of the structure of the herd.
2. Paine, 1964:84, 1972:80
3. Paine 1964:85
4. ibid.: 84
5. Roberts & Comaroff, 1976
6. Cunnison 1966:34
7. Dahl & Hjort 1976:71ff
8. Only animals which still had living descendants are included in the figure. Some "lines of cows" had at the time of my fieldwork become extinct and were difficult to trace.
9. Baxter 1966b:126
10. Spencer 1965:53, 1973:76
11. Asmarom 1973:35, Cf. Asad 1970:42-43
12. Asmarom op.cit.: 111
13. ibid.:66
14. Spencer 1965:53-65.
Much of the discussion on equality and inequality in the pastoral societies of East Africa has followed the lines indicated by Spencer in his valuable study on Samburu gerontocracy, concerned with the conflict over resources between fathers and sons, seeing the competition over potential wives and over marriage partners as crucial. Apart from Asmarom, Bonte et al. at Groupe d'Ecologie et Anthropologie des Sociétés Pastorales, Maison de l'Homme, Paris, have taken up this thread. See e.g. Bonte 1974.
15. Cf. Torry 1973:329 ff. for a similar situation for the Gabbra sons. Gabbra and Boran fathers do not seem to suffer the same kind of successive depletion of their herds as Stenning has described for the Bororo Fulani, where the marriage of the last offspring signifies the dissolution of the paternal household (Stenning 1958:92,99)
16. Hultin 1977:3,5

17. Haberland 1963:34. At roughly the same time in the gada career, the son would start to allocate cattle to his own son at the name-giving ceremony. Note also that the gadamoji elders, who had passed the final ceremony and handed over the property rights to their sons, had to follow a number of ritual taboos, one function of which appears to have been to avoid becoming involved in jural procedures. Thus, they were not allowed to carry weapons nor to have extramarital liaisons. Having given up their formal property rights, they could no longer be jural persons in their own right.
18. Asmarom, op.cit.:196
19. Asmarom, op.cit.:35
20. Stenning, op.cit.:104
21. There is no formal limit to the lowest age at which a girl can be married, although marriage is not consummated until puberty. Several old women told me that they had been married at the age of seven or even younger. Such early marriages are not common at Waso today, but marriages at thirteen or fourteen do occur and are regarded as normal. At this age, girls are, however, normally regarded as in need of additional training by their mother.
22. Torry 1976: esp. 272.383
23. Cf. Goody 1973:39
24. Baxter 1954:401. This word refers to a man whose herd flourishes since he abstains from sexual excesses and thereby does not endanger the cattle. Huntingford 1955 p.33 quotes Bahrey: "All unmarried Galla, uncircumcized or circumcized, are called gero"

6. MOTHERS AND MILK-MANAGERS

THE FEMALE SPHERE IN LIVESTOCK MANAGEMENT

The previous chapter showed how the traditional male role of the Borana is distinguished by a preoccupation with livestock, ideally changing over a man's lifetime from a concern with practical tasks of herd care towards policy-making and administration of herding tactics and husbandry. Women's involvement in practical herd management on the other hand, is normally restricted to tasks that can be carried out in the immediate vicinity of the camp, that is, to the care of sick or very young animals which have to remain in the camp during the day, to the handling of milk cattle when they return to the camp, and to the herding of small stock when they graze near the camp. Outside the camp, the traditional division of labour only allows them to partici-

pate in the care of animals when there is a shortage of male labour.

On the whole, there is a strong association between animal care and the male sphere of labour on the one hand, and between activities oriented around the homestead and the female sphere on the other. Significantly, men build the cattle fences and women build the houses. This general pattern is not peculiar to the Borana but a characteristic shared by most African societies with a predominantly pastoral adaptation¹⁾. This is the necessary result of the incompatibility of child care and pregnancy with the mobility and irregularity involved in herding. For a Boran woman, the period when her mobility is restricted by the care of children is the longest phase of her life, and it is logical that the general female role should be adapted to the needs of that particular period²⁾. Having children and caring for them not only restricts her life, but is the very axis around which it revolves. The division between herd/male and camp/female is not only expressed in the division of labour but is also reflected in the division of authority. All household goods such as the hut equipment, milk pots, stools, beds and kitchenware belong exclusively to the woman, and she can dispose of them in any way she wants. When it comes to livestock and herding tactics, Boran women rarely participate, except as conveyors of any information on pasture and weather that they happen to overhear. With regard to husbandry decisions, their rights tend to be subordinate to those of their husband. Only in relation to a limited part of the household herd can the woman challenge the authority of her husband. There is one field of decisions, however, which relates both to livestock and to the home and camp, over which she has some authority. That is "housekeeping". Planning the allocation of the products from the herd for different purposes and for the benefit of different consumers lies to a large extent in the hands of the Boran wife. In particular she has to make sure that there is enough milk for the calves, whose survival is necessary for the family's future access to milk, and for the children who are to grow up to be heirs and helpers in the pastoral undertaking. "Housekeeping" implies a concern for the reproduction of production assets in more ways than one. The woman must weigh the family's needs of today against the wants of tomorrow, both in the short-term perspective of storing some meat and milk if she can, and in the long-term perspective of not endangering the future reproduction of the herd by overmilking. As if this were not enough, the Boran wife is also expected to economize so that she always has a reserve of food to offer as hospitality to any guests that visit the family.

An adult woman in a Boran pastoral family usually has access to a number of

milk cows, whose produce she controls. Although the initial allocation of such stock is made by the husband, he does not meddle in the day-to-day management of milk resources. When it comes to blood, meat and skins, it is also up to the woman to decide on their use, but only after they have been made available by male decision. Blood is drawn only after a consideration of the animal's physical condition: sometimes the herdowner will try blood-letting as a cure for some disorder in the animal, and on other occasions he may feel that losing too much blood will weaken it. Meat and skins are unrenowable products and of course, only available after slaughter. "House-keeping" considerations enter also into "husbandry" decisions, for when men decide on the disposition of oxen or old cows, they have to calculate the consequences of sale or slaughter for the family's access to food during a future shortage of milk. They must take into account the possibilities of obtaining grain, the need for the animals to be bled, the need for meat as a reserve food and also for future ritual purposes.

Milk is regarded as the staple food of the Boran household. Meat is not seen to the same extent as meant a priori for domestic family consumption. It is a prestige food which is used as much in the development and maintenance of social relations outside the household as for consumption within it. Friedl³⁾ has pointed out that, in most subsistence-oriented societies, the men control such foodstuffs as can be turned into political assets by means of influential redistribution outside the household. This is true also for the Borana. Access to slaughter animals makes it possible to achieve the honour of being host to a lineage or neighbourhood assembly (kora). Once the animal has been chosen for slaughter, it is up to the wife to decide on the relative shares of meat to be offered to the guests or kept for the family. It is only rarely that she herself has the right to pick an animal for slaughter - on exceptional occasions such as when she is given an ox as a sign of honour at her daughter's wedding or in compensation if her husband is found to have wronged her.

Redistribution of other types of food than meat is not an ostensible part of the political process to the same extent as offering animals to be slaughtered for the kora, but it is a way of building up respect and influence. Although this would seem to be a way for women to gain influence, it is not primarily the women themselves who gain from the generosity they show with such resources. For a Boran man who has ambitions outside the limited scope of his own homestead, a generous wife is a good asset, one who without niggardliness offers milk, tea and other food to any occasional visitor, irrespective of when he arrives and not only on the occasion of formal

gatherings or large celebrations. In the context of election to the offices of lineage leadership (jallaba), an apt and munificent wife is thought to compensate for certain weaknesses in the character of the male candidate. The woman who is hospitable gains esteem for herself but does not herself take part in political life except as a lobbyist and informal campaigner. Boran women are brought up to feel ill at ease when they find themselves in the presence of more than two men who are not their close relatives. There are solitary examples of women who have been appointed to modern sub-local "development committees" in response to pressure from the central Kenyan Government, but even such women push their sons rather than themselves if they have ambitions for a higher appointment. Among Borana, Public life is not part of the female domain. Instead, it is through her "private" role as mother, wife and milkmanager that a Boran woman seeks esteem and respect in the wider community also.

A COW TO MILK...

The only formal right that a woman has to obtain personal stock from her agnates is that acknowledged by Muslim law. A strict application of the Quran⁴⁾ would require that daughters be given half the share that their brothers enjoy. There is little consensus among the Borana on how the law should be applied. The actual ratios vary, and sometimes turn out to be one to the daughter and ten to the son, or even nothing to the daughters if the total inheritance to be shared is small. There are no known cases where a Boran man has tried to push a claim in his wife's behalf for a share in the inheritance of his father-in-law. The dominant mode of thought is that a woman should not be able to "divert cattle from the clan". It is easy to quote parallel instances from the ethnographics of other Muslim pastoralists, showing how the corporate agnatic interest in livestock seems to take priority over formal Muslim inheritance rules - the Kababish Arabs of Sudan, the Cyrenacian Bedouin and the Bororo Fulani⁵⁾ are examples of this. More or less conscious neglect of the rule seems to be a common solution to the problem.

When it comes to the provisional allotment of handura stock to Boran daughters, there are no strict rules on how it should be done. Instead, different families have their own traditions which range from "never a handura to a girl" to sometimes quite explicitly stated family customs that all girls should have such stock. I met one such family, where all the daughters had been equipped with handura during the last three generations, and where one of the female members was living mainly on the produce of her 30 goats, supplemented by cash remittances from her brother. In that family, the allocation was done

purposely to provide the female members with security in case of divorce, and to give them a better bargaining position within their marriages. Similarly, there are different opinions on what rights a girl has to take away handura stock from her father's or brother's herds: this varies from family to family. Some fathers supply their daughters and sons-in-law with gifts of stock when they move away from their camps. The gifts can be described either as the personal property of the woman or a gift to the couple to hold in common. A father or brother may also give a married daughter a milk cow as a sign of affection or at her request when she has a lack of such animals.

When a woman has been given stock by her own agnates and told that she has the right to take them wherever she goes, she has full halaal rights to these animals (see p. 110). Formally, it is her right to decide on how they should be herded and whether they should be slaughtered, sold or given away. Due to the small number involved, practical considerations normally make it necessary for her to rely on her husband or guardian to organize the actual herding. In most cases, a woman has no more than one or two such beasts and many women have none. Instead, a woman's property mainly consists of animals to which she has only derived rights, and rights only pertaining to the use of their products. As we have mentioned, (p. 114) this makes her a jural minor by definition, and it also means that she can exercise her housekeeping talents only within a framework dictated by decisions taken by men. Both for her self-esteem and her economic security, a pastoral woman depends on being attached to a man as his wife or ward, and on his giving her access to the use of some of his stock.

When a woman is the sole adult woman in the homestead she controls the produce from all the animals in her family's access herd. Frequently, however, there are several adult women attached to the camp who are entitled to a share in the milk stock. The relation between these women and the herdowner varies; some may be his wives, some his or his wife's real or classificatory mothers, others his divorced or widowed sisters or daughters, others newlywed daughters who have not yet left their father's camp. When a woman has been accepted as a dependant, she is entitled to a share in the milk stock at least large enough to provide for her own sustenance. The herdowner has to allot specific animals to all the different women in his camp as the cows to which they have personal milking rights or amesa. It is his recognized duty to make such allocations to all women with children to feed, and the women have the right to complain if they feel underprivileged.

In the case of cattle and goats, the right to the produce from an amesa also implies a duty to supervise the milking and a responsibility for the health of the calves. The holder of the milk rights does not necessarily have to be the one who actually carries out the milking. She is free to do so if she wants to, but as milking is hard work an older woman is often glad to have some youngster do it for her. Unlike, for example, the Ankole as described by Elam⁶⁾, the Borana do not regard the potential competition between the needs of children and calves as a serious reason for banning women from milking. Milking is a public activity which takes place in the presence of several people, and anyone can see how many dugs the woman milks and how many she leaves for the calf. A woman who owns a cow as her amesa would obviously not overmilk it at the expense of the calf, the Borana say, for that would endanger the household's future access to milk: only people who milk for others would overmilk. But the woman who has the milk rights to a particular cow keeps a close watch over anybody else milking that cow, especially when one of her co-wives or her daughter-in-law has borrowed it, or if it is milked by an employed herdsman. She also has to go herself, or send some younger girl, to fetch grass and water for the calf of the amesa cow when it comes to the age of weaning and she keeps the young kids of her amesa goats in her hut during the day.

The situation used to be somewhat different with camels⁷⁾. As we have said earlier, only young and ritually pure herdsman could tend the camel calves and milk their mothers during the half-year of ritual seclusion, the gal lagan. Sakuye women still had amesa rights to particular camel dams, however, and the herdsboys had to bring home the milk from the gal lagan enclosure and give it to the rightful milk-manager of the dam.

What are the principles followed when milk rights are distributed to the women of a homestead, and what are their relation to the allotment rights of various family members? Let us deal first with the least complicated or ambiguous cases, namely, those of cattle allocated from a man's residual herd. When a man singles out a cow from this category to give to a specific woman in his camp, this changes nothing in his own property rights. At any point of time he can reallocate the cow to another woman, and although she can hand over the milking rights to some other person, she cannot regard the cow as her "allotted property" or give it away to a child as his handura. Her rights are restricted to milking that particular animal during that season and until the husband makes a re-allocation. He can change the distribution, for example, if he finds that some other woman has too few animals for the

needs of her sub-household, or if he finds that there are women in the homestead who have notably less than the others. Until the husband/herdowner/homestead head has explicitly ordered any change, the cow remains with her manager and is nominally regarded as her amesa even if it is dry and actually grazes far away in the fora. Heifer calves born to the cow will also fall to the lot of her milk-manager when they start to give milk. Should there be any cattle in the herdowner's residual herd, which have not been formally allocated as amesa to other women, the senior wife is in charge of them. When the herdowner dies and his residual herd is split up according to Muslim inheritance principles, these milking rights are not taken into account.

When a young girl marries, her husband or father-in-law (if still alive) will allocate her milk cows from among the husband's allotted herd if it is large enough. Otherwise she will get a temporary extra allocation from the father-in-law or her own father. She does not automatically get all her husband's animals. His mother has had rights to them as her son's handura and often retains these rights to some of them. As can be expected, this is an area where tension between a woman and her mother-in-law easily becomes rife, for the young wife threatens the domain of her mother-in-law's authority. The milk cows that the young wife obtains at her marriage have no special status, and she can lay claim to them only because they have once been allocated as her amesa. It is difficult for her to resist their future reallocation to other women if it should be found that she has more than enough while other women have a shortage of cows. Later she obtains other milk cows to which she can make more secure claims, and which she can demand back, if they are alienated from her during one particular season. It is especially through her children that she can get such security. A woman's adulthood is only partly defined by her marriage. Until she has a child she is addressed as intal (girl) rather than nitti (madame), even if she is married; this demonstrates the significance of female fertility to the Borana. It is the child who really provides her with an anchorage in the husband's clan and gives her proper rights to milk cattle from his herd. In this context it should be noted that, during the first year of marriage, the newly-wed couple are often partly supported by the wife's father.

When a man allots cattle to his son or daughter as handura, the child's mother expects these animals to be her own milk cows and to remain so. Nevertheless, the husband can ask his wife to cede her milking rights temporarily if another woman has no milking stock at the time. He can also remove a cow from the woman in order to give it away to a male friend or to sell it,

although this is much less often done with milch cows than with heifers. Quarrels arise when a homestead head reallocates milking rights without the milkholder's consent, and these can develop into conflicts both between the women concerned and between the man and the proper owner of the milk rights. Such conflicts tend to become acute during the dry season and every time the disputed animal comes into calf, and frequently express themselves in accusations of overmilking. The head of a homestead is often eager to stress that he has an absolute right to redistribute animals according to his own discretion, but women recognize each other's rights to the handura stock of children and try to avoid challenging them, even if conditions allow them to do so.

In Boru's cattle camp there were four adult women. There was his senior wife Roge and her mother, another of Boru's mothers-in-law and Boru's "mother" Diramu who had taken care of him when he was a small boy although she was more precisely the widow of his father's second paternal cousin. Two of Boru's wives were living in his small stock camp, sharing the she-goats between them as their amesa. At the beginning of 1975, Boru spent some time in Garba Tula. When he came back he found that his "mother" had not a single cow with her that was in milk, even though she had a child to take care of - the son of the second wife who had been entrusted to her "to keep her company". Boru was furious with the other women of the homestead, who had each five cows left and who had not volunteered to give Diramu any amesa. He told Diramu that she could go into the corral and take her pick. The old woman refused to do this, saying that it was no use forcing the other women. Then the wife, Roge, decided to offer a handura belonging to her own child as a loan. Diramu later repaid the loan when, after the drought, the handura of her small boy had come into milk. At that stage, all Boru's cows were in milk, but they had become very few: there were only two amesas for each of the women.

The child's handura gives the mother a stronger degree of security of tenure than she has to a cow allotted from the herdowner's residual herd. Traditional Boran culture offers a mother yet another type of rights in stock and milk which are even more difficult to alienate from her. This is when a woman is given cattle on the occasion of her children's important life-cycle ceremonies, as an honorary sign of her motherhood. The dungo (kiss) cow was given at a son's circumcision according to pre-Muslim custom⁸) and is still occasionally presented to the child's mother at the Muslim ceremony of circumcision. The anuna (sip of milk) is a gift from the son-in-law to his wife's mother at the wedding. The anuna animal does not have to be a cow, and today even the traditional gift of an ox for slaughter has been replaced by a gift of clothes or by transport donkeys. When dungo and anuna are female cattle, the woman has what almost amounts to husbandry rights to them, for she can refuse to allow her husband to give them away, or slaughter or sell them. Nonetheless she does not herself have the right to carry out such decisions independently,

and her rights of absolute veto relate only to the original animals and not to their offspring. The offspring are counted as the wife's "allotted stock" to which she has similar rights to those upheld by a child who has handura animals. A woman's right to veto her dungo and anuna being milked by another woman is undisputed and respected also by men. The same is true for cattle that derive from a woman's own agnates.

Many husbands do not like their wives to be too wealthy in terms of stock acquired from their agnates or other sources independent of the husband's control. In a quarrel over milk-rights a woman is always in a strong position when she has such cattle, for the typical male threat is to withdraw all amesa from a woman who is reluctant to part with a particular cow. Cattle which have been provided by a woman's clan are for her own personal use and she does not have to supply the members of other clans with them nor even her own children. If it is found that a husband has wronged his wife in relation to these beasts, or the dungo and anuna, he can be sentenced to give his wife an ox for slaughter. "You brought me here so I am within my rights to get your stock and keep my own, too" as one defiant woman said. Since such beasts - like the dungo and anuna - are only infrequently given nowadays, a woman enjoys security in milk rights mainly in relation to the handura animals of her children⁹). Obviously, when there is a shortage of stock, this diminishes the probability that a woman will get the few types of stock-rights that offer any real security of holding. Fathers, husbands and lineage elders all tend to give priority to supplying sufficient animals for men to be able to maintain themselves rather than looking to any wishes for stock that women may have.

...AND CHILDREN TO NURSE

Many Boran girls marry at puberty or soon after. Boran men marry from the age of twenty or so, but go on marrying new wives long after their female age-mates have passed the menopause. A girl's first marriage is decided by her father, senior brother or male guardian. The degree to which her own opinions are taken into account varies considerably from family to family: in many cases she has practically no say in the matter. For the older generation of women, marriage was more a utilitarian and economic union than a question of initial fondness between husband and wife. The wife, ideally, "learns to love" her husband, although never at the expense of her solidarity with her own agnatic group. What a girl expects out of marriage with a man who is not of her own choice is not romantic love, but the opportunity to fulfil the role of mother of many children and manager of many milkpots.

Table 6.1 Sources of a Boran woman's milking rights

PERMANENT MILKING RIGHTS		TEMPORARY MILKING RIGHTS	
		ALIENATION DISPUTABLE	ALIENATION POSSIBLE
Animals from brothers or father, inheritance, <u>handura,</u> <u>and gifts</u> of affection	<u>Mehar</u> <u>animals</u> from previous marriage	Animals which are handura to the woman's unmarried children, i.e. sons, daughters, adopted children	Animals tempora- rily allocated from herd-owner to cover milk needs of woman and children
	Animals obtained as a mother - Dungo at boy's circum- cision, Anuna at <u>girl's</u> marriage		

There is a place for infatuation too, but it is in the context of a voluntary, extramarital union between a married garayyu and her lover. Young girls to-day, particularly if they are educated, usually hope for a love-marriage, however, and women generally emphasize that it is better to be married to a man of one's own age "so that one can play and laugh together".

The quality of the marital relationship varies very much with the age difference between a wife and her husband. When a young couple marry, who are more or less equal in age, the household is frequently of a subordinate status within the homestead where they live. The wife can, however, expect a long life with her husband and even if he marries other women later on, she will always remain the senior wife. As such, she has privileges in respect of milking unallocated amesa cows. She can order her junior co-wives to do certain tasks which relate to the wellbeing of the homestead as a whole and not to internal domestic affairs. She is given prominence in all ritual contexts. Her husband can delegate to her the job of handing out temporary milk-rights or sharing out bags of maize-meal, sugar and tea that he has brought from the town. In a marriage between two equal in age, the wife can, if she is successful in expanding her flock of children and her milkstock holding, attain a position where she is almost an equal partner with her husband, a female head of the homestead, a had worra. If she has adolescent sons, she can mobilize their support in the case of intra-marital conflicts. A middle-aged woman who has given birth to many children is often consulted by her husband on questions of importance for the family's economy - particularly husbandry problems - and she also enjoys considerable freedom of movement such as is not offered to younger wives married to men who are old enough to be their fathers¹⁰⁾. When a young girl is married to an elderly man, she is often subject to authoritarian discipline, and she may rank as his second, third or fourth wife only, enjoying less respect than the senior wife. She also has to expect an early widowhood, outliving her husband by decades.

When her husband dies, a woman's optimal situation is for her eldest son to be old enough to take on the formal right of husbandry and herding decisions in relation to his inheritance. The son will then be her formal guardian. As the angafa he takes on his father's responsibility towards both his own siblings and his mother. The mother on her side can enjoy considerable prestige and wield informal influence over both herding tactics and husbandry decisions taken by her son, while dominating the domestic sphere at the same time. She is not subject to the authority of any husband and often has milking rights to quite a number of animals. It is in her role as a mother that a woman can gain security in her old age, and her childbearing and childcar-

capacities are also in the long run most decisive for the quality of her marital relations.

In chapter 4 we touched upon the importance of a family of many children for a herdowner who strives to build up an independent pool of labour in order to expand and diversify the economic activities under his management. Boran wives, too, orient their housekeeping ambitions towards having a large family, for which they are the main female head (hato mana), milk-manager and mother. The outward symbols of female success are the hut equipment of mats, poles and ropes, and the small exhibition of milk pots at the rear of the hut. Both these sets of material symbols are closely related to the capacity of a woman to provide adequate shelter and food for a child. Motherhood ambition is on two levels. One relates to the actual process of biological reproduction, and the other to the feeding and upbringing of children; children must both be born and properly brought up. As we shall see later, it is necessary to make such a distinction between the two aspects of motherhood for, while there are physical constraints on childbearing, the allocation of children to care for is a social fact, so that "motherhood" in the extended sense is open to women who cannot bear children. However, we shall deal first with the issue of fertility.

When a man marries a girl, the primary expectation that he and his agnates have of the marriage is that the wife will give birth to a large number of children and that she will handle the resources provided for her in such a way that the children grow up to be healthy adult members of the household and lineage. The Boran woman's own expectations and self-evaluation are geared to the same ideas. If she does not bear any children, Borana tend to blame it on some physical defect in the woman herself rather than in her husband. It is usually taken for granted that there is sufficient supply of potential genitors and that a married woman sleeps with other men in addition to her husband according to the traditional garayyu customs of the Borana¹¹⁾. A Boran woman is by tradition allowed considerable freedom in the choice of lovers, particularly from the contemporaries or gada-class peers of her husband. The Waso conversion to Islam has not changed the pattern of extra-marital liaisons significantly, except by defining it as humiliating for the husband if his wife has a lover. Neither the wife nor the lover meet with public disapproval although the couple may enrage the husband if he finds out about the relationship. Some public moral indignation is raised against women who live continuously without a husband or male guardian, but generally not against the unfaithful wife. Children born to a woman and her lover count their mother's husband as pater. Great weight is placed on the fact

that a child should have a proper social father, while biological is less relevant to its status.

A Boran woman who does not give birth to any children regards this as a disaster. Sometimes this type of problem gives rise to psycho-somatic disorders, subsequently identified as caused by ayana spirits. Borana have noted that frequently adoption of a child leads to the woman becoming pregnant, a relation between adoption and psychologically conditioned barrenness that has also been observed by Western medicine. Fatuma was cited to me as an example of the latter situation, but serves also to illustrate the former:

Fatuma, the first wife of Haro, had lived with her husband for four or five years without having a child. Haro did not complain directly about this, but constantly nagged his wife over other things, such as her incompetence in cooking vegetables. It was obvious and widely commented upon that the couple were not happy. Fatuma had asked her husband for a divorce, and begged her father to request the same on her behalf, but without any success. Haro at last married a second wife. Fatuma did not object. But she complained about migraine and diffuse pains in her head, and went to see a gallitti (shaman) to get it diagnosed. The spirit, a female ayana, was identified and pacified with gifts of perfume and roasted coffeeberries. Shortly thereafter, Haro's brother's prolific wife gave birth to a daughter, and Haro and Fatuma decided to ask that Fatuma be given the child as her own. After only a couple of months, it turned out that Fatuma was pregnant, and at roughly the same time as her new co-wife, she gave birth to a son.

Boran society leaves room for quite large variations of wealth but a total lack of resources leaves a person in an anomalous position. The totally childless woman is in the same predicament as the stockless man. There is no proper place for her in the social structure and she is considered as the typical carrier of the evil eye, the ritual expression of envy. Infertility is not in itself a reason for divorce, but it restricts a woman's relative status within the homestead where she lives. On the husband's side, lack of heirs is normally solved by marrying another wife in the hope that she will be more successful¹²⁾. After several unsuccessful attempts an heir can be formally adopted by the man, by tying a child's umbilical cord to the senior wife of its prospective pater. This type of adoption is called ilmo tuti¹³⁾. For a barren wife in a polygynous household, there are still problems even if the husband has an heir. If a woman has no child to look after nor to help her in her domestic chores her status in the household and homestead is anomalous and insecure. Her present situation is awkward and she can have little confidence in the prospects of her future as an old woman. Again it is mainly as mother and caretaker of children that a woman gets access to her own milk cows and can gain respect and secure subsistence. In fact, the two roles of mother and milk-manager are more or less impossible to separate

from each other. The lack of fertility is thus not only frustrating and degrading for a Boran woman; it would also have practical consequences for her if she were to be left wholly without children. Adoption does not appear to solve the fundamental psychological trauma of barrenness, but it eases the practical consequences of childlessness and gives the childless woman a less marginal position in the homestead. It is normal therefore to provide such women with "loans" or "gifts" of children (ergifata¹⁴), whom they can bring up as their own. Loans of children are frequently made from within the homestead or from a limited set of relatives close to the woman or the male head of the household. We shall return to them below (p. 132). Suffice it to say here that such loans are not only obtained by young, childless wives as one might perhaps expect but also by women whose children have grown up. Old women take on the care of orphans or ask younger relatives for a son or daughter to keep them company and to help in the domestic work. Such loans are extremely common, and any Waso Borana would be able to quote a sister, brother, aunt or uncle who had been "given away" or adopted somebody.

When her sons one by one reach marrying age, and acquire wives who themselves give birth to children and grow in experience, the domain of a married woman's authority tends to wither away, but never completely. Usually she maintains a fairly stable status by ensuring that she is continuously "given" children to care for. If she is lucky she also has anuna and dungo cattle, or animals derived from her own family, which will remain hers to milk until her death. Although the woman herself cannot alienate her "allotment" rights outside the family, the access to such cattle leaves her some room for manipulation, since she can forestall inheritance by choosing to give her cattle to a favourite son. She has a strongly sanctioned right to be supported by all her children, including her daughters and their husbands, and can bring her personal milkstock along and settle in any of the camps where she has adult sons or daughters.

POST-MARITAL LIFE

An ideal career culminating in the position of mother or senior wife to an independent herdowner is open only to a limited number of women. Many women are widowed without having any children at all, or when the angafa is still only an infant. For several others, divorce rather than the death of the husband ends their first marriage. Unlike what is reported among the northern Borana¹⁵, marriages among the Waso Borana are brittle and divorces frequent, a situation which reflects both legal changes connected with the conversion to Islam and the difficulty men and women experience in fulfilling traditional

marital roles in a situation of poverty. Generally, given the limited amount of stock owned as halaal by women, the only way that widows and divorcees can get access to pastoral resources is by affiliating themselves to a male guardian. Again, their age, lineage status, the number of children they have and their own capacity to bear or care for children are the crucial points that decide what options they have for residence and what claims they can make on a man's protection. Primary consideration must be given to the formal rights relating to the marriage contract, particularly in relation to the children's status, if we are to understand the opportunity situation of women after their first marriage has ended.

The bridewealth given by non-Muslim Borana comprises two parts - kadda gifts that signify the love between affinals and karata which confers the right over all the woman's future offspring to her first husband and his agnates. The bond created by the karata is irrevocable, at least as soon as the woman has borne a child. After that, she is perpetually tied to her first husband's clan. Should he die, the children born later to the wife are still members that man's clan. Marriage is indissoluble.

The Muslim counterpart of the karata is the promise of meher, which is not a gift from a man to his affines but a promise of compensation to the woman herself in case of divorce or the husband's death¹⁶). The meher promise given in front of a sheikh at the nikaa ceremony defines a "minimal wedding" according to Waso Muslim custom. It represents a union between two individuals and does not carry any weight of affinal solidarity in itself. Children born within a marriage sealed by meher belong to the lineage of the man giving the meher promise, but children born when a year has elapsed after his death have no proper lineage affiliation of their own. They can take on that of their mother by affiliating themselves with her agnates. A woman can be divorced from her husband if he writes a separation document: in fact a simple written note. Any child who is apparently begotten after the divorce has no relation to the former husband of its mother, and his lineage can make no claim on it.

Muslim bridewealth, too, has two parts. Some animals are also actually transferred from the husband to his new affines, the gabaar, and these correspond to the kadda of the northern Borana. The size of gabaar is open to discussion and in the post-shifita situation normally does not exceed ten cattle. Four are regarded as a decent request from the affines, and this allows for some haggling so that in the end two animals tend to be the customary number. The gabaar gift, in combination with a traditional wedding feast, consecrates

and strengthens the relationship between the two groups of men - on the one side the husband and his close agnates, and on the other the brothers and father or guardian of the wife. The present generation of Waso elders are of the opinion that, although a father should not be able to receive gabaar more than once for the same daughter, gabaar has nothing to do with the rights over a woman's children. (In 1978, a newly-wed pregnant wife left her husband and the jallaba of the neighbourhood decided that the husband had a right both to a redemption of his gabaar and to retain his rights over the unborn child.)

Chukulisa's case illustrates both the primacy of agnatic claims to children, and the conflicts that have arisen between Boran and Muslim law in respect of the status of children born to a widow or divorcee:

At the age of thirteen, Chukulisa had been married to a certain Halake, and she had a son from this marriage, Miyo. Miyo's father died when the boy was only two years old. Chukulisa then became the dalla wife (see below p. 129) of Halake's brother, Hokule. The couple did not get on well and finally Hokule told his inherited wife to leave. Chukulisa took her small son and returned to her parents. After seven years a new suitor, Ali, came to Chukulisa's father with a request to marry her. Unlike Chukulisa and Hokule, Ali was a Muslim. This happened in the forties, when there were still several unconverted Borana at Waso. Chukulisa's father gave his consent to the new marriage. Hokule heard about the couple, however, and reacted to the rumour by putting forward a claim both that Miyo, now nine years old, should return to his camp immediately, and that all future offspring should be his. Neither Ali, nor Chukulisa who had now been converted to Islam, accepted this, and they brought the case to the elders' court. After a lengthy session it was ordained that Ali and Chukulisa should go on and keep all their children as their own, but that Chukulisa's son Miyo should return to his proper guardian Hokule.

Whether the husband's clan has rights over the widow's future offspring or not is a matter that has implications for her future residence options. The traditional Boran system ties the widow to her husband's clan for as long as she is able to bear children. Under the Muslim system, as practised by the Waso Borana, the prospective children which a woman has after the end of her marriage are of no interest to her husband's clan. Instead, it is the existence of sons owning stock and born within the marriage, which provides the link between the woman and her husband's clan. When there is such a link, whether of the more general nature valid for the northern Borana or of the more restricted type found at Waso, the widow is put under the protection of a male guardian belonging to the husband's clan, a herdowner who manages the herding and husbandry relating to the children's inherited stock. Any property that the woman herself has acquired from her husband's side, whether as the children's allotted stock or as her own dungo and anuna, are counted as part

of the future property of her sons, and her children's guardian accordingly has to keep a check on them also. She cannot leave the guardian without temporarily relinquishing both her children and her milkstock. Although she is formally free to enter into a new marriage with whomever she likes, this puts her under strong pressure to remain with the guardian appointed by her husband's lineage.

In the case where the woman is of an appropriate age and generation to marry one of her husband's closest agnates, the guardianship usually takes the form of "widow inheritance", (dalla)¹⁷⁾ and is associated with the guardian's assumption of rights to her sexual, domestic and reproductive capacities. The once-married woman is in a better position than a young girl to assert her own opinion as to the choice of a mate. If she should reject her husband's brothers and first cousins, as sometimes happens, the clan elders seek an acceptable alternative among more distant clansmen. It should be appreciated that the range of choice for such substitutes is quite large. Of the men who are not prohibited because they belong to the same exogamous moiety as the woman, one fourth to one third are in a wide sense her husband's "clansmen".

"Widow inheritance" does not cover all forms of guardianship that are practised. Should a woman who has passed the menopause have no adult children she may be temporarily affiliated to the homestead of a "classificatory son" until her own children grow up¹⁸⁾. No marriage relation is implied. Instead the "classificatory mother" brings into the camp of her guardian other resources than her own sexuality or fertility, namely her own labour and that of her children, and livestock that may add to the viability of the herding unit. In a wealthy household, additional female labour can always be used. It serves to reduce the temporary labour shortages which arise when the women of the household are out of action because of childbirth, post-birth seclusions illness or journeys to visit adult children or agnates. The help of an old woman can release the younger women of the homestead for tasks which need strength and mobility. On the other hand, unlike a real or adoptive mother, a classificatory mother has a structurally rather peripheral role in her guardian's camp, and although her extra work input is useful, it may not be strictly necessary and, therefore gives rise to problems if there is a shortage of food. As time passes the dalla wife tends to become increasingly integrated into her guardian's household by the successive births of children who are not wards but counted as the sons of her second husband. On the other hand, a poor female ward who is not tied to her guardian by marriage runs the risk that the stock resources around which the original protective relationship was centred may dwindle away, or that the link between her and her

guardian's household may become attenuated as her sons grow up and move away to look for jobs elsewhere.

An alternative to residence with the husband's clan-mates is to return to one's own agnatic family. This is a solution sought by many women who have only weak links with their husband's clan-mates, and by divorcees whose first marriage or later dalla union has failed. A woman may settle with her father or brothers either permanently or while waiting for a new proposal of marriage. A Boran woman always enjoys higher esteem when she is the wife of somebody than when she lives alone with her brothers. Nevertheless there are many Boran women who find that they are too old to be offered any attractive range of choice, or to whom a second marriage appears unacceptable.

If a woman has infants and opts for a return to her own family of origin, she normally leaves both her children and her cattle with an appropriate clan warden belonging to her husband's lineage. Only the babies and unweaned toddlers will under such circumstances follow their mother. At a divorce, it is not rare that even such children remain with the husband or are "given" to one of his close relatives.

To return to her brothers is one of the ultimate resources of a woman, and if possible she cultivates her link with them over the years. Between a sister and brother, an affectionate relationship is built up from early childhood. Between brothers, quarrels arise even at that stage, with the younger boys challenging the angafa's right to act as stand-in for the father. There are fewer crises of authority between children of opposite sexes because their spheres of work are separate. Later in life the brother-sister relationship grows closer as the sister looks to her brother for support against the marriage plans concocted by her father or against the harshness of her husband, and the brother turns to his sister for advice on prospective wives. A married woman who has reached a stage when her husband's jealousy is no longer so acute often travels long distances to pay visits to her brother, even as far as to Voi, Marsabit or Moyale. Women whose natal families live in Ethiopia experience difficulties in keeping up the contact, but many middle-aged women endeavour to make the journey at least once every decade. Brothers and sisters who live in Isiolo District will see each other regularly.

If a widowed or divorced woman returns unaccompanied to her natal family the only livestock that she can bring with her are animals that initially were given to her as personal gifts from her agnates. An occasional exception is made for livestock given to her in fulfilment of the meher promise. For

several reasons the practical significance of meher is very limited, however. Firstly, it is not always expressed in livestock but in terms of a non-recurrent sum of money and clothes. Secondly, if the divorce is granted by the husband at his wife's request rather than on his own initiative, the woman has often renounced her meher claims while bargaining for the divorce. Islam does not recognize the right of a woman to obtain a divorce of her own will except when the husband has failed to provide her with food and shelter. Finally, a childless widow is legally entitled only to half the promised meher, and even if she has children, she cannot dispose of her meher cattle as she pleases since they are regarded as part of her son's future inheritance. In many cases, meher turns out to be a nominal promise only. A woman who is divorced on her husband's initiative should, however, be able to obtain these animals.

When she rejoins her agnates, the widow or divorcee has a generally accepted right to get support from them in the form of milk "even if she has to take it by force" as one old man expressed it. She never fully relinquishes her membership of the natal clan. She may also have more particular rights to specific animals. In some societies like the Lobedu of Transvaal¹⁹⁾ or the Kgatla²⁰⁾ of Botswana, the bridewealth cattle obtained for a sister are linked to the bridewealth transaction of a specific brother, creating a bond of "cattle-linked siblings", sometimes with the express aim that her bridewealth shall be used to bring home a wife for the brother²¹⁾, some times with the understanding that these cattle are earmarked as a reserve for the sister if she eventually returns to her brother. This is not the case among the Borana, but there is a notion that one of the cattle given as bridewealth should go to the brother of the bride. Apart from this, the allotment rights (handura) that a girl may get in her childhood and the animals that she inherits according to Muslim law can be used to reinforce her link to a specific brother. Even when she is not allowed to take such animals with her when she marries, she has a choice as to which brother she will give the cattle to. That is the brother she is likely to turn to for protection. (See the example of Godo's herd, chapter 5, for a case where the elder brother's wealth to a large extent emanates from the gift of two cows belonging to his sister.) If a sister has deposited cattle with her brother or formally given cows to him, these animals provide a special security for her in her old age. If she does not return to her brother, her animals are absorbed into the patrimony of her nephews.

CHILD CARE IN OLD AGE

A woman's formal position after the loss of her husband depends largely on

whether she has children of her own or not, on the age of these children, and on the extent to which the children themselves own stock. It may seem that, in relation to her brother, a woman's capacity as "mother" is of little significance. However, even for a childless woman living in the camp of her brother, or an aged lady living with her own son, son-in-law or classificatory son, her status vis-à-vis her guardian and other women in the camp depends on her actual care for children rather than on biological motherhood. As mentioned before, the number of animals that a woman has obtained from her own clan, and which are her own unrestricted halaa is limited. In most cases a woman depends heavily on milk rights ascribed according to her situation or on the handura of children under her care. In a homestead where there are both wives of child-bearing age and elderly female dependants, the distribution of milk rights tends continuously to favour the women who are in charge of small children. A wife with an expanding and maturing batch of sons can assert herself more and more against her husband and the women of the camp through an increase in the formal stock-rights she enjoys. Other women, the mother-in-law, mother, clan ward or sister of the herdowner, who are no longer of child-bearing age, are entitled to support from him, but do not necessarily have a right to control more cows than the minimal number required for their own sustenance.

Ageing women, whose pride and authority are threatened, tend to try to strengthen their position by a prolongation of their child-caring period. It is in this context that they request "gifts" of children. When women take on children from outside the agnatic group of the male head of the homestead, these children tend to come either from his sisters or daughters or from those of the woman who is adopting them. They have a status vis-à-vis the homestead head similar to that of his own children. Although they can obtain no share in the formal inheritance, they are sometimes given allotment rights to stock. The bridewealth of a girl who has been brought in in this way goes to the head of the homestead where she has grown up, not to her original pater whose name she carries. It is more common, however, for the child to come from within the homestead or from the immediate agnates of the homestead head. It may even be one of the herdowner's own children and the adoption makes no difference to the child's jural status.

Children jurally belong to their father rather than to their mother and it is ultimately he who decides whether a child should be handed over to his mother, mother-in-law, aunt or sister. It is difficult both for him and his wife not to yield to such a request when it comes from a member of the older generation and is backed both by sanctions of parental respect and by fear

of the evil eye, which is very pronounced in relation to children. Such requests for intra-homestead adoptions are not always made without creating tension, however.

When I visited Kosaye's camp I was struck by the extreme estrangement which appeared to exist between Kosaye and his elderly mother. Instead of living to his immediate right, the mother was living at the other end of the camp, and the two did not talk to each other. I was told that fifteen years before, Kosaye's wife had given birth to her second child, a boy. The first one had been a girl. When the boy was two years old and no longer breast-fed, Kosaye's mother told her son and daughter-in-law of her wish to have the child as her own. This was not her first adopted child, for she had a big girl living with her in her hut, a daughter's daughter. Kosaye's wife found the request unreasonable, since the boy was her *angafa*. She refused to part with him. Kosaye himself sided with his wife. This was quite unconventional behaviour, for a man's first loyalty according to Boran standards should always be to his mother, to whom he is believed to have great gratitude throughout his life. The old lady, stunned by her son's behaviour, stopped all direct conversations with him. After a few years, a second son was born and entrusted to the grandmother but the relationship continued to be tense, even though the old woman remained in her son's camp. She had few alternatives. In her youth she had lived in Ethiopia, but during the 1960s she had lost contact with any remaining relatives there. She was now around 80 and not able to go on lengthy journeys. She had no other sons at Waso, and the daughter had only a very small *shamba* at Gafarsa and several children, so she could not be expected to support her mother.

For an aunt or grandmother who makes an intra-homestead adoption there seems to be an important distinction between having a grandchild or nephew living in the next hut, and actually having the responsibility for the child, sheltering him in her own hut and enjoying the milk rights implied by this. By securing rights to milk-stock for her, adoption enhances her status relative to the other women of the homestead and to her guardian. It singles out and strengthens her relationship to a particular child who will in the future have a special responsibility for her.

SEXUAL STRATIFICATION: A SUMMARY

The division of labour between men and women among the Borana may suggest that there is a balanced interdependence between them whereby each has his/her own sphere for gaining esteem and wielding authority²²). Women perform critical tasks which must be done if a man is to become a successful herdowner. A man cannot realize male values unless he has access to female services. As Asmarom points out, a Boran man without a wife suffers severe social handicaps since he has no hut of his own²³). Women also have a twofold part to play in pastoral reproduction, for it is mainly through their work that regeneration and expansion is secured both in the labour force and in cattle

and small stock capital holdings. However, when it comes to control over property, over the instruments of labour and the products of work, it is clear that there is a sexual bias rather than a balance. The hut and the household equipment are in fact the only assets that a woman can be said to "own" independently of a man. That the power she gains from this is marginal is evident from the fact that her property is not expandable like an animal herd. A man can support a large number of wives and other women by providing them with livestock, but a woman can never support more than one husband with a hut.

Although women are said to "own" food products, and particularly milk, they can generally only get access to them by being attached to a man. Motherhood defines the range of potential guardians to whom a woman has access and the relationship she can maintain with them, whether she lives with a man who owes her the loyalty of a son, with one whose children she bears and cares for, or one whose infant wards she has mothered. As long as her children are young, not even they are under her own exclusive control. They legally belong to her husband rather than to her, or to their father's agnatic group after his death. She can lose them either at a divorce, or even within the marriage when pressed to give away one of her younger children to some other, childless woman. Only the adult children that she has actually brought up under her care are irrevocably "hers" and are culturally defined as indebted to her for this care (even though they may in practice not live up to these expectations). A woman can insure her future mainly by building up a large following of adult children and by cultivating her own agnatic links. Fraternal and filial solidarity can guarantee her a minimal subsistence in old age. Other values, such as a high relative status of influence and respect within the homestead where she lives, can only be safe-guarded by the woman if she continuously takes on the care of new infants and actively participates in the physical and social reproduction of labour.

The food produced from the livestock is only part of the "product of female work", and even if it can be claimed that the woman in a limited sense controls that part, the same is not true for another part - the capital gain that emanates from women's work with the kids and lambs of small stock and the calves of cattle. From this, it is ultimately a woman's husband, guardian or son who will profit in the sense of extending the amount of resources under his independent control. Capital control is in the hands of men: hence they also make women their jural minors and reserve for themselves the sphere of public influence.

Footnotes to Chapter 6

1. Dupire 1963:75. See also Driberg 1932:408. Kelly (1972, p.56) has noted for pastoral Arab women in Sudan that female involvement in herd management is negatively correlated with the distance of grazing migrations undertaken by each particular species of domestic animals. A similar point is made by Dupire (1963:76) who mentions that among the Fulani and Bororo knowledge about milking and the definition of milking as a male or female task seems to be closely related to movement patterns. Incidentally, the distances of grazing migrations correlate very closely with the "production value" per unit of each type of stock (Dahl and Hjort 1976:229) so that low-value animals are more typically ascribed to the sphere of female management. Camels are thus typically a male affair while small stock fall into the female realm.
2. Kelly 1972:45
3. See Friedl 1975: esp. 13, 19ff, 58f, 135; Sacks 1973:216
4. The Quran, Sura 4 verse 11
5. Asad 1970: p. 69-71; Dupire 1963:56, 86, 89. For a similar conflict in another Oromo context see Blackhurst 1974:217
6. Elam 1973
7. Torry 1973:73. Since my first-hand experience of camel-owning households is limited, I dare not venture into any attempt to offer an explanation of this difference. Borana Gutu share with Sakuye a notion that human sexuality endangers herd reproductivity. Perhaps one should see the Sakuye prohibition of female milking as strengthening a common cultural theme in a situation where ecological conditions promote a stricter labour division. Folk models trace the prohibition only to the indecency (for women) of the posture used when camels are milked. Another hypothetical explanation could refer to the separate ethnic origin of the Sakuye, who like Gabbra (Torry 1973:36) claim to have been Muslims before coming under Boran influence. See the Quran, Surab verse 160 where where women are explicitly barred from all involvement in camel affairs. The Rendille, too, make such a claim (Spencer 1973:147).
8. Asmarom 1973:32
9. Asmarom (*op.cit.*:25) and Haberland (1936:240) mention that a woman is sometimes given outright gifts of stock from her cisbean husband or lover. I have recorded no such cases in Isiolo District. Baxter (1954: 395) and Haberland (1963:93) mention the *biriti* heifer that is given to a daughter, whether married or unmarried, on the occasion of her father's *gadamoji* ceremony. The heifer is kept in the father's herd, and at his death remains with the cattle of the woman's brothers.
10. See Asmarom 1973:111; Baxter 1954:332. A man is not allowed to marry women who belong to that *gada*-class to which his father belongs, or to that class in which his own sons will fall.
11. Haberland 1963:239f; Asmarom 1973:19f
12. Baxter 1954:113
13. Haberland 1963:235f
14. *ibid.*
15. Asmarom 1973:18f; Haberland 1963:240-1
16. Lewis, I.M. 1961:139

17. According to Cerulli (1933:chap. IV) could the dalla marriage among the Ethiopian Borana only be avoided if a payment of redemption was made from the woman's family to the clansmen of her dead husband.
18. Asmarom (1973:24) makes an attempt to cover the range of statuses open to Boran women by stating that "There are three categories of adult women in Borana families: senior wives, junior wives and mistresses". This enumeration is insufficient as a catalogue of the possible relations between dependent women and the male homestead head they are attached to. It fails to mention "mothers" and "sisters" and obviously neglects that women are attached to pastoral households even when they have past the menopause.
19. Krige 1964:164
20. Roberts and Comaroff 1976
21. ibid.
22. Cf. Driberg 1932:419
23. Asmarom 1973:20

7. KIN AND CAMP

INTRODUCTION

The focus of the previous chapters has been on the internal organization of the pastoral Boran household. In the present chapter, we shall turn our attention to the immediate arena for inter-household cooperation, the camp or nomadic village (*ola*). I shall dwell on the content of collaboration within the camp, the ties linking different households in the camp, and the process of recruitment of camp members.

The composition of a camp is the result both of restrictions and opportunities inherent in the structure of kinship solidarity and property relations

on the one hand, and of natural events on the other. Its character at a given point in time is the result of a history of individual responses to both these sets of factors over a long period frequently spanning more than one or two decades. Living in a camp has dimensions related both directly to the process of production and to kinship considerations of a more general kind. I shall try to deal with both.

At first sight, one easily gets the impression that each camp represents a random collection of kith, kin and unrelated people and that no one principle of recruitment dominates the Boran camp structure. Social configurations however, are rarely random, and it is indeed possible to identify a number of factors which are decisive in the formation of the Boran camp.

A camp consists of a number of cooperating homesteads, comprising in all anything from ten to forty mat-houses. The mat-house, corresponding to the social unit of a woman and her children, often represents the only immediately visible sub-unit of the camp. Frequently, not even a dry branch between the houses signifies a physical sub-division of the camp into wards or homesteads. Only on interrogation is it possible for the visitor to guess the internal differentiations. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the pastoral house-unit headed by a married woman is usually only a sub-household within a larger household unit, headed by a senior man who has the right to delegate tasks to his dependants, carry out husbandry decisions, and allocate milking rights. Household and homestead are not exactly co-terminous, for within the homestead of a particular elder one may also find other house-units, headed by men who are junior partners in a cooperative herding arrangement (say a client clansman or a son-in-law) but which have to be defined as separate households to the extent that their heads control separate property. Furthermore, homesteads may be joined into even larger units, sharing the same corral and tending their livestock in daha on a more equitable basis. There are, of course, great differences between the extents to which members of the camp are free to choose whom to camp with or not. The total composition of the camp is a result of processes taking place on all levels, individual nuclear families, households, homesteads and daha units. When I talk about choices of daha or camp partners, it is, however, of necessity mainly to the independent herdowners and corral heads that I refer, and it is their options that decide the larger configurations within the camp: other members of their homesteads are there through their particular links of dependency on these men, and can often wield only an informal influence on the latter's decisions.

Table 7:† The internal differentiation of a camp

Despite the apparent physical homogeneity of a Boran pastoral camp, there are a number of levels at which a camp can potentially be internally structurally segmented:

CAMP				
Herding alliance (<u>daha</u> , or corral union)				<u>Daha</u>
Homestead				
Household of herdowner		Household of son-in-law	Household of client	Homestead
Married son's subhousehold	Wife's subhousehold	Subhousehold of other dependent woman		

In the present chapter I shall deal in particular with the content of agnatic and affinal solidarity, and how these relate to residential cooperation and structural ties between different homesteads. First, it is necessary to look at the forms of mutual assistance given within a camp. I shall also give some examples from the experience of my fieldwork of what a Boran camp looks like, and its development over time.

CAMP COOPERATION

Some of the advantages of several households clustering together should be apparent from chapter 4 where we dwelt on problems related to the balance between the size and structure of the family herd and the amount of personnel available in the household. A camp provides enhanced security against raiders and the pleasure of company, but above all, it creates an opportunity for pooling milk, meat, and labour. Junior personnel are lent between co-residing households. In the female sphere, women cooperate in erecting huts and in looking after the children of the camp. Milking lends itself less easily to a cooperative effort, for it involves a personal relation between the milker and the cow. In the male sphere, the collection of information necessary for the decision of herding tactics, the mala marri (discussion and decision), is a cooperative venture, as is also the execution of many of the herding and watering tasks.

Wells are not "owned" campwise but they are often used in that way. The heavy work both of maintenance and water-hauling makes cooperation at well-watering essential: this is one of the foremost aspects of intra-camp cooperation. It is only in the context of wells that watering is regulated by a particular set of rights. The proper "owner" of the well is the man who organized the digging of the well or his lineal descendants. In the long run a good, permanent well will come to belong to a clan or a lineage segment, but, since the rights to a well are to a great extent usufruct rights, the rights to a smaller well may fall into obscurity when the wellowner moves away, unless he has clan relatives who stay and save the well from decay. The main users of a well-hole are the owner of the well (abba e₁a), and his own camp companions who by their work share priority rights¹⁾ in it. If there is plenty of water the abba e₁a usually allows members of camps other than his own to use it, requiring them to take part in its maintenance. This work, as well as the watering rota, is organized by the abba e₁a in discussion with the senior leaders of other camps. The abba e₁a can also mete out fines for misconduct or unauthorized use of the well.

The camp's strategies of herd movement are decided by what could be called the "camp council", consisting of the camp's independent herdowners headed by the "father of the camp" (abba ola). For example, fora expeditions to far-lying pastures are usually organized on a camp basis. The camp elders as a whole decide on the personnel to follow the herd, usually one or two elders and two or three young men, possibly also some boys or girls. The older men decide on the herding tactics to be practised by the fora herdsmen, and on the division of tasks and food. If grass, water and firewood resources around the main camp have become depleted, the camp council also acts as a unit and may send out scouts to look for a new area to settle in, or, after the dry season, to locate the first rain.

All members of the camp normally migrate together, unless some member gives valid social reasons for settling temporarily or permanently at another camp. Such reasons can be a new marriage or importunate request from a close relative. If a camp is split due to divergent opinions on herding matters there is frequently an undercurrent of suppressed conflict. There are strong social pressures to follow the group as it migrates. Although Borana say that "your ideas about grazing are like your taste in trousers", indicating that individual preferences have to be respected, a man who stubbornly wants to go his own way may thereby put in question the soundness of the herding tactic advocated by the camp majority and may not be welcomed back to the same camp at a later stage if he wants to return. If his former companions fare better than he has he suffers a severe loss of prestige, while a corresponding success on his part may give him some prestige but not necessarily recommend him as a camp-mate. To have companions in one's misfortune, on the other hand, does not render the misfortune less severe from an economic point of view but it involves less of a prestige loss than when one has only oneself to blame. Formally, each homestead is independent and can leave and rejoin the camp according to the choice of the homestead head, granted that the abba ola as the camp father approves. This he will do, apart from exceptional circumstances, such as if some one's cattle have been lost or if someone has died. To try and retrieve lost cattle or to bury the dead are tasks that are little appreciated by the Borana, though it is thought that everybody should share the responsibility for them.

The abba ola has the final secular responsibility for the camp's cattle. He is not the ritual leader of the camp, however, and has no specific privilege to pray for rain or to lead in slaughter; but he does have the prerogative of allocating tasks to the junior members of the camp homesteads when watering

or herding has to be undertaken in cooperation. It is also his duty to settle minor squabbles within the camp. More serious quarrels are taken to the Chief, who is an officer, appointed by the Government of Kenya. The title of camp leader is given to the most prominent member when a new camp is established. His senior position, as "father" of the village, is symbolically expressed through the physical location of his homestead, normally at the extreme right of the camp (as seen when standing in the door of a hut and facing the cattle corral)²⁾.

The prestige and central economic role of a well-owner is an asset when it comes to camp leadership³⁾, so that the abba ela is often also the abba ola, although this is not by definition necessary. Prominence in the camp context is not a matter solely of ritual seniority based on age, clan or generation class, although such factors may be of importance. It is rather a question of "influence" in the sense of the man being able to support a large following of dependants and attract clients and friends by personal generosity and pastoral success.

Anybody who establishes an independent camp, however small, can be an abba ola. If the camp is small the abba ola has little prestige. When the camp is large, the nomination can be seen to a certain extent as the public acknowledgment of bigmanship, a recognition that the relative standing of the elected man is higher than that of other men in the camp. The post as such does not really involve any considerable powers, however, and the title is often nothing more than a honorary sign in a camp where most decisions over herding tactics are taken jointly.

There are few categories of people whom a Boran campleader would exclude on principle from association with his camp, apart from people with a notoriously bad reputation as lazy and unwilling co-workers. Such men can be refused permission to join the camp even if they are clan relatives, while unrelated people are welcomed when they are known to be industrious and peaceful. The choice lies mainly with the newcomer, who decides whom to join. On the other hand, the cattle's welfare is an acceptable excuse for not welcoming an entrant if one can point to a high density of cattle in the area. Sometimes people who are already settled in the camp are asked to leave because of such conditions⁴⁾, although this is considered as bad taste according to Boran ethics.

The development of Ola Ilman Kotele - a case study

In order to illustrate the processes behind the camp formation, let us take a closer look at a particular camp, the Ola Ilman Kotele which in 1974 was situated in the vicinity of Bule wells east of Kinna. The camp took its name from the original core family, the children of the now deceased elder Kotele, who occupied one of the four homesteads which were part of the camp. Besides that of the Kotele brothers, there were corrals belonging to Waqo, Dima and Nyencho. Dima's corral contained only his own stock and that of his wards; Waqo's only his own and some few cattle belonging to his son-in-law; the corrals of the two other men represented more complex herding arrangements. In the Kotele corral there were stock belonging to the different brothers and a group of cows which were the property of a clansman. Nyencho's enclosure harboured also stock owned by his sister's son Karo, his sister's son-in-law and the son-in-law's paternal uncle.

Figure 7a Adult "owners" of stock in the corrals of Ola Ilman Kotele and their relations to corral heads

DIMA's corral NYENCHO's corral Ilman KOTELE's corral WAQO's corral

- ▲ Corral head
- △ Herdowner
- Woman (does not own stock)

Figure 7a shows the adult owners of stock in the corrals of Ola Ilman Kotele (disregarding allocated rights) and their relations to the corral heads. Figure 7b shows the total outlay of the camp.

The background of the core family

Kotele, the father of the present camp-head, originally lived close to the Ethiopian border, where his eldest son Hokkoba, was born. The family moved into Kenya because of overpopulation and lack of grazing in the traditional Boran area, it is said, but the extortion practiced the pastoralists by the Emperor's soldiers also played a part.

Figure 7b. Outlay of the Oia Ilman Kotele camp

First, the family moved to Wajir. In the middle of the twenties, the last Boran foothold at the Wajir wells was lost to the Somalis, and the Kotele family migrated to the Euaso Nyiro. For some years they stayed in the area northeast of Merti. Then they migrated to Malka Loni south of Garba Tula, where Hokkoba got a job as policeman. The family remained at Malka Loni for seven years, making restricted moves each year when the camp site was considered fouled and unhealthy. Around 1955, Hokkoba and his brother Halake both married. At the end of the fifties the family moved closer to Garba Tula, and when the father died around 1960 they again migrated northwards in the Sericho direction. Here the camp was joined by the paternal uncle (Dida) and grandfather (Hiyesa) of Hokkoba's wife. At that time, these two men had a separate corral of their own.

When the secessionist war broke out most of the family left Sericho, but Dida and one of the younger Kotele brothers stayed on with the herd, driving it eastwards toward Somalia⁵ at the height of the crisis. The family settled in the Garba Tula daba⁵ which was one of the major camps where the local population was detained. When the restrictions on human and herd movements were lifted in 1969, the family decided to move with their remaining herd to the campsite close to Kinna where I found them in 1974. Shortly after my visit I heard that they had moved to Duse, and in 1978 they again lived just a few kilometers outside Kinna.

Despite the fact that the Kotele family were lucky enough not to lose all their cattle during the war and the droughts that followed they did not have enough animals to cover their essential needs. Hokkoba, being the elder brother, was left in charge of the remaining animals. The second brother, Halake, and Hokkoba's sons took employment in a gemstone mine at Duse. This was the only large-scale industrial enterprise in the Boran area in 1974 employing a couple of hundred men in the search for semi-precious stones. In 1978 the mine was closed for an indefinite period. Of the two younger sons of Kotele, one migrated down-country to take a job as a watchman in Nairobi. The other tried his luck as a small-scale farmer in Kinna.

Figure 7c Hokkoba's homestead

Nyencho, the brother-in-law

The Kotele brothers and the Dida-Hiyesa homestead were the pre-shifta core of the camp. Some individual households and two new corral units were joined to it after the war. During the period 1969-1974 no homestead or household moved away permanently.

Figure 7d Nyencho's homestead

The first new corral unit was that of Nyencho. He was the brother of Halake Kotele's first wife. He had also been staying in the Garba Tula daba during the emergency and decided to join the Kotele camp with all his dependants when they moved out from Garba in 1969. In 1974 Nyencho's sons were working at the mine. Their wives lived in Nyencho's homestead; one of them was in fact a daughter of the youngest Kotele brother. In Nyencho's compound there was also the household of his sister and her husband Bidu; he had lost most of his stock and deposited the remainder with Nyencho in order to take a job at the mine. Another sister, Hadiya, also lived there. She was an old lady with an adult son and a young daughter. In 1969 she had gone to Kinna to cultivate a farm. After a couple of successful years, the harvest failed due to salination, and she decided to settle instead with her brother Nyencho. Dida, the abovementioned uncle of Hokkoba Kotele's wife, took a liking to Hadiya's daughter and married her. Hadiya's grown-up son, Karo, enrolled as a policeman and went to Mombasa. He left behind a few cattle to be looked after by his mother and uncle, and used to return during holidays to increase his herd from his savings out of his salary. At the time of my visit to the camp, he was on such a holiday and had just married a young girl whom he planned to leave in the camp when he returned to Mombasa.

Although Nyencho, Karo and Bidu had united their herds under the management of Nyencho, the total number of cattle owned by the men was not enough to "fill a corral". Dida had found the same. His herd contained animals formally belonging to him and others that belonged to Hiyessa, his father's brother, who was too old to take an active part in herd management. Thus they all joined in daba, Nyencho being considered abba kara.

Abdi, the clansman

A long time before when Kotele was still alive, the widow of one of his clansmen had joined the camp. She had left a troublesome leviratic marriage with Ali, the younger brother of her dead husband and attached herself, and her two-year old son Abdi to Kotele's camp. Abdi had an inheritance of cattle to claim, but since he was so young the animals were left initially with Ali, the legal herd guardian. By affiliating herself to Abdi's clan-mates his mother tried to ensure the early realization of his stock rights. In reconstruction, she remarked to me that it is sometimes risky to trust stock to close agnates, and the more distant the relationship is, the less likely it is that stock rights will be ambiguous. The question of Abdi's inheritance was later solved as an internal clan affair, and Abdi and his mother got all the cattle

Figure 7e Abdi's homestead

they had a claim to. During the shifta war, Abdi nevertheless lost all his animals. He took a wage job and managed to earn enough money to re-invest in a core herd. In 1972, his clansmen - the Kotele brothers - invited him to rejoin them in order to share daha with them. Abdi and his old mother moved back to the Kotele camp from Garissa, where they had been living in the meantime. Later, Abdi also took on the responsibility for his father's brother's wife (Ali's widow), her children and their remaining cows.

Gurach and Dima

Two of Abdi's maternal uncles were living in a nearby camp. This was one of the reasons why he and his mother accepted the invitation to rejoin the Kotele brothers. A third maternal uncle (Gurach) lived in Duse, close to the mine, where he camped and corraled with his wife's brother, Dima. When Gurach died, the question arose of whether the daha union should be split or not. Gurach's child and cattle should properly have been looked after by his brother - living in the camp next to Ola Ilman Kotele - but the widow wanted to go on living instead with her own brother's homestead as she had done while her husband was alive. The prospective levir was not too keen either to introduce a new wife to his own main homestead and preferred that she remained with her brother but within walking distance. In order to solve the problem, it was decided that Dima's whole homestead should move closer to Gurach's brother and that he should continue to manage all the animals of the corral, although in close consultation with the proper herd wardens.

Figure 7f Dima's homestead

Abdi, who knew his uncle's daha-mate Dima well, introduced him to the Kotele brothers who allowed him to settle in their camp. This move was also motivated by other factors. In Duse, the grass had become scanty because of an invasion of Somalis from neighbouring drought-stricken areas.

It suited Dima well to get closer to Kinna. Like the Kotele brothers he had too few cattle. His family supplemented their resources by non-pastoral incomes. Dima himself had a post in the County administration and a rather sizeable irrigation farm at Kinna, which, however, turned out to be a complete failure in 1974. He spent only every third or fourth day in the cattle camp and his stock were looked after by the women and a stockless Somali employee.

Waqo

The last arrival at the camp was the homestead of Waqo, the father-in-law of one of Kotele's daughters. He in turn had recruited his son-in-law to stay with him as a dependent herdsman - one of his own sons being a trader and busy elsewhere.

Figure 7g Waqo's homestead

THE IDEAL OF FRATERNAL CO-RESIDENCE

Ideally, Boran brothers should keep their patrimony intact after their father's death and continue to live together as an undivided unit. This does not necessarily mean a residential unit, but rather that they should continue to manage their herds together. If the fraternal group has several types of stock, the varying demands of the different species will disperse the group spatially in the way Baxter describes for the Marsabit Borana⁶). As referred to in chapter 2, Baxter found at the beginning of the 1950s that most stock-owning families among the Boran groups at Marsabit had at least some camels, cattle and small stock. For each adult male in the family they appointed a category of animals appropriate to his relative status within the family but the totality was considered as a joint fraternal estate. It is clear that such a division of labour within a fraternal group could only be temporary. Since diversification would be advantageous for any herdowner of sufficient wealth, each brother would strive to establish a diversified situation for himself and would never relinquish his rights to animals named for him in his brothers' herds. If the brothers own only cattle and small stock, which is the normal case today among the Waso Borana, this ideal "unity of management" also implies camping together. The group of brothers, who share ola carry on their father's name; the camp is not named after the eldest brother but called "the camp of the sons of X". (Ola Ilman X)

In practice, joint fraternal households tend to represent a temporary arrangement that lasts while the younger brothers are waiting for the division of the family estate⁷). If there are enough cattle for all the brothers, or for two of them, the residential union rapidly breaks up, although the premature death of one of the brothers may bring their families together again in co-residence. One reason why the fraternal units tend to break up is, of course, tension over the inheritance. After the marriage of a younger brother, his older brother has no formal right to decide about the junior's property but he may continue to seek authority over his brother by force of age or superior wealth even though the junior resents it. Both fraternal unity and the respect ideally shown by a junior brother rests then on a kind of moral obligation rather than on legally shared property rights and formal guardianship. A man's brothers are his heirs if he has no children, and the guardians of his children if he should die. They are also morally entitled to support from him if they become poor. This naturally makes them interested in their brother's wealth, but they have no legal say about it while he is alive, except as members of the same lineage. The decisions that a senior brother has taken before his brothers' coming of age, and the outcome of inheritance and antici-

patory allotments can, however, continue to create dissent long after the brothers have become formally equal partners. However, if fraternal conflicts do not split the co-residence - which is very common - the concept of a morally based joint estate may do so, and there is safety in spatial dispersal when there is enough livestock and labour to make a division possible⁸⁾.

With herds drastically reduced during the shifita war, many Boran brothers have found that each section of the inheritance has been too small to live on; they have therefore decided to join up the different parts under the authority of the elder brothers while the younger ones move into non-pastoral activities in order to make their contributions to the family. This can be illustrated by the case of Kotele brothers, referred to in the camp history above. Ola Ilman Kotele also demonstrates how the absent members of such fraternal groups continue to assert their rights to a share in the family cattle herd by leaving members of their households in the camp. Particularly when a migrant labourer lives for several years downcountry out of contact with his brothers, he risks having his rights regarded as forfeited⁹⁾. This situation is avoided if his wife is left in the camp, while at the same time this makes it possible for the household to combine both wages and pastoral products in their budget. The joint fraternal group is then represented in the camp by a number of households whose male heads are absent.

CLANSHIP AND RESIDENCE PATTERNS

Boran clans and sub-clans are named, quasi-agnatic categories of people widely scattered over Boranaland, corresponding to clans with identical names among several Oromo people. As clans they rarely or never act as corporate units. There is still a corporate ideology linked to clan-ship, however, and the fiction of a common patrimony. I have chosen to use the term clan-ship for this ideology, which, in theory, recognises no local boundaries. Within Isiolo District, however, the local members of different sub-clans within one clan form what can be termed "a local lineage group". Most mature men belonging to the same clan know of each other, or at least of their prominent clan leaders, and there is over the years a continuity in membership, a common recollection of joint activities, and a sense of corporativity. I shall refer to this aggregate of local sub-clan and clan fractions as "the lineage". It is possible that the lineage in Waso is a more permanent unit than local aggregates of clan members in other Boran areas, since the Waso area is so territorially isolated from the main body of Borana and the population is small enough for it to be possible for the herdowners of one clan to keep track of each other.

In a camp, agnatic kinship often indicates actual sharing of property, with junior agnates, during a phase in the domestic development cycle, being subordinate to senior brothers or clansmen. When agnates are co-resident due to such sharing of property, the relation involved is normally rather a close one from a genealogical point of view. Sometimes more distant clansmen, like Abdi and the Kotele brothers in the case quoted above, decide that they want to live together as a result of the custom of clan wardenship having created a link of foster brotherhood. Nevertheless, clanship in itself does not generally appear to motivate common residence. One integrative factor may be that the rights to certain wells are vested in the clan, but since such rights are not exclusive I doubt that this is very important.

Within the Waso at large, the lineage's collective responsibilities have a cohesive effect on the spatial distribution of clan members, particularly between richer and poorer members of the same agnatic group. Borana "like to live close to their leaders" i.e. near the most influential elders of their lineage, especially if the latter constitute a link with the administration. They seek to keep continuously informed on lineage matters. This leads to a certain, though never absolute or exclusive, concentration of clan and sub-clan members in particular locations, so that it is possible for Borana to speak of Merti as a Digalu area. Garba Tula as dominated by Karayu and Worra Jidda, and Sericho as an area with many Dambitu, Nonitu, Karayu Danka and Karayu Didimtu. Although the interests vested in the clan have this effect, there is little in clan-ship that causes Boran herdowners to wish to have their clan-mates as camp-mates.

The fiction of a common heritage of stock is central to clanship. Clan members use the same stock brand, sometimes with the addition of an individual mark. They are responsible for each other's stock, as can be seen from the practice of guardianship and in the duty to go and look for each other's cattle if they are lost. But the prime expression of this common heritage is that if a herdowner loses his stock and has no breeding nucleus (butume), Boran traditions prescribe that the senior elders (jallaba) of his lineage shall decide at a public meeting the number of stock to be contributed to him by lineage members. Contributions are made on the basis of wealth rather than on each man's relation to the poor person (qolle). According to my informants, the beneficiaries from such redistribution should normally become affiliated to the homestead of one of the contributors, so that they can also be supported with food and clothes until the herd has grown big enough. The host gains prestige and labour from the transaction. Borana do not generally "beg" cattle

from individual clansmen, "except for entertainment"¹⁰⁾. The prospect of doing so does not initially bring them to camp with their clansmen, as is the case, according to Spencer¹¹⁾, among their Samburu neighbours. Among the latter, one can identify a clearly clan-based system of residence linked with an elaborate system of stock-begging between members of the same clan. A Boran man who has no cattle to use as bridewealth may get support for the purpose from his clan relatives, but such transactions are usually regarded as a private matter between a man, his father and brothers. Poor men may also affiliate themselves to their clansmen as client herdsmen, accepting paternalistic protection from their hosts, their own role being rather that of intra-homestead dependants than of camp partners. Agnatic co-residence is thus another symptom of inequalities in access to pastoral capital.

When households are rich enough to be able to make their own decisions on whom they are going to cooperate with in the daily drudgery of pastoral life, agnation does not seem to be very important. Wealthy clan-mates are likely to be rivals over lineage and community influence and the forces governing their mutual relations are repelling rather than consolidating. However, for a man lacking contacts in a new area where he wants to settle, clanship can be instrumental in gaining permission to join a certain camp. "Clanship" is also a heading that can be used to legitimize a relationship that is really based on more complex links. Dima in the Kotele camp, as we have seen, joined the camp because he was the brother-in-law of the brother of the mother of the abba ola's father's former ward. He himself continually referred to their common clanship, although he was himself a Mattari and the abba ola a Digalu.

The Boran segmentary system does not work in the classical way of the Nuer or the Somali, where clan groups more or less coincide with territorial units, and where, during conflicts, clan segments split and join with each other according to the relative position of the adversaries within the genealogical structure. The Borana do not fight internal wars, and clan organization has very little to do with military strategy. The segmentary system of the Borana ensures that, even if sub-clans and clans are not evenly spread over Boranaland, a man can always find "clan-mates" to turn to for help or to settle with. The range of what is defined as clan is situationally defined by the number of clan and sub-clan members available in a specific area. Thus while Digalu and Mattari have joined forces in Isiolo District, and regard each other as clansmen and have meetings in common, similar co-operation in northern Boranaland might be confined to sub-sections like

Mattari Meta or Digalu Emmeji. Daccitu, Maccitu, Konitu, Oditu and Galantu, who are independent units in southern Ethiopia, join into one single lineage unit at Waso.

FRIENDS-IN-LAW

Perhaps the most striking feature when one considers the history and structure of the Ilman Kotele camp is the frequency of affinal links both between daha partners and between the heads of corral units. The exceptions are provided by Abdi and Dima, the former a classificatory brother once adopted as a ward in the core family, and the latter superficially "just a clansman" but also brought in to the camp via affinal links.

In order to understand this pattern it is necessary to make an assessment of the general nature of affinal ties among the Borana. Affinal relations are both a formalization of close friendship and a means of creating such cooperation. Hence the heading "friend-in-law" is an attempt to interpret the emotional overtones of the Boran expression sodda. In its most restricted sense, the term refers to the sister's husband, wife's brother, wife's father and daughter's husband but it is very often situationally extended as a term of reference and address to any classificatory representative of these categories to all members of clans into which one's own clan has married, and ultimately to all members of the opposite moiety. The term always has connotations of alliance and affection, although the intensity of these vary with the context. A number of proverbs stress these connotations, i.e. "Bar china soddat walin bahi"¹²⁾ "the season, when all separated, the in-laws stuck together", "Obbole dowe, sodda dowe dadabe" - "You can refuse your brother, but never your sodda" or "Lubu sodda reban" - "You chase away the death of your in-law".

The term is related to the Oromo verb soddachu, to fear and respect¹³⁾. Not only on the level of conscious ideals, but strikingly often also on the level of observed behaviour, the sodda relation is characterized by warmth and affection. Borana often express the view that it is the fundamental value of their culture. One man, complaining about the decadence of modern times, told me:

"Everything has changed and we miss water. There is no respect for ladies, brothers or old people. The only people remaining who are given respect are the soddas. That is a thing which will never change. It can't stop. Brothers-in-law are not like your own brothers. They are better."

In any Boran camp there are a large number of persons who will now and then refer to each other as sodda. Many of them are also actually close affinals, men living with their fathers-in-law or with their sister's husbands, wife's brothers or son's fathers-in-law. Although these relations are referred to by one single expression by the Borana, their implications differ. It means one thing to live with a father-in-law and quite another to live with a brother-in-law. I shall try to sort out these implications below.

Among some of the Borana's neighbours, i.e. the Nilotic Turkana¹⁴⁾, the wife's relatives are considered in some ways superior to the bride-taking group. This is also the case among groups closely related to the Borana, such as the pastoral Gabbra or the agricultural Oromo of Shoa¹⁵⁾. Such an evaluation may not be alien to the Borana, but little importance is attracted to it. There is a notion that it is not good for two brothers to marry two sisters or even girls from the same sub-clan, while, on the other hand, direct brother-sister exchange is praised as a very good form of marriage. If there is an element of superiority-inferiority involved at the individual level, the bias is not allowed to extend to relations between the two involved agnatic sections as a whole. The concept of balanced opposition is central to Boran thought, as can be seen in the context of their moiety system which we shall return to shortly.

While the sodda relation in principle is reciprocal and egalitarian, relations between a man and his parents-in-law are complicated by the age and generation difference. Parents-in-law are addressed in the same way as parents and rules concerned with children's behaviour to their parents are extended to parents-in-law, although this pattern is amended when the groom and his father-in-law are of roughly the same physical age, such as in the case of an elder marrying as the junior wife the daughter of another elder. Apart from this situation sons-in-law are required to pay filial respect to their fathers-in-law¹⁶⁾. Daughters and daughters-in-law are fully equal. The only special case concerns the relation between a man and his mother-in-law, which is marked by complete avoidance especially at the beginning of the marriage¹⁷⁾. The ambiguous status of the mother-in-law that one often finds in patrilineal societies is intensified by the Boran moiety system which leads to a classification of the mother-in-law both as an affinal and as a quasi-agnatic kinswoman.

In chapter 5 we discussed the reasons that may bring a young Boran man to live in his father-in-law's homestead, and noted that this form of residence

has low status. This applies, however, mainly to the situation where a man's principal residence is in the homestead of his wife's father. Often, a man establishes a secondary household with a junior wife whom he leaves in her natural home. Although his own structural position in that particular camp is insignificant, he can at the same time be the head of a large homestead elsewhere, or even be a "father of a camp". There is nothing degrading in such an arrangement, nor in a situation where the two men - wife's father and daughter's husband - co-reside each with his own corral or homestead.

Brothers-in-law who share corral or live in the same camp are often partners on the same level. Gulliver's¹⁸⁾ contention about the Turkana and their affinal relations is equally valid for the Borana:

With his wife's brother or sister's husband, once the marriage has become well established after a few years, a man often maintains extremely cordial relations of a practical equality, equivalent indeed to fraternity with none of the latent tensions that are involved in real brotherhood. A brother-in-law is pre-eminently a person whom one can trust and rely upon, even to the extent of allowing him temporary control over one's herd. There is commonly considerable affection between the pair of men, and this relationship is one of the most valued among these people. There is not the difficulty of superiority and age difference as with the father-in-law, nor of tension and rivalry as with an agnate. The two men are often of the same generation at about the same stage of personal development, and with similar but not competing interests and problems. There is in addition the strong emotional bond via the sister-wife.

Asmarom¹⁹⁾ discusses Boran settlement patterns briefly, particularly stressing the last factor, the strong brother-sister relation among the Borana, although he does not dwell on the question of what mechanisms tie the two (sister and brother) together. He seems to infer from the low amount of bridewealth paid - the obligatory portion is around four cattle - that the affinal network is of lesser importance for the Borana than, for example, for the Nuer²⁰⁾. In my opinion this is to underrate the significance of sodda-ship, but, on the other hand, it is clear that neither the brother-sister bond nor the brother-in-law bond can be properly understood without reference to the other. However, societies where affinal relations are highly valued may or may not stress the particular bond between brothers and sisters. As noted in chapter 6, this relation is highly significant for the Borana and one can perhaps argue, that it takes priority over the sodda relationship.

When a brother and a sister are of approximately the same age, or when the brother is only a few years older, the bond between them is strengthened by the fact that the preferred marriage-partners for the girl fall into the

same age-group and generation class (luba) as her brother. The friends and age-mates of the brother are the young men that a girl is most likely to meet, and vice versa. No doubt brothers are often instrumental in achieving a positive disposition on the part of their sister toward a prospective suitor. Overt expressions of premarital love are precluded by moral norms and much of the young suitor's efforts go into "courting" the girl's brother, simultaneously with showing respect to her father. Since most girls prefer to be married to men of their own age, they may recruit their brothers as allies if they want to refuse a proposed marriage to an older man²¹).

While a close relation between a sister and brother can be extended to the husband of the sister, friendship between two men often leads to marriages between their respective children, or between one of them and the other's daughter. Marriage often formalizes an already existing relation of friendship using it in a normatively prescriptive form. This gives the relationship between sodda a permanency which exceeds that of a single marriage. It is in this context that one can understand the occasional practice of sororatic marriages, where the deceased wife is replaced by one of her sisters. By analogy, when a marriage ends in divorce, this does not necessarily lead to a break in the relationship between the two men. Dima in the Kotele camp and his brother-in-law Dibe living at Garba Tula were one example of this:

Dima's sister Kaball was married to Dibe and the two men used to camp together. The war broke their co-residence, and later Kaball also left her husband, moving to a sister selling miraa in Isiolo Town. The two men, after joint but wasted efforts to persuade the wife to return, continued to regard each other as close friends and soddas, even after Dibe had written the letter of divorce requested by Kaball. In 1974, the relation was confirmed by a new marriage between Dima and Dibe's sister.

In such a case, if the two men are camp-mates, they may even continue to live together despite the marriage break-up. It is hard to single out either friendship or affinity as of primary importance: in Boran thought they are closely related and one leads to the other. Marriage establishes also a shared interest in particular animals. Asmarom²²) mentions that among northern Borana small gifts of stock, particularly of sheep and goats, may be included in the courting gifts given by a suitor to his prospective father-in-law. This is less common at Waso, where such gifts normally comprise only small items for pleasure consumption such as tobacco or miraa. Once agreed upon, however, the affinal union is symbolically and materially confirmed through the transfer of the gabaar cattle from the groom to his in-laws. The Muslim gabaar, like the traditional kadda, is negotiable depending on the wealth of the groom.

After the wedding, affines do not approach each other directly for loans or gifts of stock, but under particular circumstances they can expect to be given some animals by their in-laws. When a man has been declared "destitute-through-no-fault-of-his-own" by his clan relatives, and thus been accepted as a recipient for clan redistribution, his bride-giving affinal relatives are supposed to volunteer gifts of stock, without being asked, as a part of the normal solidarity pattern between affines. I do not have any quantitative information on the extent to which this moral ideal is carried out in practice, or of the range of affinals that actually come forward voluntarily but most Borana would not question that this makes up an important part of the destitute's new breeding herd.

A man who has a disproportionately small portion of milch stock may turn to a friend or clansman for the loan of a dabarre cow, i.e. a cow which he gets the right to milk but whose offspring belong to the creditor. If he seeks a cow from an affine he can only request it by describing his affliction in a general vague way, hoping that this will generate the spontaneous gift of a cow. A direct request embarrasses a son-in-law or brother-in-law for there is a notion that a junior sodda is obliged to supply anything that he is asked for by his senior affine. If he accedes to the indirect request, he is not expected to do so in the form of conditional help, but rather in terms of an outright gift of halaal rights. Within the context of in-law transactions it is difficult to reclaim an animal or its offspring without breaking the rules of respect or comprising the spontaneity of affinal patterns of help.

When it is the household of the son-in-law rather than of the father-in-law that experiences a milk scarcity, affinal help is maintained by the wife's right to support from her own agnates' stock. If they live in the same camp, her father or brother may allocate milk stock to her, or her mother may support the family members in a more covert and flexible way. Thus, despite dabarre loans of milk-cows not being given between close affines, in-laws are held more responsible than others for supporting each other with food when it is scarce. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, such cooperation is one important aspect of day-to-day cooperation.

Affines are also regarded as ideal cooperators in herding matters. The "bride-giver", it is conceived, would not mismanage the stock from which his daughter or sister and sister's child are supported - partly because the final economic responsibility for their support will always rest with himself. The "bride-taker" will fear and respect his senior in-laws because of

the influence they have over his wife, and therefore not mishandle their livestock. Soddas are therefore ideal partners in daily production activities and the best trustees a man can have for his stock when he is not present himself. A polygynist can place his different wives in the camps of their brothers, allocating to them sufficient milk-stock and trusting his brothers-in-law to manage the herding of this stock. Having several wives, when possible, means a duplication of alliances, and if animals can be spread to the sodda, it can also mean a reduction of risk, and sometimes a way of achieving herd diversification.

CHAINS, MOIETIES AND NETWORK CLUSTERS

As we have seen, when two men decide to share corral, there is often a link of close affinity between them, and similarly, it is often brothers-in-law who decide to settle with their homesteads and corrals in the same camp. When camps are subject to continual fission and fusion and reorganization, several such links are combined into extended chains of affinally-bound sibling groups.

In the camp example given in this chapter, and in most other Boran camps that I know of, one can find extended chains of sodda. This pattern has also been identified by Asmarom²³⁾ among the northern Borana. He calls them "bilateral joint family chains" illustrating the principle thus:

Figure 7h Bilateral joint family chain

Torry²⁴⁾, in his article on residence rules among the Gabbra, presents a number of examples of the same "python-like patterns of local association". Referring to a small survey among Boran camps, he suggests that Asmarom has exaggerated the bilateral character of Boran camp structure. Asmarom on the other hand, states that such chains are very common among Borana, but rare in the ethnographic literature. My own data would support Asmarom's claim. The factors behind this chain-like configuration, or rather the factors counteracting agnatic co-residence, are related to property relations in the cattle-keeping sphere. However, the multi-focality of the Boran economy in Isiolo District today leads, as we have seen, to a tendency for camps to appear more agnatic in character. Now it is not likely that agnatic residence principles will take priority over those based on affinity as long as the

people who are responsible for the management of the herds find that it is advantageous to share camp with other independent herdowners. When it is recognized that the skeleton camp structure is shaped by the choices of senior "heads of corrals" (abba kara) the dominance of affinal choices becomes even more clearly visible. In most cases agnatic co-residence is a symptom of scarcity of resources and of junior agnates holding passive but not yet relinquished rights in their senior relative's herd stock. When the cattle economy is more self-sustaining one would expect Boran residence to be even more emphatically affinal.

"Snaking" (as I shall call it) is probably not such a rare ethnographic phenomenon as Asmarom suggests. The camps presented by Robert Pehrson²⁵⁾ in his classic book in the Kōnkämä Sami all contain extended sibling group "snakes" and it is probably easy to find several examples from other pastoral societies²⁶⁾. Where residence is not permanent, where it is a good solution to ecological hazards to spread the property of an agnatic group, and where it is advantageous to live in large camps, "snaking" is very likely to occur.

In the Boran context it is also advantageous for each herdowner to live in a camp which provides him with as wide a network of contacts as possible. Kinship and social contacts are useful information channels and, in the Boran environment, it is important to have "information alliances". An extended affinal network gives the Boran herdowner access to a large amount of knowledge of current ecological conditions in the district, its neighbouring areas and in Ethiopia. An arrangement where he cooperates in herding matters with affines is from this point of view much more efficient than one where he confines himself to cooperation with agnates.

Each Boran herdowner usually lives in the same camp not only as his own affines but also as his affines' affines, and affines' affines' affines. As far as I know, the Borana do not like the Kōnkämä Sami, have any special term for "cognates of brother's affine" or similar types of indirect relatives. Nor do they have any term for the "snake", although a "snake" metaphor would no doubt appeal to them. To understand how the Borana conceive of the composition of a camp, it is necessary to add one element to Asmarom's sketch of the chain. The Boran system is shown in figure 7.9.

The two exogamous moieties Sabbu and Gona are the largest kinship units of the Borana. As Asmarom expresses it²⁷⁾

"Borana seem consistently to think big and relate to each other by

reference to the largest units of the social system".

Figure 7i Moieties and bilateral family chains

When asked his clan affiliation, a Borana always gives the name of his moiety first, rather than the name of his clan or sub-clan. The principle of balance between the two moieties permeates traditional Boran political and religious organization. In an extended sense, all members of the same age-class but opposite moiety regard each other as sodda, and, when the concept is stretched further, all Sabbu are the sodda of all Gona and vice versa. The affine of one's affine belongs by definition to one's own moiety. In a camp composed of a number of affinally related sibling groups, there is some feeling of identity between those who are affinally related to the same group of people. This is also expressed in the ideal physical structure of a camp.

As has already been mentioned, the homestead of the abba ola is at the extreme right of the row of houses. Apart from this special recognition of the place of the camp leader, Isiolo Borana have no explicit rules for the ordering of homesteads within the camp in terms of seniority. Age and generation class (luba) are irrelevant in this context²⁸⁾, but the ritual seniority of the Gona is given recognition in the ideological conceptualization of a "normal" camp structure. The Gona should be to the right (mrigicha) and the Sabbu to the left (bittata). This would mean that if an agnatic group formed the core of the camp, they would live at one end, and all the affinally recruited camp members would live at the opposite end as each other's neighbours, to the right or to the left depending on whether the core group was Sabbu or Gona. In practice, the preferential rules for where the moiety members and the abba ola should live are modified in a number of ways and none of the camps I visited corresponded exactly with the ideal model. New-comers to a camp should ideally be spread out according to the proper camp structure so that they are not marginalized²⁹⁾, but if space does not allow this they can be put at one end of the camp row.

If a person who for some reason is senior to the camp head appears, the latter

might or might not agree to place that man's homestead to the right of his own. An elder brother of the camp head can be obliged to stay to the left until the next move. A polite classificatory son-in-law, like Hukkoba in camp A, shows his respect for his senior relative by exhibiting some confusion about who is the real camp head. If there are already a number of Gona families at the right, the position of later Gona families is not considered important.

Apart from the ideally preferred juxtaposition of moiety-mates, the identity of moiety members in a camp is continually stressed in all kinds of everyday recreation. Moiety opposition is the team basis for ball games, singing contests and competitions in mice- and squirrel-hunting. Such pastimes have a conscious element of integrating camp newcomers.

People who are living in the same camp are rarely total strangers to each other, however, even if they have been recruited to the camp in disparate ways and through different persons. Apart from the indirect links that they may have with each other through the "snake", they are very likely to have first, second or third degree kin in common outside the camp. Camp-mates often move together in search of pasture, but may also split up temporarily to join up again later on with friends that they get on well with. Although it is true that the Boran camp is often "an unstable grouping of families who have settled together for the duration of a season"³⁰⁾ one may find a greater continuity in the camp composition than is perhaps to be expected, if one observes the camp over a longer period of time. The social world of a particular individual is not infinite, although its boundaries may be more fluid than one would find in an agricultural society. There is a limited pool of related groups and individuals with whom a camp-member will cooperate.

Since the existing literature on the Borana primarily deals with the formal rules of the society and the structural aspects of its most striking institutions, very little interest has until recently been paid to what Firth³¹⁾ would call organizational aspects, or the regulations created by the pastoral households' decisions and choices in daily production activities. Thus we still know little about the constancy or fluidity of the borders of local communities. The authors of the Agrotech Report³²⁾ identified among the northern Borana two types of territorial units larger than the ola - the deda and the rera - which no other source has so far mentioned. The deda was a comprehensive unit denoting a more or less permanent grazing area, up to 20 km. wide, exploited by the warra herds of a more or less fixed number of

encampments, on average 38 ola per deda. The rera or arda were neighbourhood groupings of an intermediate size, on average comprising 8 ola. The Isiolo Borana often refer to people in terms of their locality, assuming a degree of persistence in using the same area - i.e. "these are Sericho people" - and perceive of the district as split into at least two roughly distinguishable territorial (partly ecological) divisions - the Charri and Waso - with slight differences in dress and dominated by different Muslim tariqas (sects). The term "deda", referring to a smaller unit, is used sometimes more or less synonymously with "administrative location of a sub-Chief". There is normally little dissent over who is "abba deda" in each case. This refers not necessarily to the Chief but to the most outstanding big-man and traditional law-giver in the area - frequently an ex-colonial Chief. Again, the title is an honorific one rather than a definite office.

On certain occasions, elders' meetings are summoned to discuss problems that are of interest to the total community of herdowners using a particular grazing area. Such meetings, referred to as the mala marri of a deda can be summoned by any influential elder and are for the purpose of solving specific problems, rather than for general discussion. The "agenda" can be about a concerted move into "hostile" territory by people and stock when it is advantageous to move on a broad front to avoid attack, or an agreement to save a certain piece of pasture for the sedentary settlement of school children. Deda meetings are not common. They may take place once in every two or three years or not at all, depending on the particular situation in the deda concerned. The deda is not a formalized unit with strict boundaries but represents a concentration of population and a "statistical" regularity of use, and this goes for all local communities on the lower level among the pastoral Borana.

To express it in Barnes' terms³³), there are in the "total network" system of the Borana, definite "clusters of higher density". A field of Borana studies which certainly requires more research would be the correlation between such clusters of camp cooperation and affinal links on the one hand and clan or generation class membership on the other. The gada system, which has some similarities to an age-set system, builds on the classification of all Borana men into a number of categories variously called in the literature "generation classes", "gada-classes" and "descent sets". These categories or luba recruit members on the principle that all sons of a certain luba shall belong to the fifth next luba, coming to power 40 years later than their fathers. Groups directly descending from each other form gogessa or

"lines of descent sets".

Although both the luba of the gada system and the clans and lineages within the agnatic system are recruited patrilineally, authorities like Knutsson³⁴⁾ and Baxter³⁵⁾ agree in seeing clan-ship and luba-membership as independent from each other and crosscutting territorial divisions of the Boran society. It was earlier claimed (p.152) that the clans do not appear to be evenly spread over Borana territory. A number of clans referred to by Baxter, Asmarom and Haberland are absent in Isiolo District.

The same seems to apply to luba membership. Although I have not been able to verify this statistically, my impression is that the line to which the generation Bule Dabassa belongs is heavily overrepresented in the Garba Tula-Kinna area³⁶⁾. That this is so is partly explicable by the affinally oriented residence pattern and the preferential rule that prescribes marriage within the same line of generation sets. Thus the alliances of the fathers of the lub Bule generation, who migrated together from Ethiopia at the beginning of the century, were decisive for the present composition of Isiolo Borana. Locally, the luba are dominated by particular clans and luba endogamy leads to continuously renewed marriage alliances between specific local lineages. Since marriages within the luba are only preferential, there is no absolute isolation of such clusters from the total network of affinal relations. However, this preferential rule and the continuous affirmation of friendship through marriage alliances create a continuity in the social world of each individual Borana which is not immediately apparent when one considers the structure of any particular nomadic village.

When strangers appear in the camp, having only weak links with the camp inhabitants, they are often badole (forest dwellers, i.e. people from northern Borana) who have decided to make a definite move to Isiolo in order to escape drought, poverty or more specifically personal problems in Ethiopia (for example jealousy of a wife's lover, an inappropriate sentiment, according to traditional Boran norms). But apart from these, adult neighbours tend to be people who have at some stage of their lives already camped together, or whose parents used to camp together. The links tying such people together are not always discernible merely from a consideration of first or second rank kinship relations between the inhabitants of a camp. This may sometimes render the work of an anthropologist difficult. For example, in the case of dependants, a shallow genealogy does not necessarily reveal the kind of "telescoping" of classificatory kinship that need for support and lack of immediate agnates may give rise to. Nor does genealogical information on

adults in all cases show how adoption or guardianship in the past may have intensified relations between a child and relatives outside his natal nuclear family.

CONCLUSION

In a semi-nomadic society like that of the Borana, residence patterns are both an outcome of structural restrictions and an aggregate result of the individual choices of each household. In this chapter I have tried to identify the aspects of Boran subsistence and property systems that are relevant to choices of residence and selection of camp-mates. To summarize, it can be shown that when each co-residence relationship is considered closely, its major components are in most cases related to one of five sets of recruitment factors:

1. Joint interests in agnatic stock: the rights to herding and husbandry that junior agnates can make formal claims to but have not yet assumed.
2. The institution of clan guardianship as a substitute for widow inheritance intensifying the relation between an orphan and his more distant clansmen.
3. Clan redistribution of capital or produce in return for labour.
4. Bride-service.
5. Close cooperation between soddas, both as friends with whom the relationship has been formalized in a kinship way, and as people with whom one has shared interests in the form of responsibility for the sustenance of certain dependants, i.e. the women.

These factors represent different degrees of structural determination and free choice of residence partners. The first three relate to the field of property relations and to the ideology of a common interest in the capital aspects of a shared herd patrimony. The two latter represent optional cooperation in activities that have to do with the care and exploitation of animals as food producers. Shared interests within these two fields work cohesively on the members of a camp, but at the same time they carry the seeds of dissent. Divergent opinions on what is good husbandry in relation to shared capital, or on the degree of sharings will separate agnates when the herd is big enough to split. And conflicts over the best way to allocate labour, the best grazing to use in the dry season etc. may split a group of soddas and cause them to settle with another camp - probably with other brothers-in-law.

Footnotes to Chapter 7

1. Baxter 1966b:124, Helland 1977
2. Asmarom, 1973:36 states exactly the opposite position but is, as far as I understand, mistaken on this point.
3. Haberland 1963:32
4. Cf. Baxter 1966b:119 "...as in some societies the idiom of witchcraft pervades discussion of social relationship, in Boran the idiom of stock management is pervasive".
5. "daba" is the name given to the "strategic villages" set up during the shifta war. Its original meaning is "enclosure".
6. Baxter 1966b:120
7. Asmarom op.cit.:34
8. Gulliver 1955:164
9. Baxter op.cit.:126
10. Baxter op.cit.:125
11. Spencer 1965:15-24
12. This expression is connected to Chin Titti Guracha, the season of the Black Flies, i.e. the period of disastrous smallpox and rinderpest epidemics around 1890. Cf. Baxter 1975:221
13. See Blackhurst 1974:39. Baxter 1954:333 refers this to the fear that the wife's relatives will influence her too much at the expense of the husband's authority.
14. Gulliver op.cit.:205
15. See Torry 1976:273, Blackhurst op.cit.:291
16. A Boran father is never supposed to sit on his daughter's or daughter-in-law's bed, and should preferably not enter her house at all.
17. Baxter 1954:213
18. Gulliver 1955:206
19. Asmarom op.cit.:32-7
20. ibid.:34
21. Although the girl's consent to the marriage is formally required by Muslim law, there are a number of cases where she has been married against her will, especially when the suitor has been a person of political or administrative power whom it might be advantageous for a girl's father to be allied to.
22. Asmarom op.cit.:32
23. ibid.:35
24. Torry 1976:276ff
25. Pehrson 1964
26. For a similar type of residence pattern in an agro-pastoral community, see Rigby 1969:109-153
27. Asmarom op.cit.:41

28. Asmarom(op.cit.:36) claims that among northern Borana all huts are ordered according to seniority, but does not specify what "seniority" means here. It is known among the Waso Borana that the gadamoji of northern Borana usually stay to the extreme right of the camp - these are persons who have reached the last, liminal stage of the gada career. Apart from this, I was not able to obtain any information on whether homestead heads had at any time in the past been placed according to gada-class seniority.
29. ibid.:34
30. ibid.:32
31. Firth 1951:35ff
32. Agrotech-SRD-SEDES 1974:25ff. However, Baxter makes a similar distinction between "district" and "neighbourhood". The latter signifies all those camps which lie at the most a day's walk from each other in the dry season and which use the same waterpoints at the same time. A district is that area, which during a "normal" year can be self-supporting with grazing and water, and may contain one or several neighbourhoods. Both are referred to as dirra; Baxter 1954:417-8.
33. Barnes 1969:55ff, 64ff
34. Knutsson 1967:195
35. Baxter op.cit.:284
35. Baxter op.cit.:81-84, Asmarom op.cit.:40, Haberland op.cit.:123 all cover extensive lists of clans. See also Appendix 2 in this book.
36. This impression could be the result of the faulty character of my own Boran network, although I tried to avoid being trapped in any special "cluster" of relations. If it should happen to be so, it would strengthen the main argument rather than falsify it.

8. RESOURCES AND REDISTRIBUTION

THE ETHOS OF EGALITARIANISM

Like other East African pastoralists, the Borana have frequently been referred to as "egalitarian"¹⁾. The basis for such statements is usually the fact that age- and generational organization is taken to be central to the functioning of these societies, and that the ideology of their systems stresses fraternity and equality between peers in the same age-set or generation²⁾. Apart from the fact that these societies are supposed to have an egalitarian ideology, it is occasionally assumed that this egalitarianism also implies a relative equality between different societal sub-units in the access they have to power and material resources. With regard to the

Borana and other Galla groups it has been thought that the gada system and the succession of eight-year reigns of different generation classes have led to a situation where "no man can build up a position of permanent power or authority"³⁾. On the other hand, Baxter⁴⁾, in a volume on East African generation and age systems, has recently contended that what was allocated to the "ruling" gada class was not so much power over economic resources as the duty to take on an "exhausting ritual burden" including the expenditure of material resources rather than the exercise of authority.

In the same volume, Almagor argues that, despite an egalitarian ethos, differences between age-peers in wealth, power, status and prestige are common to age-set systems: in fact, it is rather these differences that lend force to the normative emphasis on equality⁵⁾. He shows how, among the Dassanetch living north of Lake Turkana, differences between male age-peers grow during their life-cycle, particularly with respect to the status each man has in his own natal household⁶⁾. At public meetings the egalitarian ethos is expressed as a polite facade in spite of variation in real influence. Each member of the age-group can voice his opinions in the same way, but their impact will vary. Egalitarian etiquette also implies that any age-set member can approach any other of his age-peers as a social equal, and request access to the latter's "network" resources. But each service transaction motivated by the egalitarian ethos further enhances and emphasizes the really inegalitarian structure of the age-set as seen in terms of control over economic resources and social influence. Though Almagor specifically refers to the Dassanetch, large parts of his argument are capable of generalisation and can be applied to the Borana. Boran society may be an "egalitarian" one, but from the previous chapters it should be clear that this equality is not one which extends to all physically adult members of society, but immediately excludes women and those men whose fathers are still alive and active. It

"applies to the heads of family in their capacity as representatives of autonomous domestic units: it reflects the structural equivalence of these groups within the productive community and the equality of their access rights to collective resources"⁷⁾.

However, among the men who are each others age equals, irregularities in the developmental cycle of their domestic groups, variations in filial status, skills, kindred assets, herd fortunes and so on all the time create differences in wealth. Disparities in access to livestock capital and labour in turn give rise to large differences in "bargaining power" and influence within the Boran society.

The age-set structure is not very pervasive among the present day Waso Borana Gutu, it being mainly "a nostalgic item of folk memory"⁸). The generation class system has not been particularly important either. Nevertheless, ideological egalitarianism is no doubt an active in-group ethos, applying to "cliques" of men in the same approximate age and position in the social structure such as the young men waiting to marry, or the independent abba kara. It is not a universalistic value which implies that all men are equal before God, but is restricted in its applicability to those who cherish values central to Boran cattle pastoralism.

In Isiolo District, I think most Borana Gutu would be willing to extend ideological equality to those few Sakuye who are still having some stock, but less obviously to the Wata except in tactical rhetoric or for politeness. However, within the Borana Gutu, all abba kara do have a say at the neighbourhood meeting (kora deda) and all male and married clansmen can attend the lineage council (kora gossa) and raise their voice if they wish to do so. From the point of view of formal social structure there is little differentiation in social status between different pastoral management units. The only indigenous office of authority which existed among the Borana of Waso at the beginning of the colonial epoch were those of hayu and jallaba among the Wata and Sakuye, and jallaba among the Borana Gutu. These titles referred to positions of elderhood within the lineage, and in contrast to the purely honorific titles of abba ola and abba deda they entailed some power to impose sanctions on herdowners, through enforcement of fines, hamstringing of stock and (in theory) expulsion from the lineage of members who did not comply with council decisions. Lineage authority was usually vested in several such men, so that no monopolization of power was possible, and the power of officeholders was clearly very circumscribed by social control.

CONTROL OVER VITAL RESOURCES

One can argue that, if there was no direct economic equality, neither was there any explicit economic stratification. On the whole, above the level of abba kara who wielded control over household dependants and occasional clients with unviable stockholdings, there was no layer of Borana who could monopolize vital economic resources, such as either local means of production or imported items necessary for survival. At the time of the Borana's colonization of Waso, all production assets other than livestock were rather difficult to control, water and salt resources being widely scattered and easily accessible. This meant that, apart from direct interference with

stock rights (such as the sanctions applied or threatened by the jallaba) there were up till the shifita period few means for any section of the society to apply negative economic sanctions on any other group or category of Borana. That this was so has to be related to the general climatic uncertainty and the pragmatic migration practices followed by the Borana.

In an area with a very unpredictable climate, as in the Boran case, land which is useful today may be wasteland tomorrow. Therefore, unlike what may be the case in areas with patterns of more regular transhumance along fixed routes⁹⁾ political and economic dominance cannot be based on control of specific pastures. In the 1960s and 70s changes in land control have created problems for the Borana, but primarily because of total expulsion from certain areas. Such changes particularly concern areas which are normally of little importance for pastoral production but which can be of increased significance in years of drought when they become famine refuges.

ALTERNATIVE OBJECTS OF INVESTMENT

During the initial period of settlement at Waso, the ecology of the area not only restricted the system of economic sanctions which were theoretically possible and secured direct access for each household to important non-herd means of production. It also limited the possibility of meeting ecological hazards by investment in ventures less vulnerable to climatic and epizootic hazards than herds are, and thus created a ceiling to the amount of stock wealth that could be accumulated in the long run.

Trade could have provided one such drought-secure object of investment, particularly if imported goods had been of any significance to Boran subsistence. It is, however, only during the last few decades that grain trade on any large scale has taken place. In precolonial and early colonial times many East African pastoralists were involved in dry-season trade with agriculturalists¹⁰⁾. This usually took the form of direct local trade between neighbouring households. There were no specialized grain traders. Problems of security, related to the difficulties of bushland travelling, the lack of adequate transport facilities, and underdeveloped storage techniques all contributed to the absence of any large-scale specialized trade in agricultural produce. Also, the pragmatic type of migratory pattern followed by the pastoralists did not lend itself to a combination of long-distance trade and pastoralism in the same way as transhumance can do.

The major trade routes of the nineteenth century long-distance trade passed

further to the east, in the Jubaland area. When long-distance trade was intensified in northern Kenya in the later part of the century, the goods imported were mainly luxury consumer goods such as perfume, cloth, beads, tea etc. which involved little change in traditional subsistence. These goods were less perishable and bulky than foodstuffs. The goods exported were those for which arid northeast Africa had been famed for thousands of years: ivory, incense, game skins, gums and ostrich feathers. During the nineteenth century the Ethiopian Borana had acted as middlemen between the slave sources in the southwestern parts of Ethiopia and the Garri-dominated trade between Lugh and the Benadir coast¹²⁾. There is, however, little evidence about the role played by the Gabbra, Wata or Sakuye groups living in what is now northern Kenya, though it can be imagined that they were affected by the turn of the century boom in demand for ivory, not least because of the devastating raids carried out by ivory hunters armed with rifles operating from within Ethiopia. Long-distance trade at that time was controlled by Somali merchants. The Borana were concerned mainly as suppliers or purchasers of goods. Somali, Arab and Indian merchants also came to dominate the livestock and grain trade that began to grow under British protection, taking advantage of widespread networks of contacts which the Borana lacked¹³⁾. As we shall see, trade became a realistic alternative occupation for the Borana only during and after World War II.

THE NATURE OF WEALTH

In an ecology which permits agriculture and a social and ecological setting where trade is another alternative to pastoralism, the wealthy herdowner can escape pastoral risks by transferring some of his resources into projects that are not vulnerable to drought or disease, and thereby accumulate a surplus in the way that Barth has described for southern Iran¹⁴⁾. In this way inequality can become permanent. In a completely pastoral situation the herdowner is restricted to reducing risks mainly by the means I have discussed in chapter 2, dispersion and diversification, and by institutionalized insurance against risk in the form of reciprocal friendship exchanges, marriage alliances etc. The lack of alternative objects of investment makes the constraints that obtain in relation to the accumulation of livestock capital and labour decisive.

Factors related to the type of productive activity tend to redistribute wealth in the long run. As should be clear from the discussion in chapter 4, the herdowner, in order to manage a large herd, is to a very large extent

dependent on having access to labour which is either directly available in his own household or which has been recruited from closely related families or in other ways approximates to "household labour". A man who is wealthy in terms of animals will strive to enlarge his own family and there are several ways of doing so: by marrying more than one wife to produce children, by adopting children, by marrying off daughters to relatively poor men who can be recruited to live uxorilocally etc. A man rich in terms of animals is therefore also likely to be rich in terms of people, many of whom are his heirs who aspire to a share in his herd either at his death or by gifts during his lifetime. Dependence on household labour for herd management and the ecological advantages of herd dispersion therefore in themselves place a limit on the opportunities for transferring capital from one generation to the next in a non-egalitarian manner.

But, as we have already emphasized, this does not mean that Boran society is not economically differentiated internally. An important aspect of economic differentiation in a pastoral society is expressed by variations in "recuperative power", that is in the capacity of a household to continue as a viable independent unit after a major stock loss¹⁵⁾. Though all members of a pastoral society are to some extent subject to the whims of Fortune and Nature¹⁶⁾, a wealthy herdowner can manipulate them more efficiently. It is wealth that makes it possible to establish a "recuperation herd" within one's own livestock holding by having a risk margin, by dispersing animals into different risk zones, and by achieving species diversification of the herd. A household's recuperative power also varies according to the strategies which have been followed with respect to building up external and alternative sources of livestock capital that can be mobilized to rebuild viable herds and flocks after a drought, for example. Such non-domestic resources consist of outright livestock credits in the form of loans that can be recalled, and of social bonds and links of solidarity that can be activated in the face of individual misfortune. In the present chapter, we shall be concerned with these aspects of Boran culture, with how capital and consumer items are institutionally redistributed within the community, and also with the criteria on which claims for such solidarity are seen as legitimate.

FORMS OF REDISTRIBUTION

One can differentiate between redistribution systems that rest on a collective principle of solidarity such as clanship, and those which are based on individual relations of risk-sharing, i.e. "stock association". Both can be

found in the pastoral societies of East Africa.

Stock associates are those men within an individual's primary network with whom social ties are strong enough to permit the possibility of begging or demanding domestic animals to cover a temporary shortage of milk stock or an acute need for reproductive livestock capital. Usually such relations exist with kinsmen of various kinds, though the specific orientation may differ from one ethnic group to another. Stock associates may also be recruited from a wider circle of "friends", for example from the members of a man's age-set. Local forms of stock association are usually adaptations of two main patterns: either a system of gifts or a system of loans. In the following paragraphs we shall refer to the former as "stock alliance" and the latter as "stock patronage" or "stock clientage", depending on which partner to the relationship is in focus.

Among several north Kenyan people, stock alliances are the major form of capital redistribution. This form of voluntary association between individual herdowners involves the transfer of irrevocable rights to specific animals and their offspring, and is initiated when a man accedes to a request for a cow from a kinsman or friend, for example. After the kinsman has received the gift, the donor cannot claim that particular animal back, but will expect that a later request on his part will be acceded to. The relationship depends on continued reciprocity backed up by moral sanctions. Among the Waso Borana outright gifts of reproductive stock are uncommon except between very close affines and within the context of clan redistribution. If a man suffers a total loss of animal capital he can regain some through his in-laws, but it is mainly the collective responsibility of the local patri-lineage to look after reallocation of stock to the needy. The lineage council levies tolls from the herds of more affluent members in order to provide unfortunate clan-members with butume herds. It is mainly on the occasion of total loss that a Boran pastoralist can expect help with animal capital. Borana do not have any institutionalized system of individual stock-alliances similar to that described for the Turkana¹⁷⁾ or the Samburu¹⁸⁾, nor do they have the heavy marriage expenses that occur in these societies, which create peaks in demand for cattle during certain stages of the life-cycle.

The initiative in clan redistribution may come from the poor man (qolle) himself, from somebody who has tired of a dependant's demands for assistance or from the elders of the poor man's clan. Clan elders among the affluent Borana clans meet regularly once or twice a year to discuss clan matters

and "review" the internal distribution of stock. Among the Sakuye, according to some informants, there is no regular clan review system. Large-scale reviews are ideally done on an all-Sakuye basis in situations of crisis: to my knowledge, no such meeting has taken place since the shifita time, but there are also very few Sakuye who would be able to contribute to the collection of funds. In traditional times the qolle who wanted help had to go through an intermediary, for as a stockless man he was more or less without jural identity. The clan-member whom he initially approached was expected to feed and protect him until the matter had been raised with the jallab of his closest clan section. The latter would summon all the members of the local lineage to discuss the case and to decide whether the man could be considered as a true qolle or as a man who had dissipated his wealth through waste, folly or negligence, a nyatu. The jallab would then either proceed to discuss the actual fund-raising arrangements in the lineage council or in the case of the Sakuye, transfer the matter to the council of hayus for the same purpose. The lineage council would have to decide on the size of the contribution to be made by each member; and before this purpose it was essential that all important herdowners of the lineage were properly invited to the meeting, and either were present or could acceptably explain their absence, lest they should have to accept any levy on their property decided by the clan meeting. The size of the total gift received by the qolle would depend on his own previous miserliness or generosity, and on the number of his wives and children. As an indication of the normative range involved ten cattle was the number quoted to me by Boran informants as reasonable for a married man with a couple of children. Sakuye informants said in recollection that a man with two wives and six children would be given 8 camel dams, four in milk and four pregnant, two transport carriers and one stallion; men very renowned for their previous generosity had occasionally been given up to twenty camels.

The qolle benefiting from clan redistribution can expect a few additional animals from the clan's affinals: among the Borana, from those with whom they have immediate relations and, among the Sakuye, from any close neighbours belonging to a clan into which the qolle's clan marry their daughters¹⁹⁾. The discretion to decide whether or not the qolle is right to claim redistribution lies, however, wholly with his own clansmen. Normally, if he is considered to be a good stockman, the main part of the collective allocation will take the form of an outright gift, with no explicit or tacit agreement that the cattle are to be returned to the donors under any circumstances. It is expected that the recipient will follow the elementary rules of hus-

bandry. A man who sells the female cattle that he has obtained in this way would never be able to claim a new share. When the man in need is held to be in part responsible for his own losses, he may be given a loan rather than a gift, particularly if he has not yet any children to care for. A notorious waster may be refused help altogether.

TAKA: THE MUSLIM "TAX"

Islam has introduced into the Boran culture yet another form of stock redistribution, the zakat (ar.) or taka (bor.) Every good Muslim is obliged to pay taka annually according to a sliding scale depending on his wealth. There are exact figures laid down for each type and size of stock holding, indicating what a minimal gift should be. A simplified list is given in the table below.

Table 8.1 Normative rules for gifts of taka

<u>Number of animals owned</u>	<u>Required minimal size of offering</u>
Cattle	
30	1 ox 2-4 years old
60	1 heifer 3-4 years old
100	2 heifers 3-4 years old
Sheep and goats	
35	1 goat or sheep - an adult female
60	2 - " -
100	3 - " -
Camels	
10	1 small bull calf or two sheep and/or goats
25	1 heifer 2 years old
50	1 pregnant dam, 4 years old

If the taka prescriptions are followed, they imply a certain degree of redistribution of herd capital. However, in many cases today at least the stock gift is replaced by a gift of money, a hoe and a bag of seeds, or consumer items such as food and clothes. The main idea behind taka is never-

theless that the gift should have a lasting effect on the well-being of the poor recipient.

Taka is an individual gift and not a matter of collective solidarity. Therefore it is likely to work more selectively than the clan collections made for the qolle. It is not geared towards a general protection of all stockless members of the community, but leaves the donor free to choose the recipient. The formal rules of taka give no preference to lineage kinsmen, though they are often favoured in practice. In terms of religious merit, it pays to give taka to religious specialists (sheikhs) or teachers (maalims) particularly people who have reconverted Christian ex-Muslims back to Islam. Close neighbours are also favoured by religious preference.

In theory, the paying of taka is an inescapable duty, and to default makes one's wealth immoral, haramu. The elders can mete out fines of two cattle for neglect of this duty, although I have not recorded any cases where this was actually done. In 1978, the fate of some Boran cattle were traced and it was found that of 72 animals lost, sold or disposed of only 2 had been given away as taka. Taka is not a substitute for taking part in clan redistribution, though I know of one case where a man refused to obey the decision of the lineage council and give a cow to the clan collection on the ground that he had already paid his taka. Taka payments earn religious merit, while alms to clan members are seen as a secular duty.

THE CRITERION OF CAPITAL CARE

Boran "egalitarianism" in no way implies that all members of the society (and still less, all human beings) are equal or should be given equal access to material resources. It would be more correct to say that it implies that all male members of the society rightfully should be given opportunities, that is unless they have shown neglect with respect to the care of capital or have voluntarily opted out of such care. It is necessary to reiterate here that an orientation towards care of the reproductive value of stock is one of the fundamentals of Boran culture. It is by the observation of such care rather than by his physical performance that a man's virility is judged. To reject or fail to give primacy to this value of reproduction and growth is seen in a sense as an anti-social and immoral act which threatens the basis of the continued existence of Boran society. But the man who is properly directed towards the values of cattle reproductions also has a right to be rewarded by society, and by his clan. A stockless man is an anomaly that must be corrected, particularly if he has not disqualified himself by the

breach of this code.

Since the secessionist war, when so many Sakuye lost their stock, Gutu-Sakuye relations have become increasingly uneasy. Many Sakuye with unviable herds had to sell their few remaining animals, since they were unable to give their camels adequate care. Sakuye openly complain about the lack of solidarity on the part of the Borana Gutu. The latter express anxiety about the existence of this large destitute group which does not benefit from the limited stock redistributions that take place within the Boran clans, but they argue that the emergency sales by the Sakuye were proof of irresponsibility. This way of justifying the present imbalance in resource access is very typical and reminiscent of the mythical explanation offered for the Wata's traditional lack of stock.

Wata and Borana are thought of as the descendants of a couple of brothers, Wayu and Boru. There are two versions of the myth. In one, the aged father of the two (and of Adano, the Gabbra) stumbles into a dry canyon during a walk in the forest, dropping his loin cloth in the fall. Wayu, the firstborn son, only laughs at the sight of his naked father, while Boru promptly runs to the rescue, helping his father with his dress and offering him water for refreshment. The enraged father decides to cut Wayu off from his inheritance and gives his blessings to the younger son.

In the other version of the myth, the father's rage results only in a curse: since Wayu laughed, he will himself always be laughed at. The first cattle have not yet been found, and it is Wayu who finds them, when on his father's death he neglects the burial in order to hunt elephants in the forest. After having brought back the stock to the camp, Wayu goes to rest under the shana tree unconcerned by the cattle's discomfort. Boru offers his brother the shade of the shana in perpetuity in exchange for the cattle and Wayu accepts the offer. He returns to the forest and the meat of elephants, forfeiting his right to marry Boran girls. "The Wata are firstborn, but they are regarded as lastborn".

According to this myth, which is told both by Wata and Borana Gutu, Wayu forfeits his rights to paternal help - and by extension, to lineage solidarity - by showing filial disrespect. He makes a deliberate choice, even if a foolish one, of the elephants rather than the cattle. Thus the myth strives to justify the status quo of the relationship: that Wata are not entitled to clan redistribution, even when they claim affiliation to particular Boran clans.

Apart from referring to the breach of their food taboos and to the myth mentioned above, Borana Gutu justify their despoliation of Wata in terms of the lack of opportunities and concern for capital expansion that is built into a hunting adaptation. Paine²⁰⁾ has demonstrated how hunting differs from

growth-oriented pastoralism in that it involves an exploitative relation to resources that are to appear to be outside the control of the hunter, and in that hunters do not control the reproductive value of wild animals nor endeavour to do so²¹⁾.

This generalization was on the whole true for the Wata²²⁾, except that they did have large packs of dogs which they cared for, and that a rudimentary care of capital was maintained in relation to elephants through prohibitions against killing mother elephants with calves. Such rules did not apply to other types of prey, such as rhino, giraffe, hippo or dikdik, and the gathering of berries, roots etc. of course involved a direct exploitation of natural resources. Honey collection was made from natural bee hives and did not involve capital care.

Since Borana Gutu equate wealth with livestock, hunters are by definition poor people, regardless of the efficiency of their adaptation as a way of obtaining food: possibly they are also peculiar in their relation to the social and moral order. However, despite the stigma of hunting, the material relationship between livestock holders and hunters may well have been one of complementarity and symbiosis rather than of one-sided dependency or exploitation. In this context it should be noted that the Wata never appear to have constituted a stockless labour reserve for the Borana. Both Borana and Wata informants agree that Wata in old times rarely took employment as herdsmen²³⁾. They were believed to have a mystical influence upon the reproductive capacity of cattle, which could be turned into either a blessing or a curse²⁴⁾.

Haberland²⁵⁾ quotes information stating that the Wata were once barred from ownership of cattle. A Borana Gutu could confiscate stock that he found at the compound of a Wata, and a Wata could in turn claim as his any hunting dogs and spears that he found in a Boran camp. At Waso no such prohibition of Wata livestock ownership has existed within living memory. Instead it is clear that there were several different ways that a Wata could obtain stock in exchange for goods or services or as gifts, particularly from the Sakyue. With the latter, who did not observe Borana Gutu food taboos, the Wata sometimes lived in close residential cooperation and they even intermarried. It is likely that many Wata over time have become absorbed into the Sakyue and vice versa. Borana Gutu also refer to the Sakyue as half-Wata²⁶⁾. To the extent that Wata were excluded from active pastoralism this is likely to have been not so much because of legal obstacles as because of the practical

difficulties of combining the labour requirements of the two subsistence alternatives.

While there was no judicial bar to a gradual assimilation into the Sakuye, particularly through goat- and sheep herding, it was impossible for stockless or poor Wata to take part in the Borana Gutu legal and political structure as independent jural persons. But some kind of affiliation to that structure was essential for Wata residing in areas where the Gutu were predominant, in order to ensure legal protection. Many Borana Gutu clans therefore have Wata members²⁷). The Wata could turn to Borana Gutu clansmen for mediation in jural procedure, but they would still be inferior members in the sense that they could make no claims to stock redistribution. To regard the hunters as merely a suppressed group kept in their specific adaptation by an active Boran policy of exclusion is probably an oversimplification, however. The myth of a deliberate option for hunting may not be wholly false in regard to a situation where game was more abundant than it is now, and hunting free from interference.

According to traditional cattle-owner values, the failure of the Wata to expand their small herds enough to bring them back to pastoralism is a continuous proof of unworthiness. A man shows his worth by being able to expand even a very small herd into a viable unit, so that, once given a butume and some milk stock to get over (dabarsa) the initial problems, a skilful herd manager should be able to devote himself to pastoralism²⁸). I was told the following "rags to riches" story, which allegedly took place in 1915:

At Waso, there was a man called Ware Gudda who had killed a lion with one hand. He was therefore renowned for his bravery. Ware had lost all his stock through misfortune, and his clansmen decided to give him ten cattle. Ware was grateful but decided to return all the cows and keep only one ox. This ox he bartered for two doubled sized spears (bode). Then he went out to hunt with his spears and killed two big elephants. With the profit from the sale of two sets of tusks he was able to invest in a herd of 60 cattle and in addition pay the bride-wealth for a wife and also buy new clothes for himself and his family. Ware thus reestablished himself as a herdowner, but he continued to kill game and to increase his herds until he had hundreds of cattle.

The moral of this story is, of course, that a good and brave man deserves assistance from his agnates but does not really need it, for he can turn even a non-capital-oriented activity such as hunting into investment in a growing herd. Since the secessionist war, the standard measure of poverty and wealth has changed very much, of course. A herdowner with 50 cattle who

in the days before the war and the droughts was considered poor is now relatively well-off. But there is still a feeling that a real man should be able to work his way up through initiative and entrepreneurship in even the most humble trade, like berry-picking or miraa-selling, and finally set himself up again as a herdowner. The extent of the trauma of destitution can only be appreciated when the difficulties of fulfilling such ideals are taken into consideration.

GIVING AND GETTING

Systems of redistribution can be looked at from two different angles, which are both relevant for a discussion of inequality in the broad sense. One is that of actual access to material assets - means of production and necessary items of consumption - and the other concerns accumulation of prestige, official recognition and social merit. The recipient gains in "recuperative power" from the gift particularly of capital, but the donor gains esteem²⁹⁾. These two values, "recuperative power" and "esteem" are not independent of each other. Seen in the longer perspective, the donor also profits from the exchange for it increases his chances of taking advantage of redistribution in the future.

It is obvious that clan redistribution has immediate advantages for the recipient qolle, but all partners in the system make long-term profits from taking part in it. Another way of establishing a fund of solidarity is to develop an extensive individual network of "stock patronage". Loans of stock have a part to play in the context of clan redistribution, if supportive loans are given to enable the qolle to withstand his initial viability problems. In contrast to gifts of stock, however, they are undertaken outside the context of strong community sanctions.

Unlike the stock alliance, the stock patronage relationship involves only a temporary transfer of the rights to use a particular animal. Such loans (dabarre) of milk cows may be made between individuals in order to cover temporary shortages of food for the recipient's family. Occasionally dabarre loans are not of milch stock, but of breeding bulls. The terms of the transaction are tied to the particular animal given. For the creditor, the risk of loss of the particular animal by drought or disease is not diminished by the transaction but it is kept low by the fact that the loss would also be disadvantageous for the debtor. The major implication as regards risk-spreading is the creditor's gain in security through an increased spatial dispersion of his property³⁰⁾. In the event of a crisis he can recall his

stock, or, at least, the female offspring of the original cow given³¹). Male offspring of dabarre cows are counted as produce, rather like milk, and hence belong to the debtor. But, unlike the stock-allianceship, the creditor retains the jural rights to the reproductive capacity of the animal he has handed over.

There is no equality between the two partners in a stock-loan relationship. While the role of the "patron" (the creditor) is quite clearly defined - that he is helping his "client" (the debtor) in a particular situation of milk shortage - the client is often left more or less ignorant of whether and when the patron will ask for his cattle back, and is generally supposed to repay his patron with less tangible values, such as political allegiance. The creditor's right to decide when the contract should terminate is fundamental, since it enables a man to build himself into a position of bigmanship through such redistribution. The subordinate status implied in the relationship is accepted only with a certain degree of resentment on the part of the recipient. Among the Borana, stock-clients, who recover from the temporary crisis that motivated the loan, tend to try to redress the balance by returning the original animal plus a small "gift of gratitude" (galatho) and so transform the originally skewed relationship into one of mutual help. Stock loans between clansmen are also an important tool in gaining political influence within the clan, in addition to generosity in lineage stock collections. Under modern conditions when the prizes to be won are not only jalab-ship but also offices that involve control over wage jobs and trading licenses, stock patronage continues to play a part in local politics. Today, however, with the general scarcity of stock in Isiolo District, by no means all herdowners are involved in such transactions either as recipients or donors.

Receiving a stock-loan normally entails no gain in reproductive livestock capital for the client. The male offspring are counted as the client's property, which he can of course sell and try to reconvert into small stock or heifers and in that way increase his stock holdings. Primarily, however, what he gains is help to support the labour need for the management of an underproductive herd. Nevertheless, after a number of years, if the original animal has not been handed back and if the donor has not asked for the return of its offspring, it is possible that the transaction can fall into obscurity, so that the "loaned" animals come to be counted as the property of the client's descendants. Related problems have been touched upon by Baxter who argues that the amnesia regarding past stock transactions is an important equalizing mechanism in Boran society. When a man dies, his outstanding debts

and the cattle that have been borrowed from others are transmitted to his eldest son with the rest of the inheritance, i.e. those cattle that the father has not allotted to any specific child during his lifetime. Over time, these transactions are forgotten, "there is a period past which memory is not stretched... a point at which 'our' herd as it were becomes 'my' herd" ³²).

Stock clientage, which redistributes access to cattle as productive units but not as reproductive capital, is one of the factors which in normal years "masks" a structure similar to class inequality in the pastoral society as a whole. There are other forms of redistribution of material assets which also contribute to this. We have already mentioned that taka gifts are sometimes given in the form of consumer items. There is also a more voluntary form of Muslim alms-giving, saddaga, which takes place particularly on Fridays when destitute acquaintances gather round the houses of wealthy Borana. Other less conspicuous and institutionalized forms of redistribution of food and clothes take place all the time. It is safe to say that access to food is considerably more evenly spread in Boran society than is pastoral "recuperative power", a feature which is accentuated in a situation of scarcity but probably nothing fundamentally new. To understand why food redistribution has traditionally been important, one must first consider the characteristics of pastoral produce, the simple technology involved, and the need for the household to be continuously ready to move ³³). Both meat and milk can be stored for limited periods, but there are restrictions on the quantity that can be handled and kept. Surplus meat and milk, over and above the amount needed for immediate domestic consumption, are often best used as social assets, either by means of covert help to camp colleagues who run out of milk or through lavish hospitality.

Legitimacy of leadership in the eyes of Borana is very much a function of generosity, of which hospitality is the main symbolic expression. A well-respected man is literally a man whom people like to visit and who entertains his guests well. It brings shame on you if it is said about you that "People never go to their house", and nothing is more insulting than to feel that "they refuse to visit our homes". This association between local leadership and hospitality means that an equitable distribution of consumption items may be maintained at the cost of an unequal distribution of influence. The wealthy cattle owner can be thought of as a "big man" who builds up personal power from a number of informal links with people who owe him allegiance in return for food, loans, gifts of stock or services such as help with pastoral labour.

BIGMANSHIP AND TITLE

A number of different spheres of influence for a Boran herdowner can be discerned. First, there is the domestic sphere where he has the direct control of capital and husbandry decisions. Second, the camp and neighbourhood sphere where he gains influence through direct food redistribution or loans of milk stock, and by offering others the opportunity to take advantage of the labour resources that he controls. Third there is the larger Boran community, where he acts from a well-established position within the two narrower spheres and actively participates in lineage affairs oriented towards a formal recognition of leadership status.

Since until recently very little interest has been taken in the day-to-day economic life of the Borana and the "action" aspect of Boran local politics, especially in comparison with the attention focused on the structure and rules of the gada system, I shall pay some attention to the links that exist between distribution of wealth and the formal Boran system of honour and authority.

As already mentioned, clan activities are organized by particular leaders, called jallaba. Each clan in Isiolo has one or more jallaba, sometimes one for each sub-clan. This is true both of the Borana Gutu and the Sakuye. Borana Gutu jallaba are still influential today (1978), while among the Sakuye the whole system of clan solidarity and cooperation seems to be lapsing due to the lack of livestock property which was traditionally its focus.

The jallaba of Borana Gutu in Isiolo correspond to the lowest level of the gada organization of the northern Borana, that of "deputy officers" for different grazing areas. Within the gada system there was also a superordinate position called hayu (justice of the peace). The incumbents of the latter office are ritually prohibited from passing south of the Ethiopian border, and this has meant that for sections living south of that limit, the jallaba were the only links to the higher tribal authority structure. Sakuye and Wata have had hayu of their own, even at Waso, with more prestige and influence than their own jallaba but not super-ordinated to those of the Gutu. The Gutu jallaba at Waso have probably from early times had a high position in respect of local affairs as compared with their Ethiopian counterparts.

Jallaba are appointed by a process of consultation between local lineage members. The Qallu in Ethiopia is supposed to take the initiative by sending a deputy messenger to the lineage, to advise it to submit its nomination and

to act as a silent observer of the election process before bringing back the names to the Qallu for confirmation. At the end of the shifta war, when the Harsuwa clan of the Sakuye had appealed to the Qallu for help, a deputy did in fact arrive at Garba Tula and this led to a mass confirmation of jallab statuses. Jallaba appear however to have been appointed on local initiative after that. In practice it is improbable that the Qallu plays any very close exmining role. His confirmation is, however, an important legitimisation of appointment even in the Muslim Waso community. The presence of his deputy may further ensure a proper nomination process. During the meeting of the lineage council (kora gossa) the advantages and disadvantages of different candidates are openly discussed, and final decision is taken by consensus and not by vote.

Before appointment to jallab-ship a person has to serve a period of apprenticeship as abba kae. Ideal qualities looked for in a jallab are generosity, skill in negotiation and knowledge of traditions. The character and standing of one's father and patrilineal ancestors are taken into consideration as signs of leadership capacity³⁴). It is likely that at least one of the sons of a jallab will also achieve the title: normally, but not prescriptively, the firstborn son. A jallab deals mainly with the affairs on his own lineage section, but may be called upon to settle disputes between members of any other lineage whose elders are not available. A jallab has considerable authority, particularly over clan redistribution, and must be shown respect: cases of disrespect are brought "to court" and the accused lineage member is threatened and cajoled into adequate apology by appeals to lineage morale and the threat of cattle confiscation.

Borana deny that these offices, or those of the gada system, are ever given to a person on grounds other than his wisdom and the hospitality of his household. "Rather a poor man whose wife is generous with what little they have than a rich and miserly man", it is argued. Despite this conscious model, generosity in terms of immediate gifts of food or contributions of stock for communal use - or gifts to poor clan relatives - is clearly easier to achieve with a certain amount of wealth. In the gada system, the hayu were elected at an early stage in the career of the gada class, when a majority of the gada class members were still young. The relative importance of the father's merits increased therefore. At each eight-year period only a restricted number of men were chosen and political competition was intense. Haberland³⁵) makes the interesting observation that, since the ritually senior officer was often younger than his deputy assistants (jallaba), the latter were

frequently more influential. Appointments to jallab rank were not numerically restricted, but appear to have worked as a way of formally integrating local "big men" into the larger Boran authority system by a post facto ritual acknowledgement of their power³⁶). Jallabship in Isiolo District should be interpreted in the same way.

There is a clear relation between wealth and official recognition, even if it is not a direct one. In fact, many of the jallaba and hayu, particularly of the Sakuye, have themselves become extremely poor since the secessionist war. Such officials, though they enjoy the title, are now more or less completely without practical influence. One of the Sakuye hayus who is married to a Gutu girl is at present taking an active part in the clan meetings of his wife's clan and hopes to be able to claim a qolle distribution from them.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, various aspects of equality and egalitarianism have been discussed, taking as the point of departure the traditional livestock-based society. To sum up, the egalitarian ideology and the redistribution both of consumer items and of cattle as milk producers together act as a screen to conceal real divergences in capital control, recuperative power, and influence between different households. But internal mechanisms to protect pastoralists from ultimate destitution, limitations on the unrestricted accumulation of wealth and obstacles to the transmission of wealth from generation to generation have also existed in Boran society. The latter obstacles lie in the pastoral dependence on household labour and in the need to disperse animals geographically, factors which can be related to a number of ecological determinants. A major condition for such ecological dependence has been the absence of alternative objects for investment, which has traditionally put a further ceiling on the amassment of riches. As we shall see in the following chapters, that ceiling has to some extent been lifted by the introduction of Western technology and national administration at the same time as stock losses have occurred among such large sectors of the Boran community that traditional forms of stock redistribution have in many cases been put out of operation.

Footnotes to Chapter 8

1. See, for example, Asmarom 1973:25
2. Notes and Queries 1951:68
3. Hultin 1977:284
4. Baxter 1978a:152
5. Almagor 1978:70
6. ibid:79
7. Lefebure 1979:6
8. Baxter 1978a:161
9. Salzman 1967:122-3
10. Zwanenberg and King 1975:149, Waller 1975:9
11. Zwanenberg and King op.cit.:173
12. Abir 1970:131 ff
13. Hjort 1979:24 ff
14. Barth 1961: 103 ff
15. Lefebure 1979:7
16. On the tendency of ecological hazards to work as "levellers" of pastoral wealth, see e.g. Black 1972:421, Salzman 1979:439
17. Gulliver 1955:196 ff
18. Spencer 1965:27 f
19. Sakuye do not have exogamous moieties but a system of preferential marriage rules linking different specific clans in asymmetrical relations of bride-givers and bride-takers.
20. Paine 1971
21. ibid:167
22. An interesting question which may raise some doubts as to the validity of this statement is that of the historical place of East African hunters in the production of ivory for the caravan trade. We can only regret that this is a field where documentation is lacking and which has so far attracted surprisingly little interest. Baxter (1954:55) states that the Wata (presumably of Ethiopia) "had to" trade their ivory through the Borana Gutu, "much of the profit of the latter". The exact way in which ivory was appropriated is not clear from his text, but one can assume that the involvement of the Borana in the long-distance trade may have altered the relation between the two sections of the society.
23. Nevertheless, Torry 1973:59 mentions that Wata use to help Gabbra by acting as herdsmen, butchers, hairdressers and collectors of material for roofing.
24. It is difficult to say whether the Wata represent an original population of hunters or a substratum of people sloughed off from pastoralism. The same problems meet the researcher dealing with other hunting groups in East Africa, such as the Dorobo and Okiek. See Zwanenberg 1976, Galaty 1977:152 ff. I will offer a wildly speculative hypothesis - namely that they were partly recruited from the people classified as "nyatu". This could explain their particular mystic relation to cattle reproduction.

25. Haberland 1963:135
26. Baxter 1954:55
27. Such clan membership cuts across another categorization of Wata into non-exogamous groups. This rests on somewhat unclear grounds but seems to coincide partly with territorial groups, partly with a division based on the emphasis in each group's particular ecological adaptation. The groups that are said to be represented among the Waso Wata are Hegan, Shama, Roggobla and Kochot. Haberland 1963:135 mentions three territorial groupings: Shama, Hesa and Kodele.
28. Cf. the description given by Black (1972) on the situation among the Lur of Western Iran. "Although the Lurs have an ideology of achievement and equality of opportunity, very few individuals are able to move from the poor and dependent categories to the wealthy and independent categories. The ideology is supported by the fact that some few poor men are successful in upward mobility". Black 1972, quoted by Salzman 1979:435
29. Paine 1970:15, Sahlin 1965:147,162
30. Cf. Torry 1973:350
31. Among the Rendille (Spencer 1973:37 f) and Gabbra (Torry 1973:339) dabarre animals can be loaned out to new recipients, creating chains of loans linking different herdowners. As far as I know, this is not common among the Borana.
32. Baxter 1978a: 167
33. Dahl and Hjort 1976:193
34. Cf. Asmarom 1973:220; Baxter 1978a:167
35. Haberland 1963:230
36. Baxter 1978a:154 makes a similar point

PART II

Stratification through Integration

9. BECOMING KENYANS – THE HISTORY OF INTEGRATION

The first part of this book has mainly dealt with factors internal to the Boran system of subsistence production: relations of control over livestock capital, produce and labour, forms of intra-familial and inter-domestic dependency and resource distribution in the livestock sphere. In the second part, which follows, power and dependency relations will remain in focus. But I shall also try to show how the local resource structure has changed now that the community as a whole has itself become a dependent part of a larger society. This chapter will therefore try to delineate the historical conditions under which the Borana's relatively slow integration into the market economy and the larger national community has been taking place. Two sets of factors have been decisive in this process. One is the military-strategic

significance of the area as such, the other the development of the livestock trade. We shall see how the various policies followed by the British in relation to this trade, and the creation of a local administration, have provided the framework for the development of a Boran "petty bourgeoisie" of traders and administrative officers. We shall also deal with the events immediately after Kenya's independence which shook the Boran economy to its foundations and created widespread stocklessness.

COLONIALISM AT THE PERIPHERY

Livestock did not play any significant part in the pre-colonial long-distance trade between the interior of arid northeast Africa and the coast. Ghee was exported from the pastoral areas, but not stock on the hoof. On the Somali coast, livestock exports were low at the end of the nineteenth century except to the north, where the British occupation of Aden created an outlet for sheep and goats¹⁾. This trade did not markedly affect the Benadir coast, which was in more direct trading contact with Boran areas.

British colonization of northern Kenya was not motivated by an interest in livestock. Access to the ivory trade routes of southern Ethiopia was attractive but it was mainly for strategic reasons that Britain wished to include northern Kenya in her Empire as a way of countering the expansion of Abyssinian rule under Menelik II of Shoa. With the turn of the century, however, the advent of British settlers to Kenya created a sudden demand for breeding stock from Ethiopia and northern Kenya, and for a couple of decades the trade of Somali and Arab middlemen flourished between Moyale and Wajir in the north and Nyeri and Nanyuki to the south²⁾. Bulls from northern Kenya were also traded to Maasai pastoralists who were eager to improve the breed of the herds they were striving to rebuild after the big epizootic losses around 1890. There was also a good market for small stock in the agricultural areas of central Kenya³⁾. These conditions were very favourable to the indigenous livestock traders dominated by the Somali. The Borana, though less prominent in this context than the Isaq and Herti Somali, on several occasions drove caravans of stock down to Nyeri. As time went on, the white settlers themselves acquired a foothold in livestock production, their initial "raw material" coming partly from the specialized Somali traders, and partly from animals confiscated in punitive raids against the Nandi, the pastoral Somali, and other cattle-keeping people⁴⁾. As they themselves created large herds, they began to fear both competition from African producers and the spread of contagious diseases such as rinderpest or CBPP⁵⁾ from areas where traditional subsistence pastoralism was practised⁶⁾.

In the 1920s, these settler interests became strong enough to create legal obstacles to the African livestock trade. The movements of traders, especially "alien" traders such as the Isaq and Herti Somali, were restricted by new pass rules included in the ordinances of "Outlying Districts" (1926) and "Special Districts" (1934) which were used to "encapsulate" (or, in Wisner's terms, to "containerize"⁷⁾) northern Kenya during the whole of the colonial period⁸⁾. Holders of visas to Kenya needed additional licenses to visit the Northern Frontier District and NFD Somali could not enter other districts without special permission. Quarantine regulations made cattle exports from Isiolo and southwards illegal from 1922 until well into the 1940s. The sheep and goats trade was allowed to continue, but even that was hampered by quarantine rules. On average 40-80,000 sheep and goats were legally exported from the NFD each year in addition to continuous illegal exports to Kikuyu areas⁹⁾. This trade depended on the degree of coincidence between good harvests in Central Province and drought conditions in the NFD¹⁰⁾. Not only the settlers but also the representatives of the colonial administration saw it as in their interests to limit the small stock trade, for it was feared that the reserve of meat animals available in the north would be depleted, making it difficult for the Army to obtain provisions of beef¹¹⁾. However, despite the policy of "encapsulation" the sheep and goats trade continued throughout the colonial period.

EARLY ADMINISTRATION AND THE GROWTH OF MARKET TOWNS

As a result of the lack of appreciation of, or even the negative attitude to, the resources of northern Kenya, the administration of the area during the first twentyfive years of British rule was maintained at minimal cost and frequently reorganized. For the Waso, this meant periods of military administration alternative with civilian rule and, for some periods, practically no administration at all. The status of the area varied between being a sub-district, a district in its own right within the NFD, and a sub-part of the merged Isiolo-Samburu District¹²⁾. Isiolo District has been an independent district since 1934. The Waso area is the largest part of the district but, as can be seen from the map, the district headquarters are situated outside the Boran area proper.

The British presence frequently consisted only of a patrol of the Kenyan Police or the King's African Rifles, one or two clerks, and the District Commissioner on his occasional visits. Contacts between the local population and the colonial administration were mediated by the chiefs and headmen. The concept of chieftdom was introduced to the Borana by the British in order to

establish a means for indirect rule. The chief was to be the local arm of British authority and at the same time the representative of his "constituency". He was supposed to collect taxes and tribute¹³⁾ when these were imposed, and to see to it that government regulations relating to grazing boundaries and hunting were followed. When conflict occurred between neighbouring tribal groups or between different clans of the Borana, the chief was to mediate or arrange negotiations. Headmen had roughly the same functions but were subordinate to the chiefs.

From the first years of British rule, such officials were appointed from among the big men of the Borana at Wajir, Moyale and Waso. Appointments were made on the basis of de facto influence, sometimes at an open meeting of Boran elders but always from a range of candidates that were acceptable to the British. Since many of the Borana Gutu had come to the area as refugees, there was no clear and well-established system of authority among them. On the contrary, they were rather marginal to the central tribal system, though some of the influential men leading cohorts of refugees were jallaba. A majority of those appointed to chieftdom or "headmanship" by the British were wealthy men, and some of them could claim traditional titles. The colonial administrators approved of appointees who could claim some positive genealogical antecedents of leadership, in order to give the office an aura of traditional prestige. Accordingly, when the Wajir chief Dido Doyo died in 1923 his son Galma, who was only in his early teens, was appointed to succeed him. Galma later became the senior chief of all Waso Borana. His father had not been a jallab, but his paternal uncle, grandfather, great-grandfather and great-great-grandfather were all remembered as having had traditional leadership titles. Being men who were recruited because of their influence in the traditional pastoral sphere, the Boran chiefs at first led lives marked mainly by a traditional Boran orientation. In 1924, G.B. Watson, the District Commissioner at Garba Tula, complained that the headmen were never seen at the administrative headquarters, but were always busy tending stock elsewhere¹⁴⁾.

Even though Boran culture and society are likely at that time to have appeared quite unaffected by economic and social change, there was the beginning of an economic transformation of the area, namely in the growth of small trading centres. The British colonization had brought an end to the traditional caravan trade of the Somali and Arab merchants, partly by the construction of roads which made motor traffic possible and partly by the granting of privileges to sedentary traders stationed at the colonial outposts. British policy rechanneled the NFD trade towards the Kenya highlands rather than the Benadir coast¹⁵⁾. The growth of small trading centres was expected to lead to a

stabilization of the nomadic population; - in particular it was hoped that it would be a method of "anchoring" the restless Somali groups to specific areas. Later on, the running of big trading centres became regarded as a costly burden on the colonial government, and the latter tried to restrict trade to a few traders based in these centres, rather than letting the centres grow too fast or allowing the trade to be spread into the rural areas by itinerant hawkers¹⁶⁾. The small trading towns were usually located with an administrative eye to health conditions, water supplies, existing caravan routes etc.¹⁷⁾. When the district administration moved from Bulesa to Garba Tula in 1919, there was only a small settlement in Garba Tula with one Indian, one Arab and one Swahili merchant¹⁸⁾.

Until that time, the material needs of the officers, clerks and soldiers of the British administration had been covered by government imports. From around 1920 however, traders were encouraged to provide the necessary goods. Dalleo writes that "Duka trade began primarily as a supply source for administrative staff and troops, with only a small portion of the goods included to attract the nomads. Its main items were tea, sugar, posho, cloth, kitchenware, utensils and canned goods¹⁹⁾. Nevertheless, when the Garba Tula District was amalgamated with Samburu and the administration evacuated Garba Tula, it was still useful for the British to let the trade continue. Trading centres could act as subordinate police and chiefly posts and thus support the administration²⁰⁾. Garba Tula therefore continued to provide a base for some control over Boran affairs.

During the initial years of the duka trade (1920-25) only merchants with good access to capital could venture into it, because of regulations stating that shop buildings must be built of stone (costing 1200-1500 K.Sh.) and that the trader must show proof of 5000 K.Sh. working capital²¹⁾. Lower fees for licenses were charged in the NFD than downcountry, however, and the British tried to encourage Indian and Arab traders to come to the area. Some of the merchants who established themselves at this period are still in 1978 the only ones to have stone buildings. There were also Isaq and Herti Somali who had retired from service as British soldiers. In 1928²²⁾ there were 7 duka plots and 24 residential plots in Garba Tula Town, most of them owned by Isaq. There were even three lorries owned by local merchants. Not a single Borana had a shop or a mud house in Garba at that time.

Most of the trade took the form of exchanges in kind, since it was live animals and skins that were given as tribute to the Government. Duka owners were given hides, skins, ghee or small stock in payment for goods and traded these

things downcountry for additional profit²³⁾. In 1930, the British administration introduced cash taxation as an alternative to paying tribute in the form of livestock²⁴⁾. From 1935 all taxes had to be paid in terms of money, and exchange in kind between retail traders and their customers was prohibited. In other parts of Kenya, the introduction of hut and poll taxes led to an increased demand for wage employment²⁵⁾. This alternative was not popular among the pastoralists of the north, who generally only accepted employment as soldiers and policemen (askaris)²⁶⁾, one reason for this being that the pastoralists could sell sheep, goats and skins as a handy way of getting cash²⁷⁾. As more cash came into circulation, the Borana became increasingly eager for the consumer goods to be found in the retail shops supplying the administrative centres with necessities. It was, however, considerably later that they themselves attempted to start up as shopkeepers or became more closely tied to the town.

A MARKET FOR LIVESTOCK

In the early 1930s, both the economy of the white settlers and that of the indigenous farmers met with great difficulties. These stemmed from the international depression, but also from the adverse effects of land and labour losses which had started to become apparent in the areas dominated by traditional African cultivation. Political unrest among the rural poor and soil erosion were two problems which worried the dominant European group.

The Kenyan settler economy was based on access to cheap labour. Such labour could be secured only when the wages of agricultural labourers were supplemented by incomes from their rural homes. Thus even the settlers were dependent on an African agriculture that was still working well enough to produce and support cheap labour. The new concern for the conditions under which African farmers lived also extended to the pastoral areas. The dominant government agency dealing with the economy of these areas was the Veterinary Department, which was strongly marked by settler interests. This Department saw erosion and overstocking as the biggest problems facing the arid regions²⁸⁾. Today, it is very difficult to judge whether this was a realistic view in the NFD, where, even with more detailed surveys, expert judgements differ on the question whether serious degradation is taking place or not. The colonial authorities held that this was the situation, and they put the blame for excess stock numbers on the lack of cattle marketing facilities (for which they themselves had been responsible). The same interpretation was later taken over by such authors as Smith, Zwanenberg and Wisner²⁹⁾ when they wrote on the economic history of the pastoralists. This theory, that marketing

Map 9.1 Cattle trade from or via Isiolo District

facilities can lead to substantial reductions in stock numbers, can be challenged on the grounds that marketing presupposes sales which are not just a substitute for normal slaughter for domestic consumption, but also involve the sale of reproductive stock. This is rarely the case³⁰).

Whether valid or not, the colonial appraisal of the situation led to a common understanding between administrators and settlers that the pastoral herds ought to be reduced in size, either by trading them off or by forcible confiscation. One problem was to find a market where low quality meat from indigenous cattle would not compete with that emanating from the settlers' ranches. Another was to identify stock routes where there was no risk of disease transmission to European stock. The Lamu market was seen as one solution to the problem, especially when, during a short period, 1936-8, the Lamu trade boomed due to the Italo-Ethiopian war³¹⁾. From Lamu cattle and small stock were taken to Kismayu by dhow. The Italian demand, closely linked to the invasion of Abyssinia, was soon over, however. The Lamu harbour was not able to sustain any significant exports in the long run. It could not cope with steamer traffic and compete in that way with Kismayu for the long-distance trade to the Arabian peninsula³²⁾, and the neighbouring markets of Mombasa and Zanzibar had even closer and better supplies of high quality meat³³⁾.

At roughly the same time, the British authorities decided to create an internal outlet for pastoral stock in the form of a meat cannery at Athi River. The Liebig company was invited to run it. Under this arrangement, it was hoped that the entry of indigenous stock into the market where "European" beef was sold, could be avoided and, at the same time, that there would be as steady demand for low-price slaughter stock. In the end, it was found that the policy of destocking and Liebig's demand for raw material for cornbeef canning could be fulfilled only through enforced sales or confiscation. An attempt was made to brand Kamba herds and confiscate the poorer animals found in them but it was dropped when the Kamba people showed fierce resistance³⁴⁾. Further attempts were made with Samburu and Njemps herds in 1939³⁵⁾.

When World War II broke out, government intervention was directed towards meeting the army's need for beef rather than Liebig's. The Kenya Meat Supply Board (KMSB) bought up large numbers of cattle and sheep. The peak came in 1942, when 255,000 sheep and goats and 20,000 cattle were sold from the NFD³⁶⁾. The Army offered quite high prices with a unit price per beast irrespective of its quality, which was at that time favourable to the pastoralists; this lessened their opposition to the enforced sales³⁷⁾. The war trade at Isiolo dealt a final blow to the Lamu trade.

After the war, a civilian agency, the Meat Marketing Board (MMB), which functioned under the Veterinary Department, was given the task of organizing livestock sales. It put a stop to the enforced sales, but still kept a monopoly over the trade, offering low fixed prices. The Somali traders who had

Once worked over great distances now ended up as middlemen between the MMB auctioneers and the livestock owners³⁸⁾, or as smugglers of illegal stock in the bush east of Mount Kenya, where Garba Tula stock was sold at black market sales³⁹⁾. In 1952, another new organization was set up, the African Livestock Marketing Organization (ALMO). ALMO was to be the main instrument for a new policy, officially guided by the need to destock the arid areas and to provide cheap meat for the agricultural areas around Mount Kenya as well as the meat canning factory at Athi River⁴⁰⁾. A minimum price per animal sold was offered in an (unsuccessful) attempt to stop middlemen traders from controlling prices to the disadvantage of the pastoralists⁴¹⁾. ALMO constructed stock routes which would lead stock at a suitable distance from herds owned by the white settlers. Veterinary measures such as tick control, tsetse clearance and inoculation were introduced into the pastoral areas⁴²⁾. Some measures were also undertaken to combat soil erosion in Wajir, Isiolo, Garissa and Samburu Districts. The Mau Mau emergency, however, closed the Kikuyu market in Central Province. For long periods emergency regulations were used by the British, to justify and ALMO monopoly of exports from the district⁴³⁾. In the late 1950s, however, when the Mau Mau emergency was over, traders from Garissa and Kikuyuland were periodically allowed to compete with ALMO and the Isiolo Somali at the Garba Tula market. Borana were not altogether satisfied with the new marketing measures for they disliked ALMO's pricing policy. The spread of cattle disease along the stock routes within the pastoral areas also created discontent. Nevertheless, ALMO trade grew continuously during the 1950s, particularly when 5-to-7-ton doubledecker diesel lorries were introduced in 1957⁴⁴⁾ to carry small stock over long distances.

THE CREATION OF A NEW ELITE

The period during and after World War II, with its high demand for cattle, contributed much to giving Boran society an altered profile. Deliberate new attempts were made to back up the power of chiefs and headmen and fresh fields of activity also opened up, which made it possible for a stratum of Boran leaders to differentiate themselves more distinctly from the "common herd-owner".

In the forties, additional institutions were introduced to link the colonial administration with the local population, viz. the Local Native Council (LNC) and the Native Tribunal⁴⁵⁾. These consisted of the chiefs and a number of members elected specifically for the purpose, and were supposed to deal with questions of jurisdiction over taxes and grazing regulations⁴⁶⁾. The LNC continued to exist for almost ten years, but was dissolved in 1951⁴⁷⁾ at the

request of the Borana on the grounds that "it caused legal decisions to be made too quickly, that it enabled recognized elders to give one-sided decisions rather than by discussions persuade litigants to a compromise which maintained the Peace of the Boran⁴⁸⁾ and that it had led to bribery"⁴⁹⁾. Though the LNC was closed down as a failure, it contributed considerably during the time it was in existence, to strengthening the position of its members, some of whom subsequently made careers as chiefs instead.

The war and postwar era led to an increased involvement in the cash economy, in military and quasi-military service, in the cattle trade and in retail business. As they had done during the peak of the Nyeri trade, individual Borana ventured into the Somali-dominated local livestock trade. Occasionally, such Borana traders also drove stock long distances to far-away markets, for example in 1937 when two flocks of sheep and goats were driven down to Lamu⁵⁰⁾. The Borana were usually not specialized stock traders, however. They were at a disadvantage as compared with the Isaq and Herti, who had widespread networks of transport and trading contacts, greater initial knowledge of Swahili and of the tricks of the trade, and the liquidity of "merchant's capital" to use wherever there was an opportunity. Boran traders used to buy small quantities of animals, for resale either to ALMO or to Somali middlemen. Some of them were retail merchants in a strategic position, who could both meet people in need of cash and get information on marketing opportunities. Or they were Army men or askaris who invested their earnings and labour in trading stock only to use the proceeds to establish themselves more firmly as herdowners.

The war had meant an increased supply of jobs acceptable to the Borana. Apart from other advantages, the families of chiefs and tribal leaders were sometimes favoured in regard to access to employment as soldiers, policemen, grazing guards and game scouts. This policy was pursued particularly in relation to local police units, which were considered to need a back-up of prestige and authority⁵¹⁾.

Already before World War II some of the chiefs and headmen and a number of local policemen had been living part-time in the towns⁵²⁾, but it was not until the postwar period that Borana became engaged in retail trade. Though it was mainly the families of chiefs and headmen who controlled enough cash funds to open a duka the British feared that such a combination of activities would lead to abuses, and barred these government officials from owning shops⁵³⁾. In the fifties, some of the restrictions appear to have lost force and a new policy was introduced, which directly favoured local traders -

part of a country-wide attempt to encourage economic entrepreneurship in the traditional African areas⁵⁴⁾. The abundance of cash during the war had done much both to make retail trade economically attractive and more prestigious.. Shop licenses were now given to Boran leaders as encouragement for loyalty or refused as punishment for subversiveness⁵⁵⁾. In 1960, the District Commissioner complained in his annual report⁵⁶⁾ that the headmen had to be dug out of their dukas and forced to visit their own areas. (- in quite a contrast to his predecessor of 1924 (see p. 193)). From this time onwards, there has evolved in the Boran community a close conceptual connection between political power and trade. Today, most of what can be referred to as "elite" culture is specifically linked to town models provided by Indian, Arab and Somali traders.

THE SHIFTA CONFLICT

1960 brought the livestock trade to a new standstill, this time due to political unrest within the NFD itself. The British Somaliland Protectorate had unexpectedly become independent and had merged with the former Italian colony Somalia. This gave rise to political insecurity both in the Somali-occupied areas of the NFD⁵⁷⁾ and in Ogaden and Somalia - where many of the Somali pastoralists and traders nurtured dreams of a "Greater Somalia" - to Somali boycotts of Kenyan elections, and finally, in 1963, to the flaring up of the shifta war⁵⁸⁾.

This was a conflict with many dimensions: superpower strategies and interests with respect to the important entry to the Red Sea; the potential significance to Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia of mineral and oil exploitation opportunities in the arid areas; Somalia's wish to control the upper reaches of its rivers; and the difficulties of communication between northern and southern Somalia that could be solved if Somalia included Ogaden and the NFD. There was also the fact that Somalia was one of the few mono-ethnic countries in Africa, and was pursuing ideals of nationhood and the revision of colonial boundaries which were menacing to her sisters in the Organization for African Unity.

Local tensions were partly the expression of a conflict with wider ramifications which has again exploded during the 1970s, particularly in the Ogaden. But it was also a local conflict, with roots in local fears of interference with the traditional pastoral form of production, in Muslim-Christian rivalry and, to a high degree, in the insecurity of land-rights experienced by the then so-called "alien Somali". These were Somali ex-soldiers of the British

Army who had established themselves as livestock holders and traders in an area called the Isiolo Leasehold area just outside the district capital⁵⁹). The "alien Somali" who initiated the secessionist campaign hoped that the constitutional conference would treat the future of the NFD separately from the question of Kenya's independence. They wanted a transitional period during which the British would go on administering the area so that they themselves could build up a working administration and could then enter into negotiations with Somalia as an independent party.

They soon gained support for this idea among the pastoral Somali of north-eastern Kenya, and among some of the Borana who identified with them because of common religion, myths of common descent, and affinal links with Somali pastoralists⁶⁰). As a whole, the Waso Borana were divided over the issue of the NFD's future fate, torn between their affiliation to the Somali and their links with the non-Muslim Borana of Marsabit and Ethiopia. The Marsabit Borana were more or less unanimously anti-secessionist. One reason for this identification with the Kenyan cause might have been that an important Marsabit leader, District Commissioner Daudi Dabasso Wabera, was already a rising man in the Kenyan administration.

During 1963, tensions grew when Britain broke her promise to consult with the Somali Government before deciding on the future of the NFD. In March it was announced that the NFD was to be the seventh province of Kenya. In the summer of that year Kenya and Ethiopia signed a defence pact, and later in the autumn it became known that Somalia was to receive Russian military aid. Open conflict broke out first in the Ogaden, then in November in the NFD, one month before Kenya's independence. Attacks were made on police and army posts and led to the declaration of a state of emergency at the end of the year. The guerrillas operated mainly with old Italian and British weapons which had become superfluous in Somalia because of Soviet military aid. Their attacks continued all through 1964, with considerable success to begin with. They were able to take advantage of their knowledge of the local terrain, which was difficult for the better equipped and better trained Kenya Police and General Service Unit who were generally recruited from other parts of the country. They were also better able to endure the NFD climate.

During 1965, they had problems in setting provisions and there was a temporary slackening in the intensity of the war, with an unsuccessful attempt being made at the end of the year in Arusha, Tanzania, to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the conflict. More efficient weapons, particularly explosives, were introduced in the spring of 1966, however, and this intensification of

Map 9.2 "Northern Frontier District" and pre-shifita limits of Somali areas

Source: Hjort 1979

the war led to more rigorous restrictions on the movements of civilians. About 80%⁶¹⁾ of the total population of the NFD were settled into 15 different "strategic villages" (daba), enclosed by barbed wire and thorn-bush fences. In Isiolo District, such camps were established at Sericho, Merti, Garba Tula and Isiolo Town. Those who moved further than one mile from the camps were

considered as shifita . Herds were allowed to graze only at particular restricted zones outside the camps, under close military supervision. They were gradually reduced through malnutrition and contagious diseases which spread rapidly in these congested grazing grounds. These grazing restrictions were maintained until October 1967. During 1967 the war was stepped up even further, when the guerrillas introduced land mines on a large scale. For every lorry that was blown up the Kenyan troops meted out severe collective punishments in the form of large-scale confiscations of cattle, some of which were exported downcountry, to the Nairobi market and the ranches that were being established. Camels and some of the cattle were simply shot. Much of the small stock were slaughtered by the Borana themselves in their desperation for food. At the same time as morale was breaking down in the civilian population and among the guerrillas, important political changes took place in Somalia, with the establishment of a new government under the leadership of Prime Minister Egal, a wellknown pan-africanist. Egal turned out to be more open to negotiation and the Arusha talks were resumed, this time with more success. Help from Somalia for the guerrillas slowed down, local resistance waned during 1968 and in March 1969 the last emergency restrictions were lifted from the former NFD.

But Independence and war had left lasting effects on the economy and social structure of the area. On the one hand, Kenya's political independence had opened up a range of new positions and opportunities for some members of the local community, who were drawn in to fill the administrative and political vacancies left after the colonial withdrawal. On the other hand, the pastoral economy was shaken to its foundations by the war, and hard dry seasons followed by torrential rains in 1968 did little to improve the economic situation. A severe drought in 1970-1 dealt what appeared to be almost the "final blow", after which many people are said to have starved to death. Massive relief operations were launched by the Kenya Government and various Christian and international aid organizations. At one time, 140,000 people in northern Kenya were reported to be living on famine relief⁶²).

The cattle resources of the district had been severely reduced. The flocks of sheep and goats and the herds of camels were more or less extinct. Due to their mobility and resistance to drought, camels were more attractive to the guerrillas than cattle. Some camels were stolen by the guerrillas, others shot by the Kenyan Army to prevent valuable transport and milk animals from falling into the hands of the enemy. Others died from diseases brought about by congestion in the dabas or from the adverse conditions in southern Somalia

where many Sakuye fled with their stock. By the end of the war, many Sakuye families were left with only a couple of camels, or none at all. The slow regeneration of camel herds and the scarcity and cost of breeding dams have made recovery impossible. Individual Sakuye who are able to raise a little capital now tend to follow the "sheep and goats strategy" and invest in small stock with a speedy but risky reproduction. (I found large numbers of such animals being imported into the district from Marsabit in 1973.) The Borana, too, were badly hit by the drought and the war, but, in contrast to the Sakuye, several of them had at least a small nucleus herd left with which to start again. In 1975-6, when the cattle herds were approaching recovery, there was a new drought and new relief hand-outs had to be started.

POST-SHIFTA TRADE

Paradoxically it was during the mid-sixties, that disastrous period for the livestock economy of northern Kenya, that the economic potential of the arid areas was for the first time officially recognized in Kenya⁶³), and seen as important for national development. The new policy makers were aware, however, that excessive regional discrepancies in the degree of economic development would slow down peaceful political integration. It was thought that the pastoral areas could be involved in the modern beef industry by the transfer of immature cattle from the poorer areas to feeding lots for fattening⁶⁴). The government agency dealing with cattle marketing problems was removed from the Department of Veterinary Services, in order to free it from over-preoccupation with disease control⁶⁵). Under the name of the Livestock Marketing Division (LMD) and working within the Ministry of Agriculture, this agency is authorized to establish and run stock routes and holding grounds and has a motorized unit to overcome local obstacles of water shortage or disease along the routes⁶⁶). LMD buys supplies for the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) which has a monopoly over meat distribution and butchery licencing in urban areas⁶⁷). It is also KMC which now runs the factory at Athi River. All export rights are with the Brooke-Bond-Liebig company⁶⁸).

LMD and the County Council, i.e. the local government, also run auctions where rural butchers, individual traders and ranchers buy stock. Hjort⁶⁹) has noted how the timing of cattle auctions in the early seventies could be governed by livestock trader interests within the County Council. Auctions were infrequent and LMD bought only large herds of stock. Local middlemen traders could therefore buy 2-3 cattle at a time from herdowners eager to sell, and then take them to LMD later. This system particularly favoured those who had special access either to good permanent grazing, like the

shareholders of the Meru Ranching Society near Isiolo, or to transport facilities like certain Somali traders. But there were also Boran traders who were able to take advantage of the situation. The drought of 1970-1 forced many poor Borana to offer oxen and even dry cows at very low prices in order to meet their immediate needs for food, and this enabled those who had some drought-secure capital to hoard trading stock at relatively little expense. The greatest profits appear to have been made by traders in the eastern part of the district, where certain families were known to have been leading residents of the flood plain dedas and therefore had a kind of informal privileged access to these areas in the dry season. These traders continue to have a dominant position both as cattle traders and as leaders in local politics.

Quite apart from these few wealthy Boran herdowners - cum-traders, the disasters have fundamentally changed the relation between Boran pastoralists and the cash economy. Whereas, before, few were dependent on a marketing stock of milk for their survival, it has now become necessary for the majority to maximize the food output from their herds by converting livestock or livestock produce into grain, and to supplement herd incomes with wage jobs or farming. Due to the stock losses, the herdspeople are now much more dependent than before on the few animals that they can sell.

Since the 1975-6 drought, the cattle marketing facilities appear to be somewhat better than used to be the case for the Waso Borana, although, at the same time, Borana maintain that there is a scarcity of marketable stock. LMD has recently changed its policy, so that auctions are much more frequent and even small quantities of cattle are bought direct from the herdowners. Private traders from areas further south have also been encouraged and given more opportunity to buy. They buy at a unit price per category of stock, rather than over the weighbridge, and thus follow a practice usually preferred by the Borana. The marketing facilities for small-scale traders and for the herdowners themselves have thereby been greatly improved, while the scope for the larger local middleman has been narrowed. There is a new niche for the Boran small-scale trader, who operates at a much lower level than the traditional Somali cattle-merchant, by going round to collect herds of four to eight cattle and driving them himself to the weekly auction at Kinna. Butchers and private traders from the Meru, Kamba and Kikuyu areas have been offering high prices at these auctions for sheep, goats and cattle. Despite the present boom, however, it can be predicted that the cattle trade will be subject to many obstacles during the years to come. As the sector of Africanized commercial ranches expands, new lines of conflict over marketing and disease control may

well be developed. Even today, veterinary regulations hamper the trade. They are still "sufficiently arduous to give rise to a substantial illegal movement of cattle, bypassing the normal stock routes"⁷⁰).

Notes for Chapter 9

1. Swift 1979:448-449
2. Hjort 1979:26
3. Waller 1975:7
4. Smith, L.D. 1976:116
5. Contagious Bovine Pleuro Pneumonia
6. Zwanenberg and King 1975:97
7. Wisner 1977:29
8. Castagno 1964:117; Ghai & Mc Auslan 1970:418
9. Dalleo 1975. There are very few comprehensive studies of the modern history of pastoral groups in northern Kenya, and even district records give only piecemeal information. I want to acknowledge here my indebtedness to P. Dalleo for much on the information on pre-World War II conditions. I have made an extensive use of his valuable thesis in order to supplement my own interviews and archive research, as can be seen below.
10. Dalleo op.cit.:158; Isiolo District Annual Report (IDAR) 1929 ISO/1
11. Dalleo op.cit.:158
12. The division of Kenya into administrative sub-units and the changes that took place in the boundaries of such sub-units during the colonial period are described in Gregory et al. 1968. A summary of the changes relevant to the Waso Borana is extracted from that source:
 - 1909: Unofficial start of administration in the Northern Frontier District through stations at Marsabit and Moyale and a police post at Archer's Post
 - 1910: Official proclamation of NFD. Headquarters at Moyale but NFD nominally under provincial commissioner, Naivasha
 - 1912: Military posts at Wajir and "Gurreh" evacuated during the following years
 - 1915: Bulesa designed a subdistrict /corresponding to "Waso area"/
 - 1917/18: " achieves full district status: HQ moved to Garba Tula
 - 1919/20: " reverts to subdistrict when HQ NFD administration are transferred to Meru
 - 1921: Military administration of Garba Tula and rest of NFD
 - 1925: Part return to civilian rule, but in practice no effective administration carried out at Garba Tula
 - 1929: Garba Tula District merges with Samburu District to be administered from Isiolo Town: Provincial HQ moved there too and remains there until 1947 when transferred to Marsabit
 - 1934: Samburu and Isiolo Districts separate again, Waso administered from Isiolo Town, and continues to be so.
13. Garba Tula Annual Report (GTAR) 1924 ISO/1, IDAR 1930, ISO/1
14. GTAR 1924 ISO/1

15. Dalleo op.cit.:142
16. ibid.:128, 130 Castagno 1964:171; Hjort 1979:19
17. ibid.:121
18. Bulesa AR 1918/19 PC NFD 1/4/1
19. Dalleo op.cit.:129
20. ibid.:145
21. ibid.:144
22. Northern Frontier Province Handing Over Report (HOR NFP) 1930 PC NFD 2/1/1
23. Dalleo op.cit.:129, 46
24. IDAR 1930 ISO/1
25. On the use of taxes as a method to generate a supply of labour for White farmers and capitalists, see Zwanenberg 1975b:76-103
26. Baxter (1954:65) wrote about the grounds for this dislike: "...one works like a woman, is shouted at and abused, fed on maize flour and loses one's manly independence... Fathers dislike their sons to go to work for although they bring gifts to their fathers they learn to drink Nubian gin, pick up diseases from dirty women, become dissatisfied with a milk diet and "forget cows" and Boran customs..."
27. Dalleo op.cit.:161
28. Cf. Spencer 1973:182, 190 regarding British and Samburu opinions on overgrazing under the colonial period
29. Smith, L.D. 1976:137; Zwanenberg & King 1975:97; Wisner 1977:28-9. Similar analyses, seeing the exclusion of peripheral peasantries from access to the capital markets as a main cause of "underdevelopment", can be found in Palmer and Parsons (eds.) (1977) "The Roots of Rural Poverty", notably in an article by van Horn.
Wrigley 1965:256 argues that the success of veterinary campaigns was to blame for overgrazing, but that is really to exaggerate the rather limited impact of colonial veterinary inputs in the pastoral areas.
30. Dahl and Hjort 1976:180
31. Dalleo op.cit.:159,160
32. ibid.:164
33. ibid.:168,173
34. Wrigley loc.cit.
35. Dalleo op.cit.:102. For attempts to limit Samburu herds see Spencer 1973:161,179ff
36. ibid.:160,175
37. ibid.:176. In parts of the region, the Livestock Control bought at compulsory sales, where quotas were taken from each tribal group with the headmen and chiefs working as a kind of middlemen, both receiving commission per beast sold and handling the payment of the proceeds to the herdowners, See Dalleo op.cit.:179
38. Dalleo op.cit.:181
39. ibid.:202
40. Smith, L.D. 1976:136; Swynnerton 1954:31-33

41. Zwanenberg & King 1975:106
42. Castagno 1964:172
43. IDAR 1954, 1955, 1956 PC NFD 1/4/4, IDAR 1959 PC NFD 1/4/5; Senga 1976:101; Hjort 1979:81
44. IDAR 1957 PC NFD 1/4/5
45. IDAR 1942, 1943 PC NFD 1/4/3
46. IDAR 1943 PC NFD 1/4/3. In the election process, the Borana apparently cared less for genealogy than did the DC. He would have preferred a council consisting of traditionally appointed leaders with claim to "inherited authority" (Political Record and Anthropology DC /ISO/1) but found that the council only consisted of "one jallab and two sons of jalabs", the rest being discarded as "men of standing and wealth" but not "aristocrats", and hence only likely to be headmen's satellites.
47. NPAR 1951 PC NFD 1/1/10
48. Even today, a Boran lineage council settles conflicts mainly by pushing the man who is considered to be the wrongdoer into a humble apology rather than by meting out punishment on him. Cf. Spencer 1973:170-1 on compromise as a solution to conflicts among Samburu and 173 on the failure of Local Native Councils
49. Baxter 1954:63
50. IDAR 1937 PC /NFD 1/4/2
51. Dalleo op.cit.:225-7
52. IDAR 1932 PC NFD 1/4/2
53. Gvnr to Secretary of State for Colonies April 1940 PC/NFD 11/3
54. Dalleo op.cit.:228-9
55. Northern Frontier Province Annual Report (NPAR) 1952 PC NFD 1/1/10
IDAR 1954 PC NFD 1/4/4
56. IDAR 1960 PC NFD 1/4/5
57. NPAR 1960 PC NFD 1/1/11
58. The most comprehensive study available about the Somali-Ethiopian-Kenyan frontier conflicts is that of Matthies (1977), which provides a compilation of published material and analyses the national and international content and background of the conflict.
59. Hjort 1979:31 ff
60. See Castagno 1964:175 particularly on secessionist parties among Somali and other groups of NFD. An "independent" Commission was appointed to look into the opinion of various NFD groups - about its work and findings see Castagno p. 178ff
61. A figure officially given by Dr. Mungai in 1967. See Matthies 1977, p.214
62. Matthies 1977:259
63. Republic of Kenya, Devt.Plan 1966-70 p. 134
64. Von Kaufmann 1975:275
65. ibid.
66. Von Kaufmann op.cit.:283
67. Heyer 1975 p. 328ff
68. NCCK 1968:32

69. Hjort 1979:87
70. Heyer loc.cit.

10. THE NEW ECONOMY OF WASO

After the 1970-1 drought, the livestock losses experienced by the Sakuye had left them more or less on a par with the Wata, who were always low in stock. None of their clans had enough stock to redistribute to the poor. The same was true of some of the local Borana Gutu lineages. When large sections of the pastoral community have suffered major losses, traditional systems of redistribution and insurance prove altogether insufficient. Some Boran clans have not even had a lineage council meeting since the beginning of the 1960s, for the simple reason that there are far too few animals for anyone within these clans even to suggest a redistribution. What then were the alternatives open to those whom the disasters had left without stock?

TAKING A JOB

For an untrained labourer there are relatively few opportunities of getting a steady job within the district. The main employers in the rural parts are government and aid agencies, but together they offer only about 200 permanent jobs for local workers. In the area occupied by the Borana there are mainly temporary jobs as road workers, pit diggers and builders. In 1973 a gemstone mine was operating at Duse, employing about 200 men (at a monthly salary of between 120 and 180 K.Sh.) but as we noted in chapter 7, it was closed down in 1975 for an indefinite period. A major school building project in Garba Tula supported a similar number of workers for a year or so. Other more irregular local employment has been offered as shop assistants in about 150 actually functioning retail shops and hotelis, and as house servants and agricultural labourers with wealthy private employers. Isiolo Town, somewhat peripheral to the true Boran area, offers some further opportunities of more or less the same kind¹⁾. In addition there are herding jobs at the LMD, employment as cleaners, sweepers and messengers to various government departments, and a few industrial jobs such as maize meal milling, sorting of gum arabicum and the preparation of skins.

Given the limited access to jobs within the district a large number of Boran men have turned to other parts of the country and to Somalia to look for jobs. The first job that an uneducated Boran man who is young and fit would seek is still that of askari. The training and experience given to a police recruit are useful if he should later want to change his career, and the job is exceptionally well-paid in comparison with what a labourer can get. Organized recruitment campaigns in Isiolo have enlisted men into army service as well as the police, and to the second-best alternative of a job as guard or watchman with a private downcountry company. The occupation of nightwatchman is a traditional Boran niche, not as well-paid as that of a policeman or soldier, but still a manly job in Boran eyes²⁾.

Less highly appreciated jobs are those as herdsmen and farmhands. At the end of the 1960s a number of commercial ranches were established at Voi. The initial herds were bought from northern Kenya and the herdsmen who had driven the stock down to these ranches in many cases remained as employees, or acted as bridgeheads for later migrants. Other similar jobs are found in the ranches of the former White Highlands. After the latest drought, 700 agricultural workers, according to the Boran chief at Isiolo, were recruited via Isiolo Town to work as coffee-pickers and garden hands at Meru. There has also been an organized effort to recruit Isiolo workers to a fruit canning enterprise at Thika.

Map 10.1 Some directions of Boran labour migrations

In the absence of census data after 1969, it is difficult to ascertain how large is the exact proportion of migrants out of the district. In a small survey of older Boran women in the pastoral camps, it was found that only about one fifth of their adult sons were occupied in pastoralism within the district. Two fifths were engaged in other occupations within the district and one third were outside. My impression is that, compared to 1974, Borana in 1978 had become immensely more involved in labour migration, and in a wider range of occupations.

In the early studies of African labour migration, authors like Watson³⁾ and Van Velsen⁴⁾ saw the phenomenon as a support for "tribal cohesion" and "continuity". Rural economies, where male labour had been under-utilized or easily dispensed with, prospered from the export of labour. Absentees continued to play an important role in their home communities, sending back cash and cultivating links with the home in a way that stimulated traditional values. In the Boran case, a similar situation is perhaps true for the police and army recruits. With monthly wages of around 500 K.Sh., they are often able to send back money to their pastoral relatives and later to retire from the service with some savings plus a once-for-all pension payment that can be converted into a shop or a herd of small stock and cattle. But the recent wave of outmigrants in search of jobs as herdsmen or agricultural workers may not play the same role. Such migration is to be seen more as a solution to the immediate pressure on food in the district than as a means of channeling back "extra" resources to Waso. Even the young men who spend some years downcountry before marrying are rarely able to do more than support themselves on their earnings while their livestock hopefully increase in numbers at home under the care of senior relatives. Stockless families, particularly of the Sakuye, are likely to drift off permanently to life as the rural proletariat or as members of the "informal sector" living in the city slums.

DIGGING A GARDEN

Another major alternative for stockless and poor Borana has been offered by the irrigation schemes.

The technologically most advanced schemes are Rapsu at Bisanadi River, and Merti and Malka Daka at the Euaso Nyiro. Rapsu was organized by the National Christian Council of Kenya, and Merti and Malka Daka by the Ministry of Agriculture in cooperation with FAO. Rapsu and Malka Daka are particularly closely directed schemes, where central planning is important in the choice of crops and the organization of marketing. Cooperative labour is systematically used to clear new fields, and paid with foodstuffs. These schemes have a better access to tractors, handmills and other mechanical aids than the other schemes which usually rely only on human labour. (There are no draught animals.) Less closely supervised schemes have been opened at the Kinna and Isiolo rivers, outside the centres of the same name, and at Bulesa, Gafarsa, Irresaboru, Korbasa (Malka Galla) and Sericho along the Euaso Nyiro. The last three were no longer operating in 1978 and Kinna and Gafarsa have both suffered great difficulties with salination, flooding or silting of canals. The minor schemes provide a varying scale of external involvement and local

communal cooperation. The government or an aid agency has in some cases assisted with the initial clearing of the land by tractor, and the Ministry of Agriculture supplies expertise in the form of agricultural instructors. There is normally an agricultural committee which plays a directive role in the planning of watering rotas and the allocation of land plots, and organizes cooperative communal labour to maintain canals and, less regularly, to help farmers who face problems of breaks in continuity, due to illness, for example. On the whole, however, the tenants are left to themselves to see to it that they get a harvest, and that they maintain their fields well enough not to forfeit their land-rights.

The varying organizational set-up of the different schemes has led to differentiated recruitment. In the Gafarsa scheme, which has operated more or less without any external help at all for seven years and under extremely adverse conditions, there are very few single women maintaining fields of their own. Only families who have settled in the scheme as complete households have been able to remain. According to the agricultural committee, the average plots are larger than those found in the centrally directed schemes. The latter have recruited families on poverty criteria, and there is a higher proportion of single female farmers. In Merti, to mention one example, female plotholders make up half the membership of the scheme, which is remarkable even if not all of them are actually single women. The high proportion of divorced or widowed mothers with small children is seen as a problem by the managers of such schemes, for these farmers have great difficulty in giving their shambas the continual care they need. To maintain a garden of even 1/2 acre is hard for an inexperienced farmer whose household is only the remnant of a family. Tenants see their position as insecure; in practice farming is a viable alternative only for the relatively young and strong, and for families with more than one adult. The limitation of plot sizes to 1/2-2 acres in the aided schemes makes it unrealistic to expect that they can provide the basis for rehabilitation back into the pastoral economy for families who do not initially have supplementary holdings of livestock.

NEW FORMS OF DIVERSIFICATION

Farming and wage employment do not by definition lead to a severing of relations with the pastoral community, nor is it only the completely stockless who have turned to these alternative means of subsistence. As indicated earlier (p. 79) one consequence of the large stock losses has been to reallocate the actual responsibility for practical herd management (and the use of livestock products!) to a limited number of herdowners: to those who have herds

which are large enough or who are in a senior position in the kinship structure. In this situation, more of the population may actually own livestock than can be seen from the access to cattle in practice. In the case of a group of brothers, the cattle management may be reserved for the eldest brother, and younger brothers are, it seems, "squeezed out" of pastoralism. The traditional redistributive system of the clan also favours herdowners who are senior in the structure, namely, those who had a relative degree of economic autonomy before the disaster. There is less to be expected for those who in the pre-drought period were still waiting to assume authority over inherited or allotted herds, and who had not yet taken any active part in clan affairs.

Too much preoccupation with senior-junior status may however obscure the extent to which the alternative activities of squeezed-out brothers are seen as a matter of common concern for the fraternal group as a unit. There is not only a specialization of the role of the elder brother vis-à-vis his junior siblings, but even between the junior ones, there is a certain spread in the direction of their efforts. The group can then as a unit combine all possible careers, each with its own risks and advantages. Post-shifta life involves a new form of diversification, which makes use of new sources of income. Boru and his brothers will act as an example:

Boru had left his brothers in Ethiopia when he was young. He tried his luck as a tobacco trader in Isiolo and married a Waso girl. When the shifta war was over, he had a small herd of cattle and money to invest in sheep and goats. Before the war he had acquired a plot in Garba Tula and built a shop, which he now rented to an Isaq trader.

Boru's brothers had had cattle in Ethiopia, but they lost almost all of them during the 1971 drought. They then decided to follow Boru and settle with him, and drove the remaining animals down to Boru's camp in an exhausting journey. The combined herd was a rather meagre source of living for them all, however, and after some time they joined the Kinna irrigation scheme. Their first attempt as farmers did not give them any harvest to speak of, but at a second attempt they were able to grow maize, pawpaw and sugarcane with some success. During this first period at the irrigation scheme they had kept their animals close to Kinna, but they soon found that area too infested with tsetse.

It was then decided that the eldest brother, Guyo, should take the joint herd and settle at Bibii. One of the younger brothers attended to the small stock at Matasara, and another was left to look after the shamba. Boru himself lived with his wife in a traditional mat-house erected in the courtyard of his shop plot in Garba Tula, from whence he ventured into small stock trade.

These brothers represent one form of diversification of the family economy which is very common among the Waso Borana, and which is still based on shared interests in stock⁵). This strategy, of keeping the brothers together in one

unit with a multi-focussed economy, in itself carries the seeds of dissolution of the fraternal group as a unit. For not only do the brothers as a corporate body try to engage in all available types of career, but each individual also strives to establish the same kind of diversification for his own nuclear family or extended family as it grows. Thus the brother engaged in small-scale trade does not content himself with that, but when he gets an opportunity he invests in goats, and sends his son to school to learn Swahili so that he can get a job. If the ideal outcome occurs, that all the brothers are able to take on the practical responsibility for the livestock to which they maintain rights, an important link is finally severed and the unit dissolves. Should all animals be lost, the link is also broken.

Father-son units frequently exhibit the same type of attempt at diversification. We have seen how many Boran fathers try to substitute the work of clients or sons-in-law for the labour input of their sons in order to enable the latter to take employment from which they can profit by cash remittances. The definition of the diversification situation, it is true, may vary, so that the migrant does not share the opinion that he is a member of a multiple family enterprise. Nevertheless, pastoralism holds a promise of capital growth which is not even hinted at by the salary obtained by an uneducated Boran migrant, and this gives the stock-owning senior a bargaining advantage. On the other hand, when a father has lost all his animals, his offspring may be united by a common concern for the support of their father and mother, and at least keep track of each other; but the idea of a fraternal economic unit is likely to evaporate as its symbolic and material base disappears.

For the pastoral household, there are great advantages in having additional, non-pastoral sources of cash, particularly if they can be used as a spring-board for recovery after drought or to save livestock from enforced slaughter in the face of famine. Neither contracts for jobs nor shambas are very safe assets in northern Kenya, but a combination balances some of the disadvantages of the one with the advantages of the other.

I have referred to diversification as a "strategy". One can question whether this new form of multi-focussed economy is the result of a conscious planning strategy, or just the outcome of a scarcity of resources which makes people seize any opportunity they find available. My impression is that it is really a matter of strategy, the logical extension of the pastoral "disperse and diversify" strategy emanating from a high-risk situation. People who have experienced such traumatic losses of security as the Borana did in the cattle massacres of the Somali secessionist war do not put all their eggs in the

same basket - instead they tell you that "education and shambas cannot be shot" and so on.

The engagement of a household or group in more than one branch of economic activity is not unique to the Borana, but is a response to precarious ecological and economic conditions common to many rapidly changing economies. Long⁶⁾ calls it "an almost ubiquitous feature of underdeveloped economies", and notes that it has been observed both among national and regional elites who use it to maximize their economic control by investing in several sectors at once, and among poor peasants and urban workers dependent on unreliable sources of income. A household may diversify its economy by exploiting several different local resources, but in many cases diversification necessitates the establishment of several widely spread sub-units or of links between households operating within different zones. Smith⁷⁾ has observed such arrangements, reminiscent of those we find among the Borana, between pastoralists and cultivators in highland Peru and households making a living in the urban economy of Lima, and he uses the term "confederated households" to describe them.

A typical pattern of household formation among East African migrants has been that of the split rural-urban family with the wife caring for the shamba and the husband a temporary resident in the town. A few words should be said about this household pattern in the Boran context. Boran migrations down-country involve both young unmarried men and whole families of men, women and children. The former are recruited from all sectors of the Borana: both from the destitutes and from those who still have some cattle left. Family migrations, on the other hand, are mainly a feature of the completely stockless categories. For those who have lost their stock and taken up employment, there is little to tie them to Waso. Significantly, genealogies and network charts collected for the Sakuye show that they are much more widely spread over East Africa than the Borana. Married men who still have a claim to stock try primarily to earn a living within the district boundaries and cases of long-distance migration were relatively rare among them, at least in 1974. Some workers at Isiolo or Garba Tula had brought their wives along, others left them in the cattle camps as a way of reducing living costs and as an indication of a continued interest in their stock. Their situation was reminiscent of that prevalent in some agricultural areas of East Africa where land consolidation is still pending, and where effective use of farming land by a migrant's household members is the only means whereby he can secure a share in ancestral land - and thereby a safe retreat from urban unemployment⁸⁾.

One would perhaps expect that the irrigation schemes would become the basis for a combined adaptation of male long-distance migration and female farming in the manner well known in other situations of labour migration⁹⁾. This does not seem to be the case. Wisner¹⁰⁾, in 1971, when the Kinna scheme was relatively new, found no sexual imbalance within the farmer households that could indicate such a split. A similar lack of evidence for a split of nuclear families was found by a survey in 1974 of Boran cultivators on the outskirts of Isiolo Town. Out of 93 households, only 6 were managed by women whose husbands had migrated downcountry. 19 farms were maintained by the wives while their husbands had jobs in the town itself. Of the 6 migrant households, 5 were the households of police and Army men who could afford both to employ casual labour to assist the wife in the shamba and to support two wives, one in Isiolo and one accompanying them to their new place of residence. Many of the Isiolo farmers, however, had brothers or affines who had migrated downcountry to look for jobs. The reasons why there are so few farming-migrant nuclear families are probably to be found in the relatively low efficiency of irrigation farming in the area, and the absence both of a female tradition in farming and of a general recognition that land for irrigation is scarce. There is no general feeling that a migrant must continuously assert his rights to a share in land at home, or that there could ever be an acute shortage of land for cultivation, other than locally.

There is also the subjective problem of social control. Boran men are reluctant to let their wives reside outside their closest circle of kin or affines, and the irrigation schemes are less well integrated socially than the traditional pastoral camps. It is regarded as difficult for a woman to handle a shamba by herself (although, if she is single or widowed she may have to do so) and also to avoid breaking codes of wifely behaviour if money remittances should fail and she be left to support herself in some other way. Many single women, on the other hand, actually live on courtesanship and miraa trade. For a man who is working within the district, social control is less of a problem, and "dispersed polygyny" may become a basis for modern diversification as it has been for the traditional, pastoral form of risk insurance. Aga can be cited as an example:

Aga is the chairman of the school committee in his sublocation. He has about 60 cattle in a camp where his senior wife and his junior brothers reside, and a mobile camp of small stock. His second wife, and one of his cousins, maintain a hoteli for him in one of the district towns. His third wife lives in his 5-acre shamba, and gets help from a Sakuye employee in cultivating it. One of Aga's sons is a ranger at Meru National Park and a daughter is a secretary. Both support their father with cash on request - in fact, the hoteli was built with such money.

THE COMBINATION OF "ELITE" ASSETS

Successful diversification such as Aga's requires a certain degree of initial wealth and control of labour. Among the Borana, rich and poor alike respond to economic risks by diversifying their activities - with the difference that the richer households are in a better position to establish control over resources which are not only economically profitable in themselves, but also act as keys to new fields of opportunity or are supportive in relation to each other. In the following sections of this chapter, we shall dwell on some of the resources which are specific to the wealthier stratum of Borana, and see how the combination of such resources creates a basis for new forms of stratification. The core assets in the multiple set of resources controlled by "elite" Borana are still the livestock they own. Elite members still operate within the traditional, cattle-oriented networks of social relations and the predominantly domestic production system. They can enjoy the advantages that wealthy herdowners have always had in terms of pastoral risk reduction and of building up big-man positions through linking unviable labour units and providing help with food.

With the complex and fractional nature of Boran livestock rights, it is no easy task to obtain meaningful figures of individual herdowners, stockholdings or average herd sizes. However, it may be of some interest to note that, in the Kinna-Garba Tula area, the two men regarded as outstandingly wealthy in 1978 "had" 300 and 400 cattle respectively. In the Sericho area, such holdings are less rare, and there is a group of herdowners whose wealth exceeds even that size. The richest man is reputed to "have" between 1200 and 1500 cattle and 500-700 sheep and goats¹¹⁾.

To what extent have pastoral labour relations been transformed by the recent disasters? In chapter 4 we discussed the reasons for the pastoral undertaking to be largely a family enterprise, based on domestic and quasi-domestic labour. Many of the problems of social control are still the same: how to watch over what is happening when stock is on fora, how to avoid "overmilking", and how to detect cheating over slaughter. The problem of outright theft is perhaps easier to overcome today for the herdowner who wants to employ wage labour rather than use his own family labour - particularly if he has links with the modern agencies of law and order and can make use of the improvements in communication that "development" has provided. Great changes have also taken place with regard to the supply of willing job-seekers. Whereas, earlier, most of those who could be recruited as employed herdsmen - apart from sons-in-law doing bride-service - would be individual members coming from other

pastoral peoples in the neighbourhood, today there is a large pool of Borana looking for employment. These job-seekers are more constrained by the social control of the community than the immigrants were, less prone to escape into another area with their employers' stock, and more aware of the competition for jobs. These factors may contribute to make employment of hired labour loss complicated for the wealthy herdowners of today than it was in traditional times, while at the same time more profitable opportunities have opened up for the use of the herdowners' own domestic labour. It should be remembered, however, that the pastoral system entails many ways of appropriating labour that are more subtle than outright wage employment and this may limit the extent of such economic relations.

The irrigation schemes which are the last resort of many stockless families provide an additional object of investment for wealthy families. In the context of such shambas the use of wage employees is a more prominent feature than in livestock rearing. Even in the schemes originally designed for the settlement of the stockless, the "elite" has gradually taken on the role of plottolders with employees doing the digging and tending of the shamba. Some of the managers of "aided" schemes regret that room has been left for these wealthy Borana, but note that they "are much more efficient and provide an example for the others". Farmers relying on paid labour can supply a more continuous labour input than can the poorer tenants at the schemes, and they are able to maintain their fields in a better state and even cope with gardens that are generally bigger than those of the destitutes - up to 5 or 6 acres as compared with 1/2 to 2 acres. The produce is sold to other pastoralists, to grocers in Isiolo, or consumed as a supplement to the family diet. As a reserve activity, the shamba is important, for it can redirect the family consumption from pastoral products at times when these are scarce. At other times, the garden provides handy additional cash; the sale of a small amount of maize is never such a complicated decision as the sale of an animal. Finally, having a shamba when you are not wholly dependent on it is a sign of "development-mindedness", an important aspect in modern local politics.

BORANA AS TRADERS

Another occupation of concern for the Boran elite, and which is similarly associated with development, is that of trade. Borana have never themselves been particularly successful as traders, although in the main towns of the district the majority of shop plots are registered as having Boran owners. It is not difficult to find instances of attempts in the duka business but few have continued. To take the example of Garba Tula, there were 20 retail

shops in 1978 but only 5 of them were used by Boran traders. Nevertheless almost all the shop premises were originally intended for the Boran owner of the plot, and had at some time been used by their owner. Most of the shops are now rented and managed by Somali merchants. In Isiolo, the district capital, there was in 1974 some fifty cement buildings, but only one of them was owned by a Borana, a wealthy cattle trader. Though his business-cum-residence plot holds several shop premises, none of them is rented to or managed by a Borana. One single Boran merchant rents premises in another cement building; he is a relatively recent immigrant from Moyale who is acting as the agent for a big, national bakery. No Borana has been able to break the barrier between retail and wholesale trade, or to establish himself in Isiolo Town where the requirements in store equipment and in the quantity, quality and variety of stock are much higher than in Waso proper.

As traders Borana have been relatively free from the serious political constraints which have hampered other groups active in trade, like the Somali during the shifa emergency or the Arab and Asian traders during the Africanization campaign⁽²⁾. It has not been difficult for them as a group to get trading licenses and loans from the organ of local government, the County Council, where Boran members are in a majority. Their failure to expand or even to maintain a retail firm may seem all the more puzzling, since trade is regarded as prestigious and ranks prominently in the ambitions of wealthy Borana. Examples of rapid business careers and immense opportunities for profit are always present to the Borana in the form of Meru and Somali traders who run well-stocked retail shops without any apparent problems of continuity and skilfully manipulate the grain and cattle trade in times of drought (not to mention high profit/high risk undertakings such as trophy or miraa trade⁽³⁾).

The high number of abortive attempts at starting and running a shop can perhaps be related to the relative ease with which an initial attempt can be made. Since many of the Boran shopowners use their household dependants as shop assistants, labour is cheap. The iron-roofed mud buildings of the towns can easily be converted from a residential house to a shop, granted that the owner has a trading license. Local shops are generally sparsely furnished with only a rough wooden counter and a couple of shelves for displaying the commodities for sale. Capital for stocking is the major difficulty. Here contacts with the County Council are essential, for the latter authority allocates loans to traders. Good relations with rich sponsors who can vouch for a loan of 5-10,000 Kenya Shillings are also important. Individual members of the Council frequently take on the role of guarantor. The shops maintain no specialised assortment of goods, but all supply simple manufactured goods

and maize meal, wheat and sugar which are sold in small quantities measured direct from the sack.

Keeping the store in a wellstocked condition is a problem. The supply found in a small rural or town store is often extremely limited¹⁴). It is difficult both to obtain the goods initially and then to transport them to the shop from the wholesalers in Isiolo Town. Few Boran merchants have their own Landrovers and in order to find transport they have to spend several days in Isiolo. Shortages of essential goods, for example tea, sugar and rice, occur frequently at the wholesale level. A couple of big Indian and Meru traders have a monopoly of important commodities such as tea leaves that enables them to dominate the trade.

The small Boran trader also meets problems of a different nature, related to the contradictions between traditional norms of inter-personal help and the demands of business. Marris and Somerset¹⁵) aptly describe the dilemma of East African retail traders, in a way which well applies to the situation of the Boran trader:

"A businessman, especially if he runs a retail business in his own community, is obviously vulnerable to the pressures of social organization. His wealth is exposed on his shelves, in the goods people want: and it seems far more than it is since the elderly widow who needs a packet of sugar she cannot pay for or the cousin who has spent all his wages on school fees sees the goods themselves... when he /the shop-keeper/ demands cash the district officer is offended, the poor accuse him of meanness and his family rebuke his selfishness..."

In this context, it is interesting to compare the Borana with the "town Somali" who dominate the small trading centres. Apart from the fact that these Isaq, Herti and Ashraf merchants have access to trading contacts all over East Africa, they are also not hampered by social obligations to destitute relatives. The pastoral Somali population of the district belong to other Somali sub-sections and are better off in terms of livestock than the Borana¹⁶). Obligations to very poor in-laws and clansmen can be a burden to the Boran trader, but the Somali merchant is able to refuse credit when not given security for example in the form of small stock. The most successful traders in the Waso region are people immune from the pressures of Boran community. At Garba Tula there are a small number of stores drying hides and skins. The skins business requires spacious and well-ventilated buildings and considerable initial capital. The wealthy owners of these stores, however, are people with an ambiguous ethnic affiliation and not subject to the same constraints as the Borana proper. Two of the firms are owned by the former and present MP respectively, men whose families have been in the livestock and hides trade

for more than a generation and who brought in the original capital from outside Isiolo. A number of galtu Borana (immigrants) who originate from Arab, Indian or Somali groups but who speak Borana and have Boran wives, have acquired rather prominent positions within the Boran community. The Boran identity acted out by them, however, stresses pan-Boran values and, compared to "true Borana" they are less tied down by traditional particularistic obligations. Yet in some cases it seems that their business interests also have suffered from the restrictions inherent in building a political career on Boran support.

The differences between Boran traders and merchants with more peripheral community obligations is most clearly visible in times of drought. While the big wholesale dealers in Isiolo Town prosper during such times, when demands for maize are great, the problems tend to increase for the small-scale Boran trader due to increased pleas for credit from his relatives. In times of scarcity, it is difficult to combine being a successful trader and having the image of a "good man" in the Boran sense.

Marris and Somerset¹⁷⁾ describe one of the typical responses to the problem of credit as an attempt to separate private life and business as much as possible. For a Boran man who has political ambitions, this is difficult, since his aspirations necessitate generosity and redistribution. The retail trader who is also a local politician obviously deals with things which are most immediately needed by his potential supporters. "Food is power", in the modern context as well as in the traditional one. Yet, there is an important difference. Traditional expectations of hospitality do not include the expenditure of capital (i.e. fertile livestock) except in the context of formal religious or lineage-based redistribution. In livestock keeping, the distinction between reproductive animals and food is relatively unambiguous. Capital in the form of money or stores of foodstuffs has a much more unclear character¹⁸⁾ which is not always understood by the customer. The most skilful handling of private and business interests is undertaken by men who have both a sizeable herd and a shop. The livestock can then be used as a source of food for redistribution and demands from hungry relatives or clients can in critical times be diverted away from the shop. For men who have both cattle and a shop, the business may contain little room for expansion but continue to function as a kind of subsistence asset which pays off well enough to cater for the family members or dependants occupied with its care, which can provide liquid cash to a herdowner with all his wealth tied up in livestock, and which can offer a centre of social interaction and information-gathering for the politically ambitious.

Retail trading is, in the Boran context and because of credit problems, no less risky than pastoralism or cultivation. An alternative use of town houses - renting them to others as shops or living quarters - has, on the other hand, the advantage of being more profitable and reliable in drought than during other periods. In 1973, a common source of income for the wealthier Borana was to rent rooms to Somali families. Many of the Somalis then living at Garba Tula allegedly dealt in illegal trades such as the smuggling of game trophies. They were made to leave the town in 1977, during a period of strain in Kenya-Somali relations. In 1978, several Garba Tula houses were empty. This was partly due to the exodus of Somali, and partly to the unusually good rains of 1977-8 that had led many Borana to leave the town for the cattle camps. In the earlier years of the 1970s the renting of rooms provided, for many town families, a small but steady income with little labour input.

THE EMERGENCE OF A SALARIAT

The best supplement to pastoralism that a family can have is one or two members engaged in salaried employment within the district. Even more than with opportunities for unskilled labourers, the supply of more qualified jobs is by and large restricted by the structure of government and its extensions. There are no private enterprises in the area which demand and employ educated personnel. It should be immediately recognized that there can be a wide difference between the security and material rewards offered to qualified workers and civil servants and those enjoyed by untrained labour. A skilled driver or a "Development Assistant", to mention a couple of examples, can earn 900/- monthly, as compared with 5/- or 8/- daily for a labourer. Employment within the district makes it easier to continue to take an active part in livestock rearing, and involves much lower living costs than living in Mombasa or Nairobi for example.

Three sets of civilian Government authorities are present in Isiolo District. The head official in the district is the District Commissioner (DC) working under the Provincial Commissioner (at Embu) and ultimately under the Office of the President in Nairobi. The DC is represented by two District Officers (DO) stationed at Merti and Garba Tula, by a senior chief and a dozen locational subchiefs. The DC and the DOs are usually recruited from other parts of the country, while the chiefs should be local people. The central government also has a number of district offices tied to various departments or ministries, such as those of Agriculture, Water Development, Education and Health. These are represented in the local Boran areas by extension officers, clerks, teachers and nurses who are sometimes Borana, sometimes externally

recruited. Direct local influence over the jobs offered by the Central Government is often minimal, with the exception of the appointments to chiefly office. In certain fields, such as education and health, Boran youths with a secondary education have found a fairly secure market. The local government, the County Council, also recruits almost all of its civil servants (clerks, tax collectors, secretaries etc.) from the population of the district.

The Boran salariat frequently, but not exclusively, come from the families of wealthy herdowners and colonial ex-chiefs. There is no completely linear relation between a family's wealth and the education that their children get. Primary education was made officially free of charge in 1974, but formal school fees were soon replaced by informal charges, fees for building funds etc. Some primary education and knowledge of Swahili and English is a necessity for those who want to go downcountry in search of a job. Many poor families see education as the only resource for their children and make great sacrifices in order to give them as long an education as possible. Some get support from school bursaries from the County Council or the Catholic Mission and manage to obtain secondary education for their children in that way. Some of the richer cattle owners, on the other hand, are reluctant to send all their children away to school, partly because of a less imminent need to despatch migrants, partly because of scarcity of pastoral labour. Such men will still seek to see at least one of their sons and daughters through to "Secondary", however, while keeping the rest at home to be engaged in livestock tending. Subject to these provisos there is a bias in recruitment to secondary school, which favours the wealthy. It should also be noted that those who had close relations with the colonial government were among the first to send their children to school, and that during the years immediately after the emergency rewards of wellpaid and influential jobs were high even for a CPE standard of education. As the extent and standard of Boran education has improved, without a corresponding expansion of the bureaucracy, the rewards have consequently diminished¹⁹⁾. It is now difficult to get a job at the County Council or in the department of the Central Government. While nurses and teachers are still recruited, the educational requirements for such jobs have risen, those who were first to pass through secondary education had unique opportunities²⁰⁾. Salaried jobs as health inspectors, tax collectors, or teachers have often been treated as an intermediate stage between secondary school and a political or business career. In families engaged in trade or oriented towards achievement of political office, the household members employed as civil servants provide a stable source of cash and a link with the information flow of the administration.

POLITICO ADMINISTRATIVE RESOURCES

Among the positions offered by the government structure, there are some which have a twofold economic importance, namely, chiefship and councillorhood. The latter is a political office which functions as a job since it is endowed with significant allowances which correspond to the salary of a civil servant. The former is a regular job, but of a semi-political character. They are both sources of regular income and at the same time provide "keys" to important resources which are basically economic, such as control over job opportunities, licensing, loans, certificates for town plots and allegedly, though it is more difficult to substantiate, also access to certain public funds.

The formal political system offers the inhabitants of Isiolo District a three-fold representation: by Members of Parliament (MPs), County Councillors and "Committee members" (komiti). The MPs and Councillors are elected by ballot usually on the same occasion. The komiti which form various location-based boards for specific purposes are chosen at open meetings with the residents of a particular area, or appointed by the chief. An additional political office of some significance is that of local chairman to KANU, the only official party in Kenya, which otherwise has no strong local organization.

The district is divided into two political and administrative areas: Isiolo North and Isiolo South, with Isiolo Town joined with the area north of the Euaso Nyiro for election purposes. Each division has its own MP. At present, both the parliamentary positions are held by people who claim to be Borana, although they have been elected not as tribal representatives but as delegates for a certain geographical area. There is a further division of the district into locations, each with its own Councillor in the local government. A couple of the 12 councillors come from other ethnic groups and represent Isiolo Town, but the majority are Borana. Until 1969, local government was responsible for primary education, rural medical services and the maintenance of some rural roads but today these functions have been taken over by the central government. The Council is responsible for town sanitation and some services connected with livestock production (dips, hides and skins inspection, slaughter houses) and agriculture (vermin control). Apart from these concerns, of less political significance, the Council also controls markets and rural trade, has a say in the appointment of chiefs, and is the trustee for the land in the district, which as a rule is "Tribal Trust Land"²¹). As such the Council wields considerable influence over the distribution of compensation when trust land is alienated, it decides on the allocation of town plots, and is the recipient of big revenues from the game parks in the district.

Game park fees are its main source of income, making up 80% of the total, with various rents, cesses, market fees and service charges contributing to the remaining 20%. Salaries and allowances to staff and councillors amount to 66% of the total recurrent expenditure, with staff salaries averaging 7-8,000 K.Sh. a year. Control over job opportunities makes the Council an important resource in itself, quite apart from its policy-making functions. Certain fields of economic power which were formerly important parts of Council authority, such as the control over the timing of auctions (mentioned on p. 204) seem now to have lost their relevance. Another field of decision which was once more significant than it is today, is that of school bursaries. Early lists of bursaries suggest that they were a means for the politically leading families to consolidate their position through an initial advantage in education. Today, bursaries are more consistently given to children of poorer families.

Since Independence the councillors have taken over some of the functions that pertained to chiefs in the colonial structure. The latter used to be the only officially recognized authorities representing the Borana. Though in the post-colonial situation the functions of colonial chiefdom have been spread over a larger number of officials other tasks have been added to chiefship and the chiefs are still politically important figures in the Waso community. They are in charge of implementing administrative decisions at the local level and have a number of Administration Police under their control. The chiefs chair, or play a dominant role in, the local development, school, and agricultural committees. They have direct influence over the allocation of irrigation plots, particularly at the "unaided" schemes. They are supposed to be instrumental in initiating modern self-help projects, like the building of primary schools, medical centres etc. A significant task since the emergency and droughts has been the distribution of famine relief resources coming from the government or from international aid and charity organizations.

STABILIZED INEQUALITY

Being wealthy, in the sense of having a large number of livestock, was important already in the pre-shifita situation for a man's chances of reducing the risks of pastoral life and increasing his productivity. Sons of influential men had advantages when it came to being chosen for appointments of honour and ritual/jural authority within the lineage system and, earlier, within the systems of age and generation classes. Today, the most important features of the inegalitarian situation remain the increased opportunities for the wealthy to reduce risks and to give their children relative advantages. Thus,

the existing differences of wealth and influence between families, even between pastoral families, tend to become "frozen". Inequalities originating from more or less temporary discrepancies in household and herd development have been transformed into more permanent forms of stratification. Among the present-day Waso Borana, wealth in the form of cattle, small stock, shops and sizeable irrigation gardens tends to cluster in the same families, those with traditional authority, administrative prominence and political success. These families are the "elite" both in the modern and the traditional spheres, and enjoy advantages of great "recuperative power", having bases from which they can rapidly reestablish themselves into the stock economy when it has been struck by heavy losses due to drought, disease or war. Looked at from the other end, the most successful herdowners of today are often people who had already before the disasters of the 1960s and '70s established drought-secure forms of insurance and followed diversified household strategies.

The relation between different resources is not a simple one. On the one hand, good contacts with the local administration are in many ways vital for a family's access to employment, and critical for business success. To be an officially recognized local leader or to have direct access to such a person makes it much easier to get trading licenses and also to solve transport problems, for government transport makes up a significant part of the traffic between Isiolo Town and the rural centres. On the other hand, despite the fact that trading is prestigious and credit an instrument that can be useful in campaigning for office, the combination of politics and trade tends to undermine the liquidity of the business. In order to become a political leader, or to maintain such a position, it is essential to have the capacity for redistribution of wealth and favours without drawing on one's own working capital. This is easiest to achieve for the rich cattle owners, for within the livestock sphere there is a cultural recognition of the difference between livestock as capital and livestock as milk producers. But the distinction can also be maintained by people who already have stable incomes from jobs or from ownership of buildings, and by brokers who can score political points from the distribution of public development or relief funds that formally lie within the authority of their office.

Thus, for a certain category of Borana, the control of multiple resources not only involves a set of economic ventures which are subject to different risks but also a complexity of assets which are mutually supportive. It is difficult to discern any unilinear progression between these different enterprises - a typical career so to speak where control over one particular resource becomes the spring-board for reaching another particular stage.

Rather, the Boran operator cultivates opportunities in a number of fields simultaneously, in order to achieve an optimal mix. The path that leads to the most favourable constellation may be started off by extraordinary pastoral success, good fortune in trade or a job in the administration: the turning point may be the first acquisition of a drought-secure resource, but, ultimately it is the combination of activities within the different spheres that is advantageous rather than control over any one specific form of economic resource.

Footnotes to Chapter 10

1. Hjort 1979:108 ff
2. A classical choice for pastoralists in Kenya. See Spencer 1973:163-164
3. Watson 1958
4. Van Velsen 1961
5. Henrikssen(1974:55) and Lewis (1965:379) have observed the same patterns among Turkana and Somali pastoralists respectively. See quotation from Lewis in Monod 1972:179
6. Long 1975
7. Smith, G.A. 1976:42-6
8. Ferraro 1971:190
9. Weisner 1969:1016
10. Wisner 1972:4
11. Sandford and Dahl 1978:89
12. Regarding the Africanization campaign, see for example Swainson 1977:41. The Trading Licensing Act of 1967 which restricted non-citizens from trading in certain goods and regions led to a close-down of Asian businesses in Isiolo Town. Its practical effects on traders in Waso do not appear to have been large, however. The majority of the small Asian community of Garba Tula have lived rather isolated from their own nationals and intermarried both with Borana and between themselves across the boundaries of caste and distinctive origins. All are now Muslims, even those of Goanese descent.
13. Hjort 1974, 1979:69 ff
14. As an example of the range of goods involved and the size of stock available in a small Boran duka, I will provide the inventory of one of the Kinna shops in April 1974:
 - 2 mosquito nets
 - Around 100 "hotel size" pieces of soap
 - 10 bottles of hair oil
 - 4 packets of razor blades
 - 2 pairs of rubber sandals
 - 5 packs of blue bleaching-powder
 - 30 1 kg bags of wheat flour
 - 10 bars of soap for washing clothes
 - 40 50 g. bags of tea
 - 1/2 sack (around 50 kg.) of maize meal

15. Marris & Somerset 1971:157
16. Dahl and Sandford 1978:11
17. Marris and Somerset 1971:158
18. On the volatility of money as compared with livestock, see also Spencer 1973:188-9
19. Cf. Leys 1975:191
20. The pioneers in secondary school education also maintain a sense of close identity which cuts across clan and sub-tribal boundaries.
Cf. Hjort 1979:221
21. Law of Kenya, Chapter 288

11. PATTERNS OF MODERN LEADERSHIP

CLANSHIP AND THE STRUCTURAL HERITAGE

Even after the shifta war, the independent herdowners remain the politically most important collection of people in the area. The power of local politicians rests very largely on the support they can claim from the wealthier livestock-holders. Political power governs access to a number of resources, but until today, when land questions are emerging as the critical issue, it has not directly involved control over the vital assets on which pastoralism is based. Over the self-sufficient abba kara nobody can really wield informal political power in the way that an industrial capitalist or wealthy landowner can do in other societies. Through the herdowners other groups of people can

be reached, such as junior daha-partners, owners of small and insufficient herds and flocks, client herdsmen, and women - all the categories of people who are not economically autonomous but who depend on the livestock economy. Only through manipulating traditional values and through an appeal to those who are active pastoralists therefore can political influence be won.

The central institution of the traditional, livestock-oriented community, the clan, is still vital to faction-building in the modern political context. Political competition is interpreted in clan terms and candidates for political office are frequently regarded as "clan candidates". This does not necessarily mean that such candidates are always the most successful ones: "neutral" candidates stand a chance when clan rivalry becomes too openly divisive. Generally, however, recognition within the traditional clan system is important to men who entertain elite ambitions, both as a means to influence and as a legitimization of power. The title of jallaba is sought even by men who hold office as chiefs or councillors.

Around 1950 the jallab institution appeared to external observers to be on the wane¹⁾. The contacts between Waso and southern Ethiopia had been severed by World War II, a fact which might have contributed to the decline as perhaps the colonial attempt to introduce new legal institutions also did. After the failure of the Local Native Council and Tribunal, there seems to have been a revitalization of the jallab-ship, perhaps in late 1953 when district records mention official support for "the jaldaba court"²⁾. All Borana Gutu clans now have jallaba, some appointed in the 1950s and others who have been given the title since the shifta emergency. Jallab authority as such only concerns the traditional social structure and pastoralism. In matters related to the urban centres, to school building, development projects and irrigation schemes, the jallaba have no power qua jallaba, and do not interfere with the authority wielded by the chief appointed by the administration. On the other hand, the degree to which a jallab's own field of authority is shared by a chief is not clear, and probably never has been. It seems safe to say that the influence of the chief has greatly diminished since independence when it comes to settling internal Boran affairs linked with the pastoral economy, one reason being that he is no longer appointed on the criteria of traditional leadership³⁾. The decline of chiefdom has left room for a strengthening of indigenous justice-of-the-peace offices within those clans which have still got livestock wealth. In practice, whether the chief can be accepted as an authority on such matters depends on his personality, on whether he behaves in a way conforming to the Boran code, and on whether he proves his legitimacy through generosity, hospitality, and "bigmanship".

Clan leadership and modern political leadership are closely connected: in fact there is a certain overlap of people within the two fields. The connection is two-sided: you merit one form of leadership through the other. In 1972 when a messenger from the Qallu formally handed over the skin bracelets that are the insignia of jallab appointment, councillors and members of parliament were found among those given the title. Those who were made chiefs during the colonial period without prior appointment to jallab office got the rank subsequently. Modern forms of leadership act as criteria for the choice of jallaba, and the rank of jallab in turn lends prestige and influence to the chief or councillor, - given that the clan within which you hold office is a wealthy one. Many small and poor clan segments have jallaba with little reputation or influence outside their own clan. The honour of the appointment does not necessarily confer access to the "elite"; it is not a sufficient condition for recruitment, but is undoubtedly an asset.

As we have seen in chapters 7 and 8 the clan is a collection of men traditionally bound to help each other, and responsible for each others' welfare through shared claims in a putative heritage from their ancestors. Clan solidarity works on two levels. One is the collective level where decisions on redistribution are made by the kora gossa, and where a man's participation proves that he is loyal to the clan and in a general sense worthy of support from his agnates, should he need it. There is also another, individual level where clan solidarity can be shown. Individual support to other clansmen is expected and regarded as morally correct, but is wholly voluntary; to give such support therefore enhances a man's reputation as a good clansman, but also gives him a bit of fatherly authority over the recipient.

Clan solidarity becomes the ideological cloak for any support given within the clan, from the gift of a heifer to employment as a herdsman. Nevertheless, because of limited options that in the traditional context was an accepted form of paternalism sometimes appears today as exploitation; the prospective clients do not always look upon the "assistance" in the same way as the patron does. Diro, a road labourer, told me when I asked him whether he had been given any help by his clansmen:

"No. I have been working ever since the shifta war, but you see, with my salary and my family I have not been able to buy even a single she-goat. And they have given me no stock either. The other day my rich clansman, Haji Tepo, urged me to come and stay with him and to help him with his cattle. He would give me one heifer per year, and milk. You see, he has several hundreds of cattle and sheep and goats, many karas. But I thought I am now an old man, I tell you, I prefer to have this road job rather than to be somebody's herdsman for such a salary".

During the same period, Diro fought vehemently for his right to choose a son-in-law uninfluenced by his clansmen, who did not like his particular choice, a political rival of theirs. Despite such individual cases of rejection of the clan ideology, the clan is normally the first group a man turns to when he wants either help or political support.

While demands for generosity in the modern situation can be seen as a structural continuation of expectations vis-à-vis the traditional big man, new types of goods, gifts and assistance have been added to the traditional favours. The big man gains his political position through the generous handing out of products from his herd and loans of stock, or by making labour assistance available. The modern Boran leader still reinforces his position by such material gifts from his own resources, but also to an increasing extent by linking the poorer members of his people to new, extraneous resources. In the words of Powell⁴):

"As the twin processes of state and market penetration of the peasant village occur, the patron becomes transformed into a broker, mediating the impact of the larger society on peasant society".

The resource base that is required for the politically ambitious man has broadened, and some of the favours are less tangible than the loan of a milk cow or bull. They can take the form of support in the Council for a licence application, recommendations for a job, intervention with the police, "hints" about strategic opportunities such as claiming compensation when tribal trust land is alienated, or assistance in small personal matters that implies a more or less covert promise from the big-man of more help at a later stage. The transaction, particularly shortly before an election, may take the form of outright haggling, but is normally more subtle.

Whereas political support can of course be given as a response to any kind of relationship, the archetypal man to whom high hopes of future favouritism can be geared is the clansman. Such expectations also make the achievement of political success not only a matter of concern for the individual and his household, but for the lineage as a whole. In fact, the initiative for launching a candidate for elections does not necessarily come from the candidate himself. Particularly in the case of parliamentary elections, where literacy in English and Swahili is essential and counts more than seniority, the lineage elders may sometimes take the decision to approach some young, educated lineage member with a promise of support. Political campaigning is costly and difficult to carry out without personal wealth of substantial financial assistance from clansmen, friends and occasionally close affines. A candidate for Parliament or Council elections must meet certain formal economic conditions.

In 1974 the prospective MP had to put down a deposit of 3,000 K.Sh. and the corresponding fee for Council candidates was 300 K.Sh. Other expenses are the costs of a Landrover to travel round the district, and the large-scale redistribution of material assets which is part of the hunt for votes. Lineage members support the clan candidate they have chosen with such funds and normally line up behind him in the election, expecting that the total assets of the corporate unit will benefit from his success.

In the selection of a candidate from among the younger clan members, it is not only their own standing that governs the choice, but also the relative merit and influence of their fathers. This is a direct consequence of actual differences in power over clan decisions, but it also relates to the idea of inherited leadership capacity. With a slight rewording of the saying, one can say about the Borana, "Behind every prominent man there is a good father" - or as one of the leading young politicians in Garba Tula said to me, "It is still the old men who decide everything". A son who advances within the "modern sphere" can form a kind of team with his father, who is handicapped by his lack of education⁵⁾. The son interprets the modern system to his father, supports him with cash, and channels information to him. At the same time, he himself depends on his father, for, in order to handle his relations with other pastoralists and derive political support from them, he is likely to have to go through his father and other leaders who take a prominent position in the local lineage council.

AFFINITY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT

If clanship is relevant to political solidarity, what about other structural features of Boran society? Affinity, soddaship, although seen as the ultimate expression of cooperation, is not generally regarded as a normal or effective vehicle for such loyalty. "You do not vote for your soddas. Why should you? They are fools!" is a rather surprising statement to hear when one is used to listening to the continual praise of affinal friendship. If there is a clan whose members consider that they cannot afford to present a candidate for election, or if they see that they stand small chance of winning the seat, their support for affinal candidates can be negotiated, but it is also possible that they will opt for joining another clan within their own moiety. However, clans within the same moiety differ in their structural distance from each other and candidates from the same moiety are often bitter rivals. "Moiety thinking" does not permeate the political thinking of Waso Borana, in contrast to the situation in Ethiopian Borana areas where, according to Asmarom⁶⁾, the moiety system was incorporated into the imperial Ethiopian

administration of Boran areas.

As members of the same clan have a number of different affines, affinal political solidarity is not regarded as trustworthy. It cannot be taken for granted, and you always face the risk that other candidates from within your own moiety will compete for the allegiance of your brother-in-law. Thus, the Sabbu Karayyu will compete with the Sabbu Digalu for the allegiance of the Nonitu of the Gona moiety. Your affine is always subject to crosscutting claims from other affines and to dominant pressure from his own clansmen. Affines are allies of your family or household, not of your clan: the level where they are your associates is not the level where political activities take place. When it comes to economic partnership, there is a difference, for economic cooperation with your affines is a way of safeguarding your individual household interest from the collective, corporate interests in your property upheld by the clan. Access to the rewards of the local political game is seen as a much more "limited good" than commercial or pastoral success. Economic rewards may be limited in fact, but this is not apparent to those taking part in the transaction: there is no recognition that one person's success leads to a diminution of the welfare of others. Political cooperation with affines is subject to more social control than economic cooperation.

Furthermore, requests for gifts from soddas must be acceded to as a result of the debt relationship which was created through marriage: hence, there is no necessary reciprocation of political support resulting from the gift. It is the gift itself that is repayment. You cannot become a leader by giving presents to your father-in-law: nevertheless, it is a form of "redistribution" which a man must take part in.

Alliances with affinal relatives do occur in the political context, but they are often brittle. Affinal distrust can take rather drastic forms. When a woman marries, she is in some respects regarded as a member of her husband's clan, but it is still considered as normal and right that her prime allegiance should lie with her own natal clan. In one case of competition between clans of the two opposing moieties, Hamo, an important local leader of a Gona clan, was alleged to have been instrumental in making the district administration prevent a clan meeting of his wife's clan from taking place. Only lengthy negotiations between his father and the elders of the Sabbu clan were able to return his wife to him. In another case, involving two candidates from the same moiety, the enraged loser in a political contest drove out his wife who was more or less held responsible for the failure of her clan to give enough support. The wife's clan had soddas within both competing parties. In this

way, the marriages themselves become pawns in the game. On the personal level, the political implications of affinity can become awkward, as close affinity implies respect despite distrust. A young man, Dika, told me about his anger when he found out that his senior sodda Hussein, for whose sake he had abstained from his political candidature, had in turn withdrawn from the contest to the advantage of somebody else.

THE CULTURAL MODEL OF LEADERSHIP

In order to prove legitimacy of leadership a Boran politician has to play with a number of ideological elements and demonstrate that he fits into a rather complex set of expectations, based both on his involvement in the pastoral community with its demands for bigmanship and in the national context where "development" is the predominant slogan and "development-mindedness" a cardinal virtue. At the local level this virtue can be demonstrated by an active interest in the development projects launched by the government and in local harambee undertakings such as the construction of schools and medical centres or the organization of cooperative irrigation. A development-minded man maintains a garden even if his family is not strictly forced to do so by economic circumstances. He sees to it that his children are educated and, if possible and necessary, takes part in adult literacy classes himself. It has so far not been a strict requirement that a councillor should have any particular standard of education himself, but the argument for a need to be literate and to master English and Swahili is increasingly raised in campaigns before Council elections.

But there are also other elements to "development-mindedness". In Kenya, the national development policy is based on the hope that "the profit motive, substantial inputs of foreign resources and indigenous entrepreneurship" will increase national output rapidly and in the long run permit more social welfare and enhanced social justice⁷⁾. The self-made man and the trader are seen both as symbols for and agents of development. This idea is continually emphasized in the central administration, and reflected in the frequent appointment of traders to local development committees⁸⁾. Yet "development-mindedness" must not imply the rejection of values which are regarded as central to the Boran culture and identity, such as showing respect for elders, for the Boran peace, and for the marriage rules of Sabbu and Gona. Nor must it imply a neglect of religious duties. A man who aspires to political leadership must try to be a good Muslim, pay his taka, perform his daily prayers and regularly be seen visiting the mosque. There is less of a paradox in the parallel importance of "development-mindedness" and Islam than

one would at first think. In essence, both represent the adaptation or acceptance of what have been forcibly presented to the Borana as superior cultural values by a more powerful, colonizing group. It is true that knowledge of Islam was introduced to the Borana partly by Muslim immigrants coming from neighbouring Somali groups and settling with the Borana as clients, but the main channel of influence was through the Muslim clerks, soldiers and traders who were auxiliaries to colonial change and with whom Boran chiefs and headmen early came into contact in the small market towns and army camps⁹⁾. Individual conversions on the part of Boran leaders¹⁰⁾ were then followed by group conversions of their dependants and supporters, until around 1950 there is said to have been a big meeting of Boran elders after which the few remaining traditionalists also decided to be converted. Islam was spread from the towns¹¹⁾; closely associated with an alien, commercial town culture, it was a forerunner of the development ideology of today.

For a man who wants to stand for election or maintain and lend authority to his office, it is an advantage to be born a Borana Gutu, and otherwise a Sakuye, and not to be a Gabbra, Wata or absorbed immigrant (galtu). He should preferably be a married man with children, and, if he is a Borana Gutu, he should have taken his wife from the opposite moiety. None of these conditions are insurmountable, but if they are not fulfilled they are things that are likely to be brought up against him by his opponents time and time again. He must show solidarity with the Borana as a whole, but has to solve the universal dilemma of how to play on the particularistic values and feelings of his own group so that he gains a foothold as their candidate, without affecting his chances of competing with representatives from other groups who do not share the same values. "Boran-ness", however important, cannot be exploited in all situations, especially not since the parliamentary electorate for Isiolo North also contains substantial groups of Somali, Turkana and Meru who reside in Isiolo Town¹²⁾. These groups are also represented within the County Council, but not in all constituencies. Similarly, the clan candidate cannot openly show that he is a candidate for the clan by publicly referring to it in his campaigning, but has to prove it in a more subtle way in his behaviour towards his clansmen. In order to understand the guidelines followed by men who aspire to recognition as elders of standing within the wider community context, one possible way is to look at the personalities who are generally recognized as the most important and respected men of the local society. Such men are not necessarily typical in their behaviour, but form normative models for what is counted as a successful and worthy life, and for the expectations Borana have of a local leader.

Waqo Wario, a colonial ex-chief, in many ways provides a living model for the ambitious elder. The old man is still physically impressive in his squarechecked loincloth, turban and beard, with the elder's scarf thrown over his shoulder. Hajji Waqo was at the beginning a poor man, who started his career by opening a small canteen in Kinna. His original rise to wealth and influence appears to have coincided with the boom years of the late 1930s and the 1940s. In a manuscript¹³⁾ probably dating from 1943 he is described as rich, and in 1944 he was "standing for the next election as jallab"¹⁴⁾ He became a member of the Local Native Council, then a chief in 1953. At this stage he had expanded his holding of cattle, he had a shop and had already tried irrigation farming at Kinna as one of the pioneers. Initially one of the staunchest traditionalists and the main opponent of the Borana's conversion to Islam, he is today the leader of Kinna's mosque and deeply learned in the Quran as well as in Boran law and custom. Like the late Galma Dido, Hajji Waqo is usually referred to only as "Hajji", which indicates, according to some informants, that he is regarded as a Hajji by reason of real religious merit, and not only a Hajji who has gained his title by being wealthy enough to travel to Mecca¹⁵⁾. He has a wellstocked shop at Kinna, a sizeable garden managed by employees and a residential plot at Garba Tula. His children are all educated and work as administrators, teachers and officers: one of them has been an MP and is still one of the leaders of opinion in the district. Another son has been to the university. Hajji is the richest cattle-owner in the Kinna-Garba Tula region, the undisputed abba deda. The common view is that he has reached his position through very hard work. Today, he has retired from his job as a chief and from the arena of modern politics but is still a very active jallab and referred to as one of the two greatest law-givers of Waso.

PATRONAGE

In the local model of political leadership, the choice of clan candidates and the final election of representatives for the wider community are based on the public appreciation of a man's virtues. In practice, a man's political following is not only based on his reputation as a good man, but also on the two-sided relationship which tie a number of specific clients to the "big man". In the post-colonial context, generous gift-giving is seen as an unavoidable part of a political career - or as a prospective candidate expressed it: "It is not easy today to campaign if you are not rich. People have become like snakes and hyenas nowadays."

Anthropologists like Gluckman¹⁶⁾, who were active during the colonial epoch, took an interest in the "interhierarchial" role of the colonial chief, and the problems of being both a representative of the colonial government and subject to its expectations and at the same time the main representative of the tribe. Post-colonial Boran officials - councillors, MPs and chiefs - are in a rather similar position. Their status enables them to control important resources, but at the same time makes them subject both to the power from above and the social control and obligations from below¹⁷⁾. They act on a

borderline where values clash. Clan solidarity is regarded as nepotism in the bureaucratic value system, and traditional tribute for protection as corruption and bribe-taking.

Although there are many Boran leaders who manage to work in this twilight zone of clashing values and demands with a great deal of integrity and devotion, it is difficult for them to avoid breaking one set of rules or the other. Allegations of "tapping" public funds are legion. Direct use of power to accumulate wealth from individual fellow Borana is politically dangerous as was shown in the case of a man who used his administrative position to mete out fines for traditional civil crimes without consulting the jallaba. He created enormous unpopularity for himself by fining his wife's alleged lover and then using the proceeds to buy iron sheets to roof his house. In the end he had to be removed from his job due to his total loss of authority. But it is less difficult to make use of public funds; there are various more or less institutionalized procedures, such as the use of undated chits for "loans" of building material, or generous compensation for "travel expenses" when a collection has been undertaken for a school, for example. Though such practices are resented, they seem to weigh less politically than the patron-client relations created by favours given by the incumbents of such strategic positions. Legitimacy is seldom seriously questioned on grounds of embezzlement, nor does there appear to be any conscious feeling that the elite enrich themselves at the cost of non-elite members. A young school-leader told me *àpropos* one of the local politicians about whom rumours had been rife that he abused power for personal gain:

"Yes - he never leaves a thing if there is something for him in it. But if they /other powerholders/ do not share with him he is very harsh against them. He is indeed a very tough man. But he is also such a good man. I remember when I was in school. He used to come up to me in the street and ask how things were proceeding. He asked if somebody paid my school fees. Once he bought me new shoes. And he is not even of my clan! He cared very much for us schoolboys. Now he has promised to look for a job for me"

Political power opens up economic resources, but legitimacy of authority has its cost. One chief complained to me:

"These 500 per month that I get as a chief's salary do not even cover my costs. All my relatives think that I am rich, because I have a salary. At the same time I have to start Harambee collections and contribute generously myself. How will people otherwise think I am a leader? And when there is an important guest coming from Isiolo everybody expects me to slaughter a goat for him. How I wish that I had camels instead! They are much more profitable!"

However, one should not overrate the economic importance of the redistribution

from Boran leaders to their followers¹⁸⁾. Some of the riches are redistributed down the social scale, but the lower one's position on the scale, the lower one's expectations can be, and the smaller the gifts and services need to be in order to be reckoned as important. The drastic poverty of so many Borana and Sakuye gives plenty of room for various kinds of assistance, ranging from a cup of tea, paying a busfare or giving a lift to connecting somebody with the departmental officer in Isiolo who controls employment. What is a trifle for the civil servant may be the means of survival for the woodcutter's widow for a week.

For somebody fishing for votes, a man who supports a number of people is obviously a better client than one who only supports and represents himself. Yet the political system is not "a pure market system in which individual buyer meet individual seller as a jural equal in the increasing pursuit of profit"¹⁹⁾. Bargaining power ultimately derives from the structure of control over economic resources. While the wealthier herdowners can often be said to represent a larger group than themselves, many of the stockless irrigation farmers and the artisans and destitutes of the shantytowns (manyattas) only represent themselves and are very poorly organised, being marginal in a true sense -

"poor in such a way and such a place that the household is effectively cut off from participation in the political process and from access to important social and economic infrastructure"²⁰⁾.

For people who no longer have a stake in the pastoral economy, traditional forms of leadership have little relevance and the concerns of day-to-day survival often leave them little time for political ambition. Their relation to the more affluent strata of Boran society takes an untraditional, non-kin form, such as customer-trader, subject-administrative chief, employee-employer or beggar-almsgiver. Political ideology and class consciousness do not figure in their choice of leaders, either; instead these are founded on modern forms of patronage. In a society where authority is legitimized by a demonstration of "generosity", the existence of a large number of resourceless people takes on a specific political significance. Even though in practice they are themselves barred from political careers, this category has votes which are useful to town-based politicians who, in their relations with such voters, can exploit a niche of pan-Boranness outside the traditional Gutu clan system, to which the poorer groups of farmers, artisans and "manyatta people" are peripheral. County Councillors are usually chosen on the basis of location, and as a rule have been Borana Gutu, being elected in areas where their families have had traditions of local dominance or where

their clansmen happen to be numerous. In the district as a whole, or within the two major divisions, Isiolo South and North, clan candidates tend to cancel each other out and leave room for candidates from outside the Borana Gutu lineage structure. Of the five men who have been members of parliament since Kenya gained independence, two are Gutu, one Sakuye, one a galtu of Ajuuran extraction and another a galtu of Indian ancestry.

Several anthropologists and sociologists have tried to describe the typical milieu in which patron-client relations prosper²¹). Traits commonly cited are, for example, a degree of local physical isolation, enhanced by language barriers, economic gaps, and cultural differences. Such barriers do in fact cut off large parts of the Borana community from direct involvement with the national administration. Knowledge of Swahili is increasingly widespread, but the generation of people who are heads of pastoral households or camp leaders are still to a large extent illiterates with little fluency in other languages than Borana. In Isiolo, English is the official language. Even in purely physical terms, the majority of the Borana are cut off from the district headquarters for transport is difficult and expensive, and Isiolo Town is not situated in the Borana area proper. For many Borana, the chief is the main representative of the Kenyan administration that they come across. Local representatives of government departments, on their side, also have small resources for travelling round the district, and often do not speak or understand Borana. Due to frequent transfers, district officers and district heads of department are poorly integrated into the Borana community²²). Apart from the two MPs who have had a temporarily elevated position, no Waso Borana has yet made a successful career at the national level and contacts with national centres of power invariably go through non-Borana²³).

Borana are not unique in this situation, for in large parts of Kenya there are the same divergences in wealth, cultural values, and language and the same barriers to communication, which slow down the process of national integration. Nor is it unique to Kenya that the overall national structure generates the "patron-client" type of vertical relationship between the people at the local level and the actors in the national arena, and that the positions of communication between them become very important power points. However, it is probably futile to try to pin down whether, in the case of the Borana, the present structure of local leadership is primarily governed by the fact that there are chains of patronage also at a higher level, or whether it is caused by the traditional images of leadership - bigmanship in a new guise. I will only note that there is no contradiction between the two.

Footnotes to Chapter 11

1. Baxter 1966a:244
2. IDAR Isiolo District Annual Report PC NFD 1/4/4
3. During colonial times, chiefs were appointed sometimes at open meetings with pastoralists and sometimes directly through a choice made by the British administrators. Present-day chiefs are appointed from among a number of applicants, by a formal procedure in which local MPs, the County Council and the Provincial Administration all have a say before the final choice is made by the President's Office. More emphasis is now put on literacy and knowledge of English and Swahili and less on the candidate's initial status within the Boran community. Previous Government service is a merit, for example employment as a policeman.
4. Powell 1970:411
5. This feature of "small town" politics in East Africa has also been observed by Vincent (1975:24) who remarks: "The patron among the peasantry and the young broker together have mobilized the vote banks of the countryside in a manner not yet sketched for Africa but familiar to us from the work of Bailey and Epstein on the Indian political scene."
6. Asmarom 1973:40
7. Sandbrook 1975:5-6
8. On the rhetoric of development in rural Kenya see also Lilljequist and Östberg 1978:15. On District Development Committees see Leonard 1973: 66.
9. See for example IDAR 1939 PC NFD 1/4/2
10. Vincent (1975:131-2) has commented upon the role of Asians as "pace-making" models of success in colonial East Africa. On the spread of Islam through administrative centres, see Trimmingham 1964:27-8,57. On the Islam of Isiolo Somali see Hjort 1979:40-6. There is a clear division between "high Islam" and "low Islam" in Isiolo. The prestigious form of Islam is that of the "town Somali", the Isaq, Herti and Ashraf merchants who have generally been adherents of the Saalihiya and Qadirhiya Sufi sects. This is the religion of the Boran "establishment", but there is also another stream of Islam within Waso, that of the syncretistic Husseinia Order. This was introduced to Boran mainly by the Garri. It is linked to a shrine in southeast Ethiopia, where its main saint, Sheikh Hussein is buried. Spirit (*ayana*) possession is a major element of its cultic life. Husseinia attracts members mainly among men with limited economic resources and among women (For Sheikh Hussein, see Andrzejewski 1972)
11. Muslim chiefs are mentioned for the first time in the archival records of 1928 (Garba Tula Annual Report 1928, ISO/1). At the beginning of the 1940s, all chiefs and headmen had already been converted. (See "Draft Anthropological Notes" in Political Record and Anthropology DC/ISO/4/1.) My own interpretation of the conversion process departs slightly from that of Baxter (1966a). Baxter maintains that for the culturally isolated and peripheral Borana at Waso, the culture of their neighbours, the Somali, offered an alternative model which was "successful, attainable and vigorous" (p. 242). The Somali, he states, were more efficient in trade, in relations with the government and in local skirmishes. It is not clear whether Baxter refers to the pastoral Somali or the "town Somali". However, he notes that "There have been neither a Muslim elite to emulate, nor local centres of Islam, urban

- or monastic, to act as stimulators..." (p. 245). It is on this point that our opinions diverge, for I think it is realistic to regard the small market towns with their population of colonial intermediaries as such centres. See also Northern Frontier Province Annual Report NPAR 1956, PC NFD 1/1/11:p. 16. Cf. Spooner 1971:200 on Islam, townships and pastoralists in the Middle East.
12. Hjort 1979:208-13 describes some aspects of the political situation of multi-ethnic Isiolo Town.
 13. Paper on Native Tribunal, in DC/ISO 4/1 "Political Record and Anthropological"
 14. Brown: Golbo Boran and their Customs, 4/6 1944 DC/ISO/4/1
 15. Less than ten Boran elders have yet afforded the expensive journey to Mecca, so being able to put hajji before your name is really a mark of distinction.
 16. Gluckman 1968
 17. Cf. Spencer 1973:172
 18. Sandbrook writes about the typical patronage chains that characterise poor countries (1975:21): "Although these networks do permit some of the benefits of the underdeveloped country to trickle down the social pyramid, one must also recognize that they are part of the structure of domination".
 19. Asad 1972:85
 20. Wisner 1977:6
 21. See, for example, Weingrod 1968:381 f
 22. On the difficulties of communication between administrators and pastoralists, see Chambers 1979, particularly p. 88 where he mentions the problem of frequent transfers. See also Hjort 1979:100
 23. Officials higher in the administration strive to get as much as possible of their contacts with local interest groups channeled through chiefs, councillors and MPs, and send away individuals who, without being elected, claim to voice Boran views. Councillors are especially regarded as representatives of Boran views, with respect also to issues outside the formal control of the County Council.

12. TOWN LIFE

In this chapter, I shall try to place the town household in its relation to pastoral life, and also show how domestic life in the towns diverges from life in the pastoral camps. In the first part of the chapter, I shall try to show how wealthy men use the district towns as a base for political and commercial activities, often maintaining dual residence both in the town and in the cattle camps. Women tend to be more restricted to the town than men, either because they live in towns as the wives of the wealthy, or because they do not have strong enough links with any herdowner. It is in the changed roles of women that the basic structural changes of Boran life are borne out in the most dramatic way, and my discussion in later sections of this chapter

to a great extent focuses on them.

Nowhere are the incipient tendencies towards stratification more apparent than in the physical structure of the small district towns, which clearly reflects a sharp division between those who have and those who have not. The nucleus of a Waso town is made up of straight streets lined with square, iron-roofed mud houses and dukas on rectangular plots. Around or to one side of this core, which is referred to as "the town", is another distinct type of settlement, the "manyatta", an aggregation of mat-houses of the traditional dome-shape, covered with anything from proper house mats to plastic rags and pieces of cardboard. This pattern is common to Garba Tula, Merti, Sericho, Madogash and Kinna¹⁾. Isiolo Town, the district headquarters, deviates from it, in scale and modernity, but there is still a distinction between those Borana who live in the tidy brick houses supplied by the administration and those who live in the desolate area of decaying wooden barracks called Bula Bao. In Isiolo, Kinna and Merti, some of the townsmen are farmers, and there are shamba suburbs with mat-houses and small circular mud buildings.

A PASTORAL CENTRE

It is in the mudhouse area, "the town", that we shall find the houses of traders, rich stockowners, County Councillors, hajjis, teachers and civil servants. Here are the dwellings belonging to most of those who claim to take an active part in community life and aspire to be prominent elders recognized not only within their own household or camp but also by other Borana. The town is not split away from pastoral society but an integral part of it. Over time, centres such as Garba Tula, Merti and Sericho have become essential foci for the community life of the Borana. Any Boran elder who wants to be well-informed and to take an active part in the moulding of the Borana's future makes frequent visits to the town. That is where you meet other elders, where business is done, and where you can get information both on national affairs and on the pasture conditions in other parts of the district. It is also the foremost arena where you can show off that you are a man of standing, a religious person making regular visits to the mosque, and a progressive, development-oriented citizen.

When public meetings (baraza. sw.) are organized in the area to bring together the pastoralists and representatives of the central or provincial administration, these rarely take place outside Garba Tula or Merti. The elected representatives of the Borana dwell in these towns rather than in the cattle area, even when they themselves are rich herdowners. Meetings of the develop-

ment, agricultural or school committees also take place in the permanent centres. It is only the meetings of the grazing communities (kora deda) and lineage councils that are held in the home camps of aspiring elders.

If a herdowner can get a license for a town plot and afford to build a house he often gives this high priority, even if he does not aspire to a business career. A town house is a multi-purpose asset. For a man who makes frequent visits to the town, it is awkward to have to rely on the hospitality of others, and it can be difficult to raise cash at short notice in order to pay for accommodation in a rest-house. Having a house in the town enables him to take on a hospitable role himself, and at low cost, for at any town house guests arrive at all times of the day or night to ask for a place to sleep after a long walk to the town from one of the pastoral camps. The town house also provides the pastoral family with a refuge in periods of drought, when milk is scarce in the cattle areas and it has to rely on maize from the shops. It is also a place to retire to in old age, when the herdowner starts to get tired of the hardships in the camp. Children who go to the town school can have a home in the house, and when family life in the polygynous household or the extended family becomes difficult, problems can be solved by placing some members in the town house.

The typical town house has two rooms. Frequently a mat-house in the courtyard is used as additional living quarters for some of the family dependants, or as a kitchen. The interior furnishings are influenced by Arab/Somali domestic styles and contain many items not usually found in the cattle camps and which are mainly for decoration and to communicate "elite" ambitions. There are usually not many household utilities, but some of the things that are peculiar to the wealthier Borana are things for which there is little practical demand so that they are not "begged away". Life in the cattle camps does not favour an accumulation of things which are merely decorative or status symbols. The need for mobility makes it necessary to keep light-weight household equipment, and the moves exert wear and tear on the utensils. In pastoral life, small personal ornaments, leather wall tablets and production assets like cattle and milk pots represent personal success and one's stage of life. Things that are considered "modern" and associated with town culture on the other hand, are often unsuited for use in the pastoral areas. The town house therefore becomes the focus for whatever conspicuous consumption there is. However, the level of such consumption is not high among the Borana, who find it unnatural to show off a blatantly higher material standard than needy relatives have, and for whom "the only purpose of surplus clothes and utensils is to give them away"²).

A high-status home in northern Kenya ideally has a shingo bed, a huge carved and painted wooden bed imported from Somalia and draped with white cotton sheets and pillow-cases decorated with flowers. Under the iron roof is suspended an inner roof of printed cotton pieces and the red mud walls are embellished with coloured Muslim prints. Nice fragrances of perfume, incense and spices turn away malevolent spirits and attract blessings to the house. Wooden tables and folding chairs, in the richest families European-type armchairs, are covered with white crochet cloths. Enamel kitchen-ware and glasses are exhibited on a small table. Unlike the Somali houses, few Boran houses have all the components of this ideal, but it can be traced in all the affluent families. Boran women, if they live in the town, spend much time on embroidery and crochet work. The dowry of a daughter from a town family consists of enamelware, furniture, pillowcases, sheets and tablecloths rather than the traditional hut equipment.

THE TOWN WIVES

Though town households are often closely linked to camp households women's daily lives tend to be more markedly either "pastoral" or "urban" since they are subordinate to their husbands and commute less often than the latter between town and camp. There is also a clear difference in the marital roles of town wives and camp wives. Among the wives of the wealthy townsmen two separate patterns can be discerned. On the one hand, there are a few Boran girls who have been educated, and it appears that the upbringing and education of daughters is increasingly an important part of elite consolidation. A wife who has a primary school education is an asset for a trader, and a secondary school leaver can herself take a job as a teacher or nurse, and thus contribute to the total economic resources of the family. Such girls usually count on being able to continue their occupational careers rather than becoming housewives, and this poses few problems given the easy access to the cheap domestic servants that wealthy members of Boran society have. Although no Boran girl has yet tried to use her education for a political career of her own, an educated wife is also regarded as an important asset for a man campaigning for election. In the modern context as well as in the traditional, a "good wife can partly compensate for the weakness of her husband". The wealthy families have been pioneers in the education of their daughters, but still of course most Boran girls, even in rich families are handicapped from the educational point of view. On the other hand, the education of the daughter in a poor family can sometimes be the main part of their survival strategy today. Daughters are considered as more reliable than sons when it

comes to supporting their parents and an educated girl is a good match. Educated girls from the wealthy families without exception marry other members of the incipient elite.

In contrast to the few educated women, the uneducated town wives of Boran merchants, civil servants and wealthy herdowners lead lives which are in many ways more restricted than those of camp wives. They spend their time nursing children, adorning the houses and preparing the curried meat stows, anjera, posho and boiled maize which are part of town diet. Though women in the traditional Boran households were regarded as peripheral to livestock management, they carried out certain tasks that were of extreme importance to it, namely, those connected with the care of weak and young animals. A man depended on having a wife who was skilful in this respect, and the wife also signified important links of cooperation with other herdowners outside his agnatic group. The role of the "town wife" contrasts with that of the "camp wife" in that it is often wholly marginal to the economic pursuits of the husband, and oriented towards status maintenance instead. The organization of consumption is important, but involves less well qualified decision-making than pastoral "house-keeping".

Domestic work has also changed in nature and significance, so that on the whole it can be easily and cheaply replaced by non-marital services. A man who earns cash does not have to be married in order to have a house of his own, for he can rent rooms in the town or hire labourers to build a mud- and-wattle house. Sex is available outside the framework of marriage, and there are plenty of poor youths in the manyattas who are willing to take on jobs as cheap domestic servants. In a general sense, men who have a town job are less dependent on their wives than are husbands in the cattle camps. Town wives are sometimes themselves regarded as "objects of conspicuous consumption" by ambitious men, who want to show off that they can afford to have a young wife for consort and pleasure only. A man who is already married may seek such a wife from among the daughters of other townsmen, or the divorcees and widows living in the manyattas. In the latter case, when the woman has been married before, only a minimal wedding ceremony takes place. Such marriages are rated as of lower value and are not seen as expressions of male friendship to the same extent as the proper Boran marriage with gabaar giving and a traditional weddingfeast. Rather than a symbol of wider alliance, or an economic union, this kind of town marriage appears to be mainly an affair of the emotions. The woman depends upon her success in presenting herself as a pleasant consort, able to keep her husband favourably disposed towards her, and faithful enough not to embarrass him, and this in a situation where there

is ample competition for the favours of wealthy men. This is no easy task, it seems, for several of the older and more successful members of the town-oriented elite have two or more divorces behind them apart from a number of current wives. Male Muslim ideals of wifely seclusion gain in strength in the context of the town, where they appear to be more practically feasible than in the cattle camps. Even though these ideals are far from effective, they constantly generate intra-marital conflicts. At the same time as it is important to have a town wife, men see the town as having a corrupting influence on a wife. Boran garayyu traditions clash with Muslim ideals, and since many town husbands spend a lot of time travelling, they feel that they have too little chance of controlling their town wives and become notoriously jealous. The individual and emotional nature of these marriages make them more brittle than traditional Boran unions, and leaves the wife in a insecure position.

IN THE MANYATTAS

The original inhabitants of the manyattas or shantytowns were sedentarized artisans such as carpenters and ironworkers who preferred to cluster around the towns rather than to lead a mobile life between the camps. When the daba confinement was ended after the shifita war, the number of residents was increased by ex-pastoralists who were no longer able to return to their occupation. Some of them were whole families who had lost their camels or cattle, while others were members of shattered households: widows, divorcees and deserted women. There were also several Wata who before the emergency would have lived as hunters and clients of Boran stockowners, but whose position became critical because of the poverty of the pastoralists and the restrictive game laws.

While all Borana who live mainly from pastoralism experience periods of plenty as well as seasons of near starvation, many of the permanent inhabitants of the manyattas lead a life of continuous hardship, where the proceeds of one day's work always have to be consumed immediately and where one or two days' illness means that the family has to go hungry. Many of the sources of income available to them are both limited in quantity and of short duration, so that eking out an existence requires both ingenuity and awareness of opportunity. Some ways of making a living such as charcoal burning and miraa trade, are liable to be legally restricted at intervals, or continuously forbidden like liquor, brewing and poaching. Other sources of sustenance are unpredictable, like alms, famine relief and mission charity. Berry pickers, firewood collectors and carpenters depend on an

insecure market. Normally the methods of making a living are such as need little capital and depend on one's own personal labour only. Nevertheless, those who are confined to this way of life are not the young, strong and fit, but those who have never been useful to employers of wage labourers or able to get hold of and maintain a shamba. They are both marginal in the Boran social structure and "marginalized" in the economic sense³⁾.

The core of the manyatta population, who live there permanently, are more or less cut off from pastoral life. In the dry seasons, especially when there is a prolonged drought, the number of inhabitants of the settlement is increased by poor pastoral households wanting to take advantage of town-based handouts of famine relief, and by individuals who find it difficult to stay on as dependants in pastoral households when milk is scarce. When the rains return, those who are able to do so gradually drift off again. In the households belonging to artisans and ritual specialists, women and men tend to specialize in different crafts and control their own earnings from these activities although they pool them in order to buy food. The women are charcoal burners, mat-makers or basket-weavers, the men carpenters or blacksmiths. Their children are frequently employed as poorly paid house-servants in the "town". Only men can be officially recognized Muslim teachers and healers, but there are female circumcizers and midwives and some women who are shamans in the Husseiniya⁴⁾. The wives in such families frequently maintain quite a strong position vis-à-vis their husbands by virtue of their earning capacity. Polygynous households are relatively more rare in these contexts, and this gives the wife an initially stronger position. This apparent emancipation takes place only at the cost of high living standards, however. Poverty in fact undermines a Boran man's ability to fulfil his main marital role, as defined both by traditional Boran culture and Islam. Since many girls have little say in the initial choice of a husband, they often judge a marriage in terms of the subsistence security it can offer. A man's failure to support his wife adequately creates tension and may lead to marital breakdown.

There are women in the manyattas who after a couple of broken marriages have opted out of marriage altogether and reject all proposals. They have found that, for a relatively young woman, it is easier to make a living if one is not tied down by the formal wifely duties or restricted in one's mobility by a jealous husband. Outside marriage there are new opportunities which presuppose a degree of free intermingling with people that many husbands do not consent to. A single woman also finds it easier to evoke charity and

material support both from her own relatives and from prospective suitors and lovers. It is however the relative economic advantage of not being married that motivates this choice rather than independence as such.

The younger women in the manyattas sometimes get their living from trading miraa, hitchhiking to Kulamawe or Gachuru to buy their supplies from Igembe traders, who in their turn bring the goods down from the Meru miraa growers in the Nyambeni hills. Others survive on the support given by more or less temporary male friends, engaging in relations ranging from "tea and sympathy" to concubinage or formalized but shortlived marriage with a merchant, policeman or civil servant resident in the town. These women maintain mat-houses which do not lag behind the houses of the wealthier "town" households in charming embroideries and the pleasant scent of incense.

Many of the permanent inhabitants of the manyattas are old women, however, particularly Wata and Sakuye widows and divorcees. They are the category most likely to have only a weak link with pastoral households, the Wata because of original paucity of stock, and the Sakuye because of the breakdown of the camel economy. But there are also several Borana Gutu women who have failed to establish or maintain viable links with stock-holding men. Due to their peripheral status in relation to stock-rights, women are vulnerable to the effects of pastoral impoverishment. The traditional forms of social "insurance" that were designed to protect women after the end of their child-bearing stage cannot absorb all those who, even under more favourable conditions, need help and protection. Still less can they cover the needs of those who have been impoverished by the war and subsequent droughts. The old women with the best chance in the post-shifita situation are those with brothers and sons who are independent herdowners, or with daughters married to such men. Childless women, and the sisters, daughters and mothers of stockless men tend to gravitate towards the peri-urban settlements.

Sadly enough, the opportunities that offer themselves to people who have been pushed out of pastoralism do not directly favour women, least of all old women. There is little demand for them on the regular wage labour market, and only by physical strength and access to the help of children is it possible to maintain an irrigation garden in the "schemes" in such a state that one does not lose the title to it. Nor are the incomes from wage-labour or shambas generally so large that even those who are young and strong can afford to support any large number of marginally productive dependants. The framework within which such smallholders or wage-labourers operate presupposes only small atomistic units of husband-wife-children. The wages of migrant

night-watchmen, herdsmen or agricultural labourers are such that even their immediate nuclear households frequently need to prop up their economy with some subsistence-oriented activities. There is a need for a flow of resources into the family to supplement the wage, rather than an opportunity to support others by it.

Left without much support from relatives, many of the old manyatta women survive on the "cash gathering" of forest products - firewood, aromatic woods and roots, acacia pods to be used as goat fodder, wild berries and so on, supplementing this by begging. Some have attached themselves to the settlements mushrooming around the Catholic Mission and act as "boarding mothers" for a number of school children originating from families who live in the pastoral areas or otherwise at a distance from the schools. By pooling the children's rations they can get some food for themselves as well. Ironically, the subsidies that the Catholic Mission gives to destitute families are tied to whether or not there are school children in the family, again favouring women who have children under their care. Also, it is only women who have a hut of their own who can make use of such opportunities. Several old women have also lost even this last resource, however, due to lack of time for hut maintenance, accidental fires in the dry and windy season, etc. Serious losses of hut equipment were suffered during the emergency, when many huts were burnt down as part of the anti-guerrilla campaign, and the total supply of mats in the area has never really recovered. The large amount of work vested in a hut makes it difficult for a poor old woman to regain her hut once she has lost it. There are several women who do not live in their own houses but board with sisters or female friends, and who have bartered their milk pots, fat containers and even personal ornaments to hawkers of tourist souvenirs in order to get food. Boran women regard the loss of mat-houses and domestic equipment as a loss of dignity and an ultimate sign of destitution, for they are important symbols of married and adult status.

Footnotes to Chapter 12

1. Although Lewis deals with northern Somalia, his description of small market towns in that region gives also a good impression of what the Waso towns are like. See in particular Lewis 1965:374-5
2. Baxter 1966b:125
3. See for example Wisner 1977:7, and below, note 13:2
4. See above, note 11:10

13. CONCLUSION

DIFFERENTIATION AND STRATIFICATION

In the early days of the Waso community, when as a rule all Borana were pastoralists or hunters/gatherers, the society is likely to have appeared more or less homogeneous from the point of view of life-style and access to food and similar necessities. The most visible and permanent status differences pertained to the "caste" gap between the herdspeople and the hunting/gathering minority (justified by the cattlemen on the grounds of failure to take care of capital) and to relations between men and women. The latter left women highly dependent on whatever links they as mothers of children could maintain with men who were in control of capital. Between the male

herdowners, however, or between the pastoral households seen as units there was a structural equality. There were men with more or less access to authority and influence, and men with more or less livestock capital and labour under their control, but such discrepancies were masked by an ideology of egalitarianism and a fairly egalitarian access to consumption items, as opposed to capital. All households of the pastoral community led an economic life subject to high risks - though some men would appear to have enjoyed a greater security against ecological hazards by this capacity to control more labour and hence follow more efficient management practices and to mobilize more debts of reciprocity in the case of loss of stock. Wealth accumulated in one generation would, however, be dispersed in the next.

Changes in the political and economic structure, especially through the growth of the colonial and then the independent Kenyan administration and through the expansion of the capitalist economy, have created a situation where there is an increased inequality even between people who would traditionally have been equals. Economic gaps are easily observable in the division of the community into the following rough categories:

- 1/ families who have no animals left at all and no resources other than their labour;
- 2/ poor pastoralists and irrigation farmers who produce partly for their own subsistence, partly for the market and who are also involved in labour migration;
- 3/ "the pastoral bourgeoisie" or elite who combine traditional economic ventures with political and administrative office with intellectual leadership in the fields of modern schooling and Muslim teaching, and with attempts in trade.

Between the adults of these categories and also between children born into them there are substantial differences in "life chances" if we define the latter as the probable access to material resources during a person's lifetime. There are also differences in "life style", which can be related to the fact that the main way in which a family earns its living determines both its domestic organization and its material equipment and sets limits to its opportunities of realizing high prestige values such as Muslim merit, modernity, or traditional generosity. So far, this "life style" does not exist independently as an autonomous cultural system, but is more or less solely the result of economic differences.

Members of the three strata also diverge from each other in their opportunities

to influence the income chances of others, and thus in their economic power over each other. This power derives from differences in their access both to the primary means of production and to political control over the job opportunities generated outside the Boran area.

The inequality that we see in the Waso society today is the result of a crystallization of the administrative-political-commercial elite which began in colonial times and of more recent, drastic impoverishment. The latter has expressed itself in three closely related processes which I would like to summarize as peasantization, proletarianization and marginalization. Peasantization largely refers to the integration of households as producers of agricultural commodities within a capitalist economy, but where they continue to possess land or livestock and regard it as "an indispensable means of providing successive generations of households with the basic necessities of life and not merely one thing among many in which capital may be invested for profit"¹⁾. By proletarianization I mean the process whereby people become more and more dependent on the direct marketing of their own labour. Marginalization, as the final component of the triad, refers to the creation of a societal sub-section of "marginals"²⁾ who do not control any capital assets and whose labour has no marketable value: the poorest of the poor represented by the settlers of the manyattas.

A PERIPHERAL ELITE

It may be tempting to see these processes of impoverishment as closely related to the creation of a Boran élite, perhaps as necessary concomitants of it. Yet, the core of the present élite is made up of a number of families who were able to reestablish themselves rapidly after the crises through an advantageous combination of resources that they had already achieved in the pre-independence period. The processes generated by the interaction of the traditional livestock economy and the larger political and economic system might well have created an impoverished class of Borana even without the devastating events of the last fifteen years, but, as it is, the consequences of the shifta war and subsequent droughts overshadow any such mechanisms of change.

As we have seen, the Boran élite has advantages of security and "pastoral recuperative power" which are based both on pastoral wealth and on easier access to drought-secure cash assets. An early awareness of the benefits of schooling and better opportunities to educate their children give them an advantage when they seek administrative positions, and their wealth enables

them to barter for political support, through which they can gain control over a number of resources that enter the local economy from outside, such as central government subsidies, tourist revenues and aid and famine relief funds.

It is important to remember that the economic and political system does not end at the district or tribal boundary. What is "upper class" in the local Boran community is in the wider national context only a peripheral petty bourgeoisie. Isiolo is marginal to the areas where the most rapid economic development takes place, where the big profits are made, and where the national elite have their interests - the former White Highlands and the high potential agricultural areas of Central, Western and Nyanza provinces. In analyses of the East African political economy, the Kenyan élite has variously been called "a national bourgeoisie" and a "political class", the latter since it is considered that its political power was prior to its economic status³⁾ by access to government loans and other official support, and by being able to influence national policies, the political-administrative élite has been able to convert itself into a property-owning class⁴⁾. This class consists of Members of Parliament, officeholders in the central bureaucracy, the heads of parastatal bodies, etc. who in their interests and activities in turn have been shown to be very closely related to transnational capital as well as independently accumulated indigenous merchant capital and land-ownership⁵⁾. They represent a group which has profited from the "Africanization" of modern sectors of the Kenyan economy - a process of taking over rather than structurally changing the colonial economic system. This take-over has implied an involvement in the "settler economy" based on large-scale commercial farming and also increasingly in the capital-intensive industrial and commercial apparatus for processing and marketing agricultural produce and for manufacturing sophisticated consumer goods for the wealthy⁶⁾. The Boran élite can, of course, be seen as a rather peripheral extension of this national élite. It is, however, generally marginal to the informal networks of the upper hierarchy which draws its recruits mainly from the numerically strong Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya and Kamba. The Boran élite has little bargaining power on the national scene as representing an area which is regarded mainly as an insignificant and inaccessible market.

THE PASTORALIST AS PEASANT?

The initial integration of Isiolo District into the Colonial capitalist system was based on its function as a source of raw "breeding" material for the ranching economy of the Highlands. Later on it also provided a source of

cheap meat for the rural areas from which the workers on commercial farms in the same settler area were recruited. Today, its function in the national economy is still presumed to be that of providing immature cattle for the commercial ranches, cheap meat for the urban dwellers and raw material for the transnational food business (here represented by Brook Bond Liebig).

It was only after the shifita war that the Boran pastoralists became directly dependent on marketing their produce. After the emergency the sub-survival size of many family herds made more "calory-efficient" use of their products essential, with the conversion of milk and meat into grain. The relative scarcity of natural resources in the district had for a long time prevented outside agencies from trying to introduce any alternative land use pattern in place of the traditional one, or to change the system of tenure. Now that the government contemplates introducing "grazing blocks", a system of rotational grazing on communal land, it envisages a situation where the Borana will be integrated into the national livestock industry as deliverers of newly-weaned calves, which will be taken to areas of richer rainfall for fattening and finishing. Such a "stratified" system, it is claimed, will mean that the available pasture can be better exploited for milk and calf production, instead of using important grazing resources in the arid lands for the production of low-quality beef. Granted is then that producers of high quality beef do not have to pay for the intensive labour costs connected with animal reproduction and cow-calf care, nor take the risk of low calving rates in bad years. Instead, the commercial rancher can take advantage of very cheap pastoral labour, namely that of the households of northern Kenya, where slaughter oxen are only one by-product of a multi-focussed subsistence production⁷⁾. In this development model the pastoralists will become "small commodity producers articulated into capitalistic forms of commodity circulations without themselves necessarily being capitalistic enterprises (not employing wage labour)"⁸⁾. It is simply uneconomic in capitalist terms to have calf-rearing ranches based on wage labour and therefore, if the plans at present prevailing are to succeed, subsumption under capitalism will take a form whereby the local mode of production in an area such as that of the Borana will appear largely traditional, with an idiom of labour relations dominated by kinship and paternal protection.

Today, however, Boran pastoralists sell immature cattle only when they are in dire need of cash and have no alternative, or when there is a danger of cattle starving. The whole system of a "stratified cattle industry" will therefore have to rest on a situation where pastoralism is precarious enough to encourage sales but not inefficient enough to push everybody out of

pastoralism, so that there are no longer any producers of cheap immatures.

The same goes for the export of another utility: migrant labour. The process of pastoral impoverishment on the one hand, and the spread of farming and ranching capitalism to the African areas that initially served as labour reserves, on the other, has expanded the recruiting area for agricultural labourers and herdsmen to include the Borana also. Many writers on change in poor countries have noted that, in the wider context, subsistence economies like that of the Borana or of peasant farmers tend to support the capitalist sector with which they are connected, by paying for the reproduction of labour employed in industries and on commercial farms. By bearing and bringing up young men who can be used by the capitalist enterprises as labourers, and by supporting their rural families who bring up new labourers, the subsistence economy makes it possible for the buyers of labour to pay only "bachelor" wages⁹⁾.

A SHRINKING RESOURCE BASE

Though the processes of labour migration and meat and livestock exports are the most obvious mechanisms of integration, there are other ways in which colonialism, expanding capitalist economy and national integration have affected the fundamental conditions of the pastoral economy. One is through the limitation of land. The Borana on the whole benefited from the colonial "Pax Britannica" and the institution of tribal boundaries, since they were given an area coveted by other tribes. They lost the Wajir wells, which they greatly lamented, but after the initial loss of Wajir it was more often their Somali neighbours who wanted access to the Borana's grazing than they themselves who asked for concessions to the Wajir area. Wisner has written that, by the establishment of colonial boundaries and other British measures, "the colonial power had severely weakened the productive power of the Somalis' social formation"¹⁰⁾. This is probably true, seeing that the Somali had been expanding westwards, which indicates some kind of internal pressure, and that this expansion was stopped by the colonial administration. Borana, on the other hand, won on the deal, which meant that they could devote more energy to their cattle and less to competition over resources with other pastoral groups. Consequently they have rather favourable memories of the colonial power.

The colonial tribal boundaries policy was a visible element of change, but the growth of monetarized farming systems, triggered off during the colonial period, affected the Borana adversely in subtle ways, which were not always

understood or easily observed by the ordinary herdowner. At the southwestern border of the Boran areas, towards Meru and Tharaka, the tsetse-infested country was both unsuitable for cattle and too dry for profitable, rainfed agriculture in normal years. In drought years, the border area provided a resource for the Borana, while the Meru who lived on the other side of the border had little reason to turn eastwards in such years. The colonial power opposed transgressions on that side of the district as well as elsewhere, but less efficiently than if there had been any real competition from alternative land uses. Only in the extreme drought of 1943-4 were there clashes between Borana and the Tharaka people. Since the 1940s, however, the land pressure at this border has become more severe, while smallholder capitalism and land registration have expanded beyond the original centres of commercial farming. This process is described by Wisner¹¹⁾ in a work on regional and class polarization in the Kenyan economy. Increasingly, poor and landless farmers turn to these marginal areas to find a livelihood, and the area open to pastoral drought-grazing is reduced.

More recent losses of land, partly concerning areas in the same zone, have been caused by the establishment of game parks. Inside Isiolo District, there are three parks. One is the Isiolo-Buffalo Springs Reserve, which is connected to an adjacent park in Samburu District where one of the largest tourist firms in Kenya, Jack Block, has a luxury lodge. This reserve is not so important as a potential grazing area for the Borana, but plays a significant part in the economy as a source of revenue for the County Council and as a market for souvenirs. The Shaba and Kinna-Bisanadi Conservation Areas in Isiolo District, and the Meru National Park, which is outside the district but on Boran grazing grounds, are of more strategic importance for the pastoral community. They are in areas which have traditionally been drought reserves, the loss of which has involved a loss of security for the cattleherders, and, of course, for the Wata who once used them as hunting grounds. Paradoxically, the lack of competition over grazing lands from which the hunters pastoralists have until recently benefited, today itself becomes a threat to them when "virgin land" has become an important tourist attraction. Game parks are an important part of Kenya's development strategy, however, and are favoured both by Central Government which sees them as important sources of foreign currency, and by the County Council which covers its expenditures by game park revenues¹²⁾.

For the pastoralists, limitations of drought grazing, in whatever way they are caused, lead to increased vulnerability. The drastic herd reductions

during the shifita war led to an outmigration of significant categories of people, whose labour was essential for an ecologically merciful landuse pattern¹³). When large numbers of young men turned southwards to look for jobs downcountry, vast areas of grazing were left unused because of problems in organizing the defence of fora herds in areas which were no longer permanently used by allied Sakuye camelherders. A scarcity of transport animals and the need for some poor families to combine pastoralism with river-bed farming only worsened the problem. The range of cattle mobility decreased, and particularly in the eastern part of the district this led to overgrazing of essential areas with annual grasses, which were within reach of permanent waters. The vacated areas, renowned for their good quality of grass, leading to fast reproduction rates, were taken over by Somali groups instead.

It is very likely that the related losses of land, labour and livestock made the Borana more vulnerable to the post-war droughts than they would have been if they had been able to practise their traditional movement patterns. The pastoral economy has become more fragile than before, and the colonial and post-independence changes in the conditions of Boran life have led to a situation where the poor have worse chances of surviving on pastoralism, and the rich better chances of returning to livestock keeping when the drought is over.

PASTORALISM AT A LOSS

I have now brought this study to its conclusion, after having endeavoured to unravel the socio-economic situation of the Borana from a number of varying perspectives. I have tried to depict a situation where the pastoral society is economically differentiated but where these differences have been played down up to now rather than stressed, and where they have also not been perpetuated over the generations. Recently, however, Boran society has undergone a new type of stratification process, different from the traditional differentiation one. The major force in this development has been the increasing integration of the Borana into a capitalist economy and a national political organization.

By departing from the actual situation of the Borana I have touched upon some general problems which will, I hope, be relevant to the understanding of other cases of change in African pastoralism. Irrespective of the particular ecological adaptation of each individual pastoral group, there are many features that these societies have in common in their relation to external sources of economic and political power. The catastrophes of the shifita war

and the droughts that followed it may appear to the reader to be peculiar to the local situation in which the Borana have found themselves. The general progress of change at Waso closely adheres, however, to a pattern of wider applicability, recognisable, for instance in Bonte's account of the transformation of Maure society¹⁴). Bonte describes how a period of military conquest and political unrest upset the Maure system of production which was a combination of pastoralism, cultivation, and caravan trade. This period of incipient disorganization of production was accompanied by the introduction of a monetary system mainly through the payment of salaries and pensions to soldiers and government-employed headmen. The scope of the changes experienced by Maure society became apparent only after a serious drought when the traditional Maure mechanisms of herd restoration and resource redistribution no longer worked. Many producers were left with too few resources and were forced to sell both their labour and some of the produce of their herds on the open market. In particular the initial adjustments had a backlash effect on the productivity of Maure pastoralism, which was severely hampered by the outmigration of the young men. Bonte's case, like that of the Borana, shows the close intertwining of political crises with problems of adjustment to ecological hazards.

Pastoral societies are very frequently politically and economically peripheral to an economic and social system which nevertheless dominates them. They occupy areas which to a large extent have been ignored for no other reason than their scarcity of natural resources, and they have little means therefore of bringing pressure to bear on the powers that be in the dominant centre. A decentralised internal structure may decrease their opportunities for exerting political pressure within the context of the modern state, and groups which have for decades maintained local political independence through mobility and knowledge of an inaccessible terrain may today have to surrender to domination by groups in control of modern means of transport and military technology.

The shifita war therefore was not such a unique local experience as one would think, but is perhaps typical of the modern subjugation of areas which used to be in the "insurrection zone", to use an expression coined by Swift¹⁵). Swift makes the point that as one moves away from the dominant centre of a society, there are sometimes successive geographical zones where different types of control are maintained: there may be an inner area which is fully controlled and administered by the central government and another band of territory where government is represented only by a few agents, tax collectors,

missionaries and the military - a zone which periodically escapes completely from central government control. Though such areas have traditionally been the niche of pastoralism, these "escapes" become less and less easy to make, as the technology of control is developed. A process whereby the pastoral community becomes firmly involved in one national context or another seems to be inevitable in most places today. This process involves the removal of decision-making over vital subsistence resources from local control, or the concentration of such decision-making power in the hands of a few people who are more or less immune from social control by the local community. As a result of such estrangement, the resource base of the pastoral society is frequently diminished.

All pastoral groups in tropical Africa appear to have their own histories of land losses, due to increased arid land cultivation caused by pressure on land in the farming zone, or the establishment of commercial, ranch-type enterprises and tourist resorts or mineral exploitation. As argued by Hjort and myself in an article on "Pastoral Change and the Role of Drought"¹⁶⁾ such losses frequently concern the more humid and better-watered areas of pastoral land, zones which are important for the long-term continuity of the pastoral adaptation, but which may seem under-exploited when they are considered in isolation from the larger pattern of pastoral land use or judged from within a limited time perspective. Losses of such land lead to more intensive use of the remaining, more arid areas, and thus undermine the productivity and ecological conservation of the arid land resources as a whole.

At the same time, there are many extraneous factors which are apt to change the internal structure of the pastoral society. There may, as in the case of the Borana, be new alternative goals of investment and means of insurance against drought for those who are wealthy, which in the long run cause the economically successful to turn away from traditional forms of insurance based on exchange or loans of stock¹⁷⁾. Access to government support may prop up the monopolization of certain water sources or grazing areas in private hands¹⁸⁾ or make it easier to use hired labour. In certain places, wealthy members of the pastoral society, or immigrant entrepreneurs make use of technical innovations which demand money but which increase the efficiency of livestock production, such as using lorries to transport animals between different pastures¹⁹⁾, drilling and building private water points by means of modern techniques²⁰⁾ or using veterinary facilities in a more efficient way. While the resource bases of the pastoral system as a whole are withering away, so that many people are pushed out completely or partially from pastoralism, there are at the same time improved opportunities for the better-off

herdowners to maintain themselves in spite of climatic fluctuations and other hazards.

Despite their internal differences of social structure and ecological adaptation, the relations of pastoral societies in Africa with the outside world tend to generate similar processes of change within them. Their future still depends on a few critical factors: on the one hand, the pressure to alienate land from them to the benefit of other forms of land-use which leads to a weakening of traditional adaptations of production, and, on the other, the national need for them to act as reserves of cheap, unskilled labour and sources of meat both for expanding domestic urban consumption and for international export. The latter factor implies a development which relies on the weakness of the internal production system failing to allow for local self-sufficiency.

Will these factors lead to a stable adjustment of the pastoral society to meet the changed conditions - or to its being continuously undermined by increasing labour scarcity and limitation of pasture resources? Will there still be resilience in the suffering grass? I would hope so, but can see no clear answer.

Footnotes to Chapter 13

1. Leys 1976:170-1
2. "Marginal" (*marginalizado*, sp.) has been used by Nun (1969, quoted by Stavenhagen 1970:71) as a label for a category of people who are not only unemployed but, given the locally available level of technology, also unemployable - and who hence do not form a reserve of cheap labour for capitalism.
3. Sandbrook 1975:12-13; Cohen 1972:248; Shivji 1976:21-22
4. Cliffe 1975:149
5. Sandbrook, *loc.cit.*; Swainson 1977
6. Leys *op.cit.*:259; Cliffe *op.cit.*:146
7. Dahl and Hjort 1979:33
8. Ennew *et al.* 1977:304
9. Meillassoux 1972:102; Leys *op.cit.*:267,171; Cliffe 1978:328
10. Wisner 1977:28-9
11. *ibid.*, particularly chapter 5
12. The revenues produced for the County Councils or Central Government are only a small part of the money involved in the tourist traffic. Mitchell (1968) found that around 60% of the GNP generated by tourism accrued to Kenyans (including the government, and private entrepreneurs as well as low skilled wage-employed labour). The rest pertained to various forms of "foreign finance".

13. Land degradation has been a standard companion of labour migration in African areas where male labour has been important to the indigenous system of production. Richards' classical study of the Bemba (1939) showed the negative effects of labour migration on a Zambian farming community where the men used to do the dangerous and labour-consuming task of cutting down high trees to clear new fields. Cliffe (1978:333) notes the generality of this phenomenon in societies based on shifting agriculture.
14. Bonte 1975
15. Swift 1978:8
16. Dahl and Hjort op.cit.:6
17. Bonte 1972:252; Swift 1979:464; Dahl and Hjort op.cit.:33
18. Salzman 1979:438
19. Lefebure 1979:8
20. Mirreh 1978:76-77; Swift loc.cit.

APPENDIX 1: IN THE FIELD

The anthropological research on which this thesis is based was undertaken primarily from April 1973 to July 1974. During this period I had a home base in Isiolo Town, where my husband, Anders Hjort, was conducting research for a rural electrification study and also collecting general data on the social and economic life of the town itself (Hjort 1979). My own main field of operation was the Boran area further to the east, the Waso region, and I used our home mainly as a place to relax in and as a point of departure for gathering supplementary material on Boran townsmen.

Most of my empirical information was gathered during visits, of between a week and a month, to different Boran camps and town compounds, particularly in the Kinna-Garba Tula area. I worked together with one Boran assistant at a time, normally a secondary-school leaver, who both gathered some data independently and also acted as a support and interpreter when English and Swahili were not enough. I am able to follow the general drift of discussions carried out in Borana, but have never mastered the language well enough to undertake independent interviews. The main method used was one of informal conversation and unstructured interviews on topics arising from the daily observation of, and interaction with people in whose camps or town compounds I was living as a guest.

We also collected information in a more systematic way, by gathering life-histories and outlining some 50 genealogical charts showing the kinship networks of pastoralists in the camps and the destitutes of Garba Tula manyatta and Isiolo Town. The genealogical charts enabled us to trace the whereabouts of Boran migrants and also the spatial spread of Boran kinship groups. Some questionnaire surveys of household contacts and incomes were carried out in the Garba Tula manyatta, and (in cooperation with my husband) among Boran townsmen in Isiolo town and in the irrigation schemes at its fringe (see Hjort 1979:239-43). These surveys and genealogies were a useful supplement to the more detailed mapping of kinship relations that I undertook in eight camps; they strengthened me in the belief that the camps I had selected were not untypical. The camps that I visited were situated at Kulamawe, Dadach Lata, Bibii and Duse: regrettably I was able to spend too little time at the large, sedentary camps closest to the Euaso Nyiro swamps, where the local

population's stamina in fighting off mosquitoes apparently exceeded my own.

A more statistical approach to my study was impossible due to the unreliability of macro-statistics from the area - there is neither trustworthy information on the size of the present population, where estimates range from 30,000 to 70,000 - see note 1.26 - nor are there unambiguous accounts of sizes of household stock holdings or of the total livestock population.

Since my departure from Isiolo District I have maintained contacts through correspondence with Boran friends. In 1977 I visited Isiolo Town for a fortnight, and in 1978 I was again able to return to Waso. I had then been offered a 3-month assignment as a consultant for ILCA (International Livestock Center for Africa), in which I worked together with Stephen Sandford of the Overseas Development Institute on a "sociological base-line study" of the Borana at Waso. According to our terms of reference we were to produce a report (Dahl and Sandford 1978: Which Way To Go?) on those aspects of Boran life that could have implications for the future planning of livestock development projects, notably the construction of new waterpoints and the introduction of a system of grazing blocks. When conducting research for that report, I was, of course, helped by earlier experiences and the contacts I had made during my first periods of fieldwork and at the same time my own study profited, particularly through the opportunities I was given to travel to almost all parts of Waso.

The anthropologists are by tradition their own main instrument of research, and the way their roles are defined in the interaction with informants is critical also for their chances to obtain an understanding of the society they wish to study. As a young Swedish woman, I feel that I stepped more or less into a vacuum. Only a few European women had lived at Waso before me, and these few exceptions had tended to be substantially older than me and had been more isolated from the local community. There was therefore less of the colonial memsabu role than I had feared. During my first fieldwork I was generally identified as a young girl (intala). In spite of my having a husband in Isiolo, I could make no strong claim to married status, since I had no child. At my second visit, I was able to redress my status in this respect by reference to my small son. It has often been observed that female anthropologists have a more ready access to all categories of informants than men, who tend to be kept out of the female sphere. I think this is largely true also for my own work. I can only recall one occasion when a herdowner consistently postponed being interviewed by me in order to be interviewed by my husband on one of his brief visits to Kinna. Talking to the women, while

they were preparing mats or stirring the maize porridge, has perhaps been a natural thing for me to do, but I have also spent many evenings and afternoons chatting and discussing with herdowners.

If I was regarded as a young girl, this status was not without its ambiguities for it was soon evident that (thanks to my ethnographic studies) I knew much more about the gada system than even many elders at Waso. Although that system does not figure much in my thesis, it has played an important role throughout my fieldwork as a key to serious conversation. An interest in those conditions of livestock keeping, that Borana themselves see as important, served the same function.

Knowledge on subjects normally not expected from women thus compensated for my being initially classified as a girl. Nevertheless, I cannot deny that one of the main conditions that made my fieldwork possible was the unfair advantage I enjoyed as a well-fed, well-educated and secure member of a well-fare state. It is impossible to enter the field as a structural equal rather than as either an important and honoured guest, potential benefactor or suspect stranger, however much the anthropologist wants to participate and however much his or her own values emphasize the equality of all human beings irrespective of age, sex and cultural background. I have always felt that being pressed into a status system inherited from the colonial past adds to the stress caused by the exhausting heat and other inconveniences in the field. At the same time the value of the hospitality that people have shown me, and their generosity in sparing time for me, cannot be estimated highly enough. Borana are a people who are not restrictive as regards information about their own culture. On the contrary, I consider that they have an expansive attitude towards strangers: almost as eager to turn you into a galtu Borana as to convert you to the Muslim faith.

APPENDIX 2: DETAILS OF CLAN STRUCTURE

THE CLANS OF THE BORANA GUTU

<u>Moiety</u>	<u>Clan</u>	<u>Subclan</u>
<u>SABBU</u>	DIGALU	Nurtu, Titi, Udumtu, Emeji
	MATTARI	Kuku, Meta, Dorani, Mankat, Gadulla, Karara, Garjeda
	KARAYU	Akaro, Berre-Tissele, Didimtu, Danku, Wale, Sibū, Dano, Hajeji, Abole, Sunkana, Siku, Sole
<u>GONA</u>	DACCITU	
	KONITU	
	MACCITU (FULLELE)	
	GALANTU	
	ODITU	
	HAWATU	Aboiye, Kura, Bokkoltu, Wolensu, Wayitu, Dore
	KARCHABTU	Debitu
	WQRRRA JIDDA	Anna, Waragu, Horro, Arito, Uso, Gumato, Jaro
	MALIYU	Halchaya
	NONITU	Amoye, Baritu
	DAMBITU	

Only those clans and subclans that I have come across in Isiolo District are listed here. For further details see (i) Baxter, 1954:83, (ii) Asmarom: 1973:40 (iii) Haberland 1963:123.

In Isiolo District the clans linked by brackets tend to cooperate with each other and behave as if they were a single clan.

THE CLANS OF THE SAKUYE

SAKUYE "Proper" (Ex-Rendille)

Hora

Matharba

Warsuya (Warrasuwa)

Warfurra (includes Jaali)

Delle

Illani (treated as one clan)

Kurno

Harsuwa

MIGO (Ex-Garri)

Tullu

Yiriwa

Mailanyi (Malan or Melyana)

Dima

Chirchiro

Ex-Midgan Somali

Ela

Baxter (1954 p 123) mentions Odholla as a Sakuye clan, probably referring to the Mailanyi who occur both among Sakuye Migo and according to Torry (1973:276) among the Gabbra Odholla. Baxter also mentions Sharbana as a clan within Sakuye. This may similarly refer to the Matharba and Ela who appear respectively in the upper and lower classes of Sharbana Gabbra. Haberland (1963:145) mentions Çako, a group which does not appear to occur within the Waso area.

APPENDIX 3: GLOSSARY OF INDIGENOUS TERMS

abba	father, owner of
abba kara	father of the stock-gate
addolesa	dry season from May to September
amesa	milch cow, cow to which a particular woman has milking rights
angafa	first-born son
annan	milk
anuna	wedding gift from son-in-law to wife's mother
arjara	"fallow herd" of sheep and goats, widely roaming herd of small stock
ayana	"fate", auspicious day, spirit of possession
badole	Borana coming from southern Ethiopia
baraza (swahili)	meeting
bon, bonagaya	dry season from December to March
butume	branch with which the cattle gate is closed, minimal breeding nucleus
charri	hot and dry scrub area
chirresa	traditional veterinarian
daba	enclosure, "strategic village" during the secessionist war
dabarre	loan of animal
daha	joint herding unit, herding cooperation between two or more partners
dalla	widow inheritance
damballa	water pan
deda	grazing community
duka (swahili)	retail shop
dungo	cow given to a woman at her son's circumcision, kiss
ela	well
ergifata	loan of child to childless woman, intrafamilial adoption
fora	"fallow herd" of dry stock
gabaar	part of bridewealth signifying affinal love
gada	hierarchic system of generation classes
gadamoji	elder retiring from gada system
gahawa	gift, notably of livestock or capital
gal lagan	seclusion of camel calves
galatho	return gift, gratitude
galtu	immigrant, assimilee
ganna	rainy season from March to May
garayyu	lover
gogessa	foreskin, descent line of generation classes, handing-up line at a well
gossa	lineage

had, hato	mother, female owner of
had worra	female homestead head
haggaya	rainy season from October to November
halaal	exclusive property
handura	umbilical cord, personal property of a child, a child's allotted herd
hare	rainpool
hawicha	herd of milch cattle kept at main camp
hayu	justice-of-the-peace, elder: among Sakuye and Wata local leader superior to <u>jallaba</u>
ilmo tuti	when a herdowner formally adopts a heir from outside his household
intala	unmarried girl, woman who has not yet given birth
jallab	deputy justice of the peace, appointed leader of local lineage
kadda	see gabaar
karata	part of bridewealth signifying a transfer of rights over a woman's offspring
kero	sexually immaculate young man
komiti	member of local governmental committee
kora	public meeting according to Boran custom
luba	generation class within <u>gada</u> system
meher	Muslim promise of compensation to woman in the case of divorce or widowhood
mala marri	discussion and decision over grazing matters
manyatta (swahili)	squatter settlement, mainly of traditionally shaped huts outside market center or town: originally Maasai temporary encampment
miraa	stimulant drug, leaves of Catha Edulis
nyatu	"eater", person who consumes his own capital
ola	pastoral camp
posho (swahili)	maize meal, maize porridge
qallitti	female shaman or "priest-doctor"
qallu	priest-king of the Boran tribe: (sometimes) leader of possession cult
qolle	person who has become poor through misfortune
re	sheep and goats
rera	cluster of pastoral camps
saddaqa	alms which give religious blessing to their donor
shamba (swahili)	cultivation plot, garden, field
sheikh	Muslim teacher or clergyman
shifta (amharic)	secessionist guerrilla; originally "bandit"
sodda	affine, in-law
taka (zakat, arabic)	stipulated annual Muslim levy on wealth
Waq	God
Waqalal	Muslim namegiving ceremony
ware	dawn grazing

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abir, M 1970: "Southern Ethiopia", pp 119-37 in M Birmingham and R Gray (eds) Precolonial African Trade, London: Oxford University Press
- AGROTEC-CRG-CEDES 1974: Southern Rangelands Livestock Development Project Part II: Studies and Surveys, vol 2, "Sociology and Pastoral Economy" with Appendix 1 "The Borana Plateau". Imperial Ethiopian Government, Livestock and Meat Board
- Almagor, U 1978: "The Ethos of Equality among Dassanetch Age-Peers" pp 69-94 in P Baxter and U Almagor, Age, Generation and Time: Some Features of East African Age Organizations, London: C Hurst and Co
- Anderssen, K Blegvad 1977: African Traditional Architecture: A Study of the Housing and Settlement Patterns of Rural Kenya, Nairobi, London, New York: Oxford University Press
- Andrzejewski, B W 1962: "Ideas about Warfare in Borana Galla Stories and Fables" African Language Studies, 3: 116-136
- Andrzejewski, B W 1972: "Sheikh Hussien of Bali in Galla Oral Traditions" in Congresso Internazionale di Studi Ethiopici, Rome 4: 463-480
- Asad, T 1970: The Kababish Arabs: Power, Authority and Consent in a Nomadic Tribe. London: C Hurst and Co, New York: Praeger
- Asad, T 1972: "Market Model, Class Structure and Consent: A Reconsideration of Swat Political Organization", Man 7:1:74-94
- Asad, T 1979: "Equality in Nomadic Social Systems: Notes towards the dissolution of an anthropological category" pp 419-428 in Pastoral Production and Society. Proc. of an International Meeting on Nomadic pastoralism, Paris 1-3 Dec 1976, Equipe Ecologie et Anthropologie des Sociétés Pastorales. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Asmarom, L 1973: Gada: Three Approaches to African Society. New York: The Free Press
- Baker, R 1975: "Development and the Pastoral Peoples of Karamoja, North-Eastern Uganda: an example of the treatment of symptoms", pp 187-205 in Monod (ed) Pastoralism in Tropical Africa. London: Oxford University Press for Int. Afr. Inst.
- Barnes, J 1969: "Networks and Political Processes" in C Mitchell (ed) Social Networks in Urban Situations, Manchester: Manchester University Press
- Barth, F 1961: Nomads of South Persia: the Basseri Tribe of the Khamseh Confederacy, London: George Allen & Unwin
- Barth, F 1964: "Capital, Investments and the Social Structure of a Pastoral Nomad Group in South Persia", pp 69-81 in R Firth and B S Yamey (eds): Capital, Savings and Credit in Peasant Societies, London: G Allen and Unwin
- Bates, D G 1971: "The Role of the State in Peasant-Nomad Mutualism", Anthropological Quarterly 44:3:109-131
- Baxter, P 1954: The Social Organization of the Boran of Northern Kenya. Unpubl. Ph D Thesis, Lincoln College, Oxford University
- Baxter, P T W 1965: "Repetition in Certain Boran Ceremonies" pp 64-75 in M Forbes & C Dieterlein (eds): African Systems of Thought, London: Oxford University Press for Int. Afr. Inst.
- Baxter, P T W 1966a: "Acceptance and Rejection of Islam Among the Boran of the Northern Frontier District of Kenya" pp 233-250 in: I M Lewis (ed): Islam in Tropical Africa, London: Oxford University Press for Int. Afr. Inst.

- Baxter, P T W 1966b: "Stock Management and the Diffusion of Property Rights Among the Boran", pp 116-27 in Proceedings of the Third International Congress of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa vol III
- Baxter, P T W 1972: "Absence Makes the Heart Grow Fonder: Some suggestions why witchcraft accusations are rare among East African pastoralists", pp 163-191 in M Gluckman (ed): The Allocation of responsibility, Manchester: Manchester University Press
- Baxter, P T W 1975: "Some Consequences of Sedentarization for Social Relationships" pp 206-228 in Monod (ed): Pastoralism in Tropical Africa, London: Oxford University Press for Int. Afr. Inst.
- Baxter, P T W. 1978a: "Boran Age-Sets and Generation-Sets - Gada: a Puzzle or a Maze?", p 151-182 in P Baxter and U Almagor (eds): Age, Generation and Time - Some Features of East African Age Organization, London: Hurst and Co.
- Baxter, P T W 1978b: "Ethiopia's Unacknowledged Problem: The Oromo", African Affairs: 308:283-296
- Beckingham, C F & Huntingford, G W B (eds), 1954: Some Records of Ethiopia 1593-1646, London: Hakluyt Society
- Black-Michaud, J 1972: "Tyranny as a strategy for survival in an "egalitarian society", Man 4:614-634
- Blackhurst, H J 1974: A Community of Shoa Galla Settlers in S.Ethiopia, Manchester, unpubl. Ph D Thesis, Manchester University
- Bonte, P 1975: "Conditions et Effects de l'Implantation d'Industries Minières en Milieu Pastoral: l'Exemple de la Mauritanie", pp 244-262 in Monod (ed): Pastoralism in Tropical Africa, London: Oxford University Press for Int. Afr. Inst.
- Bonte, P 1974: "Organisation Economique et Sociale des pasteurs d'Afrique Orientale", Etudes sur les Societes de Pasteurs Nomades 2, Les Cahiers du centre d'études et de recherches marxistes 110, Paris; Centre d'études et de recherches marxistes.
- Bremaud, O 1969: Notes on Camel Production in the Northern Districts of the Republic of Kenya, translated from French into English for ILCA, Addis Ababa
- Castagno, A A 1964: "The Somali - Kenyan Controversy Implications for the Future", Journal of Mod African Studies: 2:165-187
- Cerulli, E 1933: Etiopia Occidentale, Rome: Sindicato Italiano Arti Grafiche
- Chambers, R 1969: Report on Social and Administrative Aspects of Range Management Development in the North Eastern Province of Kenya (Mimeo)
- Chambers, R 1979: "Administrators: A Neglected Factor in Pastoral Development in East Africa", Journal of Administration Overseas; 18:2:84-94
- Church, B , H W Poppe and R H D Sandford.1957: Livestock Survey in Borana: Report to the Government of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Ministry of Agriculture (mimeo)
- Cliffe, L 1975: "Underdevelopment or Socialism? A comparative Analysis of Kenya and Tanzania", pp 137-186 in Harris, R (ed): The Political Economy of Africa, New York: Schenkman Publ Co.
- Cliffe, L 1978: "Labour Migration and Peasant Differentiation: Zambian Experiences", Journal of Peasant Studies; 5:3:326-346
- Cohen, R 1972: "Class in Africa - Analytical Problems and Perspectives", The Socialist Register, London: Merlin Press
- Copans, J (ed). 1975: Secheresses et Famines du Sahel, Paris, Maspero
- Cunnison, I 1966: Baggara Arabs: Power and the Lineage in a Sudanese Noma-dic Tribe, Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Dahl, G and A Hjort 1976: Having Herds: Pastoral Herd Growth and Household Economy, Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in Social Anthropology vol 2
- Dahl, G and A Hjort 1979: Pastoral Change and the Role of Drought, SAREC Report R2: 1979, Stockholm

- Dahl, G and S Sandford 1978: Which Way to Go - A Study of People and Pastoralism in the Isiolo District of Kenya. A joint study commissioned by the Canadian International Development Agency and the International Livestock Centre for Kenya (mimeo)
- Dalleo, P T 1975: Trade and Pastoralism: Economic Factors in the History of Somali of North Eastern Kenya 1892-1948, Unpubl. Ph D Thesis, Syracuse University
- Diarra, S 1975: "Les Problèmes de Contact Entre les Pasteurs Peul et les Agriculteurs de l'Ahaggar", pp 284-297 in T Monod (ed) Pastoralism in Tropical Africa, London: Oxford University Press for Int. Afr. Inst.
- Driberg, J H 1932: "The Status of Women among the Nilotes and Nilo-Hamites" Africa 5:4:404-420
- Dupire, M 1963: "Women in a Pastoral Society" pp 47-92 in D Paulme (ed) Women of Tropical Africa, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press
- Dyson-Hudson, N 1962: "Factors inhibiting change in an African Pastoral Society: The Karimojong of Northern Uganda", Transactions of The New York Academy of Sciences 11 (24):771-801
- Dyson-Hudson, N 1966: Karimojong Politics, London: Clarendon Press
- Dyson-Hudson, N and Dyson-Hudson, R 1970: "The Food Production System of a Semi Nomadic Society, the Karimojong, Uganda" pp 91-123 in Mc Loughlin (ed) African Food Production Systems, Cases and Theory, Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins Press
- Dyson-Hudson, N 1972: "The Study of Nomads" pp 2-29 in N Dyson-Hudson and W Irons (eds) Perspectives on Nomadism, Leiden: E J Brill
- Dyson-Hudson, R 1960: "Men, Women and Work in a Pastoral Society", Natural History 69:10:42-57
- Elam, Y 1973: The Social & Sexual Roles of Hima Women: a Study of Nomadic Cattle Breeders in Nyabushozi County, Ankole, Uganda, Manchester: Manchester University Press
- Ennew, J, P Hirst & K Tribe. 1977: "Peasantry as an Economic Category", Journal of Peasant Studies 4:4:295-322
- Evans-Pritchard, E E 1940: The Nuer: a Description of the Modes of Livelihood and the Political Institutions of a Nilotic People, Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Ferraro, G P 1971: Kikuyu Kinship Interaction: A Rural-Urban Comparison, Unpubl. Ph D Thesis, Syracuse University
- Firth, R 1951: Elements of Social Organization, London: C A Watts & Co Ltd
- Frantz, C 1975: "Contraction and Expansion in Nigerian Bovine Pastoralism" pp 338-353 in Monod (ed) Pastoralism in Tropical Africa, London: Oxford University Press for Int. Afr. Inst.
- Frantz, C 1978: "Ecology and Social Organization Among Nigerian Fulbe (Fulani)", pp 97-118 in W Weissleder (ed) The Nomadic Alternative: Modes & Models of Interaction in the African-Asian Deserts and Steppes, Paris: Mouton
- Friedl, E 1975: Women and Men, An Anthropologist's View, Basic Anthropology Units, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston
- Galaty, J G 1977: In the Pastoral Image: The Dialectic of Maasai Identity, Unpubl. Ph D Thesis, University of Chicago
- Ghai, Y P and J D McAuslan. 1970: Political change in Africa, Nairobi: Oxford University Press
- Gluckman, M 1968: "Interhierarchical Roles: Professional and Party Ethics in Tribal Areas in South and Central Africa" pp 69-93 in Swartz (ed) Local Level Politics, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co
- Goody, J 1973: "Bridewealth and Dowry in Africa and Eurasia" pp 1-58 in J Goody and S J Tambiah (eds) Bridewealth and Dowry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Goto, P S G 1972: The Boran of Northern Kenya. BA Thesis, University of Nairobi

- Gregory, R G, Maxon, R M and Spencer, L P 1968: A Guide to the Kenya National Archives, Syracuse University Eastern African Bibliographical Series No 3, Kenya, Program of Eastern African Studies, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York
- Gulliver, P H 1955: The Family Herds: A Study of Two Pastoral Tribes in East Africa: The Jie and Turkana, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd
- Haberland, E 1963: Galla Süd-Athiopiens. Völker Südäthiopiens, Ergebnisse der Frobenius-Expeditionen 1950-52 und 54-56 Band 2. Universität Frankfurt am Main, Frobenius Institut
- Helland, J 1977: Social Organization and Water Control Among the Borana, Paper pres. to Workshop on East African Pastoralism organized by ILCA Nairobi 22-26 August 1977 (mimeo)
- Henrikssen, G 1974: Economic Growth and Ecological Balance: Problems of development in Turkana, Bergen: Inst. for Sosialantropologi, Occasional paper 11
- Herskovits, M J 1926: "The Cattle Complex in East Africa", American Anthropologist 28: 230-272, 361-380, 494-528, 633-664
- Heyer, J 1976: "The marketing System" pp 1-32 in Heyer, J, J K Maitha and W M Senga (eds) Agricultural Development in Kenya - An economic Assessment Nairobi: Oxford University Press
- Hjort, A 1974: "Trading Miraa: from School-leaver to Shop-owner in Kenya" Ethnos 39:1-4, 27-43
- Hjort, A 1979: Savanna Town: Rural Ties and Urban Opportunities in Northern Kenya, Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in Social Anthropology vol 7, Stockholm.
- Horn, L van 1977: "The agricultural history of Barotseland" in R Palmer and N Parsons The Roots of Rural Poverty, London: Heinemann
- Hultin, J 1975: "Social Structure, Ideology and Expansion, The Case of the Oromo of Ethiopia", Ethnos 1-4:273-284
- Hultin, J 1977a: "Inequality among the Macha Oromo", Pastoral Production et Society. Proc. of int. meeting on nomadic pastoralism, Paris 1-3 dec 1976 Equipe Ecologie et Anthropologie des Sociétés Pastorales, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Hultin, J 1977b: Man and Land in Wollega, Working Papers of the Dept of Soc. Anthropology, University of Gothenburg (mimeo)
- Huntingford, G W B 1955: The Galla of Ethiopia, the Kingdoms of Kafa and Janjero, Ethnographic Survey of Africa, North-Eastern Africa, Part II, London: International African Institute
- Jacobs, A H 1963: The Pastoral Maasai of Kenya: A Report of Anthropological Field Research, Cyclostyled by the Ministry of Overseas Development, London
- Jacobs, A H 1965: The Traditional Political Organization of the Pastoral Maasai, unpubl. Ph D Thesis, Oxford University
- Jacobs, A H 1972: Maasai Pastoralism in Historical Perspective pp 406-425 in Monod (ed) Pastoralism in Tropical Africa, London: Oxford University Press for Int. Afr. Inst.
- Kaufmann, R von 1976: "The Development of the Range Lands" pp 255-287 in Heyer et al (eds) Agricultural Development in Kenya: an Economic Assessment, Nairobi: Oxford University Press
- Kelly, E 1972: Women's Chances for Power in Three Sudanese Nomadic Tribes M Phil Thesis, University of London
- Kenya 1963: Kenya Population Census 1962, Nairobi: Government Printers
- Kenya 1970: Kenya Population Census 1969, Rep of Kenya, Statistics Division in Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Nairobi: Government Printers
- Knutsson, K E 1967: Authority and Change: A Study of the Kallu Institution among the Macha Galla of Ethiopia, Göteborg, Etnologiska studier, Etnografiska Museet i Göteborg (Ethnological Studies, Gothenburg Museum of Ethnography)

- Krige, E 1964: "Property, Cross-cousin Marriage and the Family Cycle Among the Lobedu" in R F Gray and P H Gulliver (eds): The Family Estate in Africa, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
- Lefebure, C 1979: "Introduction: the Specificity of Nomadic Pastoral Societies" pp 1-14 in Pastoral Production and Society, Proceedings of an International Meeting on Nomadic Pastoralism, Paris 1-3 dec 1976. Equipe Ecologie et Anthropologie des Sociétés Pastorales, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Leonard, D K (ed). 1973: Rural Administration in Kenya, Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau
- Lewis, H S. 1965: A Galla Monarchy: Jimma Abba Jifar Ethiopia 1830-1932, Madison and Milwaukee
- Lewis, H S 1966: "The Origins of the Galla & Somali", Journal of African History 7:1:27-46
- Lewis, I M 1955: Peoples of the Horn of Africa, Ethnographic Survey of Africa: North East Africa, part I, London: Int. Afr. Inst.
- Lewis, I M 1961: A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa, London: Oxford University Press for Int. Afr. Inst.
- Lewis, I M 1965: "Lineage Continuity and Modern Commerce in Northern Somaliland" pp 365-385 in P Bohannan and G Dalton (eds) Markets in Africa: Evanston: Northwestern University Press
- Leys, C 1975: Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neocolonialism 1964-1971, London: Heinemann
- Lilljeqvist, A and Östberg, W 1978: "Bybön, klättraren och utvecklingen - om några motsättningar på Kenyas landsbygd" pp 6-36 in Har Lokalsamhället en chans? Studier från Kenya och Indien. Utveckling i Närbild 1, Stockholm: Swedish International Development Authority
- Long, N 1975: Multiple Enterprise in the Central Highlands of Peru, Paper presented to Advanced Seminar, School of American Research, Santa Fe, New Mexico (mimeo)
- Marris, P and A Somers 1971: African Businessmen: A Study of Entrepreneurship and Development in Kenya, Nairobi: East African Publishing House
- Mason, I L and J P Maule 1960: The Indigenous Livestock of Eastern and Southern Africa, Techn. Commun. Commonw. Bur. Anim. Breed Genet. 14:1-151 Farnham Royal, England: Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux
- Matthies, V 1977: Der Grenzkonflikt Somalias mit Äthiopien und Kenya. Analyse eines Zwischenstaatlichen Konflikts in der Dritten Welt, Hamburger Beiträge zur Afrika-Kunde Band 21, Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde
- Meillassoux, C 1972: "From Reproduction to Production. A Marxian Approach to Economic Anthropology", Economy and Society 1:1:93-105
- Mirreh, A G 1978: Die Sozialökonomischen Verhältnisse der Nomadischen Bevölkerung im Norden der Demokratischen Republik Somalia, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag
- Mitchell, F 1968: "The Economic Value of Wild Life Viewing as a Form of Land Use", E.A.Agr. & Forestry Journal 33
- Monod, T 1975: "Introduction" (English version) pp 99-183, Pastoralism in Tropical Africa, London: Oxford University Press for Int. Afr. Inst.
- NCCK (National Christian Council of Kenya) 1968: Who owns industry in Kenya? Report of a Working Party, Nairobi: East African Publishing House
- Notes and Queries on Anthropology. 1951 (6th ed), Revised and rewritten by a Committee of the Royal Anthr. Inst. of Great Britain and Ireland, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd
- Nun, J 1969: "Superpoblación Relativa, Ejército Industrial de Reserva y Masa Marginal", Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología 2
- Ormerod, W E 1976: "Ecological Effect of Control of African Trypanosomiasis" Science 191:815-821
- Paine, R 1964: "Herding and Husbandry: Two Basic Distinctions in The Analysis of Reindeer Management", Folk 6:83-88

- Paine, R (ed). 1970a: "A Theory of Patronage and Brokerage" pp 8-21 in Patrons and Brokers in the East Arctic, Newfoundland Social and Economic Papers: 2, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland. University of Toronto Press
- Paine, R 1970b: "Lappish Decisions, Partnerships, Information Management and Sanctions - a Nomadic Pastoral Adaptation", Ethnology 9:1:52-67
- Paine, R 1971: "Animals as Capital: Comparisons among Northern Nomadic Herders and Hunters", Anthr. Quarterly 44:3:157-72
- Paine, R 1972: "The Herd Management of Lapp Reindeer Pastoralists" pp 76-87 in N Dyson-Hudson and W Irons (eds) Perspectives on Nomadism, Leiden: Brill
- Pehrson, R 1964: The Bilateral Structure of Social Relations in Könkäma Lapp District, Oslo: Norsk Folkemuseum
- Powell, J D 1970: "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics", Am. Pol. Science Review, 64:411-425
- Pratt, D 1962: "The Grazing Areas of the Lower Euaso Nyiro Basin" in An Investigation into the Water Resources of the Euaso Nyiro Basin, Government of Kenya, Min. of Works, Hydraulic Branch, Report 4:II app. C, Nairobi
- Pratt, D, P J Greenway and M D Gwynne 1966: "A classification of East African Rangeland, with an appendix on terminology", Journal of Applied Ecology 3:369-382
- Pratt, D J & M D Gwynne 1977: Rangeland Management and Ecology in East Africa, London: Hodder and Stoughton
- Richards, A 1939: Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia: an Economic Survey of the Bemba Tribe, London: Oxford University Press
- Rigby, P 1969a: Cattle and Kinship among the Gogo: A Semi-Pastoral Society of Central Tanzania, London: Cornell University Press
- Rigby, P 1969b: "Pastoralism and Prejudice: Ideology and Rural Development in East Africa" pp 42-52 in "Society and Social Change in East Africa", Nkanga 4, Makerere Institute of Social Research, Kampala
- Roberts, S and J Comaroff 1976: Chiefly Decision and the Devolution of Property in a Tswana Chiefdom (mimeo)
- Rossetti, G & S Congiu 1955: Ricerche zootecnico-veterinarie sulle animali domestici della Somalia, Mogadiscio: Ispettorato Veterinario Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia
- Sacks, K 1973: "Engels revisited: Women, the Organization of Production and Private Property" pp 207-222 in M Z Rosaldo & L Lamphere (eds) Women, Culture and Society, Stanford: Stanford University Press
- Sahlins, M 1965: "On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange" in M Banton (ed) The Relevance of Models in Social Anthropology ASA monographs No 1, London: Tavistock Publications
- Salzman, P C 1967: "Political Organization Among Nomadic Peoples", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 111:115-131
- Salzman, P C 1979: "Inequality and oppression in nomadic society" pp 429-446 in Pastoral Production and Society, Proc. of an Int. Meeting on Nomadic Pastoralism, Paris 1-3 dec 1976. Equipe Ecologie et Anthropologie des Sociétés Pastorales, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Sandbrook, R 1975: Proletarians and African Capitalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Schneider, H K 1957: "The Subsistence Role of Cattle among the Pakot and in East Africa", American Anthropologist 59, 1:278-299
- Senga, W M 1976: "Kenya's Agricultural Sector" pp 69-110 in Heyer et al (eds) Agricultural Development in Kenya - An Economic Assessment, Nairobi: Oxford University Press
- Shivji, G 1976: Class Struggles in Tanzania, New York and London: Monthly Review Press
- Smith, G Alderson- 1976: Internal Migration and Economic Activity - Some Cases from Peru, Center Develop. Area Studies, Working Papers No 14, McGill University, Montreal

- Smith, G Alderson- and P Cano: H 1978: "Some factors Contributing to Peasant Land Occupations in Peru - the Example of Huasicancha 1963-1968" pp 163-190 in N Long and B R Roberts (eds) Peasant Cooperation and Capitalist Expansion in Central Peru, Inst. for Lat.American Studies, Austin: Texas University Press
- Smith, L D 1976: "An Overview of Agricultural Development Policy" in Heyer et al (eds) Agricultural Development in Kenya: An Economic Assessment, Nairobi: Oxford University Press
- Spencer, P 1965: The Samburu: a Study of Gerontocracy in a Nomadic Tribe, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press
- Spencer, P 1973: Nomads in Alliance: Symbiosis and Growth among the Rendille and Samburu of Kenya, London: Oxford University Press
- Spooner, B 1971: "Towards a Generative Model of Nomadism", Anthropological Quarterly 44:3:198-210
- Stavenhagen, R 1970: "Marginality, Participation and Agrarian Structure in Latin America" pp 57-92, Int. Inst. for Labour Studies, Bulletin 7
- Stenning, D 1958: "Household Viability among the Pastoral Fulani" in Goody, J (ed) The Developmental Cycle in Domestic Groups, Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology No. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Stenning, D J 1959: Savannah Nomads: A Study of the Wodaabe Pastoral Fulani of Western Bornu Province, Northern Region, Nigeria, London: Oxford University Press
- Ståhl, M 1974: Ethiopia: Political Contradictions in Agricultural Development, Stockholm: Rabén & Sjögren
- Swainson, N 1977: "The Rise of a National Bourgeoisie in Kenya", Review of African Political Economy 8:39-55
- Swift, J 1978: "Marginal Societies at the Modern Frontier in Asia and the Arctic", Development and Change 9; 3-19, London and Beverly Hills: SAGE
- Swift, J 1979: "The Development of Livestock Trading in a Nomad Pastoral Economy: the Somali Case" pp 447-465 in Pastoral Production and Society, Proceedings of an International Meeting on Nomadic Pastoralism, Paris 1-3 dec 1976. Equipe Ecologie et Anthropologie des Sociétés Pastorales, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Swynnerton, R J M 1954: A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya, Government Printers, Nairobi
- Torry, W I 1973: Subsistence Ecology among the Gabra: Nomads of the Kenya/Ethiopia Frontier, unpubl. Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University
- Torry, W 1976: "Residence Rules among the Gabra Nomads: Some Ecological Considerations", Ethnology 15:3:269-286
- Torry, W 1978: "Gabra Age Organization and Ecology" pp 183-206 in P Baxter and U Almagor (eds) Age, Generation and Time: Some Features of East African Organization, London: C Hurst & Co
- Trimingham, J S 1964: Islam in East Africa, Oxford: Clarendon Press
- UNDP/FAO. 1971a: Range Development in Marsabit District, United Nations Development Programme Rangeland Surveys Kenya, UNFAO, AGP: SF/KEN 11 Working Paper no 9, Nairobi
- UNDP/FAO 1971b: Range Development in Isiolo District, United Nations Development Programme Rangeland Surveys Kenya AGP: SF/KEN 11, Technical Report no 3, Nairobi
- Velsen, J van 1961: "Labour Migration as a Positive Factor in the Continuity of Tonga Tribal Society" pp 230-241 in A Southall (ed) Social Change in Modern Africa, London: Oxford University Press for Int. Afr. Inst.
- Vincent, J 1975: "Room for Manoeuvre: The Political Role of Small Towns in East Africa" pp 115-144 in M Owusu (ed) Colonialism and Change: Essays presented to Lucy Mair, The Hague, Paris: Mouton
- Waller, R 1975: Uneconomic Growth: The Maasai Stock Economy 1914-29 (mimeo)

- Watson, W 1958: Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy - A Study of the Mambwe People of Northern Rhodesia, Manchester: Manchester University Press for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute
- Weingrod, A 1968: "Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties", Comparative Studies in Society and History 10:376-400
- Weisner, T 1969: One Family - Two Households. A Rural-Urban Network Model of Urbanism (mimeo). Paper presented at the University of East Africa Social Science Council, 5th Annual Conference in Nairobi
- Widstrand, C G 1973: Pastoral People and Rural Development. A Case Study, Ann. Regiae Scientiarum Upsaliensis 17, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell
- Wisner, B G 1972: Kenya Drought Study: Kinna Site Sub-project. Preliminary Report no 1, Interview Survey, Some Descriptions and Analytical Results (mimeo)
- Wisner, B G 1977: The Human Ecology of Drought in Eastern Kenya, unpubl. Ph.D. Thesis, Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts
- Wrigley, C C 1965: "Kenya: The Patterns of Economic Life 1902-1945" pp 209-264 in V Harlow, E M Chilvers and A Smith (eds) History of East Africa, vol II, Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Zwanenberg, R M A, van and A King 1975a: An Economic History of Kenya and Uganda 1800-1970, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanity Press
- Zwanenberg, R M A van 1975b: Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya 1919-1939, Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau
- Zwanenberg, R M A, van 1976: "Dorobo Hunting and Gathering - a Way of Life or a Mode of Production?", African Economic History 2:12-21

INDEX

- abba 270
- abba deda 169
- abba e1a 140ff
- abba kara 92, 159, 169, 271
- abba Toni 61
- abba ola 141f, 169
- abba-ship 102
- Abdalla Somali 14
- Abdwak Somali 14
- Abir 186, 273
- Abyssinia 191, 197
- access herd 69f, 86, 94, 110
- addolesa season 31, 35, 271
- Aden 191
- adoption 78, 125
- administration 25, 104, 142, 224f
- administration centres see towns, small
- Africanization 221, 229
- African Livestock Marketing Organization 198
- age-set structure 169
- agriculture 12, 31ff, 38f, 101f, 104, 191, 213f, 218 226
- Ajuran Somali 14, 242
- aldhuhor 61
- alien Somali 200ff
- allotted herd 94, 95, 103
- Almagor 168, 186, 273
- amesa (milking rights) 117f, 271
- Amhara 27
- Andrzejewski 27, 243, 273
- angafa 95ff, 105, 123, 126, 271
- anjera 63, 67
- Ankole 118
- annan 35, 271
- anuna 120, 122, 126, 128, 271
- Arabia 197
- Arab merchants 171, 191ff
- Ariaal 55
- arjara 72, 271
- Arusha 201, 203
- Asad 12, 26, 135, 244, 273
- Ashraf 222, 243
- askari 195, 211
- Asmarom 20, 27, 99f, 101, 103 104, 111, 112, 133, 135, 136, 155, 158, 165, 166, 186, 187, 235, 243, 269, 273
- Athi River 197f
- auctions 204ff
- Aulihan Somali 14
- authority 19, 92, 103ff, 141ff, 169, 231ff
- autonomy 99ff
- ayana spirits 125, 243, 271
- badole 163, 271
- Bahrey 112
- Baker 26, 273
- Bale 35
- baraza 246, 271
- Barnes 162, 166, 273
- Barth 11, 25, 54, 86, 171, 186 273
- Bates 16, 26, 273
- Baxter 11, 15, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 50, 53, 55, 86, 87, 111, 112, 135, 165, 166, 168, 186, 187, 207, 208, 243, 269, 270, 273
- Beckingham 274
- Bemba 265
- Benadir coast 191
- berries, wild 37
- bigmanship 23, 83, 181, 232ff
- biriti 135
- Bisanadi 32, 33, 45, 48, 213, 260
- Bisanguracha 33
- bittata 160
- Black-Michaud 186, 187, 274
- Blackhurst 135, 165, 274
- Blegvad-Andersen 67, 273
- Block, Jack 260
- blood 35f
- Boji 48
- bonagaya season 31, 271
- bon season see bonagaya season
- Bonte 12, 26, 111, 265, 274
- Borana cattle 40
- Borana, Ethiopian see Borana, northern
- Borana, Marsabit 19, 50
- Borana, northern 20, 136, 156, 171 235f
- Borana Gutu 16, 38, 51ff, 135, 169, 177, 178, 183, 186, 210, 232f, 242
- Boran peace 19
- Bororo see Fulani
- bourgeoisie see elite
- Brayne-Nichols 67

- Brémaud 54, 55, 274
 bridewealth 100, 127, 155
 Brook-Bond 204
 brother-sister relationship 130f
 Brown 244
 Bule 52
 Buna 45f
 butume 57, 103, 151, 173, 271
 camel 11, 16, 23, 34ff, 41ff, 50ff, 55, 67, 118, 135, 175, 177
 camp see ola
 camp cooperation 140ff
 camp structure 138ff
 Cano 279
 Canott 86
 capital care 176ff, 223
 capitalism 12, 22, 34, 231ff
 Castagno 206, 207, 208, 274
 Catha Edulis see miraa
 cattle 11, 13, 16, 23, 34ff, 41ff, 50ff, 55, 175, 177f, 219
 cattle-rustling 49
 Central Province 192, 198
 Cerulli 136, 274
 chain, family 158
 Chambers 55, 244, 274
 chapati 63, 67
 charri 53, 56, 271
 Chera Plains 45
 Cher Daba plains 48, 54
 Chief 21, 142, 193ff, 239f, 243
 child-caring 113ff
 chirresa 60, 271
 Christian religion 200f
 Church 67, 274
 clan, geographical distribution 151, 187
 clanship 18, 152f, 166, 174, 187, 210, 232f, 236f, 240
 clienthood 181ff, 239ff
 client son-in-law 107ff
 Cliffe 264, 265, 274
 Cohen 264, 274
 colonial administration, British 13, 20, 21, 22, 44, 48, 53, 78, 98, 169, 171, 192ff, 207, 243
 colonialism 22, 191ff
 Comaroff 111, 136
 containerization 192
 Congiu 54
 Copans 54, 274
 corral herd 94
 councillors 226f, 233ff, 241, 243, 244, 246
 cultivation see agriculture
 Cunnison 111, 274
 Cyrenaican Bedouin 116
 daba 145, 165, 202f, 271
 dabarre 180ff, 187, 271
 dabarsa 179
 Dadach Latta 48
 daha 70, 138ff, 271
 Dahi 26, 54, 55, 67, 86, 87, 111, 135, 187, 207, 229, 230, 264, 265, 267, 274
 dalla (widow inheritance) 129f, 136, 271
 Dalleo 206, 207, 208, 275
 dambala 48, 271
 Dambitu 151
 dase 67
 Dassanetch 14, 168
 decision-making 88ff
 deda 41, 161, 205, 271
 Deghier goats 40
 dependency 79ff, 107ff
 "development" 16, 34, 105, 220, 237
 Diarra 54, 275
 differentiation 254ff
 Digodia Somali 14
 dirra 166
 Dirre 16, 18, 19, 50
 disease see health
 diversification (see also herd d.) 104
 diversification, new forms 214ff
 domestic consumption 115ff
 domestic group see household
 Dorobo 186
 Driberg 135, 136, 275
 drought 22, 23, 34, 38, 40f, 45, 48, 50, 55, 64, 91, 210, 229
 duka 194, 199f, 220, 229, 246, 271
 dundo 120, 122, 126, 128, 271
 Dupire 135, 275
 Dyson-Hudson N. 11, 25, 26, 111, 275
 Dyson-Hudson R. 26, 275
 East African Cattle Complex 13
 ecology 11f, 19, 21, 30ff, 39ff, 49, 55, 135, 162, 170, 187
 egalitarianism 19, 167ff, 176ff
 ela 48, 271
 Etam 118, 135, 275
 elite 198ff, 219ff, 239ff, 246ff, 254ff
 Ennew 264, 275
 epizooty 50, 170, 191, 198
 ergifata 126, 171
 esteem 180ff
 Ethiopia 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 34, 35, 171, 186, 191, 197, 200

Euaso Nyiro 9, 10, 32, 45, 48, 62, 213
 Evans-Pritchard 175
 family 19, 33, 39, 49, 52, 70, 75ff, 114ff
 FAO 213
 farming see agriculture
 father-son-relations 99ff, 111
 fat production 37, 50
 female fertility, significance of 119f, 121ff
 female sphere 15, 19, 56ff, 88ff, 113ff, 135, 136, 138, 248ff
 Ferraro 229, 275
 Firth 161, 166, 275
 food production 39ff
 fora herd 42ff, 48, 49, 68f, 86, 219, 271
 forest products 54
 Frantz 26, 275
 fraternal groups 51, 149ff, 215f
 Friedl 135, 275
 friend-in-law see sodda
 Fulani 11, 69, 71, 111, 116, 135
 gabaar 127f, 156, 271
 Gabbra 14, 18, 19, 54, 65, 107, 111, 135, 186, 187, 270
 Gachuru 45
 gada 19ff, 102f, 112, 124, 135, 162, 166, 168, 183, 268, 271
 gadamoji 102, 112, 135, 166, 271
 gadis galgalla 61
 gaharva 92, 271
 Galana 48
 galatho 181, 271
 Galaty 186, 275
 Galla 14, 16, 26, 101, 112, 168
 gal lagan 118, 271
 galtu 223, 238, 242
 Ganda 14
 ganna season 31, 271
 garayyu 123, 271
 Garba Tula 25, 31, 62, 85, 151, 194, 198, 202, 217, 219, 220f, 229, 246, 266
 Garissa 46
 Garissa District 46, 198
 Garri Somali 14, 270
 gela mat 67
 generation classes see gada
 gerontocracy 101ff see also father-son relations
 Ghai 206, 275
 ghee 59, 191
 Gluckman 239, 244, 275
 goats 11, 34ff, 42f, 50f, 175, 179, 219
 gogessa (lines of descent lines) 162f, 271
 Gona moiety 18, 269
 Goody 112, 275
 gossa (lineage) 271
 Goto 275
 grain, dependence on 65f see also agriculture
 Gregory 206, 276
 guardian 105ff, 149ff
 Guji 27
 Gulliver 11, 25, 155, 165, 186, 276
 Gwynne 31, 55, 278
 Habbaswein 31
 Haberland 27, 55, 112, 135, 165, 166, 178, 184, 187, 270, 276
 had, hato (mother) 272
 had worra 123, 272
 haggaya season 31, 272
 hajji 244, 246
 halaal 102, 110, 272 see also ownership of livestock
 Hamitic, Western 14
 handura 93ff, 116ff, 122, 131f, 272
 harambee 86, 237
 haramu 176
 hare 48, 272
 hato mana 124
 hawicha herd 42ff, 48, 49, 68f, 86, 272
 hayu 169, 174ff, 183, 185, 272
 headman 21, 193ff
 health 41, 43, 48, 49, 50, 51, 60, 65, 86, 90, 165, 198
 Helland 19, 27, 54, 55, 165, 276
 Henrikssen 229, 276
 herd dispersal 19, 49f, 70ff
 herd diversification 19, 49f
 herd management 39ff, 68ff, 81ff, 88ff, 108
 herding 88ff, 111
 herding tactics 89ff, 106, 110
 herding tasks 89ff, 106
 herding unit 94
 Herskowitz 26, 276
 Herti Somali 191, 194, 222, 243
 Heyer 208, 209, 276
 Hjort 11, 15, 26, 54, 55, 67, 86, 87, 111, 135, 186, 187, 204, 206, 207, 208f, 229f, 243f, 263f, 265f, 276
 Horn 276
 hospitality 115ff, 182f

household 19, 70, 140
 household confederation 70, 217
 household viability 69ff, 79ff, 91ff
 housekeeping 89, 114ff, 248ff
 Hultin 27, 102, 111, 186, 276
 Humr Arabs 92
 Huntingford 112, 274, 276
 hunting/gathering 33, 38, 177ff
 husbandry 88ff, 111, 174f
 Igembe Meru 45
 ilmo tuti 125, 272
 Indian merchants 171
 inequality 168ff, 227ff
 inheritance 92ff, 106ff, 116ff, 149f, 181f
 intal (girl) 119, 272
 integration 190ff
 Iran 11, 171, 187
 irrigation schemes 65ff, 79ff, 85
 Isaq Somali 191, 194, 222, 243
 Isiolo County Council 204, 221, 225, 238, 260, 264
 Isiolo District 9, 10, 16, 25, 34f, 46, 51, 53, 63, 66, 150, 169, 192ff, 202, 238
 Isiolo Town 25, 28, 31, 46, 48, 62, 85, 202, 217, 218, 222, 238, 243, 244, 246
 Islam 18, 21, 124, 126, 243, 244
 ivory 27, 173, 186
 Jacobs 11, 25, 26, 276
 Jallaba (lineage elders) 102f, 116, 169, 174f, 183ff, 193, 232ff, 272
 Jilodima 33
 Jubaland 171
 kadda 127, 156, 272 see also bridewealth
 Kamba 14, 197, 205
 Karamojong 11
 karata 127, 272 see also bridewealth
 Karayu 151
 Karayu Danka 151
 Karayu Didimtu 151
 Kelly 135, 276
 Kenya Meat Commission 204
 Kenya Meat Supply Board 197
 kero 108f, 112, 272
 Kgatla 92, 131
 Kiengu 45
 Kikuyu 14, 192, 205
 King 186, 206, 207, 208
 King's African Rifles 13, 192f
 Kinna 32, 38, 45, 48, 59, 205, 219, 246, 260, 266
 kinship solidarity 137ff
 Kismayu 197
 Knutsson 27, 166, 276
 komiti 226f, 272
 Konso 35
 kora 115, 272
 kora deda 169
 kora gossa 169, 184
 Krige 136, 277
 Kulamawe 45
 Könkämä Sami 59
 labour allocation 19, 52, 68ff, 79ff
 labour, domestic 76ff, 85, 171
 labour migration 79ff, 150, 211ff, 261
 labour, recruitment of 78ff
 labour shortage 85f, 114
 laga 45
 Lake Turkana 168
 Lamu 197, 199
 language 16, 52, 55, 77
 Lare 45
 Leys 264, 277
 Lefebure 186, 265, 277
 Leonard 277
 Lewis H S 27, 277
 Lewis I M 11, 15, 25, 26, 135, 229, 277
 Liban 18, 27, 50
 Liebig company 197, 204
 Lilljequist 243, 277
 lineage council see kora gossa
 Livestock Marketing Division 204
 Lobedo 131
 Local Native Council 198ff, 208
 Long 217, 229, 277
 love 121ff
 luba 156, 162f, 272
 Luhya 14
 Luo 14
 Lur 187
 maalim 176
 Maasai 11, 14, 191
 Macha Oromo 101f
 Madogash 85, 246
 Mafuriko 32
 mala marri 140ff, 162, 272
 male sphere 15, 19, 56ff, 88ff, 113ff, 138, 248ff
 Malka Galla 48
 Malka Daka 213
 management herd 94
 management of livestock (terminology) 94
 manyatta 241, 246, 250ff, 266, 272

- marginal 25, 160, 241, 250ff
 marginalization 256
 market town see town, small
 marriage 99ff, 112, 186
 Marris 222f, 230, 277
 Marsabit 18, 19
 Marsabit District 45f
 Mason 54, 277
 Matasara 51
 Matthies 208, 277
 Maule 54, 277
 Maure 12
 McAuslan 206
 Meat Marketing Board 197
 meat production 35ff, 39, 50, 54, 68ff, 196
 Mecca 244
 meher 122, 127, 130f
 Meillassoux 264, 277
 Melbana 67
 Member of Parliament 222, 226f, 233ff, 243, 244
 Menelik II 27, 191
 Merti 45, 85, 151, 202, 213, 246
 Meru 14, 35, 45, 205, 238
 Meru District 45f
 Middle East 244
 milking rights 122
 milk production 35ff, 39, 50, 54, 68ff, 113ff, 134
 minimal breeding herd 92ff, 103, 170 172 see also butume
 miraa 62, 67, 156, 180, 218, 221, 252, 272
 mirgicha 160
 Mirreh 265, 277
 Mitchell 264, 277
 mobility 19, 40ff, 135
 Mohamed Zubeir Somali 14
 moiety 154, 159ff, 186
 Mombasa 197
 Monod 229, 277
 motherhood 121ff
 Moyale 18, 19
 Mungai 208
 Muslim Law 98, 165, 182
 Muslim religion 200f, 229
 Muslim tax see taka
 Mutuati 45
 National Christian Council of Kenya 213, 277
 neighbourhood meeting see kora deda
 Nandi 191
 Nanyuki 191
 Native Tribunal 198ff
 NFD see Northern Frontier District
 nikaa 127
 Njemps 197
 Nonitu 151
 Northeastern Province 22
 Northern Frontier District 22f, 78, 192ff, 207
 Notes and Queries on Anthropology 177
 Nuer 152, 155
 Nun 264, 277
 Nyambeni Hills 46
 nyatu 91, 174, 186, 272
 Nyeri 191, 199
 Ogaden 200
 Okiek 186
 ola 62, 137ff, 272
 Ormerod 54, 277
 oroge 67
 Oromo 16, 20, 26, 101f, 135, 150, 153, 154
 Ostberg 243, 277
 overstocking 40
 ownership of livestock (terminology) 94, 108
 Paine 1, 25, 54, 89, 111, 177, 186, 187, 277
 Palmer 207
 Parsons 207
 pasture claims 20, 44f, 52f
 patrilinearity 18, 149ff
 patronage 23, 180ff, 239ff
 Peace of the Borana 199
 peasantization 256, 257ff
 Pehrson 159, 165, 278
 periphery 191ff
 Peru 217
 posho 38, 63, 67, 272
 post-marital life 126ff
 Powell 234, 243, 278
 Pratt 31, 55, 278
 production, relations of 75ff
 proletarianization 256
 property herd 69f, 86, 94
 property relations 137ff
 property rights, women's derived 117ff
 gallitti (shaman) 125, 272
 gallu 18, 183ff, 233, 272
 qolte 151, 173f, 180, 272
 Quran 135
 rainfall 31, 48
 Rapsu 33, 213
 re 42, 272
 recuperation herd see minimal breeding herd
 recuperative power 180ff
 redistribution 83ff, 92, 151, 167ff, 172ff, 181ff, 210, 239ff
 relations, intra-domestic 19

relief aid 203f
 religion 18
 Rendille 13, 14, 18, 53, 55,
 77, 135, 187, 270
 reproduction vs production
 114ff
 rera 57, 161, 272
 residence 107ff, 150ff
 residual herd 94, 95, 98
 resource control 19, 109f,
 167ff, 259
 Richards 265, 278
 Rigby 26, 165, 278
 risk-reduction 22, 39, 49ff,
 90ff, 171
 Roberts 111, 136, 278
 Rossetti 54, 278
 Sabbu moiety 18, 269
 Sacks 278
 saddaga 182, 272
 Sahlins 187, 278
 Sakuye 16, 23, 26 33, 37, 51ff
 55, 65, 67, 135, 169, 174,
 177ff, 186, 204, 210, 213,
 217, 242, 270
 salt licks 43f, 90, 169
 Salzman 25, 48, 55, 186, 187,
 265, 278
 Samburu 11, 13, 14, 18, 47,
 49, 55, 99, 100, 111, 152,
 173, 197, 207, 208
 Samburu District 46, 192f,
 198, 260
 Sami 11, 89f
 Sandbrook 243, 244, 264, 278
 Sandford 229, 230, 267, 275,
 278
 Schneider 54, 278
 seasonal changes 48, 62ff
 seasonal outmigration 65
 secessionist war see shifta
 war
 segmentary system 152
 Senga 278
 seniority, ritual 160
 Sericho 151, 202, 213, 246
 settlers 191ff
 sexuality 135
 sexual stratification 133ff
 Shaba 260
 shamba 33, 38, 59, 66, 213f,
 218, 220, 246, 272
 sheep 11, 34ff, 42f, 50f, 135,
 175, 179, 219
 sheep and goats strategy 204
 shegat 86
 sheikh 127, 176, 272
 shifta war 13, 22f, 32f, 37,
 51ff, 66, 165, 174, 200ff,
 221, 262, 272
 Shivji 262, 278
 Shoa 154, 191
 Sidamo 35
 small stock see sheep and goats
 Smith 86, 195, 206, 207, 217,
 229, 278, 279
 snaking 159
 sodda 153ff, 235ff, 272
 soil 43, 51, 52, 90, 198
 Somali 11, 18, 25, 41, 47, 51,
 52f, 77, 152, 171, 191ff,
 208, 229, 238, 270
 Somalia 16, 22f, 200ff
 Somali cattle 40
 Somali sheep 40
 Somerset 222f, 230, 277
 Soviet 201
 Spencer 11, 13, 25, 26, 55, 86,
 100, 135, 152, 165, 186, 187,
 207, 208, 229, 230, 244, 279
 Spooner 244, 279
 Stavenhagen 264, 279
 Stenning 11, 25, 69, 71, 83, 86,
 87, 111, 112, 279
 stock association 172f
 stock-loan 180ff
 stock-rights, female 120f
 stratification 254ff
 Ståhl 27, 279
 Sudan 32, 135
 sub-household 70, 119
 Swainson 229, 264, 279
 Swift 206, 262, 265, 279
 Swynnerton 207, 279
 taka 175f, 272
 Tana River 45
 Tana River District 46
 task-sets in production 71ff, 85
 Tharaka 14, 45f
 ticks 55
 Torry 12, 19, 26, 27, 54, 55, 65,
 67, 86, 107, 111, 112, 135,
 158, 165, 186, 187, 270, 279
 town, small 15, 65f, 238f, 244,
 245ff
 town Somali 222, 243
 trade- barter 35, 37f, 66, 170,
 194
 trade, camel 53
 trade, cattle 22, 195ff
 trade, generally 170, 186, 220ff
 trade, livestock 195ff
 trade, longdistance 186, 191ff
 trade, retail 104, 194f, 222ff
 trade, small stock 53, 170,
 192ff
 transport animals 52f, 54, 60
 Tringham 243, 279

tse-tse 33, 45
 Turkana 11, 14, 154f, 173,
 229, 238
 UNDP 279
 wage employment 104f, 211ff,
 224ff
 wages for herding 77f
 Wajir 191
 Wajir District 45f, 198
 Waller 206, 279
 Wamba 46
 Van Velsen 229, 213, 279
 Waq 18, 272
 waqalal 93ff, 279
 ward 105ff
 ware 57, 63, 279
 wari 62
 warra 161
 Warrilibin 18
 Wata 16, 33, 38, 55, 169, 178,
 186, 187, 210, 260
 water 20, 35, 44, 48, 52, 63,
 169
 Watson 26, 213, 229, 280
 vegetation 51, 90
 Weingrod 244, 280
 Weisner 229, 280
 well 34f, 48, 63, 140
 Veterinary Department 197, 204
 Widstrand 55, 280
 village see town, small
 Vincent 15, 26, 243, 279
 Wisner 38, 54, 192, 195, 206,
 207, 218, 229, 244, 264,
 280
 Von Kaufmann 208, 276
 World War II 13, 197, 198f,
 206
 Worra Jidda 151
 Wrigley 207, 280
 yabiye 71
 Yamicha 53
 Yavello 18
 zakat see taka
 Zanzibar 197
 Zebu 40
 Zwanenberg 186, 195, 206, 207,
 208, 280

STOCKHOLM STUDIES IN SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY

1. *Caymanian Politics: Structure and Style in a Changing Island Society* by Ulf Hannerz
Skr. 25:-, \$ 5.00.
2. *Having Herds: Pastoral Herd Growth and Household Economy* by Gudrun Dahl and Anders Hjort (Out of print)
3. *The Patron and the Panca: Village Values and Pancayat Democracy in Nepal* by Bengt-Erik Borgström Skr. 25:-, \$ 5.00.
4. *Ethnicity and Mobilization in Sami Politics* by Tom G. Svensson Skr. 35:-, \$ 7.00.
5. *Market, Mosque and Mafraj: Social Inequality in a Yemeni Town* by Tomas Gerholm
Skr. 40:-, \$ 8.00.
6. *The Community Apart: A Case Study of a Canadian Indian Reserve Community* by Yngve Georg Lithman Skr. 40:-, \$ (Can. or US.) 8.00.
7. *Savanna Town: Rural Ties and Urban Opportunities in Northern Kenya* by Anders Hjort Skr. 48:-, \$ 10.00.
8. *Suffering Grass: Subsistence and Society of Waso Borana* by Gudrun Dahl
Skr. 48:-, \$ 10.00.

Available from
Department of Social Anthropology
University of Stockholm
S-10691 Stockholm
Sweden

ISBN 91 85284-14-9