Reordering of Meaningful Worlds

Memory of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Post-Soviet Ukraine

Yuliya Yurchuk
In memory of my mother
Each PhD dissertation is the result of a long journey. Mine was not an exception. It has been a long and exciting trip which I am happy to have completed. This journey would not be possible without the help and support of many people and several institutions to which I owe my most sincere gratitude.

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### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>NKVD</td>
<td>People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (<em>Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del</em>), a law enforcement agency of the Soviet Union. Associated with the Soviet secret police and is known for its political repression during the era of Joseph Stalin.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OUN</td>
<td>Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (<em>Organizatsiia Ukraïns’kykh Natsionalistiv</em>), established in 1929.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OUN-B</td>
<td>Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Stepan Bandera, established as a result of the split in the OUN leadership in 1941.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OUN-M</td>
<td>Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Andriy Mel’nyk, established as a result of the split in the OUN leadership in 1941.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rukh</td>
<td>The People’s Movement of Ukraine (<em>Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy</em>), a Ukrainian center-right political party. Organized in 1989 as the People’s Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction (i.e. for <em>perestroika</em>), a civil-political movement as no other political party was allowed in the Soviet Union but the Communist Party. The manifesto of the movement was drawn up by the Writers’ Association of Ukraine. The organization was mainly initiated by Ukrainian dissidents.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>UAOC</td>
<td>Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church: it has its origins in the Sobor (synod) of 1921 in Kyiv after Ukraine’s newly declared independence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UHA</td>
<td>Ukrainian Galician Army (Ukraïns’ka Halyts’ka Armiiia), the military wing of the West Ukrainian National Republic during and after the Polish-Ukrainian War (1918-1919).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPP</td>
<td>Ukrainian People’s Party (Ukraïns’ka Narodna Partiia), established in 1999 from Rukh and other parties, Yuriy Kostenko was elected as the head of the party. In 2014, Oleksandr Klymenko is the head of the party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNR</td>
<td>Ukrainian People’s Republic (Ukraïns’ka Narodna Respublika), inaugurated on 23 June 1917, led by Symon Petliura. Between April and December 1918 the Ukrainian People’s Republic was scarcely detectable and was overthrown by the Ukrainian State of Pavlo Skoropadskyi. After the October Revolution, several governments acted in Ukraine. The two most significant were the Ukrainian People’s Republic, in Kyiv, and the Ukrainian People’s Republic of Soviets, in Kharkiv. These two sides were in a conflict. As a result of the Treaty of Riga (18 March 1921) the Soviet Union extended its control over the territory that became the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UOC (KP)</td>
<td>Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate), established in 1992. It is one of the three main Orthodox churches in Ukraine, together with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. The church is unrecognized by other canonical Eastern Orthodox churches.</td>
</tr>
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UOC (MP) Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate): an autonomous Church of Eastern Orthodoxy in Ukraine, under the ecclesiastic jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. Only this church has its canonical status recognized by the whole Eastern Orthodox communion.

UPA Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrains’ka Povstans’ka Armia): the military wing of the OUN-B

URP Ukrainian Republican Party (Ukrains’ka Respublikans’ka Partiia), the first registered political party in (then still) Soviet Ukraine created in 1990. It was in place of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group (the human rights organization founded in 1976, active until 1981 when its members were jailed). In April 2002 the party merged with the Ukrainian People’s Party “Sobor” and became the Ukrainian Republican Party “Sobor.”

UVO Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrains’ka Viiskova Organizatsiia): a Ukrainian resistance and sabotage movement active in Eastern Poland during the years between the two world wars. Headed by Yevhen Konovalets’ who later became the leader of the OUN.

ZUNR Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (Zahidno-Ukrains’ka Narodna Respublika) that existed in late 1918 and early 1919 in Eastern Galicia. The Republic was dominated by the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance, a party guided by varying degrees of Greek Catholic, liberal and socialist ideology.
A Note on Language and Transliteration

In my study, I use the Library of Congress system of transliteration from Ukrainian. Exceptions to this are the terms that have become accepted usage in English, such as e.g. Yushchenko instead of Iushchenko. Place names are transliterated from Ukrainian rather than Russian (e.g. Kyiv rather than Kiev, Rivne rather than Rovno, etc.) The names transliterated in the cited passages are left the same as in the original. All translations are my own, except where otherwise noted.
It is a crisp sunny day in October. The air is fresh and clear in Rivne. The leaves are turning yellow, red and brown. It rained the night before. The road is still wet. Some patches are covered with puddles. It is Sunday. No-one seems to be in a hurry. People are just strolling through the park’s paths. The road is almost empty, only the occasional bus or car passes by. The setting is almost idyllic and invites meditation. I stand in a small square and look for someone I could pose a question to about the Klym Savur monument which stands behind me. I wonder whether those people, who are passing by, pay any attention to what I am writing my dissertation about. Soon I will know. But first, I need to find someone to start with.

Meanwhile, a man in his mid-fifties approaches the monument. He carries a big bunch of flowers: violet chrysanthemums. He kneels in front of the monument, takes several flowers from the bunch and places them on the pedestal. My heart stops. This is an intriguing moment for me as I am interested in the entanglement of memory, monuments and commemoration. It fascinates me. I am afraid I will be too slow with my big camera, so I take out my mobile and begin taking pictures. But the man is in less of a hurry than I think, he takes his time, looks steadily at the monument, kneeling calmly. “I could have taken good pictures. There would have been enough time,” - my inner voice scolds me. The man gets up and becomes aware of my husband and me. The man smiles at us, looks at the camera, pad and pen in my freezing hands and asks: “Are you Americans?” Well, who else could be interested in him kneeling in front of the monument? We start talking and he says that the flowers he kept are for another monument or two. “Yeah, probably I will make two more today,” - the man says. “Why?” - we ask. “Because they are monuments for dead people, they all deserve flowers because they all are dead,” - is his answer. “What other monuments would you visit today?” - I wonder. “Most probably Shevchenko and the Dubens’ke cemetery,” - he responds. I ask him whether he wants to answer several questions in my survey, and his answer comes “No,” nice but firm. I cannot insist. The brief

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1 Klym Savur is the alias of Dmytro Kliachkivs’kyi (1911-1945), the commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (the UPA-North).
2 Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) - the romantic poet, a national hero of Ukraine, who was indeed seen as such during both the Soviet period and afterwards in independent Ukraine.
3 Dubens’ke cemetery in Rivne is the cemetery where the memorial to the Red Army soldiers is placed.
encounter with him and our short conversation make me think of so many things that now I have to pause before continuing.

Surely, this must have been an unusual encounter. It is not everyday you see people kneeling in front of secular monuments. Yet, I was there at the very moment he was there. Sheer serendipity, no? The day I started interviewing people near the monument many of my pre-anticipated conclusions dissolved. “In the field of observation, chance favors only the prepared mind,” Louis Pasteur famously once said. Was my mind prepared for that chance, to encounter a man who was at the same time bringing flowers to such a diverse mix of monuments: to Klym Savur, the commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), to Taras Shevchenko, the romantic Ukrainian poet, and to the numerous Red Army soldiers who fell in the fight against Nazi Germany?

Having read extensively on state- and nation-building in Ukraine I was expecting to get more definite answers. While conducting research in Rivne, Western Ukraine, I imagined I would meet people with nationalist inclinations who would have glorified Klym Savur as a national hero. They were not supposed to bring flowers to the fallen Red Army soldiers. After Rivne, I planned to go to the eastern city of Luhans’k and find the “counter-memories” that would deny the status of the UPA being national heroes and would instead commemorate only the Red Army heroes. My entire research plan and hypothesis rested on this preconceived idea. After the fieldwork in Rivne and Luhans’k I would write my dissertation based on two polarities – Western and Eastern Ukraine. That was my plan.

What I found in Rivne, though, dramatically changed my plan and my thoughts on the intricate interplay of history and memory. I did not need the interplay of geographical polarities any more, as the regional complexity appeared so rich, that I could build up my narrative rooted in this complexity. Instead of painting a picture about “Ukrainian memory” in broad brushes, I would concentrate instead on the details that shed light on the more complex relationship between time and space, memory and history, region and nation.

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Figure 1. A visitor kneeling in front of the monument to Klym Savur. Rivne, October 2011. Photo: Yuliya Yurchuk.
Chapter I. Introduction

The picture of what we were at the earlier stage may not be recognizable and cannot, certainly, be pleasing to contemplate in later life. But we must not repudiate it, for it is a proof that we have really lived.

Marcel Proust. Remembrance of Things Past.5

Ob diese Geschichte wahr ist, weiß ich nicht, aber ich habe sie so oft gehört, dass ich mir nicht vorstellen kann, sie sei es nicht.

Monique Schwitter. Goldfischgedächtnis.6

This study was drawing to a close at same time as the most crucial events in the history of post-Soviet Ukraine were taking place. Those events started on 21 November, 2013 when hundreds of people gathered on Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kyiv. They were there to demonstrate against the decision of the then President Viktor Yanukovych’s government to withdraw from signing the Association Agreement with the European Union (EU).7 Due to a pro-European agenda the protests were entitled “Euromaidan,” or “Euro-revolution.” After a week of uninterrupted protests, the authorities employed violence to control the uprising. In response, more people came out on the streets. At this point, the protestors’ agenda shifted from demands for European integration to protection of human dignity and human rights. Consequently, some people started to call the events “the revolution of dignity.” The demands of the protestors were by and large ignored by the government; tension increased and the conflict escalated. In January 2014, two protestors were killed by police, Maidan activists and journalists were kidnapped, abducted and tortured. What began as a peaceful demonstration in November ended with unbridled violence in February when around one hundred people were killed by snipers from the special security forces. Thereafter dramatic change happened at breakneck speed:

6 “Whether this story is true, I do not know, but I have heard it so many times, that I cannot imagine that it is not.” (Schwitter, Monique. Goldfischgedächtnis: Erzählungen. Wien: Literaturverlag Droschl, 2011, p.70).
Yanukovych left the country, an interim government was formed, Russia invaded Ukraine, annexing Crimea and continually threatening Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the east of the country. All these pivotal events when tackled by journalists, area experts, and politicians were framed by memory talk. The past was invoked by the demonstrators for mobilization, the past provided a paradigm for analysis, and the past was the basis for territorial claims.

One of the central historical themes referred to at that time was the Ukrainian war-time nationalist movement – the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, and its military arm – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (the OUN and the UPA respectively). And it is precisely this memory of the OUN and the UPA, as it developed from 1990 up to 2010, which became the subject of this book. The dramatic events set out above showed that the memory of the OUN and UPA is charged with so many meanings and has such a strong resonance in society that it can be used to achieve diametrically opposed goals. These range from mass mobilization to the ruling authority's crackdowns, from fighting for democracy to the justification for a foreign invasion into a neighboring country.

**Research Questions**

This book tries to explain why the painful memories of the Second World War, which hold such a strong potential to fracture the society, are revived in such strength almost seventy years after the event. Why do these historical episodes matter so much that they are introduced in geopolitical talks on war-and-peace? Why do those who trumpet democratic and pro-European orientation for Ukraine invoke the history of an anti-democratic nationalist movement from the past? Or, as Swedish historian Per-Anders Rudling puts it, why do the democratic Ukrainians have to take up the legacy of the OUN? Do they really have to accept these legacies?

Because the question of memory is so broad, I synthesized the research questions to a number of concrete points: Why does the history of the OUN and UPA matter so much in particular times and in particular places? Who are the memory actors engaged in fostering the memory of the OUN and UPA? How is this memory received by the public? What is actually remembered when the memory of the OUN and UPA is discussed?

To answer these questions more effectively, I chose to concentrate in detail on the context in which memory is shaped and on the process of producing and receiving one specific representation of memory, its

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“hardware” i.e. the monuments. This study, though, is not the study of monuments. I am interested in monuments in so far as they can shed light on memory work as a whole. I chose monuments as an entrance point from which I could prompt discussions, actors and practices related to the memory of the OUN and UPA. By isolating the points where the discussions on monuments were at their most intense I could trace where the memory of the OUN and UPA mattered the most. By focusing on the narratives and rituals linked to the monument I could see who the actors involved in memory work were. This led me closer to the answer to the main questions on why exactly this episode of history became so important and so widely used by many actors and what this past really meant to those actors and to society in general. To further limit the discussion, I concentrated on one particular geographical site. This was the Rivne region in Western Ukraine. As a result, I examined how memory work in the region influenced the memory politics in the center and, conversely, how the center impacted on the region.

Reordering of Meaningful Worlds

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, society faced a new reality. The old, known world disappeared. The new world which was looming on the horizon brought not only hopes of a better life but also risks and uncertainties. The new reality needed new orientations which were unearthed in the present and in the past. The new order also meant consolidation and transformation of collective identities. Reinvigorating of national identity led to a change in the emphasis on how the past was dealt with – many things which were regarded as negative by the Soviet regime became positive in independent Ukraine. Such a shift - which Verdery called a “reordering of meaningful worlds” meant the war-time nationalist movement became one of such re-configured themes of history. This theme was seen as an opportunity to tell the story of the war from a different, non-Soviet, perspective. As a result of such a re-configuration, to some extent the misdeeds of the nationalist organizations could be overlooked, while the main accent in national history was placed on presenting the heroic struggle of the Ukrainian people for an independent state.


10 Verdery, Katherine. The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 50. I refer directly to this phrase coined by Katherine Verdery in the title of my book as, in my view, it illustrates precisely the process in memory work that I analyze. Hence, I give credit to the scholar when I use this phrase.
Thus, my working hypothesis is that the memory of the OUN and UPA became a hub which translates experiences of war in a different way to those conveyed in the Soviet-styled master narrative, which underlines “the Great Victory of the Soviet people over fascism,” ignoring the specificities of experiences of war that do not fit the dominant framework. The Soviet-bred narrative of war downplays the experiences of each individual nationality within the Soviet Union and silences, stereotypes or stigmatizes anti-Soviet movements which were active during and after the war, including the OUN and UPA. The need to tell a new story about the war was brought about by several reasons. On the one hand, it was promoted by political groups to legitimate their power after the collapse of the Soviet system. Such a political use of history is in no way a new phenomenon, as history has been used for political purposes since time immemorial. On the other hand, there was a demand for a new history of the war from the side of the broader societal perspective which could guarantee the public acceptance of a new narrative. Stories of a nationalist underground must have acquired a theme that resonates with the needs of a particular society at a particular moment. Thus, the use of the past is not limited to political purposes; it also extends to the existential needs of the community.

**Reclamation of the Past**

I argue that the memory of the OUN and UPA has a strong resonance in society since it goes in tandem with a need to reclaim history (which is a part of a national liberation project), and a need of smaller communities and individuals to build their group (or even biographical) identity narratives. I argue that the postcolonial project of reclamation creates a new memory culture. The literal meaning of the verb “to reclaim” is “to regain,” “to make one’s own,” or “to repossess.” The term “reclamation” is used with respect to language in the studies of a discursive and narrative formation of identity, where the questions of domination and subordination are analyzed. Using reclamation, the life order conveyed by the language of the dominant group is fractured and a new order tries to emerge.

Reclamation is closely linked to the need of self-definition whereby the main demand is to “take the kind of authority to name, describe and create our world… to engage in distinctively human activity of defining, describing and re-creating ourselves while simultaneously defining, describing, and

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recreating our social and material world.”\textsuperscript{13} Reclamation is the rejection of the idea of judging oneself from the perspective of the dominant group.

Put another way, to tell the story of oneself or of a group one belongs to, including one’s nation, is to take charge and find one’s own voice which can speak without the impact of the internalized other that generates oppressive values.\textsuperscript{14} The American philosopher Hilde Lindemann Nelson conceptualizes the telling of stories as a method of reclamation and resistance. She underlines the selective character of depicting facts for construction of one's narrative of the self: “By selectively depicting and characterizing the acts and events of my life that are important to me…by plotting these various elements in ways that connect my stories to other stories that give my stories their overall significance, I come to an understanding of who I am.”\textsuperscript{15} In this sense, telling stories about the past can become a resource for counter-stories - stories that resist and undermine the oppressive identity and attempt to replace that identity with one that commands respect.\textsuperscript{16} Counter-stories can thus become tools for repairing the damage inflicted on identities by abusive power systems.\textsuperscript{17}

To become a constructive part of identity, the memory must be presented in such a way that all the difficult aspects of past events, which could damage the positive image of oneself, pass unnoticed. My assertion is that such a presentation is provided by myth. In other words, the memory of a war-time nationalist movement follows a mythological model. By this I mean that this memorialization process does not follow the logics of history in the sense of science (whereas a historical event is placed in a certain time and space axis following concrete causal sequences), but instead, it is to a larger degree influenced by myth which is understood as a “special mode of knowledge” shaped in response to the “emotional need” of a given community.\textsuperscript{18}

It is exactly this mythical structure that helps to construct conflict-laden history as conflict-less memory (either in its heroic or sinister modulations). Thus, through the process of mythologization, the history of the nationalist movement becomes memory that generates its own meanings of the past, shapes historical knowledge and makes its own claims about the truth. In the book I show how this mythologization is realized, which elements


\textsuperscript{16} Hilde. \textit{Damaged Identities}, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{17} See: Godrej. “Spaces for Counter-Narratives.”

of the past are lost on the way to remembrance and which elements of the myth replace them.

Structure of the Book

This book is structured so that each chapter describes one chain in the circuit of memory work i.e. the framework of remembering, production of memory, and consumption of memory. In Chapter I, I present theoretical and methodological considerations about memory and distinguish the approach to memory and monuments which I apply when dealing with the material. As my understanding of memory is closely connected to concepts of myth and knowledge, I present a model of memory that preempts in exact terms these aspects of memory. Bearing in mind that memory (and monument) itself has history, I address pre-mediation and remediation theory\(^\text{19}\) which enables the previously established traditions of representing the past to be depicted. Moreover, as a result of my interest in multiple vectors of memory which involve many actors from both sides of production and reception, I apply narrative analysis to analyze the stories these actors recount about the OUN and UPA.

Having introduced the reader to the main concepts used and the main methods applied, I turn to a short presentation of the history of the OUN and UPA in Chapter II. It should be stressed that this book is not a history of these organizations. Thus, the presentation of the history of the OUN and UPA in Chapter II is based on research done previously by historians who specialize on the Second World War and nationalist movement in Ukraine. My task in this chapter is to delineate the main problematic aspects of the history that fuel conflicts and tensions in memory work. I also use this chapter to discuss the main approaches that the leading scholars take when they discuss the memory of the OUN and UPA.

Chapters III to VI present the main parts of the study that show the results of my analysis. Thus, Chapter III presents the frameworks of remembering which is seen as an integral part of the entire memory process. It focuses on the main shifts in the remembrance of the nationalist movement in relation to a broader context of state- and nation-building from the end of the 1980s to 2010.\(^\text{20}\) In this chapter I try to see how these shifts in remembrance took place in the region and in Ukraine as a whole, how the local and regional memory actors responded to memory politics sanctioned from


\(^{20}\) I also cursorily glance at the period of 2010-2014, as 2014 appeared to be a time when the memory of the OUN and UPA gained some new and unexpected meanings.
Kyiv and, moreover, how they tried to influence all-national memory politics in Kyiv.

Chapter IV presents the production part of memory work. It focuses exclusively on the process of monument building based on the analysis of three cases. In selecting these cases, my intention was to demonstrate different strategies taken by memory actors in reclaiming the past.

Chapter V presents the main mechanism that governs the memory of the nationalist movement in Ukraine. I refer to these mechanisms as “grammars of remembering” that govern the whole of memory work.

Chapter VI focuses on the reception part of the memory work. In this chapter, I present the results of interviews conducted near the monument to one of the UPA commanders, Klym Savur. I also present results from an analysis conducted on students’ essays on the topic of memory of the OUN and UPA in the city of Rivne. Here, I look how the Soviet and post-Soviet representations of war are perceived and articulated by the public.

I hope that the proposed approach to memory presented in this study will not only reveal new aspects of memory of the nationalist movement in post-Soviet Ukraine, but also will present some new perspectives on memory of war in Eastern Europe and will shed light on the human relationship to the past and the present.

The last chapter of the book presents a final discussion on the basis of the research undertaken.

Dealing with a Difficult Past

When studying memory culture in Eastern Europe one must be sensitive to the specificities of the wartime and postwar experiences in the region. The historian Vladimir Tismaneanu pointed out that the “most important thing the East European experience provides is knowledge that the region’s citizens saw and endured radical evil in pure form.”

Postwar developments and the Communist legacy left an inerasable imprint on the memory of East Europeans. One should bear in mind that differences in the memories of the war in the East and West of Europe has historical and structural explanations. Indeed, “when memory was booming in the West […] it was being whispered in the East, as the Soviet Union and its satellite states invested much energy and violence into subjugating cultural memory to official history.”

When thinking of the memory of war in Eastern Europe, it is noticeable that for many in the East, victory over Nazi Germany marked the

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beginning of a new occupation. Often, though, the attempts of anti-communist groups to express themselves in the East were dismissed as “nationalist.” Indeed, as stated by Dorota Kołodziejczyk and Cristina Sandru, both scholars of postcolonialism, “antitotalitarian dissidence in East-Central Europe was much too often treated in the west as framed within right-wing politics.” In my work I tried to be sensitive to this critique and look beyond the “nationalist” paradigmatic explanation, as one of the main questions I wanted to address when I started the dissertation was: Why do some pro-democratic, pro-European and liberal groups in Ukraine contribute to formation of heroic representations of non-democratic nationalist organizations?

**Production, Contextualization, and Reception of Memory**

Blacker and Etkind note that Eastern Europe is “a fascinating laboratory in which to study cultural memory in action.” It is exactly this memory in action, with the emphasis on the process of remembering and forgetting, that interests me most. My expectation is that by concentrating on the process in memory work I can approach issues which are, by and large, understudied in memory studies. First of all, I focus on both ends of the spectrum of memory – production and consumption (reception) in terms of continuous process of exchange. To illustrate this exchange, I decided to concentrate on monuments which I see as catalysts and symptoms of remembering.

In the study I try to distinguish between who initiated the idea of the monument, who made decisions on its construction, and why it was built in a particular place at exactly that moment in time. Hence, I pay a great deal of attention to memory actors, memory entrepreneurs, who reinforce the memory work. My hope is that such a detailed perspective on the process of monument building and on the actors will afford an insight into the private and public levels in memory work.

In addition, I want to question the widely accepted view that monuments are crystalized statements of top-down memory politics. Could it really be a top-down politics that dominates memory work in a pluralistic society that continues to look for its identity-markers? Moreover, there is no guarantee that the meanings encoded in a monument by its producers are decoded in the same way by its consumers or receivers.

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25 The term “commemorative entrepreneurs” was introduced by Georges Mink (Mink, Georges. “Between reconciliation and the reactivation of the past conflicts in Europe: Rethinking social memory paradigms.” Czech Sociological Review, 44 (3), 2008, pp. 469-490). I refer rather to “memory entrepreneurs” in order to underline the actors’ engagement in memory in general, not only in commemorative practices.
In order to understand how monuments are perceived, in my study I concentrate on the consumption (or reception) of memory. This part of my work is substantially understudied by other authors\(^\text{26}\) so that one can even speak of a “reception bias”\(^\text{27}\) evident in memory studies which means that it is often presupposed that the audience perceives the proposed versions of the past as produced by dominant discourses. As a result, the public’s views are supposed to be the same as the views produced by the memory entrepreneurs. Yet there is no evidence that the public holds the same views as those proposed by “producers” of memory. Quite the contrary, the findings of media and cultural studies suggest that there is no guarantee that the public perceives the message in the way it was intended by the producer of that message. In his theory of encoding and decoding, cultural study theorist Stuart Hall noted that there is a discrepancy between a message encoded and a message decoded.\(^\text{28}\)

Moreover, the meaning is produced both by the speaker and by the reader (listener, viewer, visitor, etc.)\(^\text{29}\) In the same vein, the meaning of history, as it is commemorated in a monument, arises only through the interaction between two ends of memory work – production of this specific articulation of memory and its reception. In order to understand the character of this interaction both these processes should be addressed with reference to the context of where they take place and to the tradition that gives a

\(^{26}\) In the studies concerning memory in Ukraine most attention was paid to the production part of memory work, but there are several works that present an original approach to reception. E.g. Olena Ivanova presented an interesting study about the reception of the Holocaust by school students and Gelinada Grinchenko conducted a reception analysis of Ostarbeitters’ memories, which is especially interesting as the researcher analyzed the reception of state-sanctioned memories by the people who actually were the forced workers in the Third Reich. Grinchenko traced how state-sanctioned memories were received and how they influenced the construction of the memories of the Ostarbeinters themselves. See: Ivanova, Olena. “Ukrainian High School Students’ Understanding of the Holocaust.” \textit{Holocaust and Genocide Studies}, 18.3, 2004, pp. 402-420; Grinchenko, Gelinada. “The Soviet Memory Project on Forced Labor during World War II.” In Pyliavets’ R.I., Yaremenko V.M.(ed.), \textit{Materialy Vseukrainskoi naukovoi konferentsii, Kyiv, 27 September, 2012, Ukraïns'kyi Instytut National’noi pamiati/Instytut Istorii NAN Ukrainy. Kyiv: Prioritet, 2012, pp. 21-44.}

\(^{27}\) See the critique by Kansteiner where he contends that most studies on memory focus on the representation of specific events within particular chronological, geographical, and media settings without taking account of the audience of the representations in question. As a result, the wealth of new insights into the past and present historical cultures cannot be linked conclusively to specific social collectives and their historical consciousness. Thus, he proposes to “conceptualize collective memory as the result of the interaction among three types of historical factors: the intellectual and cultural traditions that frame all our representations of the past, the memory makers who selectively adopt and manipulate these traditions, and the memory consumers who use, ignore, or transform such artifacts according to their own interests” (Kansteiner, Wulf. “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies.” \textit{History and Theory}, May, Volume 41, Issue 2, 2002, pp.179–197, p. 180).


\(^{29}\) \textit{Ibidem}. 
recognizable form and content to memory products. In such a way, I follow the suggestion of Kansteiner who argues:

shortcomings in the studies of memory can be addressed through the extensive contextualization of specific strategies of representation, which links facts of representation with facts of reception. As a result, the history of collective memory would be recast as a complex process of cultural production and consumption that acknowledges the persistence of cultural traditions as well as the ingenuity of memory makers and the subversive interests of memory consumers.30

It is this complex relationship between the facts of representation and the facts of reception in their reference to cultural tradition and historical context that I aim to focus on in this work. By concentrating on the “consumption” part, I hope to uncover what Confino calls “mundane memory,” i.e. the memory that does not have an ideological underpinning but rather has a “pick and mix” character.31 I underline that the notions of production and consumption are used for the schematic definition of links in the chain of remembering. Both of the terms imply an active role on the part of the memory agents, thus, not only production but also consumption is understood as being an active interaction/appropriation process.

Besides that “reception bias,” I also tried to avoid “national bias” in memory studies. I do so by focusing on one specific locality – Rivne and the region around it. The following chapters do not, however, constitute a collection of local cases, but rather present a local focus that is used to demonstrate more general and broader interpretations. Those interpretations can shed light on the formation of memory culture in Ukraine and, indeed, in post-Soviet societies more broadly. I used the region as an entry point that allowed undercurrents of memory fluctuations between the national, regional, international, local and private levels to be understood. My aspiration is to reveal a complex entanglement of memories which shows that none of those levels has a higher status in memory work. Thus, the study is aimed at untangling the image of domination of national memory over local memories.

Recently, a few works have been written which closely focus on the memory work in different regions of Ukraine. Tatiana Zhurzhenko approached regional memory cultures in the border regions of Kharkiv and Belgorod (in Ukraine and in Russia)32 and L’viv and Pawłokoma (in Ukraine

and in Poland), Peter Rodgers focused on Luhans’k, Olена Ivanova concentrated on Kharkiv, Niklas Bernsand - on Chernivtsi, Gubar, Herlihy and Tanya Richardson on Odesa, while L’viv was perhaps the most studied Ukrainian city in terms of questions of memory. In this patchwork of regions Volhynia, and Rivne specifically, has remained, to a large extent, understudied. Such a status is especially striking if one

40 Volhynia is a historic region which is not identical to Volyn’ oblast’ in the present day. This historic region includes what is now Volyn’, Rivne, and part of Zhytomyr oblast’s in Ukraine. After a partition of Kyivan Rus’, Volhynia became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In 1569, as a result of the Treaty of Lublin, Volhynia became part of the Kingdom of Poland. In 1793 and 1795 it became part of the Russian Empire.
considers that the history of the OUN and UPA is closely connected to this region. The UPA history started in Volhynia. In this region, the darkest episodes of the history of the UPA took place – the massacre of the Poles in 1943. Furthermore, during the Nazi occupation of Ukraine, Rivne was the base for the central administration of the Reichskommissariat Ukraina. Providing prison facilities, the city also became one of the places for the mass killings of Jews. Rivne region was also a location for the Soviet partisan movement that was particularly active as of 1943. Despite such a rich historical legacy, memory work in the region is largely overlooked.

Facing Diversity: Overcoming the East/West Approach

I chose this region for analysis exactly because of its low profile in memory studies. Moreover, by focusing on a single region I hoped to show a complex mix of attitudes, actors, narratives and meanings that deconstruct a homogeneous discursive figure of “Western Ukraine” to which the region of Rivne belongs. As such, I want to overcome a specifically Ukraine-related geographical bias widely spread in Ukrainian studies – the east-west division of Ukraine.

In the studies on Ukrainian memory culture it is broadly accepted that Western Ukraine did not welcome attempts to include the “Great Patriotic War” in a post-Soviet official conception of history, whereas the new views on the OUN and UPA history could not penetrate the invisible wall to the Eastern Ukraine. As Tanya Richardson argues, “the watershed which divided two communities

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41 In the works on memory in Ukraine the memory of the OUN and UPA is perhaps the most popular topic since it is the most contested legacy of the war. However, Rivne, and Volhynia in general, in comparison to Galicia, for instance, stayed aside the interest of most of the scholars.

42 Andriy Portnov in his study of memory politics in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova touches upon a question of the monument boom in Halychyna and Volhynia, but in his study he takes a broad comparative framework and concentrates on the political interests and strategies of de-communization and de-Sovietization in the memory politics of the three countries (Portnov, Andriy, “Velyka Vitchyzniana viina v politykahk pamiati Bilorusi, Moldovy ta Ukrainy: kil’ka porivnia’nych sposterezhen’.” “Ukraïna Moderna,” 15(4), 2009, pp. 206-218).

in the past – those who supported Red Army and those who supported the Germans – is still dividing the community into those who support the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and those who support the EU.”

Similarly, in Stefan Troebst’s view, the Ukrainian culture of memory has a dual character which means that it consists of two integral parts, which simply neighbor each other without being connected.

Such a divisive approach stems from the well-established views on state- and nation-building in Ukraine as those views have developed since the 1990s. In that decade, Samuel Huntington identified Ukraine as a “cleft country,” where east and west clash around an internal “fault line” between civilizations. The Ukrainian political scientist Tatiana Zhurzhenko termed such an approach to Ukraine, which permeated from academia to politics, “the Huntingtonization of the Ukrainian political discourse.”

This approach can be used (and indeed is used) with a purpose of “othering,” when one part of Ukraine is presented as hostile to the other part. The beneficiaries of such


“Huntingtonization” are political parties that collect electoral dividends from the parts of the population who internalize such rhetoric.\(^49\)

Of course, it needs to be borne in mind that Western and Eastern Ukraine are not ontologic categories and this dichotomy is a schematic simplification of a much more complex society. That society is hard to encompass in two categories i.e. the nationalist west and the pro-Russian or (neo)-Soviet east.

That is not to say that divisions do not exist. They do, as is consistently evident in electoral preferences. But these divisions are not exclusively based on east or west dichotomy. Olena Ivanova, for instance, in her study of memory about the Holocaust in Ukraine speaks about the meaningful division with respect to the perception of the past by representatives of different generations.\(^50\) Mykola Riabchuk, while speaking about “two Ukraines,” concedes about the differences of mentalities as not being necessarily reflected in the geographical division.\(^51\) In general, attention should be paid to the more complex system of differences. On the other hand, notwithstanding the differences, sensitivity should be shown to similarities and shared historical legacies. Such an approach can help with the discovery of a more complex dynamics within a seemingly homogenous region as well as between different regions.

The divisional approach to memory is also influenced by the choice of source material by scholars who most often concentrate on national and international politics or on the textbooks used for school education. In my view, such a choice of material and a pre-conception to approach Ukraine as an East-West divided society makes scholars see the culture of remembrance as a battlefield or a zero-sum game.\(^52\)

If we study the nationwide political debates, then we face the situation where the parties try to persuade their potential electorate of their exclusive correctness. The narrative in this case presupposes a distinct division between good and evil that reaches a \textit{crescendo} aimed at touching the hearts of the voters and getting their support. In this respect, history is often used as a whip to beat

\(^{49}\) Ibidem.

\(^{50}\) Ivanova. “Ukrainian High School Students’.”

\(^{51}\) Riabchuk. \textit{Vid Malorosii do Ukraiiny}.

one’s opponent. It is similar when we take history textbooks as a source, because textbook production is centralized and monopolized by the state. This does not, of course, mean that the studies of national and official representations of history are invalid. On the contrary, they tell us a lot about the confrontations, about encounters of the old and new views on history, and about the final result of such confrontations, usually as reflected in public representations of history, for example, a monument, a street name, or a commemorative practice. But what these studies do not tell us is why a particular representation takes over, how the process of transition from old to new went on, how the new perspective on history is perceived by the public.

To contribute to a fuller understanding of memory culture, the focus has to be reduced down to the local scale, to regional politics, to the grassroots groups or to individual initiatives. At the same time, to better understand memory culture, reception of memory should be approached. It will allow to see how the constructed memories are perceived by the community to whom the memory politics are addressed. As a result, a more nuanced and grounded study of memory can be presented. In this respect, I do not oppose the studies on memory that have been done on the topic before, but rather build a dialogue with them and aim to add some new perspectives on the given problem.

\textit{Between Manipulation and Sincerity}

In the literature on the UPA remembrance, the main argument is that the past of the OUN and UPA is used by nationalists to propagate their ideology and to legitimize themselves.\textsuperscript{53} My argument, in this respect, is that the use of the UPA by nationalists is only the tip of the iceberg which is more complicated than nationalist/communist/liberal tension. By focusing not only on political rhetoric, but also on the responses on the ground, I tried to see whether questions of history always serve as political markers. By analyzing the meaning of historical events through magisterial paradigms in pluralistic social spaces, I hoped to observe how these meanings change and magisterial paradigms prove not so important.

In the literature on the relationship between memory, history, and collective (often national) identity, the discussion often raises the concept of myth, most often understood as the opposite of both memory and history or, to the contrary, as a byword of memory.\(^{54}\) In such a vein, in his critical remark on “national memory,” the historian Duncan Bell argues that memory is an “under-theorized and yet grossly over-employed term.”\(^{55}\) He argues that remembrance occurs only among individuals so it is erroneous to speak about collective remembrance, especially if it concerns memory of events not experienced by the actors who remember. Instead of collective memory he argues for the term “mythscape,” which “can be conceived of as the discursive realm, constituted by and through temporal and spatial dimensions, in which the myths of the nation are forged, reconstructed and negotiated constantly.”\(^{56}\) For memory, Bell designates a more subaltern and dissent function called for undermining the “governing myth” of the nation.\(^{57}\) What Bell calls “mythscape” is close to what Nora calls “sites of memory.” In his view only the oral tradition of those who experienced the past in question preserves the memories, but in the sites of memory one encounters the reworked representations of the past which are reconstructed and renegotiated constantly.\(^{58}\)

Commenting on memory politics in Ukraine, many historians mention its mythologizing tendencies.\(^{59}\) For instance, when writing on the memory of Stepan Bandera, the leader of the OUN, in the community of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, the historian Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe argues that this memory refers more to a myth than to a history as such.\(^{60}\) The historian John-Paul Himka, while writing on historical politics in Ukraine, also refers to a myth which he understands as the “unexamined components of the ideologized version of history, articles of faith more than of reason.”\(^{61}\) In such


\(^{56}\) Ibidem, p. 75.

\(^{57}\) Ibidem, p. 65.


a way, by referring to a “myth,” the authors regard it as a product of manipulation or of false consciousness. While I agree with the scholars on the mythologizing tendencies of nationalist memory politics, I approach memory’s potential of mythologization of the past in a somewhat different way. Inspired by Eliade’s theories of myth, I see mythologization as one of the functions of memory that is called for in a society where such a need appears.

The motivations behind the mythologization cannot be understood without a thorough analysis of the context which produces these myths. Myth is not the opposite of history. Along with history, it is one of the ways to perceive the reality. What is more, myth is not devoid of truth, it is not a mere manipulation or a means of deception, it makes its own truth claims, although they are not the same as the claims of history towards the truth. When we look at myth from this perspective, we can see to what extent mythologized collective memory preserves the recollection of a historic event and at the same time to what extent memory as a mode of thinking about the past negates, neglects, or ignores historical events.

In what follows I put forward my operative model of memory and explain the use of the main concepts in this study which could help to develop a common language between the writer and the reader.

Defining Language

Cultural Memory

Memory is one of those concepts which are rather difficult to define as it is widely used in everyday communication as well as in scholarly works of almost all disciplines. When I use the terms “memory” or “remembering” throughout the book, I realize that they have a rather metaphorical meaning as they transfer something which is possible in individual cognition to the level of collectivity. The focus of this study is not on individual or autobiographical memories, though. What interests me most is the relationship to the past which is formed and shared within larger groups of people who are distanced from the events in time so that they do not have any personal recollection of those events.

I do not use the term “collective memory,” because, in my view, this term can be rather confusing as it points to a collectivity but does not specify why exactly a collectivity matters. When Maurice Halbwachs in his seminal work on memory introduced the term “collective memory” (mémoire collective), he emphasized the decisive role of collectivity as it provides a socio-cultural context that shapes the act of remembering. He referred to this
context as social frameworks of memory (cadres sociaux).62 This is an important point to which I refer throughout this book. In my view, though, the term “cultural memory” is more appropriate in this respect, as it underlines the link between memory and socio-cultural contexts.63 Thus, the term “cultural memory” also refers to collective ways of remembering but it specifies how exactly collectivity matters, i.e. because it provides socio-cultural frames.

Consequently, I use the term “cultural memory” with the broader meaning expounded by literature scholar Astrid Erll who defines it as “the interplay of present and past in socio-cultural contexts.”64 I also refer to this term in its narrower and more specific meaning given by two German scholars Jan and Aleida Assmann who see cultural memory (Kulturelles Gedächtnis) as a “collective concept for all knowledge that directs behavior and experience in the interactive framework of a society and one that obtains through generations in repeated societal practice and initiation.”65

Jan Assmann contrasts cultural memory with communicative memory: the latter meaning remembering shared and transmitted within a social group, defined by common memories of personal interaction via verbal communication.66 It covers a relatively short time span, some 80 to 100 years. Communicative memory is also an unstructured type of memory, as everyone is allowed to be part of the interaction in which the autobiographical memories are being communicated.67 In contrast to communicative memory, the content of cultural memory cannot be influenced by every member of the community. It is intrinsically related to power and tradition. In short, cultural memory is encapsulated in material culture.68

Throughout the book I use terms “memory actors” and “memory entrepreneurs” by which I mean people, interest groups, organizations and

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64 Erll and Nunning, *Media and Cultural Memory*, p. 2.
institutions which directly and strategically take some actions towards influencing the way the OUN and UPA are remembered. In this regard, I also use a term “memory politics” which means strategic plans and agendas undertaken by memory actors. It does not mean, though, that memory politics is a prerogative of a state or some governmental authority. An organized group of people can also have their memory-related agendas and realize “memory politics” which can influence decisions concerning memory at a state level. Throughout the book I also refer to “memory work,” by which I mean all practices and discourses engaged in planning, negotiating and realizing remembrance. I use the expression “node of memory” when I speak about the constellation of meanings concentrated around some pivotal concept in memory culture. This draws to its center several mnemonic figures or events which can be distanced in time and space historically, e.g. a “struggle for independence” can be seen as a “node of memory” that draws into its orbit historical figures which are seen through their role of freedom-fighters.

In the book I also refer to a notion of “culture of memory” (or interchangeably “memory culture”) by which I mean a distinct sphere of culture that is simultaneously a reservoir and a vehicle of memory. Throughout the book I refer to the term “culture” in a very broad anthropological sense meaning a specific way of life realized within specific webs of meanings characteristic of a given community. The concept of “culture of memory” underlines the relationship of memory to, first and foremost, “unscientific references to history in the public sphere.” This term is at odds with historical culture which “refers to history as cultural artifacts considered worth handing down to posterity […] history products such as historical monographs, textbooks, films, museums, exhibitions or public debates in the way they are produced, mediated or received.” Thus, just as Stefan Troebst does, I differentiate “historical culture” which is formed under the influence of historical science from the “culture of memory” which, as a

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73 See also a discussion on historic culture e.g. Rüsens, who defines historic culture (Geschichtekultur) as “practically effective articulation of historical consciousness in the life of a society.” In Jörn Rüsen, Theo Grütter, Klaus Füßmann (Hrsg.), Historische Faszination. Geschichtskultur heute. Köln: Böhlau, 1994, pp. 3-26, p. 4). See also: Rüsen, Jörn. “Historical Consciousness: Narrative Structure, Moral Function, and Ontogenetic
rule, is not associated with historical writings.\textsuperscript{74} No doubt, historical culture and memory culture mutually influence each other as neither of them exists in isolation to the other.

Memory and History

Perhaps I could underline that by “history” I mean the discipline of scholarly research and the product of that research: a work of a historian who presents a picture of the past on the basis of the analysis he or she undertakes. Any differentiation between memory and history is schematic and based on simplification. But in order to establish a common ground on terms I have used, such simplifications should be used.

Memory presents a subjective picture of the past, whereas in writing history a professional historian worth his salt strives to get a picture of the past from all sides, grounded on evidence. Memory does not need evidence. Instead it needs an emotional drive to preserve some episode of history. While history has a distinctive temporal relationship to the past, memory lacks such a distance, it is instead distinguished by “atemporal sense of the past in the present,”\textsuperscript{75} by its inherent “present-ness.”\textsuperscript{76} Hence, for memory the past is not really the past which is gone, passed away, it is rather the past which persists, passes through, haunts, heals, disturbs and otherwise influences the present.

History is driven by the end goal of discovery of something new which was not known before. Memory is more strategic in its essence, it is driven by ever changing present needs. Due to its relationship to diverse needs and interests, cultural memory has an inherently conflict-laden character. Conflicts and tensions are buried in memory. In light of this, no wonder it is memory that is often metaphorically presented in the research as a battlefield, struggle or even a war. What is more, memory is opposed to history by its tendency to mythologize the past and appeal to emotions.

Despite a rather long list of differences, history and memory influence each other. As Zerubavel maintains, the relationship between memory and history is as punctuated by conflict as it is by interdependence, as collective memory continuously fluctuates between available historical accounts and social-political contexts.\textsuperscript{77} Historians turned their attention to memory as a

\textsuperscript{74} Troebst. “What Sort of a Carpet?” p. 44.
\textsuperscript{76} See the discussion of the history of memory starting from the oral societies up to the present in: Misztal, Barbara. \textit{Theories of Social Remembering}. Theorizing Society Series, Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2003.
result of many theoretical “turns” in humanities: cultural, linguistic, spatial, and emotional. Hence, interest in memory has always been connected to symbols, space, imagination and emotions.

The cultural turn in history enhanced the interdependence of history and memory, while stressing that history, as another form of narration, does not have any particular claim to the truth. As Hutton contends, “[h]istory is no more than the official memory a society chooses to honor.” Furthermore, the historic narrative in itself may become an integral part of the collective memory. Equally, collective memory can become the subject of investigation of a historian who could write a mnemohistory—a history of memory, by analyzing the developments of remembrance of a certain event through time. Notably, interest in living memory became a driving force behind the emergence of a sub-discipline in historical studies - oral history. In sum, there is a reciprocal relationship between historical culture, which is formed by the influence of historical writings, and memory culture, which depends more on imagination, values, and emotions.

**Nation-Building, Identity Consolidation, and Fragmentation**

Historical studies of collective memory went hand-in-hand with the studies of nation-building, whereby the past is seen as a resource for building collective affiliations. On the other hand, interest in memory proliferated when national identity finished to be a point of reference and national collective identities fragmented into smaller identities - ethnic, gender, group, etc. In this respect, Nora wrote his famous work on *les lieux de mémoire* where he developed the idea that history as a national project succeeds to memory as an identitarian project of fragmented groups. This interest in memory which comes from seemingly different directions – studying consolidation of the nation, on the one hand, and fragmentation of the nation, on the other - demonstrates a significant feature of memory – its ability to be both the resource for consolidation of collective identities as well as the grounds for splitting these

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80 *Ibidem*, p. 129.


84 Nora. “Between Memory and History.”
identities and eventually building new alliances, which shows that these two processes are actually closely connected.

Past as a resource for memory is endless as any event can be taken up by a community for mnemonic purposes.85 Yet, as we can see, not all historic events form “memory veins”86 that can produce “memory events.”87 Glorious victories or horrific suffering are most likely to become the veins through which the formation of memory events would flow as precisely these histories are typified by emotions. What is more, battles, conquests, and victories often become the “founding” memory events that serve as founding myths of the nation. In this respect, remembrance and memorialization go hand-in-hand with nation-building and nationalism.

Memory boom and the mushrooming of monuments is not a coincidence in post-1989 Eastern Europe. Redefining statehood and reorienting the nation are intertwined with the refiguration of memory. As Olick and Levy pointed out: “Mythical and rational images of the past sometimes work together and sometimes do battle, but these images always shape identity and its transformation.”88

Myth

Ahistoricity, atemporality, emotional drive, embeddedness in present needs are those features that memory shares with myth as understood by a scholar of religion, Mircea Eliade.89 For Eliade, mythological thinking means

85 Political parties, though, can treat the past as if it were a limited resource which makes the memory politics rather influential. See: Kalinin, Ilya. “The Struggle for History: The Past as a Limited Resource; Memory and Theory in Eastern Europe.” In Uilleam Blacker, Alexander Etkind and Julie Fedor (eds.) Memory and Theory in Eastern Europe. Palgrave Studies in Cultural and Intellectual History. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp. 255-266.


87 Etkind, Warped Mourning.


89 As the studies of myth are numerous, we must leave aside other major research on myth by Levi-Strauss who deals with myths as stories of primitive societies (Levi-Strauss, Claude. Structural Anthropology. London: Allen Lane, 1977), Barthes who conceived myths as false notions of reality (Barthes, Roland. Mythologies. London: Paladin Books, 1973), or Cassirer who concentrated on symbolic forms of culture with myth being one of those such forms (Cassirer, Ernst. The Myth of the State. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1946). Although Eliade referred to archaic societies in his conceptualization of myth, it does not mean that it cannot be applied to the present day, as the elements of “archaic ontology” are present in modern cultures even if in “disguised” and “unconscious” forms. For Eliade, history comes into the lives of men as unbearable terror. Thus with regret he wrote that the “return” to archaic religion with dominating mythical thinking is not possible for modern man, thus the terror of
remembering the past that transcends historical time. The past events that matter for mythological thinking and that have to be remembered happened in *illo tempore* – the sacred time. In the proposed conceptualization of memory, the object of memory is not a historical event, it is the ahistoric model that has to be remembered as it gives instructions on how to behave. Eliade called this model an archetype. The truth of myth is the truth of the model, of the archetype, not that of historical “fact.” The events of myth, in contrast to episodes of history, lose their individuality and singularity as they constantly repeat themselves. Linked to this, historic personalities lose their individuality in myth. They are deprived of the specificity of time and place.

The boundaries of the past, present and future are obscured in myth: the past can become the present. Indeed, in myth, the golden ages are expected to repeat in the future. Times of social turmoil are perceived as an anomaly, a deviation, or as chaos in myth. As Ernest Cassirer put it, myth “reaches its full force when man has to face an unusual and dangerous situation.” In such crises, the memory of archetype is recalled. By following the model, normality and order are restored. Hence, myth has a soteriological function as it provides knowledge essential for salvation.

In Eliade’s understanding, history exerts its “corrosive action” and reveals itself to people in times of turmoil because, at these moments of time, history demonstrates “the irreversibility of events.” Myth provides a means for overcoming such anomalies. As mythical thinking shows, sufferings caused by social injustices, natural catastrophes, wars, and conflicts are caused by divine intervention. In such a way, suffering becomes intelligible and hence tolerable. This is not to say that in the times of crisis the community becomes

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92 Archetype is different from the well-known use of the same term by Carl Jung. For Jung it is connected to the sphere of the unconscious, for Eliade “archetypes” mean an exemplary model. For Eliade “everything which lacks an exemplary model is ‘meaningless’” [in myth] (Eliade. *The Myth of the Eternal Return*, p. 34, see also pp. 87-89).
93 Myth divides the world into sacrum and profanum, it does not tell the history of a concrete event, it tells the story of the chaos-cosmos relationship. The plots may differ but the fabula remains the same – every myth is about the transformation of chaos into cosmos by the divine act of creation (cf. Eliade. *The Myth of the Eternal Return*, p. 10).
95 Eliade uses the term “soteriological” to underline the religious function of myth and its connection to spiritual sphere.
96 Eliade. *The Myth of the Eternal Return*, pp. 74-75. In contrast to historical, mythical thinking fuels belief that everything can be repeated, reversed, while nothing is singular.
archaic in sense that it rejects history and returns to myth. On the contrary, as argued by Eliade, being fully immersed in the flow of history (facing its terror and suffering under the pressure of historical events), the community finds refuge from history in myth by establishing special dates for commemoration when the community can “forget” about historical events and, from time to time, remember archetypes.⁹⁷

If history is governed by a drive to new knowledge, and memory is driven by emotion, then myth is driven by reiterating what is already known. Being repeated many times in many variations, myth does not provide any new knowledge. In his essay about mythological texts, Lotman argues that a mythological text is a non-discrete system, it is circular, it is an auto-communication i.e. it conveys the message we already know, it strengthens the knowledge we already have.⁹⁸ In Lotman’s view, myth always reveals something about the self. As he put it: “Myth always says something about me.”⁹⁹ Hence, myth has to resonate with some self-image in order to become an element in one’s identity narrative. Non-mythological texts, in contrast, are linear, they are discrete, and they contain a new message.

Knowledge

Memory believes before knowing remembers. 
William Faulkner. Light in August.¹⁰⁰

Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone argue that memory is a special mode of knowledge.¹⁰¹ Memory is knowledge loaded with beliefs, images, emotions and personal experiences. Eliade noted that to remember means to know something, while by knowing something a person appropriates something essential.¹⁰² Refusal to know is a refusal to appropriate something that can be of damage or risk. Aleida Assmann proposes “a theory of cultural memory that investigates the role of emotions and affect in a diachronic, trans-generational dimension.”¹⁰³ Having noted this, I can generalize and extend the

⁹⁷ Eliade. The Myth of the Eternal Return, p. 75.
¹⁰² Eliade. The Myth of the Eternal Return.
¹⁰³ Assmann, Impact and resonance, p. 15. Assmann draws on Eva Illouz's definition of emotions as the “energetic side of action, the term energy implying simultaneously cognitive, affective, value-oriented, motivational and physical aspects.” See: Illouz, Eva. Die Erretung
definition of cultural memory as emotional knowledge shared by the community of people that is articulated through representations by means of cultural resources.

Often, knowledge that is of interest to a scholar of memory is of a particular character. This knowledge is often connected to the desire not to really know. This is a kind of knowledge which does not inspire but rather causes despair. It is linked to the refusal of memory to appropriate something that would fracture the identity of a subject of remembering. Knowing that someone belongs to a group of victims or to a group of perpetrators is a different kind of knowledge, but in both cases we deal with “difficult knowledge.” On the one hand, though, difficult knowledge can become a “founding trauma” that could distinguish one’s identity. On the other hand, this memory has a tendency to be repressed and indeed may not even be mentioned.104 The notion of difficult knowledge comes from the educational theorist Deborah Britzman, who distinguishes it from “lovely knowledge.”105 Lovely knowledge reinforces what we already know. This is a kind of new information that goes hand-in-hand with our previous knowledge.106 Difficult knowledge, on the other hand, is a kind of knowledge that does not fit into what we have known before.107

Difficult knowledge is related to what in the studies of collective memory is often referred to as a “dark past,” “difficult past” or “troubling past.”108 Yet, as Franklin Ankersmit maintains, at these moments of difficult past, the past truly reveals itself in the present.109 Certainly, not all kinds of knowledge are equally important for a sense of our identity, we may know that 2+2=4, but we are hardly interested in arguing that this area of knowledge


104 “founding traumas” introduced by Dominick LaCapra meaning “traumas that paradoxically become the valorized or intensely catheted basis of identity for an individual or a group rather than events that pose the problematic questions of identity” (LaCapra, Dominick. Writing History, Writing Trauma. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001, p. 23).


is what makes us into ourselves. It is emotional knowledge that we are most likely to remember as a part of our historical self. This kind of remembrance ensures our identity, our perceived sameness carried through time. As John Gillis notes on the recurrent relationship between memory and identity: “The core meaning of any individual or group identity, namely a sense of sameness over time and space is sustained by remembering; and what is remembered is defined by assumed identity.”

Difficult knowledge is close to Freud’s concept of the uncanny which is simultaneously knowing-and-not-knowing. In this regard, the uncanny reveals the two main forces of memory in relation to knowledge – the pain of knowing and the desire to know. Alexander Etkind in his theory of mourning argues that the “desire to know the unbearable is also a desire to share its burden.” Only through the act of sharing, when memories about the unbearable become public, the work of mourning is considered complete.

An argument can be made that when the memory of wrongdoings is not recognized, there is nothing to mourn and no work of mourning is really needed. Yet, even if difficult knowledge is not included in cultural memory explicitly, it is present in the communicative memory. In this respect Lethe is not really a healing medicine especially if there are reminders of unbearable

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112 The concept of the uncanny is introduced by Sigmund Freud in his essay “The Uncanny” (1919), wherein the uncanny is some repressed memory about the past that returns in not a fully recognizable form, it is familiar and unfamiliar at the same time. (See: Freud, Sigmund. The Uncanny, translated by David McLintock, introduction Hugh Haughton. London: Penguin, 2003). The “uncanny” is close to the category of “ignored knowledge” (or “unthought knowledge”) which according to the conceptualization of the British psychoanalyst Cristopher Bollas constitutes a dimension of the unconscious that emerges from experience that has been lived but never fully known. Bollas wrote about experiences of infancy before acquisition of language, but as Schwab argues, we may also relate traumatic experiences to this category as they are not fully lived in a conscious and remembered way, but which can be pursued by researchers and which can find their place in the memory culture of the future, if such a need appears. “Ignored knowledge” (or “unthought knowledge”) differs from Freud’s concept of uncanny as it does not necessarily involve the psychological mechanisms of repression of experiences. (See: Bollas, Christopher. The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
113 Etkind. Warped Mourning, p. 208.
experiences in mnemonic narratives of other communities of memory. Discussions of the history of the OUN and UPA became perhaps the first time when Ukrainians had to face history where they are not presented only as victims, but also as perpetrators.

Monuments as Symptoms and Catalysts for Memory Work

My study focuses only on one specific kind of mnemonic representation – the monument. The monument is a part of the cultural and political process of the invention of tradition. At the same time it is embedded in an established tradition that shapes its meaning through the appearances, location, and rituals involved. Scholars see monuments as an apparatus of social memory and consider them as “sites of rhetorical meaning,” “staged events,” and “the official memory book of significant events or the metaphors of national life.” Where they fulfil their function of “significant events or the metaphors of national life,” they interest me the most.

I decided to concentrate on monuments because they are the most visible representation of the past. Moreover, they usually afford an opportunity to access a wide range of discussions, debates, conflicts, and negotiations around the memory of the past that is represented in bronze or in stone. As it would be impossible to capture the whole range of discussions on memory in this book, in my study monuments serve as an entry point to the discussion of memory and as a limiting device that restricts the unembraceable volume of the material that could be studied in relation to memory.

In this respect, the present study is not a cultural history of monuments in sensu strictu, as it does not analyze a monument’s materiality, neither is it a study of urban space where the monument is scrutinized in the space-object relationship. To use James Young’s words, through my analysis I try “to make visible the activity of memory in monuments.”

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116 For instance, Polish mnemonic narrative on the Volhynian massacre that will be discussed later on serves as a reminder of the difficult knowledge the community faces in the act of memory in Ukraine. It is difficult to ignore completely the difficult aspects of the past.

117 Throughout the book I use the words “monument” and “memorial” very much interchangeably, although many authors make the distinction. See e.g. a detailed discussion on different kind of monuments in: Neumann, Klaus. Shifting Memories: The Nazi Past in the New Germany. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000, pp. 10-11.


120 Young. Texture of Memory, p. 14.
The monument in this study is seen as, first and foremost, a symptom and a catalyst of the remembering process. As a symptom, monument gestures to the important area in the system of meaning as it signifies that some episode of the past enters the mnemonic space and claims its position in cultural memory.\(^\text{121}\) Thus, it serves as a sign or indication that something is remembered. As a catalyst of the remembering process, a monument causes and accelerates debates, disputes, negotiations, agreements and disagreements concerning a particular episode of the past which is represented by the monument.

My study also touches on the building of the most recent monuments. Indeed, some of them are only at the planning stage. But even their potential existence (or demolition) involves so many discussions in the press, in city councils, and even in the national Parliament, that hardly any representation of the past can lead to such a rich and diverse source of study material as monuments. By focusing on monuments I can get to both chains of remembering – “production” and “consumption” of memories.\(^\text{122}\)

Monuments might be seen as the most rigid memory matter - rigid in its materiality, in its status of “eternity” crystalized in bronze and stone. Alexander Etkind correctly terms monuments the “hardware of memory” in contrast to its “software” found in texts.\(^\text{123}\) At the same time, when looked at from a viewer’s perspective, monuments might be seen as the most innocuous material inviting multiple readings of possible meanings. Thus, the study of how monuments are received can reveal these meanings.

**“Lives” of Monuments**

Monuments do not only “recount” history, they themselves “have” history. To study monuments means to study their threefold relation to history – history that they represent, the historical context that gave rise to them, and history of their “lives” (and sometimes afterlives). In relation to possible approaches to studying memory through monuments, Jay Winter identifies three distinct periods in the evolution of public monuments: a creative phase – “the construction of commemorative form” marked by monument building and the creation of ceremony. Secondly, the “grounding of ritual action in the calendar” through a process of institutionalization and reutilization. Finally, their transformation or disappearance as “active sites of memory” during a

\(^{121}\) Please note one of the characteristics of cultural memory in Aleida Assmann’s understanding – it is “founded on durable carriers of symbols and material representations” (Assmann, Aleida. “Reframing Memory. Between Individual and Collective forms of constructing the past.” In Karin Tilman, Frank van Vree and Jay Winter (eds.), Performing the Past: Memory, History and Identity in Modern Europe. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010, pp. 35-50, p. 43). Monuments are very important kind of such representations.

\(^{122}\) Assmann. “Reframing Memory,” p. 5.

\(^{123}\) Etkind. Warped Mourning, p. 177.
final phase that depends on the second generation of mourners, whether they attach old or new meanings to the inherited monument or whether they forget about the place.  

As the monuments I study are quite new and as I am interested in them to the extent that they are symptoms and catalysts of remembering, my analysis focuses more on studying the “creative phase” with much attention being paid to the historical context that gave rise to the monuments and on the “grounding of ritual” phase with the focus on institutionalization and (re)utilization of monuments. Robert Musil’s famous dictum: “There is nothing in this world as invisible as a monument”\textsuperscript{125} is applicable to many monuments which inhibit the city space. In order to be visible and not to turn into meaningless stone, monuments need to be periodically clad with values and meanings that would guarantee their use as points of reference in the society. Indeed, without “supporting” tools in the form of commemorative practices and discourses around the monument, and/or the past it represents, the monument would lose its meaning-generating function and be turned into a mere stone. Thus, it is essential to study practices and discourses around the monument to understand what the monument means for society.

The monument’s function of forgetting means not only that people can forget the past the monument represents, but it also means that monuments help to forget or negate the conflicts and tensions of the past which characterize any society as by “creating common spaces of memory, monuments propagate the illusion of common memory.”\textsuperscript{126} Claiming to represent “common memory,” monuments mark the values and ideals which are claimed to be shared by all. Carefully looking at monuments, one can see which events are regarded as “watersheds” and “chronological anchors”\textsuperscript{127} in the history of a society and one can consider what the remembrance of these events conveys about the society. If we deal with the memory that is claimed to be national, one can by critical analysis of this memory provide an analysis of the nation itself.\textsuperscript{128} Similarly, by studying how the meanings of monuments changed one can see how society changed.

In the conceptualization of memory outlined above, monuments function to actualize the myth. In this respect, Bronislaw Malinowski pointed out that ritual and myth are indispensable from each other.\textsuperscript{129} In his understanding, myth is a ritual articulated in words. Moreover, only through

\textsuperscript{124} Winter, Jay and Emmanuel Sivan (eds.) War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 22-25.
\textsuperscript{126} Young. The Texture of Memory. p. 6.
ritual can myth realize its regulatory function, e.g. give examples and bringing order into an unstructured sequence of events. Monuments are a part of the ritual but also they provide a site for rituals to be practiced. According to Victor Turner, ritual is a “prescribed formal behavior for occasions not given over to technological routine.” Thus, one can guess that formalized routines practiced near a monument give little space for questioning the existence of the monument or the version of the history it represents. The participation in the ritual requires a belief that everything is done as it must be done.

One should bear in mind that monuments arise not only on the whims of power, they respond to the one of the most basic human needs – to come to terms with the death. When one deals with the public monument, the death of a person to whom the monument is dedicated acquires some additional meaning. The death of a historic person who is stripped of his historic subjectivity makes the person into an “ancestor” who presents the models of acting for successive generations. The scale of the mythologization of a historic person by means of transformation into the archetypical figure of cultural memory in a monument is perhaps the most visible in comparison to other representations of memory. Myth gives meaning to death by transcending rationality and giving hope for a return (resurrection in religious traditions). The main condition for the return of the dead in the mythical system is proper remembrance, following the rites of burying and mourning. A monument marks the place of death. Commemorative practices near a monument which are repeated cyclically down the years guarantee the persistence of remembrance.

Soviet War Monuments and the OUN and UPA Monuments

The monuments I study can be classified as war monuments as they refer to the war period and are devoted to people who took part in armed conflict, who lost their lives on the battlefield or while confronting the enemy. War monuments are brought to life by a need to cope with grief, on one hand, and to legitimate the loss of life, on the other. Thus, the individual feelings of grief are closely linked to the collective propagation of glory. In monuments, “an agglomeration of official and the personal” dimensions of memory are best observable. War monuments presumably aim to “stop time and block the

work of forgetting [...] to immortalize death, to materialize the immaterial meaning the values, beliefs, ideals.”

With thousands of soldiers’ bodies which remain unidentified from both world wars, the First and Second World War memorials’ function has been to act as a substitute for graves and to provide places for mourning and grief. Thus, memorials are an important part of the healing process as they provide people with the means to comprehend the catastrophes of war and transcend them. At the same time, monuments mask the reality of individual war experiences and serve the ideology of nationalism. In this regard, Anthony Smith argues that war memorials refer to the sacred origins of the nation, they are part of the modern nation. Through war memorials the national narrative is anchored. Indeed, victories in battles often serve as founding myths of the nation. As the American historian Kurt Piehler pointed out, national identity is “inexorably intertwined with the commemoration and memory of past wars.”

Whereas in Western Europe war memorials gained in their significance and started to be built en masse after the First World War, in the Soviet Union the growth in war memorials mushroomed after the Second World War. The significance of the Second World War in the foundational mythology of the Soviet Union cannot be underestimated: it has already been treated by many distinguished scholars. Soviet war memorials responded to the needs of the Soviet elites to install a foundation for the Soviet Union. The Great Victory over Nazi Germany served as such a foundation. The nodal point of this foundational myth is an emphasis on a pronounced anti-fascism that symbolically divided the world into two camps: fascist and anti-fascist.

Critical views about the war, questioning the price of victory, and/or anti-war

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135 Winter. Sites of memory, Sites of Mourning.
rhetoric was perceived as anti-Soviet. An antifascist stance was used heavily for the ideological justification and superiority of the Soviet Union within it. After its collapse, the Soviet-bred war narrative started to be questioned. Not everyone within the former Soviet Union saw victory as liberation. For many, the victory over Nazism marked the beginning of Soviet occupation. Possibility of elaboration of new representations of the Second World War raised some logical questions: Was it possible to build a single monument that would encompass asymmetric experiences of war? Was it possible to represent at the same time the liberation of Europe from Nazi Germany by the Soviet Union and the occupation of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union? Can a complex reality be avoided in a simplified pattern of war memorials?

Here we can see another tension permeating the East-West European axis that sheds light on the specificity of memory politics in Eastern Europe. Building new monuments in Eastern Europe happened at a time when the anti-military discourse in monument building was beginning in the West. The monuments to the Second World War are mostly monuments devoted to the Holocaust with abstract forms inviting observers to make their own interpretations. As Winter argued, one of the important consequences of the memory boom in the West was the “popular disenchantment with war.” Interest in memory that was a precursor for individual experiences of suffering and losses undermined the justification of “foundational violence” and brought into question celebration of victorious wars. This prompted a “move from nostalgic image of war to haunting images of war, suffering, terror, etc.”

As noted above, in the Soviet Union the anti-war stance contradicted state ideology. A “foundational violence” motive in national historical narratives continued in the post-Soviet period. A new dimension was added to the representation of war which emphasized national experiences. Consequently, in independent Ukraine, new monuments devoted to the war period were dedicated to the history of the nationalist movement as it was

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143 Kattago. *Commemorating Liberation.*
144 Here I refer to the idea expressed by Kattago that “the future lies in memorials which can aesthetically and visually represent the complexity of Estonian history. Rather than emphasizing the Second World War as either liberation or occupation, contemporary monuments face the challenge of representing the liberation of Europe from Nazi Germany by the Soviet Union and the occupation of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union.” (Kattago. *Commemorating Liberation*, p. 446.)
145 Young. *The Texture of Memory.*
perceived to be a part of a specific national history distinct from the Soviet-bred narrative of war. But new war monuments follow traditional forms of war memorials which are decidedly militarist in their appearance. This limits the space for creativity and co-performativity on the part of an observer. The new dimension added to almost all war monuments dedicated to the OUN and UPA is the fact that they all are presented with clear religious symbols.

The religious dimension of the OUN and UPA monuments is reiterated by ritual and commemorative practices which are borrowed predominantly from the religious sphere. The days of celebration of the OUN and UPA take place on religious holidays, the presence of priests has become a common practice in commemorative activities, and monuments are often decorated with crosses while inscriptions often contain words from prayers.

Approach and Method

When studying memory, attention should be paid to the “hermeneutical triangle of object, maker and consumer.” In my study I closely followed this triangle formula. Monuments as a representation of memory in themselves do not remember. Remembering is done by people. Such an “object” as a monument is not only a thing but is also a mix of relations. It points to the actors who brought this monument into existence and the visitors who relate themselves to the past the monument represents.

Monuments served as entry points for me to the understanding of memory work. They led me to statements made by the producers and consumers of memory. To follow the triangle formula in practice, I borrowed the ethnologic analysis of historical politics by German ethnologist Wolfgang Kaschuba. His five-level approach provides the tools which are also helpful to my analysis. The proposed levels of inquiry consist of studying: 1) public discourse in the mass media about history; 2) the space and territorial conception of representation and symbolization through monuments and places of memory; 3) the symbolic struggle for signs and the interpretation of the “aesthetics of memory”; 4) the canon of ritual and aesthetic practices of “memory work”; and 5) the collection of forms and figures of transmitting such as stories, mémoire series, photographs, local and national history.

151 A term “consumer” of memory is proposed by Kansteiner. See: Kansteiner. “Finding Meaning in Memory.”
textbooks. In my study I concentrate mostly on the first four levels, while the fifth level is touched upon cursorily as it has already been studied at length by other authors. All these levels of inquiry comprise various materials ranging from objects, photos, maps to political statements, interviews, and public discourses in the media.

The importance of the audience in the construction of the narrative has been highlighted by many authors. On the one hand, as Berstein demonstrates, in certain contexts the narrator may be influenced by the imagined or future audiences. On the other hand, a receiver of the message takes an active part in the meaning generating process, as Hall contends.

In my study I drew on the reception theory to highlight the importance of the consumption part of memory work. The reception theory originated in literary studies in the works of German scholar Hans-Robert Jauss in the late 1960s. It was considerably enriched by Hall who paid special attention to the audience in the analysis of meaning. His theory of coding-decoding emphasizes the role of the receiver in any meaning-generating process.

The reception theory was also enriched by Umberto Eco in his books “Towards a semiotic inquiry into the television message” and “The Role of the Reader.” A term coined by Eco “aberrant decoding” is used to describe cases where the reader’s interpretation differs from what the sender of the message intended, and is broadly used by scholars who are interested in reception.

Furthermore, both the production and consumption of memory should be studied with the reference to the context – historical, cultural, and institutional – in which the statements are made. The context encompasses the

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153 Marples. Heroes and Villains; Rodgers, “Regionalism and the politics of identity”; Richardson. “Disciplining the past.”
155 Hall. Encoding and Decoding.
157 Hall. Encoding and Decoding.
frames of memory\textsuperscript{161} that consists of “national and other meta-narratives which are dominant in a society at any given point of time.”\textsuperscript{162}

\textit{Remediation, Premediation: Giving Form to Memory}

As previously mentioned, memory is shaped by the tools which already exist in culture. As literature and media scholars Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney put it “[s]haping cultural memory is a work of refashioning, re-configuring, formatting, absorbing, incorporating, selecting and editing from the reservoir of available meanings in a given culture.”\textsuperscript{163} Thus, to study memory, culture includes finding previously established meanings that shape the emergent node of memory culture. In other words, a “pre-life” of representations, their development and transformations has to be found. This can be done by addressing the theory of premediation and remediation as proposed by Erll and Rigney. The two scholars argue that “all representation of the past draws on available media technologies, on existent media products, on patterns of representation and media aesthetics.”\textsuperscript{164} In their conceptualization, premediation can be seen in the diachronic axis of memory, it refers to “the cognitive schemata and patterns of representation that are available in a given media culture…, and which already preform the events that we later remember through remediation.”\textsuperscript{165} Remediation, in turn, can be viewed through the synchronic axis of memory as the patterns of representations “realized, over and over, by means of those media technologies that a community has at its disposal and to which it ascribes the potential of creating ever greater immediacy and memorial truth.”\textsuperscript{166} It should be stressed that it is not only representations of earlier events that shape understanding of a later event, but that art, mythology, and religion can exert great power as premediators which shape our understanding and remembrance.\textsuperscript{167}

The diversity of material and theoretical approaches meant that a mixture of methods was applied. One common method which could be used for studying both production and reception of memory was narrative analysis. Narratives in human sciences should be defined provisionally as discourses with a clear sequential order that connect events in a meaningful way for a definite audience and thus offer insights about the world and/or people’s experiences.\textsuperscript{168} I am interested in those narratives about the past events and

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reflect on the impact on and importance of this past for the present and the future. They often have highly emotional undertones and usually include the main elements of narrative as distinguished by William Labov and Joshua Waletzki: abstract (summary of the subject of the narrative), orientation (time, place, situation), complicating action (what happened), evaluation (socially the most important), resolution (ending), and coda (that reveals the perspective to the present).\textsuperscript{169} For social research, the evaluation part is the most important:

\begin{quote}
evaluation is \textit{socially} the most important component of the narrative... It is evaluation that conveys to an audience how they are to understand the \textit{meaning} of the events that constitute the narrative, and simultaneously indicates what type of response is required... the addressee or audience must collaborate by demonstrating that the evaluation has been understood.\textsuperscript{170}
\end{quote}

For my study the most important part is also evaluation as it constructs the ways in which the event is to be remembered and explains why the events should be remembered. In the evaluation part, the event gains the status of a historically important event which is worthy of commemoration and virtual eternity, whereas in the coda part the past event is linked to the present, and the mobilization potential of the historical narrative is preserved.

Besides the narrative analysis, I also addressed the interpretative approach that draws on studies of interpretative anthropology made by American anthropologist Clifford Geertz. Following Geertz\’s methodological and theoretical considerations, I saw the social world as a “web of meanings” and tried through thorough reading of the texts, participant observations, and reflection on the visuality and locality of the monuments to present a “thick description”\textsuperscript{171} of cases. I felt this could shed light on the meanings produced by given contexts. Through this thick description of cases I tried to distinguish the main mechanisms that produce the meaning in memory work. Following Aleida Assmann\’s conceptualization, I refer to these mechanisms as “grammars of remembering”\textsuperscript{172} that govern the meanings in the process of remembrance and which locate “new” memories into the well-recognizable premediated forms.

Collecting Data and Positioning “Me” into the Research

Concentrating on multiple levels of inquiry (the production, the consumption, and the frameworks of remembering) influenced the selection of a different type of material. Despite the variety of the sources, all the material shares two common features: it is all recent and difficult to access. These two characteristics are conditioned by the fact that I am dealing with very recent history (1990-2010). Thus, almost all the sources are comparably new, are yet to be archived, pre-selected, or managed in any way. A lot of materials have not yet been given over to public use so that the fact that I obtained them at all contains an element of chance and considerations not dependent on some structural and foreseeable procedures.

Obtaining the material I needed was a time-consuming and unpredictable affair, it was like stumbling about in the dark. I had to read most of the published sources which were not categorized in any event to select the relevant pieces of information from a pile of totally irrelevant data. In order to conduct a study of reception I had to create my own archive from the scratch, i.e. I conducted surveys and interviews which would shed light on the highly understudied area of memory work. Due to such a peculiar situation, in what follows I will not only outline my material but also explain how I collected it.

Schematically, I outlined one set of data for each link in the chain of memory work as it is analyzed in the chapters below. Hence, for the framework of remembrance part (Chapter III) the main volume of material is comprised of articles published in the local and national press, political statements published in the press and on the Internet, materials from the Institute of National Memory in Kyiv, interviews with memory actors, intellectual discussions in books, in the press and on the Internet. I also referred to some TV shows and fiction, but these were used sparingly, simply to illustrate the main arguments based on the material outlined above.

The analysis in the case-studies part (Chapter IV) is based on the vast range of material that includes regional and national press, political statements, participant observation of commemorations, minutes of meetings in city and regional councils, and interviews with key memory entrepreneurs.\textsuperscript{173} In Chapter V, where I summarize my findings in order to present the main mechanism of remembering, I refer to all the above mentioned material. I also refer to some biographies of the OUN and UPA soldiers, but they should be understood only as secondary material used in order to illustrate the main arguments. The reception study in the Chapter VI

\textsuperscript{173} In Chapters III and IV I also refer to some of the published biographies and memoirs of OUN and UPA members, as well to fictional sources, TV broadcasts and films on the topic, but they play a secondary role in this study. References to this material have to be understood more as being illustrative to the conclusions reached from the main bulk of material. In my view literature, films, and TV broadcasts present such a large and rich corpus of data that they deserve to be studied separately.
is based mainly on semi-structured interviews and the students’ essays on the

The material from the regional press was accessed in the Rivne Regional Library at the Department of Regional Studies of Volhynia (RRL). National press and national cultural journals were accessed in the National Library of Ukraine, named after V.I. Vernads’ky, in Kyiv (NLU). Many of the statements from political parties, governmental institutions, and presidents were published on a variety of these organizations’ sites.

Minutes of meetings held by the city and oblast’ councils were provided, in response to my written request, by the officers responsible for data administration in those respective offices. This meant that I had no direct access to archives or their catalogues. In my written request, I had to stipulate all the information I required from the councils and, citing my constitutional right as a citizen of Ukraine to access information from the state authorities, I asked for all relevant information which would reveal the work of the council as regards the monuments in question. In the request I stated the purpose of my search as “research for a PhD dissertation.”

It is worth underlining that in most cases the officers at the councils were delighted to hear that such research about their home town specifically, and Ukraine in general, was being undertaken in Sweden. May be it was down to this that the staff involved was welcoming and cooperative to a large extent. However, I am fully aware of the limitations such methods presented: with restricted access to the archive. Certainly, in this case, the respective officers played the role of gatekeepers, and made decisions on which documents to disclose and which to keep hidden.174

I encountered the same limitation while conducting interviews with key memory entrepreneurs where I was occasionally prevented from talking to some people.175 While being aware of all these limitations, I still trust that the main questions of this study could be answered through the material I collected.

174 I should add that initially I envisaged my study as focusing exclusively on an analysis of the monuments in relation to urban space, their materiality, and ceremonies. But all my attempts to get the necessary information on the plans, drawings, templates, architects’ works, and reports from ceremonies, etc. failed. I was directed to the Ministry of Culture or its representative in the region. I contacted that ministry without any success, however. The organizations that were involved in monuments’ building could not provide any information on ceremonies as they argued that they did not produce such kind of reports. Thus, everything what I could obtain was restricted to local press coverage of the events. I do not exclude that the type of study that I initially planned can be realized at some point in the future, as access to the material needed is, to a large extent, conditioned by chance and personal connections.

175 As was the case with the UPA veterans whom I accidentally met while doing participant observation in Hurby and the local (rayon) administration strived to be the main (if not the only) people who could comment on the whole memorial complex which I will touch upon in more details in the chapter on this specific case study.
Ultimately, through this work I aspire to contribute to memory study and to research on Ukraine specifically. I believe that the fact that this data has not been used before for such research contributes to the originality of this study.

**My Position in the Research**

It should be added that one of the important instruments in this study was my own experience and my own memories of the time I am writing on. It is not only because I was born in the region I am writing about, but also merely because I was present at the places while carrying out study which in some way influenced the outcome of this research. Indeed, James Young noted: “Insofar as I stand within the perimeter of these memorial spaces, I become part of their performance, whether I like it or not. In describing these sites in narrative, I have unavoidably transformed plastic and graphic media into literary texts.”

Historians are not usually expected to write on their own positionality and cover reflexivity questions to the degree it is generally required in anthropology, for instance. In my case, though, as I am dealing with the recent history of a society, I can be seen as a part of it. It is important to add some thoughts on this so that reader can see the angle from which the research has been approached.

I am fully aware that I present findings based on “situated knowledges,” which are “marked knowledges” that reflect my locationality (historical, national, generational) and positionality (gender, class, nationality). Suffice to say that my first encounter with the history of the OUN and UPA came in the form of my memory of my grandmothers. Both of them told me similar stories about nationalists and wartime violence, but the modulation of their narratives was strikingly different: in one narrative the struggle for national independence meant nothing in comparison to the human suffering that this struggle involved, in the other narrative the independent Ukrainian state meant everything and suffering for this aim was justified. When I was listening to these stories I was too young to connect them to reality and to see some logical explanation in the experiences my grandmothers had - both victims of the same history but in different ways. One was forcibly displaced from the Polish territories to Ukraine when the war ended. She lost everything in that displacement – home, relatives, friends. For her, nothing was left which she could associate with home. The only goal she probably held was to survive, no matter how, no matter under which rule and in which

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176 Young. *The Texture of Memory*, p. xii.
state. My other grandmother, as a resident of one of the Volhynian villages, was a witness to horrendous violence emanating from all the sides involved in the war. She lost a big house and everything the family possessed under the “first Soviet occupation” (1939-1941). For her, Soviet rule must have always been associated with this loss, while independent Ukraine probably meant some compensation for it.

I happily “forgot” those stories until they started haunting me when, as an adult, I witnessed changes in the city I was born in. The monument to Lenin disappeared, in his place the monument to Shevchenko arose, not far from that place the UPA monument was built. All these changes became the subject for my PhD. I was astonished when the stories I had heard from my childhood echoed in the responses of people I encountered during my research. In such a way, my own experiences and memories *nolens volens* became a part of this book. Of course, this was both an advantage and a disadvantage in conducting the research. Still I hope that there were more advantages as my own position gave me access to the sources, people and remote places which would be inaccessible to the outsider. At the same time, I hope that living for more than ten years outside my country of origin, being trained at four different universities in four different countries means that I can take a more dispassionate approach to the questions tackled in this book. Considering this, I also acknowledge positionality as not being fixed but as a constantly moving position which depends on the context and time. I hope that my reflexivity enabled me to think in terms of multiple perspectives.

Needless to say, by writing this book I also *nolens volens* contribute to the memory work which I analyze. Without wanting to position myself into one of the pigeon holes of ideological categorizations or into one of the barricades in the memory war, I am aware that this study will be put there by others regardless of my own wishes. My hope is, though, that this book will destabilize some fixed points and pose some important questions in subsequent memory work so that any categorization will be at least a more difficult enterprise.
This chapter introduces the reader to a history of the OUN and UPA. The Swedish historian Per Anders Rudling contends that “there are few other events in modern European historiography around which there is such a complete lack of consensus as that of the role of [the OUN and UPA].”\(^{180}\) In my introductory note on these organizations I decided to focus exactly on the aspects that demonstrate such a “complete lack of consensus.” In other words, I limited this historical preamble to the presentation of the most complicated aspects of this past that position this past into the realm of difficult knowledge and that make this past a bone of contention in memory-related debates. The reader is invited to study more extensively about the OUN and UPA in the works cited in the footnotes.

The OUN and UPA: Difficult Aspects of the Past

As already mentioned, difficult knowledge refers to knowledge about the past of a group which cannot be positioned into the realm of glory, pride or victimhood, e.g. the space of positively laden affects. Difficult knowledge often refers to knowledge about the suffering of others inflicted by the group one belongs to. The most difficult aspects of the OUN and UPA history is the relations between the OUN and UPA with “others” – Jews, Poles, and Germans. To these difficult aspects we can add the ideology of the OUN, as, for many, the mere notion of the OUN as an organization which had some fascist, or nationalist, characteristics is disturbing and difficult to accept.

An additional difficult aspect in the history of these organizations, which remains considerably understudied in the historical literature, is the persecution of Ukrainians by the OUN. Timothy Snyder estimated that among the victims of the OUN’s “purging” campaigns there were more Ukrainians who did not support the OUN’s ideology or deeds than any other nationalities.\(^{181}\) For instance, in the interwar years many of the Ukrainian moderates – mostly members or supporters of the Ukrainian National

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\(^{180}\) Rudling, Per A. “Historical representations of the wartime accounts of the activities of the OUN-UPA (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Ukrainian Insurgent Army).” East European Jewish Affairs, 36: 2, 2006, pp. 163-189, p. 175.

Democratic Union (Українське народно-демократичне об'єднання – UNDO) that represented Ukrainians in the Polish Parliament – were killed. The problem of persecution of Ukrainians by the OUN is paid such scant attention in memory-related debates, though, that it cannot reasonably be included within the category of “difficult knowledge” as it has not penetrated the public debates and virtually remains “unknown.”

History always happens at a particular time and in a particular place. In terms of time, when we speak about the OUN and UPA, we speak about the period that lasted over 27 years (1929-1956). The OUN was founded in 1929. In 1948, it concluded its activities in both Poland and in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR). The UPA was formed in the late 1942. That army’s final unit was destroyed by NKVD forces in 1956. Formally, however, the OUN pursued its activities in the diaspora, where it established itself in 1948 into a smaller group entitled OUN-zakordonnyi (OUN-z), or OUN abroad, led by Mykola Lebed’.

The OUN legacy is actively exploited by several far-right parties in Ukraine. After 1991, the OUN tried to establish itself in independent Ukraine. It was split between the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) in Ukraine and the émigré OUN-B, led by second-generation émigrés from Germany and Australia. Nowadays four organizations trace their origin to Stepan Bandera: the KUN and the émigré OUN-B, the “Tryzub imeni Bandery” (“Trident in honor of Bandera”), and the VO “Svoboda” (All-Ukrainian Party Svooboda - Freedom). Such active exploitation of the OUN legacy by Ukrainian far-right parties makes the perception of the OUN over the years 1929-56 more complicated, as the present parties not only try to influence memory politics but also, through their own activities, affect public attitudes to the OUN.

In terms of the place, and the history that the OUN and UPA is mainly connected to, the historical-cultural regions of Volhynia and Galicia in Eastern Poland and Western Ukraine stand out. The OUN was most heavily represented in Eastern Galicia, with the strongest representation in L’viv. Other centers were in Przemyśl (in Poland) and Stanisławów (now Ivano-Frankivs’k). In Volhynia, by contrast, due to the different political and cultural history of the region, the OUN was somewhat underrepresented, especially at the beginning of the organization’s existence.

The UPA originates in Volhynia in 1941, where the first insurgent groups were organized by Taras Bul’ba-Borovets, and were linked to the Ukrainian People Republic’s government in exile. Bul’ba-Borovets was

defeated by the OUN and had to flee. The insurgent groups were subsequently subsumed by the OUN. The UPA came to Galicia only in late 1943.

Putting the nationalist movement into a cause-and-effect sequence, one makes it clear that it is a product of the situation that developed after the First World War, when state-building projects in both Eastern and Western Ukraine failed and the subsequent rule over Ukraine by several different states was established. The Riga Treaty of 1921 delineated new borders between Poland and the Ukrainian SSR. According to the new map, Central and Eastern Ukraine became a part of the Soviet Union, whereas Western Ukraine was divided among several neighbors. The historical-geographical regions of Bukovyna and Bessarabia were allocated to Romania; Carpathian Ukraine became a part of Czechoslovakia; Volhynia, East Galicia, and Polissia were included to Poland. Subsequently, the territories that were allocated to Poland were divided into four administrative units: Wojewodstwa Lvów (L’viv), Stanisławów (Stanislaviv, and since 1962 Ivano-Frankivs’k), Tarnopol (Ternopol’) and Volhynia. This terrain was a home to approximately 4.5 million of ethnic Ukrainians, who formed a majority of the population of these lands. 184

The Polish state conducted a rigid Polonization campaign on the newly-gained territories. These suppressions served as the basis for the growing popularity of nationalist ideals among the local Ukrainian population. The popularity of nationalist ideology among Ukrainians in the interwar period was fuelled not only by Polish anti-minority politics, but also by the fact that Polish nationalist parties, like National Democracy (Narodowa Demokracja), chaired by Roman Dmowski, enjoyed vast support among Poles.

After the death of the Polish leader Marshal Józef Piłsudski in 1935, the authoritarian factions in the Polish parliament became stronger. This resulted in the oppression of minorities as well as of the Polish opposition. By the end of the 1930s mutual hostility between Poles and Ukrainians escalated.

In such a radically charged atmosphere the OUN was founded on 3 February 1929 at a conference in Vienna. Most of the participants at that conference were representatives of different West Ukrainian parties and movements who envisaged an independent Ukraine.

The most influential and supported military and political player at that time was the Ukrainian Military Organization – the full name in Ukrainian “Ukraïns’ka Viiskova Organizatsiia” (UVO). 185 The UVO’s chief, General

184 Snyder. The Reconstruction of nations.
185 As the UVO was an important training base for the OUN, it is worth adding some more information about it. The UVO (Ukrainian Military organization, Ukrain's'ka Viiskova Organizaciia) – this should be in the main text! was organized in July 1920 by officers of the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA) and of Sich Shooters (Sichovi Striltsi) who fought for Ukrainian autonomy during the First World War. The UVO was a secret organization, it organized actions of sabotage against Polish politicians and Ukrainians who did not support
Yevhen Konovalets’, was appointed head of the OUN. Konovalets’ remained the OUN’s leader for almost 10 years from the day of the organization’s creation up to 1938 when he was assassinated by an NKVD agent in Rotterdam. As a result of heated ideological disputes after Konovalets’s death, in 1940 the OUN split into two opposing factions - a more moderate group of older members led by Andrii Mel’nyk (OUN-M), known as Melnykites, and a more militant group of young members led by Stepan Bandera (OUN-B), known as Banderites (banderivtsi).

The OUN’s Ideology and its Relationship with Nazi Germany

Most scholars who deal with the history of the OUN agree that from the moment of its foundation, the OUN had an authoritarian character. Power was seen as an exclusive prerogative of the OUN. No other ideology was accepted. Communism and socialism with their ideals of internationalism its cause. Particularly numerous were the actions in 1922 against the elections to the Polish Sejm and Russian Senat. Following these acts, the repressions against UVO increased and many of its members had to flee abroad. Initially, its leadership settled in Berlin, then in Geneva. At a conference in Vienna in 1929, the UVO representatives stressed that they would support the foundation of the OUN only if the UVO leaders would comprise the leadership of the OUN. These demands were met. Another noteworthy fact is that one of the organizations present at the conference was the League of Ukrainian Nationalists, organized in 1925, which included among others the Union of Ukrainian Fascists. This fact is often referred to when the memory of the OUN is a target of criticism where the OUN is accused of fascism. The question whether the OUN was fascist or not is very important in memory battles. In the Soviet Union “fascist” became the word that signified almost all anti-Soviet organizations and movements. Worth noting is that, German National Socialism was labelled “fascist” in the Soviet Union. One of the explanations of such an (intended) conceptual confusion is that in the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics the word “socialism” could desecrate socialism when referring to the enemies, e.g. National Socialists. Another explanation could be that the Soviet socialists did not acknowledge the existence of other socialists, as only Soviet socialists were regarded as true ones. A tradition to label everything anti-systemic as fascist persisted in Russia where it became commonplace to refer to all national democratic movements in former Soviet republics as fascists. This was particularly well observed during the Revolution of Roses in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, during the war in Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as during Euromaidan and the war in Donbass in 2014, where the Kyiv government was labelled as “fascist junta” by Russian propaganda. The use of a term “fascist” in the Soviet Union and in post-Soviet countries, especially in Russia, should be studied in detail separately. It became one of the buzz-words used for defining very different parties, movements and even peaceful civic protests.

were perceived as especially hostile. Dictatorship was seen as the only method of ruling. The OUN’s version of extreme nationalism is usually compared with Mussolini’s version of fascism in Italy. The American historian, and one of the first specialists to study Ukrainian nationalism, John A. Armstrong, defines Ukrainian integral nationalism as:

a belief in the nation’s supreme value to which all other must be subordinated, glorification of action, war and violence as an expression of superior biological vitality of the nation; and an expression of the “national will” through the charismatic leader and an elite of nationalist enthusiasts organized in a single party.

According to the OUN nationalist ideology, the nation was determined in biological terms: it is perceived as being natural to be born into the nation and to put the nation at the center of one’s own life was also considered natural. The nation was seen as a living organism that could not incorporate foreign bodies (more precisely ethnic minorities which were numerous in Ukraine - Jews, Poles, Russians, etc.) “National revolution” was one of the ideals of the organization as they felt the old order could only be brought to the end

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190 Main ideological beliefs of the OUN are stipulated in the book by Mykola Stsibors’kyi “Natsiokratia” (Paris, 1935). In opposition to democracy, socialism and communism, Stsibors’kyi admired Italy’s fascism. In contrast to democracy’s “liberty, equality, fraternity” Stsibors’kyi praised fascism’s “duty, hierarchy, discipline.” He wrote that society should be organized according to the principles of national syndicalism, a socio-economic system adopted by Benito Mussolini. Another important ideological impact on the OUN was made by Dmytro Dontsov and his theory of Ukrainian nationalism. Although Dontsov was never a member of the OUN, however, the OUN members adhered to the main principles Dontsov outlined in his book “Ukrainian Nationalism.” These principles included reliance only on one’s own national strengths, distrust to national enemies, avant-garde views on the nationalist movement as a special order that includes only the best people of the nation, whereas the goal of these best people is to create a new kind of active and creative man. These ideas were broadly used in the OUN propaganda and the OUN members were to present this kind of new personality. The characteristics of an ideal Ukrainian nationalist were listed in the “Decalogue of Ukrainian Nationalist” (see Appendix 1), “Twelve characteristic attributes of Ukrainian Nationalist,” and “44 guidelines of Ukrainian nationalist.” Nowadays these guidelines can be found in almost all nationalist propaganda materials, in museums. They are also referred to in films and literature, so that the guidelines themselves form a topos of memoryscape, or a lieu de memoire of the OUN and UPA, which will be discussed in detail later. See aslo: Stryjek, Tomasz. Ukrainska idea narodowa okresu miedzywojennego: Analiza wybranych koncepcji. Wroclaw: Monografie FNP, 2000.
through violence. The revolution and violence were also presented as natural.\footnote{191}

As for allegations of the OUN’s fascist ideology, there are three main approaches in the historiography. The scholars who represent the first approach contend that Ukrainian nationalism had nothing in common with fascism (Petro Mirchuk, Volodymyr Kosyk, Volodymyr Viatrovych). The cohort supporting the second approach agree that European fascism influenced Ukrainian nationalism (John Armstrong, Alexander Motyl). The third approach is defended by the group who claim that Ukrainian nationalism represented by the OUN was part of the European fascist movement (Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, Per Anders Rudling).\footnote{192} Scholars who do not agree that the OUN was fascist base their arguments on the assumption that nationalism is connected to national liberation, while fascism is a form of rule where there is already a nation with an established state. Hence, the argumentation runs, the OUN was an integral nationalist movement, but it is erroneous to call it fascist.\footnote{193}

On the basis of the research of the many historians set out above, we can certainly state that the OUN was an authoritarian organization. It was a power-oriented movement that concluded unions according to its political and ideological convictions as well as out of its strategic considerations. Thus, the OUN’s main goal was to retain power and adhere to nationalist principles. The issues of collaboration and the means of fulfilling these goals were not questioned as long as the power of the OUN was guaranteed.

The war was seen by the nationalists as the chance to take control of ethnic Ukrainian lands. Both factions of the OUN saw allegiance to Germany as an opportunity for establishing the Ukrainian state, where the OUN could establish its rule. Before the German invasion, both factions of the OUN –

\footnote{191} The “national revolution” was supposed to happen during the war. Influenced Dmytro Dontsov’s ideology, the OUN idealized the war along with a new type of humans who would appear as a result of a national, or permanent, revolution. (See more on the idea of “permanent revolution” in: Lagzi, Gabor. “The Ukrainian Radical National Movement in Inter-War Poland – the case of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).” \textit{Regio – Minorities, Politics, Society}, 1 (1), 2004, pp. 194-206. 200). In the memorialization process, though, the idea of national revolution as understood by the OUN is somewhat omitted, and the figure of “national revolution” as a sacralized war for independence prevails. See also: Rossoliński-Liebe, Grzegorz. “The ‘Ukrainian National Revolution’ of 1941: Discourse and Practice of a Fascist Movement.” \textit{Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History}, Volume 12, Number 1, Winter (New Series), 2011, pp. 83-114. Metaphors of nation-as-organism, nation-as-nature, nation-as-mother were widely used in the OUN’s propaganda and served as an effective mobilisation strategy directed towards predominantly peasant communities for whom images of nature, mother and woman were close and connected to Christianity (Bruder. \textit{Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen}).

\footnote{192} See also: Lagzi. “The Ukrainian Radical National Movement.”

Bandera and Mel’nyk – sent letters to Hitler where they set out the need to establish the sovereign Ukraine within its ethnic boundaries.  

When the Nazis entered L’viv, the OUN-B declared independence from Ukraine (30 June 1941) and appointed Yaroslav Stets’ko as its prime minister. The reaction of the Third Reich to the proclamation of independence was far from welcoming and resulted in harsh repressions against the OUN. About 80% of the leaders of the OUN-B were killed by Germans in 1941 - 42. Bandera and Stets’ko were arrested in July 1941 and remained imprisoned in Sachsenhausen until 1944. Bandera’s two brothers were deported to Auschwitz in the summer of 1942. The OUN-M members were also repressed. In 1942, in Babyn Yar raven, in Kyiv, many OUN-M members were murdered together with thousands of Jews who were killed in the raven from 1941 to 1943. Among the OUN-M members murdered in Babyn Yar in February 1942 was the Ukrainian poet Olena Teliga who later became one of the national symbols of resistance in Ukrainian memory culture.

The relations between the OUN and Nazi Germany in the years 1942-44 are rather complex. The Roland and Nachtigall battalions were withdrawn from the front. The militia who supported the OUN-B was dispersed and new police units were formed. Although the OUN members were persecuted by the Nazis, there still was agreement that the OUN would not fight against the Germans. The agreement was often violated, though. From February 1943 onwards, a series of attacks on the institutions of the German occupation administration began. In July 1943, the anti-German attacks started in Eastern Galicia. From summer 1943 onwards, the attacks were so frequent that Germans termed it a revolt, while the OUN saw Volhynia and Polissia in autumn of that year as a “liberated region.” At the same time, there is evidence that the OUN shared their intelligence with the Germans.

During the course of the Battle of Stalingrad (23 August 1942-2 February 1943) it became clear that Germany would lose the war against the Soviets. It made the OUN reorient its politics. The program of armed struggle against both the Soviets and Germans was adopted at the Third Congress of

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196 Nachtigall Battalion was formed by Wehrmacht in March/April 1941. It was composed with 330 soldiers mainly from western Ukraine, who were supporting OUN-B. The Ukrainian head of the unit was Roman Shukhevych, the OUN-B member. Another battalion with Ukrainian soldiers, Roland, encompassed about 350 soldiers. There are historical findings that confirm Nachtigall’s participation in pogroms against Jews in L’viv on the day when the independence of Ukraine was proclaimed. (Bruder. *Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen*, p.149). Both battalions were dismissed in July-August 1941.
198 Rudling. *The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust*. 

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the OUN which took place on 21-25 August 1943.\textsuperscript{199} At this congress all forms of cooperation with Germans were condemned. But in February 1944 the OUN and UPA leadership took up contacts with the Wehrmacht and Sipo (Sicherheitspolizei, Security Police) leadership in the hope of concluding a tactical union with the Germans against the Red Army and Soviet partisans. In September 1944, as a result of an unofficial agreement with the National Socialists, Bandera and Stets’ko were released from Sachsenhausen.

At the same time, though, when the formation of SS-Galicia\textsuperscript{200} was announced, the OUN-B warned Ukrainians against entering the unit and presented cooperation with both the Gestapo and Bolsheviks as betrayal of Ukrainian nation. In those confused times, it is hard to make out whether that was a tactical move or one based on ideological beliefs. The best way to judge what was intended and what was staged can be made by looking at the events that followed, especially the fact that the OUN fractured further as Bandera, in the postwar period was unwilling to accept any “democratic” transformation.

The Third Congress of the OUN in 1943 is often referred to in the memory space as a “democratic turn” in history of the OUN. Some scholars, though, see the program of the Congress as a tactical move in the face of the anticipated victory of the Soviet Union in the war and the need of further negotiations with the Allies on the future of the Ukrainian state.\textsuperscript{201}

Of note here is the discussion between two renowned historians from Canada John-Paul Himka and Zenon Kohut. Himka advocated that the OUN had a totalitarian character even after the congress, while Kohut spoke about the movement of the OUN towards democracy that started at the congress and continued after the war.\textsuperscript{202}

One can see that a complicated past with many movements to and fro, and maneuvers are quite confusing to evaluate. Depending on the perspective taken, there is a choice whether to see the picture of the past as the relationship between its integrative details or to concentrate only on one detail without taking into account other components. Most often, remembrance takes the latter path – ignoring the details that do not fit the desired image of the past.

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\textsuperscript{199} Rudling. “Organized Anti-Semitism,” p. 169.  \\
\textsuperscript{200} SS-Galicia was the military formation within the Waffen-SS structure, consisting of Ukrainians, formed in spring 1943 under the name 14. Freiwillige Grenadier Division der SS (galizische Nr.1). It totalled about 13,000 people. On SS-Galicia see: Littman, Sol. Pure Soldiers or Sinister Legion: The Ukrainian 14\textsuperscript{th} Waffen-SS Division. Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2003; on formation of memory of SS-Galicia after the war see the insightful study: Khromeychuk, Olesya. “Undetermined” Ukrainians: Post-War Narratives of the Waffen SS “Galicia” Division. Nationalisms across the Globe Series.New York: Peter Lang International Academic Publishers, 2013.  \\
\textsuperscript{201} Rudling. “Historical representations of the wartime accounts,” p. 164.  \\
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Thus, in cultural memory, the events that followed the Congress and which were distant from any democratic values (like the Ukrainian-Polish massacre in 1943) are mostly avoided.

The OUN and UPA and the Jewish Population

As noted above, the war unleashed interethnic conflicts which were fuelled during the decades of the interwar period. When Nazi Germany invaded Eastern Galicia and Volhynia, the first ethnic group that was targeted by Nazis were the Jews. During the war Eastern Galicia and Volhynia were the epicenters of what Timothy Snyder called Bloodlands, the lands where the people suffered the most under the Soviet and Nazi regimes. Between 22 June 1941 and the end of June 1943 the National Socialists killed 90% of the Jewish population of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. This constituted about 500,000 Jews killed in Eastern Galicia and more than 200,000 in Volhynia. Special militia units formed by the OUN-B collaborated with Wehrmacht in the pogroms against Jews between 22 June and the end of July 1941. About 4,000 Jews were killed in L’viv in summer 1941. John-Paul Himka argues that anti-Semitism was central to the ideology of Ukrainian nationalists, particularly to the OUN-M. The Dutch historian Karel Berkhoff contends that anti-Semitism was an important element in the ideology of both factions of the OUN.

The topic of anti-Semitism as well as the collaboration of the OUN, UPA and the local population in the killing of Jews is taboo in the Ukrainian society where the traces of Jewish life and wartime atrocities are almost totally erased. As a Ukrainian historian Vladimir Melamed notes, “a Ukrainian memory rather avoids touching a Jewish component or refers to the Jewish

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208 Himka. “War Criminality.”
plight as a tragic and inevitable historical reality.”

If approached, this subject arouses many emotions and disagreements not only in Ukraine but also abroad, especially in diaspora communities. For instance, in reply to David Marples’ article in the Edmonton Journal where the Canadian historian questions the appropriateness of granting the Order of Hero to Bandera by the President Yushchenko, and touches on the historical facts of the OUN’s involvement in pogroms in L’viv in summer 1941. An active representative of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada Marko Levytskyi denigrated Marples claiming that his articles employ the style of “Putin-KGB falsifications.”

Stepan Bandera, the grandson of the leader of the OUN, also contacted the Journal, accusing Marples of spreading “disinformation.”

In respect of the refusal to accept the crimes of the OUN by certain collectives and the promotion of heroic memory that ignores difficult knowledge, Himka speaks about instrumentalization of memory “with the aim of generating political and moral capital.” He strongly objects to such an instrumentalization “particularly when it is linked to an exclusion from historical research and reflection of events in which Ukrainians figured as perpetrators not victims, and where ‘own’ evil is kept invisible and the memory of the others’ dead is not held sacred.” Such an instrumentalization of memory raises an important question of the liberation of history-writing from influences of memory culture. In my view, this can be done by producing more studies on these difficult topics reflecting the influences of memory battles, and by disseminating such knowledge widely.

It would be wrong to say, though, that all the Jews’ experiences at the hands of Ukrainians were negative. Many Ukrainians were among those who bear the title of Righteous among the Nations. But individual instances of kind treatment of Jews by the OUN were the exception rather than the rule.

The often repeated story about Jewish doctors who helped the UPA was used

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216 Perhaps the most scandalous case of public intolerance shown to the views of historians who contradict the glorifying memory culture was in 2012 and the lectures of the German historian Grzegorz Rossoliński -Liebe. At the time when he was planning to present his book “Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Fascist, 1909–2009” it was disrupted in Kyiv. Ukrainian nationalists were among those who attempted to break into the lectures. The historian even received threats while visiting Ukraine. This lamentable situation was criticized by some Ukrainian intellectuals. See e.g. Hrytsak, Yaroslav. “My response to Grzegorz Rossoliński -Liebe.” *Ab Imperio*, 1/2012, pp. 451-456.
217 Righteous among the Nations is an honor title used by the State of Israel to describe non-Jews who saved Jews from extermination by the Nazis during the Holocaust.
after the war in order to whitewash the dark side of the history of the UPA. This theme became popular in memory culture too. For instance, friendship, love, and mutual support between Jews and Ukrainians (specifically UPA) during the war is one of the main themes in the bestselling novel “Museum of Abandoned Secrets” of one of the most famous Ukrainian writers Oksana Zabuzhko.

The OUN and UPA and the Polish Population

The German historian Grzegorz Rossoliński - Liebe notes that the Ukrainian nationalists, personified by Bandera, became for Polish settlers the “emotional symbol” of suffering experienced by Poles from Volhynia and Galicia during the war. As mentioned before, to a greater degree, the hostility to Poles was the result of pressure arising from the Polish pacification of Ukrainian villages in the 1930s. About 450 Ukrainian villages in 16 districts were pacified between September and November 1930 alone.

Since the war was seen by Ukrainian nationalists as an opportunity to gain national independence, the Poles were perceived as the main competitors

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220 Zabuzhko, Oksana. Muzei Pokynytykh sekretiv. Kyiv: Komora, 2009. Zabuzhko received the highly acclaimed Polish Angelus prize for the novel. The prize is often presented as an analogue of “East European Booker.” Granting such a prestigious prize for the book dedicated to a difficult past of both nations might be a sign of a movement towards a reconciliation and a striving towards a more inclusive and entangled perspective on the shared history of Poland and Ukraine.


in territorial claims after the war. The idea the nationalists had was that after the end of the war, when new borders were demarcated, lands would to be allotted to those who had control over those lands and who constituted the majority of the population in those lands. To seize control over the territory was, henceforth, perceived as the primarily goal.

The results of the Battle of Stalingrad acted as a catalyst to the nationalists in committing acts of violence against the Poles. In February 1943, the UPA started aggressive military operations against the Poles: threatening with death they forced Poles to move to the Polish territories. Who made such a decision is not possible to say for definite now. In October 1943 the OUN-B leadership rejected any affiliation with the UPA in military aggression against the Poles. At the same time it is known that the OUN justified the need of such actions in response to the execution of 394 Ukrainians in Holmshchyna in April 1942. Thus, while in practice the Polish population was murdered in its thousands, neither organization held themselves responsible for the murders.

Most of the attacks by Ukrainians on Polish and mixed villages happened in March-April, July-August and at the end of December 1943. The estimated number of Poles killed ranges from 40,000 to 60,000. In January 1944, the conflict moved to Galicia where about 25,000 Poles were killed. In January 1944, in Volhynia, the 27th division of the AK was formed (comprised of about 6558 soldiers). Their task was not only to protect the local Polish population but also to destroy Ukrainian villages and kill Ukrainians. 20,000 Ukrainians were killed in Volhynia by Polish forces and 11,000 Ukrainians were killed on Polish territory.

In summer 1944, Western Ukraine was liberated from Nazi Germany by the USSR. On 21 April 1945, the Soviet-Polish treaty on friendship was signed, which was amended by an agreement on border on the 16 August 1945. Eastern Galicia and Volhynia were included within the Ukrainian SSR. By the end of 1944 all of Ukraine was freed from German occupation and Soviet rule was established. For some West Ukrainians, though, the end of the German occupation meant the beginning of Soviet occupation. The UPA continued

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223 Snyder. The Reconstruction of Nations, p. 163. Poles, though, considered their actions in Holmshchyna as a legitimate response to the participation of Ukrainian police in the deportation of the Polish population from the Zamostye region where the territory of "Himmlerstadt" was planned for future German colonization. See: Yaroslav Hrytsaks, Tiazhke prymyrennia, in. Hrytsak, Yaroslav. Strasti za natsionalizmom. Kyiv: Krytyka, 2004, pp. 129, 126-137.
225 Snyder. The Reconstruction of Nations.
227 Rudling. Historical representation of the war-time accounts, p. 171.
their fight for independence against the Soviets within the territory of Western Ukraine and Eastern Poland. To resolve the “Ukrainian question” once and for all, a mass deportation from the eastern territories of Poland was launched. Those who did not want to leave Poland or who were suspected of supporting the OUN and UPA were arrested or killed. The deportations culminated in 1947 with Operation Vistula which resulted in Ukrainians from Eastern Poland being removed to Western Poland. This operation brought about the end of the UPA on Polish soil and the OUN ceased its activities. Some units of the UPA which remained on Ukrainian territory continued fighting sporadically against the Soviets until 1956, when the last unit was destroyed.

A high number of deaths and grave suffering on the battlefield, in prisons, through deportations, and persecutions conditioned the memory of war as well as the memory of the OUN and the UPA. In Ukraine issues of troublesome memories of violence and suffering merge together with questions of responsibility of the local populations for the fate of the Jewish and Polish minorities. In terms of remembering this troublesome past, memory is characterized by a reclamation process that is realized through the nationalization of memory. It involves exclusions of “unpleasant” historical facts which could damage the coherent picture of a heroic past.

Ukrainian historian who specializes on questions of memory Andriy Portnov argues that in the Ukrainian discussions on the “dark pages” of the history of the UPA, meaning mainly the killing of the Polish minority by the UPA, three main approaches can be distinguished: denial of the crimes of the insurgency; acceptance of the crimes of the UPA but on the premise that “we...

In this regard, Portnov distinguishes the following positions in dealing with responsibility and guilt: “repentance with conditions or conditional repentance” (first you acknowledge the Holodomor as genocide than we acknowledge our guilt); “partial repentance in order to be even more proud” (we acknowledge our guilt and become even more proud with the organizations for their input in independence); “forgiving and asking for forgiveness” (which mathematically equates the actors on both sides and this equation is questionable).\footnote{Portnov. \textit{Istori\i dlia domashnioho vzhytku}, pp.189-190.}

Concluding Remarks

This chapter presented the reader with a short history of the OUN and UPA. The main emphasis was placed on aspects of the past that can be classified as “difficult knowledge,” the knowledge that has a potential to damage the coherent and positive image of the nation. Painful knowledge about the OUN and UPA encompasses questions of the organizations’ ideology and their relation to the Polish and Jewish minorities. The OUN ideology of integral nationalism, its links to Nazi Germany, the participation of some of the OUN and UPA members in the Holocaust, the murder of Polish residents which was organized and supported by the OUN and UPA are those aspects of the past which do not allow them to be remembered in a heroic way.

Yet, they are celebrated exactly as that - heroes. Astonishingly, such a heroic remembrance is promoted not only by nationalist parties but by parties who represent pro-democratic and pro-European values. How can this be so? Why is this so? Who is promoting this remembrance and with what purpose? These are some of the questions which will be tackled in the next chapter.
Legacies of the two totalitarian regimes, Nazism and communism – although different in their duration and the intensity of the violence they inflicted, but at certain moments of history similar in their relation to the human life – impregnate the memory of the OUN and UPA. Taking into account all the details discussed in the previous chapter, it could be asked why the organizations that were engaged in violence and had a totalitarian character should be commemorated at all? While memory is mostly cherished as a mobilizing and integrating force, why should one invoke memory that potentially brings more disintegration than unification? And last, but not least, why is the history of undemocratic organizations even brought up by actors who envisage a democratic future for Ukraine? Why does the democratic project need these memories?

In his ground-breaking study of collective memory which gave impetus to the development of the whole area of “memory studies,” Maurice Halbwachs underlined the decisiveness of the present moment on the formation of the memories of the past. He referred to this present and to the communicative process that translates the past into the present as the “frameworks of remembrance” (cadres sociaux de la mémoire).\(^{233}\) In the literature on the memory of the OUN and UPA, though, scant attention is paid to exactly the frameworks of remembrance which transcend the state-sponsored politics of memory. In other words, little attention is paid to the interactive communicative process in which the community is engaged while shaping the memory.

The following chapter aims at shedding light on the dynamics of memory work and the intricate relationship between different communities both at local, regional and national levels that mold the remembrance. The frameworks of remembrance are seen in this study as an integral part of memory. Unless these frameworks are analyzed, an understanding of why exactly the past of the OUN and the UPA became so important in post-Soviet Ukraine is impeded.

Thus, this chapter is not to be read as a historical context of the object of study but as an indivisible part of the object of study itself. Therefore, this analysis is based on primary sources. It refers to secondary literature only in those parts where extensive research has already been conducted. Namely I

\(^{233}\) Halbwachs. *On Collective Memory.*
refer to the secondary literature where I mention state-and nation-building from the perspective of the centralized politics, and I refer to primary sources where I reconstruct the regional dimension in the complex dynamics of state- and nation-building in relation to memory politics.

As the focal point in this framework, I chose one locality in Western Ukraine – Rivne and the area around it, which is part of the larger historical-cultural region Volhynia. Rivne oblast’ and even Volhynia itself has not yet been studied in the literature dedicated to memory culture in Ukraine, although the history of the OUN and especially that of the UPA is closely connected to this area in particular. It is where the UPA began, it is where the darkest pages of the history of the UPA were written (i.e. the horrific mass murders of Poles), and it is one of the epicenters of intense human suffering under the Nazi occupation.

Why such little attention has been paid to the region in memory studies can be explained by the fact that the attitude to the OUN-UPA after the war was influenced by the diaspora from Eastern Galicia which, in all likelihood, recounted the Galician experiences of the UPA, not the Volhynian ones.234 The first UPA units in Galicia were formed at the end of 1943, almost a year after the UPA was active in Volhynia. In Galicia, there were far fewer massacres of Poles, and the UPA was known primarily by its post-war activities fighting the Soviets.235 It was precisely these experiences which influenced the construction of the main historical narrative about the UPA both in émigré scholarship and in Ukraine. As scholars remark, after 1991, Ukrainian “nationalizing” historians imported a historical narrative of the OUN and UPA which had already been developed by émigré historians, members of the OUN and UPA soldiers who migrated to the West.236

Close focus on the locality allows the possibility of shedding light on the intricate interplay between what happens at the local, regional, and national level in the remembering process. This is much more complicated than the top-down memory politics often presented in the literature on the memory of the OUN and UPA. In what follows I scrutinize the dynamics of memory in relation to the processes of nation- and state-building which to a great extent defined the memory work.237 As so little is written on this locality, I will initially introduce the city and the region in brief terms.

235 Motyka. Od rzezi wołyńskiej.
237 Since nation- and state-building in Ukraine are extensively studied, I mainly refer to secondary literature when looking at these processes from the center. Where I scrutinize these processes at a regional level, I refer to primary sources, as, to the best of my knowledge, these processes have not yet been scrutinized at this level.
Równe - Rovno – Rivne: Putting Rivne on Map

Rivne is the administrative center of Rivne oblast’, which is a part of a larger geographical and cultural entity – Volhynia. The city’s population is 250,000, while the population of the entire oblast numbers 1,173,000. Often the name of the place alone can reveal much about its history. Rivne is one of those places. By changing its allegiances over time it aligned its name (Równe - Rovno - Rivne) to the powers that ruled over it – Poland, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and Ukraine.

Figure 2: Putting Rivne on map. Map of Ukraine and its oblasts.

Belonging to different political entities down the centuries and having a rich ethnical composition in the past, the city bears Ukrainian, Polish, Jewish, Russian, and Soviet historical legacies. In the Middle Ages Rivne was a part of the Principality of Galicia–Volhynia. As of 1340 it became a part of Grand Duchy Lithuania and as of 1569 - the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth. In 1793, following the second partition of Poland, Rivne became a part of Russian Empire. Some of these legacies can still be traced through the city’s architecture, some are newly created, re-established, re-defined and re-articulated, while others are hard to find even after a very thorough search.

Judging from the changes in the architecture of the city, it can be said that the Galicia–Volhynian and Polish-Lithuanian legacies were seen as the golden age of the city’s history, they were revived, constructed and re-constructed in the 1990s, when Rivne was reestablishing itself in the independent Ukraine. A lot of efforts were made to establish the new façade of the city which would refashion the appearances of a typical Soviet city set

238 Volhynia broadly comprises of several administration units called oblast’ (oblasti) - Rivne, Volyn’ (its center being the city of Luts’k), and Zhytomyr.
in all different possible shades of grey into the (an imaginary) Polish-Lithuanian baroque city painted in all the colors of the spectrum. Even if these new Polish-Lithuanian appearances are based on someone’s imagination, such efforts on the part of the city’s elite are quite telling in showing how the city may be repositioned in time.

Despite such endeavors to position itself as a Polish-Lithuanian city which was rich in its ethnic composition, Rivne today is, to a large extent, an ethnically homogenous place where Ukrainians comprise 91.6%, Russians – 6.8%, and Belorussians - 0.6% of the population. These figures differ drastically from those of the 19th century, for instance, when the population was only 5,054 people, of which 55.8% were Jews, 17.4% – Russians, 16.6% – Ukrainians, 6.8% – Poles, 0.1% Belorussians (according to the language of the residents). Such a dramatic demographic transformation in the city is, of course, explained by the turbulent history of the “short” 20th century.

Figure 3. A row of new buildings and a monument built at the beginning of the 2000s on Soborna Street - the city’s high street.

To the left, the arch and monument to Maria Nespytska (–†1518), the Princess of Rivne, who has been the patron of Rivne since 1479.

The World Wars and the City

During the First World War, the city was briefly occupied by German forces in 1918. For a short period during April–May 1919 Rivne was the capital of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) under the leadership of Symon Petliura, whose memory was revived in the 1990s (as discussed below). In 1919, the Bolsheviks also briefly took control over the city. In accordance with the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921, which was amended when the borders between Poland and Soviet Union were fixed, Rivne became a part of Poland under the administration of Volhynian Voivodeship (Województwo wołyńskie).

The Second World War began in the region with the Soviet occupation on 17 September 1939, following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Initially, the new authorities were widely welcomed, because the Soviet Union was seen as a liberator from the Polish colonizers. However, it did not take long for the repressions and forced collectivization implemented by Soviets to change people’s attitudes. On 28 June 1941 Rivne was captured by Nazi Germany. In August 1941 it became a center of Reichskommissariat Ukraine.244

During the occupation 232,000 civilians were killed in the region. In Rivne alone, the number of civilians killed and prisoners taken amounted to 100,000. During the occupation the population shrank by 2.5 times. About 22,500 young people were deported to Germany as forced labor.245 There were three concentration camps in the town; prisoners from other regions were brought there to be killed. The group that suffered the first wave of mass extermination was the Jews. During 6–8 November 1941 about 17,000 Jews were murdered in a forest near the village of Sosonky on the outskirts of Rivne.246 Another place for the mass killings of Jews was the concentration camp established in Vydumka sand mines, which was then a village near the city but which now is part of Rivne. The second wave of mass killings in October 1943 was directed towards the Ukrainian intelligentsia and leadership of the local OUN.247

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244 Erich Koch was appointed as Reichskommissar. The German administration was based at the building which housed the men’s gymnasium and which now hosts the Rivne Oblast’ Ethnological Museum (Rivnens’kyi oblasnyi kraieznavchyi muzei).
Rivne was also the place where several partisan and insurgent groups conducted their activities: the Soviet partisan units of Vasyl’ Begma and Oleksiy Fedorov, the Polish formation of anti-German groups under the command of Robert Satanowski, the special operations’ forces under the leadership of General Dmitrii Medvedev, NKVD intelligence under Mykola Kuznietsov, and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (which included different groups loyal at different times to Taras Bul‘ba-Borovets’, Andriy Mel’nyk, and Stepan Bandera, see above). Some of these multiple allegiances were in one way or another reflected in the memoryscape of the city and the region after the war, some were entirely erased and became taboo.

The War Remembered 1945-1985

The Region of the Partisan Glory

When the Second World War ended and when Western Ukraine was incorporated into the UkrSSR, the pre-revolutionary Ukrainian pantheon of national Ukrainian heroes remained. Taras Shevchenko, the Ukrainian 19th century poet, continued to occupy his place of “father of the nation” in this pantheon, and Ivan Franko, the poet and writer from Stanislaviv, played the role of the second “father” mainly in Western Ukraine. Directly after the war there was a vacuum in state-sanctioned memory politics regarding the commemoration of the recent war with almost no monuments built, and no officially sanctioned procedures for commemoration prescribed. No doubt, there was much more pressing work to be done for repairing the damages caused by the war. Nevertheless, the vacuum in memory politics at a state level did not mean that there was no memory work at a local level. The pain of loss, death, and injuries had to be dealt with by practically every family. During and immediately after the war, local people in towns and villages

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250 Tu markin. The Living and the Dead.
arranged graves and memorial sites on the places where they knew people had been killed. This local memory work continued for decades after the war, and even when the state sanctioned official memory politics.\textsuperscript{251}

With the gradual restoration of industry, infrastructure and everyday life, the Soviet authorities turned their attention to the remembrance of war. But instead of memory, sorrow and penance, an amnesia ruled in the guise of fake triumphalism.\textsuperscript{252} Such an approach in memory was not specific to the Soviet Union alone, the same was seen everywhere. As Jeffrey Alexander pointed out, the postwar period was characterized by a “progressive narrative.” Wartime atrocities were downplayed and the main focus was on the construction of new life.\textsuperscript{253}

After 1945, the glorification of the cultural heritage of non-Russian peoples was increasingly connected to praising a wise leadership of the Russian nation.\textsuperscript{254} In the complex system of commemorative rituals and celebrations in the national republics, the priority was given to the preservation of the heritage of one’s own nation as long as it was in line with the Sovietization policies, so no historical themes that undermined the leadership of the Russian nation could be taken up for commemorative practices.\textsuperscript{255} Furthermore, local heritage had to be chosen in such a way that it underlined the connection of the republican history to that of Russia.\textsuperscript{256}

\textbf{Soviet Heroes: Partisans, Generals and Secret Agents}

In the 1960s Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1964 - 1982), introduced several changes to memory politics in the Soviet Union. With winners’ losses having far outnumbered the losses of the defeated German enemy, the price of victory began to be questioned.\textsuperscript{257} When the large number of Soviet casualties was first made public, there was a need to add something to the heroic story of a victorious and invincible Soviet people.

\textsuperscript{253} Alexander, Jeffrey. “On the social construction of morals universals. The Holocaust from War Crime to Trauma Drama.” \textit{European Journal of Social Theory}, 5, no. 1, 2002, pp. 5-85, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{254} Yekelchyk. \textit{Ukrainskaia istoricheskaia pamiat}.
\textsuperscript{255} In his insightful study of the complex relationship between Moscow and the Soviet Republics in questions of memory politics, Sergiy Yekelchyk vividly demonstrates how preservation of historical monuments became one of the directions of the official politics of memory which could be used by the Ukrainian intelligentsia and citizens as a way of expression of their national self-consciousness. See: Yekelchyk, \textit{Ukrainskaia istoricheskaia pamiat}, p. 113.
\textsuperscript{257} Tumarkin. \textit{The Living and the Dead}. 
The suffering and sacrifice of civilians came to the forefront of memory culture. Monuments to civilians were erected in memory of “peaceful citizens” or “innocent people” as it was worded, with no distinction being made between ethnicities or religions. “Nobody is forgotten, nothing is forgotten,” the line from Olga Berggolts’s poem originally written for the memorial for victims of the Siege of Leningrad at the Piskarevskoie cemetery in 1959, became widely used on numerous memorials in the Soviet Union. Among these new sites of memory were many places where Jewish local communities were murdered. The victims, though, were not described as being killed because of their Jewishness.258

To add a civic dimension into the memory culture of war, the Soviet partisan movement became a central topic in memory politics at a local level. Thus, the narrative of self-sacrifice and heroism of dedicated Soviet partisans who protected the locals became a popular motif in films and books about the war. The partisans’ past also presented a favorable resource to shape the monumental representations of war. In almost every town a monument to local partisans was built, in every cemetery a memorial to “the unknown soldier” was erected. In this way the idea of Rivne as a region of partisan glory has been widely promulgated through memory politics since the 1960s.259

The glorification of the Soviet partisan movement allowed a focusing on the broad support given to the Soviet army by the local population and on the heroism of the ordinary soldiers. In this regard, the story of Alexander Golikov and Pavlo Abramov became an emblem of such regional rank-and-file soldiers’ glorification.260 Golikov and Abramov were two tank crew who sacrificed their lives in the defense of Rivne against the German army on 28 June 1941. They became a legend in the city and served as a site of memory for many decades in both the software and hardware of memory. Their heroism was eternalized in fiction,261 and in material culture. The figure of a tank presented as the tank in which the soldiers were killed was located in one of the city’s streets. The memorial site was opened in 1965 at the place of their death (Ostrovs’kogo Street). In 1967, School No.10 was given the name of these two soldiers. One of the town’s streets, where they are actually buried, bears their names.262

Notably, almost all the commemorative places in the city are connected to places of death. The fact that the people were killed in the war

258 E.g. the Sosonky memorial in Rivne was established at the place where in November 1941 Germans shot Jews, was built in 1967 without specifying the groups of victims (it was reconstructed in 1990).
259 Yekelchyk. Ukrainskaia istoricheskaia pamiat.
260 P. Panchenko et al.Ukrainina v polumyi viyny.
262 Ironically, not far from this street in 2002 a monument to a commander of the UPA, Klym Savur was erected, in such a way mixing within the space two distinct traditions of commemorating the fallen in the same war but on different sides of the barricades.
adds a new dimension to commemoration of death whereby death has to be dealt with publicly rather than privately. Death during the war is perceived as a sacrifice for the sake of the others, especially for those who are alive. The duty of living co-patriots is to remember. The stories about the soldiers who were killed in a tough battle, about their dogged resistance to the enemy became an emblem of heroism, self-sacrifice and high moral standards. These stories served as model for subsequent generations (it was quite a telling gesture to name the school after the aforementioned fallen tank crew).

Rivne was presented, though, not only as one of the centers of the Soviet partisan movement, but also as the center of significant activity of Soviet intelligence led by Mykola Kuznetsov that undermined the German administration. There was even discussion about changing the name of Rivne to Kuznetsovgrad in honor of the secret agent of the NKVD, who became a widely promoted cult figure throughout the entire region. In Rivne itself he became a legendary agent like James Bond. Special exhibitions were devoted to him in the local museum. Schoolchildren had special classes on Kuznetsov where his devotion to Soviet ideals and his “anti-fascist” rigor were presented. Often such classes also included visiting the museum’s exhibitions.263

Despite such a wide promotion of Kuznetsov’s cult in the region, the plan about renaming Rivne never materialized.264 The monument to Kuznetsov was built in the city in 1961. Notably, the order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR about the building of a monument to Kuznetsov was taken in 1951, but it was another 10 years or so before the monument was actually built.265

It was erected on the spot of a former prison where mass killings of local residents, mostly Jews and political prisoners (including OUN members), took place during the Nazi occupation. In such a way, the commemorative practices of making visible one specific case in history masked over some other suppressed memories, hid incongruities and conflicts which encompassed society for decades. Remembrance of sacrifice, devotion, the heroism of Soviet partisans and intelligence promoted the feeling of pride and instilled belief in a united community who univocally supported the Soviets. No trace of other allegiances was to be found.

In 1970-80s, Soviet memory culture took another turn to emphasize the triumphs and greatness of the Soviet people.266 The megalomaniac features of new monuments of that time also penetrated to Rivne. Megalomania

263 It is worth stating that now there is also an exhibition dedicated to Kuznetsov in the Rivne museum, but the accent of the representation is shifted. At time of my last visit to the museum (autumn 2012) the exhibition on Kuznetsov was placed into a narrow passage (little more than a corridor) off a larger room which represents the years of occupation and another larger room where Volhynian embroidery patterns were displayed. Thus, the overwhelmingly heroic aura of the agent diminishes away.

264 In 1973, though, a smaller town near Rivne was named Kuznetsovsk in honor of the famous secret agent.

265 Yekelchyk, Ukrainskaia istoricheskaia pamiat.

266 See more in: Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead.
culminated in the project of the Park of Glory with a huge 48.5 meter high monument in the center of the park which was opened on 9 May 1985 to celebrate the 40th anniversary of victory.267 Behind the monument there is a place with military equipment.268 This memorial complex has never become, though, a popular place for visitors. As one commentator noted, the Park of Glory is a “dead” monument, which is hardly ever visited because it is located on the outskirts of the city.269 I would add that it is also dead because it arrived so late. In 1985 perestroika was launched. It opened a way to new interpretations of history and the old-style monumentalization of war became dated. In this atmosphere there was no place for a new monument with an old meaning.

One has to bear in mind that building a monument is not only about ideology, politics, and memory, it is also about bureaucracy. Sometimes all the technicalities involved in the process of monument building take so much time that when the monument is finally built it is already out of date: it responds either to no need or to no current trends in politics/society in general. In such a manner, the “Park of Glory” memorial complex remained dead not only because of its position in space but also because of its position in time. At the beginning of 2000s the place was in such a ramshackle condition that it could scarcely be used either for commemorative purposes or for city residents to stroll around it.

A similar example of belated memorialization in the city is the building of the last monument to the Soviet hero in 1988. It was the monument to Soviet general Dmitrii Medvedev near the KGB building. Discussions on its construction ran for around thirty years. When it was finally built, it was no longer required as it represented the obsolete values in a society that was struggling for liberalization, nationalization and democratization. The monument stood there only for another four years. In 1992 it was taken down and sent to Briansk in Russia where the general was born.

Dynamics of Memory 1985-2014

State- and Nation-Building as Frameworks of Remembrance

Nation- and state-building became at one and the same time a means and a target of post-Soviet transformation. These two processes were the main conditions in reordering of meaningful worlds after the collapse of the Soviet

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267 The sculptor of the monument was V. Vinaikin, and the architect Y. Moskaltsov.
268 The whole project in Rivne is reminiscent of the huge monument “Motherland” and monumental composition in the vicinity of this monument which was opened in Kyiv in 1981. The monument entitled “Motherland” in Kyiv (sculptor Vasyl’ Borodai) was built imitating the monumental work “To Heroes of Stalingrad” (sculptor Yevgeniy Vatutich, 1967) in Volgograd.
system. To understand the dynamics of memory more effectively, special attention should in particular be paid to the nation- and state-building processes as they pushed forward transformations in memory work in the late 1980s. At the same time, memory per se became a vehicle of transformation. That is why it is important to present the context of the late 1980s-2000s in which these transformations took place.

State- and nation-building processes did not coincide in the case of Ukraine. Nation-building started in the 19th century, but state-building, by contrast, was rather sporadic, with several failed attempts at building a sovereign Ukrainian state after the First World War and during the Second World War. For seven decades Ukraine was part of the USSR and Ukrainian statehood was more a de jure status than a de facto reality. In this book where I address state- and nation-building I address mainly the years following 1991 when Ukraine became a sovereign state. In what follows I argue that the main processes involved in the memory work in Ukraine during 1991-2010 are as follows:

- Pluralization and fragmentation of memory that gave way to previously silenced voices.
- Regionalization reflecting different historical experiences of those in different regions of Ukraine.
- Nationalization of memory which means initiatives to give new “Ukrainian” perspectives on history.
- De-Sovietization understood as distancing Ukraine from Soviet legacies.
- Politization conceived as the political parties’ use of history in power struggles.
- Decolonization characterized by emerging post-colonial perspectives on history.

These processes are interlinked and influence the memory work to a greater or lesser degree depending on the context and configuration of power.

Disordering the meaningful world: 1985-1995

The program of social and economic change launched by Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in 1985, which was entitled perestroika (literally meaning “re-building,” perebudova – in Ukrainian) brought along the politics of “glasnost’” that allowed open discussion of previously silenced or taboo topics. Thus, the entire period of the mid-1980s to the beginning of the 1990s is characterized by attempts to map those silenced topics and make them public. These silenced and prohibited topics were referred to as “blank spots” of history. Tackling “blank spots” was a voyage of discovery driven by the need to find the historical truth and bring new - and “true” – historical knowledge to the society.
As Etkind pointed out, the drive for truth was one of the strongest in the society where the access to knowledge about the past (even the past of one’s closest family) was limited and where memory had a largely prescriptive character, i.e. where the ways and content of remembering were censored and filtered by the state.\textsuperscript{270} Thus, looking for truth, keeping and sharing the truth about the past and about the present situation was one of the main imperatives in dissident circles in East European countries that can be best demonstrated by famous Milan Kundera dictum: “The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.”\textsuperscript{271} Starting with the end of the 1980s, the need to know what really happened to oneself, to one’s relatives, and to the society in general, which had been concealed for decades, could be finally openly addressed.

It must be stressed, though, that \textit{glasnost’} did not eliminate all the taboos. Some topics were still off-limits or stigmatized. The history of the OUN and UPA was among these topics. Such an unbalanced approach to history in Ukraine was questioned by patriotic, democracy-oriented groups which began to form the anti-communist opposition. This was not an easy task in such a stagnated society as Ukraine by that time which was largely unprepared for the seismic changes that were to come.

\textbf{Undermining the Reserve of Stagnation}

The fact that the democratic changes started in Ukraine was mainly due to the resignation of Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi, at the time the First Secretary of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Ukraine, in September 1989,\textsuperscript{272} and to the formation of the mass anti-Communist civic movement under the aegis of “\textit{Narodnyi Rukh za Perebudovu}” (People’s Movement for \textit{Perebudova - Rukh}) at the end of 1989.

\textit{Rukh} encompassed different democratic groups, dissidents, intellectuals, politically active youth, who became an alternative to the ruling Communist party. It was an all-Ukrainian movement which involved people from all the regions of Ukraine.\textsuperscript{273} As \textit{Rukh} was deeply rooted in the national humanistic tradition, with emphasis on literature, language, and culture, it focused its attention largely on the cultural liberation. At the very beginning of its existence, the main demands of \textit{Rukh} concerned language and history. Some concessions were made by Moscow when the law on language which guaranteed education in Ukrainian was adopted in 1989. Already by July 1990, under pressure from national democratic forces, the \textit{Politburo} KPU

\textsuperscript{270} Etkind. \textit{Warped Mourning}, pp. 74-75.
\textsuperscript{272} Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi held this position from May 1972. He was a devoted communist who resisted the changes brought about by \textit{perestroika}.
signed the Republican program of development of historical studies. One of the issues covered was the introduction within schools of a distinct course on the history of the Ukrainian SSR. In 1991, the name of the course was changed into the “History of Ukraine.”

From the beginning of its activities, Rukh organized several mass commemorations which defined the main themes of memory politics for several decades to come. One of the new commemorative practices introduced was a celebration of zluka – the unification of the West Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR) and the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR), attested on 22 January 1919. In order to commemorate the unification of the ZUNR and UNR, on 21 January 1990, a “living chain” united thousands of people on the roads from Kyiv-Zhytomyr-Rivne-Ternopil’-L’viv-Ivano-Frankivs’k. The number of participants was estimated at between 450,000 and one million. It became one of the first national commemorations demarcating the opposition to the communist power.

The Ukrainian historian Georgiy Kasianov noted that the aim of the performance was not only to separate national and Soviet history, but also to juxtapose the “natural” unification of Ukraine in 1919 against the “unnatural” unification in 1939. In such a way, history became a means of juxtaposing the “true” Ukrainian statehood against the “false” Soviet one. Symbolically, the ZUNR and UNR became the political entities which created the genealogy of the Ukrainian statehood, while the USSR era was presented as the split in Ukrainian state history.

**Rock-'n-Roll Nationalism**

In 1989 Rukh together with other patriotic organizations established the first song festival “Chervona Ruta” (literally “Red Rose”) in Chernivtsi which brought together nationally-minded youth. This festival was genuinely “a means of education in civics” whereas for many it became the first time they had experienced civic courage and could express their national feelings. As a Ukrainian music scholar Oleksandr Yevtushenko wrote, sharing his own memories of the event:

The day before the beginning of “Chervona Ruta” the country was still sleeping in a lethargic sleep. The next day, though, it woke up as a completely different country. To the festival we were going as the citizens of the USSR and felt, if you don’t mind, as sheep, who are just waiting every second for a “lord” to come at any moment with a knife and then we would have the harshest time.

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276 Kasianov. *Ukraiina*, p.21
But from the festival we returned as completely different people, with a heartbreaking feeling that we were entering a new life without lies and distorted mirrors.\(^\text{278}\)

One Yevtushenko recalled, one of his friends, the son of a Communist Party functionary, was quite skeptical about the festival and characterized it as a “Banderites’ gang, a Sabbath organized by L’viv Nazis.”\(^\text{279}\) Whether such a view on the festival was really shared by the Party, it is hard to say, but it is clear that the festival presented a true challenge for the authorities. The politics of glasnost’ opened up a Pandora’s Box of suppressed feelings. People sincerely believed that free expression was really allowed, a lot of blue-and-yellow flags were waved, and young women wore blue skirts and yellow t-shirts to express themselves. This caused troubles with the police as blue-and-yellow flags were still banned at that time. So, in a seemingly open society, the police started arresting the people who demonstrated Ukrainian national symbols.

At the festival, the reinvigorated patriotism was not only demonstrated in visual symbols of the public but also in the content of most of the songs sang there. The lyrics of the songs undermined the communist regime. Participants specifically chose “new” themes that separated Ukrainian experiences from Soviet ones. These themes included coal-miners strikes, nostalgia for East Galicia, and Ukraine’s war-time struggle for independence. The song by the rock band “Braty Gadiukiny” (Gadukiny Brothers) “Oi, lykho!” (“Oh, evil!”) referred to Ukraine in 1946. The song reflected the frustration of the OUN and UPA who lost the opportunity to gain independence during the war years.

Rock music became one of the main transmitters of subversive discourses and memories. Religion also played one of the central roles in the formation of new nodes of memory culture, as we will see below. In such a way, two spheres of both cultural and social life from seemingly opposite ends of society fostered the emerging memories of the OUN and UPA. Notably, in 1991 “Braty Gadiukiny” produced a collection of songs entitled “We are lads from Banderstadt” (“My hloptsi z Bandershtadtu,” where by “Banderastdt,” i.e. Bandera’s City, L’viv is meant), which became a clear statement that the underground memories of Western Ukraine began spreading nationwide. In such a way, popular culture, and music specifically, executed a social function inscribed to it by Simon Frith, which is to give ways of managing the relationship between public and private emotional lives.\(^\text{280}\) What was preserved in private or in a very small group of the insiders at the level of


\(^{279}\) Yevtushenko, Oleksandr. “Korolivstvo priamykh dzerkal.”

communicative memory became public through the means of pop culture. A study of the lyrics of the song “We are lads from Banderstadt,” reveals what kind of reordering of meanings takes place:

All our family are daredevils from L’viv,
An apple did not fall away from the apple-tree.
Mummies and daddies broke so many beds
So the stork could bring us to God’s world.
Because we are boys from Banderstadt,
We go to church, we respect our parents.
None can party like us
Till the bugles don’t play, till the drum does not beat
Some say we are bandits, hooligans,
From this swamp there won’t be human beings.
But we will see, when there is a need,
Who will crawl down to the cellar, and who will go under bullets.281

Thus, “bandits, hooligans” are turned into those who “when there is a need […] will go under bullets.” In these lines there is a clear indication of the typical reworking of the Soviet-bred master narrative about the OUN and UPA which labeled Banderites “nationalist bandit formations” into a heroic national master narrative that present the OUN and UPA as defenders of the Motherland.

The lyrics also indicate the hope of repositioning L’viv (and Galicia) to that of “Ukrainian Piedmont” which is believed to have existed in the past and it was hoped to be revived again in the future. Hence, the myth of “Ukrainian Piedmont” is reiterated through the song’s lines whereby from the provincial “swamp” from where no “human beings” were expected, there will come heroes that will defend the whole nation.282 In such a way, the memory of the OUN and UPA plays simultaneously two roles: it consolidates and articulates regional (Galician) identity as well as claims its indisputable place in the cultural memory of the whole nation.

The changes which were launched at the end of the 1980s seemed to be irreversible. By the end of the 2000s, the “Banderstadt” theme became so popular among youth groups that in 2007 the festival called “Banderstadt” was launched in Dubno, Rivne region. The festival’s logo stated “Banderstadt - the festival of Ukrainian resistance” (“Festyval’ Ukrains’kogo oporu”).283

283 Official website of the festival: http://bandershtat.org.ua/.
The festival was the initiative of a far-right party “Natsional’nyi Alians” (National Alliance), but it drew in youth who did not necessarily share that party’s ideology. “Banderstadt” serves as a site of memory that safeguarded the place of the OUN in memory culture. Through the festival, the OUN and UPA became increasingly associated with everything new, young, and revolutionary.

In such a way, nationalism acquired a certain “rock-n-roll” flair. Without questioning the history that stands behind the celebrated organizations, the youth seems to take for granted the heroic, revolutionary, and daring image which is transmitted to them. For a historian such a situation seems rather disturbing. There is always the professional awareness about the danger that such uses (or rather abuses) of history hiding under the cloak of “banal nationalism” may have potentially. This is because those uses may detonate in the most unexpected and, indeed, awful ways.

Reclaiming Words: The Case of “Banderivtsi”

The present use by the public of the name of Bandera demonstrates that the name “banderivtsi” (literally Banderites), which was used as a pejorative and informal term for depicting the OUN and UPA in the Soviet master narrative, became widely spread among larger groups of Ukrainians. Gradually the term itself lost its pejorative meaning and became one of the reclaimed words to which some communities refer in order to express themselves. In such a way, the past of the OUN and UPA became one of the “memory veins” which when dug up gave resources for formation of a “reverse discourse” which when dug up gave resources for formation of a “reverse discourse” which is aimed at articulating the past which was not represented in the Soviet historical narrative. Within this discourse “banderivtsi” became one of the reclaimed

284 To evaluate properly the attendees of the festival we would need to conductng a new study which we will leave for the future. The referenced comments are based on my thorough reading of the forums of the festival and my observation of the festival’s audience in 2010.


286 The term refers to the everyday representations of the nation as a discursive formation which creates an imagined sense of national belonging. To use Billig’s words, banal nationalism is a “complex of beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practices must also be reproduced…. in a banally mundane way, for the world of nations is the everyday world, the familiar terrain of contemporary times.” (Billig, Michael. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage, 1995, p. 6).

287 Reclaiming a word refers to a word which is used as a mechanism of repression. Reclamations does not change the meaning of a word completely. Reclamation gains rather the power of that reclaimed word. It alters the value or connotation of the word. (Foucault, Michael. The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction. London: Allen Lane, 1979; see also: Foucault, Michael. Language, Counter Memory, Practice. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
words that expresses the identity denied or misrepresented by the dominant Soviet discourse.

Scholars who study reclamation underline that by reclaiming words and phrases used by dominant groups, subordinated groups and individuals refurbish the meanings of those words so that they correspond to the specific purposes. By repossessing the words and phrases that have derogatory meanings, subordinated groups take the authority to name, to shape and to control meaning. As Godrej contends, “linguistic reclamation is usually a tool for disarming the power of a dominant group to control one’s own and others’ views of oneself or one’s group in a totalizing way.”

It should be stressed that Soviet tradition to call anti-Soviets “banderitvets” persists in Russia to the present day. The Russian historian Klementii Fedevich notes that in Russian mass consciousness “banderitvets” first of all stands for a cruel enemy of the Soviet and inherently Russian state. “Banderivets” is a collective image of an enemy to the Russians on the lands which were joined to the USSR after September 1939. Fedevich rightly adds that images of the enemy in Ukrainian-Russian relations always change. It is worth mentioning that already in the 18th century the tradition began to call “autonomists” (the people who wanted some kind of autonomy for Ukraine) by some name or other. In the 18th century, it was “mazepyntsi” after Het’man Ivan Mazepa who established a military alliance with Sweden in the fight against the Russian Empire. In the 1920-30s it was “petliurivtsi” who were considered as the main enemies of Russian-Ukrainian relations thanks to the name of Symon Petliura, the leader of the Ukrainian short-lived inter-war autonomy. In the 1940s and after the war the role of the collective enemy was played by “banderivtsi.” During and after the Orange Revolution in 2004 the enemy was collectively referred to as an “orange pest” (“oranzhevaia chuma”). During “Euromaidan” in 2013-2014 the image of the enemy was again “banderivtsi” while the post-Maidan government was presented by the Russian media as a “fascist junta.”

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289 When people in Western Ukraine or any Ukrainian speakers were called “banderivtsi,” this name lost connection with a concrete historic person and became one of the markers of Ukrainianness in general (as “mazepyntsi” or “petliurivtsi,” i.e. followers of pro-independence leaders). Protesting against negative connotations of the term “banderivets,” a few people borrowed this name as their own, as a symbol of their own identity (Portnov. Istorii dla domashnioho vzhytku, pp. 172-173). It is worth pointing out that modern Russian use is “bEnderivtsi” indeed, which shows a lack of knowledge of term’s origin. It is also worth to be mentioned that there is a town Bender (also known as Bendery) in Moldova which is under de facto control of the unrecognized Transnistria Republic since 1992. Thus ‘bEnderovite’ actually refers to its inhabitant.
It should be added that such othering and enemy-making strategies are vastly criticized in Ukraine. In response to such othering, Ukrainians construct a defensive mnemonic narrative whereas “banderivtsi” (as well as other historical figures denigrated by Russian discourse) are whitewashed and presented exclusively in positive terms. Thus, Moisei Fishbein, the writer and leader of the Jewish community in Ukraine and the member of the PEN-club, argued:

by slandering Stepan Bandera, Russian intelligence tries to destabilize Ukraine, to create the negative image of Ukrainians, to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and hinder its integration into the EU and NATO.292

In such a defensive narrative, the memory of the OUN and UPA is seen as a means of protecting one’s ontological security against (perceived or real) threats to one’s identity. As Anthony Giddens points out: “To be ontologically secure is to possess, at the level of the unconscious and practical consciousness, ‘answers’ to fundamental existential questions which all human life in some way addresses.”293 As we will see in the discussion that follows, such a defensive role of memory is one of the decisive factors in remembrance of the OUN and UPA.

**Establishing New Order**

By the end of the 1980s the idea of independence dominated not only among the national democratic groups of intellectuals and civic activists but also among the party nomenclature circles and trade unions of the industrial east of the country. On 11 July 1990 a large coal-miners’ strikes took place in Donbas. In Kyiv, on October 2-17, 200 students went on hunger strike, their protests became known as “Revolution on the Granite” because they were sitting on a granite paved square of October Revolution in Kyiv (now called “Maidan Nezalezhnosti,” “Independence Square”). Among the demands of the students were national independence and an end to communism. In 1991, crucial events in the history of Ukraine occurred with a dizzying speed. On 24 August 1991, Verkhovna Rada (the Supreme Council) of the Ukrainian SSR proclaimed the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. On 1 December 1991 the overwhelming majority of people in Ukraine voted for national independence in a national referendum and elected Leonid Kravchuk, a former

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propaganda minister of the UkrSSR, as president. On 30 August 1991, the Communist Party of Ukraine was banned.

As a result of such changes, the national democratic elites who in fact were leading the anti-Communist movement found themselves in a precarious situation: on the one hand, they had won as the overwhelming majority of people voted for independence so that their much-cherished target was reached, Ukraine had become independent. On the other hand, the national democratic elites lost, as the highest ranking positions in Ukraine were taken by representatives of the Communist Party nomenclature and there were no significant changes in the state offices. Basically, the same people who were running the country under Moscow’s guidance remained in their posts but were now governing the country without instructions from Moscow.

Two rival groups in the past – the communist nomenclature and national democrats - essentially concluded an “unwritten agreement” on a specific “hybrid” type of state-building, with political power remaining in the hands of the communist nomenclature adorned with a facade of national symbols promoted by national democratic groups. Such a combination legitimized the old order in disguise as a new one. To put it bluntly, hardcore politics was made by the old communist nomenclature that turned into national democrats only during the course of the election of 1991, while soft politics was informed by those national democrats who were actively protesting against communists during the perestroika years. However, those democrats had but little power to influence major decisions such as strategic geopolitical orientation, acquiring NATO membership, etc. The main task of “soft politics” was “to separate Ukrainian identity from Russian or Soviet.” This task was far from easy. Although in 1991 about 90% of Ukrainians voted for the independence of Ukraine, actual separation from Russia did not occur overnight. As Orest Subtelny observed, “an especially telling manifestation [of this complicate process of separation] is the fact that Ukraine was the last of the former Soviet republics to adopt a new constitution.”

Transformations in History-Writing

If Ukrainian history in the Soviet Union was presented as the continuous striving for unification with the Russian “elder brother,” then the Ukrainian

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294 90.3% of population voted for independence (turnout comprised 84%). “National-Communist” Leonid Kravchuk got about 62% and a national democrat Viacheslav Chornovil - 23% (data cited in Kasianov. Україна, p. 32).
298 The official Soviet scheme that persisted in neo-Soviet historical discourse is based on the Russian imperial scheme that emphasizes the unity of Eastern Slavs in the period of Kyivan Rus’ composed of three “brethren” proto-nations: proto-Ukrainians, Russians and Belorussians. Within this conceptual framework, Russians are depicted as more ancient and more powerful
history in the post-Soviet time was presented as a continuous struggle for independence from Russia. The post-Soviet changes required definite attitudes towards the past to be formed, both pre-communist and communist. To resolve this, attention was paid to making a national scheme of history which took its genealogy from the populist Ukrainian historiography established by the mid-nineteenth century historians that was based on traditions of romanticism and positivism. This scheme underlines the distinctiveness of Ukrainian people among other Slavs and demonstrates that Ukraine had followed its own separate historical path.  

Georgiy Kasianov distinguishes two stages of nationalization of the history of Ukraine: the first began in the mid-nineteenth century and reached its height in Mykhailo Hrushevskyi’s “History of Ukraine-Rus’.” In Ukraine, this tradition was destroyed by the Soviet authorities after the Second World War. The second stage of the nationalization of history began in the late 1980s and is not yet complete. Within this scheme, the main aim of Ukrainian history is national independence and state sovereignty. Thus, the deeds that are directed towards the main aim of independence are glorified and those who are devoted to these deeds take on a higher profile and are idealized. In such a framework, the Ukrainian nationalist movement for independence against the Soviets during the Second World War is seen as the pivotal element in the history of national liberation. One of the triggers of memory as well as the carriers of new knowledge was the historical writings of diaspora historians as well as pre-war historians.“Ukraine: A history” of Canadian historian Orest Subtelny301 (published in Ukraine in 1991) served as a textbook in schools and universities before new textbooks in the independent Ukraine were published. There is only a rather short passage on the OUN and UPA in the book, but it was the first step made to cover that initial need to fill in the blank spot on this topic.

Schools and universities became the main channel for disseminating the newly formed national historical narrative. Whereas in the Soviet Union people who can protect their younger Ukrainian brothers. This approach was incorporated in the 1986 Soviet curriculum that states: “In the process of studying the history of the Ukrainian SSR, students are to be convinced that the friendship of the Ukrainian people and all other peoples of the USSR with the great Russian people has great historical significance” (cited in : Richardson. “Disciplining the Past,” p.114).

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history education was used to establish *Homo Sovieticus*, in the independent Ukraine, history education is used to establish *Homo Ukrainicus*. At universities all students in their first year are introduced to an obligatory course on the history of Ukraine.

The Swedish historian Johan Dietsch argued that in the independent Ukraine “‘nationalization’ became a lens through which all education was to be filtered and with which it was possible to rid the educational apparatus of Soviet remnants.” The First Deputy Prime Minister responsible for Education in the newly founded (in 1992) Ministry for Education of Ukraine, Anatoliy Pohribnyi, stipulated that “education in Ukraine has to be fully and unconditionally subordinated to the building up of an independent Ukrainian state.” Such a view on history has persisted down the decades up to the present day. In 2011, the Ministry of Education, Science, Youth and Sport of Ukraine (MESYSU) in the instructions for teaching history at school underlined:

important objectives of teaching history are to develop students’ historical thinking, form positive historical self-identification, creative skills and ability to use the gained experience in practice, bringing up the young generation as citizens of Ukraine, developing universal moral values, democracy, patriotism, preparing students for conscious active participation in public life.

Thus, history education at schools and universities is used to help reorder the meaningful worlds. In this function, education can be seen as what Pierre Ricoeur called “forced memorization” meaning inscribing past events to be “held to be remarkable, even founding, with respect to the common identity.” In school and university textbooks the OUN and UPA were presented as an integral part of national liberation and of state-building. This struggle for liberation became a lens through which all the deeds and ideologies of these organizations were interpreted.

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307 Although there were many changes in the textbooks published between 1991 and 2014, in general we can say that such an interpretation of these organizations became to some extent the official version in the textbooks. For more details see the abovementioned studies of Dietsch. *Making Sense of Suffering*; Marples. *Heroes and Villains*; Richardson. “Disciplining the Past.”
As I have stated above, the nationalization of memory served to eradicate Soviet legacies, although, as Zhurzhenko argued, it does not exactly mean de-Sovietisation of memory in terms of coming to terms with the past. Rather one can speak about the removal of Soviet symbols, the externalization of communist legacies, and the use of the past as political capital.\(^{308}\) In this case, the symbolic de-Sovietization can be spoken about rather than de-Sovietization in the sense of coming to terms with the historical injustices committed by the communist regime.

De-Sovietisation of memory in Ukraine, thus, can be characterized in terms of decolonization whereby the former subordinated colonial entities strive to write their own history liberated from the grand narrative created in the imperial center.\(^{309}\) De-colonization is directly linked to the search for new identities and orientations and is often characterized as a choice between Russia and the West as the main points of orientation. In these de-Sovietization and de-colonization processes, history becomes an object to be reclaimed whereas the formerly subordinated subject tries to tell a story of its own.\(^{310}\)

In terms of the relationship to the communist past, the Ukrainian situation was similar to that of some other postcommunist nations, where re-evaluation of the communist past took place in an implicit manner. No lustration was made, no tangible punishment was engaged and “rather than aiming at an absolute standard of justice or morality, attempts [were] made at carefully negotiating justice so that it is politically feasible.”\(^{311}\) As a result of such negotiations, distortions of history inflicted by the Soviet regime were to be compensated by memory politics. In post-Soviet Ukraine such an approach to the past was characterized by “demarcation of recognizing Communist, but not pre-Communist, injustices.”\(^{312}\) Such a symbolic reparation refurbished national identities and often led to changing the accents of history – what was regarded as negative by the Soviet regime became positive in the independent Ukraine.

Intelligentsia who gathered around Rukh turned their eyes to the history of the Second World War as a memory vein which could provide


\(^{309}\) In this respect Andriy Portnov stated that Ukraine is going through “unfinished decolonization.” See: Portnov. Istorii dlia domashnioho vzhytku, p. 139.


\(^{312}\) Barkan. The Guilt of Nations, p. 120.
resources to separate from communist legacies, in particular if focused on the anti-Soviet fight of the OUN and UPA. Since the history of war, as saturated in the memory nodes of the “Great Victory over fascism” and “Great Patriotic War,” served as a founding myth of the Soviets, dissociating from that myth would mean symbolic dissociating from the Soviet Union per se. Such a move needed formation of some new nodes of memory that would express specifically Ukrainian experiences of war, different from those conveyed by the Soviet narrative. Such a memory node could serve for substituting the Soviet foundational myth and provide the grounds for reiterating a specific Ukrainian identity that falls in a cultural, political, and discursive category.

Thus, those topics related to the war, which were suppressed during the Soviet rule, came to the surface of public discussions during perestroika. As was mentioned, they were initiated by anti-communist groups. These topics included the OUN, UPA, Operation Vistula, and the Ukrainian-Polish armed conflict in Volhynia in 1943. The term “Great Patriotic War” came under question and the more neutral term “the Second World War” was propagated instead. At the same time the fact that the war was started in 1939 by allied Nazi Germany and Soviet Union aggression against Poland, became one of the new pieces of information that the society had to digest.

“Blank spots” of history were so emotionally charged that they kindled formation of new nodes in memory culture. One of the most important nodes of memory that was formed around the figure of the OUN and UPA can be schematically called the “memory of resistance” which underlined the struggle of Ukrainians against the communist regime. Already by the late 1980s the memory of the OUN and UPA started to undergo a process of mythologization wherein by responding to the need of distancing itself from the Soviet Union, memory loses some of its historically based traces and acquired transhistorical characteristics which helped convey best the idea of “resistance.” In this process, the knowledge that could undermine the flawless status of the resistance movement represented by the OUN and UPA is not mentioned, avoided, and silenced, whereas the struggle against the Soviet regime, on the contrary, is underlined and positioned into the ahistorical axis of sacred times where Ukrainians resist all foreign powers’ pretense on Ukrainian territories.

A drive to dissociate Ukraine from Soviet and communist legacy while stressing the specifically Ukrainian experiences of war through the

313 In the Soviet tradition it became commonplace to refer to the “National Socialism” of Nazi Germany as fascism as it was discussed in this book on p. 61.
history of the UPA was strengthened by the fact that Soviet victory in the Second World War was “nationalized” by Russia. In the official Russian narrative of war, Russians are portrayed as the victors and Ukrainians along with representatives of other nationalities are bracketed out of the narrative.\textsuperscript{315} One of the speeches of the then Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, is particularly of note, where he declared that the war could have been won without the participation of Ukrainians simply because “Russia is the country of victors.”\textsuperscript{316} Suffice it to say that this declaration neglects the fact that more than three million Ukrainian residents joined the Red Army. Such open lack of recognition of other nationalities in the victory over Nazi Germany by the neighboring country leads to transformations of the Soviet master narrative in Ukraine so that it emphasizes the contribution of Ukrainian people to the victory. The problem is, though, that this “specifically Ukrainian” war theme as presented only through the OUN and UPA heroic narrative is problematic. By highlighting this theme, memory entrepreneurs iron out the manifold experiences of the war of the population of Ukraine which in the course of war years had different allegiances. It is sufficient to mention that more than three million Ukrainian republic’s residents joined the Red Army, 200,000 of them volunteered in the first months of the war.\textsuperscript{317} It is quite telling if we consider that the UPA in 1944 had about 30,000.\textsuperscript{318} By insisting on only one prescribed memory, one denies the right to remember to other groups.

Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that during 1939-45, the Ukrainians were engaged in several conflicts simultaneously – being in the Red Army, in the Nazi serving police, in the UPA, etc. Sometimes one person could change allegiances several times. These entangled experiences make the construction of a unified and homogeneous national history a complex and intricate task, as any attempt to premise one theme of history as “national” would downplay the role of other experiences so numerous that they can also claim to be “national.”

Historians tried to address the problem of history-writing in a rational way. This took the time needed for research which became possible with, for instance, the opening of archives in Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, such a complex segment of history immediately became a

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{317} Historians estimated that there were more than three million Ukrainians in the Red Army. Some put the number at 4.5 million Ukrainians. See: Drobot, Ivan, Volodymyr Kucher, Anatolii Sliusarenko, Petro Cherneha. \textit{Ukrainskyi narod u Druhii svitovii viini}. Kyiv: Shkoliar, 1998, pp. 219–220.
\bibitem{318} Rudling. “Yushchenkiv fashyst,” p. 281.
\end{thebibliography}
resource for politicians who did not try to solve the problem by incorporating different experiences into a multifaceted narrative. Rather they used a one-sided interpretation of the past as a whip to chasten the opponent by stressing the exclusivity and authenticity of only one experience of war worth being remembered. This was either the glorified memory of the Great Victory or the glorified memory of the OUN and UPA, either a memory of the Great Patriotic War or the memory of the Second World War, either the memory of the Soviet partisan movement or the memory of Ukrainian insurgency.

In such a way, memory is often cut down to a zero-sum game in political battles which also influences the formation of memory culture. Since complex stories sell badly, politicians use simplified patterns that pull at people’s heart strings. Often such patterns are driven by “othering” strategies in constructing a narrative that distinguishes “us” and “them.” In such a way, the past becomes a resource that helps gain more votes at the elections. Already by the mid-1990s history was to a greater extent substituting the role of ideology in political campaigning as we will see below.

Despite new steps in history education and in remembrance of the OUN and UPA at large, the Ukrainian intellectual Mykola Riabchuk argues that the dominant discourse in Ukraine continues to portray the OUN as “bourgeois nationalists” following the Soviet tradition. The OUN is perceived as “pathology, deviation of the official norm, whereas the norm is seen not as the confident, liberal democratic Ukrainian as an alternative to nationalist and authoritarian banderivets, but as the obedient supporter of unification with Russia that is ready to offer its own identification, dignity and probably independence in the name of mythical East Slavic brotherhood under the leadership of Moscow.”

By and large, though, the entire period beginning with the 1990s is characterized by a tension between old and new interpretations of the OUN and UPA although it is difficult to say which interpretation is dominant. In education, which is the most centralized channel of dissemination of historical knowledge one can tell that a more or less heroic interpretation of the history of the OUN and UPA is dominant. It places the history of these organizations into the consolidated narrative of national independence. If one looks at other spheres of the public use of history, or at the ways organizations are remembered and memorialized in space, one can see different and often opposite approaches as will be demonstrated in further discussion, when the anti-OUN/UPA discourse will be analyzed.

Parallel to the changes in approaches to history-writing and history education, there were changes in representing the history in urban districts. The beginning of the 1990s was characterized by some vacuum in memory politics at a national level (which was also witnessed in the period directly after the war when official memory politics did not touch the war itself). The fracture in the social structure of the society seems to put memory work first of all into the hands of local actors. The first steps in this direction were taken in Western Ukraine in 1989-1990.

Thus, on 1 September 1990, according to the decision of Chervonograd city council in L’viv oblast’, a monument to Lenin was taken down. This was the first monument to Lenin which fell in Ukraine. The following week a monument to Lenin was taken down in Ternopil’, then in L’viv, and in Ivano-Frankivs’k. In the east of Ukraine, monuments to Lenin also became the victims of vandalism. Kasianov connects these acts to anti-communism rather than to nationalism, as it was in the western parts of Ukraine.

It should be stressed, though, that nationalism at that time had pronounced anti-communist undertones. These anti-communist undertones formed the main themes in memory politics at the national level which came about first of all in the changes of the topographical names and in symbols. In the 1990s nationally promoted nodes of cultural memory were: Kyivan Rus’, the Cossacks, and the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR). Both Kyivan Rus’ and the Cossacks were already well established in memory culture in Soviet times as they were presented through the prism of the common destiny of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples. In the 1990s, though, there was a change of emphasis in these themes through the separation of Kyivan Rus’ history from the history of Moscovia and the underlining of the autonomist struggle during the Cossack period. The history of the UNR was definitely a new theme which was promoted nationwide without much difficulty as it emphasized the common destiny of Eastern and Western Ukraine.

The inter-war West Ukrainian People’s Republic and the Ukrainian People’s Republic which were united on 22 January 1919, became political entities that were presented as the beginning of Ukrainian statehood. Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, the president of the UNR, was often called the first president of Ukraine, whereas Leonid Kravchuk was presented as the second president. Of note, when Kravchuk was elected as president, he took the symbols of presidency from Mykola Plavjuk, the last president of the émigré government.

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320 In L’viv during the demounting it was revealed that stone plates from the Jewish cemetery destroyed by Nazis were used for strengthening the base of the monument.
which takes its genealogy from the UNR. In such a way, the Soviet period is presented as a fracture in the “natural” development of the nation. Such a theme as the OUN and UPA remained significant in memory culture only at the regional level. Topics that would divide a polarized society (where the ideas of separatism were heard here or there) were somewhat avoided.

The main themes of the newly established pantheon of Ukrainian heroes were portrayed in the design of money which was already in circulation in 1992. The portraits of people who decorated banknotes - Volodymyr the Great, Yaroslav the Wise, Bodan Khmelnitsky, Ivan Mazepa, Ivan Franko, Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, Taras Shevchenko, Lesia Ukrainka - demonstrate which figures were accepted as national symbols. The inclusion within this collection of heroes of the figure of the Cossack Het'man Ivan Mazepa is rather telling, as in Soviet history he was presented as a traitor and a betrayer of Russian imperial interests for his alliance with the Swedish king in 1709 against Russians. In this way, the inclusion of Mazepa into the

322 Here parallels can be drawn with the Baltic States, whereas the genealogy of the independent states is traced from the interwar period.
323 It should be noted that from the very beginning of independence the separatist and federalist desires were apparent among certain political groups, especially in the first half of the 1990s. Suffice to say, the endeavors of local activists to create Zakarpattia autonomy in 1992 was supported by the Canadian and USA Rusyn Diaspora, the federalist movements in Novorosia - in 1990, in Donbas - in 1990, or the Halychyna - in 1992. Nevertheless, the only part that actually gained autonomy was Crimea.
324 Volodymyr the Great (958 – 1015) was a prince of Novgorod, grand prince of Kyiv, and ruler of Kyivan Rus’ from 980 to 1015.
325 Yaroslav the Wise (978 – 20 February 1054) was the Grand Prince of Novgorod and Kyiv.
326 Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1595 – 1657) was the Hetman of the Zaporiz’ka Sich He held the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (now part of Ukraine). He led an uprising against the Commonwealth and its magnates (1648–1654) which resulted in the creation of a Cossack state. In 1654, he concluded the Treaty of Pereyaslav with Muscovy.
327 Ivan Mazepa (1639 – 1709) was the Cossack Hetman of the Hetmanate in Left-bank Ukraine, from 1687–1708, and the Prince of the Holy Roman Empire 1707-1709. He played an important role at the Battle of Poltava where he deserted his army and sided with Charles of Sweden.
328 Ivan Franko (1856 – 1916) was a Ukrainian poet, writer, social and literary critic, journalist, interpreter, political activist, and doctor of philosophy.
329 Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (1866 – 1934) was a Ukrainian academic, politician, historian, and statesman. He was the leader of the pre-revolution Ukrainian national movement, head of the Central Rada (Ukraine’s 1917–1918 revolutionary parliament), and a leading cultural figure in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s.
330 Taras Shevchenko (1814 –1861) was a Ukrainian poet, writer, artist, public and political figure. He is regarded to be the founder of modern Ukrainian literature and a symbol of Ukrainian romantic national revival.
331 Lesia Ukrainka (1871 –1913) was one of Ukraine’s most famous poets and writers. She also was a political, civil, and feminist activist. (On the meaning of Lesia Ukrainka in Ukrainian culture see: Zabuzhko, Oksana. Notre Dame D’Ukraine: Ukrainka v konflikti mifologii. Kyiv: Fakt, 2007.)
pantheon of national heroes indicates not only a de-Sovietization but also a new pro-European orientation promoted through memory politics.

At the same time, included within the illustrative characteristics of memory politics in post-Soviet Ukraine is its (perhaps unintentional) reliance on Soviet legacies which can be demonstrated by the naming of the new Ukrainian currency “hryvnia” (banknotes) and “kopiika” (coins). This linked Ukraine, as pointed out by Andriy Portnov, to two different traditions simultaneously - Kyivan Rus’ and the Soviet Union.333

As the 1990s progressed, the initiative in memory work in the Rivne region was taken up by diverse regional players such as parties, cultural actors, schools, and museums, etc. The only “unwritten” rule was to bring memories that were different from those established by the Soviets. This rule was formulated by national-democratic ideals and articulated by groups united under the auspices of Rukh. In Rivne four main themes were used to substitute the symbols of the old regime: the Halych Volhynian Rus’,334 the Polish and Lithuanian legacies,335 the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR), and the OUN and UPA. As at the national level, Kyivan Rus’ was celebrated as the golden time of the Ukrainian nation, in Western Ukraine the emphasis was put on Halych Volhynian Rus’ which guaranteed the continuity of Kyivan Rus’ tradition and linked Ukraine to Europe.

It should be underlined that the most visible symbols in Rivne as reflected in the architecture of refurbished facades and newly built shopping centers and cafés are associated with images of Halych Volhynian Rus’ and Polish-Lithuanian legacies. This is something that appeals to everyone, permeates the landscape with imagined Europeanness, and makes the appearance of the city more attractive and “marketable.” This legacy is relatively neutral in political terms. Politically saturated legacies, though, are those of the UNR and of the OUN and UPA, which also shape the memoryscape of the city but they are more disputed, contested and fought over. As a result, the memorialization of this past comes to the city much later, only at the beginning of the new millennium.

333 Portnov. Istorii dlia domashnioho vzhytku.
334 Halych Volhynian Rus’ - The Principality of Galicia–Volhynia, or Kingdom of Ruthenia, was a state in the regions of Galicia and Volhynia of present day Ukraine that was formed after the conquest of Galicia by the Prince of Volhynia Roman the Great with the help of Leszek the White of Poland. The state existed from 1199 to 1349. Along with Novgorod and Vladimir-Suzdal, it was one of the three most important powers to emerge from the collapse of the Kyivan Rus’.
335 The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was a European state from the 12th century until 1795. It was founded by the Lithuanians. The duchy later expanded to include large portions of the former Kyivan Rus’ and other Slavic lands, covering the territory of present-day Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, and parts of Estonia, Moldova, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. At its height in the 15th century, it was the largest state in Europe. It was a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional denominational state with a great diversity in languages, religion, and cultural heritage.
Private Becomes Public: From Communicative Memory to Cultural Memory

The relative vacuum in official memory politics at the beginning of 1990s allowed the uninterrupted flow of family and private memories which freely entered the public discourse. This brought about a pluralization of memory. Consequently, the Soviet canon lost its hegemony. As rightly argued by Stefan Troebst, there appeared new dimensions of culture of memory, which are not strictly “state” or “private,” but could be formed in the midst of civil society, parties, political unions, ethno-cultural communities.336

Among those intermediary actors, the main role was taken by the church. Being under the threat in the Soviet Union, religion, when allowed and welcomed in the society again, played a most decisive role in the formation of memory, especially of the memory of newly rediscovered history, including the history of the UPA. It was religion that influenced the establishment of the memory of the UPA in such a way that it acquired a mythical structure as will be discussed at full length in Chapter IV.

At the beginning of the 1990s, few new memorials awaited construction, but new ideas already dominated the public sphere in texts, as a Rivne resident, a professor of Ukrainian, Yaroslav Polishchuk, expressed his deep concern about the city’s image presented through the monuments:

What does the imaginary tourist think about our city when he looks at the monuments? Perhaps he thinks that we are very aggressive, because we have so many military monuments. That we are very untalented, because even our monuments - which should be considered the decoration of the city - are tasteless and primitive. And he also should think that [...] our city is not Ukrainian as there are no monuments to (Ukrainian) glorious compatriots (zemliakam)! (emphasis added)337

The Soviet monuments were considered as “tasteless and primitive,” as if reflecting the attitude to the Soviet period which produced those monuments. Of note, the author mentions military monuments which are strongly associated with the Soviet time. These monuments are presented as non-Ukrainian. Indeed, such an attitude to Soviet as being foreign and strange to everything Ukrainian is characteristic of memory politics at that time. Moreover, what we witness in post-1991 transformations in memory culture is the constant search for its “Ukrainian” aspects.

The basis of such aspects were the topics of history suppressed by the Soviets. Consequently, almost everything that was denigrated in Soviet times was dug up and exhibited to the public. This process was marked by some postcolonial resentment, whereby at the same time enchantment and shame in

337 Polishchuk. “Shcho uvichnuemo, panove?”
the face of one’s own past can be sensed. This is based on the mixture of superiority and inferiority complexes. In the text cited above we can see such resentment from the author being at the same time ashamed and proud of his past – ashamed with the past represented and proud with the past not represented in the city.

Although the author does not mention the past that he is proud of, it is understood that there is some great past of “glorious compatriots.” The past represented in the monuments makes the writer feel ashamed and afraid of being misrecognized. In fact, he fears that the community of “compatriots” that should be seen as glorious will be seen as aggressive instead. This fear of misrecognition, as contended by Etkind, is one of the main features of warped memories forged in societies where there is a tangible discrepancy between private memories and the memories promoted in public discourse. In the Ukrainian case, I would argue, this feature of memory has its own additional dimension provided by a post-colonial condition - a fear to be mixed up with a colonizer or to be (mis)perceived through an image projected by a colonizer (not by oneself). This is the fear that “the imaginary tourist” would think that “we are very aggressive,” whereas it is not “we” who are aggressive because this story is not about “us.”

Changes Come to the Streets

Gradually, the discussions that aroused changes in memory’s software led to transformations in its hardware. Since the mid-1990s the memory space of the city has changed dramatically. From 1992 the city council and administration in Rivne were dominated by pro-democratic and right-wing forces which influenced the development of new trends in memory culture. As a result, the streets named after Olena Teliga, Nil Hasevych, Prince Roman, Stepan Bandera, Princess Ol’ga, Klym Savur replaced streets which bore the names of the Soviet-era heroes. In such a way, by being renamed by new authorities,

339 The street was renamed in September 1991. Olena Teliga (27.07.1907-13.21.1942) was a poet, member of the OUN. She cooperated with the “Volyn” newspaper, which was published in Rivne in 1941-42, with its chief editor, the Ukrainian poet Ulas Samchuk. In Kyiv she was an editor of the journals “Lytavry” and “Ukrainsk’ke slovo”. As a nationalist, she was arrested by the Nazis and shot at Babyn Yar in Kyiv in 1942.
340 The street was renamed in October 1992. Nil Hasevych (12.11.1905-4.03.1952) was a well-known partisan artist and illustrator of almost all the printed materials of the UPA publications. He was born in the village of Diuksyn and killed at Sukhivtci, Rivne oblast’.
the city’s streets became “ideological statements” and “nation-building measures” rather than roads of memory as the names did not reflect the past so much as they reflected the present currents in state- and nation-building.342

Cultural historian Lisa A. Kirschenbaum reminds us, though, that even after the changes with the official naming policies of the city, people continued to remember the streets and public buildings as they were before, as they are preserved in their memory. In such a way, “[t]he everydayness of the city resisted, even as it embodied, official efforts to fix the meaning of the past [while the city residents’] mental maps include the present and the absent, the real and the remembered city.”343 Thus, today it is commonplace to hear from a taxi-driver or a passer-by when asking for directions, something like: “Oh, you mean Titova Street? It is now Teliga Street, I know!” Of course, these dual names exist as long as we have a generation of people who have the old names in their living memory. The next generations will know only the new names, unless they are changed again to some new, more topical, figures.

This phenomenon of the dual existence of two names for one place, though, is relevant to my research as it seems to reveal a fundamental characteristic of post-Soviet memory culture in Ukraine. This is the combination and co-existence of several seemingly exclusive narratives which do not necessarily run parallel to each other but became entangled into a patchwork of memories that, as I will argue later, actually reinforce one another.

**Monuments Movement**

When the streets were renamed, monuments became the new targets in the process of reordering. At one city council meeting the Kuznetsov monument was depicted as a “symbol of terror.”344 Its location on the grounds of mass killings was presented as a humiliation of the memory of the murdered since Kuznetsov, as chief of the regional NKVD, was fighting the UPA and OUN members who were among his victims in the prison.345

As a result of the heated debates between pro-democratic parties and communists that lasted for years, the monument was finally taken down in

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345 Isaiev. “Koly my vmyraly.”
1994 and re-erected in a more remote place, Yasna Street, far from the city center and far from any municipal building. The square where it stood was renamed to Ploshcha Magdeburz’kogo prava (Magdeburg Law Square), thus as if demonstrating the city’s connection to Europe. In place of the Kuznetsov monument, in 1994 a new monument entitled “To those who died for Ukraine” was erected. The plaque on the monument reads that it was built to honor “the innocent victims of fascist occupation and the patriots who were killed in the Rivne region in the fight of the Ukrainian people with the Stalinist and Hitlerist totalitarian regimes.”

During the opening ceremony the monument was presented as a “symbol of purification after the Communist delusion that sewed in people’s souls thoughtless obedience, slave psychology, and fear.” In such a way, new trends in commemorative practices were driven by three interlinked forces – de-communization, de-Sovietization, and decolonization. Notably, the Soviet tradition to describe the Nazi occupation as “fascist” persists in post-Soviet Ukraine.

Figure 4. Reordering the monuments. New monuments that were built in the city center after 1991. Kuznetsov’s monument was removed to the cemetery and the Park of Glory is a reminder of Soviet war memorials. Collage: Daria Anfalova.

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347 Isaiev. “Koly my vmyraly.”
Whereas the UNR’s history was primarily used at the national level with the reference exclusively to Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, the main figure used from the UNR period in the Rivne memoryscape is Symon Petliura (1879–1926), a more controversial figure than Hrushevskyi. Petliura was a leader of the UNR who fought the Soviets in 1919-21. As an anti-Bolshevik leader, he was denigrated in Soviet history. By way of contrast, as a national leader who fought for independence, he is glorified in nationally minded circles. Petliura is often accused of anti-Semitism which is, probably, a reason why he is not widely used in fostering national cultural memory. But as a regional hero he is a significant figure of memory.

The short time during which the UNR government was based in Rivne was nevertheless sufficient for local memory actors to make him into a site of memory in the city’s memoryscape. In 1999, a monument to Petliura was consecrated in Rivne in vicinity of the headquarters of the political parties and organizations that promoted his memory. Notably, the same memory entrepreneurs (the Ukrainian People’s Party, Prosvita, and Rukh) were mainly engaged in shaping memory of the OUN and UPA in the region.

“Insurgent Glory” under Construction

The image of Rivne as “the region of partisan glory” was advanced to transform it into “the region of insurgent glory.” In the newspaper “Volyn’,” the mouthpiece of Rukh (and later of the national-democratic Ukrainian People’s Party - UPP), a special section entitled “Insurgents’ land” (“Povstans’kyi krai”) was published regularly from 1990 onwards. The newspaper’s section was dedicated to the history of the OUN and UPA, to the folklore of the UPA with the regular publishing of songs, poems, and excerpts of memoirs. It also provided a place for local historians and readers to share their personal memories or family histories with the readership. As a result, an entire collection of stories was collected and presented to the audience.

This project, although launched by a political party which had its own agenda, helped to make truth claims, presenting one’s personal experiences as common regional, or national.

The local claims (as expressed in the letters) could be private, but the response to these claims was public. The mere fact of commemoration made those private memories collective, as through collective means of remembering they became shared not only in a small community of those who experienced them (be they even second or third generation) but also by outsiders, for whom these memories first came as new knowledge which

348 “Prosvita” is a society established in L’viv in 1868 with the aim to preserve, develop and promote Ukrainian culture and language. In 1939 “Prosvita” formally finished its activities in Halychyna, but some of its members continued working on the organization’s aims in the émigré communities. In the 1980s Prosvita renewed its activities in Ukraine.

responded to their emotional needs (of identification, reclamation, self-understanding) in such a way that this knowledge became so emotionally charged that it became a part of their cultural memory.

Noteworthy, some material in the sections was explicitly presented as an aid for the teachers of history who had to deal with new topics in their discipline which were not in the textbooks yet. In many letters the readers told the stories about their villages where the NKVD units killed the UPA soldiers (mainly called “patriots” in the letters) and asked for appropriate commemoration of the dead in those places:

Now on the place of a former NKVD headquarters there is a militia administration building. It is actually situated on human graves. It would be appropriate to commemorate the place where Ukrainian patriots were shot.

Such letters were quite numerous within newspapers in the 1990s. In those letters the need for “appropriate” commemoration is linked both to the existence of “human graves” and the assumption that those graves are of “Ukrainian patriots.” Nevertheless, the emphasis on death seems to serve as the main drive for commemorative claims. When it became possible, crosses were erected in many places where villagers knew the UPA soldiers were killed. The places where the Red Army soldiers or partisans had suffered had been already marked, so that it is quite understandable that most of the letters called for the proper demarcation of the places of death of the UPA soldiers, which was hitherto banned. It does not though diminish the fact that political parties involved in this memory work had their own agenda in responding to such needs and to a greater extent helping in formulating such a need.

Often in the places where the crosses were erected, after several years monuments were built. The story about the crosses raised by the local people to the killed UPA soldiers directly after the killing or after the war which were then cut down by Soviets are repeated in the newspapers and in the conversations with the local people. In such a way, communicative memory was preserved in those numerous small villages and towns that kept remembering those events in private, within family, or within a small community. When it became possible to articulate those memories openly (or, even more so, when there appeared a clear, public demand by local elites for

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350 See e.g. the article aimed as an aid for teachers about the topic: “Activity of UPA on the Eastern territory of Poland, deportation of Ukrainian people from native places.” Visti Rivmenshchyny, 2 August, 1996.


352 Hohoi, P. “Vshanuvaly pamiat’ poleglykh povantsiv.” Volyn’, 16 September 1994 (the author of the article is the head of Prosvita in the town of Radyvyliv, Rivne region).
people to speak up), people started to do so and asked for “proper” commemoration of the places of death.

Of note, there was very little detail provided on the ways of “proper” commemoration in the letters. So the actual response from parties or civic organizations engaged in memory work - be it building a monument, erecting crosses or stones - might well contrast with the way of remembering imagined by the writers of the letters. I am limited in my ability to conclude from the material analyzed what was presented as “proper” ways of commemoration. But judging by the coverage of organized commemorations in the local press it is clear that opening ceremonies were welcomed by local communities as numerous visitors came to the ceremonies.

When the monuments were opened, one could see in respect of these events a complex entanglement of private memories, political strivings, human need to remember one’s dead, demands for recognition, and claims for the truth. Such ceremonies were numerous up until the beginning of the 2000s. At one of the opening ceremonies that took place in 2001 in the small town of Berezne, where a “symbolic grave” to those “who were killed in the ranks of the OUN-UPA in the 1940-50s battles against the NKVD and the fascists” was consecrated, the main message:

We have engraved their [those who were killed] names in granite plates so that the descendants of those who were killed and whose graves are scattered all over the forests and fields and whose location is still unknown could have a symbolic place where they could come and honor their compatriots.353

As this example demonstrates, even the absence of a dead body does not preclude the possibility of organizing the area as a site of memory aimed at mourning and remembering the dead, so that the memory site symbolically represents the place of death and provides the site for mourning. Moreover, the crosses and stones are often decorated with fresh flowers, so it is clear that these places are not left unattended.

From the memory work I researched it can be clearly seen that building a monument (or organizing some kind of commemoration) at the beginning of 1990s was not a top down process, it is rather a process of communication between local communities with the oblast’ administration, parties, cultural and civic organizations who can provide financing and administration of such projects. It does not mean, though, that these memory actors have no stake in memory work, and are simply responding to local needs. In fact, local memory claims often are a source for structuring the political agenda of political actors. It is worth underlining that the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP) and Rukh were the main memory entrepreneurs in the management of monument building in Rivne at that time. Since 1998, the

UPP has joined in with this memory work. In an atmosphere of an ideological vacuum, memory became the substitute of ideology. Discussions in the regional press about the parties’ political and social programs are few, but hundreds of pages can be found devoted to discussions of history.

**Cossackdom as a Pre-Mediated Memory of the UPA**

A historical theme widely employed in memory culture in the 1990s was Cossackdom. At the beginning of September 1990, Rukh organized the second mass commemorative event in Zaporizhzhia entitled “Days of Cossack Glory,” dedicated to the 500th anniversary of the Zaporizhzhia Sich. That same year, at the beginning of August in Dnipropetrovs’k, the tradition of celebrating the days of Cossack Glory near the grave of otaman Ivan Sirko was established. Each year it drew an increasing number of participants, so that by 2010 there were more than 40 Cossack organizations from all over Ukraine represented. The celebrations included reconstructions of battles, performing songs and dances, and prayers. Sometimes the celebrations led to open conflicts between different churches that supported different Cossack organizations. Initially these conflicts were influenced not by different positions taken on Cossack history, but by the animosity of different churches to each other.

It is worth stressing that the early 1990s was characterized by genuine conflict between the churches. This is the time when the Orthodox Autocephalous Church and the Greek Catholic Church were re-establishing themselves on Ukrainian soil. The Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC (KP)) was established. They all were competing with the Moscow Patriarchate in trying to get back their churches and parishes. Nevertheless, regardless of the conflicts, the days of Cossack glory were popular and celebrated throughout Ukraine and draw on various commemorative practices.

On 22 March 2002, President Kuchma signed the “Decree about annual celebration of the day of Ukrainian Cossacks on the day of Pokrova

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354 Besides playing an important role in memory work today, Cossackdom was a source of inspiration for the OUN and UPA during the years of their formation. For further information see the study on this: Lada, Krzysztof. *The Ukrainian Topos of Oppression and the Volhynian Slaughter of Poles, 1841-1943/44*. A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (History) Flinders University. Adelaide: Flinders University, 2012.

355 For instance, in L’viv region the days of Cossack Glory are traditionally celebrated by climbing Hoverla Mountain (http://zik.ua/ua/news/2011/02/21/273390) The days of Cossack Glory in Donets’k and Kyiv usually draw many participants and are celebrated as massive festivals (http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/1851117.html)
One of the first rock festivals in Ukraine was organized in 1991 and went under the name of Taras Bul’ba, the fiction Cossack character created by the writer Mykola Hohol’. It takes place annually in Dubno, Rivne oblast’. Its slogan is “The festival of determined spirit!” (“Festyval’ vpertogo duhu!”) and best reflects the main strand of Cossack history in memory culture – a free, unharnessed, determined, and, indeed, stubborn spirit.

One of the best examples of how the Cossack and UPA pasts became entangled in the memory space is demonstrated by the monument to the UPA in the village of Pliasheva (Berestechko), on the border between Rivne and Volyn oblast’s. This monument was built in 1994 as part of a wide range of UPA monuments which appeared in small villages throughout the 1990s. The town of Berestechko is the memory site and it has rather a long history. The memorial complex “Cossack graves commemorating the Battle of Berestechko” was built there during the Soviet era in memory of the battle between Cossacks led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky allied with Crimean Tatars, and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under John II Casimir from 28 to 30 June 1651.

Because of its pivotal place in the national liberation struggle, this site is often referred to as the “holy place” or “holy land.” Cossack Graves (Kozats’ki Mogily) became a must see destination for pupils and students. The memorial complex includes a church which belonged to the Moscow Patriarchate. After the declaration of independence the struggle began to return this church to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC).

Notably, Volodymyr Moroz, the protégé of the right-wing party UNA-UNSO and the head of the city council, did not support the event in Berestechko. This was most probably because of the internal conflicts between Rukh and the UNA-UNSO which by the beginning of the 1990s began to clash over their respective interests. Thus it is incorrect to regard the

357 Official web-site of the festival: www.tarasbulba-festkiev.ua.
358 The village used to be called Pliasheva, but the memorial bears the historical name Berestechko, where the Cossack battle took place three centuries earlier.
359 Memorials to the UPA in Basiv Kut (1994), Derman’ (1996), Derazhne (1997) and many other villages and small towns mushroomed from 1990 onwards.
360 E.g. Shman, Borys. “Viddaly shanu kozakam.” Dzvin, 2 August, 1996; Excerpt of Minutes of the plenary meeting of the 12th session of Oblast’ council, dated 18 June 2007. Of note, in the article, the Cossacks were named “insurgents” (povstantsi).
361 At the end, in mid 1990s the struggle over church was won by the UAOC. It should be stressed that at the consecration ceremonies in other villages the priests from the UOC (KP) or the UAOC were always present together with representatives of the Ukrainian Cossacks societies (Cossack Unit of Volyn’ Sich), some deputies from Rukh from the oblast’ and representatives from the city administration.
memory politics of anti-communist forces as a united strategy and agreed actions between nationalists and national democrats (such as Rukh, the URP or UPP).

Although the opening ceremony had no support from the city council, the organizers of the Berestechko commemoration were supported by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense: indeed several soldiers were sent to the ceremony to represent the Ukrainian Army and made a salute in honor of the dead.363

Through such an example, we can see how a small commemoration is entwined into the network of relations, disagreements and cooperation not only at a local but also at the national level. Without formal support from the oblast’, the commemoration was still possible due to the initiatives of interested parties and help from the state which came directly from Kyiv. Thus, connected with the Cossack theme and implemented in a remote place in the western Ukraine, the UPA could be commemorated with support from Kyiv, although at that time no formal nationwide politics of memory was implemented in respect of the OUN and UPA directly.

Anti-UPA Discourse in the Struggles of Churches and Parties

Although the stated aim by national-democratic parties who came to power in 1991, the de-communization and de-Sovietization processes, which were accompanied by the project of the reclamation of history, were not so easy to realize in practice.364 The history of the OUN and UPA was one of the topics that was largely contested by political opponents of the URP and Rukh, namely by the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Socialist Party. Accordingly, measures were taken for keeping the memory of the OUN and UPA out of the city’s memoryscape. The battle against change was quite tense. Suffice to say that the only monument that was actually demolished in Rivne in the 1990s was the monument to Lenin replaced by a monument to Shevchenko.

A series of articles against the new trends of interpretation of history started to appear regularly in “Dialog,” the main newspaper of the Communist party, in 1990.365 These articles aimed to present “objective” (as stated in the newspaper) information on the personalities and events which were targeted at being “rehabilitated” by national forces.366 The appearance of a special section in the newspapers entitled “Memory” (Pamiat’ often accompanied by

364 In 1992, the power in the oblast’ was in the hands of Rukh and Ukrainian Republican Party (later merged into the UPP).
365 In 1991, when the Communist Party was banned, the paper “Dialog” (the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of Ukraine in the Rivne region) became the mouthpiece of the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU).
a sub-section entitled “Documents are Witnessing”) allowed for articulation of this anti-UPA narrative.

The perceived importance of memory was outlined in one of the issues: “The death of memory is the death of the soul.”367 The “Memory” section was mostly focused on the victory in the Second World War. Being the strongest founding myth of the Soviet identity project, the topic of victory was recalled in the moment of deepest crisis of this identity, i.e. at the moment when the existence of the USSR itself became rather tenuous. By that time, the Baltic republics had already declared themselves independent, the Berlin Wall was demolished, and the complete collapse of the USSR was approaching. The struggle for preserving Ukraine within the USSR was conducted in the field of memory. As stated above, memory became an outpost of ideology. Among the most attacked areas were events related to the liberation movement of 1920s, the OUN and UPA together with corresponding personalities - Symon Petliura and Stepan Bandera.

Another relevant topic connected to the accusations of these personalities was the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC),368 personified by the Metropolitan bishop of this church, Mstyslav (lay name Stepan Skrypnyk369), who was blamed for collaboration with the Nazis. Interestingly, the communists in Ukraine, who based their ideology on a strong atheist worldview, got involved with religion and became proponents of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Often Petliura, Bandera, and Skrypnyk were presented together so that they created a particular meaning space where they stood for everything “anti-Soviet,” “fascist,” and indeed “anti-Ukrainian,” whereas “truly Ukrainian” was presented as Pro-Soviet. One of the articles in the “Pamiat”’ series, dedicated to Skrypnyk and entitled “The Career of Petliura’s aide-de-camp,” effectively demonstrates this stance:

a son of Symon Petliura’s sister succeeded to become a colonel in Petliura’s administration... [He] took part in bloody executions of revolutionary-minded co-patriots and peasants, in Jewish pogroms in the Left-bank Ukraine... [Then he became] an agent of defensive political police of Poland... shortly after this he became a secretary of Rovno and ambassador to Polish Sejm... took part in merciless exploitation and assimilation of Ukrainian people, repressions and persecutions, Polonization of Ukraine. [He was] an agent of Abwehr [...], editor of pro-fascist paper “Volyn” [...], a person far from any creed, he had no

367 “The death of memory is the death of the soul.” Dialog, No 111, October 1991, p.3.
368 Although perestroika allowed more religious freedom, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was still presented as an outcast connected to the diaspora.
369 Stepan Skrypnyk (10 April 1898 – 11 June 1993) was a Metropolitan bishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. His mother was sister of Symon Petliura, the leader of Ukrainian People’s Republic (1919-21). Skrypnyk himself was a propagator of Ukrainian independence and independence of the Ukrainian Church. During the years of Nazi occupation, in April 1942, he entered the priesthood. He was ordained as the Bishop Mstyslav of Pereiaslav by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC).
clerical education... famous for his political schemes, intrigues, commercial talents.\footnote{Andriievskyi V., Troiitskyi V. “Karyera petlurivskoho adyutanta.” \textit{Dialog}, 5 November 1990, p. 3.}

The same article criticizes “\textit{Rukh}” and its leader Viacheslav Chornovil for supporting Skrypnyk and the UAOC. In such a way, the past was used to denigrate the present political opponents. Such a strategy of associating all the anti-communist opponents with the “fascist” past became widely used throughout the decades of Ukraine’s recent history.

In another article, Skrypnyk is described as “Hitler’s candidate metropolitan bishop of Ukrainian Autocephalous church [who became] a national bishop.”\footnote{\textit{Dialog}, No.42 (163) October 1992.} In such a way the genealogy of the present clerical power is traced down to the Third Reich.

At this time, there were continual fights between the Moscow and Kyiv Patriarchies for the main church in the city, Sviato-Voskresens’kyi Sobor (St. Resurrection Cathedral). Support of one of these churches often also served as a marker of political identification - the communist camp supported the Moscow Patriarchate whereas the national democratic camp supported the Kyiv Patriarchate, the Greek Catholic Church or the Autocephalous Church.

As the Autocephalous Church claimed autonomy from the Moscow Patriarchate, it was directly presented as anti-Soviet and fascist. Again, the Metropolitan bishop Mstyslav (Skrypnyk) became a target of the accusations of fascism. The figure of Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’, who was taken up by national democrats as one of the “reclaimed” regional (if not national) heroes, was accused by the communists/socialists as being committed to fascist ideas. The accusations were based on the fact that Borovets’ was in correspondence with the bishop.\footnote{Presented letter from Borovets’ to Dr. Bayer, Gebietskommisar in Rivne, 15.03.1943 (No.19 (140) May 1992), correspondence between Metropolitan bishop Mstyslav and Borovets (printed in \textit{Dialog}, No.31 (152) July 1992), articles printed in \textit{Dialog}, No.26 (147) June 1992, p.5; No.42 (163) October 1992 with some testimonies of witnesses, where they shared their memories about the terror and brutality of the UPA, which were described in a vivid manner. Some of the witnesses were presented as former OUN and UPA members who regretted their participation in the organization.} In such a way, one can see that communists attacked their political opponents by accusing almost all the historical figures or organizations in fascism. By doing so they probably hoped to denigrate their opponents in the eyes of the voters.

Interestingly, as soon as Metropolitan bishop Mstyslav renounced the allegiance to the UOC (KP) in autumn 1992, and consequently was not now perceived as an ally to the UPP and \textit{Rukh}, the communists/socialists lost their interest in him. The Bishop’s renouncement of the alliances with the UOC
(KP) was reprinted in the “Dialog” and the bishop was described as “wise and courageous,” who “demonstrated to all the Orthodox believers that God is not in the power but in the truth which is not to be tackled by false prophets.” The “false prophets,” according to the Dialog, are Vasyl’ Chervoniy and the bishop of UOC (KP) Filaret.

Anniversaries as Arenas for Memory Battles: Holodomor and OUN and UPA Entanglement

In 1992, when the 50th anniversary of the UPA was widely celebrated by Rukh, the URP and their sympathizers, the newspaper “Volyn” dedicated an additional section entitled “To the 50th anniversary of UPA,” the purpose of which was to iron out the “distortions of history” (“vykryviennia istorii”). The celebration of the anniversary started in the summer and involved such commemorative events as conferences, meetings, opening of monuments in small towns and villages, museum exhibitions, a song festival, films, sport and tourist activities on the sites where the UPA units were based, and meetings with UPA veterans etc.

In Rivne, the celebration of the anniversary culminated on the Day of UPA, 14 October, with commemorative concerts, marches, meetings and demonstrations. The day was declared a public holiday by the Rivne Oblast’ Administration. Although most businesses continued to work as usual, public institutions - schools, kindergartens, universities, etc. - were all closed for the official holiday. A special “gift” to mark the anniversary from the city council for Rivne residents, was the renaming of the streets. The names which held Soviet connotations began bearing names of the OUN and UPA – Nil Khasevych, Klym Savur, Yevgeniy Konovalets’, Roman Shukhevych, Stepan Bandera.

The renaming of the streets was met by harsh criticism from political opponents of the national democrats – the socialists (essentially consisting of the same Communist Party members but renamed because the Communist Party was banned at that time). Those concerned stated that the aim of the renaming of the streets in honor “of SS and Hitler’s Abwehr agents [was] to

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374 Editor’s commentary to “Zrechennia Mstyslava vid UPTs-Kyiivs’koho patriarkhatu.” Dialog, No. 66, November, p. 5.
375 Editor’s commentary to “Zrechennia Mstyslava vid UPTs-Kyiivs’koho patriarkhatu.” Dialog, No. 66 ,November, p. 5.
delete the bright memory about the heroic deeds of the Soviet people from [the minds of] the youth.”

In response to the program of large-scale celebration of the 50th anniversary of UPA, from August 1992 Dialog began publishing the “Lists of civilian population killed by UPA” without references to any sources. The special theme “Eternal memory” was opened with the article “Sorrowful Chronicle of Polissia” (“Skorbotnyi litopys Polissia”) which includes the lists of the names of “great martyrs who were killed by the bandits in Rivne rayon.” In these lists the losses of the civil population were portrayed with the religious pathos of martyrdom. Such martyrology was updated weekly. Defaming the OUN and UPA as “bandits” followed in the footsteps of Soviet propaganda. Nothing was mentioned on how the lists were created, who was compiling them, how the collection of the material to form the lists was done. The only fact that remained in the paper was the long list of victims and their places of birth.

In June 1992, before the anniversary of the beginning of the Second World War, the oblast‘ council of Veterans Organizations of Ukraine, the Oblast’ Committee of Socialist Party, the Union of Afghanistan Veterans, and the Collegium of Oblast’ Organization for Memorials Preservation, addressed a request to the city council to stop plans to demolish the monuments of the “Heroes of the Soviet Union Mykola Kuznetsov and to Dmitrii Medvedev.” The cultural value of these monuments was seen as the main argument for their preservation. The monuments were taken down in any event.

In the course of this memory battle the territories which were gained became clearly demarcated: the memory of victory in the Second World War was appropriated by the socialists whereas the “blank spots” of the OUN and UPA history were in the hands of the national-democrats. Here, we can see a peculiar twist: while perestroika envisaged new approaches to history, proclaimed the endeavors to fill in the “blank spots” of history, and saw communists slowly moving towards new interpretations of the war, in the period after 1991, pro-communists came back to the pre-perestroika understanding of the war, stressing the “Sovietness” of victory and denouncing all other experiences of war as sympathetic to “fascism.” In these narratives, the unity of Russia and Ukraine in the past and a necessity of such a unity in the present and future was especially underlined.

Communist sympathizers published the series of articles with the aim of revealing the “truth” about the historical personalities “rehabilitated by

380 First list was published in Dialog, No.33 (154), August 1992.
381 Dialog, No.35 (156), August, 1992.
384 “50-rinchyu UPA hidnu zustrich?” Dialog, No. 147, June, 1992, p. 3.
history.” Most of these articles were historical fiction presented in the form of memoirs closely following the lines of the Cold War propaganda (the West was presented as an enemy, the OUN - as blood-thirsty fascist collaborators). Several of these such articles presented Ulas Samchuk, the anti-Communist writer close to the OUN, as a traitor and a Hitler devotee. In a “Dialog” article the following “autobiography” of Samchuk was presented:

As for my Ukrainian origin... I am not myself quite clear who I am. Although I am born to a Ukrainian mother and a Ukrainian father and was brought up on Ukrainian bread, for more than the last ten years I have been wrapped into a German skin, have been absorbed by German spirit, so that I feel as if I were German myself. What can possibly tie me to Ukrainians? I hate this people, because they are devoted to the communists and to the Soviets so much that even the sky over them seems to be red. That is why I can assure you that Hitler’s regime and his order is in my blood.

By “citing” Samchuk, the authors of the article killed several birds with one stone – they denigrated not only the memory of the OUN but also indirectly the memory of the famine of 1932-1933 which was the topic of Samchuk’s writing.

The famine, called the Holodomor in Ukrainian memory culture, was taboo in Soviet historiography; Samchuk’s books, which were first allowed after Ukraine became independent, essentially served as a documentary for people who wanted to know more on the topic of the famine. By 1992 when the above mentioned article in “Dialog” was published, Samchuk’s books were already widely read in Ukrainian literature courses in schools. Thus, the knowledge of the famine was disseminated on a massive scale, but for communists, the Holodomor became one of the targets for fierce attacks.

By constantly attacking the Holodomor and the OUN and UPA, the communists indirectly strengthened the position of national democratic circles and consolidated them around these topics. Subsequently, these two themes of history were increasingly integrated into the culture of memory. In a somewhat twisted manner, the memory of the Holodomor and the memory of the OUN and UPA, occupied the same symbolical space in the memory.

385 “50-richchu UPA hidnu zustrich?” Dialog, No. 147, June, 1992, p.3.
culture which was opposed to pro-communist forces. Although in the past these two episodes of history did not intersect, memory could mold them into one mnemonic complex – a node of memory concentrated on suffering and anti-communist resistance. Indeed, what cannot be done by Cleo, can be done by Mnemosyne.

Anniversaries provided politicians with a range of possibilities to lead battles in front of the eyes of the interested public. Shortly after the 50th anniversary of the UPA celebration, another anniversary in November presented one more chance to use history as a political weapon - the anniversary of the October Revolution. The Socialist Party used this occasion “to warn all the working masses against the possible arrival of a new totalitarian regime under the banners of nationalism, to call them to unity and struggle against the threat of neo-fascism in our young independent state.”

Again the OUN and UPA became the main targets in this war. This time, a series of articles devoted to “telling the truth” about the UPA’s commander Roman Shukhevych and his “terrorist activities” was published:

Hitler who came to power in 1923 (sic!) started preparations to fulfill his plans to gain Lebensraum for Germany. He made the OUN into the tool of realization of his own plans: Berlin’s organization of the OUN was incorporated into the Gestapo as a special unit and was fully funded by Germany.

Needless to say that such “lessons of history” propagated through the press were full of factual mistakes. For instance, the above passage gives wrong information not only on the date of Hitler’s coming to power but also the impression that already by the 1920s the OUN formed part of the Gestapo, although neither the OUN nor Gestapo even existed at that time; furthermore, even later on no OUN organization in Berlin was ever incorporated into the Gestapo. But the mere word “Gestapo” and the alleged allegiances of the OUN to it charges such narratives with strong emotional undertones.

It is worth mentioning one distinguishing feature of such partisan presentations of history in the press, namely the twisting facts. In the case of pro-OUN/UPA coverage, a conceived authenticity was claimed by referring first and foremost to numerous letters from readers that allegedly had first-hand experiences of the OUN and UPA. In the case of the anti-OUN/UPA coverage, the perceived trustworthiness of the stories was mainly derived from the commonsensical knowledge driven by the Soviet master narrative and the authority of “documents”, although those often were the products of someone’s imagination, as demonstrated above. In any case, the main task of

the press articles (both anti-OUN/UPA and pro-OUN/UPA) was to shape a “correct” worldview, as pursued by each party.

Ironically, to counteract the formation of the OUN and UPA node in memory culture, the pro-Soviet, mainly communist, memory actors addressed the memory of the Holocaust which was never addressed as such during the Soviet era when communists actually ruled.391

Holocaust as a Memory Appropriated by the Communists

As from 1990-1991 the theme of the Holocaust came into the memory space of the region. In the Soviet master narrative the extermination of the Jews during the war was not generally known as the “Holocaust” and the killings of Jews was presented mainly in terms of the Soviet tradition of speaking about “victims of German-fascist occupants” (“zherty vnimets’ko-fashysts’kykh zaharbnykiv”). In 1990s some first tentative steps were made to differentiate the victims, and the term “genocide of Jews” started to be used. In such a way, the Jewish population was first addressed as a distinct group of victims whose death was to be commemorated in a distinguished manner. In September-October 1991 several plaques and memorials were opened in a couple of villages nearby Rivne, where the mass killings of Jews took place.392

The pro-communist newspapers launched a series of articles about the killings of Jews. In those articles extensive information was given on mass killings of the Jews at Babyn Yar. The local history of the Jewish Holocaust in the Rivne area was covered in several issues of “Dialog” in 1990-92 (namely the killings in the villages of Sosonky, Klevan’, Rahivka, Mezhrych, Sarny, and Ivanova Dolyna).393 The stories were accompanied by excerpts from archival documents and testimonies of Ukrainian witnesses. While the main text presented mainly well-demarcated camps of perpetrators (Germans) and heroes/victims (Russians, Ukrainians, and Jews) in line with the established Soviet tradition, the series of documents about the killing of Jews (the documents depicted as “acts of Soviet trials”) presented people with Polish, Ukrainian and Russian names among those who, along with the

391 Interestingly, the particular situation that was noted in the beginning of the 1990s in the region, when the memory of the Holocaust was propagated by communists, was similar to that in Moldova e.g. where Holocaust discourse is seen as an anti-Romanian and pro-communist discourse. An insightful article on this is: Dimitru, Diana. “Caught Between History and Politics: The Experience of a Moldovan Historian Studying the Holocaust.” In Alexei Miller and Maria Lipman (eds.), The Convolutions of Historical Politics. Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2012, pp. 239-252.
392 Villages Klevan’, Sosonky, to name but a few.
Germans, were accused of the killings of the Jews.\textsuperscript{394} Those documents were, though, never commented on. In these articles, on the contrary, the life of Ukrainians and Jews is presented as an ideal relationship between neighbors devoted to their work and families:

All the people were living according to human morals, all were united in their fate of being workers. Children of both Ukrainians and Jews were raised together. The youth had friendships. Ukrainian boys and girls were interested in the rituals followed in synagogues, and the Jews came to the churches for weddings of their Ukrainian friends.\textsuperscript{395}

In the same vein, one can see how at the commemorative ceremony of the opening of one of the numerous memorial places dedicated to the Holocaust, the Jewish victims are thoroughly intertwined with the victims of other peoples within the USSR and Europe:

At the meeting the people are honoring the memory of not only Jews who were killed, but of everyone whose blood was innocently spilled - peaceful residents and Red Army soldiers, Russians and Ukrainians, Poles and Belarusians, French and the representatives of other nationalities who had faced the sad fate.\textsuperscript{396}

In such instance, it is not difficult to see the common feature of Soviet presentation of people united by class, all suffering the same fate. Although the article is dedicated to the “genocide of Jews” the victims are presented together with a group of “other nationalities.” The recognition of Jewish suffering is realized through references to already established image of victimhood of the Soviet people (Jewish being part of it) as well as through specifying the characteristics of Jewish people which would render them as worthy of commemoration:

Martyr-nation (narod-muchenyk), workers-nation (narod-robitnyk), soldiers-nation (narod-soldat). 200,000 Jews were fighting in battlefields and in partisan units against fascists... This nation which was murdered first by fascists was to a certain degree a nation that shielded other nations by itself.\textsuperscript{397}

Even if closely connected to the Soviet tradition of presenting an all-Soviet victimhood, this new approach appears to create a distinguished memory space exclusively of the Jewish victims. This distinguished space was created first and foremost through monuments and memorials dedicated solely to the

\textsuperscript{394} Dialog, No. 38 (108), September 1992.
\textsuperscript{395} Myroshchuk, K. “Yih strashnyi kryk ya pamiataiu dosi.” Dialog No. 38 (108), p.3.
mass killings of Jews. Thus, if commemorative speeches often drew parallels with other victims, in the monuments *per se* these parallels were absent as they were dedicated solely to Jewish victims.

Building of memorials dedicated to the Holocaust was initiated both by local residents and by Jewish communities abroad. In the beginning of 1991, the Israel community of Jews who lived in Volhynia before the war and survived it, wrote a letter to the Head of Rivne oblast’ administration Petro Pryshchepe, in which they asked him for an appropriate commemoration for the more than three thousand Jews who were killed in Velyki Mezhirichy, “whose graves were buried under the huge piles of rubbish.”

Their plea was heard and, in September 1992, the monument in the village was declared officially open.

The memory of the Holocaust became a weapon in the struggle between socialists/communists and national democrats/nationalists. Thus, building a monument to Jewish victims was presented by the socialists as a huge victory against the national-democratic camp. Socialists presented themselves as more civilized, more in line with the global tendencies in memory politics, supported by the Jewish communities from Canada and Israel.

Appropriation of the memory of the Holocaust by the socialist/communist camp presented the socialists/communists in a rather favorable light against the background of overtly anti-Jewish statements of leaders of Rukh and the URP published regularly in “Volyn’.” It should be stressed that by 1992, the URP became more radical in their statements. Little remained in its rhetoric from the times when, together with Rukh in the late 1980s, it called for democratization and national liberation. An increasing number of publications in “Volyn’” became overtly xenophobic. The most illustrative case was the publication in “Volyn’” of parts of the book of Matviy Shapoval “Jews in Ukraine” which repeated the most debased anti-Jewish stereotypes of “Jewish exploitation of Ukrainians.”

The anti-Jewish position was often presented as a protection of Ukrainian culture and language. In the article “Jews of Ukraine Today: reality without myths” (“Jevrei Ukrainy Siogodni: real’nist’ bez mifiv”) Vasyl Yarmenko, a professor of Interregional Academy of Personnel Management (MAUP) that is notorious for its anti-Semitic publications, criticized Vasyl’

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401 MAUP (Interregional Academy of Personnel Management, the university in Kyiv) has been often criticized for publishing anti-Semitic literature. Some of its professors have also been criticized for anti-Semitism. See: Umland, Andreas and Anton Shekhovtsov. “Right-Wing
Kremin’, the then Minister of Education of Ukraine, for his readiness to introduce a particular subject in schools which would deal with the Holocaust as declared in talks with Shmuel Kamins’ki, the rabbi of Dnipropetrovs’k.\footnote{More on this in: Kremin’, Vasyl’. “Humanitarny i aspekt procesu derzhavotvorennia v Ukraini.” In Shemchuzhenko et al. (eds), Ideologiia derzhavotvorennia v Ukraini: istoriia i suchasnist, materialy naukovo-praktychnoi konferencii, 22-23 lystopada, 1996. Kyiv: Heneza, 1997, pp. 19–23.} The author of the article maintained that such a new discipline would be introduced at the cost of the Ukrainian language, history, and literature.\footnote{Yaremenko, Vasyl. “Yevreii v Ukraini siogodi: realnist’ bez mifiv.” Volyn’, 14 November 2003, p. 7.}

These and many other anti-Semitic statements published in “Volyn” were grist to the mill for communists’ criticism of their opponents. Although the memory of the Holocaust was instrumental in the hands of communists who used this memory in political struggles, it destabilized the situation and did not allow the nationalist ideology take on a hegemonic position.

**Summarizing 1990-1994**

In sum, the period from 1990 to 1994 was characterized by a fragmentation of memory culture. The Soviet grand narrative of the Great Patriotic War was destabilized. National democratic elites that came to power in 1992 in the region made “blank spots” of history their program agenda. This agenda limited grassroots’ expressions of memory. Everything that did not suit the mold of resistance was not presented in public and, subsequently, was not used in the formation of cultural memory. In this regard, we can speak about the *kidnapped memories* of the OUN and UPA, whereas the diverse indigenous experiences of the OUN and UPA were forced by the political discourse into widely promoted molds that forged the glorious memory of the resistance.

In the public sphere this memory was premediated through images and narratives of the Cossacks, on the one hand, and through the history of the *Holodomor*, on the other hand. Consequently, emergent memories of the OUN and UPA took the place in the node of memory culture saturated with images of suffering, resistance, courage, and sacrifice.

The national-democratic parties *Rukh* and the Ukrainian Republican Party (later Ukrainian People’s Party) enjoyed wide support among the population of the region. Memory politics implemented by these forces were welcomed by the population as it went hand-in-hand with demands for de-Sovietization. Pro-communist parties did not back down. They continued struggling to keep the old narratives of the Great Patriotic War flowing. In their memory agenda, the *Holocaust* became the main topic addressed in attacks against their opponents.
Many Vectors and No Direction?

Ukraine at the Crossroads in 1994-2004

After the first months of euphoria of following independence, the hardships of everyday life started. Like other parts of the Soviet Union, Ukraine produced many semi-finished products which kept the Ukrainian economy dependent on other republics of the USSR. With the loss of the economic production cycle with the other republics, the economic situation in independent Ukraine became truly deplorable.\(^\text{404}\) People became frustrated and associated failures with the national democrats. Frustrations led to alienation of people from the state, disillusion with independence, and proliferation of separatist and regionalist sentiments. In the parliamentary and presidential elections that followed, people disappointed in the rule of national democrats voted for the forces who promised stabilization and a return to previous conditions. It should be remembered, however, that the key positions in “national democratic” government (1991-1994) were occupied by old communist nomenclature.

In April 1993, 41% of seats in the parliament were taken by leftist parties: the Communist Party of Ukraine (which was allowed again from 1993), the Socialist Party of Ukraine and the Agrarian Party (\textit{Selians’ka Partiia}) who united into one block before the elections. The national-democratic parties (\textit{Rukh} which fragmented into several parties) gained 23% and the independent deputies 33% of the seats.\(^\text{405}\) In July 1994, Leonid Kuchma became the second president of Ukraine.\(^\text{406}\) In his presidential election campaign, Kuchma took a strong pro-Russian position and called for an end of “the reign of Galician nationalism” which, in his view, was represented by the leader of \textit{Rukh} national democrat Chornovil.\(^\text{407}\) Being a representative of the Soviet “red directors” who managed huge industries in the east of the country, Kuchma presented himself as a “good administrator” free from ideological sentiments. The Ukrainian media scholar Volodymyr Kulyk describes Kuchma’s discourse as “centrist” and dependent on the positions of his opponents, e.g. whatever the position of the opponents, Kuchma’s position was always “alternative” to them. His “ideology without ideology” presented itself as common sense marked by opting for a peaceful status quo and avoiding any conflicts.\(^\text{408}\) This “centrist” position without a pronounced direction in internal and external politics became known as

\(^{404}\) In 1993 inflation reached a record of 10,155 percent (Kasianov. \textit{Ukraiina}, p. 76), unemployment grew, salaries were low, poverty rocketed and mass emigration started.

\(^{405}\) Kasianov. \textit{Ukraiina}.

\(^{406}\) Leonid Kravchuk received 45% (12.1 million) of votes and Kuchma - 52% (14.6 million) of votes.

\(^{407}\) Wolczuk. \textit{The Moulding of Ukraine}, p. 139.

“multi-vector” politics which in reality was aimed at preserving the status-quo that ensured keeping Kuchma’s team in power.

Kuchma remained in power for the next ten years. Under his rule many significant changes were implemented which shaped the main characteristics of Ukrainian statehood and nationhood. In 1996, the Ukrainian currency, the hryvnia, was introduced. The same year the Constitution of Ukraine was adopted. Important changes were also introduced to the national calendar - the Day of Independence of Ukraine, the Day of Constitution, Christmas, Easter, Pentecost, the Day of Cossackdom. The 1st of May (Labor Day) and the 9th of May (Victory Day) remained from the Soviet calendar, while the 7th November (the Day of Revolution) was removed. As the entire politics of 1994-2004 was marked by incongruity and a multi-vector character, the same is true of the memory politics in relation to the OUN and UPA. On the one hand, school textbooks started to represent members of the OUN and UPA as heroic warriors for Ukrainian independence, equivalent in their heroism to Cossacks; on the other hand, the themes of the OUN and UPA did not reach the wide range of resources provided by memory culture which would position the OUN and UPA within the pantheon of heroes nationwide. In such a way, memory politics concerning the OUN and UPA was concentrated primarily on educational policy; the whole panoply of cultural policies was not reached by the memory entrepreneurs interested in promotion of the OUN and UPA as the resources of cultural politics on the national scale were in the hands of people interested in maintaining the status quo.

The themes that would raise questions in some parts of Ukraine were avoided. As the choice of politics and ideology depended on the moment, Kuchma was acting according to whatever the situation was in each region. In L’viv he could praise the UPA, in Donbas – the Red Army veterans. Reluctance to promote the topic of the UPA as all-national as demanded by national democrats was explained by Kuchma by the lack of a clear vision expounded by government officials on what exactly the history of the OUN and UPA concerned.

As during the Soviet era, the topic was not dealt with by historians and existed mainly in a form of labeling of “bourgeois nationalists,” the new historical studies were needed to elaborate a vision on this episode of history. For this purpose, in 1997 Kuchma established a special committee where historians had to approach the OUN and UPA and make their conclusions on the role of these organizations in the history of Ukraine.

The committee arrived at their conclusion, which was published in 2005. In their conclusions, scholars noted the highly complex nature of the history and suggested that it would be problematic to establish the same

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410 Portnov. Istorii dlia domashnïoho vzhytku.
411 The conclusions were published in 300 issues which were directed at a limited readership.
congruent picture of the OUN and UPA which would be accepted unconditionally by the residents in all the regions of Ukraine that had experienced the war in different ways.\textsuperscript{412} The oft-debated question of granting social privileges to the UPA veterans which are equal to those enjoyed by the Red Army veterans remains unresolved to this day.

To stay in power, Kuchma tried to establish a so-called “manual democracy” - the regime with a strong center that dictated its rules to all the levels of administration under the guise of democratic procedures (elections, representation, etc.) By and large, Kuchma succeeded in his endeavors. Central power was largely monopolized by his camp. At a local and regional level, parties struggled against each other but not against the center.\textsuperscript{413}

Due to the peculiarities of the distribution of power in Ukraine whereby the heads of the oblast’s’ administrations (the body of executive power) are appointed by the president and the heads of the oblast’, city, town and village councils (legislative power) are elected by the public, it is possible that in the regions the balance of power is not the same as it is in Kyiv (as represented in the Parliament). This largely influences the specificity of memory work on a local and regional level.

Whereas at the national level the questions of the OUN and UPA were approached rather cautiously, in Rivne, where power was concentrated in the hands of the national democrats (mainly represented by the UPP and \textit{Rukh}), the history of the OUN and UPA became the central theme. Thus, through the example of Rivne oblast’, we can see that the composition of the city council down the years is reflected in the transformations in memory politics and in the traces it left on the region’s landscape - as each monument has to be voted for in the council.

In 1994-98 Rivne city council had only 25 deputies, 90% of whom represented a national-democratic and nationalist leaning (\textit{Rukh}, the UPP, the URP, the national democrats; the UNA-UNSO, the far-right); a similar representation was visible in the towns and villages. At this time many monuments were built in small towns and villages all over the region. Very often the sponsors of these monuments were party members from the oblast’ center, which will be seen in the case-studies in more detail.

Nevertheless, in spite of such a decisive role of partisan involvement in memory work, it is worth underlining that the memoryscape during 1994-2004 was filled with personal recollections. We cannot really speak about a pure top-down process. The local newspapers continued to encourage the people to share their own recollections for the sake of coming generations.

\textsuperscript{412} Conclusions of the commission “\textit{Organizacija Ukraïinskikh Nacionalistiv i Ukraïinska Povstans’ka Armiia: Fakhovyi vysnovok robochoii grupy istorykiv pry uriadovoi komissi z vyvchennia diialnosti OUN i UPA}” can be downloaded from the website of the Institute of National Memory under http://www.memory.gov.ua/ua/454.htm

\textsuperscript{413} Kasianov. \textit{Ukraïina}, p. 45.
Mykhailo Shkurga, the head of the oblast’s OUN-UPA brotherhood. Put it like this:

The youth today has to know and realize what a difficult path we had before we gained Ukrainian independence. In order to prevent erasing half a century of history, historians, ethnographers, journalists should join us in writing the history.\footnote{Shkurga, Mykhailo cited in: Hrushets’kyi, Vasyl’. “Pamiatnyk voinam UPA.” Dzvin, 19 July 1996, p. 2.}

Although such calls framed the main directions in memory work, they also opened the way for people to speak. As a result, many letters to the newspapers based on personal recollections or family memories were published. Furthermore, with the possibility of forming civic organizations, people with shared experiences in the past started to unite into groups. Thus, during this period of time we observe a formation of civil society around the memory of the OUN and UPA and forced deportations – the UPA veterans unions and the union of victims of forced deportation “Holmshchyna” were formed in the late 1990s. The work of such societies, according to Jay Winter, “occupies the space between individual memory and the national theater of collective memory choreographed by social and political leaders.”\footnote{Winter and Sivan. War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, p. 41.}

As the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate gained a stronger position in society, the bond between the memory of the OUN and UPA and the church became even closer. Being supported by national-democratic parties, the Church addressed the memory promoted by these parties. Thus, the UOC (KP) appropriated the soldiers of the UPA as their own martyrs. Being embedded into religious tradition positioned the UPA into a realm of suffering, martyrdom, sacrifice, and even holiness which made it easier for people to neglect the difficult knowledge about the UPA. Furthermore, the strong link with Cossack memorabilia made the topic of the UPA easily recognizable and widely acceptable in public.\footnote{There are several Cossack organizations in Ukraine, different churches support different organizations, as well as different Cossack organizations have different attitude to the OUN and UPA.}

The meaning of Cossacks in memory culture as protectors of Ukrainians from all kinds of enemies made it possible to facilitate representation of the UPA as the liberators and fighters against all the enemies of Ukraine – Nazi Germans and Soviets/communists.
In Search of New Symbols

In order to sustain “manual democracy,” Kuchma and his milieu environment employed all available means including the misuse of administrative resources and oppression of freedom of speech which led to a proliferation of persecutions against journalists. It all culminated in the political crisis of 1998 which exacerbated divisions in the team close to Kuchma. Consequently, this phase in the formation of memory culture (1998-2003) is influenced to a large extent by the “Kuchmagate” which came about through the “Ukraine without Kuchma” campaign. Viktor Yushchenko, then the Head of the National Bank, and Yulia Tymoshenko, then the Minister for Energy, started to distance themselves from Kuchma. In 2001, Yulia Tymoshenko’s party “Bat’kivshchyna” (“Motherland”) broke with Kuchma as a result of the criminal case which was pursued against Tymoshenko. Yushchenko was rather slow to oppose Kuchma. He joined the opposition only in 2002. Both the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (with Batkivshchyna party in its core) and Yushchenko’s party “Our Ukraine,” both formed before the elections of 2002 and both comprised with diverse national-democratic parties, were “derivatives of Kuchma’s power,” “electoral projects" without any strong ideological core.

Being rather populist in their nature, the parties used history as the ersatz of ideology. In the ideological vacuum, a person’s attitude towards the history made one “nationalist,” “communist”, “socialist,” etc. Having been closely associated with Kuchma, the newly formed opposition parties looked for symbols which would distance them from this association. A search for such symbols was not an easy task, as almost all the symbols propagated by the national democratic parties were already well-established and in use for years – the anthem, flag, currency, etc. were all introduced by national democrats. Thus, the anti-Kuchma camp turned their attention to the symbols which were already present in the western regions of Ukraine. Moreover, there the support for the national democrats was always higher which made West Ukraine an appropriate starting point for the opposition campaign.

Beginning in 2002 Yushchenko’s presence at commemorative ceremonies to the UPA became rather frequent. Never before had small villages attracted so much attention from high-ranking state officials. One of these occasions was on 13 October 2002, at the opening of the memorial (in

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417 The case is often linked to the clan struggles for controlling the energy sector. It should be stressed, though, that Tymoshenko was arrested for the first time only when she became a political opponent in the anti-Kuchma campaign.

418 Kasianov. Ukraina, p. 228.

419 Viacheslav Chornovil, the leader of Rukh, was the main figure in national-democratic parties, and gained more voters in Western Ukraine.
the form of a Ukrainian coat of arms on a high hill) to UPA soldiers in the small village of Hutvyn, in Kostopil’ region (about 80 km from Rivne). The monument was mostly financed by the oblast’ council and the forest industries of the region. Yushchenko was present in the company of Yurii Kostenko, the leader of the UPP, and Metropolitan Filaret, the head of the UOC (KP). The latter consecrated the memorial. Vasyl’ Chervoniy, the head of Rivne Oblast’ headquarters of the UPP, was also present there.\footnote{Kolodiazhnyi, Mykola. “Povstantsiam – vid nashchadkiv.” Fomenko, Mykola. “Podvyhy UPA uvichnuiut’ pamiatnyky.” \textit{Vil’ne Slovo}, 16 October 2002.}

Worth noting was that Yushchenko attended several openings of monuments to the UPA in the region. Politicians used the occasion to show off in villages, but they did not come to Rivne, to the opening of Klym Savur monument the next day, as such an appearance at the official ceremony in the oblast’s center would probably be more publicized for the national, even international, audience, while an appearance in the small village drew the attention of locals only and was covered mainly in the regional press.

At the regional level, though, the anti-Kuchma campaign became the litmus test that would show the affiliation of regional elites to one of the rival camps. In future, these affiliations would provide an opportunity for regional leaders to influence national politics. Exactly at this time the competition between different parties in the regions also increased. One of the most powerful ways to demonstrate a party’s power in Rivne became monument-building, which would very visually and tangibly demarcate the terrain of influence. In 2001, a monument to Symon Petliura was erected in Rivne. In such a way, monuments became symbolic trophies during the anti-Kuchma campaign. It was precisely at this point of time that the memory work concerning the OUN and UPA that started in villages and small towns moved to the city where, in 2002, the first monument to the UPA was built. It was the monument to Klym Savur that is analyzed in one of the case-studies.

By that time the opposition to Kuchma strengthened both in Kyiv and in the regions. All national magazines and newspapers turned their interest to the topics of the history of Ukraine, especially its war history. In 2003 the articles on historical topics, published in national newspapers in Kyiv, became extensively republished in Rivne. Among those articles were some by Volodymyr Viatrovych who specialized in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict and was a director of the institute studying the liberation movement. In this regard, he is one of the most devoted memory actors who continues to promote the heroic picture of the OUN and UPA in many articles and books.\footnote{Viatrovych, Volodymyr. “Vybachytysia za shcho?” \textit{Volyn}, 30 May 2003, 6 June 2003, p. 6; The passages of the books of some nationalist historians were published to support anti-Polish arguments, see: Sergiichuk, Volodyymyr. “Poliaky na Volyni u roky Ddrugoi Svitovoi Viiny.” Denyshchuk, Oleksandr “Zlochyny polskyh shovinistiv na Volyni.” \textit{Volyn’}, 15 August 2003. It should be added that the \textit{Holodomor} was recognized as genocide by the Ukrainian Parliament in November, 28, 2006.}
As political tension increased, the conflict between the churches also became clear, whereby the Moscow Patriarchate was called in the “Volyn’” newspaper “the fifth column” that promotes politics of Russia in Ukraine. The number of articles on the OUN and UPA in local newspapers grew significantly. Furthermore, the articles in “Volyn’” became aggressive, often taking on the characteristics of hate speech. Anti-Semitic, anti-Russian and anti-Polish undertones characterized these publications. The UPP and Rukh that used “Volyn’” newspaper as their mouthpiece radicalized.

At the same time the parties’ activists from Rivne became quite prolific in Kyiv, putting memory politics at the center of their agenda. On 12 February 2003, hearings dedicated to the memory of the Holodomor victims took place/were conducted in the Verkhovna Rada. Vasyl’ Chervoniy, the deputy from Rukh, represented the Rivne region at these hearings. In his speech he emphasized that Holodomor was a greater tragedy than the Holocaust and even portrayed Jews as main organizers of the Holodomor, reiterating most of the nationalist prejudices and stereotypes:

They [Ukrainians] were doomed to death by hunger which is a much more horrible death than the death by bullets and gas chambers. [...] And as for the real organizers of the ethnocide of Ukrainians, we have to take into account those who actually seized the power of leadership of the KPSS and NKVD! Yes, the staff of the NKVD in Ukraine was composed of more than 90% of Jews, who directly carried out the orders of their chiefs from the Kremlin (where the percentage of Jews was no smaller). They were not atheists. [...] They were devoted enemies of Christianity. [...] The late professor of Kyiv University Matviy Shestopal in his book “Jews in Ukraine” on the basis of documents proves that the genocide of Ukrainian nation was organized and realized by Zionists. [...] I make a proposal to address the general public prosecutor’s office of Ukraine with a request to open a case [for recognition of the Holodomor as genocide, and also to address the international organizations about such a recognition].

Chervoniy also asked the head of the Rada to help him to lobby for the broadcast of film about Holodomor entitled the “Harvest of Despair: the Unknown Holocaust” directed by Slavko Nowytski and Yurij Luhovy (1984) on the main TV channels. It would not be necessary to cite such a long passage that presents a series of the lowest stereotypes of Ukrainian nationalists against Jews, if the speaker was not the main actor in memory politics in Rivne region.

Suffice to say that almost all the cases of monuments that have been analyzed were initiated, supervised and almost fully financed by the parties represented by Vasyl’ Chervoniy (he changed his party affiliations several times).
times), or by him personally.\textsuperscript{423} Obviously he was valued by Yushchenko’s
team as, posthumously in November 2009, Chervoniy was decorated with the
“Order of Freedom” which is the state order of Ukraine granted for
distinguished and special deeds for strengthening sovereignty and freedom
of Ukraine, for consolidation of Ukrainian society, for development of
democracy, social-economic and political reforms, for protecting civil and
human rights.”\textsuperscript{424} It is puzzling that a person whose public statements seldom
differed from the words cited above was decorated with the Order aimed at
the distinguishing the values opposite to the ones propagated in those
statements. How “democracy” and “protection of human rights” could
correlate with above mentioned statements remains a source of perplexity and
puzzle.

\textbf{The 60th Anniversary of UPA as the Scene for the Political Campaign}

In 2002, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the UPA, an opportunity
was presented to start a heated memory battle again. If in 1992 the celebrations
had only a local resonance as the memory of the OUN and UPA was weak and
only began its formation as a memory node in memory culture, in 2002 the
celebrations embraced a broader public and became more visible as they
shifted from villages to the cities. On the Day of the UPA on 14\textsuperscript{th} October the
monument to Klym Savur was solemnly consecrated in Rivne. The opening
ceremony drew a broad public. Special sections in the newspapers, dedicated
to history, appeared again. At that period the discourse became more
accentuated on regionalism. In the narratives in the local press the main
emphasis was made on the role of the UPA in Western Ukraine rather than in
Ukraine as a whole:

   if it were not for the UPA both conquerors [Russians, Germans] would have
   plundered all of Western Ukraine. Thanks to the UPA, fascists did not deport
   the Ukrainian youth into servitude in Germany, and the Soviets [did not deport]
   all the population of the West to the ice deserts of Yakutia.\textsuperscript{425}

\textsuperscript{423} As the name of Vasyl’ Chervoniy will be mentioned many times in this work, it is worth
adding some information on his personality. He was born in 1958 in the village of Pogorilivka
in Berezne rayon, Rivne oblast’. Chervoniy arrived on the political arena in the 1990s, when on
18 March 1990 as a result of the first democratic elections he became a deputy in Verkhovna
Rada of URSR, representing Rivne. He was a typical representative of the new national elite,
from his early youth affiliated to the Rukh and actively propagating Ukrainian independence
from the USSR. From 1990-2009 he was an oblast’ leader of Rukh and later - of the UNP.
During the election of 2004 he directed Yushchenko’ s election campaign in the oblast’. He died
in April 2009 in an accident.


\textsuperscript{425} Novak, Oleksa. “Vyboruiuchy volu i nezalezhnist’.” Visti Rivnenshchyny, 4 September
2002.
Soviet rule in such narratives is presented as an occupation that brought more damage to the local population than the war. The large number of sacrifices on the part of the UPA is justified as this was the only chance to fight against the occupants:

It was a right choice [the armed struggle against all the enemies] because the liberation war always brings about fewer victims than the unpaid terror of the occupants. [...] During the war we lost 5.3 million people while during the years of Soviet rule we lost 25 million people in holodomors (famines), executions, concentration camps and deportations.426

The 60th anniversary of the UPA was celebrated not only with the opening of a new monument in the city center but also with the concert of insurgent songs, a special exhibition devoted to the UPA in the Ethnographic Museum, and a dramatic piece entitled the “Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalist” was performed in the theater.427 The oblast’ council approved a special program “Veteran” whereby political prisoners, former repressed persons and UPA soldiers were proclaimed equal beneficiaries of welfare aid with the Red Army soldiers.428 The city council took a decision about additional monthly payments from the city budget in the amount of the minimum salary for Rivne residents who were the participants of the liberation movement. Administrations of five oblasts of Western Ukraine financed the building of a rehabilitation center “Hoverla” in Morshyn, L’viv oblast, where the UPA veterans could spend some time for medical treatment.429 In such a way “a holy role of defender of the Motherland in the difficult war time combined with the holy role of builders of their state”430 was called to be recognized nationally and appraised.

It would be wrong to state, though, that memory politics was homogenous throughout the whole region. There were numerous instances when seemingly opposite celebrations took place. Every year Victory Day was celebrated, following the tradition established in Soviet times, near Kuznetsov’s monument. Some new sites of memory continued to be built in line with the Soviet memory of war.

In September 2002, two weeks before the vast celebration of the 60th anniversary of the UPA, not far from Rivne, in Rokytne region, following an initiative of the regional administration, the site of the Soviet partisans’ glory was built. The historical-memorial complex includes 26 objects (three monuments and 23 bunkers) that commemorate the place where the Soviet partisan unit named in honor of Bozhenko (commander Rudych) was based both there and in Belarus from July 1943 to January 1944. The representatives

of the oblast’ administration were present at the opening ceremony. The project was mainly financed by the forestry industries of the region. Thus, although there are attempts to reconstruct the region as the “land of insurgency,” there are also attempts to sustain and strengthen its meaning as the “land of partisan glory.”

Radicalization of Memory

With the beginning of the new millennium, memory politics radicalized in line with the anti-Kuchma campaign. The symbolic reflection of such radicalization in Rivne was the relocation of Kuznetsov monument. This time, there was no space in the city that could contain the “symbol of terror,” thus, on 9 May 2003, on Victory Day, the bust of Kuznetsov was relocated to Dubens’ke cemetery, where it was consecrated by the priest of the Moscow Patriarchate. The high ranking officials of the city administration and Soviet Army veterans were present at the event that marked the celebration of the anniversary of victory. Although relocated to a more remote place because of more practical than ideological reasons, it gained more meaning than over the decades when it remained in the small street in the city. This removal, therefore, made the monument more visible and meaningful by the mere act of its relocation. The presence of high-ranking officials (at that time the oblast’ administration power was in the hands of pro-Kuchma government) and especially the veterans added to the importance of the monument.

Orange Blues (2003-2005)

As it was demonstrated above, intensive political struggle shaped the character of memory work both in the center and in the region in the years of political crisis during 1998-2003. The struggles culminated in 2003 with the formation of the united opposition (comprised of the parties representing opposite sides of political spectrum BYUT, “Our Ukraine,” the Socialist Party of Ukraine, and the KPU) and the beginning of presidential election campaign that led to mass protests known as the Orange Revolution.

What kind of memory culture was produced in the specific political and societal situation that culminated in the Orange Revolution? Indeed, what is the role of memory of the OUN and UPA in the protests that led to that Revolution? To better understand the memory work in Ukraine at the outset
of Orange Revolution, one should consider what was happening in the international context especially in relation to the neighboring countries, Russia and Poland. In relation to Poland, the main event that aroused international tensions was the 60th anniversary of Volhynian Ukrainian-Polish conflict. In relation to Russia, the whole presidential campaign and oppositional protests were based on the main (and simplified) question – should Ukraine keep a pro-Russian orientation or should it turn closer to Europe? Let us start with the Western neighbor, Poland.

**Commemorating Volhynia 1943 in Volhynia 2003**

The atmosphere around the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the inter-ethnic Volhynian conflict in both Ukraine and Poland demonstrated that in dealing with the past conflict, two nations were mainly concentrated on national histories. In Ukrainian public discourse the Volhynian conflict was presented as a response to anti-Ukrainian policies implemented by Poland in the interwar years and as one of the steps in the battle for national independence, the killing of Poles in this discourse is depicted as the Volhynian “tragedy;” in Polish public discourse, though, the Volhynian conflict in 1943 was presented as the quintessence of the long-lasting Ukrainian resentment against Poles that culminated in the massacre.\(^{434}\) The Polish definition of the ethnic conflict is the “Volhynian massacre” (Rzeź Wołyńska), “genocide” (ludobójstwo), or “ethnic cleansing” (czystka etniczna).\(^{435}\) Hence, “tragedy” and “massacre,” or “genocide,” narratives do not reconcile easily.

In the turbulent years of the Kuchma-Yushchenko stand-off both rivalries faced a rather difficult task to state their position on the Volhynian tragedy so that they could get the support of most of the voters. Kuchma openly supported reconciliation politics, which was not popular in the Western Ukraine, as it was seen as acceptance of Ukrainian guilt, for which the community was not ready. Yushchenko adhered to an undefined position that was presented as more balanced. He maneuvered between Scylla and Charybdis of intricate memory construction trying to attract more voters while not losing his main support in Western Ukraine. In his statements, Yushchenko emphasized the role of the church which, as he argued, had more influence in society than state authority. Thus highlighting the fate of victims and shifting the decision-making onto the church, Yushchenko presented himself as an understanding partner who attempted to engage with his


counterparts. During his official visit to Poland on 9 May 2003, he made a point of visiting Auschwitz in order to demonstrate that he shared European memory culture by remembering Jewish suffering on “Victory Day.” Yushchenko promoted himself as a truly pro-European candidate and his pro-European rhetoric helped him so that his approach to the Volhynian problem seemed to be closer to the Polish side, although in actual politics back home, Kuchma was more pro-Polish in tackling the Polish-Ukrainian conflict.

As opposition leader, Yushchenko used the situation to demonstrate his anti-Kuchma stance as well as his tolerance towards the difficult past. It was not easy for the opposition to assume a definite position in historical disputes. On the one hand, they wanted to be associated with Western values and European integration, thus they could not speak openly against Poland. On the other hand, their electoral support was larger in Western Ukraine, for whose population the history of OUN and UPA was important. Open support of the Polish position would weaken their position in the region. As a result, Yushchenko took up a rather ambiguous position. Nevertheless, against Kuchma’s open support of the Polish position, Yushchenko’s veiled statements in support of both sides and calls for mutual understanding were welcomed as acting in the national interests.

Addressing the Second World War and the UPA in a search for new heroes provided the opposition with a desired revolutionary symbolism (which was particularly needed later in 2004 during the Orange Revolution). On the other hand, references to the OUN and the UPA provided grist to the mill for opponents to denigrate the opposition as “fascists.” So, when the election campaign of 2003 started, the posters with Yushchenko dressed in a Nazi uniform were disseminated by his opponents. In such a way, Ukrainian nationalism was used both by the opposition and its opponents, with different purposes, of course. Since the 2004 election campaign, the “fascist” card became widely used in political battles.

Reconciliation or Reclamation? Intellectuals’ Position on the Conflict

The Ukrainian-Polish conflict was not only approached by politicians. Intellectuals were widely engaged in working up of some appropriate position to address such an uneasy question. The journal “Ji” published the letter of Ukrainian intellectuals addressed to Polish people where they asked for forgiveness for the past wrong doings of Ukrainians in Volhynia. Although this journal has a rather small audience, the people who wrote the letter are

indeed those who can be called “public intellectuals,” who actively engage in civic life, who comment on all the important events in leading national newspapers, who openly demonstrate their views and influence the worldview of the others. Many of them are well established in academia in Ukrainian, Western European and North American universities. Among the signatories were the famous writers Yurii Andrukhovych, Volodymyr Yeshkilev, and well-known historians Myroslav Marynovych, Vasyl’ Rasevych and Yaroslav Hrytsak, intellectuals and essayists like Yurko Prokhas’ko and Mykola Riabchuk. This letter to a large degree reflects a widely accepted attitude to the Volhynian conflict by the larger intellectual community that in general tends to represent European liberal ideals and values. In this regard, it deserves an extended citation:

Pressed into the ideological jaws of communism, our two nations were deprived of the possibility to lead an honest and open dialogue about the events that have been mentioned [the Volhynian conflict] which would be based on the concrete facts of history. Indiscriminate condemnation by the communist propaganda of the national liberation struggle of Ukrainians, especially of the OUN and UPA, was only an instrument of the total Sovietization of the Ukrainian nation. It was not a test for conscience (ispyt sumlinnia). The Poles can understand this since they also, although to a lesser degree, have witnessed such an ideological distortion of the history of Armia Krajowa. Today, 60 years after the tragic events in Volhynia, such a test for conscience is not to be avoided. It was the war which ideologues know more about than historians. Nevertheless, trustworthy historical facts, documents and testimonies can considerably refute the warped black and white picture of the past. The spirit of truthful history does not allow such black and white interpretations wherein some are seen only as heroes and others only as criminals. (emphasis added) 437

Thus, reclaimed “truthful” history is seen by intellectuals as a way of reconciliation for both nations. The same ideas were postulated by leading Ukrainian historians who saw Ukrainian discussions about the Polish Ukrainian tragic past as their own Historikerstreit,438 as a result of which the new revisionist history is written. Notably, the letter of intellectuals includes a passage where the writers state their views on Ukrainians involved in the conflict:

We are bowing our heads in front of those Ukrainians who in the terrible time of war under the pressure of circumstances or out of their own choice took up weapons to protect their land and their families. We are aware that our present

freedom was gained by them, by their sacrifice, and we think that the Ukrainian state has not yet paid its dues to them. And showing them our respect we ask all the participants of the aforementioned events, who are today with us, and together with them the whole Ukrainian society in a Christian manner to forgive the misdeeds of those who from the Polish side became the reason of their crushed fates.

At the same time we are asking for pardon from those Poles whose fates were crushed by Ukrainian weapons, and through them we are ask for the forgiveness of the whole Polish society… We are express our sorrow… and confess that the violent removal of the Polish population from Volhynia was a tragic mistake⁴³⁹ (emphasis added).

Although the UPA is not explicitly mentioned in the letter, the passage above implicitly addresses, among others, the UPA as those who were fighting for freedom and for whom the state owes its recognition. As we see, in the liberal circles of Ukrainian intellectuals the questions of national freedom and state independence are of primary significance.

From the beginning of 1990s two parallel processes have been ongoing in both Poland and Ukraine. On the one hand, the exclusivist national narrative of the conflict was constructed and promoted by official memory politics in the two countries; on the other hand, there were the constant attempts by historians from Poland and Ukraine to find a common language and produce inclusive narratives of the conflict. Thus, in June 1994 the first meeting of Ukrainian and Polish historians on the topic of the conflict took place under the title “Poland-Ukraine: Difficult Questions” Subsequently, ten similar meetings were held in Warsaw and Luts’k (Volyn’ oblast’, Ukraine). Although this work was open to a rather small circle of involved historians, its results have the potential to influence the discussions of history at a public level and how memory politics is played out by the communities. This potential is not, as yet, widely used.

“German-Polish Occupants”: Culmination of anti-Polish Attitudes in the Regional Memory Politics

No doubt, the positions of both Kuchma and Yushchenko were widely discussed in the region. For opposition parties, Kuchma’s reconciliation position on the Volhynian conflict presented an opportunity to attack him. Thus, “Volyn” newspaper harshly criticized Kuchma’s standpoint and accused him of divisive politics. The paper published dozens of articles underscroing the Ukrainian losses caused by all the “occupants” including the Poles. The discussions about the Volhynian events of 1943 took place against a background of strong support for Yushchenko’s pre-election campaign in the region.

⁴³⁹ The open letter concerning the 60th anniversary.
On 10 July 2003, deputies from Volhynia met with the President (among the deputies was already mentioned Vasyl' Chervoniy). They transmitted their views about the inappropriateness of the apology demanded from one side only. In the Parliament, though, 227 (out of 450) deputies voted for Kuchma’s proposal of reconciliation that included an apology on the Ukrainian side. The UPP commented on this that the deputies who voted for the proposal “humiliated honor and dignity of Ukrainian nation.”

In response to the official position of Kyiv, the newspaper “Volyn’” started a new column “Volhynia remembers!” with the telling subtitle “Massacres in Volhynia during the Polish occupation when the Poles murdered 100,000 Ukrainians.” This column followed with the publication of lists of Ukrainian victims who suffered from Volhynian tragedy in 1943 under the title “Chronicles of Volhynian Tragedy.” The series included letters from readers who shared their personal memories at the time under the title “Memory of the victims of Polish-German terror is living in our hearts.” Some of these letters presented Ukrainians as victims of their neighbors, both Poles and Jews.

The UPP organized a series of commemorations, which they called “meetings-requiems,” where “Ukrainian victims of Polish terror” could meet and share their memories. The party also launched a book project and addressed, through the newspaper, “the patriots of Ukraine” with the request to share their stories about “the crimes committed by German-Polish occupants.” By the following month such stories started to appear in the paper and the readers cast these stories in the same wording as suggested by the newspaper, whereby the perpetrators were called the “German-Polish occupants.” The book was never published, but the titles of such articles speak for themselves - for example, the “Barbarities of Polish Hangmen” or the “Genocide of the Ukrainians of Holmshchyna.”

Some of those accounts were written by public figures who often wrote to “Volyn’,” so it appears that all these letters were not the product of the imagination of the editors. The UPP announced the competition for the best documentary or work of fiction devoted to the topic “Sorrowful Bells of

441 See issues: Volyn’, 21, 12, 28 February; 7, 14, 21, 28 March; 4, 11 April 2003. Historians estimate the number of Ukrainians who were killed by Poles in the Volhynian conflict was 20,000 (see: Motyka. Od rzezi wołyńskiej; Ilyushyn. Ukrains’ka Povstans’ka Armia).
442 Chronicles of Volhynian Tragedy, Volyn’, No. 8, No. 9, No. 21, No. 28, February 2003.
Volhynia” (“Skorbotni Dźvony Volyni”) about Polish-Ukrainian conflict. The project was planned as “a response to Polish accusations in ‘genocide’ committed by Ukrainians.”

In general, in 2003 it became commonplace in the rhetoric of the UPP to address both Poles and Germans as a united enemy – “German-Polish occupants” (“nimets’ko-pols’ki okupanty”). Coupling Poles with Germans in such a bizarre way made the enemy very recognizable. The open letter, which was initiated and signed by the leaders of the URP “Sobor” (Ukrains’ka Respublikans’ka Partiya “Sobor,” Kyiv, Odesa) and the UPP of Rivne oblast’, demonstrates the logic that stands behind such position to the commemoration of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict. In the letter, the Volhynian massacre is referred to as “a regular ‘pacification’, the unpunished massacre of Ukrainians.”

In the letter the blame for the “massacre” is shifted exclusively onto the Poles who incited the Germans against Ukrainians:

The Poles directed the anger of the occupants [Germans] against the local Ukrainian population and by the means of the German army and police forces plundered villages and towns... The Poles were the first to start the massacre... During the whole war having the support of the Polish colonizers, the Armia Kraiowa existed only at the expense of the Ukrainian population whom they robbed and killed. Taken together, this extinguished patience and allowed the anger to rise up among the most peace-loving nation in Europe - the Ukrainian people. The massacre on both sides started, and nothing could stop it... We think that it is the present Polish government [...] that has to ask for forgiveness of both Poles and Ukrainians for the criminal anti-Ukrainian state politics of its predecessors.

Furthermore, the signatories of the letter saw Ukrainian-Polish disputes about the past as being provoked by third parties (Russia mainly) interested in deteriorating relations between Poland and Ukraine:

*certain anti-Polish and anti-Ukrainian forces* are striving to hinder Ukrainian-Polish closeness and understanding. They hinder Ukrainian-Polish relations preventing Ukraine and Poland from becoming a serious geopolitical force in Europe. [These forces] take the opportunity to play with Polish national sentiments and strive to disunite our nations as they have done so many times before. [They are] striving to involve us into a round of mutual pretentions and accusations, in endless struggle, the ominous symbols of which have become Ulster, Cyprus, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, and Kashmir.

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451 “The open letter regarding the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the tragic events in Volhynia in 1943.”
452 “The open letter regarding the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the tragic events in Volhynia in 1943.”
Kuchma’s government, which supported Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation and expressed its readiness to apologize, was presented as anti-Ukrainian. In a letter addressed to the Poles, the nationalists underlined that Polish demands for a Ukrainian apology undermined “Ukrainian national interests”:

We ask Poland to retract its demands for a one-sided apology from Ukraine. [...] What is badly needed for mutual understanding is the Polish revision of its anti-Ukrainian prejudices and refusal of its traditionally incorrect Ukrainian politics which, for already more than 400 years, proves its invalidity. [...] We are calling for mutual prayers for their memory, for the mutual forgiveness of suffering inflicted by both sides. ...so that we won’t let our nations, as it was in the past, fall into the abyss of mutual claims and accusations, so that the memory of the Volhynian tragedy won’t hinder Ukraine and Poland in looking confidently towards a common European future.453

What is peculiar are the exhortations to the European future in this context. It must be said that the discourse of Europeanness is closely tied to the memory of the UPA as it is propagated by the national-democratic camp. Surely, the memory of the UPA as the antitheses of Soviet memory of war is anti-Soviet and anti-communist, but is it necessarily pro-European? If one thinks about Europe as a symbol of democracy and respect of human rights, then the desire to iron out “difficult knowledge” about the violation of exactly these democratic principles by shifting the blame on others seems to contradict the declared “common European future.” On the other hand, though, one can see this unwillingness to internalize the difficult knowledge as a fear to damage one’s own identity.

**Academia as a Contested Scene for Partisan Memory Politics**

Memory struggles took place not only in the Parliament, city councils and in the press, they also came up in academic institutions, although some of these sorts of academic events were launched and sponsored by political parties. In April 2003, there was an academic forum at the respected university “Ostroh Academy,” in the town of Ostroh (in some 30 km from Rivne). The forum was funded by Poland. The forum was entitled “Events in Volhynia 1943-44: how to live with such a burden?” Polish and Ukrainian scholars tried to create a platform where different positions and different perspectives could be shown. The event was boycotted by the nationalist youth linked to the UPP. On the day the forum started, the small town was full of posters proclaiming “Poland, repent!” The UPP condemned the event, accusing the director of the Academy of being “a traitor whose position was quite understandable as his wife was of Polish origin.”454 The scholars who had a floor at the forum were accused of

453 “The open letter regarding the commemoration of the 60th aniversary of the tragie events in Volhynia in 1943.”
taking a “pro-Russian and pro-Polish” position. Among those accused was the Ukrainian historian Igor Ilyushyn, an active member of the Ukrainian-Polish commission of historians dealing with the problem of the Volhynian massacres, and the distinguished Ukrainian scholar Myroslav Popovych. After some complications, Vasyl’ Chervoniy finally managed to have a word at the forum and declared:

The uncompromising Polish position [on Volhynian events of 1943] will only strengthen the position of those who are promoting the Eurasian vector in Ukraine, and will weaken the Ukrainian independence movement which means that it will also weaken Poland in spite of its stable present position and the dream of being in NATO achieved. Did Riga 1921 [...] fail to teach you, Polish brothers, a lesson? 

In his speech he drew attention to the “Ukrainian insurgents who were fighting for national liberation against German, Polish, Russian, and Hungarian occupants on their own territory.”

In this instance it can be seen how the past was presented as a refuge from the threats of one’s (or national) ontological security, as it provides an exemplary model for acting and at the same time as something that has to be solemnly remembered, as if this remembrance can protect against the dangers in the present and in the future. In this respect, memory provides the means for ontological security – one of the fundamental human needs, as it was already stated before.

Parallel to the forum in Ostroh Academy, there was a conference on “Volhynia 1943” organized in Rivne State Humanities University, which hosted Ukrainian scholars who were not invited to Ostroh. This discussion had “anti-reconciliation” undertones and became a forum for such politicians as Chervoniy to promote their political agenda. Chervoniy spoke here and was welcomed as a “professional historian” by one of the professors of the university. In his speech he repeated the accusation about the “German-Polish” occupants who exploited Ukrainians and forced them to fight against Germans, Poles, and Russians. The Poles, by contrast, according to Chervoniy, fought only against Ukrainians.

After the conferences in Ostroh and Rivne there was a conference in Luts’k entitled the “Ukrainian Polish conflict in Volhynia in the years of the Second World War: genesis, character, course and consequences” organized on 20-23 May, 2003. Chervoniy repeated his anti-Polish rhetoric here too. At

457 Porovchuk, Vitaliy. “Chy shukaly poliaky istyvu v Ostrozi”.
that conference there were historians from both Ukraine and Poland (such as the well-known historians Mykola Kucherepa, Yaroslav Isayevych and Jerzy Kroczowski). The conference presented many balanced accounts from both Ukrainian and Polish participants. But as soon as history was entrusted to the politicians, it became twisted so that it lost its historical traces and became the mere manipulation with stereotypes. The omnipresence of Chervoniy at all the events devoted to the OUN, UPA and Volhynian conflict demonstrates an attempt to appropriate history by one party and to transform it into an ideology and political program.

These conferences demonstrated the fragmented and contested character of the memory of the Volhynian events in Ukraine. It is obvious that even at the regional level there was no unified view on events. Symbolically such conferences were located in the intellectual centers of Volhynia – the place where the Ukrainian-Polish conflict took place. The conference in Ostroh illustrated how political parties, working as the main memory entrepreneurs, tried to influence academic research and even prevent it. In general, open academic discussions of historians were not welcomed by parties as these discussions had the potential to destabilize meanings which the parties tried to homogenize and hegemonize.

One important note has to be added to this discussion. The UPP and Rukh, the main propagators of the glorious memory of the OUN and UPA, found themselves in quite a peculiar situation during the anti-Kuchma campaign. On the one hand, they supported Yushchenko’s camp, but, on the other hand, they were afraid to lose their political position in the region should Yushchenko’s and Tymoshenko’s parties win and new deputies enter the councils and the parliament. They had to find some balance and popular support. As can be seen from the abstracts cited above, the parties looked for the solution in openly populist rhetoric which led to the radicalization of memory work, i.e. memory work ruled by victimizing, exclusivist, and defensive strategies which have the tendency to polarize society.

**The Role of Russia in Ukrainian Memory Battles**

I would argue that one of the main parties against which memory politics concerning the OUN and UPA was framed was Russia. To a certain degree radicalization of these memory politics came in response to transformations in Russian memory politics. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the main vectors of Russia’s memory politics were redirected. At the very beginning of the 1990s Russian anti-communists were reluctant to turn their attention to national history, as they considered it as being associated with the

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communists. But when the Russian Communist Party attracted strong public support in the December 1993 parliamentary elections, Russian President Boris Yeltsin addressed history as being a subject where he could outwit his opponents. In his memory politics Yeltsin addressed an anti-Bolshevik theme, by rehabilitating persons executed on Lenin’s orders. The focus on revolutionist and internationalist ideas changed to being an emphasis on the imperial past with the key motifs of honor and heroic suffering. Such a shift could be seen as an attempt to find some new post-Soviet identity distanced from the communist legacy. Such distancing was common in other post-Soviet countries as well.

After the 1990s, though, Russia moved “toward the conscious and energetic exploitation of the past for political and geopolitical purposes.” Imperial legacies continued to be used but the motifs of suffering were now downplayed along with the motifs of imperial greatness. Such a radical break in approaching the past can be explained by the national memory frameworks of the former Soviet countries, first and foremost the Baltics, ruled by de-Sovietization and a Europeanization agenda.

The attempts to deal with communist legacies, or even to get rid of them, were associated in the Kremlin with the move from the Russian sphere of influence and as betrayal of Russian state interests. Russian memory politics depended very much on what was happening in neighboring countries. In May 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev inaugurated a presidential commission on fighting historical falsifications. One of the falsehoods concerned was the organized famine in Ukraine. On 17-18 May 2010, though, soon after the pro-Russian candidate Victor Yanukovych became president, Medvedev himself visited the memorial to the victims of the famine of 1932-33 during his official visit to Kyiv; the same memorial the opening of which he refused to visit when invited by Victor Yushchenko just two years before. In such a way, one can see how evaluations of, and attitudes to, the past varied in the Kremlin depending on who was the president in Ukraine.

As stated above, if in the 1990s under the rule of Yeltsin Russia went through the process launched during perestroika, which was directed towards re-evaluation of Soviet past, especially of the Stalinist legacy, then from 2001,

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462 Ibidem.
463 Backer and Etkind. Memory and Theory in Eastern Europe, p. 15.
when Vladimir Putin became president of the Russian Federation, there was a break in the “distancing-from-the-Soviet” agenda. A slow return to Soviet heritage including the positive evaluation of Stalinism began. The main stance in Russian politics of memory since 2001 can be schematically defined through Putin’s personal perception of the collapse of the USSR as the biggest catastrophe of the 20th century, as he maintained at a conference in Munich in 2007. Resentment and nostalgia for the Soviet past became the driving forces underlying memory politics in Russia.

As for Ukraine, probably with the aim of demonstrating Kuchma’s power through the friendship with and support of Russia, the year 2003 was proclaimed the year of Russia in Ukraine. This meant some cultural events linked to Russia and some two-party activities to be held in Ukraine. In light of these initiatives, Russians proposed to change the content of Ukrainian history textbooks. The proposal was met with indignation from part of Ukrainian society. But the contacts with historians from both countries intensified.

It is worth highlighting that in internal political struggles the “Russian question” (understood as “Russia-as-a-friend” or “Russia-as-a-threat” depending on the position of the party addressing the question) was taken onboard and exploited by the politicians of all parties. In the years of the bitter struggle between the opposition and Kuchma, the use of the “Russian question” only escalated. Kuchma and Yanukovych presented alliance with Russia as a guarantee of well-being for Ukrainians. The opposition presented such an orientation as an opposite to European orientation and as a threat of Russian imperialism.

In 2004, during the presidential election campaign, the use of pro-Russian propaganda heightened. Yanukovych boasted of support from Putin. His camp made extensive use of all available means to associate Yushchenko in the minds of voters with hardcore nationalists labeling him as “fascist.” The provocations organized by Yanukovych against Yushchenko using radical nationalists became commonplace. For instance, Roman Kozak, a leader of

467 In 2006 a team of authors, led by Alexander Filippov and Alexander Danilov, was assigned to write a new set of history textbooks. The main concepts of the new textbooks were summarized by Danilov as: “The main cause of the ‘Great Terror’ was resistance to Stalin’s policy of rapid modernization and Stalin’s fear that he might lose control over the country. There was no organized famine in the rural areas of the Soviet Union. In talking about victims of repression, it would be correct to devise a formula that would include only those who were sentenced to capital punishment or were executed. It should be emphasized that the Red Army’s campaign in September 1939 concerned the liberation of territories transferred to Poland under the 1920 Treaty of Riga, in other words, it meant the liberation of part of the homeland. Although there is no justification for the massacre of the Polish prisoners of war at Katyn, it should be noted that, from Stalin’s point of view, the executions went far beyond the problem of political rationality, and were a response to the deaths of thousands of Red Army soldiers held in Polish captivity after the war of 1920.” (Miller, “The Turns of Russian Historical Politics,” pp. 258-259)
the micro-party Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, was created as a "clone," or a dummy, candidate who used radical speeches and supported Yushchenko in his TV ads. Similar provocation was made by the “new” UNA-UNSO, which made a radical statement and actions in the name of Yushchenko. Later on, these provocations were denounced by the leader of the real UNA-UNSO party, Andriy Shkil’. Although the provocations were diminished, the image of Yushchenko in Yanukovych’s election campaign became strongly linked to nationalist ideals of Western Ukraine. The fact that the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists was a part of his bloc “Our Ukraine” supported the idea of him being a nationalist.

The association of Yushchenko with only one part of Ukraine was obviously aimed at alienating voters from other parts of Ukraine from his candidacy. State TV channels broadcasted a video-clip where Ukraine was divided into three categories: the highest first category was Western Ukraine, the second - Central, and the third, lowest category - Eastern Ukraine. It was directed first and foremost at residents of the eastern regions of Ukraine to intimidate them and present the opposition as a threat.

In order to strengthen Yanukovych’s position before the elections the views of spin doctors were directed to history. On 28 October 2004, a mass celebration of the liberation of Ukraine from Nazi Germany was organized. It was an unprecedented celebration for that day and mirrored Victory Day, the 9th of May. On the basis of this celebration, Putin made a three-day visit to Ukraine. Obviously, the main reason for such an unexpected celebration was to demonstrate the support of Russia for Yanukovych. Presenting Yanukovych in association with the Great Victory in the Second World War was aimed to position him into the space of glory and pride which he needed in the campaign. Ironically, the association of Yushchenko with the UPA which was orchestrated by Yanukovych’s spin doctors backfired, as in the eyes of many voters the association with the UPA struggle brought about the pathos of revolution and liberation (in that context the liberation from the oligarchic pro-Kuchma clans, including Yanukovych). This proved to be especially effective when the Orange Revolution began.

The Orange Revolution

The 2004 presidential elections were marked by widespread instances of voter fraud. The significant difference between the results of nonpartisan exit polls (52% of votes for Yushchenko against 43% of votes for Yanukovych) and the results announced by the Central Election Committee (49.5% for Yanukovych against 46.6% for Yushchenko) were grounds to consider the official results
falsified. On 22 November 2004, hundreds of people were drawn to the main Kyiv’s square, Maidan Nezalezhnosti, with demands for refuting rigged results and organizing new and fair elections. Similar protests took place in many towns and cities of mainly Central and Western Ukraine.

These protests came out of the blue since it was a widely accepted view that Ukraine had a weak civil society “unable and perhaps unwilling to exert control over the government.” Eastern Ukraine seemed content with the results of the elections. On 26 November, about 60,000 people gathered near the central railway station in Kyiv in support of Yanukovych. Kharkiv and Donets’k oblast’ councils declared their wishes to establish oblast’s as autonomous state units. On 28 November the Party of the Regions held an all-Ukrainian meeting in Siverodonets’k (near Donets’k) where the federalization of Ukraine was discussed. The mass protests in Kyiv lasted for a month and became known as the Orange Revolution. Thousands of people were living in tents and unwilling to leave them until a new election be held. On 3 December, the Supreme Court of Ukraine ordered new elections. On 26 December, Viktor Yushchenko was elected as the President of Ukraine with 52% of the vote (Yanukovych received 44.2%).

In Ukraine, the choice between Yanukovych and Yushchenko was presented in the election campaigns of both candidates as a choice between closer integration with Russia and closer integration with Europe up to an eventual EU membership. Notably, in Russia the elections of the Ukrainian president in 2004 were presented not as an internal Ukrainian affair but as a contest between Russia and the West over the influence on the post-Soviet space. In the USA as well, the Ukrainian protests were presented from the perspective of a struggle between the West and Russia. In Ukraine, though, the surveys showed that only 5% of the protestors came onto the streets because of the geopolitical choices, the most popular answer of the protestors (42%) was “protest against authority.”

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Once aware of the serious threat from Yushchenko in 2004, Yanukovych used the same strategy which was used by Kuchma in the elections in 1994 when he presented his opponent as a “Galician nationalist” (see the discussion above). The state-owned media portrayed Yushchenko as a “hard core cultural nationalist.” But this time, the stakes on nationalism misfired and nationalism became the main mobilizing power which instigated the protests that brought victory to Yushchenko. In the insightful analysis of what citizens said during the period of the Orange Revolution, Anna Fournier showed that the protests in November-December 2004 were largely about “restoring order” where the status quo was presented as a deviation from normality.

The slogans on Maidan were framed as being the opposition to criminal (abnormal) bandit authorities and honest (normal) people (bandyty vs. chesni ludy). The protestors’ claims for restoring normality went hand-in-hand with Yushchenko’s promises to “begin life from a new page” and “create this world.” Since Yushchenko represented the struggle of “honest people,” his project of national identity, mainly based on worldviews of the national democrats, acquired the status of such “normality.” As a result, the version of history promoted by Yushchenko’s memory politics concerning the OUN and UPA was no longer seen as some deviant expression of “Galician nationalism” but as an expression of restored “normality.” Thus, after the victory of Yushchenko in the presidential election of 2004, one can speak about the normalization of memory of the OUN and UPA that was realized not only symbolically but institutionally, as will be discussed below.

473 Ibidem.
476 The lines from Yushchenko’s party “Our Ukraine” campaign song (Rosava, Nasha Ukraina, Prosto Neba, Kyiv: Lavina Music, CD.)
Rise and Decline of “Nationalization” (2005-2010)

Whose Right to Define the “National” in Memory? Institutionalization of Memory

Yushchenko had an ambitious “historical agenda” with promised to make Ukrainian national history free of “blank spots.” He referred to the OUN and UPA themes as if they had a potential to generate points of reference that the whole nation could identify with. His politics of memory was specifically aimed at incorporating the OUN and the UPA into national history not only at an educational level but also in some normative institutionalized practices. Yushchenko declared his intention to solve the long lasting problem of the pensions of former UPA soldiers. As a veteran’s pension is intended only for those who fought against the Nazis, the veterans’ pension system excludes a number of former soldiers of the UPA who fought against the NKVD units. Yushchenko’s declarations have, though, remained mere rhetoric and had no effect on the lives of the UPA veterans.477

After Yushchenko came to power, he continued with what Andriy Portnov called an “integration-oriented narrative” – where he tried to combine in one narrative both UPA and Red Army heroic narratives.478 When giving his position on the status of the UPA veterans, he usually spoke about the reconciliation through dialogue between the veterans of the Red Army and the UPA. But he failed to make specific moves to build such a dialogue (taking into consideration the fact that the UPA still remained unrecognized by the state and the promised pensions were not paid). Instead, Yushchenko spoke with abstract notions: “To call a person who was mobilized by the state an enemy is a blasphemy, but it is also a blasphemy to stick the same label on those who defended the independence of their country.”479 The “common” celebrations of Victory Day by both UPA and Red Army veterans in Kyiv did not succeed. But where Yushchenko failed, the local initiatives were more successful. For instance, in the villages of Zhavriv, Bochanystsia and Duliby near Rivne there were “united” celebrations of Victory on 9 May 2005, organized by village councils. The celebrations brought together some Red Army and UPA veterans.480 In such a way, we can see that sometimes initiatives propagated at a national level fail as they are too politicized, but they tend to succeed at a local level where inter-personal relations play a more important role than politics.

477 The issue of financial support of the UPA veterans, however, has been partly addressed at the local level. The city councils in some of the bigger West Ukrainian towns make additional monthly payments to the residents who are UPA veterans (See: Portnov and Portnova. “Der Preis des Sieges.” p. 36).
478 Portnov. Istorii dlia domashnioho vzhytku, p. 175.
480 Vil’ne slovo, No. 37, 17 May, 2005, p. 4.
A Weak Position in politics – a Strong Position in Memory

The year after the Orange Revolution was characterized by a harsh political struggle the result of which was that Yulia Tymoshenko lost her position as prime minister and in 2006 Viktor Yanukovych, Yushchenko’s main rival in the Orange Revolution, became prime minister. The upshot was that Yushchenko’s position weakened. Losing his political power, Yushchenko pointed towards history in an attempt to retain his symbolic power. Instead of implementing crucial anti-corruption policies and economic reforms which he promised during the Orange Revolution, he took some decisive steps in memory politics. In 2007 with the parliamentary elections approaching, Yushchenko granted the Order of Hero to Roman Shukhevych, the commander of the UPA. During Yushchenko’s presidency some larger memorial projects took place in the regions – the Hurby pantheon of heroes near Rivne in 2006, the opening of which was attended by Yushchenko (which is one of my case-studies), and the Bandera Monument in L’viv in 2007.

With one of his purposes being to institutionalize the politics of memory, in 2006 Yushchenko sanctioned the foundation of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory. Presented as an initiative similar to the Polish National Institute of Memory, the newly formed Ukrainian institution had very little in common with its Polish counterpart as it had no authority to conduct activities that the Polish Institute of Memory has. For example, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory did not gain control over the archives of the KGB, did not have a special investigation unit, regional departments, or vast financing. Ihor Yukhnovs’kyi, the physicist, politician of the national-democratic camp and a leader of one of the veteran unions who supported Yushchenko’s politics of memory regarding the war, was appointed as the chairman of the Institute. Vladyslav Verstiuk, the historian, the author of several university history textbooks and the vice chairman of the Ukrainian National Memory Institute, commented that the Institute:

did not have a clear directive on the executive actions, it was rather an educational institution, which was called on to distribute a correct vision of history and develop recommendations on how to approach history, especially its problematic periods and events which were defamed and misrepresented by the Soviet propaganda (emphasis added).

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483 Portnov. Istorii dla domashnioho vzhytka. p. 129.
The most “painful” themes in his view are the Holodomor, the Second World War, and the UPA. Although the Institute did not have much power, it had the potential to become a strong instrument of memory politics. The archives related to the history of the UPA fell under the control of the Security Service of Ukraine, and the process of disclosure of the archives began. It was especially intense during the two last years of Yushchenko’s presidency (2008-09). During 2008-2009 scholars from the Institute of National memory cooperated with scholars from the Security Service of Ukraine (Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukraïiny) and the Center of Research of Liberation Movement to organize an exhibition “The UPA: History of the Unbowed” that was shown in many cities in Ukraine and abroad. The exhibition traveled throughout all the oblast’ centers of Ukraine from September 2008 to May 2009. About 60,200 people visited the exhibition in all the places where it was shown, more than 350 different mass media covered the event in more than a hundred articles in the printed media, dozens of TV and radio programs in national and local broadcast mentioned the exhibition.

Luts’k and Rivne boasted a record number of visitors and organized excursions for schoolchildren and students. In contrast to such (organized) popularity in Volhynia, the exhibition failed in several cities in the east and south of the country. In Luhans’k the exhibition was not supported by the city administration and was practically not shown at all. In Odesa a parallel exhibition, the anti-UPA, was organized, in Zaporizhzhia the people’s deputy of the Communist Party destroyed one of the exhibited objects.

As can be seen from the scheme set up by the Institute (Figure 5), the OUN and UPA are understood as the continuation of the national revival at the beginning of the 20th century and struggles for independence since 1917. In short, the UPA is conceptualized as the closest approximation to a national army. The OUN and UPA activities are perceived as liberation movements fighting for the independence and liberation from the two regimes of occupation. Consequently, both the OUN and UPA were a constitutive part of the new master narrative where the raison d’être of Ukrainian history can be schematically presented as a permanent struggle for freedom.

The scheme published by the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory demonstrates the lineage of the liberation movement as it is generally portrayed in history textbooks. The master narrative treats independence as a result of a glorious struggle and tracks the genealogy of the national independence from: (1) the national revival at the beginning of the 20th century and struggles for independence since 1917. In short, the UPA is conceptualized as the closest approximation to a national army.

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485 Verstiuk, Vladyslav. Interview.
487 “Summary on Realization of Exhibition.”
century through; (2) the national revolution in 1917-1921; to (3) the armed underground struggle of the Ukrainian Liberation Organization (UVO) and the OUN in 1920-30s to; (4) the struggle of the UPA and the armed underground OUN in the 1940-50s through; (5) the dissident movement of the 1960-80s until; (6) the national-democratic movement at the end of 1980 and the beginning of 1990s and finally up to; (7) the proclamation of the Act of Independence on 24 August 1991.489

As one can see from the history of the OUN and UPA occupies an important place in the narrative of the liberation and serves as a cornerstone of the liberation struggle that finally led to independence. Through such a


conceptualization two crucial conclusions are possible: the uninterrupted struggle for liberation is ensured and the interpretation of Soviet rule as an occupation is justified.

Although opening up the history of the OUN and UPA was supposed to fill in a “blank spot” in the history of Ukraine and to shed light on the topics which were silenced by the Soviet historical culture, this aim has not been fulfilled. The conceptualization per se of the OUN and UPA as a cornerstone of Ukrainian liberation sets limits to the historical representations of these themes. As an integral part of the liberation movement, the history of the OUN and the UPA can only be glorified and celebrated. As Viatrovych contends, the foundation of an independent Ukrainian state is the evidence of the victory of the movement. That is why it is time to stop labeling them as terrorists, collaborators, etc.491

The OUN and the UPA Become Popular

By the end of first decade of the 21st century, the theme of the OUN and UPA became so popular that in 2008 in the TV show “Great Ukrainians” Stepan Bandera was ranked third. 2009 was the year of the centennial anniversary of Bandera’s birth and the 50th anniversary of his death. It was in fact the year of Bandera in terms of wide public attention he received. As already mentioned, the Institute of Memory organized special exhibitions in the regions and in Kyiv. Intellectual discussions on Bandera flourished. Some outcomes of these discussions were compiled in a collection under the book cover “Passions for Bandera”492 which includes articles by well-known scholars from Ukraine and abroad (Hrytsak, Viatrovych, Marples, Rudling, Snyder, Himka, to name but a few, which are extensively cited in my work). In 2010, the epic novel about the UPA “Museum of Abandoned Secrets” by renowned Ukrainian author Oksana Zabuzhko was published with the financial assistance of Yushchenko’s foundation. In 2013, Oksana Zabuzhko received the Central–European Angelus Prize for her novel.493 To receive such an acclaimed prize from Poland for a novel about the UPA could be seen as a sign of reconciliation, especially taking into account that 2013 was the 70th anniversary of the Volhynian Ukrainian-Polish conflict.

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493 The prize was established in 2006 in Wroclaw, the Polish city that introduced this prize. Authors from twenty-one countries of Central and Eastern Europe can receive the prize.
On 22 January 2010, at the very end of his presidency, Yushchenko granted the Order of the Hero of Ukraine to Stepan Bandera.  

**Notably, the date when the order was granted coincided not only with the end of presidency of Yushchenko, but most importantly with the Day of Unification (Den’ Sobornosti) of Ukraine. These aspects symbolically equated Bandera with the process of forming the state in the mythical space of memory. This order caused heated debates and even litigation.**

**Popularity Counteracted**

In April 2010 a district administrative court in Donets’k cancelled the presidential decree on the Order of Hero granted to Bandera on the ground that he was not a Ukrainian citizen. The logic of this accusation against an allegedly unlawful presidential decree went as follows: as before 1991 there was no Ukrainian state and no-one before the year 1991 could be a citizen of Ukraine, Bandera as a non-citizen of Ukraine could not be given such an order. In response to the court’s resolution, Yushchenko took the matter to an appellate court but in the end he lost the case.

Even without the litigation, the order was problematic to the extent that about 60% of Ukrainians did not think the order was legitimate.  

In granting the order to Bandera, Yushchenko also unleashed international tension as the Polish addressed the European Parliament to condemn such Ukrainian action. The Roman Catholic Church in Poland also condemned the order. Jewish Organizations such as Simon Wiesenthal Center declared their deep concern regarding the order which was seen as a part of the relativization of the Holocaust.  

On 29 January 2010, Yushchenko gave another Order of Hero to all the “participants of the struggle for independence of Ukraine in the 20th century.”  

On 22 February 2010 the European Parliament condemned the order of Bandera “who collaborated with Nazi Germany.”  

At the same time, on 1 February 2010 the Ukrainian Canadian Congress asked the Government of Canada for including the OUN-UPA within Canada’s Veteran Allowance Program.

As the court case against Yushchenko’s decision demonstrates, the politics of memory promoted by Yushchenko was not welcomed in all the regions of Ukraine. In the state’s memory politics the opposition parties found the stimulus to protect, preserve and claim their own “righteous” views on history. Yushchenko’s politics was criticized by his opponents for attempting

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494 Decree of the President of Ukraine № 46/2010 On Granting the Order of Hero of Ukraine to S. Bandera, can be retrieved under http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/10353.html
496 See: Rudling. “Yushchenkv fashyst,” p. 263.
497 The official representation of the President of Ukraine http://www.president.gov.ua.
499 More on this see: Himka. “Interventions.”
to instill “foreign” views on history and even to “Galicianize” entire Ukraine.\footnote{It seems that the comments about the “Galicia-nization” first appeared after a member of the Party of Region, Dmytro Tabachnyk, published a series of articles in “Argumenty i Fakty” (a low quality paper which belonged to the oligarch close to the Party of Regions) with overtly Ukraninophobe tones, depicting all the population of the Western Ukraine as “halychany,” “banderivtsi” who “genetically are not even Slavs.” Paradoxically, Dmytro Tabachnyk was appointed as a Minister of Education by Yanukovych in new Cabinet 2010. See: http://www.gazeta.lviv.ua/articles/2010/04/29/41202/; http://unian.net/ukr/news/news-309763.html (accessed 20 August 2010) Tabachnyk’s statements were confronted with passion in the media, see e.g. a series of critical responses from a well-known Ukrainian dissident-shestydesiatnyk Ivan Dziuba: http://www.day.kiev.ua/301498 No further details on who was killed and with which reasons were specified.} The reaction towards the state’s nationalizing policies in the eastern regions was pronounced. In 2007, the Museum of victims of the Orange Revolution was opened in Luhans’k. Notably, this museum houses a “hall of the pseudo-heroes of Ukraine.” One such “pseudo-hero” is Roman Shukhevych. This museum did not last long, though, as it was closed several months after opening. Other counter-UPA initiatives are more long lasting. The monument to “the residents of Luhans’k who were murdered by nationalist killers from the OUN and UPA”\footnote{“UNA-UNSO pomeshali kaznит chuchelo Bandery v Od esse.” TSN, 30 January 2010 http://ru.tsn.ua/ukrayina/una-unso-pomeshala-kaznit-chuchelo-bandery-v-odesse.html (accessed March 2010).} was inaugurated in 2010, just after the Order of Hero was granted to Bandera.\footnote{“Ruskoie Yedinstvo” was formed in Simferopol’ in 2008. The leader of the party from 2008 to 2010 was Maksym Kovalenko, since 2010 – Sergiy Aksionov. The party was banned in Ukraine in April 2014.} The ceremony of inauguration was declared open by the officials of Luhans’k city council together with Alexander Yefremov, a leader of the Party of the Regions, Konstantin Zatulin, a deputy of the Russian State Duma and the priests of the Moscow Orthodox Church, who solemnly consecrated the monument.

A series of counter-actions in other cities of Eastern Ukraine followed the example of Luhans’k. When Yushchenko granted the Order of Hero to Stepan Bandera, in Odesa Bandera’s effigy was burnt. Together with the effigy, protestors burnt Ukrainian history textbooks, declaring in such a way their attitudes to the “national” history project.\footnote{“Viina pamiatnykiv na Luhashchyni.” Nedelia, http://nedelya.net.ua/gazeta/vremya-nazad/viyna-pamyatnikiv-na-luganshchini/?mode=print; “U Luhans’ku poklaly kvity do pamitnyka zhertvam OUN-UPA.” in: TSN, http://tsn.ua/ukrayina/u-lugansku-poklali-kviti-do-pam-yatnika-zhertvam-oun-upa.html, “V Luhanske otkryli pamiatnik zhertvam OUN-UPA”: http://news.lugansk.info/2010/lugansk/05/001074.shtml (accessed 6 June 2014).} At the same time, in Simferopol’ the exhibition “Repressions of the NKVD against the supporters of the national liberation movement in Western Ukraine” organized by the charitable foundation Kateryna Yushchenko, was boycotted. The protestors were organized by the party “Ruskoie Yedinstvo” (Russian Unity)\footnote{“Russkoie Yedinstvo” was formed in Simferopol’ in 2008. The leader of the party from 2008 to 2010 was Maksym Kovalenko, since 2010 – Sergiy Aksionov. The party was banned in Ukraine in April 2014.} waved Russian flags, some held portraits of the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox
Church, and all this was accompanied by the anthem “God save the tsar!”

Although these protests never amounted to many people, they showed the main actors who are engaged in the misuse of history: political parties, both Ukrainian and Russian, the Moscow Patriarchate, and pro-Russian civic activists. Even if not enormous, those protests gave enough scope for the mass media eager to present splits between east and west Ukraine.

In Ukraine, where the political programs of the parties are almost the same, historical memory replaces the manifestos the people vote for. The presidential elections in 2010 in Ukraine demonstrated this: the discussions in the media did not concern the political programs of the main candidates, but rather whether Stepan Bandera was a hero or not. What is more, Viktor Yushchenko considered history per se as one of his main gains during the presidency. His decision to grant the posthumous Order of Hero to Stepan Bandera in 2010 was the last gesture to demonstrate his symbolic, if ephemeral, power.

Figure 6. The presidential election campaign 2010. The billboard with Yushchenko’s portrait reads: “Own history. We have gained!” Photo: Yuliya Yurchuk.

Decline of Yushchenko: Winning or Losing Memory Battle?

In February 2010 Yushchenko left the presidential office. At his last press-conference as president he stated policy-making on historical issues as one of

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his main achievements: “we now have a new history.” In his speech he specified that the topics of history which he regarded as reclaimed:

We have raised the Holodomor, resistance (rukh oporu), this is the identity of my nation... if you have a clear answer about your past, then you will have a clear answer to your future.\(^{506}\)

Yushchenko compared himself to Het’man Mazepa\(^{507}\) who was underestimated by his contemporaries but showed in history how to be a real Ukrainian.\(^{508}\) It must be added that during his presidency the Baturyn memorial complex was built.\(^{509}\) Yushchenko mentioned it as the achievement in promoting patriotism among the citizens: “When they (200,000 visitors) saw Baturyn, they left the place as patriots.” He also mentioned Bandera’s ranking as third in the list of “Great Ukrainians” as one of the indicators of the fact that people were “becoming Ukrainian”:

Have you ever dreamt that Bandera would rank 3rd or that Mazepa would be 11th? This is not the FSB.\(^{510}\) We now have a new history. You have changed. We began becoming Ukrainians.\(^{511}\)

In the beginning of 2010 Viktor Yanukovych became the President. The “ownership” of the OUN-UPA theme was no longer in the hands of solely one political camp of national democrats who addressed the topic during perestroika when it presented a “blank spot” of history and was used mainly in the program of reclamation of history. This was with the purpose of self-understanding and putting distance from the Soviet past. It is difficult to argue that the national-democratic camp that was formed at the end of the 1980s was unchanged at the end of 2010. It was far from being one camp any more. It fragmented into smaller parties; some were radicalized and positioned themselves on the extreme right, some gravitated more towards the center. Thus, we can speak about the fragmentation of memory whereas the memory of the OUN and UPA was not solely linked to de-Sovietization and de-colonization projects. The far-right parties and the nationalist youth organizations (as UNA-UNSO, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists

\(^{506}\) Press conference of Viktor Yushchenko, 16.02.2010, broadcasted on Ukrainian television channel, UT-1.  
\(^{508}\) Press conference of Viktor Yushchenko, 16.02.2010, broadcasted on Ukrainian television channel, UT-1.  
\(^{509}\) Baturyn was the residence of Ivan Mazepa.  
\(^{510}\) FSB – Security Service of the Russian Federation (Federal’naia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti)  
(KUN), the Ukrainian Nationalist Youth Congress) of the nationalists increasingly gained ownership over the memory of the OUN and UPA. In the discourses of these organizations, the OUN and UPA were no longer associated with an anti-Soviet attitude, anti-totalitarianism and the anti-communism of the 1990s, but rather the main emphasis was placed on anti-globalism and anti-Europeanism. Thus, when in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s the history of the OUN and UPA was called on to underline Ukrainian national particularity and Europeanism, and was mainly used in the program of reclamation, after 2006 it became used by nationalists to stress the specific role of Ukrainian nationalism and distance from all other nations.

**Fragmentation of Power in the Region**

I will conclude the entire discussion on the fluctuations of the twenty years of memory politics with one peculiar case of memorialization that is a telling illustration of one important tendency in memory work since 2005-2007 - its capitalization. By this I mean the renewal of interest in the memory of the OUN and UPA caused by the multiplication of parties involved in memory work. To put it simply, this tendency is caused by the fact that after the Orange Revolution in 2005 and after an unplanned parliamentary elections in 2007, new parties which could be called national-democratic (as Yushchenko’s “Our Ukraine” and Tymoshenko’s BYUT) came to power in the region. They had their own stakes in the memory of the OUN and UPA. Interestingly, as discussed at the beginning of the chapter, these actors were first inspired in their memory politics by the old memory actors in the region who from the beginning of the 1990s promoted the heroic memory of the OUN and UPA. After the victory of the Orange opposition, the actors who initially were united became political competitors. In this regard not one of them was interested in sharing “memory capital” with anyone else. The culmination of this struggle was revealed when the “Holmshchyna” monument was built in 2007. In order to understand the entirety of memory work we should, though, start from the very beginning, the 1990s, when the main player of this memory battle appeared.

**Holmshchyna: Looking for Counterbalance in Remembrance of the Volhynian Conflict**

In Rivne the memory of deportations (1944-47) became the rear-view mirror through which the whole spectrum of the Volhynian events was seen.

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512 In the previous chapter I have touched upon deportations. To summarize, when one speaks of deportations in this context one means the deportations of Ukrainians from Eastern Polish
Remembrance of the Volhynian conflict through deportations is promoted by organized communities of survivors, their children and grandchildren. On 4 September 1994 in Rivne the association entitled “Holmshchyna” was registered. According to the association, there were about 125,000 deportees from Poland to Rivne oblast’ alone. The preservation of the memory of deportations from Poland as well as the dissemination of knowledge became the agenda of the organizations. As the members of Rivne “Holmshchyna” association stated: “Historical truth has to triumph. The guarantor of this is our memory.”

To a certain degree, in the statements of these memory actors, Ukrainians and Poles were both presented as victims of Nazi Germany when the deportations were discussed:

Germans tried to provoke Ukrainian-Polish animosity.... Attempts to find understanding with the Poles were hopeless, Hitler’s henchmen tried (and very successfully) paralyzed all attempts to find agreement.

This passage demonstrates the main features encountered in almost all other articles dedicated to the deportation and to the Volhynian tragedy of 1943 which were published from the mid-1990s to 2000s. The main argument runs that Germany forced the Poles to kill Ukrainians. This resulted in the “Polish terror” against the Ukrainians in 1942-43. Ukrainians had to defend themselves: “The Polish terror forced Ukrainians to organize self-defense groups, which would defend people against the Polish attacks.” In such narratives the UPA’s forces are presented as saviors, lifeguards and liberators. In the Ukrainians’ eyes, it was the UPA who came to help people when the mass deportation of Ukrainians from Polish territory started. In such narratives, history is transformed into the well-recognized myth of David and Goliath about a seemingly weak hero who beats a giant. This representation is rather common in the narratives of the UPA, as the army without the state fights against the main evils of the 20th century – fascism and communism.

The authors of the “Holmshchyna” founding article mention terror as a method of the UPA carrying the fight, but in this case the terror is justified and seen as an inevitable tactic in the war:

513 Naming the organization “Holmshchyna” might be misleading, as in the literature on the Ukrainian Polish inter-ethnic conflict the toponym “Holmshchyna” is used referring not to the deportations but to the killing of Ukrainian civilians by the Poles near the town of Chełm, Holm in Ukrainian (see: Ilyushyn. Ukrain’s’ka Povstans’ka Armia, pp. 225-235).
515 Kovalchuk, Kudelia. “Holmshchyna: tragichni storinky.”
516 Kovalchuk, Kudelia. “Holmshchyna: tragichni storinky.”
517 Kovalchuk, Kudelia. “Holmshchyna: tragichni storinky.”
518 Kovalchuk, Kudelia. “Holmshchyna: tragichni storinky.”
The tactics of the UPA also foresaw the burning of villages, abandoned by Ukrainian peasants, in order to hinder settlement there by Polish peasants and the terror that would stop them from residing in Ukrainian households and villages.\textsuperscript{519}

The conflict is, though, presented not as a Ukrainian-Polish conflict, the main dividing line runs between Ukrainians and communists:

The conclusion is simple: in the postwar years the UPA was by no means at war with Poland, but only was in armed conflict with the new state power in Poland which was subject to the Kremlin and with the Polish anti-Ukrainian element. As for Polish authority - the satellite of Moscow together with the Polish chauvinist element - there was the war against the Ukrainian liberation movement and against the Ukrainian population.\textsuperscript{520}

The enemy is presented not as a Polish nation, but as a “state power which was subject to the Kreml” and “anti-Ukrainian elements” who opposed the Ukrainian liberation movement. In such a way the blame is shifted exclusively onto the authorities in Moscow (and Warsaw subjected to Moscow) and a part of the Polish population which is referred to as a “Polish chauvinist element.”

The “Holmshchyna” organization became the most active player on the memory-scene with the 60th anniversary of Operation “Vistula” approaching. As a result of that organization’s work, the monument to the victims of Holmshchyna was opened in Rivne on 9 May 2007. In such a way, the Day of Victory, the most Soviet holiday, was a container for new memory. Operation “Vistula” was covered by almost all the newspapers at that time. Importantly, it was referred to as “an unprecedented act of genocide.”\textsuperscript{521} In the series of articles written by the members of the “Holmshchyna” organization, the UPA was presented as protectors of the civilians and defenders against the genocide.

\textsuperscript{519} Kovalchuk, Kudelia. “Holmshchyna: tragichni storinky.”
\textsuperscript{520} Kovalchuk, Kudelia. “Holmshchyna: tragichni storinky.”
The “Holmshchyna” monument was harshly criticized at a meeting of Rivne council by the UPP deputies. As there was no obvious reason why the UPP which strongly supported the foundation of the “Holmshchyna” organization in the 1990s and which regularly published articles on Operation “Vistula,” criticized the monument which was built in 2007. The UPP deputy’s criticism was directed at the fact that the monument was declared open on 9 May, the day strongly associated with the Soviet memory of war.

There were, though, some other reasons for criticism which were not overt but which could easily be observed by studying the opening ceremony. Then one can see that such discontent of the UPP was due to the fact that this party was not involved in the significant memory project undertaken in the

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522 As my work is limited in volume I cannot dedicate more effort to the analysis of each monument which is mentioned here, but as a cursory note I want to emphasize the same style which is repeated in almost all the monuments built to the Second World War in the post-Soviet time, with Christian symbols and the overall appearance of a grave with characteristic wreaths on the memorial plates. The words of the poem underline the regional identity, a sorrow for the lost land, and a claim for the “world’s” recognition.

523 Starting with early 1990s Volyn’ was publishing many articles on Hollmshchyna, especially concerning the 60th anniversary of Ukrainian Polish conflict in 2003 (especially see: Volyn’, 14, 21, 28 February 2003; 21 March, 28 2003; 11, 18 April 2003; 1, 9, 16, 30 May 2003; 6, 13, June 2003; 11, 18, 25 July 2003; 15, 22 August 2003; 5 September 2003).

city. Thus the sphere of influence was marked by someone else, and it became problematic to the UPP.

Step-by-step initiatives in memory work have been taken by other parties. In winter of the same year (2007) the local organizations of the radical right-wing Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) and right of center “Our Ukraine” affixed a memorial plaque on Roman Shukhevych Street in Rivne. The UPP also criticized the memorial plaque. In response, the editor-in-chief of one of the leading regional newspapers defended the KUN and “Our Ukraine” when stated:

It is not the problem of only one party or even one person, who wants to make through history PR for himself, but the task of many patriots [to cherish the memory].

In the same article the author underlined the importance of monuments for educating coming generations:

It is for schoolchildren and students [...] for the coming generations that this plaque was affixed. It is they who have to know their own history, the past mistakes, in order not to repeat them in the future.

In such a way the parties that established the main direction in memory culture from the beginning of the 1990s gradually lost their exclusive ownership over this field. At the same time, the memory of the OUN and UPA was propelled from the regional to the national arena.

Thus, the same actors who devotedly promoted the heroic remembrance of the OUN and UPA could be seen as starting to criticize the same remembrance as soon as other actors got involved in this. They started to receive dividends from such remembrance in the form of peoples’ votes and chairs in the Parliament.

The Road to the Turbulent 2014

My initial analysis was focused on the years 1991-2010. Hence, the main volume of material analyzed belongs to this period. Nevertheless, the events that have occurred since 2010 compel me to add some words on this period. This was not planned when I embarked on writing this book. So, the reader

526 Minich. “Kinets monopolii na patriotyzm”. In response to this, the UPP declared that up to 2007 it built 178 memorials, 295 crosses on the places of “liberation struggle to Ukrainian patriots.” 5 chapels, 9 memorial plaques (“Hto i chomu papluzhyt patriotiv.” Sim Dniv, No. 50, 14 December, 2007).
should consider this as a rather long cursory note that may be extended and elaborated on in future research.

Yanukovych’s Revanchist Memory Politics

With the election of Viktor Yanukovych as President of Ukraine, the politics of memory started to take on some radically new features, especially in respect to the OUN and UPA. The first illustrative step in memory politics was a common Ukrainian-Russian-Belorussian celebration of the victory in the Second World War and the return naming it the “Great Patriotic War” in the public utterances of high-ranking politicians. In May 2011, the Ukrainian Parliament took a decision on the “flag of the Victory” that essentially allowed the use of the Soviet red flag as a symbol on Victory Day. It was the first sign of re-orientation from a pro-European integrationist memory politics promoted by Yushchenko to a “restorational” Yanukovych’s memory politics characterized by the return to Soviet symbols and a pro-Russian orientation.

Yanukovych appointed a new director of the Institute of National Memory, Valeriy Soldatenko, the historian of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-1921, born in Donets’k oblast’ and a member of the Communist Party of Ukraine. In the opinion of many commentators, the newly appointed director presented an overtly pro-Russian version of history. His views on the Famine of 1932-33, which he hesitated to term the “Holodomor,” and his “negative attitude” to Shukhevych and Bandera became the most discussed issues among the intellectuals, journalists and some politicians. 527

Such discussions demonstrated that the topics of the Holodomor and the OUN and UPA obviously served as a litmus test on his degree of patriotism for most of the critics. The status of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory was changed from the “central body of executive power” (tsentralnyi orhan vykonavchoi vldy) to the “scientific-research budget institution of the Cabinet of Ministries of Ukraine.” 528 Such a new bureaucratized status reflected the activities of the Institute far more effectively. 529 Some anti-UPA and pro-Soviet/Russian moves in memory politics were made by the Party of the Regions. In spring 2010, Vadym Kolisnichenko, a deputy of the Party of the Regions, in the name of “Russian-speaking Ukrainians” organized an exhibition in Kyiv devoted “to Polish and Jewish victims of UPA.” 530 At the same time in Zaporizhzia the local division of the Communist Party built a monument to Stalin which was later vandalized by Svoboda party supporters.

528 http://www.memory.gov.ua/.
529 Portnov. Istorii dlia domashnioho vzhytku, p. 131.
530 Ibidem, p. 137.
Yanukovych introduced some unpopular policies. One of his first decisions as president was signing the “Kharkiv treaty” with Russia on 21 April 2010. The treaty prolonged the agreement of the presence of the Russian navy in Crimea from 2017 to 2042. Many intellectuals and politicians saw this as national betrayal that threatened national sovereignty. Another much discussed and criticized step of Yanukovych was the enactment of the law on “Regional languages” which was seen by many intellectuals, writers, civil activists – both Ukrainian - and Russian-speaking531 – as ceding national interests to Russia. During Yanukovych’s presidency Ukraine became a country with political prisoners, when the former prime minister and the leader of the opposition Yulia Tymoshenko and one of the opposition leaders Yurii Lutsenko were imprisoned.

Corruption grew, most positions in the government both in Kyiv and within regional administrations were given to Party of the Regions’ members or supporters. Many people became frustrated with the situation. Especially in the west of the country people felt little allegiance to the authorities, even at a local level, where leading positions were taken by persons from the eastern regions, mostly from Donets’k, often referred to as the “Donets’k clan.” These attitudes are best illustrated by a piece of folklore characteristic of the period of Yanukovych’s presidency: “We survived the Soviets, we will survive the Donets’k [clan]” (“perezhyly sovetskykh, perezhyvemo donets’kykh”).532 A result of such crushing disappointment with the Party of the Regions was the election of the far-right Svoboda Party to Parliament in 2012. It was actually the first time in the history of independent Ukraine that the far-right party entered parliament. With 35 out of the 450 seats, their election was symptomatic of the shattered position of the Party of the Regions and the wide distrust of other political parties.

531 The project of the “Law on languages in Ukraine” №1015-3 was registered in the Parliament on September 7, 2010. It can be accessed on the website of Verkhovna Rada (http://gska2.rada.gov.ua/pls/zwet_n/webproc4_1?pf3511=38474). After the project was registered, the wide campaign “Zaimit’ sia dilom, a ne jazykom” (“Do business, not language!”) against the project was launched by diverse activists mainly in the west of the country. The campaign was supported by such renowned writers as Yurii Andrukhovych and Irena Karpa, or former dissidents such as Yevhen Sverestiuk and Ivan Drach. The draft law was somewhat changed and finally the law on languages was entitled the “Law on the principles of state language politics № 5029-VI” (known by the names of the deputies from Party of Regions who worked on the Law Kolisnichenko-Kivalov) was adopted by the parliament on 5 June 2012. The law allowed for official use of regional languages in the work of local administration structures or at schools where there are at least 10% of speakers of any “minority” language.

532 Mukhars’kyi, Antin. Maidan. Revolutsiia dukhu. Kyiv: Nash format, 2014. This piece of folklore refers to the old saying “We survived revolution, we’ll survive constitution” meaning the revolution of 1917 and the “Stalin’s” Constitution of the USSR adopted in 1938 which, although declared, in practice significantly limited the rights of Soviet Republics and civilian freedoms. The land ownership was allotted exclusively to kolkhozes .The Communist Party was declared “the core” of state and civilian organizations. This constitution was revised in 1977.
Euromaidan

Frustration with Yanukovych’s government culminated when Yanukovych declared that he would suspend signing the association agreement with the European Union. On 21 November 2013, the day when the then Prime Minister Mykola Azarov announced “The Resolution on suspension of the preparation process to conclude an Association Agreement with the EU,” hundreds of people came to the main Kyiv Square – Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) at short notice. They responded to a call from Mustafa Nayem, the “Ukrains’ka pravda” journalist, on his Facebook page:

Let’s meet under the monument on Maidan. Put on warm clothes, take umbrellas, tea, coffee, good mood and friends. Reposting is welcome!534

Hundreds of people came to mark their protest against the government that had refused to sign the EU-association treaty. Most people who came to Maidan were not political activists, and no political party led the protests. It was rather a spontaneous protest of social media users. In the few days that followed the protests gathered tens of thousands of people. People in other cities of Ukraine (such as in L’viv, Ternopil’, Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovs’k, etc.) gathered together at their own “Euromaidans” where they could, showing their support for people on the main Maidan of the country. It is important to add that pro-European position of Euromaidan also meant anti-Customs Union position. The Customs Union agreement with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan was perceived as a threat to national sovereignty and a return to the USSR.

The main strategy which was taken by the government towards the protestors on Maidan can be best described as totally ignoring them. In response to their protests the people were met by almost entire silence. On 26 November all Ukrainian TV channels broadcasted Yanukovych’s declaration that the Association Agreement with EU would not be profitable for Ukraine and Ukraine would not sign the agreement. On 29 November the Vilnius summit ended without Ukraine’s signature on the document.

Only a few dozen people continued the protests in Kyiv, as there was virtually no reason left to protest since the summit ended and there seemed

nothing could reverse the situation. The police called upon those protestors who still remained on Maidan to take down their tents in order to clear the space for the New Year’s tree. The people, mainly students, stayed on. On 30 November, early in the morning, the police violently dispersed the protestors who gathered on the way to Verkhovna Rada (the parliament of Ukraine). Some of the activists were arrested with use of force and imprisoned. Yanukovych and the State Prosecutor Viktor Pshonka denied that they ordered the dispersal or allowed the application of violence against the protestors. But the fact that none of the police were dismissed is a somewhat telling response to the violence from the authorities’ side.

The violent dispersal of students by the police marked the beginning of enormous protests in which the protestors substantially broadened their goals. Now the demands included punishment of those responsible for the violent actions, replacement of political elites associated with Yanukovych, and freedom for political prisoners, namely Yulia Tymoshenko. In the weeks that followed the number of protestors grew. In December 2013 the number of protestors was particularly high. According to the assessments, there were up to 500,000 people present during some Sunday gatherings known as Viche.\footnote{Ukrainian National News, Accessed 21-08-2014, http://www.unn.com.ua/en/news/1278607-u-batkivschini-narakhuvali-uzhe-500-tisyach-uchasnikiv-narodnogo-viche.} By that time, Maidan had become more politicized.\footnote{Marchenko, Alla and Sergiy Kurbatov. “Music of the Revolution: For Whom the Bell Tolls?” Baltic Worlds, 1:2014, pp. 45-48.} The political leadership was divided between three main oppositional leaders Arseniy Yatseniuk (“Bat’kivshchyna” Party), Vitaliy Klychko (UDAR – Ukrainskyi demokratychnyj alians za reformy) and Oleg Tyahnybok (“Svoboda” Party). These leaders, though, were not prepared for such massive protests. There was no political program of united opposition. The opposition leaders instead played the role of intermediaries between the protestors and the president. Their attempt on 3 December to collect enough votes in parliament for the resignation of government failed. They had quite a weak position both in the Parliament and on Maidan.

Parallel to the pro-European, dozens of tents of anti-European protestors appeared in mid-December not far from Maidan, close to the Parliament. They were far from numerous, but posed threats to the pro-European protestors as a potential source of provocations which would lead to even more violence from the police and the special security units, “Berkut.” This is not to say that there were no anti-Maidan attitudes in the population. Certainly, there were people who did not support Maidan. They gathered for instance in Kharkiv and Donets’k, but they were not nearly so concentrated and well organized. Furthermore, anti-Maidan attitudes did not equate to pro-Yanukovych support. People in the east and in the south of the country were also very disappointed by Yanukovych, but their disappointment could not
find expression in an alternative choice at the elections since no national-
democratic party addressed their specific regional identity, as is correctly
noted by Andriy Portnov.\footnote{See: Portnov:“Krieg und Frieden.” p.12}

In January 2014, after some relative calmness and almost a carnival
atmosphere in the protests shaped by celebrations surrounding Christmas and
New Year, the situation on Maidan radicalized.\footnote{This is not to say that the situation was completely calm, as in one of the most outrageous acts of violence, on the Catholic Christmas Eve, a Ukrainian journalist, Tetiana Chornovol, was severely beaten.} On 16 January the Verkhovna Rada adopted the series of laws restricting civil liberties.\footnote{The deputies, mainly members of the Party of the Regions, voted without adhering to a formal procedure and without any formal vote count. These laws began to be known as the “Laws on dictatorship” because according to many experts they were aimed at restricting the rights and liberties of citizens. See: Bespalyi, Borys. “Represyvnyi zakon 16 sichnia, ekspertnyi poglid.” Radio Liberty, 17 January 2014, http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/25233780.html (accessed 21.08.2014).} Attacks on, and persecution of, Euromaidan activists increased (the most extreme cases being the kidnapping and torture of Igor Lutsenko, the journalist, and Dmytro Bulatov, the organizer of Automaidan, a grassroots initiative that played a leading role in the organization and logistics of the protests). On 19 January, the day of the Epiphany, Molotov cocktails were first thrown on Maidan, probably initiated by the Right Sector, the group of civic activists and sympathizers of the political right, who broadly exploited the OUN symbols.

Snipers’ shots on 22 January\footnote{22 January is the Unity Day of Ukraine, the important date in memory culture, which was already discussed.} brought about the first deaths of protesters and started the most violent phase in the Euromaidan story. Outraged people started protests in different regions of Ukraine. Several regional state administrations were occupied by protesters, among them Rivne, whose administration peacefully surrendered. Facing such a situation, a special emergency session of parliament was called on 28 January to repeal recently adopted repressive laws. Prime Minister Azarov resigned.

But this appeasement on the part of the authorities was a mirage. On
18 February, another dispersal of Maidan with stun grenades was attempted. The anti-Maidan operation was framed as an “anti-terrorist operation.” The headquarters of Maidan (the Trade Unions’ Building) was set on fire and burned down. Together with the building, the main clock of Kyiv which was within the building was totally destroyed. It became a telling “symbol of the end of old times on the Maidan and in the country as a whole.”\footnote{Marchenko and Kurbatov. “Music of the Revolution.”} Dozens of people, mainly on the protesters’ side, were killed that night. Snipers’ shots on 20 and 21 February took the lives of dozens of people. According to Ministry of Health of Ukraine, as of 11 April 2014, from 30 November 2013
105 people were killed or died in the protests on Maidan (94 of them were killed on Instytuts’ka street, meaning the clashes on 20-21 February), 1112 people required medical help, 720 of them were hospitalized.\textsuperscript{545} The dead were honored as heroes and called “Heaven’s Squadron.”

On 22 February, the Parliament voted for the impeachment of the president. Yanukovych fled the country and escaped to Russia. Hardly any euphoria was felt on Maidan, though. The victory of the protestors was overshadowed by the hundred or so deaths. Moreover, in the weeks that followed Ukraine faced a new danger – the Russian invasion of Ukrainian territory and annexation of Crimea in March. At the time these pages are written an undeclared war is continuing in Luhans’k and Donets’k oblast’s with confirmed Russian participation (i.e. Russian soldiers and Russian military vehicles and weapons).\textsuperscript{546}

\textit{Myths Revived in Euromaidan}

Of course, such unprecedented events revived myths, symbols and rituals which helped convey new meanings and give sense to the rapidly changing reality. From the very beginning of the protests the starry flags of European Union, the blue-and-yellow flags of Ukraine, and red-and-black flags of the OUN often merged into one collage and became the main symbols of Euromaidan. Later, when the New Year’s tree was constructed, the slogans and demands of the protestors were put on the tree.\textsuperscript{547} This New Year’s tree became one of the main symbols of Euromaidan. While serving as a symbol, the tree also became a site for protests and negotiation. Thus, when the portrait of Yuliya Tymoshenko was put on the tree, it became widely discussed and objected to first and foremost by the Svoboda Party, but also by protestors who supported no political party in particular. As a counter measure to this portrait, Svoboda members and their sympathizers displayed the portrait of Stepan Bandera at the entrance of Kyiv City State Administration (KMDA), one of the headquarters of protestors. The portrait was later changed to the portrait to Shevchenko, though. Later a big portrait of Bandera was mounted near the main stage of Maidan. Notably, the portrait to Bandera was placed beside the portrait of Viacheslav Chornovil, a former dissident and a leader of the pro-democratic movement Rukh of the 1980-90s.


\textsuperscript{546} Usually the events in Luhans’k and Donets’k are referred to as “conflict” or “crisis” in main media which is a euphemism for the violence that has been unleashed there on a horrendous scale. The war is often called a “hybrid war” in expert analysis. As my study does not relate to the analysis of current state of affairs in Ukraine, I will limit myself to this short comment.

\textsuperscript{547} The tree itself was never completely finished though, as it was practically an iron carcass on which slogans and portraits were hanged and changed from time to time depending on the changes in the protestors’ agenda.
By and large, all main national symbols were placed there by the protestors, including the symbols of the OUN and UPA. As stated before, the OUN’s black and red flags were waved together with flags of the European Union and of Ukraine. The units of self-organized groups of protestors were called “sotni” (squadrons) referring both to Cossackdom and to the UPA as they too were organized in such small “squadrons.” The OUN and UPA greeting – “Slava Ukraini!” (“Glory to Ukraine!”) with an anticipated answer “Heroiam slava!” (“Glory to Heroes!”) – was heard from the speakers who held their speeches from the stage of Maidan and from the crowds of protestors. The UPA songs and marches were sung. Allegedly the most sung song, though, was the national anthem of Ukraine. On some occasions singing the anthem was organized as a mass event where about a million people gathered.\(^{548}\) In the same way, the most widely used and referred to symbols were Lesia Ukrainka, Ivan Franko, and Taras Shevchenko – the trinity of Ukrainian poets and writers who were barely questioned or discussed in contrast to Bandera (See Figure 8).

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\(^{548}\) People singing the anthem on Maidan in the New Year’s Eve. Espeso TV. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-1xe2qKjYC4.
made on Maidan following the night of 30 November, when violence was inflicted by “Berkut” against the protestors (also mainly young people, referred to as “students” in the news coverage). The Battle of Kruty obviously presented the protestors with a model of courage and self-sacrifice. Again, the mythical function of memory came to set examples and rescue meaningful worlds shattering apart.

Reordering of meaningful worlds that was happening on Maidan included taking revenge and trampling over old symbols. On the evening of 8 December the monument of Lenin was taken down. Some of the protesters connected to “Svoboda” Party took responsibility for the action and announced it as an act based on getting rid of the Soviet totalitarianism. Soon after Lenin in Kyiv was toppled, a series of taking down of Lenin monuments started throughout Ukraine. These acts can clearly be interpreted as acts of vandalism, on the one hand. On the other hand, though, taking into account the context of these acts I would in addition interpret them as spontaneous and a mass reclamation process which literally came to the streets.

As soon as the gathering started, Maidan began producing its own symbols. Being the site where history was made, it simultaneously became a site of memory producing its own mythologies and material trivia. Kiosks with souvenirs appeared almost immediately after protestors gathered on Maidan. Ukrainian flags, national symbols, and newly produced souvenirs dedicated to Euromaidan were sold there. Such trivialization and commercialization of memory went hand-in-hand with more reflective and cautious approaches to dealing with the present that momentously becomes history.

550 The reader is welcome to visit the Facebook page “Leninopad” (literally Lenin-fall), the collection of images of toppled monuments of Lenin and the anecdotes about them: https://www.facebook.com/groups/612017065534833/?fref=ts.
Thanks to modern communication technologies, *Maidan* became close to everyone. Thousands of pictures and statuses on Facebook and Twitter transmitted immediate emotions, moods, attitudes, evaluations, interpretations, views. Ukrainian and foreign intellectuals shared their opinions, reflections and made an *ad hoc* analysis of the situation that was changing with seemingly lightning speed. The first books on Euromaidan became available in bookshops long before the last barricade was removed from *Maidan*. This raises questions of how intellectual and academic work is linked to the commercialized uses of recent history and how they contribute to the trivialization of someone’s traumas and sufferings. On the other hand, without works of reflection and analysis hardly any coming to terms with traumatic experiences is possible.

Almost immediately after people gathered on Maidan, accusations from different sides were made that those who gathered there were neo-Nazis, or fascists. These accusations were based on the fact that one of the three leaders who represented the opposition on *Maidan* was Oleg Tiahnybok, the chairman of the “*Svoboda*” Party. The fact that protesters on *Euromaidan* used symbols of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists made it easy for some area experts to label the whole protest as “nationalist.” Leading scholars tried to explain the situation. Some scholars limited their explanations to stereotypes about the Ukrainian “nationalist” west and pro-Russian east. Some were more open to look at the complexities.

The elections for the Ukrainian presidency that took place on 25 May were won by Petro Poroshenko, the candidate who ran on a pro-EU platform. The far-right candidates (Oleg Tyahnybok and Dmytro Yarosh) received about 2% of votes between them. The results of the elections considerably undermined the statements of those commentators who failed to see more facets of the protests than nationalist symbols and the presence of Oleg Tyahnybok, the leader of far-right *Svoboda* party, on the Maidan’s stage. But these results should not be seen so optimistically, as the candidate who took 8.32% of votes (the third best result) was a radical populist Oleg Liashko which is a disturbing sign, especially if the highly destabilizing state of war in

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551 It is worth mentioning here one of the books published shortly after the people were killed in February is “*Heavenly Hundred*” a collection of poems and texts in memory of the dead (See: *Nebesna sotnia*. Kyiv: Folio, 2014). This book was heavily criticized in social media first and foremost by the relatives of the dead. Writing this, I am also aware that I myself take part in this writing which makes me reflect more on the role I play in such (recent) memory production.


Ukraine is considered. The problem being that it appears to make all kinds of radical politicians increasingly popular.

*Figure 10. Barricades on Maidan. The inscription reads: Banderstadt. Photo: Yuliya Yurchuk, July 2014.*

**Contextualizing the Use of the OUN and UPA in Euromaidan**

As it was stated above, the wide use of the OUN and UPA symbols provoked some to label *Euromaidan* as “nationalist” or even “fascist.” However, does the fact that some protesters on Euromaidan used symbols of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists mean that all those on Maidan were nationalists? Do not the symbols change their meanings depending on context in which they are used in? For example, the OUN and UPA greeting “Glory to Ukraine!” - “Glory to Heroes!” that was heard from the very beginning of the protests on *Maidan* was also repeated at the ceremonies of mourning on Maidan’s main stage from where the dead of “Heaven’s Squadron” took their last journey.

The greeting that in the beginning of the protests was rather a revolutionary symbol of courage and devotion to Ukraine and willingness to struggle for changes transformed into being a symbol of grief, pride, self-sacrifice, and gratitude of the living to the dead. It is worth mentioning here the fact that during *Euromaidan* part of the greeting “Glory to Heroes!” was questioned by many women participants of the protests who transformed it into “Glory to Heroines!” underlining the gender dimension of the protest.554

Thus we see that the OUN and UPA-related memory was referred to in multiple contexts, each of which transformed the meaning of the symbols and slogans used. When the war was unleashed in Donetsk and Luhansk, the greeting “Glory to Ukraine!” - “Glory to Heroes!” became increasingly connected to the memory of those who were killed in the war. At the same time, this greeting became used in its Russian translation when Russian-speakers mainly in the east of the country were expressing their pro-Ukrainian and anti-Russian attitudes. Due to the possibility of such re-figurations and reformulations depending on context, the use of old symbols should not be taken at face value, they should rather be considered in new contexts. Certainly the slogans and symbols originate back in the OUN and UPA. But does their use make these words and symbols mean the same as what they meant in the 1940s? Does the use of these words make the users become immediately affiliated to the organization that created them? The complexity revealed by the use of these symbols at Euromaidan does not give a satisfying answer.

It should be added that it is easy to refute the emancipating element of the protests as soon as it is typified as being nationalist. Such an oversimplification blurs the picture of a society which is much more complex than pro- or anti-nationalist, or pro-European vs. pro-Russian. Anti-communist politics of the national democrats in Ukraine in the early 1990s were also often misread as right-wing, although it went hand-in-hand with the ideas of European liberal values, liberalization of the market economy, and protection of human rights.

At the same time, scholars have to be very careful and not underestimate the role of the far-right parties, the rise of populist politics and their growing public support in circumstances of highly destabilized life.555 In this respect, speaking about many sides of nationalism, the American political scientist and specialist in nationalism, particularly on Eastern Europe, Rodger Brubaker speaks about the need to differentiate between nationalism as a category that works in an exclusivist way aiming to challenge the political order by claiming a polity of and for the distinguished ethno-cultural group from nationalism as a category that can work in an inclusive way aiming to

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555 The discussions of the Ukrainian protests in the international scholar and journalist community vividly show some drawbacks in the explanation and understanding of the problem. First and foremost, the problem is that the people of Ukraine are often seen and presented not as subjects of history but as objects of the will of the superpowers (personified with “the West” and Russia). While taking a constructivist approach to identity, some scholars fail to see that the approach they apply is equally applicable to the identities of the nations whose interests and whose identities they do not question and take for granted. Ukrainian identity is no less of a “construction” than, say, Russian, French, German or American. To see these entities, though, as homogenous and existentially given and stripped of internal conflicts and tensions is erroneous. The same approach which is given to Russia, Germany, or France, etc. should also be applied to Ukraine – people of all these countries should be treated as subjects of history not mere objects of any superpower.
create a sense of national unity in states whose populations are divided along regional, ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines.\textsuperscript{556} The nationalism in such an inclusive sense has a mobilizing and integrating potential. It can be called patriotism or national allegiance, the feeling reveals one’s attachment to the Ukrainian state, that in the view of Anne Applebaum may be the “country’s only hope of escaping apathy, rapacious corruption, and, eventually, dismemberment.”\textsuperscript{557}

\textit{Euromaidan} and the destabilized life that followed became a space for creating new meanings. In this space, the Second World War gained new dimensions. In response to the Russian media’s and to Russian officials’ accusations of Ukrainians being involved in “fascism,” Ukrainians “recalled” their contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany. The history of more than 3 million Ukrainians who fought within the Red Army and contributed to the victory over Nazi Germany found space in revived memory. A new symbol of victory, the red poppy, was introduced (Figure 11). According to Viatrovych, who was appointed as the new Director of the Institute of National Memory, new symbol of victory shows both the ethnic (Ukrainian) dimension of victory and at the same time they emphasize Ukrainian place in European memory culture.\textsuperscript{558} Thus, the main symbol of Victory Day in May 2014 was the poppy with the inscription “1939-1945 Never Again” which undoubtedly referred to the common European framework of remembrance of victims of the war.\textsuperscript{559}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure11.png}
\caption{Symbol used for Victory Day commemoration in 2014. “1939-1945 nikoly znovu” (never again).}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{556} Brubaker, Rogers. “In the name of the nation: reflections on nationalism and patriotism.” \textit{Citizenship Studies}, 8:2, 2004, pp. 115-127, p. 117.
\item \textsuperscript{559} It should be reminded that in the Soviet tradition the war is dated 1941-1945 as the Great Patriotic War starting with the Hitler’s aggression against the Soviet Union. The symbol of victory in the Soviet Union (and subsequently in post-Soviet Ukraine too) was a carnation flower. The wording known for each European “never again” (“nunca mas” or “nie wieder.” etc.) was not used in memory culture in Ukraine on any occasion before.
\end{itemize}
Concluding Remarks

Looking over more than twenty years of the contemporary history of Ukraine, I concentrated on the ways the past of the OUN and UPA was dealt in relation to state- and nation-building processes which serve as the framework for remembrance in question. Scrutinizing memory work in the dynamics between the region and the center demonstrated that memory work is not a top-down process, it is rather a continuous process of interaction and fluctuation between different levels - vertically and horizontally.

The research undertaken demonstrated that the past of the OUN and UPA was addressed by many actors with purposes changing depending on the context. At the end of the 1980s the topic of the OUN and UPA became a symbol of reclaimed history for national-democratic groups who opposed the Soviet authorities and searched for cultural liberation which included the possibility of writing the nation’s history. The memory of the OUN and UPA was framed in the context of the de-communization, de-Sovietization, and decolonization agenda. Consequently, the main themes that were articulated through and emphasized in the narratives of the OUN and UPA became the anti-Soviet and anti-communist struggle aimed at gaining national independence.

As a result of the short elapse of time from the past under question, the memory on its communicative level was preserved. Furthermore, a particular way of remembrance had been already established as a canon of cultural memory in émigré groups. Due to these two aspects the memory of the OUN and UPA in post-Soviet Ukraine was influenced by personal recollections of a generation of witnesses, on the one hand, and the émigré cultural memory canon, on the other. In the analyzed narratives, the OUN and UPA are evaluated positively because they are presented first and foremost as an integral part of the national liberation struggle and an indispensable link in the chain of events leading to independence.

Through the analysis of regional memory politics I came to the conclusion that it would be erroneous to say that all groups who addressed the history of the OUN and UPA shared authoritarian and nationalist ideals of the OUN. As demonstrated in the chapter, national-democratic parties like Rukh, that were formed in 1989-1999, turned to the memory of the OUN and UPA in line with the reclamation project aimed at de-Sovietization and decolonization of history and formation of national history.

Although the allegiances in the national-democratic camp changed throughout the years, one thing remained constant – they sought European

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560 For instance, the Ukrainian People’s Party (UPP) was founded on the basis of several groups that previously comprised the mass pro-democratic movement Rukh which was formally established in 1989. During the anti-Kuchma campaign in 2002, the UPP united with many other national-democratic parties into one bloc “Our Ukraine” which received 24% of votes in the parliamentary election the same year. At the next parliamentary elections in 2006, the UPP
integration, stood for democratic values and promoted the memory of the OUN and UPA in heroic terms. In this way, paradoxically, the ideals of European integration and democratization came close to the heroic memory of anti-democratic organizations such as the OUN and UPA. The paradox becomes narrower if one thinks about the fact that in case of the pro-democratic memory actors, the memory of the OUN and UPA functions as a myth. In this sense, the OUN and UPA became a cultural symbol signifying a present rather than a past. This myth is largely stripped of past historical essence but filled with present desires – the desire for democracy and Europe undertaken in a belief that the OUN was democratic (based on the argument that after the Third Congress of the OUN the organization turned to democracy).

By contrast, for the far-right nationalist parties like the UNA-UNSO and “Svoboda,” the OUN became an ideological symbol. They do not refute its undemocratic and totalitarian character. They grounded their political programs on the OUN’s doctrine. They appropriated the OUN’s guidelines for nationalists for their own guidelines of conduct. In this way, the OUN and UPA memory remains closer to historical facts. Although there are definite differences in motivations of why competing parties addressed the same historical themes, there is a common denominator that made such an interest in memory desirable by so many – the idea of “national liberation” and the process of de-Sovietization/de-communization. For all these memory actors, communism was seen as the main enemy threatening national independence.

Furthermore, constant insecurity at the end of the “struggle for independence,” i.e. fear that the independence would be lost again, first and foremost because of Russia (feared as a return to the USSR), strengthened adherence to the heroic OUN and UPA memory on both the political right and the political center. This is best seen in times of turmoil where the memory of the OUN and UPA becomes a symbol of protection against threats of national sovereignty. This was so in 2004 at the time of the Orange Revolution, and it was so in 2014 at the time of Euromaidan. Thus, despite its contested and conflicted legacies, the heroic memory of the OUN and UPA presents a way to existential security for many groups. In this way, memory serves the present needs and is influenced by present affects, existential anxieties, values, and desires. Memory provides examples and gives hopes for the possible future.

Functioning as a myth, this memory is full of many “factual” drawbacks as it neglects, ignores, and oversees many historical evidences that became known thanks to professional scholarship. In search of the perfect past, though, memory actors did not address this knowledge and even fought

formed the right-wing union the “Ukrainian People’s Bloc of Kostenko and Plushch” which practically failed to get into parliament with 1.89% of the votes. But they held quite a strong position in municipal power structures mainly in Western Ukraine, including in Rivne and Rivne oblast’.

against the production of such knowledge. As a result, the knowledge about the difficult aspects of the past does not come within the realm of cultural memory.

In the following chapters we will see how the memory is actually mythologized and why it finds resonance in public.
Chapter IV. Making the Past Perfect

This chapter consists of three case-studies that trace the process of the building of three memorial objects: the memorial complex “Pantheon of Heroes” in the village of Hurby near Rivne, the monuments to the UPA commander Klym Savur and to Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’, a war time partisan who is seen as the founder of the UPA. These cases were selected for several reasons. First, they all received most of the attention in the city council and in the coverage of the local press. Second, two of them occupy a central location in the city which is unusual for monuments to the OUN and UPA, as most of such monuments at that time were mainly built in the villages and small towns. Third, the “Pantheon of Heroes” is a unique project of its kind as it elevates the memory of the OUN and UPA from one small remote locality to the national level and extends this site of memory to several functional purposes: educational, entertainment, and liturgical (e.g. serving as a site for public worship).

Figure 12. Monuments analyzed in the case-studies. Picture: Dariia Anfalova

Monuments to the OUN and UPA appeared in other cities later than in Rivne, where a monument to Klym Savur was inaugurated in 2002. The monument to Stepan Bandera was built in L’viv in 2007, in Ivano-Frankivs’k - in 2009, and in Ternopil’ - in 2008.
The three cases analyzed below are a snap-shot of memory work that shows a complex entanglement of actors involved in the process of monument building. These cases vividly demonstrate which statements are made so that certain representations of history take over. Insight into the discussions behind the monuments shed light on the process which otherwise would remain invisible to the broader public but which shapes the way the past is remembered. In this respect, the city council appears as a stage where the conflicting interpretations are still voiced and they are heard, while in the final result of the contest we encounter the polished, completed version purified from counter-voices. In what follows I propose to trace these series of voices and see which voices took over and why.

Source material for this analysis was comprised of published articles in the local press, political statements published in the press and on the Internet, participant observation of commemorations, minutes of meetings in city and regional councils, interviews with key memory entrepreneurs, and interviews with local people.

The Battle of Hurby Commemoration - Pantheon of the Heroes under Construction

Landscape, in any case, is little touched by human concerns for memory: give or take a few centuries, and the battlefields will be ordinary meadows; the memorials insisting on the reality of the deaths that took place will become illegible and crumble away. In the meantime, though, the urge to put bookmarks all over the physical world attempts to recreate everywhere the palimpsest city, to ensure that nothing is lost — or conversely that only certain things are not; there are desirable amnesias here. Arguments over the preservation or abandonment of particular sites, of course, are embroiled in political and economic interests, as well as abstract and emotional ones.

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In what follows we will look at the attempts to recreate the reality of deaths that long ago became themselves “illegible and crumbled away.” We will face the palimpsest battlefield – with layers of memory dug up and exhibited for remembrance. In case of the Battle of Hurby memory site, Walter Benjamin’s metaphor of memory as both the process of digging and the theater where the past is set out and portrayed best demonstrates the character of memory work. In this place the past is literally dug, exposed, and performed, losing its historical features and acquiring mythological ones. This sheds light on the many aspects of remembrance – agendas of memory actors underpinned with

564 Here I refer to Walter Benjamin’s idea that “memory is not an instrument for exploring the past but its theater. He who seeks to approach his own buried past must conduct himself like a man digging.” Benjamin, Walter. “Berlin Chronicle.” In Walter Benjamin. One way street and Other Writings. London: Verso, 1979, p. 314.
political, economic, and emotional interests of all the parties involved as well as the persistence of the past *per se* that leaves traces which condition remembrance. It also involves desirable and undesirable amnesias inseparable from remembering. What can all these aspects tell us about the memory of the UPA in general? But, first of all, why is this place so important that it is turned into a site of memory?

On 20-24 April 1944 the largest battle between the UPA and NKVD took place in Hurby, a village some 30 km away from Rivne on the border with Ternopil oblast’. Five thousand soldiers of the UPA-North unit “Bohun” under the command of Petro Oliinyk “Enei” and the UPA-South under the command of Vasyl’ Kuk “Lemish” opposed thirty thousand soldiers of the NKVD under the command of Major General Mykhailo Marchenkov. As a result of the battle, the village was devastated and erased to the ground, so there is no longer a trace of the village there. The memory of the village is still alive, though. It lives primarily through the memory of the battle. The village gave its name to the battle and now the battle gives its name to this place.

Almost immediately after the battle, the local population from the neighboring villages began to erect crosses in the forest in order to mark the ground where thousands of people were killed. The police, though, continually demolished the crosses and prohibited search and excavation work. On 9 May 1965, following the Soviet trend of Victory glorification initiated by Brezhnev, the monument to the Red Army soldiers was solemnly consecrated in the forest. This monument depicts a soldier in bronze, hoisted on a rather high pedestal painted in blue with Soviet symbols on it. The subversive commemorations of the locals seemed to abate with time, but as soon as *perestroika* occurred with the policies of *glasnost*, it enabled local initiatives to resurface with renewed vigor fuelled by support and encouragement from diaspora and regional memory actors.

Dead Bodies from the Past

The genuine impossibility of carrying out excavation and finding the bodies of the dead meant an impossibility of proper remembrance. This became decisive in shaping the remembrance of Hurby at present. In such a way, an anti-Soviet narrative dominates whereby the Soviets are not only the villains who inflicted suffering and caused the death of UPA soldiers but also who prohibited remembrance of them and their appropriate burial. Thus, the commemorative practices at present redress the prohibition on memory and correct the wrongdoings of the past. As a result of the fact that traditional Christian ceremonies connected to death merge with remembrance of the UPA

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soldiers who fell at Hurby, memory of the Hurby battle is mainly influenced by religion.

Figure 13. Memorial Complex Hurby. Collage: Dariia Anfalova.

From the very beginning of the 1990s the commemorative practices in Hurby had an overtly religious underpinning. A tall wooden cross marked the death of people who were killed here and were never properly buried (Figure 12). Later on, a symbolic grave to unknown UPA soldiers was arranged. The grave consists of two tombstones and two crosses – one made of iron (which was erected first to mark the place of death) and one made of granite (being a part of the granite composition built in 2007-10). The plate on the iron cross has the tryzub (trident, Ukraine’s national symbol and coat of arms) an inscription “They Lost Their Lives for Ukraine’s Freedom. Glory to Heroes!” The granite stone to the left also depicts the tryzub and a woman sitting down whose appearance suggests that she is deeply in grief. The inscription near the woman reads: “To the fighters for freedom and the independence of Ukraine.” The stone to the right shows a kneeling male soldier holding a rifle in one hand and stretching out the other hand. The inscription reads:

People!
Stop, and in your thoughts
Honor the memory
Of five thousand insurgents
Who under commander “Yasen”
On 23-25 April 1944 took up the fight
With Moscow’s crudest horde of NKVD
In total 30 thousand men.
In the battle the warriors of (following) units took part:
“Storchyn,” “Mamay,” “Diuk,” “Dovbenko,”
In this corner of land in eternal rest sleep the patriots of Ukraine.
Among them most of the warriors are from the Northern Unit of Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
Eternal memory!
Glory to Ukraine!

Figure 14. Monument to the soldiers who were killed at the Battle of Hurby. Picture: Yuliya Yurchuk

An annual celebration on the third day of Easter was established. The symbolism of Easter as the high point of spiritual life reached in the resurrection of Christ is connected to the idea of the symbolic resurrection of the nation. The idea of people’s sacrifice for the sake of the nation reaches its high point during these ceremonies. Another day when people gather here annually is the Day of the UPA, the 14 October, which is also the religious feast day of Pokrova (God’s Mother Protectress), which again charges the commemorations at Hurby with special religious atmosphere. Thus, the memory of the UPA in Hurby is based on religious rituals and the religious calendar. In such a way, nationalism underpinned with religious symbolism is almost literally celebrated as religion here.

Peter Burke wrote that commemorative ceremonies are “an agreed interpretation of the past linked to shared views of the present.” The link to religion in those rituals makes the interpretation more “agreed.” Visiting an occasion of commemoration in Hurby is to experience it as if being simultaneously present at various different kinds of events – a celebratory liturgy, a political demonstration, and a ceremony of mourning. The role of the church in these commemorations is undeniable. The affect that the religious services have on visitors is hard to ignore. Through these commemorations, nationalism is articulated by means of religious rituals.

On the relationship between commemoration and ideology, Ben Gook advances his theory of commemoration understood as an “interpassive ritual.”567 He argues that “commemoration is a moment of intensified public memory in which ideology and the unconscious are deeply embedded.”568 Gook explored the potential of subjects to escape the hegemonic influence of ideology through interpassive rituals – the rituals that take place in commemorations merely by our presence among the co-rememberers. That means that even if we came “just” to watch, we are taking part in an “interpassive” ritual of co-remembering, because in reality it is the presence of each subject that makes the commemoration and remembering possible.

Although there is no way to escape the ritual in this conceptualization, there is still a chance to escape an influence of the ideology that these rituals transmit. Thus, Gook argues specifically in interpassive commemoration for a potential for subjects to escape the influence of ideology because in interpassive commemoration, “subjects maintain a capacity to give or withhold assent,”569 their subjectivity precedes and can resist the ideological identities subjects are presented to. In this regard, it can be imagined to what extent people who come to the ceremonies in Hurby are influenced by the ideology of nationalism transmitted through religious rituals.

I would argue that commemorative practices in Hurby coupled to pronounced religious undercurrents form a strong bond between ideology and unconsciousness so that it becomes practically impossible to resist subjugation. Furthermore, in the situation where power over the memory site belongs almost entirely to nationalist parties and the church, this means that no other forms of commemoration take place in practice, and the space for subversivity shrinks significantly. In this respect, I would argue that the memory site constructed within the religious paradigm has a strong stabilizing function where the community of memory is formed. As Casey suggested, “Whenever commemorating occurs, a community arises. Not only is something communal being honored, but the honoring itself is a communal event, a collective engagement.”570

When people meet at this place over and over again and repeat the same set of activities (prayers, putting wreaths on graves, and singing) the memory of the battle becomes a collective performance of collective emotions of grief, gratitude, and pride, etc., first and foremost connected to the death of the soldiers who were shut out from the mourning and remembering for several decades. Reinhart Koselleck while commenting on war memorials noted that “the only identity that endures clandestinely in all war memorials is the identity of the dead with themselves. All political and social

569 Ibidem, p. 16.
identification that tries to visually capture and permanently fix the ‘dying for…’ vanish in the course of time.”

In case of the monument analyzed, though, we can instead say that the only identity that endures in the monument is “dying for…” statement as formulated by memory entrepreneurs. What do we know about those people commemorated in stone if we look at the monument? Do we know where they were born, where they lived, what they did?

All these personal characteristics which would reveal their identity are not known to us, the only thing that remains is the fact of their death and the reason of death as given by others is the struggle for liberation. The sacralization of the past serves as the strategic silence that results from the political pressure of the present. As Tsvetan Todorov pointed out: “When commemoration freezes into permanent forms that cannot be changed without cries of sacrilege, we can be certain that it serves the particular interests of its defenders and not their moral edification.” These are the particular interests of memory actors that are revealed when we examine in depth the process of monument construction.

Insurgent Graves

In October 2002, excavation works started and the reburials of soldiers began. The place was planned to become “A Pantheon of Heroes” with all the dead bodies found buried under a high column topped with a statue to the Virgin Mary. Excavation works were mainly realized by the Community for Searching for Victims of the War “Memory” (Tovarystvo poshuku zhertv vijny “Pamiat’”) linked to the Youth Nationalist Congress. When Victor Yushchenko came to power in 2005, he offered his broad support to the Hurby commemoration project. The excavation works speeded up. By 2011, the remains of 30 soldiers had been excavated.

In May 2007, the first reburial in the “Pantheon of Heroes” was made. The celebration in 2007 was marked by its grandiosity. The presence at the celebrations of President Yushchenko and other high-ranking politicians

transformed the event from a local and regional one to a national one. The organizers emphasized that this memorial complex should “teach young generations lessons in patriotism and the history of Ukraine.”

Indeed, young generations became one of the main visitors to the place. As the site is in quite a remote spot far from any oblast’ or rayon center, it cannot be visited spontaneously or by chance like any monument in a densely populated city, the trip to Hurby needs to be well organized and planned. That is why school children are some of the most frequent visitors as schools usually organize such trips within the framework of their history lessons.

![Figure 15. Left: visitors near the monument to the UPA soldiers. Right: schoolchildren leaving the monument. Hurby 2011. Photo: Yuliya Yurchuk.](image)

In tandem with the construction of the memorial complex “For Heroes of Battle of Hurby,” other construction work takes place in Hurby – the building of Sviato-Voskresens’kyi Monastery (Monastery of Holy Insurrection). Symbolically, the commemoration of the UPA here takes place with two main celebrations – the resurrection of Christ and the resurrection of the nation.

The presence of shrines, the celebration connected to the main Christian feast days, and the building of a monastery with one church already open for visiting, endows Hurby with a special religious aura. Indeed, visitors come here not only to the site of memory but also to the sacred site, making a religious pilgrimage. If one considers the remote location and almost complete absence of public transport to this site, it is clearly not an easy kind of pilgrimage. Being near the large monastery building surrounded by the chapel and crosses of the memorial complex, it is unclear whether the memorial complex at Hurby is a part of monastery or whether the monastery is a part of the memorial complex? The boundaries between both are so blurred that no clear-cut answer is possible.

When Viktor Yanukovych ascended to the president’s office in 2010, the memory of the OUN and UPA was reactivated with a new vigor in the

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region with a strong anti-Yanukovych bias. The oblast’ council of Rivne was dominated by “Our Ukraine” deputies (the opposition, pro-Yushchenko party, at that moment). In partisan struggles, “Our Ukraine” presented the memory of the OUN and UPA in the form of a glorious narrative directly connected to the security of national interests. Consequently the anti-OUN and UPA politics of the Party of the Regions (and the party itself) were presented as a threat to national interests. In this respect, the peoples’ deputy of “Our Ukraine” Volodymyr Kinakh stated at one of the oblast’ council meetings where the Hurby project was discussed:

Today Hurby is a holy place for every Ukrainian. We are addressing a wider public, political organization of the oblast’ with the chance to show a good example of Christian morals and... to visit Sviato-Voskresens’k Monastery on the “Insurgents’ Graves” (Povstans’ki Mohyly), the pantheon of heroes of the Battle of Hurby, to pray and honor the holy memory of the UPA warriors, who gave their lives for future Ukrainian state. Eternal glory to the heroes who were killed in the struggle for freedom of Ukraine! Glory to Ukraine! (emphasis added)

In this way, the memory of the UPA is sacralized, the fight for independence turns the UPA soldiers into martyrs, or even almost into saints, and the duty of remembering is constructed as a moral duty of each Christian. Interestingly, in the OUN ideology the nation was associated with Christ and the OUN leaders with his disciplines.

In my view, such sacralization of the memory of the UPA strengthens its mythical character, whereby the UPA loses its temporality and historicity and becomes rather ahistorical – belonging simultaneously to different epochs, or indeed to any epoch in particular, or in short, to eternity. Moreover, the whole idea of the Pantheon is presented by the deputy as “Insurrectionary Graves” (Povstans’ki Mohyly) linking this project to the famous site of memory “Cossack Graves” (Kozats’ki Mohyly) that was mentioned in the previous chapter. In this way, the memory of the UPA is premediated by the well-known site of memory entitled “Cossacks’ Graves.” In this way, both

577 In the presidential election in 2010, the majority of voters in Rivne oblast’ voted for Tymoshenko (76.24%), Yanukovych received 18.91% of the votes there. Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine. In parliamentary elections in 2012 Tymoshenko’s party “Bat’kivshchyna” received 36.59% of votes in Rivne oblast’, whereas the Party of the Regions received 15.80%, and Svoboda 16.63%. Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2012/wp005?PT001F01=900 (accessed 25.08.2014).
578 Kinakh, V.A. Minutes of meeting of off-term thirty third session of the Oblast’ council, 17 March 2010.
579 Christian motives colored the ideology of the OUN from the moment of its foundation. The trinity of Idea-Will-Action was perceived as the main components for nationalist conduct. See: Rudling. The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust.
580 Rudling. The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust.
sites, divided by four centuries of history, are linked together into one node of memory whereby memories of the Cossacks and the insurgency mutually reinforce each other while sharing one mission – telling the eternal story of “liberation” that glorifies all “freedom-fighters.” Being well-established for decades, the memory of Cossackdom serves as a reliable and functional vehicle for the incorporation of insurgency’s memory into the memory culture. Remediation of the memory of the UPA through the memory of Cossackdom makes the memory of the UPA recognizable exactly as the memory of liberation. Furthermore, the sacralization of memory of the UPA makes the process of its incorporation into memory culture easier while it gives memory recognizable and trustworthy forms.

In reply to the abovementioned statement, the people’s deputy of the Party of the Regions opposed the glorification of the Hurby battle as the UPA was fighting there “not only with internal forces of the NKVD but also with the regular Red Army.” This statement was countered by the people’s deputy of the UPP arguing:

There is no difference which of the repressive forces came from Russia. [...] whether it was internal forces of Russia or armed formations of Russia. There is no difference. These were the occupants who came to eradicate us… For a development of this theme [building the Hurby memorial complex] I would ask the President of our state to come and see, to come and feel, that this is the nation, that this is the Ukrainian nation, that it has its own wonderful history, history of the fight for this state, where he is the President (emphasis added).

The President who is addressed was Viktor Yanukovych who, as can be seen, is presented as unfamiliar with the nation he is the president of. Yanukovych’s pro-Russian orientation is perceived as a threat to Ukrainian national interest and even to Ukrainian existence. The deputy’s resentments about Yanukovych’s presidency are connected with the portrayal of Russia as an enemy and a threat. In these terms, both the NKVD and the Red Army are presented exclusively in ethnic terms (Russians).

Thus, we can see that the memory of the OUN and UPA was again addressed when searching for ontological security at the moment when threats to the national existence were feared most. The same tendency was already established when the anti-Kuchma campaign, the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan were discussed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, the speaker based his argumentation on the idea of reclaimed history, on the belief that the

582 Oleksiyuk, S.S. Minutes of meeting of off-term thirty third session of the oblast’ council, 17 March 2010.
nation’s “own wonderful history, history of fight for this state” is the true history that can protect the nation from threats.

Pray, Learn, Play, Pray Again: Memory Actors and Memory Activities

Apart from the political parties that gained ownership over the memory of the Battle of Hurby, there is one more very important actor. This actor is the church, and more precisely the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate. In this regard, Rivne and the Ostroh Metropolitan bishop of UOC (KP) Yevseviy was present at some ceremonies in Hurby. At one of the first hearings at the Rivne oblast’ council about the building of the Hurby memorial complex, he delivered a speech in defense of the Hurby complex building project and especially of the building of the monastery which he considered to constitute an integral part of the memorial complex.

It should be mentioned that there was strong opposition against the building of the monastery, and it was connected not so much to the Hurby memorial complex but to the monastery in the first place, as it involved not only nationalist and anti-nationalist forces, but also the opposition between churches – the Orthodox Churches of Moscow and Kyiv Patriarchates. The Metropolitan Yevseviy hoped that allied with Rukh and the UPP, Kyiv Patriarchate could win in this clerical dispute. Perhaps, the presence of the Metropolitan at the meeting, as well as timing of the meeting that coincided with Easter celebration, strengthened the position of the supporters of the project in the council.

From the political parties’ point of view, the fight for monumentalization was embodied in person by the member of UPP, Vasyl’ Chervoniy. In his case, the fight for “truthful” history became almost a personal brand of the politician. Starting at the end of the 1990s up until his death in 2009, his name was the most frequent in all the discussions in the press and he was the main speaker for monuments in the city and oblast’ councils, as we have already seen in previous chapters. In the discussions of the memorial complex in the oblast’ council, Chervoniy referred to the UPA soldiers as “the Cossacks of the 20th century” and to the battle of Hurby as the “holy shrine that UPP succeeded to raise.”

In the narratives articulated by the parties, the UPA are linked not only to the glorious past and holiness, but also produce dichotomies between “us”

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583 Oleksiyuk, S.S. Minutes of meeting of off-term thirty third session of the oblast’ council, 17 March 2010.
584 Metropolitan Yevseviy. Minutes of meeting of the thirty third session of the oblast’ council, 17 March 2010.
and “them,” while upholding the fight for the independence to the sphere of holiness. Time and again such an exclusive picture of the past is exploited at the time of the deep political crisis in the country, when Yushchenko’s camp (to whom Chervoniy also belonged) lost its position with Yanukovych being appointed as Prime Minister in 2006 and his Party of the Region gained a majority after the parliamentary elections in 2007.

Development of the Hurby complex - which is located on the border between Rivne and Ternopil’ oblast’s - was positioned as a historical place of regional encounter which would serve to consolidate the national identity:

It [the Hurby complex] will push the development of economic and cultural ties between [the oblast’s], it will promote social and economic growth in the region. Through building the complex we will improve our knowledge of the history of the country and create new tourist routes, allow for Ukrainian patriotic youth to camp in Hurby.586

Such consolidation is presented as possible through the dissemination of knowledge and educating the patriotic youth. It should be recalled that by 2007 when the discussion took place in the oblast’ council, the “camping of Ukrainian patriotic youth in Hurby” was entirely owned by the Ukrainian Nationalist Youth Congress (UNYC). In 2003 the UNYC institutionalized camping by founding a special organization “Hurby-Antonivts’” that deals solely with scouting, camping, “terrain games,” where youth is educated in patriotism. “Hurby-Antonivsti” organizes ones a year a spring “vyshkil” – a special schooling in military tradition. The youth comes from all over Ukraine. Furthermore, it became a common practice, as mentioned above, to make school visits to Hurby as a part of studying curriculum. In this way, Hurby became a memory site with a strong educational mission.

**Parties’ Stakes in Memory Games**

The UPP, Rukh and “Prosvita” in Rivne oblast’ have been main memory entrepreneurs in Rivne since 1990s. They have always positioned themselves as anti-communist forces with the agenda of reviving everything Ukrainian. Reclamation of history for them served as one of the main reasons for such a revival. Chervoniy, as a mouthpiece of these organizations, vigorously supported Yushchenko during the Orange Revolution and indeed was the head of his election headquarters in the oblast’. However, after his dismissal from the chair of the Oblast’ State Administration in 2006, Chervoniy stood in opposition to the “orange” Chairman of Rivne Oblast’ State Administration, Viktor Matchuk (party “Our Ukraine”).

Indeed, Chervoniy started accusing “orange partisans” of “anti-Ukrainian” politics regarding the commemoration of Hurby, among other

After Chervoniy’s death in 2009 and the transfer of power in 2010, Matchuk became the main sponsor and supporter of the Hurby project. Although Matchuk, lost his position in the Oblast’ Administration (as he was from the “Our Ukraine” party), he remained a people’s deputy in Verkhovna Rada, which gave him enough power to influence memory politics in the oblast'.

In 2011, Matchuk sponsored the building of a new object in the memorial complex - the bunker. Matchuk’s assistant, Sergiy Kondrachuk, who was personally responsible for the building of the bunker, said that he was given full support to complete his main task - to finish the construction by 14 October 2011- the Day of the UPA.588

As such, the UPA memory was again privatized as a symbol of opposition. It gave a symbolic capital which allowed the opposition of the party or even an individual from the governing authority. Under pressure from “Our Ukraine” and the UPP deputies within the Oblast Administration, the authorities allocated 200,000 Hryvnias (about EUR 20,000) for construction works in Hurby.589

After 2010, with the end of Yushchenko’s presidency, the Hurby project lost its national significance. The Chair of the Zdolbuniv region (rayon) council (to which jurisdiction the complex formally belongs) Vasyl’ Tymoshchuk commented on this situation: “none of the parties are interested in Hurby now, everything depends on initiatives from individuals.”590 Matchuk’s financing of the construction of the bunker is presented exactly as such an individual initiative, whereas he is acting not in the interest of the party but as a charity that finances the project.591

Nonetheless, the work is being done, the new objects are being built, the search for the remains of the dead is planned to be continued and every year people come there to commemorate the battle, while others come there to act out a battle re-enactment. Some perhaps come to both commemorations and re-enactments. As soon as the monastery and the church are finished, people will also most probably come here to attend regular church services. Of course, schoolchildren continue to come here to “meet” history and to learn from it. In such a way, “forced memorization”592 continues to be imposed through state institutions like schools.

588 Kondrachuk, Serhii. Interview, Hurby, 14 October 2011.
589 Kondrachuk, Serhii. Interview.
590 Tymoshchuk, Vasyl’. Interview, Hurby, 14 October 2011.
591 Kondrachuk, Serhii. Interview; Tymoshchuk, Vasyl’. Interview.
When the bunker was solemnly opened on 14 October 2011 on the Day of the UPA (and Day of Pokrova), the guests were not so numerous – a couple of members of political parties, a priest (who was the head of the monastery), representatives of rayon administration who coordinated construction of the bunker, several members of the regional UPA veterans organization, and a group of pupils with a teacher.

The bunker itself is a well-constructed underground house with a corridor and two rooms. One room is furnished as a sleeping room with several two-level bunks, another - as a command center with a small writing-desk, a
larger dinner-table, several shelves, and a bank. On the shelves and on the writing desk there were sheets of paper with “Decalogue of the Ukrainian Nationalists” on them (See Annex 1).

Kondrachuk, the aforementioned coordinator of the construction, mentioned that the construction was made strictly in accordance with the description outlined in the volume of “Litopys UPA” (Chronicle of UPA). He was fully aware that the bunker presented at Hurby was a “luxury category of a bunker” or a “commander’s bunker” but they tried to make it attractive to visitors.

**Figure 18.** UPA veterans of the Rivne UPA Veteran Union in the bunker, Hurby, 14 October 2011.

**Figure 19.** A part of the interior with photos of UPA soldiers, a volume of “Litopys of UPA,” and reprints of “Ten Commandments of Ukrainian nationalist (Decalogue)” are displayed among other items. Hurby, 14 October 2011. Photo: Yuliya Yurchuk

UPA veterans who were present at the opening said that they were happy to see the bunker as it is, nice and tidy. When asked whether it resembles the object they saw in the past, they all agreed with the coordinator that it was a luxurious bunker of a kind they had not seen in reality. Thus, what is presented to visitors is not quite the reality of the past, but rather a simulation that makes the history more pleasant, tidy, and simple. The past “dug up as it

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593 Conversation with UPA veterans, 14 October 2014, Hurby. As I stated in the introduction, I did not have the chance to conduct a long interview with the veterans, but I did manage to speak with them for about a half an hour.

594 Conversation with UPA veterans, 14 October 2014, Hurby.
was” appears unsuitable for remembrance. It is, though, not the authenticity of the place that matters but the authenticity of the atmosphere.

Indeed, the veterans confirmed that although bunkers were not like this, this bunker is still “truthful.”\textsuperscript{595} In this sense, it is important to underline that in such a place as the bunker, the processes of theatricalization and spectacularization create a sense of communality and serve as a powerful mnemonic vehicle\textsuperscript{596} because “they leave no room for critical negotiations, they offer a parade of icons that progressively accumulate as a narrative embodiment of the… consensual ideology shared by the audience.”\textsuperscript{597} With this in mind, the bunker as a site of memory driven by theatricalization and spectacularization; the purpose is not to have it recognized by the UPA veterans, or by a community of first-hand witnesses, – it is aimed at the creation of a community of memory, in other words of cultural memory.

Thus, we go back to the question we asked before: what truth does this sacred site of memory conveys? As one can see, there is little similarity between the bunkers presented with the bunkers which the witnesses saw. Nevertheless, for the visitors and for the witnesses as well, this site is considered as being truthful; truthful in its atmosphere, the concentration of emotions, feelings, ideals, and hopes.

As a brief conclusion on this case, the example of the Hurby memorial complex shows how localized memories can be portrayed as national if there is an interest and/or a need from the side of memory actors in doing so. Most probably such an interest and need appears at times of political conflicts and social turmoil. While in the 1990s, the memory of Hurby was formed under the influence of ideas of the reclamation of history inviting grassroots individual memories, since 2001, with the anti-Kuchma campaign unleashed, the memory of Hurby became “privatized” by national-democratic and nationalist parties who formed an anti-Kuchma opposition.

The commemoration of the Battle of Hurby in 2007 was the first and the last time when high-rank officials including the president visited Hurby, but several parties invested political capital in this place – the church, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, and several right of center national-democratic parties (the UPP/“Our Ukraine”). This case vividly shows that one site of memory can have several “owners,” each having its own audiences, or “consumers of memory.” It is visited by believers for church services which are held here each Easter and each 14 October even without the monastery finished. It is attended by schoolchildren for history lessons, and it is used by nationalist youth for re-enactments of battles. It is precisely in this latter

\textsuperscript{595} Conversation with UPA veterans, 14 October 2014, Hurby.
function that the site can be seen as having national significance as it attracts youth from all over Ukraine. This certainly contributes to establishing the memory of the UPA as a part of the cultural memory of the region, if not of the nation.

Klym Savur –Memorialization Ruled by Amnesia

The monument to Klym Savur is an exemplary case that demonstrates how the site of memory can be based on amnesia rather than on recollection. Through the process of mythologization almost all historical facts of the person vanished, the only thing that remained in his commemoration is the collection of archetypes that convey the values and interest of memory actors involved in monument building. Astonishingly, such a mythologization enabled the memory actors to frame their memory politics through claims for historical justice while forgetting about the injustices sanctioned by the historical figure that became memorialized.

Dmytro Kliachkivs’kyi, better known by his alias “Klym Savur,” was born in 1911 in the town of Zbarazh, Eastern Galicia (now Ternopil’ oblast’). The Polish historian Grzegorz Motyka characterized him as a typical representative of the banderivets’ generation. In the period of the Second Polish Republic he was involved in the nationalist underground. Under the Soviet occupation (1939-1941) he was a leader of the nationalist youth organization in Stanislawów Voivodeship (Stanislawów województwo). In 1941 he was arrested by the Soviets and sentenced to death. Later the sentence was commuted to 10 years’ imprisonment. In July 1941, he escaped. The same year he was promoted to the leadership of the OUN-B. In 1943 he became a leader of the UPA in Volhynia. On 12 February 1945, he was killed while fighting the NKVD.

Polish historian Grzegorz Motyka pointed out that Klym Savur was the person who was responsible for matters concerning the faith of Poles in Volhynia. In this region Klym Savur was the person who in fact gave all the commands to the UPA and these commands bore little resemblance to the declarations at the conference. For Klym Savur and the UPA in Volhynia the aim of the UPA was seen as a fight against the Soviets and Poles. In spring and summer 1943 groups of the OUN-B, on the orders of Savur, killed between 30,000 and 60,000 Poles. These horrendous events, though, are avoided, or even ignored and neglected by memory actors when it comes to

598 Motyka. Od rzezi wołyńskiej, p. 88.
599 Ibidem, p. 127.
commemorating of Klym Savur, which is best demonstrated with the case of his monument built in Rivne in 2002.

The commemoration of Klym Savur started at the same time as the proclamation of Ukrainian independence. On 16 February 1992, just three months after the referendum for independence took place, the first commemoration of Klym Savur took place near the village of Sus’k, where he had been killed. This commemoration was dedicated to the day of Savur’s death (12 February).

The ceremony included a mass held at a church, a series of the speeches of local activists and ended up with the erection of a wooden cross in the name of the UPA commander who was killed. The ceremony was initiated by the regional committee of national-democratic party Rukh, veterans of the UPA, and young people from “Plast,” a scout organization with pronounced nationalist and Christian characteristics.

In the press the audience that gathered at the ceremony was commonly described as “Ukrainian patriots.” The wooden cross was consecrated by priests of the UAOC. Units of the newly formed Ukrainian Army were also present and gave salutes at the event. The meeting was opened by the head of the Rivne Committee of National Rukh of Ukraine Volodymyr Omel’chuk:

Dear community!  
We came here today to the place where in winter 1945 in an unequal battle together with his two brethren fell the devoted son of the nation, invincible fighter for the independence and freedom of Ukraine, the commander of UPA-North Dmytro Kliachkivs’kyi. We came here with the feeling of deep sorrow for those endless sacrifices which the Ukrainian nation placed on the altar for its freedom in the fight with its oppressors. We came here with a feeling of great respect to these knights, feeling deep gratefulness for their sacrifice, for the fact that they did not kneel in front of the oppressors and paid with their lives for the idea of Independence and Unity (Sobornist’) of Ukraine (emphasis added).

In common with the case of the Hurby memorial complex, the commemoration of Klym Savur was saturated with religious rituals. The parts of the speech cited above are close to liturgical speeches delivered from the pulpit of churches. It should be stressed that characteristics of speeches are repeated in many celebrations of the OUN and UPA. It helps construct the heroic commemorative narrative whereby all complicated aspects of the past get lost.

The liturgical form of commemorations makes it more complicated to express some critical views, or discontent, since the respective commemorated person is presented not only as a hero but also is worshiped as a martyr or a

602 “Plast” was organized in 1911. Of note, many OUN and UPA leaders, including Bandera, Shukhevych were members of Plast when they were young.
saint at such a ceremony. As Verdery contends: “When it can be said of a dead person that, like Christ, he suffered – for the faith, for the nation, for the cause – then that gives his corpse both sanctity and a basis for emphatic identification.”

Furthermore, the fashion of commemoration creates the atmosphere where one is invited to take part in rituals that presuppose the unanimous support and exclude questioning or debating. The presence of priests at all the openings of the monuments to the OUN and UPA members associates the commemorations not only with Christianity but also with the idea of liberation, as the church was banned by the Soviets.

The first monument to Klym Savur was opened in July 1995 in the small town of Zbarazh, the town where Klym Savur was born. It took almost another decade before monuments to the OUN and UPA figures began to appear in the bigger towns or cities. For example, the monument to Klym Savur was built in Rivne in 2002, and Bandera’s monument appeared in L’viv in 2007.

The need to build the monument to Klym Savur in Rivne, in the region that became the epicenter of the UPA’s killings of Poles, seems rather dubious. The timing of this monument is also suspicious. It was opened in October 2002, just a few months before the commemoration of the Volhynian conflict started. Obviously, the discussions at the regional level about the erection of this monument ran parallel to the national and even international discussions about the upcoming anniversary (which were discussed in detail in Chapter III).

We should bear in mind that propagation of the OUN and UPA history as a glorious past is a bone of contention not only within the international context of Polish-Ukrainian relations but also inside Ukraine, at the time when society was polarized as a result of the anti-Kuchma campaign. This raises questions of possibility, feasibility, and the real necessity of the monument in Rivne. What made this commemoration possible? How can such a dark past be remembered as glorious? Which mechanisms and strategies allowed amnesia and erasure of memory given the much-discussed topic of the UPA’s massacres?

Duty to Remember

In discussions about the monument, Klym Savur is not linked to the Volhynian massacre, this part of history is totally omitted by the propagators of the new memory politics who campaigned for the erection of the monument to Klym Savur in Rivne. The only thing that remained is the duty to remember the warrior who was fighting for independence, whose history was banned by the Soviets, who was not buried in a proper manner and whose death was never

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properly mourned. Below is the way Klym Savur was evaluated at the city council’s meeting by the UPP deputy:

[Klym Savur was] a prominent warrior, who was fighting for the freedom of our state, who was fighting for the independence of the state that we are trying to build now - the independent, democratic Ukraine. Furthermore, we propose to erect this monument at the place where according to historical data his bones had found at rest. [...] immortalization of the memory of such people will only play a positive role for our community of memory... [The commemoration is to be made] in the atmosphere of decency, and at the same time in the atmosphere of responsibility in the face of one’s own country, the country we live in, and the country we are building together.605

In such a way, the UPA fight is linked directly to the independence and statehood of the present. Death and sacrifice of previous generations place a responsibility on present generations to immortalize the dead through remembering. The speakers in the council underlined the fact that the remains of Klym Savur’s body are somewhere under the site and it was thus an absolute necessity to have the monument at that place.606 This UPA commander was presented as the one who sacrificed his life in the name of nation. Such presentation left no place for the difficult knowledge brought about by “disturbing” details of his life.607 Thus, those details were omitted.

A heroic narrative works in black-and-white without any other shades.608 Chervoniy went further in his argumentations and charged the subsequent generation to establish justice in relation to the past generations. Unwillingness to accept such a view meant one’s exclusion from the nation:

all the territory around the former NKVD prison is full of a dozen thousands of killed Ukrainians... Perhaps hundreds of thousands. That is why a monument to Klym Savur is a monument to the entire epoch of Ukrainians who, because of the occupation of Ukrainian lands, took up weapons. That is why those who do not honor them simply cannot be called Ukrainian. [...] let us honor those people who with weapons in their hands were fighting for the independence and made it closer to us. … namely we [the generation of those who built the monument] will remain in the history as those who devoted themselves to the affirmation of historical justice.609

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606 Excerpt of Minutes No. 25 of the 2nd meeting of 25th session of Rivne City Council of 2nd call dated 2 November, 2001
608 Worth noting here is the fact that in the Ukrainian Internet page of Wikipedia there is no word on Kliachkiv's'kyi’s role in the kilings of Poles. In the Polish Wikipedia page there is the detailed discussion on this.
In the discussions about the UPA, the predominant themes are self-sacrifice and victimhood of the whole Ukrainian nation. National independence is presented as the highest value that can justify the wrongdoings. The adherence to the heroic narrative of the UPA is often equated to a “real Ukrainianness” as Chervoniy put it:

*not honoring* them (the UPA) is simply *not being* Ukrainian. Our history is as it is, and we have to be proud of it\(^{610}\) (emphasis added).\(^{611}\)

Such an exclusivist view on history is quite telling, as it shows that the memory actors who promote such a view while proposing a certain project of Ukrainian identity, deny the opportunity to other projects and other ways of expression of national identity. The period of Klym Savur’s activities is represented as an “entire epoch of Ukrainians,” projecting in such a way the history of the UPA onto the history of the entire nation.

Adherence to glorifying the history of the UPA is presented as a marker of national identity. A certain version of history is linked to a prescribed way that one can belong to the nation as if history is a dogma to which one must subscribe. Playing on the opposition between “them” and “us,” memory actors drew dividing lines between allies and enemies as if the war was continuing and one was bound to choose one side.

Instead of scrutinizing history as a “foreign country”\(^{612}\) from a safe distance, listeners were drawn into the very presentness of the past, where they had to make choices now. In such a way the past is not perceived as the past, it lives on continuously. Almost the obsession with this episode of the past may be seen as a “chosen trauma,”\(^{613}\) whereby the history of the nationalist struggle is reactivated by subsequent generations and is engraved into a cultural memory in such a way that present generations were involved in events which actually happened almost seven decades ago.

As the psychologist Vamik Volkan comments, the transmission of such a “chosen trauma” is “linked to the past generation’s inability to mourn losses of people... and indicates large group’s failure to reverse narcissistic injury and humiliation inflicted by another large group.”\(^{614}\) What can be seen in the regional politics of memory is exactly this process of transmission of


“chosen trauma” influenced by “narcissistic injury and humiliation” felt against the Poles who were perceived as “occupants.”

This transmission hinders the construction of a coherent narrative of history where Ukrainians were not only victims but also perpetrators. The “chosen trauma” is based exclusively on the humiliation inflicted by the groups seen as “occupant” and downplays or even ignores the fact that the group depicted as an “occupant” was actually persecuted by the group which is presented as “occupied.” Moreover, memory politics is influenced by the existential insecurity seen in the arguments of memory actors who express anxiety about the future of the nation, particularly when it is perceived as threatened by other nations that previously ruled over Ukraine as a colony. In fact, this existential insecurity reveals the fears of becoming a colony again. As a result, the whole narrative is structured as a defensive mechanism against such perceived threats.

Those voices that were raised against the glorification of Klym Savur were few. Interestingly, in the counter-arguments the main strategy used was also claims for establishing historical justice but in a reverse direction, meaning that justice should be restored in favor of the Ukrainian population who were victimized by the UPA:

if we should affirm historical justice, tell me, are there not a few people lying in the wells strangled by national patriots? This fact should be also acknowledged, and only then can we talk about historical justice.615

The majority of deputies voted for the monument - and the decision was taken to build it.616 When on the 14 October 2002, the 60th anniversary of the UPA, the monument to Klym Savur was consecrated, the ceremony was covered by the press as a step towards the affirmation of justice and reclamation of the historical truth. The leading regional newspaper announced:

the truth ... was not lost in the flow of time and it [truth] reached the subsequent generations disregarding censorship and prohibitions.617

Figure 20. Monument to Klym Savur built in Rivne 2002. Sculptor V. Sholud’ko, architects T. Mel’nychuk and V. Koval’chuk. Photo: Yuliya Yurchuk, October 2011.

Appearances Matter

Being planned as a symbol of an anti-Soviet image of war, the monument to Klym Savur, in its appearance, mimics Soviet tradition.\textsuperscript{618} The monument’s appearance is reminiscent of the well-recognized forms of Soviet monuments and bas-reliefs dedicated to the Second World War, where the soldiers’ courage and bravery are celebrated, as in the well-known bas-reliefs near the Motherland statue in Kyiv (This statue is called “Bat’kivshchyna” in Ukrainian and is better known as “Rodina-Mat’” as it is called in Russian). Although the monument to Klym Savur is dedicated to a single person, it does not only embody the heroism of one individual, it also symbolizes the collective effort of many other warriors who fought for the same cause which is embodied within the spirit of the monument. As it will be argued in Chapter V, the well-known features of the monument made it easier for onlookers to read it as a monument to a hero, a military man who sacrificed his life for motherland.

\textsuperscript{618} In this regard Andriy Portnov notes that the style of arguably “non-ideological” monuments is less Soviet than ideological monuments of radically anti-Soviet content (see: Portnov. “Velyka Vitchyzniana viina.” pp. 206-218, p. 214). It is not, though, unusual that the aesthetics of ideological rivalries is very similar, as was the case of Nazi Germany and Soviet Stalinist aesthetics.
The only difference from Soviet influenced military monuments in the Savur monument’s style is decoration with pronounced Christian elements: the cross near the name engraved on the stone and the inscription that reads:

**Constructed in memory of the 60th anniversary of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and commander Klym Savur (Dmytro Kliachkivs’kyi) and the thousands of Ukrainian patriots that rest in peace here. Glory to Ukraine! Glory to heroes! 14 October 2002 of God’s Year**

The wreaths laid at the monument’s pedestal are those traditionally used in funerals that symbolically mark the monument as a tombstone. It bears a particular meaning if it is considered that the site of the monument is claimed to be where Kliachkivs’kyi supposedly died in prison after being wounded fighting the NKVD in nearby Rivne.

Thus, the close link to death and (no) burial gives special nuances to the meaning of this monument which add to the fact that it is so difficult to criticize the kind of memory transmitted through this monument. The most tangible opposition to the Soviet tradition, though, occurs mainly through new ceremonial practices. The 9 May remains a date for the Soviet-style celebrations of Victory Day that take place near the monuments built during Soviet times. In Rivne such a place is Dubens’ke cemetery with the tomb of unknown soldiers and the aforementioned monument to Soviet intelligence agent Mykola Kuznetsov. The monument to Klym Savur attracts the public on the days established by the new national calendar – the Day of the Independence and the Day of the Foundation of the UPA.

**Topographical Matrix of Klym Savur monument**

Commenting on the relation between the viewer, the monument and the space, Young noted:
a monument becomes a point of reference amid other parts of the landscape, one node among others in a topographical matrix that orients the rememberer and creates meaning in both the land and our recollections. For like narrative, which automatically locates events in linear sequence, the memorial also brings events into some cognitive order…. It is still perceived in the midst of its geography, in some relation to the other landmarks nearby.\textsuperscript{619}

So, what is the “topographical matrix that orients the rememberer” in the case of the monument under question? From the perspective of its location, the monument is placed in a strategically well-selected place as it is almost impossible to visit the city and not to see the monument.

The monument is located in one of the central streets – Soborna, in an alley that faces the main building of the largest university in the city and the largest park in Rivne. It is situated on the same street axis as the monument to Shevchenko, an undoubted Ukrainian hero. Its placement turns Klym Savur’s monument into a powerful symbol especially during demonstrations where people gather at Klym Savur’s monument and then march down the street to Shevchenko’s monument. This symbolically underlines the continuation of the new and old sites of memory.

![Figure 22. The figure of Klym Savur in relation to other memory sites. Collage: Dariia Anfalova.](image)

Behind the monument to Klym Savur there is a monumental stone dedicated to the memory of the “victims of fascism.” The inscription reads:

\textsuperscript{619} Young, The Texture of Memory, p. 7.
Here during the time of fascist occupation, Hitler’s killers tortured to death five hundred Soviet citizens. Eternal Glory to those who gave their lives for happiness of future generations.

The memorial plaque on the building nearby that served as a prison during the war states “thousands of Ukrainian patriots were incarcerated and tortured here during the years of Nazis occupation.”

No mention is made either on the stone or on the plaque of the thousands of Jewish victims who also were tortured and lost their lives behind the prison’s walls. Probably they are collectively referred to together with “five hundred Soviet citizens tortured by Hitler’s killers” inscribed on the stone. But the simple absence of any reference to the Holocaust is quite telling. Probably, the rationale behind this absence was that any mentioning of other distinguished groups of victims would belittle the national (in case of the plaque) or Soviet (in case of the stone) victims.

As can be seen from the Figure 22, not far from the monument there is the city council and the city’s biggest cathedral (Sviatopokrovs’kyi Sobor - Cathedral of God’s Mother Protectress). In 2001 a small chapel in memory of “Klym Savur and heroes of national-liberation struggles 1918-1950” was consecrated near the cathedral on the grounds of the cemetery, which will be discussed in detail below. In such a way, the monument’s location turns the memory of Savur and other “heroes of national-liberation struggles” into a sacred space which presupposes not only remembering the victims of Nazism and communism but also worshiping them and those who fought against the regimes as martyrs or saints. Nevertheless, as I have mentioned above, the place was selected not just because of its favorable location. This place is allegedly the place where the commander was buried, as during the war the territory was adjacent to the main prison of the city where thousands of Jews and political prisoners were killed. In such a way, the place is not only connected to the death of one person, it is linked to the deaths of thousands of victims. However, the monument is built only for one. The deaths of others are mentioned on the memorial plaque and memorial stone without indicating any names.

Being erected in 2002, 59 years after the death of the person cast in bronze, Klym Savur monument takes us back not only to the past events of the 1940s, but it also invites us to the 1990s and 2000s when the monument was discussed and built. The monument simultaneously plays both roles depicted by Verdery, it symbolizes “a specific famous person while in a sense also being the body of that person.” At the same time, being erected after the end of the Soviet regime, this monument “reverses the process, (re)sacralizing persons who had gone for some time unremarked.” These

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621 Ibidem.
two actions “signal a change in the universe of meaning that hitherto prevailed.”

In this sense, new monuments become the markers of reordered worlds of meaning, they mark new beginnings, changes and transfigurations that arise in attempts to build a new way of life. Indeed, building the monument in 2002 demarcated the line between the old and new regimes of meaning. No wonder that it was raised in 2002, when the anti-Kuchma campaign started. In such a symbolic way the monument signaled the end of the transformation that was launched in 1990s when the discussions of the monument in the council had only begun.

The Klym Savur monument is too new for us to speak about changes of its meaning over time. But what can be traced over ten years of the monument’s history, is its (re)utilization and institutionalization in calendar and ceremonies. Since its consecration, the monument has become a meeting point for nationalist and national-democratic parties and a catalyst of people’s mobilization. By being linked to the history of liberation and independence, the monument functions as an icon, a landmark of independence, and a site for protests.

Parallels that Never Meet? Remembering the Polish victims

The monument to Klym Savur was not opened in isolation. An important memory event happened in the region a year after, although, strikingly, those two events ran in parallel without actually referring to each other. On 6 November 2003, only a year after the monument to Klym Savur was opened, the wife of the then Polish President, Iolanta Kwaśniewska, visited the region. She came to visit one specific commemorative ceremony, the unveiling of the monument in the village of Borshchivka, some 30 kilometers from Rivne.

According to the announcement of the event in the local press, in 1942-43, Soviet partisans had headquarters there. At the end of 1942 the partisans destroyed the Antopil’ spirit factory which resulted in the massive punitive actions and redemptive murders of villagers by the Germans. The whole village of Borshchivka was burnt to the ground on 3 March 1943. Among the victims there were some relatives of the Polish President’s wife. High-ranking politicians and media from both the Ukrainian and Polish sides were present at the ceremony. The participation of the presidents of Poland and Ukraine was also planned but they cancelled their visits probably in order to avoid the escalation of tension between two states concerning the upcoming 60th anniversary of the Volhynian massacre. The monument was consecrated by the Roman Catholic bishop from Luts’k.

622 Ibidem.
The first monument in honor of the perished villagers of Borshchivka was built in 1978 on the initiative of local people. By the 2000s it was in rather a shabby state and impossible to restore. By that time the Polish government became interested in the restoration of the place. They started by fixing the old graves in the Polish cemetery. The new monument was produced in Poland. The main feature of the memorial is a big cross with an inscription in Polish and Ukrainian that reads:

To the memory of almost 250 Polish residents of Borshchivka who were cruelly tortured to death by fascists. On 3 March 1943 the village was burned. Rest in peace. From the former residents of the village, families, and Government of the Republic of Poland 2003 (emphasis added).

Polish historians have found the names of all who were killed in the village, and produced the memorial with the names of both Poles and Ukrainians engraved in the granite. There were 16 Ukrainians and almost 250 Poles. But the main inscription does not mention Ukrainians. Memory actors who financed the project took the decision on what to exhibit on the site of memory. It was a Polish project on preserving “Polish” memory.

Again we see how the “national” dimension takes over in public representations of the past and how it involves silences and omissions. Notably, the Soviet era depiction of Nazi Germany as “fascist” persists at this monument, both in Polish and in Ukrainian inscriptions.

At the opening ceremony some elderly villagers shared their memories of the times when Poles and Ukrainians lived side-by-side in the village. They stressed the voluntary nature of the postwar resettlement of Poles to the Polish territory: “many Poles have chosen to live in Poland.” No word was mentioned about the events that forced the Poles to “choose to live in Poland.” Friendly neighborly relationships between Poles and Ukrainians in the past was stressed many times in the local press that covered the event: “Ukrainians and Poles lived peacefully for decades, without reproaching each other for their nationality.” However, Andrzej Przewoźnik, a historian from the Polish Council for the Protection of Sites of Combat (Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa) covertly hinted at the rather complicated relations between Poles and Ukrainians in the past, and even at present:

Several days ago the candles of memory were blazing over the graves in all of Poland. But in many cemeteries this light was absent. Because far beyond the land of Poland there are graves of our people which still await ordering, especially here in Volhynia, where history was especially cruel to people.

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625 Vasyl’ Koval’chuk, a resident of the nearby village, who shared his memory with the journalist stressing the good neighborliness with Poles, in: “Borshchivka: popil, pamiąt’.,” Ridnyi Krai, 15 November 2003, p.4.
Almost every patch of land here is soaked with the blood of innocent victims of totalitarianism and nationalism.627

While the Polish speaker revealed his worries of the lack of cooperation, the Ukrainian speaker Mykola Soroka, the head of oblast’ administration, stressed the importance of such cooperation and emphasized the gratefulness from the Ukrainian side for the Polish financial support:

We are grateful to the Polish side for their funding of the memorial. There was also good work by our road builders. Such mutual cooperation is a guarantee of brotherhood of our nations.628

The Polish First Lady Iolanta Kwaśniewska highlighted the need to remember the loss in order to be able to continue living as good neighbors:

My father was born in this place. Here, in the family grave my aunt, her husband, and her child are buried. It is important that we now have the chance to pray for the dead, to light candles. Now it will be easier for us. And our countries will live peacefully as neighbors. And this is the most important thing that has to be done for our children.629

In such a way, two parallel commemorations – the one of Klym Savur and the one of the Polish and Ukrainian residents of the small village - took place in the same region with only a year difference. Each commemoration was governed by strategic forgetfulness that renders the memory of the inter-ethnic conflict full of silences and innuendos. Notably, in an interview with journalists, Andrzej Przewoźnik said that the monument to the Poles killed in the Volhynian conflict was planned to be built the following year in the village of Lidavka close to Borshchivka.630 This monument was indeed built as planned.

In general, there are a few monuments and memorial places dedicated to the Polish victims of the Volhynian conflict in the villages throughout Volhynia. On the one hand, they are connected to places of death, as the monuments are built in places where people were killed, on the other hand, though, the absence of such memorial sites in big cities shows that the national narrative is not yet ready to include the victims of other nationalities whose suffering was inflicted by Ukrainians.

So, which mechanisms and strategies allowed silences and innuendos to form the backdrop to the much discussed topic of the UPA’s massacres? My argument is that selective remembrance became possible because the need to commemorate Klym Savur was propagated within the project of

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628 Ibidem.
629 Ibidem, p.4.
630 Shymans’kyi, Oleksandr. “Znovu Volyn’.”
reclamation of history. Reclaimed history was seen as necessary for symbolic reparation of the society which was denied its history in the past and which was denied a moral duty to mourn their dead. Hence, demands for the monument were formulated as a moral right of the community. As it was demonstrated, most of the claims for the monument were articulated as a demand for the renewal of justice.

Moreover, for the time when the monument was built, it came as a reaction to the anti-Kuchma campaign whereby regional parties demonstrated their opposition to Kuchma. Memory became a weapon with which to engage with/against one’s political opponent. In this battle, the monument served as a marker of symbolic victory of one party over the other. Blatant religious symbols at all sites of memory dedicated to Klym Savur locate him within a sacred space of victimhood and strengthen the myth of the UPA.
Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’: Founding Myth of the UPA

The memorialization of Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’ illustrates the erasure of conflicts and tensions inside the nationalist movement from the memory space. The mere association of Borovets’s name with the OUN and inscribing it to the memory culture of the OUN and UPA reveals one of the main characteristics of memory – its close vicinity to imagination. To understand it we must take a closer look at biography of Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’ and his UPA.

Taras Borovets’ was born in Bystrychi (now Kostopil’ rayon in Rivne oblast’) on 9 March 1908. In 1930 he was recruited by the Polish army. In 1932 together with some friends he organized the “Ukrainian National Revival” (“Ukraïins’ke national’ne vidrodzhennia”), the organization which main aim was to promote culture and education among young people. The organization supported the views of Symon Petliura. In this regard, they followed the tradition of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in envisioning Ukraine as an independent state. As a result of his political activism, Borovets’ was imprisoned at “Bereza Kartuzka” camp. Due to his exemplary behavior he was released on condition that he did not live in the borderland territory. Thus, he lived most of the time in Warsaw. Later he became involved in the activities of the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) which, from 1922, was in exile in France.

From 1939 onwards, Bul’ba together with the UNR’s president in exile, Andriy Levyts’kyi, plotted the formation of military groups in Western Ukraine. The aim of doing this was to gain independence for Ukraine in union with the National Socialists. In 1941 Bul’ba formed the first of such military units in Volhynia, which was by then occupied by the Soviets. He called these units Polis’ka Sich: the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Borovets’ became famous first and foremost for the organization of the “Olevs’k Republic” in a small town (now Zhytomyr oblast’). The republic existed for several months, from August to November 1941. German administration allowed Bul’ba to organize the “republic” as he had forced out the Soviet partisans from the territory.

Germany, however, soon realized that Bul’ba was not loyal and the “Republic” was abolished. His relationship with Nazi Germany and his role in collaboration with the Nazis in the killing of Jews is an understudied question. In memory discussions these questions are largely omitted and Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’ is mainly remembered as an organizer and the first commander of the UPA, as if no conflict between Borovets’ and the OUN existed. Nevertheless, conflict and tensions were the defining characteristics of the OUN and Borovets’s relations.

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The OUN-B could not afford the existence in Ukraine of another political party with the same aim, with organized military units, acting in the territory that was seen as being within the OUN-B’s sphere of influence. In spring 1943, Borovets’ and the OUN-B negotiated the possibility to unite their structures. These negotiations were without success. By spring 1943 the OUN-B seized control over the majority of the insurgency by force.

As a result Borovets’ had to flee to Warsaw. Later he migrated to Canada where he died in 1981. When the political leadership of the UPA structures was deactivated, their integration into the structures of the OUN-B appeared to be not too difficult. The main argumentation used by OUN-B in convincing the units to join the OUN-B was the failure of all Ukrainian national forces to unite in their fight for independence after the First World War.  

At the same time, the OUN-M military structures were also integrated within the OUN-B. United military formations appropriated the name of the UPA, and Roman Shukhevych was appointed to lead the Army. Of note is that internal frictions within the UPA have dropped out of memory culture as it will be illustrated in this chapter. Instead Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’ is presented as the founder of the UPA, the leadership of which then passed to Bandera.

In such a way, Borovets’ is written into the genealogy of the OUN-B by means of memory culture. Ironically, for his entire life after the war, Bul’ba tried to distance himself from the OUN and presented himself as a devoted follower of the UNR. Bul’ba-Borovets’ spent four decades presenting the UNR as a “democratic” alternative for a future Ukrainian state. It is known, though, that his military forces did not always behave in such an idealistic fashion as Borovets’ claimed. The work of historians shows that Polis’ka Sich and local Olevs’k police participated in the murder of the Jewish population and also staged a pogrom in the summer of 1941. So, why do the memory actors need to commemorate a person who was in fact a rival to those who are celebrated as heroes by those actors? When, why and how did this need come about? Let us look at the details.

634 Bruder. *Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen*.
The Never Ending Building Process

The decision to erect a monument to Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’ was taken by Rivne city council on 17 April 2003. It was decided to build the monument by the 100th anniversary of his birth (i.e. by 9 March 2008). The aim of such monumentalization as stated in the council’s resolution was the “immortalization of the memory of the organizer and the first commander of the UPA on his 100th jubilee.”

It is important to note the timing of such a decision – the anti-Kuchma campaign was in full swing in Kyiv and in the regions. Thus, the monument to Borovets’ was a tool to mark yet another symbolic victory in the parties’ struggle. As the monument to Savur was already built, the debates about this monument that fueled the memory battle for decades was extinguished, a new hero was needed who could play a similar role. The UPA has long been used as a versatile “resource” in the formation of anti-Soviet/anti-communist, democratic claims by national democrats. Thus, the need for new heroes periodically comes to the surface.

Figure 23. Putting the monument to Borovets’ on the map. Collage: Dariia Anfalova.

635 Resolution of Rivne City Council No. 322 dated 17 April 2003.
The resolution on Borovets’ monument was taken after long discussions permeated by conflicts between national democrats and communists, which culminated in mutual accusations of being either “Russian traitors” or “fascist” from both sides. The main political propagator of the monument was from the faction “Our Ukraine” (which united the main actors of memory politics and which we have already encountered in a previous chapter – the UPP and Rukh). “Our Ukraine’s” views in the council were mainly articulated by its leader in Rivne Yuri Vovk. He set out some of the main ideas that illustrated the reason for the commemoration of Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’. In order to gain a true picture of the argumentation, extended quotation is necessary:

We happen to live... at such time when our state is being built, at the time, when the names of many people, who... sacrificed their lives to build this state are coming out of oblivion. We get to know more and more truth [about them]. One of these persons was Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’. This man stands among such prominent people as ... Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hrushevskyi, Petliura, and Stepan Bandera. Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’ is ... the link between the first Ukrainian People’s Republic and our state... He is the person who actually founded the army which was fighting for the independence of our country, a person who dedicated all his thoughts, all his life, all his strivings to a single thing - the foundation of the Ukrainian independent state. [...] That is why we propose building a monument to him in our city. [...] We are taking the same path we took in building the monuments to Symon Petliura and Klym Savur. Our organization will cover the costs of construction ... of the monument. [...] We ask you to support our project by the resolution because we think that our society, and our city in particular, faces not only economic problems... but also the problem of spiritual growth, the problem of spiritual memory of our and of the next generations. ... by our resolution today we build the basis of our mutual understanding, of our future, in which one will be able to say about us: they also joined [the work of] honoring... the glorious people who were founders of Ukrainian state.

Thus, state, independence, sacrifice, revelation of truth, overcoming of oblivion, and foundation of the army are among those values that underlie the demands for the monument. These are the nodes in memory culture that pull the figure of Borovets’ into their orbits. Therefore, his figure is symbolically equated to those figures which are already in those orbits. Time seems to have been suspended, differences removed, and it allows Borovets’ – a mnemonic figure stripped of his historical aspects – to mythically trace his genealogy from Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hrushevskyi, Petliura, and Stepan Bandera – and thus, through Cossackdom, the UNR, and the OUN, respectively. History

636 Vovk was in the UPP before joining “Our Ukraine.”
cannot trace such a genealogy, but memory can. Which truth remains in this memory? This is the truth of the archetype.

The mnemonic figure of Borovets’ is not faithful to the historical figure of Borovets’. It should be stressed that in saying this we are not idealizing history in its claims towards the truth, but we are emphasizing that methods of memory work and history work are different. Whereas historians try to establish facts into reasonable sequences and explain why the events happened, memory entrepreneurs look for figures in the past who can translate meanings, values, and ideals, that are by and large ahistorical, they are abstract notions set in the present time.

The need to remember is often linked to responsibility owed to the coming generations. The case of memory of Borovets’ demonstrates this link to the obligation to future generations too. The revival of forgotten or suppressed history, the proper honoring of heroes by remembering them gives an opportunity for the present generation to enter the arena of history as decent and responsible persons which reciprocally gives them a chance to also be remembered in posterity. Particular to this case is that in the analyzed statements there are also indications to whom the monument is built, so that we can speculate on who is perceived as the intended receiver of the message encoded in the monument and what kind of message it should transmit:

we have the project of resolution that proposes to build the monument to the prominent son of the Ukrainian nation in the city center, so that each child who passes by, each person who comes to the city, asks: “Who’s this?” and the answer would be: “This is the son of the Ukrainian people, who beat all the foreigners, who came here, to our Ukrainian land.”

Thus, the intended recipient is essentially the child and the tourist, which seems to presuppose that all the local adults should already know who the person in the monument is. Alternatively, it may be presupposed that adults are less malleable when forming their opinions. The monument is directed at a more docile mind. Thus, for educational purposes the group of children and tourists is seen as a more appropriate target group.

While mentioning the tourist as an intended recipient, it is worth noting the last sentence which is far from being welcoming to the “foreigners.” Such positioning of the region as a tourist site, on the one hand, and the derogatory tone in addressing the foreigner, on the other, possibly reveals a complex relationship to insiders and outsiders. Outsiders seem to be welcome only in the role of tourists who are easy to educate. Other foreigners are perceived as a threat whereas the exemplary behavior with those who present such a threat is given by an archetypical figure embodied in the monument – defeat all foreigners.

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638 Koval’chuk, O. Excerpt of Minutes No 11/2 of the second plenary meeting of eleventh session of Rivne City Council of 3d convocation, dated 17 April 2003, p. 5.
In response to the statements made by “Our Ukraine’s” deputies, the deputy from the “Bat’kivshchyna” party, Andrii Hreshchuk, referred to different aspects of the same history:

There is one nuance to which I would like to draw the attention of all the deputies, all who are present here, and of all the mass media. ... At the beginning he [Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’] was fighting against the Red Army, he was disarming the units of the NKVD, was liberating those who were packed in the freight wagons running to the east. Then he was against the Germans, then he made some agreements with the NKVD again. [...] And this misunderstanding extended right up to 1943. ... The misunderstandings were between the OUN-B (and Borovets’). 639

Then the speaker listed the main episodes of Bul’ba-Borovets’s life: that because of the conflict with the OUN-B he was forced to flee to Poland, was imprisoned by Germans in Sachsenhausen concentration camp, and his wife was killed by the OUN-B. 640 Hreshchuk insisted that it is not correct to refer to Bul’ba-Borovets’ as “the first commander of the UPA” and proposes another title – “otaman of Polissia or otaman of “Polissian Sich.” 641 Thus, in this example the “truth of history” is seen as triumphing over the “truth of memory” (in Eliade’s words “the truth of archetype”). But this truth would shatter the whole picture of the OUN-B which is presented as a united force in the fight for liberation.

Notably, in their statements the speakers link a regional context not only to a national context, but also to a global one. Thus, one of the anti-monument statements voiced by deputy Kukharchuk from the Party of the Regions follows:

You well understand, especially after the Iraq tragedy, that now the third division/partitioning (rozpodilennia) of the world is on its way. And if someone wants to correct the results of the Second World War, in which 50 million people from dozens of countries gave up their lives, then this someone will join the denial of resolution of the Nuremberg process. I won’t speak about the fact that Bul’ba-Borovets’ was an agent of Abwehr and was collaborating with Germans here. You can be convinced of this now not by the Bolshevik postcards. We have the state archive... but how will it be looked upon from the outside? There is Stepan Bandera street with the bas-relief. His SB (Security Department of OUN-B, Sluzhba Bezpeky) executed the wife of Borovets’. Close to this there is Borovets’ street, and now we think about building him a

641 Hreshchuk. “Excerpt of Minutes No 11/2 of the second plenary meeting of eleventh session of Rivne City Council of 3d convocation,” dated 17 April 2003, p.3.
monument. This is now a purely human question. How can we distinguish between the heroes who were squabbling with each other? 642

The speaker rightly pinpoints the dangers in promoting the memory of the OUN and UPA which can backfire in the future. By underlining the OUN and UPA as an all-national memory that is concerned with all-national history, a picture is established of the OUN and UPA as an enormous pan-national movement, which it clearly was not. Many more Ukrainians were conscripts of the Red Army and they were a part of the united force that beat National Socialism and brought peace to Europe.

Deputy Polots’kyi of the Communist Party drew everyone’s attention to the fact that 800 people who live near the site where the monument was to be built signed petitions against the monument.643 In contrast to other speakers who protested against some of the aspects of the proposed monument and interpretation of history, but not against the monument itself, Polots’kyi was the only person who was totally against building the monument.

Towards the end of the discussion almost all the participants were divided into two camps – “Soviets” (the bearers of the Soviet values and ideals) and “UPA-ists” (the bearers of national values and ideals). In mutual accusations “Soviets” were blamed for the “invasion of sovereign Poland” (hinting at the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact) and “national betrayal.” The “Soviets” in the arguments were associated exclusively with Russia, so that Russia served as the image of the enemy and everyone who did not support the views of proponents of the monument and the version of history embedded in the monument was seen as enemy who “insults national honor” in the interests of Russia.644 In the debates on Borovets’s monument there were, however, some moderate voices exhorting to the complexity of history but they were in a tiny minority (of those who voiced their positions).645

Regional Hero
The speakers in the Oblast’ Council appealed to the special regional role of Western Ukraine as a bearer of a special mission to enlighten the east:

645 It must be said that among 42 deputies who were present only a couple were viewing their opinions, so on the opinions of the majority or the minority we can judge only from the results of voting process: 37 for the monument, 1 - against, 4 opted out.
In the end we live in Western Ukraine, we show the example. This is not Donets’k oblast’, where unfortunately the situation is still terrible, complicated.\(^{646}\)

In such a way, the region and Western Ukraine as a whole are presented as the role model for the whole nation. The need of remembrance of regional history is projected onto the nation. In this regard, one can see how regional elites try to translate their image of the nation for the rest of Ukraine.\(^{647}\)

In the city, Bul’ba-Borovets’ is addressed as a regional hero, as a city legend. In the Ethnographic Museum there is a special section dedicated to Borovets’ where he is presented as a local Che Guevara with a revolutionary aura. His “Olevs’k Republic” freed from Soviet partisans is presented as an oasis of democracy and self-regulation in the country at war with two evil regimes of the 20th century.

![Figure 24. Part of exhibition on Borovets’ in Ethnographic Museum. Rivne, 2011.](image)

Of note, in the official narrative on the history of the UPA presented by the Center of the Study of the Liberation Movement in L’viv Academy of Science, Borovets’ is not mentioned at all in the pages devoted to the formation of the UPA. His name appears only cursorily in the middle of the chapter as a short encyclopedic entry:

Taras Borovets’ – ‘Bul’ba’ (1908-1981) – a leader of one of the insurgent units that were active in 1941 in Volhynia, subsequently formed as “Polissia Sich.” In 1942, unwilling to disperse his units under pressure of the Germans, [Borovets’] reformed it into the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. At the end of 1942, beginning of 1943, UPA-Polissia Sich that acted in small militia units amounted

\(^{646}\) Bidiuk Y. Excerpt of Minutes No 11/2 of the second plenary meeting of eleventh session of Rivne City Council of 3d convocation, dated 17 April 2003, p. 8.

\(^{647}\) The same tendency was demonstrated in the study of the L’viv intelligentsia, where the author contends that the intelligentsia try “to translate their cultural and national models for the rest of Ukraine” (Narveselius. *Ukrainian Intelligentsia*).
to about 700 people… Because these formations of Borovets’ had a real military presence in Polissia, several parties tried to use it – German administration and Soviet partisans. It was facilitated by an absence of a concrete political program of the “otaman.” Ideological ambiguity was also a reason for the hindrance for the units’ growth. Borovets’ was arrested by the Germans during an investigation and sent to a concentration camp. Released in 1944, he emigrated abroad where he died.648

Thus, the commemoration of Borovets’ as a founder of the UPA has more local character aimed at consolidating specifically its regional identity. No wonder that such a consolidation of regional identity was called for in the pivotal period of the Kuchma crisis in 2003 as exactly at that time, as I already discussed, the east and the west of the country were portrayed in Yanukovych’s presidential election campaign as having insurmountable differences. The response from the region, as seen through the memory politics, could be characterized as a “defensive attack” in that staged competition between regions. Needless to say, such tactics could only lead to further polarization between the regions.

Despite the fact that the resolution on monument building was accepted in April 2003, no concrete actions were taken and the monument was not built. On 25 July 2005, another resolution was taken by the council concerning the concrete site where the monument should be built. In the new resolution it was stressed that the monument should be erected in one of the central streets of Rivne (either Mitskevycha Street or Prospekt Myru).649 On this occasion, the description of the role of Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’ was somewhat expanded:

  immortalizing the memory of the military, political and public actor, the organizer of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Lieutenant – General Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’, his contribution to the creation and development of the UPA, that fought for the freedom and independence of Ukraine during the years of the Second World War on the territory of Volhynia.650

As can be seen in this resolution, the emphasis is put not only on the characteristics of Bul’ba-Borovets’ activities, but also on the significance of his contribution to the independence of Ukraine and his meaning for the region. This expansion of the corresponding much shorter part in the previous resolution (“immortalization of memory of the organizer and the first commander of the UPA to his 100th jubilee”) was thought to strengthen the argument and support the erection of the monument.

The monument though was not completed by the 100th jubilee in 2008, as planned. And only in 2011 a specific site was allocated for the building of the monument - on the Prospekt Myru. The engraved stone marks the place for the future monument. One explanation of the delay in building a monument might be the fact that the city council had no money for it. Another possible reason might be that after 2005 the political propagators of memory of the OUN and UPA felt safe and secure when Yushchenko came to power. The parties did not need the monument for propaganda purposes. In 2010, when Yushchenko left the presidency, the development of the monument project resumed.

In my conversation with Oleksandr Voloshchuk, secretary of “Prosvite” in Rivne and one of the active participants of memory work in the city, he noted that the problem with the monument is most often the problem of financing. Because of the lack of finance, it is delayed. But it is for the same reason that the quality of monument is so poor. That said, he showed me a miniature model of the monument that was agreed upon as a final choice (it is depicted on the poster above). On the conflicts involved in memory work, Voloshchuk commented that the conflicts are:

constructed by communists who want Ukraine to come back to the USSR, to become a colony, but the USSR is the empire for them, for their idea of “Russian World” (“Russkii mir”) the loss of Ukraine is the biggest loss.651

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A considerable part of our conversation was devoted to Voloshchuk’s biography. Because of his involvement in the national revival he was persecuted by the Soviets. He identifies himself with a past of Ukrainian Soviet-time dissent. He shared his memories of the many people whom he knew well or who were just acquaintances, who were arrested. He spoke about dissidents in 1960s that were persecuted and imprisoned. Now and then he showed me books about repressions or “Prosvita”’s bulletin with articles on Soviet repressions. It was a very emotional conversation. It was obvious that for him the changes in the memoryscape of the city are positive achievements of reclamation. His personal memories of the Soviet times find resonance in the memory counter-positioned to Soviet memory.

Taking into account the role of “Prosvita” as the main intermediary between the public and the UPP and Rukh, namely “Prosvita” to a large degree defines cultural politics of these parties. One can only contemplate to what extent the personalized of the “Prosvita” leadership memories of Soviet regime retrospectively shape cultural memory of the OUN and UPA.

Figure 26. The stone that marks the place where the monument to Borovets’ will be placed. Now marked by the stone. Photo: Yuliya Yurchuk, October 2011.

As the monument is not built yet, we can only judge on its appearances based on the model. In the center it presents a high-ranking military officer who stands together with soldiers and civilians (a woman), thus simultaneously representing a commander and a defender, protector and guarantor of the peace. The flame on the very top of the monument presumably symbolizes the spirit of the nation that he is defending and transmitting to the future generation.

The process of building the monument to Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’ illustrates how conflicts and tensions of the past are eliminated in the memory for the purposes of construction of the seamless memory of resistance. The

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652 When I addressed the UPP and “Our Ukraine” with a request to comment on the monuments in the city which were built with these parties’ support, I was advised to speak to Mr. Voloshchuk, as he was presented as the person responsible for the building of those monuments.
presentation of Olevs’k Republic like an oasis of freedom liberated from Soviet and Nazi occupiers bestows upon the memory of the OUN and UPA additional revolutionary undertones. The emphasis on the specifically Volhynian experiences through the figure of Borovets strengthens regional identity.

Concluding Remarks

To sum up, all three case-studies demonstrated that in post-Soviet Ukraine, the issue of coming to terms with the communist regime conditioned the character of the general approach to history. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, but with most of the communist nomenclature remaining in their posts, the only form of redemption for the injustices inflicted by the Soviet regime was symbolical. It was realized mainly in the realm of culture, history, and memory. One should bear in mind that communist injustices occurred on top of earlier unatoned atrocities caused by the 1939-41 Soviet occupation, the 1941-44 Nazi occupation, and postwar deportations. All these events went alongside wrongdoings committed by some Ukrainians as well. But it is the communist injustices that became the rearview mirror through which all the history was interpreted, especially in nascent cultural memory fuelled by stories of communicative memory shared by smaller groups who were previously silenced or even persecuted.

The reclamation of history was often accompanied by claims for affirmation of historical justice. These claims often ignored the injustices inflicted by Ukrainians on other ethnic groups. This politics of memory reveals the post-colonial position from which the memory is reclaimed. This position is unstable and torn apart between feelings of inferiority and superiority, between shame and pride. It does not allow the subject to openly encounter the past. Thus, the easiest step towards the reordering of meaningful worlds is taken: the past which was silenced or negatively evaluated by the Soviets becomes the object of glory and celebration.

An affirmation of historical justice in the name of one nation is often accompanied by the erasure of injustices committed against other nations. Commenting on restitution policies in Eastern Europe, Elazar Barkan spoke about “the conviction that creating new social inequality was not an injustice but merely a disparity that would provide the basis for new identities and social relations. Both the ‘limited’ justice and the new disparities were viewed as inevitable, if not as a moral good.”653 This “limited” justice is the main characteristic of not only the politics of restitution but also of the politics of memory.

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These politics of memory reduce the entire nation into one category of victims that should sign up to one version of history and remember the past in only one specific way that makes the community “Ukrainian.” Timothy Snyder wrote that in the aftermath of wars and conflicts, “personal suffering and national memory blend into an irresistible harmony, a siren’s call to a false historical past where all that is certain is the death.”654 It is up to the subsequent generations to face this death and to step beyond the national boundaries, to see the dead beyond their national allegiances and mourn the losses independent of their collective identities. Such an approach could open new perspectives on looking at the past and at the present too. It would also open up possibility of new, more inclusive, identities. As Barkan and Karn comment, as nations “allow themselves to become enmeshed in each other’s stories, historical adversaries uncover new possibilities for self-definition and fresh avenues for cooperation.”655 Yet this stage of dealing with the recent past in Ukraine has not yet arrived.

In terms of the Hurby memorial complex, one can see how localized memories can be uplifted to the national level if there is an interest and/or a need from the side of memory actors to do so. Most probably such an interest and a need appears in times of political conflicts and social turmoil. In the 1990s, the memory of Hurby was formed under the influence of ideas of reclamation of history inviting grassroots individual memories. However, since 2001 with an anti-Kuchma campaign unleashed, the memory of Hurby became “privatized” by national-democratic and nationalist parties who formed the anti-Kuchma opposition.

The commemoration of the Battle of Hurby in 2007 was the first and the last time when high-ranking officials, including the president, visited Hurby. Nevertheless, due to its special place in memory culture within which religious, entertainment and educational elements are combined, it became one of the most significant sites of memory and has an important role both on the inter-regional and national scale. This is because it is visited regularly by believers for church services, by schoolchildren for history lessons, by youth for re-enactment games. All this certainly contributes to establishing the memory of the UPA as a part of cultural memory of the region, if not of the nation.

The three cases also demonstrate how the past became the resource for political parties in their power struggles and how monuments served as markers of one’s victory in such a battle. Thus, all three monuments are very closely connected to the most conflicted and tense points in the history of Ukraine, when the power struggle became very intense. Hence, both the Klym

Savur and Borovets’ monuments came as a reaction to the anti-Kuchma campaign where regional parties demonstrated their opposition to Kuchma. Memory as the weapon to fight the political opponent was widely used by the opposition parties to which memory was sometimes the only available resource to beat the opponent. In this battle, the monument served as a symbolic marker of victory. Furthermore, memory was also used for consolidating a specific regional identity which played a particularly important role during the Orange Revolution when the whole election campaigns of both opponents were built on the perceived or constructed differences between west and east of Ukraine.
Chapter V. Grammars of Remembering –
Mechanisms of Mythologization

Having analyzed the abovementioned monuments and the narratives on them, I discovered rules that govern the narratives which in the long run shape the cultural memory in making. I refer to these rules as grammars of remembering. In “Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit,” Aleida Assmann speaks about mechanisms and basic concepts that define a “Grammar” of individual and collective memory. By “grammar” she means the generative aspect, the mechanism of formation (der Mechanismus des Hervorbringens) of the meaning. In search for such generative mechanisms, Aleida Assmann invites us to scrutinize the most emotionally charged narrative elements which appear under a specific historical situation in order to meet the correspondent requirements of a particular representation.

Drawing inspiration from the concepts presented above, I presented a working model of grammar that helps to better understand the mechanisms of transition of the past into memory. Under the “grammar of remembering” I understand a set of rules, generative mechanisms, that structure a certain kind of remembering by establishing a relation between different actors involved in memory work. This applies to rules that make particular kinds of narrative and representation possible. Each grammar of remembering sheds light on the memory work and directs us to the relationship between remembering and forgetting. By tracing these repeated structures one can trace how a particular tradition of remembering is formed, how some elements of history are shifted out of the memoryscape, while others move into central positions in meaning-generating structures. Each grammar produces a cluster of similar narratives that operate with the help of the same rhetoric and logics, which make each cluster distinctive. In this regard, I looked at the emotionally charged features as the elements that allow positioning “new” memories of the OUN and UPA into the recognizable premediated forms that draw on the established cultural tradition.

The concept of a grammar of remembering allows us to see why certain representations of the past prevail in the establishment of cultural

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memory and why some are more powerful in defining memory politics than others. As we could see, most of the narratives are governed by the logics of nationalism. The logics of nationalism produce national mythologies about the national past and transfer many historical events and figures into metaphors that are used to strengthen the affective function of some commemorative narratives. Sometimes metaphors substitute not only the aspects of a certain narrative but also stand for a whole narrative. In such a way, for instance, the history of OUN and UPA becomes a metaphor of national liberation. In the process of analyzing the cases presented above, four major grammars that govern most of the narratives were distinguished: the grammar of martyrology, the grammar of hagiography, the grammar of heroic epos, and the grammar of prophecy. All these grammars work to translate the past into memory that functions as a myth.

Martyrology as a Grammar of Remembering

The most distinct set of rules that govern discussions on the OUN and UPA positions the UPA (as well as Ukraine and Ukrainians in general) into the space of sacrificial victimhood. I refer to this as a grammar of martyrology. This classification highlights the most important elements of the narratives governed by this grammar such as self-sacrifice for the noble cause (which implies heroically enduring tortures, torment, and pain). Self-sacrifice involves religious salvation as understood in the Christian tradition. In the Oxford English Dictionary “martyrology” is defined as “a list or account of martyrs; spec. a book listing Christian martyrs and other saints in the order of their commemoration, with a description of their lives and sufferings.”

Commemoration is one of the attributes of martyrology as it is linked to the calendar and prescribes a special day for commemorating each martyr. The second definition in the dictionary is “an account of people who have suffered death for a cause.” The third definition is “the branch of history or literature that deals with the lives of martyrs; the histories of martyrs collectively.” When I apply a term “martyrology” I refer to/use all three meanings of the word. It became a common practice to combine the commemorative practices of the OUN and UPA with religious rituals and symbols.

The pathos of martyrdom in the sense of “Christian-based ideology of personal sacrifice” underpins all mnemonic narratives and practices analyzed above. The grammar of martyrology surrounds the UPA soldiers with an aura of sacrifice and holy devotion to the idea of the nation. This goes hand-in-hand with the self-representation of the UPA in the multi-volume Chronicle

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658 *Oxford English Dictionary.*
659 *Oxford English Dictionary.*
of the UPA (*Litopys of UPA*) written mainly by former UPA members who present the UPA as devoted patriots in the service of nation.\textsuperscript{660}

In post-1991 Ukraine, the books describing national martyrs have appeared under different titles such as the "book of martyrs," "book of memory," etc. They catalogue people who lost their lives (or suffered the fate of deportation, imprisonment, camp detention, repressions) under the communist regime during the famine 1932-33, or people killed during the Second World War (both in the battlefield and the civil population, mainly the Jewish victims of the Holocaust),\textsuperscript{661} in the hands of Nazi Germany or, in case of UPA, in the hands of the NKVD.\textsuperscript{662}

Such books are produced both nationwide by professional historians and locally by amateur historians. Such catalogue-like listings of victims was also published in both "Volyn’” and “Dialog” regional newspapers, as was discussed in detail in Chapter III. It is important to stress here that such lists were published by both sides in the memory battle, thus, the listings in “Volyn’” included the victims of the communist regime, and the texts in a pro-communist paper “Dialog” listed the victims of the UPA. In such a way, we can see that the same grammar of remembrance gives a form to memories which have opposite evaluations. In 2003 the 60th anniversary of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict aroused a lot of discussions as “Volyn’” newspaper published the lists of Ukrainians killed by Poles in such a martyrology style texts (see Figure 27).

\textsuperscript{660} There are about 100 volumes of the “Cronicle of the UPA” published by former soldiers of UPA from the USA and Canada.

\textsuperscript{661} See the multi-volume “Book of memory of victims of Holodomor” http://memorialholodomors.org.ua/uk/shows/exhibition-famine-genocide-road-to-truth/692

\textsuperscript{662} The Book of Sorrow of Ukraine, Rivne oblast’, in 6 volumes, Rivne: Volyns’ki Obereg, 2007. (Knyha skorboty Ukraiiny); The Book of Memory of Ukraine, Rivne oblast’, in 3 volumes, L’viv, 1995 (Knyha Pamiati Ukraiiny, Rivnens’ka oblast’, v 3x tomah, L’viv, 1995). When I spoke to people who live in Buderazh, the closest village to Hurby, I was presented with “The Books of Victims of Hoshcha’, and the “Book of Victims of Korets’,” published locally on the initiative of local historians and village councils. Both books present a long list of names of the residents of corresponding places who were on the side of UPA and were killed. Such books are numerous and the fact that people shared these books with me (gave them to me as gifts) show that they matter a lot to them, that they are proud that these people’s fates became known. Most probably, these books serve them as evidence that suppressed history was reclaimed.
As discussed, interest in the past of the OUN and UPA considerably surpassed the boundaries of the professional history and came into the pages of main newspapers and magazines, TV and radio programs, and became a “creed” to some intellectuals. The main theme underlined by intellectuals who share this creed is understanding of history as martyrology. For instance, Yevgen Sverestiuk, philosopher, former dissident and political prisoner, calls on his readers to see the life of Stepan Bandera and his family as a life of martyrs, “the martyrs of a new creed.”

The martyrs’ narratives eliminate questions of the OUN’s and UPA’s responsibility for atrocities committed both to other nationalities and to their own compatriots. To put it bluntly, martyrology leaves no space for difficult knowledge. The themes of self-sacrifice and brave endurance of suffering are emphasized in the biographies of OUN and UPA members. Thus, in one of biographies of Stepan Bandera it is stressed that Bandera from his early years was preparing himself for suffering and torture:

One day the sister of Bandera Volodymyra entered the room and saw her brother pale, with teeth clenched, with blood dripping from his fingertips… needles were under his nails. “You are crazy,” screamed Volodymyra. … “I just wanted to see whether I could survive if the enemies capture me and put the needles under my nails,” replied Bandera.

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664 Hordasevych, Halyna. Stepan Bandera: Ludyna i mif. L’viv: Apriori, 2008, p. 44. The biographies of Stepan Bandera by Posivnych and Yevhen Perepichka are written in the same martyr/hagiographical manner (See: Posivnych, Mykola. Stepan Bandera – Zhyttia
Notably, the same story is repeated in the film which introduced Bandera in the TV show “Great Ukrainians” where the visual images amplified the effect of such narratives. It should be added that the cult of martyrdom and suffering for the cause of national independence was already there in the times before the foundation of the OUN. It started in 1924, when the fate of Ol’ga Besarab, the woman who served for the UVO and who was captured by Polish police and tortured to death over the course of one night, became presented as a national martyr. Noteworthy, in one of the biographies of Bandera, Ol’ga Besarab is mentioned as a role model for the young Bandera who was allegedly inspired by her story.

Martyrology is very close to other grammar of remembrance, hagiography. Sometimes they are so close that it is difficult to differentiate between them.

Hagiography as a Grammar of Remembering

If martyrology catalogues martyrs, hagiography catalogues saints and tells the stories of saints’ lives. Like in Catholic and Orthodox traditions, martyrs often come to be worshiped as saints. Both martyrology and hagiography are connected to the calendar and prescribe certain rituals for commemorating the saint. Yet, martyrology and hagiography do have some differences.

Hagiographic narratives concentrate not only on suffering but also refer to miracles which occurred to the saints or were produced by the saints. In this sense, the whole history of the Battle of Hurby is presented as a miracle – five thousand UPA soldiers confronting thirty thousand NKVD members.

Although the UPA was actually defeated in the battle, in the memory they are the victors. In the same vein, in the mnemonic narrative, the history of the UPA – a clandestine movement of a stateless nation that managed to fight with the two main evils of the 20th century - is a miracle. All this creates the memory-cum-myth whereas in this case even the story of the myth is well recognized – an old story of David and Goliath. Although the enemies more than outnumbered the UPA soldiers, the latter continued their fight. The grounds for the longevity of the UPA’s struggle are often searched for in the abstract categories, such as truth or justice. The commentators often refer to the truth as a force that guaranteed the long struggle of the UPA. According to the logics of hagiography, truth was on the UPA’s side:

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665 The whole video can be reached in: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aKIX0-dA7sHe
666 See: Rudling. The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust.
667 Hordasevych. Stepan Bandera, p. 44.
Banderivets’ is not ambitious: you can build him a monument without a machine gun and abhorrent grenades: he always knew that against his machine gun there will be hundreds of others. So, his strength is not in a machine gun, his strength is in the truth, against which none have the power.

The UPA members are described as super-human creatures, almost unearthly beings. So, the writer Mykhailo Andrusiak in his interview about his trilogy on the UPA emphasizes that “[t]hey [UPA] were pure in their souls and strong in their spirit that is why they were able to endure these horrible tortures.”

Andrusiak stressed that because he came from the family of the UPA members he had access to the authentic voices about the events. In 2010 Andrusiak was granted Shevchenko Prize for literature for his novels, the most acclaimed literature prize in Ukraine.

Again one can see how personalized memories are travelling into memory culture, shaping the mnemonic canon. A similar mode of representation of the UPA members as people who have special spiritual strength is implemented by the former UPA soldiers in their memoirs, where they write about the commanders as heroes blessed with some unnatural characteristics that make them almost legendary, unearthly beings. Their place is not in history but in myth. For instance, in his memoirs, Mykola Androshchuk, a former UPA soldier, describes Klym Savur as follows:

He was always respectful. Always full of resolution, non-conformism, will... his look was special, extraordinary. He could see through you, through your soul. And the peasants willingly opened their souls for him.

With the significant role of the church as protector of the memory of the UPA, highlighting/brining to light/revealing/exposing/bringing out/making known difficult knowledge about the past of the UPA is a rather complicated task. Religion reinforces the nationalist narrative and pushes out the potential competitors.

If the grammar of martyrology underlines collective suffering, the grammar of hagiography refers more to the individual and is tightly connected to the cult of personality. It must be said that the cult of personality was well established in the OUN ideology. In the OUN-B it became even more intense after the assassination of Bandera in 1959. By 1968, when the Fourth Congress

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668 Sverestiuk. “Pam’atnyk banderivtsevi.”
670 Andrusiak. Interview “Dokumental’na istoria UPA.”
was held, assassinated leaders of the OUN were elevated to religious icons, included in prayers to “the national Trinity – Konovalets’, Shukhevych, Bandera.”

In such a subtle way, nationalism is constructed as a religion with its set of martyrs, saints, and creed (Decalogue, ideology, etc.) The “Decalogue of Ukrainian nationalist” is often equated to the “credo” in religious tradition (see Annex 1). In a similar manner, the “Twelve attributes of the character of the Ukrainian nationalist” and “44 rules of life of the Ukrainian nationalist” were to function as a dogma for those who became the members of the OUN or supported the “cause.”

The same kind of sacrifice is glorified, and indeed demanded, in the nationalist discourse from everyone at present. The deeds of nationalists in the past are portrayed as a direct cause of state independence today. Hagiographic narratives also structure non-linguistic spaces, the hardware of memory. Many monuments to the OUN and UPA are topped with crosses. The crosses not only delineate a symbolic grave in a Christian tradition but also endow the fallen with an aura of sainthood. It is especially evident in the case of the Klym Savur chapel on the territory of the Hrabnyk cemetery. The Soviet prisoners of war who were killed by Nazis in Rivne prison were reburied in collective graves in 1967. As discussed, in 2001 in this cemetery the Chapel in memory to Klym Savur was built.


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672 Rudling. “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust.”
When the chapel to Klym Savur was built, such a symbolic gesture connected a site of memory established in the Soviet time with a new site of memory established in the independent Ukraine. This chapel adds new dimensions to the memory of Savur as whole, it obviously adds an aura of holiness and sainthood to the figure of Savur and collectively - to the UPA, as the chapels are not meant to honor “simply” national heroes in such a way. By dedicating a chapel to a UPA soldier the memory actors turn him into a saint, constructing in such a way the mnemonic figure saturated with holiness.

Such memorialization has a strong connection to myth as it makes the person immortal and even fuels a belief in a resurrection. The inscription that acknowledges Savur and the other UPA soldiers means that this chapel is dedicated not to one person alone but to the whole army of insurgents collectively. Peculiarly, although the monument’s place on Soborna Street was identified as the alleged grave of Savur, on the stone under the dome of the chapel we read:

The chapel in memory of Head Commander of UPA Klym Savur (Dmytro Kliakhkiv’s’kyi) and thousands of other heroes of national liberation battles of/in 1918-1950s who found peace in unnamed graves in “Hrabnyk.”
Eternal Memory to Fighters for Freedom of Ukraine!
Glory to Ukraine!
Glory to Heroes!

To the left side of the inscription a trident can be seen, a national symbol of Ukraine, combined with a cross on the top. This image is quite widely used in the iconography of the monuments of the UPA that best demonstrates how religion is woven into the memory of the OUN and UPA. In the same way, as
discussed above, the memorial complex at Hurby presents the whole place as a sacred space and turns visitors into “pilgrims” endowing the whole journey there with the aura of a trip to a holy place. Of note, in the construction of both memory sites (chapel of Klym Savur and Pantheon of Heroes) the church (Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate) was one of the main supporters along with national-democratic and nationalist parties.

Figure 30. Column in Hurby with the Statue of Pokrova on the top and 33 crypts on the bottom of the column. The construction site for the monastery with one building already built to the left. Photo: Yuliya Yurchuk, October 2011.

My analysis would be not complete if I did not mention here a strong link between commemoration and prayer. The prayer reveals not only our wishes for those who are dead (so that they lie in peace, their memory preserved, etc.) but it is also our wish for ourselves. We pray for someone simultaneously as we pray for ourselves. Flowers brought to the graves or to the monuments are not only a gift from us to the dead - it is also our repentance, our confession, our way of coming to terms with the dead and coming to terms with our own selves. The emotional aspect of such commemorations is rather strong which gives rituals, although they take place, collectively a strong personal dimension. At the same time, prayer establishes a liturgical silence that characterizes the re-emergence of the UPA in general.\footnote{In this regard, see Winter’s discussion on “liturgical silences” which “touch on the sacred, and on eternal themes of loss, mourning, sacrifice and redemption. They are clearly linked to fundamental moral problems, described in reflections on theodicy, or the conundrum as to why, if God is all good, evil exists in the world... [they] are essential parts of mourning practices in many religious traditions.” Such silence is “part of public understanding of war and violence” (Winter. “Thinking about Silence,” p. 4).}

The martyrological and hagiographical ways of remembering are not unique to Ukraine. In the insightful study on Russian culture the Swedish Slavist Per-Arne Bodin demonstrated that institutionalized Christianity significantly influences the cultural and memory politics in Russia.\footnote{Bodin, Per-Arne. Language, Canonization and Holy Foolishness. Studies in Postsoviet Russian Culture and the Orthodox Tradition. Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2009.} In the case of Russia it is the imperial myth that dominates the formation of these
politics. In the Ukrainian case, though, we can speak about the persistence of the colonial myth that subjugates Ukraine to the position of a victim.

**Grammar of Heroic Epos**

The grammar of heroic epos produces narratives which underline the heroic deeds of the UPA. This heroic epos is presented in a form of a tragedy where the UPA members/soldiers are tragic heroes who, under the pressure of history (understood as fatum), had no choice but to act as they did. In these narratives the UPA heroes are represented as revolutionaries, dreamers or idealists, and Ukrainian knights.

As mentioned previously, Sverestiuk describes the UPA insurgents as “really noble (shliakhetni) people.” Or as a speaker at the ceremony of opening of one of the monuments to the UPA soldiers in Rivne region put it:

> We came here with the feeling of great respect to these knights, feeling deep gratefulness for their sacrifice, for the fact that they did not kneel in front of their subjugators and paid with their lives for the idea of Independence and Unity (Sobornist’) of Ukraine.

The best illustration of such grammar in practice may be the description of UPA soldiers in the book “UPA: History of the Unbroken,” published by the Institute of National Memory as additional material to the exhibition about the UPA organized by the Institute in 2008-2009. The book’s author is Volodymyr Viatrovych, the director of the Center of Research of Liberation Movement, which was discussed in the previous chapter. In his characterization, the interwar generation of idealists became the breeding ground for the OUN and UPA: “Young, full of energy, often unpredictable idealists – they defined political life in Western Ukraine in the interwar period, they became the basis for the Ukrainian liberation movement, the basis for the OUN and UPA.”

Elsewhere in the same book we see the OUN and UPA compared to knights:

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676 Bodin. *Language, Canonization and Holy Foolishness.*
677 It has to be added that memory of the Cossacks as discussed in detail in the previous chapters serve as the premediation of memory of the UPA in line with the grammar of heroic epos. In this respect, the Cossacks are presented specifically as Ukrainain knights (see particularly: Zabuzhko. *Notre Dame d’Ukraine.*).
680 Viatrovych et al.. *Ukraïns’ka Povstans’ka Armia*, p. 16.
[The OUN] was conceived not as an ordinary political organization but as an order of fighters for the liberation of Ukraine. That is why more attention was paid not to the program of concrete social problems but to the moral and ethical preparation of the members, educating of the knights of Ukrainian idea. In this regard the OUN resembles medieval military and religious orders. “God and Ukraine” were the key concepts of educational process, and the main principles were enlisted in “Decalogue of the Ukrainian Nationalist,” “Twelve markers of the Ukrainian Nationalist,” and “44 rules of life of the Ukrainian Nationalist,” which not only in form but also in content were similar to religious canons (emphasis added).681

Curiously, neither Decalogue, nor the 12 markers or 44 rules were cited in the book as of course a reader could ask awkward questions as to which religious canon would establish such principles as “Gain Ukrainian statehood or die in the fight for it!” as the first point in the Decalogue reads.682

The revolutionary element is underlined by comparisons of the OUN and UPA leaders to the world’s most known revolutionaries. Thus, in the annotation to the biography of Stepan Bandera “Stepan Bandera: a person and a myth,” the leader of the OUN-B is compared to such national revolutionary heroes as Garibaldi in Italy, Pancho Villa in Mexico, and Simon Bolivar in Bolivia.683

Interestingly, the grammar of heroic epos governs the narratives of liberal intellectuals too in their evaluations of the memory of the OUN and UPA. Thus, media studies scholar Volodymyr Kulyk pointed out:

Today […] it is not enough to have only Shevchenko and Stus.684 [Today] Bandera and Shukhevych are needed…. The present anti-imperial opposition has to refer to both Shukhevych and Bandera, strengthening in this way the partisan element of nationalist resistance against terrorists and [strengthening] the democratic struggle against totalitarianism. Moreover, thousands of ordinary soldiers of the UPA should be honored as heroes, as they fortified resistance not as professional warriors but as people engaged at a time of a threat to their existence.685

This statement clearly shows the scholar’s resentment with the situation in the country, when probably he himself sees the threats to the existence of Ukrainian state. Thus, both heroes in the person of the poets Taras Shevchenko and Vasyl’ Stus do not seem to the scholar to be appropriate models for

681 Ibidem, p. 18.
682 “Decalogue of Ukrainian nationalist” written by one of the ideologists of OUN Stepan Lenkavs’kyi (see Annex 1).
684 Vasyl’ Stus (1938 - 1985), was a Ukrainian poet and an active member of dissident movement.
resistance to a “totalitarian” and “terrorist” system represented by the Yanukovych regime.

It should be stressed that Kulyk wrote the article shortly after Yanukovych’s government signed the “Kharkiv treaties” with Russia on 21 April 2010. The treaties that prolonged the Russian naval presence in Crimea from 2017 to 2042 were seen as a national betrayal by many, including Kulyk, who commented on this in the same article:

I understand that my position is now dictated partly by my outrage with the Kharkiv Treaties and despair with the inability of the opposition to prevent Yanukovych’s economic policies at cost of territorial integrity and national identity.\(^{686}\)

Thus, again we see the tendency that was traced throughout our analysis many times – in times of existential insecurity, when the threats to national existence are perceived, the memory of the OUN and UPA is invoked with particular strength and regularity. Kulyk stresses that in memory culture Bandera as well as the OUN and UPA as a whole function as a symbol of anti-Russian, anti-imperialist “national liberation orientation.”\(^{687}\)

Being particularly familiar with the OUN and UPA’s dark past, Kulyk also points to the need to “speak in scholarly works and in history textbooks, in museum expositions, newspaper articles and TV shows about ideas and deeds of leaders and range members of the OUN and UPA which are incompatible with democratic values.”\(^{688}\)

The scholar also recognizes a very important position in memory battles in Ukraine. He warns about the threats which the monopoly of undemocratic nationalist parties (such as “Svoboda”) over memory of the OUN and UPA would mean – it would mean:

the monopoly over the present struggle and misuse of the nonconformist idealism of the youth who would be dressed in leather jackets and led under xenophobic slogans.\(^{689}\)

Hence, as long as the ownership of memory of the OUN and UPA is dispersed among different actors representing different political views or even apolitical groups, it is an oversimplification to claim that the heroic narrative of the OUN and UPA is shared exclusively by nationalists and far-right parties’ supporters OR: only. The grammar of the heroic epos, though, constructs such a heroic narrative in use of all memory actors involved.

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\(^{687}\) Ibidem, pp. 383-384.

\(^{688}\) Ibidem, p. 386.

\(^{689}\) Ibidem.
Grammar of Prophecy/Oracular Pronouncement

The grammar of prophecy underlines a close link between the past and the future in a narrative of the past. Such a narrative often warns the present day public about the possible threats and risks the future may yield. It projects possible future scenarios that depend upon the actions and decisions today. Through the grammar of prophecy, time acquires its mythical cyclic structure – what was in the past can repeat itself in the present and in the future. Thus, connecting the past to the future is done in two distinct ways:

First, speaking about the past, alternative futures are discussed in accordance with the formula “if not X then Y,” i.e. if there is no UPA in the past, then there is no independence in the present; if there is no UPA in the past, then all Ukrainians would be killed (as in narratives on Holmshchyna discussed in Chapter III). In such a way, an “alternative historiography” is created and this alternative has apocalyptic consequences.

As one of the students wrote on the importance of the memory of the UPA:

the UPA was fighting for the independence of Ukraine, so that future generations could have a decent life, it would be egoistical on our part not to honor their memory.  

Or as another student reiterated:

I think that we have to know and respect our history, remember the people who gave up their lives for victory, for our independence.

Second, when speaking about the past, not remembering this past today is condemned in accordance with the following formula: “If you do not remember X then Y.” The consequence clause most often also has the apocalyptic character. For instance, the Ukrainian intellectual Mykola Riabchuk, while defending the right for heroic representations of the OUN and UPA, distinguishes between two legacies in OUN heritage – one negative and one positive. The scholar calls for the importance of positive legacies understood as “patriotism, national solidarity, self-sacrifice, idealist devotion to common aims and values.” Riabchuk associates one’s adherence to this positive legacy as a choice for Ukrainians to protect their national sovereignty, dignity, and identity. Adherence to negative legacies would mean surrender to Russia and local “Ukrainophobic creoles.”

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690 Olga K. Essays/RSU.
691 Oksana V. Essays/RSU.
692 Oksana V. Essays/RSU.
In such a way, the second type of prophetic narrative is realized, schematically presented as follows:

if not adhering to the memory of the OUN and UPA, then surrendering to Russia and “creoles” [who are those who internalized the colonizers’ views about themselves].

Thus, rejection of the OUN’s heritage would be not the acceptance of liberal democratic values but acceptance of the view of colonizers on the Ukrainian history and identity.

In Riabchuk’s opinion, “banderivets” “became the synonym of each conscious, non-Russified, non-Sovietised Ukrainian; the metonym of disobedient “Friday” who refuses to accept cultural and political domination of the Russian “Robinson Crusoe.” Thus, anti-Russian and anti-Soviet orientation is again the main motivation behind pro-OUN and UPA discourse. In a similar vein, Roman Serbyn in his pro-OUN and UPA response to the critical article of John-Paul Himka stressed:

At present, pro-Ukrainian myths are being attacked from many quarters, and the efforts to discredit them seem to be gaining strength. In Ukraine itself, not to speak of Russia, state and church structures seem overly favorable to some form of the “Russian world” myth. With the weakening of Ukrainocentric myths, citizens of Ukraine will be drawn into the orbit of the myth-rich “Russian World.”

The Canadian scholar of Ukrainian origin warns about the risks that the refusal from pro-Ukrainian myths would lead to strengthening the “Russian world” myth. Such a polarized view on the past, of course, raises questions about the search for the balanced view each historian would ideally seek without necessarily being labeled as “pro-Ukrainian” or “pro-Russian.”

The philosopher James Hatley speaks about prophetic stories as stories which seek to re-awaken others to responsibility. In such a way the listeners of a story are called as witnesses. After witnessing they are entitled to responsibility. To remember becomes a responsibility of everyone who is addressed in such prophecies. In the same vein, Susan Handelman notes that

695 Ibidem.
696 Ibidem.
the prophetic voice is the voice that awakens the listener to the proximity of the other.\textsuperscript{699}

Thus, such narratives invoke empathy from the side of the listener. In such a way we deal with two ethical dimensions of remembering: the ethics of remembering directed to the past (responsibility in the face of the dead) and the ethics of remembering directed to the future (responsibility in the face of the present and the future).

Above it was established that the memory of the OUN and UPA was often promoted in line with claims for justice. In this regard, the grammar of prophecy articulates the duty to establish justice as it helps to construct a narrative which invokes a feeling of collective responsibility in the face of the dead ancestors who were pushed into oblivion by the communist regime. Through prophetic narratives remembrance acquires a soteriological feature - as it is perceived that exactly memory guarantees survival and salvation.

Concluding Remarks

To sum up, in this chapter the main generic mechanisms that shape the memories of the OUN and UPA were defined. These mechanisms were called grammars of remembrance. Having traced these repeated structures I have shown how a particular tradition of remembering is formed, how some elements of history are shifted out of memory space, while others move into the central positions in meaning-generating structures. It was set out that each grammar produces a cluster of similar representations that operate with the help of the same rhetoric and logics, which make each cluster distinctive. I came to the conclusion that there are four distinctive grammars of remembering: the grammar of martyrology, the grammar of hagiography, the grammar of heroic epos, and the grammar of prophecy.

All these grammars of remembering work together and promote a heroic and one-faceted picture of the past. These grammars help press “difficult knowledge” out of the memory space. They allow the metamorphosis of historical figures into mythical mnemonic figures, or symbols, stripped of the historical dimension of historical personalities and loaded with values and characteristics more appropriate to the present moment than to the past. On the other hand, though, one should not underestimate the importance of the past itself, as it is the past which provides traditions that transmit remembrance. Importantly, these traditions transmit both Soviet-bred

memory and new heroic narrative of the OUN and UPA as it will be demonstrated in the following chapter dedicated to the reception of memory.
Chapter VI. Encountering the Past (Im)Perfect

Reception of Monuments

This part is dedicated to the reception of monuments which were produced as a result of the memory work that was discussed in the previous chapters. Without enquiring how memory is received one cannot fully understand how the process of remembering works, as memory strategies are not formed in isolation and they aim at certain audiences. Young pointed out:

> public memory and its meanings depend not just on the forms and figures in the monument itself, but on the viewer’s response to the monument, how it is used politically and religiously in the community, who sees it under what circumstances, how its figures enter other media and are recast in new surroundings.\(^\text{700}\)

Ideologues can with great efforts unificate the public representations of history but not their individual interpretations. As Erll pointed out:

> a ‘memory’ which is represented by the media and institutions must be brought to life by individuals, by members of a community of remembrance, who may be conceived of as *points de vue* (Maurice Halbwachs) on shared notions of the past. Without such actualizations, monuments, rituals, and books are nothing but dead material failing to have any impact in the societies.\(^\text{701}\)

A lack of response from these audiences makes the whole memory politics redundant as it shows that there is no need and interest in dealing with the past addressed by memory actors. There should be a certain demand from the side of the public that would form the offer from the side of active memory entrepreneurs. Here I present a small-scale bottom-up approach that shifts attention away from the state and regional memory politics and considers agents of remembrance at the level of individuals who are not directly involved in the production of memory.

The material for analysis was gathered in two different ways: first, I asked students of a college and a university to write the essays on the topic

\(^{700}\) Young, *The Texture of Memory*, p. xii.

“The memory of World War Two as it is represented in the Rivne cityscape”; second, I collected interviews at the monument to Klym Savur in Rivne. References to a city’s memoryscape and the monument of the Klym Savur were used as a trigger for discussions on individuals’ knowledge about the OUN and UPA. What is actually known about history by individuals who every day encounter representations of memory that matter so much in the elites’ battles? Having at hand the results of analysis of the process of memory production we can now answer the following question: does the individuals’ image of the past differ from the image propagated by memory entrepreneurs? Do the views of those who witness the monument reflect the meanings which are invested by memory actors? What is decisive in the formation of individual interpretations of history?

Troubled Knowing: Students’ Essays on War and Memory

In my pursuit to access the recipients’ knowledge of history I first addressed students of the Rivne Cooperative Economics and Law College (RCELC) who were in their second year of study (i.e. between 17-18 years old). The selection of this institution was done for two different reasons: first, the specific location of the college – its close vicinity to the monument of Klym Savur, to the chapel built in memory of Klym Savur, to Stepan Bandera street, as well as to a couple of Soviet-era war memorials. All these details made me think that students will be facilitated in their task to write short essays on the topic “The memory of World War Two as it is represented in the Rivne cityscape.” The second reason was a purely practical one – having acquaintances at this college made it easier for me to get access to the students.

At the college there is no special education program for historians, all the students are supposed to take a general course in Ukrainian and world history. Only those students who wished wrote essays, it certainly meant that not all the students who had been asked to write an essay, wrote it. The weakness of this method was that students were allowed to write an essay at home if they did not feel ready to write it in the class. Thus, the moment of spontaneity and originality was lost, but on the other hand, students had more time to think about the question and, if needed, look for the answers in some sources or ask their families or colleagues. In the end I received 15 essays. All those who volunteered to write the essays were females.

The essays were very different in content and length. Some students just listed the events of the war without giving any evaluation or personal conclusions. On the other hand, even the selected passages shed light on what an author considered important and worth mentioning. The essays differed in size, ranging from two or three paragraphs to four full pages. What I got in the essays was quite unexpected. First, students made some changes in the title of the essay itself and the notion of “memory” disappeared from the question in many works. The titles ranged from “Ukrainians in the WWII” to “Rivne in
World War II.” Probably, those titles reflected more the essay topics that the students were accustomed to write in history lessons. Second, from the essays it became quite obvious that students predominantly do not relate the history of the Second World War with the history of the UPA. Third, in all the essays Ukrainians (often interchangeably referred to as Rivne residents) were portrayed as heroes, and Germans as absolute evil, without any intermediate descriptions. Russians, or any other ethnic groups, were almost always not mentioned at all. In most instances the Soviet master-narrative structured the students’ narratives with the emphasis on heroism and self-sacrifice that led to the Great Victory. In some essays, though, we could trace influences of both Soviet and Ukrainian national schemes of history.

Not a word was said in all 15 essays about any “site of memory” related to the OUN or UPA. Even in the instance when Stepan Bandera street was mentioned in the context of the memorial plaque to the “people killed in the Second World War” that was constructed in this street (no connection between the street’s name and the memory of war was made):

In the area of the present Bandera street in 1967 the memorial plaque was erected in honor of the Rivne residents who lost their lives in the war.702

Almost all sites of memory mentioned by the students were related to the Soviet grand narrative of war that did not include any mention of the UPA. Thus, one student wrote: “close to Rivne Ethnographic Museum there is a bunker of Reichskommissariat Ukraine that has remained here from the period of German occupation under Erich Koch.”703 Of note, the Soviet master narrative was reproduced in almost all of the essays. Thus, Rivne oblast’ was mentioned as “partisan land (partyzans’kyi krai), the place of active resistance against the fascist occupation.”704 Soviet partisans are presented as patriots and defenders of their Motherland:

With the aim to pull together and strengthen the activity of patriotic forces on 19 December 1942 the TsK KP(b)U [Central committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine] took the decision to let the party led by Begma to organize the Rivne underground oblast committee (obkom).705

The main heroes mentioned are partisans and Soviet commanders. The names of Red Army General Mykola Vatutin and of partisans who operated on the ground were repeated in several essays.706 In the evaluation parts the essays

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703 Kateryna Z., Essays/RCELC.
704 Olga P., Essays/RRCCEL.
705 Ganna S., Essays/RRCCEL.
706 Novak, O斯塔fов, M.I. Potapov, I.M. Muzychenko, Sydir Kovpak were among the names of Soviet partisans mentioned in the essays.
mainly repeat the heroic ethos established by the Soviet official narrative. As one of the students put it: “I believe that the Soviet Army was the most courageous in the whole world.”

A well-distinguished feature of the essays was that those students who referred to their grandparents’ recollections wrote in a more emotionally charged and personalized way:

From stories I heard from my grandmothers and grandfathers I know that the war brought a lot of sorrow to many people and took lives of many. Although my grandparents did not live in Rivne then and were still children they do remember those events. My grandpa had to leave his native land (Poland) in Operation Vistula and live in the east of our country, and only much later he moved to Rivne oblast’. The war has affected a lot of Ukrainians and it will remain in the memory, in tearful and painful recollections (emphasis added).

Thus, the personal dimension of suffering and loss are shown when the author comes to describing recollections. Of note, students who mentioned their grandparents’ experiences mentioned them in conclusions, in a way as if the thoughts of their grandparents were presented as their own evaluation and assessment of war.

Another student whose grandparents lived in a village described the life of peasants during the war as the most difficult: “the peasants suffered the most because they were killed and they were murdered by famine (yih moryly holodom).” The phrase “murdered by famine” gives connotations to another node of cultural memory in Ukraine – the famine of 1932-33, known as Holodomor. As it will be discussed below, Holodomor was rather often associated with UPA history which gives us hints that the main theme of suffering shapes the memory of both the UPA and famine.

Moreover, students who referred to their families used the most affected language: “It was a horrible time,” "towns and villages were without people, all in ruins,” “My grandfather told me a story about his father who was in the war. He had lived through terrible years.” Some essays become very detailed when it came to personal recollections of students' grandparents:

My relatives dug a bunker and hid there, they were sleeping on the ground, covered with straw, they had a cup and a spoon, they swept out footprints so that no one could find them. Their house was destroyed, they dug the bunker near the place of the house, at that site they used to have a kitchen garden. In this horrible bunker they survived. Unfortunately my grandpa is dead now. But

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707 Hryystya M., Essays/RCELC.
708 Dana K., Essays/RCELC.
709 Vlada R., Dana K., Essays/RCELC.
710 Ksenia P., Essays/RCELC.
711 Ksenia P., Essays/RCELC.
712 Moroz Y. Essays/RCELC.
when I asked him about those years he used to say: “learn well because you are a future Ukrainian and all the future depends only on you and your strength!” (emphasis added).  

Thus, we see how the student reproduces her grandfather’s admonishment governed by the grammar of prophecy, whereas one’s future is seen as threatened by past experiences of suffering unless one is strong and performs well at school.

Those narratives, which refer to family experiences, get more complicated when they contain some reflections on individual choice, personal morals in the harsh conditions of war, where the boundaries between perpetrators and victims blur:

The most horrible thing is that even at that time our people (svoi ludy) wanted to be patriots and killed their friends and neighbors (emphasis added).

Some students did mention the OUN and the UPA in a rather obscure context: “Roman Shukhevych assisted in the liberating of Rivne territory by founding here the Ukrainian republic.” In this instance it is not clear what the student means. This note, though, indicates that there is some reflection on the role of Shukhevych in the war, and especially with a positive association to liberation.

In those essays where the UPA is mentioned, the UPA’s struggle is represented as the struggle against all occupants - Russians, Poles, and Germans:

The UPA protected people against the Russian occupants. ... UPA soldiers were fighting for the freedom of the state against German occupants, against Polish and anti-Ukrainian forces, against Russian occupants. They were real successors of the Cossack tradition, they were not mobilized to the UPA by force, with hardships they sought out weapons, and swore to fight to the death. In the case of deadlock they preferred suicide to being taken in captivity. They are the real knights of Ukraine. A nationalist means a person who serves his or her nation and not the other state. ... On 5 July 1941 Germany took Bandera to Berlin for interrogation. On 15 September 1941 first mass arrests took place. Hundreds of people ended up in concentration camps and prisons.

Such cases indicate that the UPA for students directly means all Ukrainians, which makes it possible for them to compare the UPA against Russians and all the “anti-Ukrainian forces” on a mere ethnical basis.

A presupposed all-inclusive collective agent such as “Ukrainian people” is perhaps best seen in the passages where students write about the killing of the Jews. The Jewish population is presented as some foreign

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713 Ksenia P.Essays/RCELC.
714 Ksenia P.Essays/RCELC.
715 Vlada R Essays/RCELC.
716 Melena L.Essays/RCELC
community who are just temporarily present in the supposedly ethnically homogeneous region:

Rivne during the Second World War was the place of hiding of Jews. [...] In Rivne there is still the monument to the victims of political repressions. The Jews suffered the most. Out of the 27,000 Jews of Rivne 21,000 were killed (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{717}

In this instance we see that Jews are recognized as the “most suffering” group, although they are shifted out from the life of the city, they were just “hiding” there. Furthermore, the killings of Jews are associated with political repressions, not with their ethnicity. When speaking about mass killings, students first of all underline “Ukrainian” losses:

In November 1943, the Gestapo murdered more than 350 prisoners of Rivne prison among them were the most nationally conscious representatives of local intelligentsia and clergy.\textsuperscript{718}

Notably, in all the cases where the murder of Jews was mentioned, it was never referred to as the Holocaust. Probably, this term is not yet integrated into the vernacular. The fact of mentioning of Jews as a separate groups of victims, however, suggests that the Soviet historical scheme is undermined by new trends of thought (although they are only rarely present in the essays).

The problem of collaboration on the part of the local population with the Nazis is totally omitted in the essays. Half of the students explicitly stressed the fact that the power in the occupied Rivne was in the hands of the fascists, and not Ukrainians. Thus, Ukrainians had no responsibility for any of the cruelties committed on their land.

While speaking about fascists the students often use emotionally charged language referring to Nazis as “monsters” (neludy) and “cruel people.”\textsuperscript{719}

Significantly, the Ukrainian-Polish conflict in Volhynia was not mentioned directly by any of the students. Two instances when Poland was mentioned refer to the stories mentioned above where the student’s grandfather had to leave Poland in the course of Operation Vistula. This forced resettlement is represented as a loss of the Motherland followed by the hardships of deportation. Another instance is mentioning the Poles in respect of the UPA struggle “against Polish and anti-Ukrainian forces.”\textsuperscript{720}

Nevertheless, no further discussion was held about the character and

\textsuperscript{717} Lubava K. Essays/RCELC.
\textsuperscript{718} Kateryna Z. Essays/RCELC.
\textsuperscript{719} Teresa G. Essays/RCELC.
\textsuperscript{720} Melena L. Essays/RCELC.
consequences of such an anti-Polish struggle or who are meant by the term anti-Ukrainian forces.

As I did not get much information about the memory of the OUN and UPA from the essays of the college’s students, I addressed another group of students, this time of the Rivne Slavonic University with slightly amended questions. I decided to reformulate the question and asked specifically about the OUN and UPA in several stages: What do you know about the OUN and UPA? Which monuments, streets, memorial places in our town are connected to the memory of the OUN and UPA? Is it important to commemorate the OUN and UPA in monuments and streets?

History students were specifically rejected. The group that was chosen were English language students in the fourth year of study, which means that they were about 21-22 years old. They wrote essays directly in class while I was sitting with them and waiting. So, this time students did not have a chance to consult any books or people. They had about an hour to complete their essays. In contrast to the first group, the essays I got from the second group were much shorter, possibly because they did not have any chance to contact anyone for advice or to look up information in the literature or somewhere else. So, in this case I got “pure” knowledge, something that is already in their minds if they are asked about the OUN and UPA without warning and what they can give as first-hand answers without any preparation. In sum, I got 13 essays, not one of the group rejected the chance to write, perhaps, my and their teacher's presence did not give them the choice. In this group too, all the students were females.

In respect of the first question concerning factual knowledge about the OUN and UPA, the answers were very limited. Some students wrote honestly that they did not know anything. Some wrote a sentence or two, often with mistaken facts, the following being an example: “the main leaders of the UPA were Bandera, Mel’nyk and Klymov.”721 Obviously this student had heard something about Klym Savur and got the name confused. Some students associated Symon Petliura with the history of the OUN and UPA.722 This might indicate that the UPA takes the same place as the UNR in the imaginary space about national liberation and independence. It echoes the strategies of memory politics undertaken by regional national elites who promoted commemoration of both the UNR and OUN and UPA simultaneously.

Elsewhere in the essay a student tackled the difficult knowledge of collaboration whereas she stressed the primacy of the aim of such collaboration understood as the possibility to gain independence:

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721 Natalia Z. Essays/RCELC.
722 Larysa A. Essays/RCELC.
In the beginning the UPA hoped that Hitler would help them [in fighting for Ukrainian independence], but it did not happen. The UPA were fighting against the Red Army, Poles, and Germans.\textsuperscript{723}

The UPA always fought for the independence of Ukraine. In the beginning they placed great hopes on Hitler but their hopes were in vain. They were fighting against the Red Army.\textsuperscript{724}

In one of the essays a student referred to her own family when writing about the UPA: “My grandpa who is now 84 is very much pro-UPA. He even wanted me to read about them in some books.”\textsuperscript{725} Most probably, the student did not have much interest in listening to her grandfather’s advice as she did not write any specific answer to the question about the UPA. Still her grandfather’s attitude to the UPA might well have influenced the student’s views on them, as in the evaluative part the student wrote that she “strongly supports the idea of commemorating the OUN and UPA.”\textsuperscript{726}

While having a rather limited knowledge about the history of the OUN and UPA, the students referred to their everyday experiences to answer the question about the sites of memory:

I do not know a lot about the memory of the OUN and UPA in Rivne but in Kostopil’ region there is a special day in October (I do not remember the exact day, though) which specifically commemorates the UPA. In our school years we were taken to that monument [on that day], there was a red and black flag mounted near the monument. The ceremony in honor of the UPA memory took place there. My street is also named in their honor \textit{Vulytsia Povstans’ka} (Insurgent Street).\textsuperscript{727}

A lack of knowledge about the OUN and UPA means that she might not be interested in these commemorations as such, still being socialized through school she does know about the existence of special days, ceremonies and monuments dedicated to the nationalists. She also knows that they merit honor even without knowing who they actually were. The mere fact of commemoration makes her believe that such honor is deserved.

Some students referred to both their home town and to Rivne when speaking about the commemoration:

In summer in my hometown (Zdolbuniv) there are special events in honor of the UPA. I know that in Rivne there is a monument to one of the commanders of the UPA on Pushkin Street.\textsuperscript{728}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[723]{Natalia Z. Essays/RCELC.}
\footnotetext[724]{Oksana V. Essays/RCELC.}
\footnotetext[725]{Orysia F. Essays/RCELC.}
\footnotetext[726]{Orysia F. Essays/RCELC.}
\footnotetext[727]{Alina K. Essays written by Rivne Slavonic University students, 12 October 2011 (Essays/RSU).}
\footnotetext[728]{Natalia Z. Essays/RSU.}
\end{footnotes}
This “one of the commanders of the UPA on Pushkin Street” is Klym Savur. This monument was mentioned by two more students without mentioning the exact name but knowing that some UPA leader is memorialized in Pushkin Street.729

Students seemed to have the fewest troubles in answering the third question concerning their opinion about the commemoration of the OUN and UPA. Even those students who honestly wrote that they had no idea about who the OUN and UPA were, wrote that it is very important to honor them because “each Ukrainian has to know his own history.”730

One student emphasized the moral obligation to honor the memory of those who fought for independence:

The UPA was fighting for the independence of Ukraine, so that next generations could have a decent life, it would be egoistic on our part not to honor their memory.731

This view is echoed in several essays:

I think that we have to know and respect our history, remember the people who gave their lives for victory, for our independence.732

They were protecting us from our enemies that is why we need to honor them.733

The UPA wanted only the good for Ukraine.734

Some students explicitly praised the politics of memory that supports commemoration of the OUN and UPA and associated the politics with the state, not the region, or the city:

I personally support the idea and am positive about such a reaction of the state [building the monuments] towards the people who gave their lives for future independent Ukraine. In such a way, the Ukrainian state is upholding the consciousness of Ukrainians.735

Thus, the main imperative to commemoration in view of the students was the obligation of Ukrainians to know “their” history. Another key reason is the moral obligation to honor the memory of those who fought for independence, whereas independence is perceived as a guarantee of the “decent life.” Moreover, commemoration of the OUN and UPA is linked to upholding the

729 Nadia P. Essays/RSU; Oksana V. Essays/RSU.
730 Olena M. Essays/RSU.
731 Olga K. Essays/RSU.
732 Oksana V. Essays/RSU.
733 Nadia P. Essays/RSU.
734 Lena O. Essays/RSU.
735 Lesya D.Essays/RSU.
consciousness of Ukrainians, which indicates that in the view of the students the memory of the OUN and UPA is regarded as an integral part of national identity. All this goes in tandem with our argumentation about the grammars that govern the narrative of the OUN and UPA. We see that these grammars govern the narratives of the students essays as well, both where they reproduce the Soviet scheme of history or the national one.

To sum up the findings from all 28 essays, the students demonstrated a rather limited knowledge of factual history, but all seemed to have predominantly positive views on the OUN and UPA. The first group of essays, where students had more time for preparation and could reflect on the war memory in general, demonstrates that the history of the OUN and UPA is viewed as separate, but parallel, to the history of the Second World War. Several essays mentioned the UPA and presented Rivne as “the partisan land.”

But the UPA is presented as a party that took an active part in liberation as well. In such a way both schemes of history, the Soviet and the Ukrainian national one are entangled in the production of the students’ narratives on war memory. In the essays, the UPA struggle is presented as an “impact event” in Assmann’s understanding of the events that concern “moments of rapture that challenge the psychic and cultural continuity of a group or a nation.”

These events are articulated through impact narratives that “revolve around a hot kernel or what has been called ‘the access of the Real’ in contentious and competing attempts at reshaping and reinterpreting them, always coping with the essential non-representability of the impact event.”

In the case of the OUN and UPA, the difficult knowledge about killing of “their own folk” is reshaped and reinterpreted in such a way that the “patriots” are forced to kill their compatriots, or in other cases the UPA together with the Red Army are presented as “liberators” whereas the whole past saturated as it is with conflicts and tensions disappears, it gets repressed and displaced so that the only thing that is left is “liberation.”

The second group of essays, in particular, demonstrates the abundance of such displacements. Although students could not provide “facts” on the given episode of history, they all had demonstrated their “emotional knowledge” on the topic, whereas such concepts as “independence,” “liberation,” “decent life,” “victory” served as a ground of positive beliefs and evaluations that formed their knowledge about the past. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that personal every-day experiences (e.g. school visits to memorial places) and “passive” observation influenced students’ perceptions of the OUN and UPA not less than factual knowledge that they gained at school, university, or through their family. The family brings new aspects into students’ narratives. Family memories make the narratives more emotional.

736 Assmann. Impact and Resonance, p. 31.
737 Ibidem, p. 32.
and engaged which becomes evident in the evaluative part, whereby attitudes of one’s grandparents are presented as those of students themselves.

“We Must Remember Their Sacrifice”

Visitors’ Perspective on the OUN and UPA’s Past

In this part I scrutinize the visitors’ views on a particular monument which I hope will shed light on the way the past of the OUN and UPA is perceived by people who are not directly involved in the memory production process. James Young claimed that ‘how and what we recognize in the company of a monument depends very much on who we are, why we care to remember, and how we see.’ At first, I wondered what people see when they pass by the monument and what they think about the history this monument represent. I used the monument to trigger their thoughts about the history. This part of the chapter presents the results of the interviews conducted near the monument to Klym Savur which was built in Rivne in 2002. I tried to find answers to the following questions: How do people who are neither politicians nor professional historians or civic activists deal with contradictory events in history? Which meanings are conveyed to people when they look at the monument? How does the history represented in the monument relate to the identity of the interviewees?

A monument may stay unnoticed for many, but when asked to reflect on its meaning people start making sense not only of the monument but also of the history embodied in that monument.

In previous chapters I came to the conclusion that in the discussions about the UPA and the necessity of its commemoration the most predominant themes are: 1) self-sacrifice and victimhood of the whole Ukrainian nation; 2) the presentation of independence as the highest value that justifies all wrongdoings; 3) emphasizing the anti-Soviet/communist/Russian aspect of the UPA struggle. Remembrance of the UPA is presented as establishing historical justice and reclaiming national history. The adherence to the heroic narrative of the UPA is equated to a “real Ukrainian-ness,” hence promoted as a marker of national identity.

This part of the study deals with the “response” of people who encounter the proposed representation of the past exemplified by the monument. Do they recognize in the monument the same themes that they were supposed to recognize (as planned by the “producers” of memory)? Do they see such dealings with the past as appropriate or important? I envisioned in my plans a very simple task: to conduct surveys in the form of very structured questionnaires. However, the pilot survey conducted with a couple of respondents showed that people were more eager to speak than I expected.
and their answers often did not fit into my prepared variations of answers. As a result, the detailed answers for some questions prevailed and my surveys ended up in the form of semi-structured interviews. More detailed reflections on the past on the part of visitors significantly helped me better understand the complexity of memory and remembrance, although the process of collecting the data became more complicated.

In general, the interviews were made on the 15 and 16 October 2011 at the monument to Klym Savur with the passers-by who were willing to spend a couple of minutes to share their thoughts on the monument and on the history it embeds. The days for the interviews followed the Day of Foundation of the UPA. I expected that on these days the respondents would have more vivid images about the UPA, as it seemed more probable that people occasionally heard about the holiday on radio or TV, saw the celebration near the monument or even took part in the celebration.

In a sum, I conducted 52 semi-structured interviews. Interestingly, men were more eager to answer the questions than women, so as a result I got 14 female and 38 male respondents.

Most of the interviewees did not know who the person represented in the monument was (only four people knew who he was), although almost all of them said that they saw the monument plenty of times (only four visitors said that they had never noticed it).

“Ukrainian Heroes and Real Patriots”

When asked who this person could be judging only from the monument’s appearance, most of the people made a guess that it was a soldier (11 respondents), a military hero or a war hero (9 respondents), a Ukrainian/national patriot (5 respondents), someone connected to the Ukrainian independence (3 respondents), some “banderivets” (1 respondent) or Stepan Bandera (2 respondents), or some UPA hero (7 respondents). Some people said that it was a poet or writer (12 respondents). People connected this monument to the period of independence of Ukraine and in their explanations often added that if this monument is quite new that means that it is built for someone who fought for independence – either a person connected to the UPA or to the UNR. Only two respondents thought it was a monument to a Red Army soldier.

Although most of the people had trouble to identify to whom the monument was in the first instance, when they were informed that it was a monument to Klym Savur, most of them said that they heard this name for the first time (one person answered that he knew that there is a street in Rivne with this name, but he did not know who this person was). But when asked to guess who the person could be, people again linked this name either to the UPA (most of the cases – 26 respondents) or the UNR (14 respondents). Thus, people tend to associate the monuments built in the independent Ukraine with
these specific episodes of history represented as periods of struggle for independence.

As in the case of the students’ essays, the interviews demonstrated that state independence, national liberation, and the struggle against occupiers are those foci from which the history of the UPA is narrated by most people. Although most of people had troubles with giving some details on the UPA, they all agreed that the UPA were fighting for independence (42 respondents), they were a liberation army (2 respondents), Ukrainian patriots (2 respondents), fighters against Soviet and fascist occupiers (2 respondents), and the opposition to the Soviet regime (4 respondents). Interestingly, in three cases out of four, where the UPA was described as “opposition,” the respondents expressed a kind of sorrow when they were speaking about the UPA, the sorrow that there is not some version of the UPA at present:

They were a kind of opposition, active opposition which we do not have now. They were for independence and against Soviets and fascists.738

Speaking about the past, people are not only oriented to the past exclusively. They position the past into the context of the present wherein their evolutions and attitudes are shaped by the expectations for the future. In the cited excerpt, we can perceive a sense of nostalgia for the strong opposition against the ruling authorities of today.

When asked against whom the UPA was fighting, the predominant answer was: “against both fascists and Soviets.” Only four people answered that the UPA fought against Soviets only, two people thought they fought against fascists only, and one person said they were fighting on the side of fascists (interestingly the latter one nevertheless thought that it is worthwhile commemorating the UPA in the monuments regardless of the fact that in the respondent’s mind the UPA were backing the fascists).

In the answers to the question whether it is necessary to commemorate the UPA particularly in such monuments, the visitors expressed their evaluation of the past, which was most valuable for a better understanding of people’s attitude to the UPA. I came to the conclusion that death being linked to the war and struggle is perceived as sacrifice and is seen as a good reason for the commemoration and remembrance, as these passages demonstrate. The predominant attitude can be demonstrated by a short comment made by one of the respondents: the UPA were “Ukrainian heroes and real patriots.” This is the main focus through which the history of UPA is perceived, as some excerpts demonstrate:

They were fighting for independence, we must commemorate them.739

It was during the war. But I think that if there were no war, there still would have been the UPA. We always wanted independence... Patriotism and heroism have to be remembered and commemorated. They were fighting to the death, they knew they would be killed, but they were still fighting. We must remember their sacrifice.

*Family Brings Complexity*

When asked about the celebration of the Day of the UPA, people often started to share their family memories and personal recollections first and foremost connected to the celebration of Victory Day. Initially it appeared odd to me, but then I understood that the festive atmosphere and personal recollections of the end of the war obviously was a part of almost every family history and made Victory Day such an important point in memory that was mentioned by many.

As a result, most of the respondents said that they never celebrate any event related to the UPA. Only two people said they celebrate the Day of Foundation of the UPA, others knew about such a day but said that they celebrate the religious feast of The Holy Mother of God – Protectress (*Pokrova*) on that day, but not the Day of the UPA. Most of the respondents said that they celebrate Victory Day (43 respondents): either by going to parades or watching parades on TV (21 respondents), giving flowers to veterans (12 respondents), going to demonstrations or meetings (4 respondents), laying flowers at the monument (1 respondent), or simply having time with friends and family (3 respondents). People in their 50-60s said that on Victory Day they go to cemeteries and put flowers to the graves of their relatives who fought in the war (7 respondents).

Strikingly, people were eager to speak about their families and related the questions asked during the interviews to their family experiences. Almost all of the respondents in their 40-60s said that they lost someone in the war, or mentioned some relative who was in the war. They said that Victory Day was the day when they remembered these relatives. Some said that they celebrate Victory Day by going to church and praying for the souls of those who were killed in the war or died afterwards. Only nine respondents said they did not celebrate Victory Day. Sometimes people stressed that the holiday means the “victory over fascism” for them although they do not celebrate the day in any special way:

> It is a holiday for me, because I know that it is a day of victory over fascism. But I do not do anything special on this day.

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741 Only two people said they celebrate the Day of Foundation of the UPA, others knew about such a day but said that they celebrate the religious holiday Pokrova on that day, not the day of UPA.
742 Respondent O., Interviews, Rivne 15.10.2011.
Although none of the respondents who shared their family stories said that they had some relatives in the UPA, some of them seemed positive about the commemoration of the UPA soldiers while linking their family members’ stories to their own evaluation of the UPA:

My grandfather was in the Red Army. My grandmother told me horrific stories about how the Soviets killed hundreds of the UPA soldiers in the village nearby. It was terrible. Now, it is good that there are such monuments, because these UPA people were also killed… for somebody it is very important to honor them. But it is important for all of us to know our history.743

Sometimes the evaluations of history got more complicated in the instances where the people referred to family memories where they had some negative experiences with the UPA:

My mother told me a lot about banderivtsi [Bandera’s men]. They were for independence, but they killed a lot of Ukrainians. She told they were afraid of them. When Soviets killed some banderivets’ in their village the villagers were afraid to bury them. Even the relatives of the killed… Either they were afraid or thought it was a disgrace to have such relatives who killed their own folk.744

They (UPA) were fighters for independence, but their methods were questionable. My grandparents had different stories about them. You know, they killed Ukrainians too.745

Such instances show that people have some troubles in dealing with the difficult knowledge about the past which they got from their families. They have to face contradictions and accommodate them into a generally glorious picture of the UPA which is promoted in the region. The fact that the UPA were killing “their own folk” arouses questions and doubts. In these instances people make their own decisions on how to relate their subversive “private” knowledge with established public representations:

Maybe there are people who need these commemorations, I can understand it. But I do not support their [the UPA’s] methods. Their methods of fighting are unacceptable.[…] They were fighting for the independence of Ukraine but they were killing everyone like the fascists.746

Another respondent expressed his views in the following way:

745 Respondent Y., Interviews, Rivne 15.10.2011
Why not have such monuments? It is very difficult to say now who was right and who was wrong. It is all our history. My grandpa was in the Red Army... I know it was a difficult time.747

Time and again, in the respondents’ narratives, the independence of Ukraine functions as a lifeline in taking a decision on how to evaluate wrongdoings presented in the aura of sacrifice for the nation. Notably, in the abovementioned responses the bereaved are those who belong to their “own folk,” whereas there is no explicit mentioning of other nationalities. The UPA heroism is mainly questioned as soon as it is related to the attacks against other Ukrainians. Thus, the space of victimhood is predominantly occupied by Ukrainians in the imagination of the recipients.

**Space of Victimhood**

The theme on victimhood is another focal point through which the history of the OUN and UPA is narrated in the interviews. Indeed, about one fifth of respondents positioned the UPA struggle into the years of the *Holodomor* (10 respondents). Such a link between the UPA and the Holodomor let us think that the history of the UPA is placed in the space of victimhood of the Ukrainian people as whole. Of note, this placement is also realized through commemorative practices. *Holodomor* and the monument to Klym Savur get linked together on the anniversaries of the *Holodomor*. As a respondent, who happened to be a history teacher, replied:

> It (the monument to Klym Savur) was built in 2002. I often bring my schoolchildren here. I am a history teacher. On the *Holodomor* anniversary we come here to tidy up and clean up near the monument. We also meet with veterans, both Red Army and UPA veterans. I come here to participate in meetings organized by Ukrainian People’s Party (UPP).748

The positioning of the UPA in the same space of meaning as the *Holodomor* makes it easier to accommodate difficult knowledge about the wrongdoings of the UPA with the glorious representations of their deeds in the monuments. What we can also conclude from the kind of responses cited above is that the acceptance of a new portrayal of the past does not presuppose the denial of the old one.

As the abovementioned response demonstrates the respondent’s occupation as a history teacher and affiliation to the UPP makes her engaged in memory work and the shaping of new remembrance, but it does not exclude adherence to other kinds of remembrance as well, as meeting with the Red Army veterans, for instance. These two seemingly opposite kinds of war

commemorations mutually enforce each other, whereas the fact that both the Red Army and the UPA fought and were killed in the war make both of them worth remembering and commemorating. Importantly, family history strengthens this coupling:

They (the UPA) were fighting for the independence of Ukraine, against both fascists and Soviets. My grandfather was killed in Warsaw on the 5 May, 1945, and I understand that we have to remember both Red Army veterans and the UPA veterans.\footnote{Respondent Kk., Interviews, Rivne 16.10.2011.}

Death on the battlefield matches the UPA and the Red Army and thus the ideological differences of the rivalries diminish. Indeed, as Reinhart Koselleck contended: “Whether dressed in hope or cloaked in grief, symbols of death last longer than any individual case. Although the individual case of death may fade, death is nonetheless still in store for every observer.”\footnote{Koselleck, Reinhart. “War Memorials: Identity Formation of the Survivors.” In Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, Daniel Levy (eds.), The Collective Memory Reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 365-370, p. 370.} The only identity that matters is that of the dead fallen in the war. Put bluntly, even where recipients had no idea about who the UPA was, the mere fact that it was a fallen soldier easily identified from looking at the monument made them think that he was worth remembering and commemorating. In such a way:

\[t\]he formal language specific to war memorials is obsolete without ceasing to speak. Evidently, this language outlives its unique, politically and socially determined causes, so that the signs are no longer understood politically but remain comprehensible nonetheless.\footnote{Ibidem.}

To sum up, through the analysis of the interviews I came to the conclusion that the UPA is narrated from the perspective of independence and liberation. The UPA is positioned in the space of victimhood closely connected to such an unquestionable symbol of victimhood for many Ukrainians as the Holodomor. Difficult knowledge presented in the interviews relates mainly to the killings of our “own folk” by the UPA, the relationship to other nationalities is not reflected. The same tendency was observed in the analysis of the students’ essays. Their reflections on history refer to the Soviet and the UPA’s glorious pasts wherein both traditions of remembering reinforce each other.

The interviews showed that at a grassroots level the vision of the UPA went beyond the binary - Soviet/anti-Soviet, Ukrainian/anti-Ukrainian, which is promoted in the political discourse, as we saw in the Chapters III and IV.

On the other hand, both the interviews and the students’ essays demonstrated that the history of the Second World War and the history of the
UPA are perceived as two separate stories (often separated in time). Of note is that I observed the same representation of war in the Rivne Ethnographic Museum, where the history of the Second World War and the UPA was presented in two separate rooms. When I asked Ihor Marchuk, the historian who was curator for these exhibitions, why these two themes of history were separated, he explained that it was difficult to combine them into one common space, as they were so different.\textsuperscript{752}

Despite of the fact that the history of the Second World War and the history of the UPA are perceived as two separate stories, the image about the Second World War has a decisive impact upon respondents in their understanding of the UPA. The mere fact of war and death in the battlefield makes the fallen soldier a hero, while other details of history that would present a difficulty are shifted out of the memory space. They are not repressed or silenced, they are overshadowed by the topoi of independence, sacrifice, struggle, liberation, and independence.

Furthermore, the history of the UPA as it is remembered is closely connected to other, perhaps more significant, historical themes of victimization – such as the Holodomor. This (imagined) connection makes it problematic to have a critical (non-emotional) distance to the UPA, it enables ironing out the “unpleasant knowledge” about atrocities committed by the UPA to other nationalities as well as to Ukrainians who did not support the UPA’s cause.

\textit{Amalgamated Memory}

I refer to these mixed memories as amalgamated memories. I borrow the term “amalgam” from chemistry, which means “a soft mass formed by chemical manipulation, \textit{esp.} a soft or plastic condition of gold, silver, etc. produced by combination with mercury; \textit{hence}, now, any mixture of a metal with mercury, a mercurial alloy.”\textsuperscript{753} Speaking of amalgamated memory I apply its idiomatic meaning of mixture and combination that still preserves its meaning of alloy but as a result of combination of different ingredients becomes something new but unstable, whereas meanings fluctuate and changed very quickly.\textsuperscript{754} When ingredients are mixed, the amalgam is soft and docile, to make it hard two conditions are needed: time and meshing into the mold. With the flow of time and under favorable conditions the amalgam gets harder and finally it becomes indistinguishable from the mold.

\textsuperscript{752} Marchuk, Ihor. Interview. Rivne, 10 October 2011.
\textsuperscript{753} Oxford English Dictionary.
\textsuperscript{754} I specifically do not use the term hybrid memory, which also presupposes coexistence of several mnemonic narratives in one. I refer to a new term in order to emphasize that neither of the elements in such a mnemonic construction is stable, they are in constant move and re-conceptualization.
The mold, in our case, is an established template of remembrance. It provides patterns of remembrance. It is not necessarily a conscious and well-elaborated strategy. It works by facilitating meaning- and sense-making, so that each new event needs not be put in a new narrative pattern, but can be reproduced and interpreted quickly inside the existing pattern. Such patterns are produced by grammars of remembering, as discussed above.

The present peaceful co-existence of parallel memories does not, though, imply that there is no potential for conflict that can be ignited at certain points of time and in certain contexts. Exhortations to past historical injustices were not the latest things used for mobilization and perpetrating new injustices. History shows us that people who lived together for decades can seemingly instantaneously be turned into bitter enemies and have a desire to fight to the death.

Concluding Remarks

My findings show that the memory of insurgency and the memory of Soviet victory in the war peacefully co-exists in the personal narratives of most of my interviewees. Competing memories in the political discourse are reconciled in the amalgamated memory at the grassroots level, whereby the memories do not exclude each other but rather supplement each other, or even reinforce each other.

Although the political parties promote the memory of the OUN and UPA in a way that demands from the public to abandon one memory at the expense of another, the public’s response to this is rather the opposite – people tend to “internalize” several traditions of remembering simultaneously. Perhaps the best illustration of such denial to choose between memories is found in the students’ essays. But, as stressed, the nature of such memory is that it is in fluctuation. The time will come when this amalgam will solidify and establish itself in the cultural memory of the nation, but what kind of memory it will be is too early to say, especially when we take into account the turbulent years of recent Ukrainian history. One clear feature which can be distinguished for the time being is that the memory of victory in the Second World War and the history of the war in general becomes more and more “Ukrainianized,” as we saw throughout the narratives of both producers and consumers of memory politics. Hence, the reclamation of history as envisioned by national democrats and intellectuals in the 1980s yields results.
Final Discussion

Is the World Reordered / Is History Reclaimed?

In this book I aimed to explain why the painful memories of the wartime nationalist movement were revived almost half a century after the war. More specifically, I intended to see how and by whom this remembrance was shaped, which elements of this past were recalled and which were forgotten, or rather ignored. To limit the discussion of memory, I concentrated the study on the analysis of one particular representation of memory in one particular geographical site – the monuments built in the West Ukrainian region of Rivne.

The study is based on the analysis of production and reception of monuments with detailed references to local, regional, national, and international contexts. To present the findings in the book, I preferred the inductive approach wherein I started discussion with general and conceptual observations and illustrated them with the material. In practice, though, I carried out research taking a deductive approach while moving from a large bulk of material to more general conclusions and observations which in the book were presented first. Such a change in the presentation of my results as appears in the book was dictated by both the vast range of source materials that in most cases were quite similar in meaning and often repeated each other as well as by the field of memory studies which is highly theorized. My intention was to build a dialogue with theories by referring to the rich material I worked with. In the end, I went from numerous concrete cases and proposed a grounded theory of amalgamated memory based on these diverse cases.

The results showed an intricate complexity of memory work shaped by intensive dynamics of private and public, grassroots and official, local and national encounters. There have been attempts made by political actors to draw a direct link between the national identity and proposed official memory, but, as the study showed, they did not work, as in the pluralistic context the meanings are too fluid. As a result, attempts to inscribe the memory of the UPA as a core of national memory for all Ukrainians fail.

As my findings show, memory actors even fail to construct a homogenized regional memory, as communities demonstrate adherence to multiple memories that differ from the hegemonic image promoted by political parties. The study demonstrated that glorifying the memory of the nationalist movement that is often perceived as a single monolithic
construction shared throughout Western Ukraine is not that monolithic. Each case study shows that memory work is crisscrossed with negotiations, disputes and agreements both in political and in mundane spaces. The close focus on a single region and its relation to the center helped us understand how one project of national identity as shaped in the region influences and interplays with other similar projects that take place throughout the country.

The study demonstrated that the memory of the Ukrainian nationalist movement plays an important role in “reordering of meaningful worlds,” i.e. in the process of searching for new meanings at the times of dramatic transformations from the old and known life which began to crumble with the collapse of the Soviet Union. These transformations brought all kinds of changes - wanted as well as unwanted. One such change concerned the re-evaluation and re-interpretation of one’s own past. With regard to such changes, memory became a vehicle of transition and transformation. Consequently, it played an important role in democratization. Communities of memory are formed to promote group interests, to make claims for recognition of specific experiences as we saw in the example of unions of UPA veterans or victims of deportations. Memory also offered the means for de-Sovietization and de-colonization processes which were seen as a short-cut to “return” to Europe by the pro-European part of society.

At the same time, in the process of reordering of cultural memory, the memory actors addressed memory both as a tool of transformation and as an object which has to be transformed. The Soviet stigmatization and negative stereotyping of the OUN and UPA was in itself sufficient reason for the positive evaluation of these organizations by the people and organizations striving for Ukraine’s separation from the Soviet Union. At the end of the 1980s, when this topic was taken up by nascent national democratic segments in Ukrainian society, little was known about these organizations at all. Historical research on the topic was very limited due to the restricted access to archives, so that knowledge about the OUN and UPA was mainly based on writings of Ukrainian diaspora historians and some sporadic stories told by family, friends or relatives. The writings of diaspora historians were also limited because of the same problem of inaccessibility to archives and the dominant influence of memory culture that was formed in the diaspora community, mainly by descendants from Eastern Galicia. There, experiences of the UPA were quite different from those in Volhynia. In such an atmosphere, marked by little archival knowledge and a surplus of specific personal memories of the people directly involved with the OUN and UPA, the past of the OUN and UPA came into the memory culture of post-Soviet Ukraine. The attractiveness of this particular part of history was first and foremost grounded on its anti-Soviet character.

Throughout the study I argued that the revival of the memory of the OUN and UPA played an important role in the process of reclaiming the history of the Second World War in Ukraine. By this I mean the society’s
attempts to articulate interpretations, evaluations and experiences of war that challenged the Soviet master narrative of the “Great Patriotic War.” Reclamation of history is closely connected to de-communization, de-Sovietization and de-colonization as all these processes complete attempts to radically separate the Soviet legacies from the Ukraine’s national historical narrative. I argued that the memory of the OUN and UPA has been shaped in the context of nation- and state-building. I regard this context to be the frameworks of remembering (cadres sociaux) which according to Halbwachs play a decisive role in the formation of memory.

Nation- and state-building are saturated by both centrifugal and centripetal processes, whereby the center and periphery (meaning regional contexts and politics) mutually influence each other. In the course of my study, I demonstrated that in Ukraine there is no one-way and top-down memory politics in the relationship between the center and region, as this relationship is much more complex and presupposes mutual vertical and horizontal exchanges of meanings.

The same relationship exists within the region that was studied – Rivne. Regional memory politics are shaped by local initiatives (perused by groups or individuals), but at the same time the regional political agenda establishes the framework within which certain individual/groups’ memories are more welcome than others. Thus, we saw that the lack of centralized memory politics at the beginning of the 1990s gave rise to circulation of memories of small groups and families which were kept at the level of communicative memory and then suddenly became accepted by a wider public. The main “requirement” for the recognition of such private memories was their previous suppression and silencing by the Soviets.

Very soon, though, such fragmented grassroots’ memories were incorporated by different political parties, first and foremost by the national-democratic camp where this memory became almost an ideological flag stick. In this regard, I argued that political parties “kidnapped” memories of the OUN and UPA, as the indigenous experiences were forced into widely promoted molds that forged glorious memory of the Ukrainian resistance. In this regard, reclamation as a driving force behind memory work served multiple purposes. On the one hand, the memory of the OUN and UPA became a powerful instrument of legitimation for certain individuals and small groups. It helped communities to express the silenced experiences of past events.

As a result, recognition was given to the broadened space of remembrance and the diversity of narratives about the war experiences. On the other hand, the memory of the OUN and UPA was also used by political groups to legitimize their power. As the study showed, although kidnapped memories were presented on the public scene in transfigured form, they were often welcomed and recognized by the public. As it was also stated, although the pro-OUN/UPA mainstream commemorative narrative emphasizes the
brave and glorious past of anti-Soviet resistance, there are features of personalized and localized memories which deviate from the mainstream representations. These personalized and localized memories reveal traces of difficult knowledge about the dark aspects of the OUN and UPA past.

When discussing the political use of the memory of the OUN and UPA, I differentiated between the use of the memory by national democrats and by nationalists or far-right parties. I underlined those far-right parties referred to the memory of the OUN and UPA to such an extent that they traced their own legacies back to the OUN. There is a meaningful difference in the remembrance of the OUN and UPA by national democrats and the far-right. This difference comes when we try to answer the question: What is actually remembered? As the problem is, to paraphrase Yaroslav Hrytsak, not that the OUN and UPA are remembered, the problem is whether or not they are remembered as fascists.\footnote{Hrytsak, Yaroslav. “Klopoty z pamiatti.” In Tarik Cyril Amar, Igor Balyns’kyi and Yaroslav Hrytsak (eds.), Strasti za Banderoiu. Kyiv: Hranî -T, 2010, pp. 346-358, p. 346.}

As the present study showed, in memory pursued by the national democrats, the OUN and UPA are used more as the metaphors of the anti-Soviet and anti-communist struggle for independence than as historical entities. This memory is largely mythologized. Functioning as a myth it obliterates difficult knowledge that the historical research reveals on the questionable activities and beliefs of those organizations.

The far-right parties, in contrast, often do not repudiate such difficult knowledge and accept the legacy of the OUN and UPA to the full extent. In this regard, the memory of the OUN and UPA in far-right use is closest to the historical evidence. Nationalist parties refer to the OUN’s integral nationalism as their own ideological platform.\footnote{This difference in use by national democrats and the far-right deserves a new and detailed study. I did not concentrate on this more, as in the region and at the time which became the focus of my research the far-right did not come as the main memory actor in the analyzed memory scene.}

But by and large in public commemorative practices the OUN and UPA are celebrated in the version promoted by the national democrats, not by the far-right. Hence, the OUN and UPA are celebrated as freedom fighters. Such remembrance is more about the contemporary regime that promotes the past of the OUN and UPA than about the OUN and UPA themselves.

Even if it is a whitewashed picture of the past, it shows that the heritage of these two organizations is promoted not because they were nationalist and authoritarian, but because the present-day governments need a past that would supply examples of the anti-Soviet liberation struggle. Thus, the past of the OUN and UPA is re-imagined, re-filled with new meanings so that it can be aligned with the democratic and pro-European claims in the
In this way, the memory of anti-democratic organizations, stripped of historical facts, can be made compatible with the claims for democracy and European orientation. This makes it more understandable why the European Union’s flags were seen next to the OUN’s red-and-black flags during Euromaidan in 2014, or why the pro-European slogans were proclaimed alongside the UPA slogans.

Only mythologized memory devoid of factual historical evidence could enable the use of the OUN and UPA memory in the pro-European democratic protests. This memory itself was transformed in the context of the protests, as the context is decisive in the formation of memory’s meaning. Thus, the slogans used by the UPA in the 1940s and the slogans used by protestors in 2014 during the ceremonies of mourning of the people shot on the streets acquired rather different meanings.

The memory of the OUN and UPA also remained vital during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the east of Ukraine in 2014. But in the context of the military conflict, the memory once again took on some new features. Thus, through re-contextualization the memory of the OUN and UPA changes dramatically.

Summarizing the political uses of memory, in general, one can state that memory gets most politicized at times of social turmoil and political battles. What is more important, in times of conflicts, revolutions, and dramatic changes, in general, the memory of the OUN and UPA is widely referred to by “common” people as a form of myth that gives patterns to struggle throughout the horrors of history, it gives hope to overcome difficulties, and it fuels the belief that nothing is in vain.

The analysis of the narratives on the memory of the OUN and UPA showed, within a reclamation project, that memory is employed as a tool for establishing historical justice and as a resource for providing ontological security and symbolical empowerment in times when society goes through turbulent events. Analysis of both production and reception of memory showed that the past of the OUN and UPA was revived at the moments of dramatic instability, when dangers and threats to one’s community’s existence were most tangible. In this regard, memory with its incorporation in rituals and physical practices became a useful tool for overcoming such dangers. By giving examples and hopes, as was shown, memory helps overcome the trammels of history.

The study also demonstrated that the memory of the OUN and UPA became a resource for symbolic empowerment because it was often instrumentalized by the politicians at the moments when they were losing their

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757 Throughout the book I often mentioned notions of “pro-European” and “democratic.” I want to underline that I referred to them as they are referred as they are conventionally used. In the memory discourse these two terms are often used at the same time. I did not go into the analytical discussion of those terms, though, as it would need a separate book to be written on the meanings of “Europeanness” in the Ukrainian context.
political power. I drew the conclusion that certain high level politicians turned their attention to Western Ukraine in order to “borrow” the symbols that could help distinguish them from rival pro-Russian political parties. Most obviously this happened in the period of political crisis 2002 – 2004 when Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, both of whom previously worked in Kuchma’s government, stood in opposition to Kuchma. They needed some new symbols that could help distance them from their past affiliation with Kuchma. As the established national symbols had been functioning since the 1990s, they turned their focus towards the OUN and UPA symbols that until then functioned mainly in the western regions where the communicative memory of the organizations had been retained. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko as oppositional leaders referred to the revolutionary pathos of the OUN and UPA during the Orange Revolution in 2004.

During Yushchenko’s presidency, the memory of the OUN and UPA became almost Yushchenko’s personal agenda, as he addressed the OUN and UPA exactly at the moments of deepest crisis when he was losing his position in politics. Thus, in 2007 he granted the Order of Hero to Roman Shukhevych exactly at the time when in parliamentary elections his party suffered a large defeat. In 2010 he granted the Order of Hero to Stepan Bandera exactly at the end of his presidency when his voters’ support was so small that it was obvious that he would lose the presidency to practically any other candidate. The memory of the OUN and UPA was revived again with renewed force by thousands of protestors in Euromaidan in 2013-2014.

The same tendency to revive the history of the OUN and UPA in the moments of crisis could be seen inside Rivne regional politics. When the UPP and Rukh were losing their position in the power constellation, they also fought for the memory of the OUN and UPA. Similarly, when the campaign “Ukraine without Kuchma” broadened to all of Ukraine, the national democrats demonstrated their anti-Kuchma stance by activating and intensifying the use of anti-Soviet resistance memory, as a result of which new monuments to hotly disputed historical figures were built - Symon Petliura and Klym Savur. In this regard, memory became a weapon in a political struggle wherein monuments played the role of a symbolic trophy.

Analysis of the monuments demonstrated that memory culture in Rivne tends towards re-militarization. Militarized memory of war was characteristic of the Soviet Union. In the post-Soviet period, the memory of war to a large degree lost its secular perception and instead absorbed religious symbolism saturated with aura of martyrdom, victimhood, and sainthood.

Such a shift can be schematically termed as an on-going movement away from the image of the victorious “Great Patriotic War” toward a sacred image of the “War of Liberation.” However, this shift is not complete, as the analysis of new monuments demonstrates that some of the features from the previous “Great Patriotic War” tradition persist. As a result, both images exist
together and instead of excluding each other (as promoted by political parties) they reinforce each other.

This becomes especially evident while analyzing the visuality of monuments, narratives produced in the discussions of monuments in the Rivne city council, and the responses of the consumers of memory. In such a way, the previous tradition of war remembrance serves as a malleable model which takes on new meanings which fuse together with some of the old meanings in order to produce new nodes of memory.

I called this hybrid form of memory amalgamated memory whereby the blending, mixing, and melting lineaments of memory are underlined. The main distinguishing feature of amalgamated memory, in contrast to “hybrid” or “multi-directional” memory, is its unfinished and fluid state, and that the separate components can be easily identified. This memory is engaged in constant meaning-making process while mixing bits and pieces of old and new patterns of remembrance. The contours of the amalgam constantly change. But at the end of the process they will most probably harden.

Throughout I argued that the memory of the OUN and UPA follows a mythical structure that is based on the well-recognized cultural elements that find strong emotional response from society but which are not necessarily linked to concrete historical persons or events. In such a memory, the OUN and UPA become ahistorical personifications of the idea of national liberation.

Mythologization of memory has its pitfalls and dangers. Many scholars expressed their concerns about the political use of the memory of the OUN and UPA arguing that there is nothing positive for Ukraine in taking the heritage of the OUN, as this heritage has too many negative aspects.

Attempts to equate Ukrainian national identity to the memory of OUN and UPA is a dangerous enterprise, as rightly argued by Himka:

this historical identity war has been very harmful to Ukraine. Politicians find it all too attractive to mobilize the population with historical symbols, but they thereby drive the wedge in deeper between regions and between perspectives. It is always easier to deliver symbols than decent health care or affordable homes. I consider the deconstruction of the historical mythologies of both

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758 The terms “hybrid” or “multi-directional” are proposed by Michael Rothberg where he discusses the exchange and mutual reinforcement of memories of the Holocaust and memories influenced with post-colonial legacies. (See: Rothberg, Michael. Multidirectional memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the age of decolonization. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).

759 The list of scholars may be really long but I will limit myself to only several previously mentioned works where scholars preserve a high level of sensitivity to the political usages of the OUN and UPA history at present: Rudling, Snyder, Himka. Illustrative in these discussions may be Timothy Snyder’s argument that although Bandera was an opponent of Stalin, it does not mean that he differed much from Stalin (Snyder, Timothy. “Fashysts’kyi heroi u demokratychnomu Kyievi.” In Tarik Cyril Amar, Igor Balyns’kyi and Yaroslav Hrytsak (eds.), Strasti za Banderoiu. Kyiv: Hrani -T, 2010, pp. 165-174.)
camps to be more than a healthy exercise; rather, it is the prescribed medicine for Ukrainian political discourse.  

Indeed, when the state of all the country is in a deplorable situation, memory might seem to be the last thing to worry about. Moreover, if acceptance of the OUN and UPA legacy is claimed to be a marker of “Ukrainianness” then all the Ukrainians must have their say about how it should be remembered. In the pursuit of the reclamation of history the narratives reclaimed pose perhaps more questions than provide answers. Indeed, does not the reclaimed history stigmatize all Ukrainians as “nationalists” in the face of a world in which Ukraine strives to find its place?

As Himka pointed out, “there was no reason that all Ukrainians and everything Ukrainian had to be burdened with crimes committed by a particular political tendency, namely the OUN.” Since this memory provokes many troubles across the regions, it could be perhaps better to leave the memory to its local and regional usages. Indeed, it may be more constructive to strive for a nation without any common historical memory but rather with a clear consciousness as idealistically put by Andriy Portnov.

On the other hand, when claiming a special nationwide status for the memory of the OUN and UPA, memory actors call for a national and international response. They involuntarily open a Pandora Box of entangled pasts drawn from different corners of the world, from the academia, from witnesses, victims, survivors and their families. Thus, conflicting narratives become hard to be ignored. They provoke discussions, destabilize meanings, and pose more and more questions.

Nevertheless, even if one can clearly see a rationale behind the strivings to counteract the mythologization of the OUN and UPA’s past, one should not ignore the functions of such mythologization which are obviously of importance not only in political battles. In this regard, I mean first and foremost a soteriological function of myth (as theorized by Mircia Eliade) which was demonstrated in depth through the material which has been analyzed. As long as society is going through a painful encounter with the terror of history and finds refuge from calamities through mythical thinking, the cultural memory of such a society will tend to adopt a mythical model.

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761 Such stigmatization is already penetrating the representations in literature and films. One can mention a well-acclaimed novel by Jonathan Littell “The Kindly Ones” (Littell, Jonathan. The Kindly Ones. London: Vintage, 2010), the long epos of the Second World War told by a Nazi executioner, a considerable part of the novel is set on Ukrainian territory, or the film “In Darkness” by Polish-Dutch director Agnieszka Holland about the Holocaust in L’viv (based on the memoirs Chiger, Krystyna and Daniel Paisner. The Girl in the Green Sweater: A Life in Holocaust’s Shadow. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2012). In the novel and in the film, Ukrainians are almost exclusively portrayed as nationalists and Nazi collaborators.
763 Portnov. Istorii dla domashnioho vzhytku, p. 141.
Such a mythical model precludes everything that does not correspond to some imagined ideal of the past. It transforms historical actors into trans-historical personages – heroes, martyrs, or saints.

To a large extent, though, the inability to look closely into the mirror and accept the monsters of a nation’s past is a refuge from its own self. It reveals the inability to engage in a constructive process of self-redefinition freed from (post)colonial resentments. This can hide the drawbacks in the identity-building process.

It must be stressed that any construction of national identity is dialogical. Reclaimed counter-stories need “other stories that give my stories their overall significance.”\textsuperscript{764} We need others to recognize that our stories are true and credible.

The problem that arises Ukraine has a twofold nature. First, the compulsive concentration on the recognition of the dominant Other (Russia as a former imperial center/or some (imagined) Soviet “Other” that persists in the present) in the formation of the new identity hinders such formation as the Other cannot provide such recognition as such a recognition would have shattered the identity of the Other itself.

In this respect, the cult of the OUN and UPA becomes a “Soviet anachronism,” as argued by Rudling, because any cult of personality is inspired by Soviet tradition.\textsuperscript{765} In the same vein, the need for a cult which could substitute the cult of “Great Victory” is also shaped by Soviet attempts to construct a monolithic memory. Thus defensive memory work misfires in a sense that it repeats the patterns that it essentially tries to avoid. In this regard, Portnov comments:

It is not easy to understand the nationalist complexes of Ukraine, both in Russia and in the West. … the feeling of insecurity about the Ukrainian national project and (ir)rational fear of “new Russification” is regularly fuelled by official Kremlin rhetoric and humiliating derogatory remarks from Russian diplomats…[But] denying self-criticism under the premises of “persistent resistance against Ukrainophobe pressure” means to succumb to the ugly expressions of xenophobia, isolationism, and… populist nationalism of Ukrainian radicals.\textsuperscript{766}

One of the possible solutions to such an impasse might be found in changing the interlocutor. Scholars that study reclamation argue that the process of reclamation needs the communities that support, confirm and affirm the new stories. In this vein, the philosopher Marilyn Fridman proposes the concept of the “loving eye”\textsuperscript{767} and the sociologist Patricia Hill Collins speaks about a

\textsuperscript{764} Nelson. Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair. 
\textsuperscript{766} Portnov. Istorii dlia domashniiho vzhytku, p. 91. 
“safe space”768 whereas they highlight the role of communities of choice that provide reassurance and comfort that strengthen the meanings of ourselves and confirm them as credible and accepted.

In the Ukrainian situation that has been analyzed, a postcolonial condition hinders building up narratives in a “safe space.” Too much selectivity conditioned by mythologizing of the past sharpens the problem of connectivity, whereas overtly simplified stories of the past do not connect with the stories about the same past as told by other communities (as for instance in the case of relations with Poland in respect of questions arising over the Volhynian killings in 1943) which play a significant role in self-understanding for both Poles and Ukrainians.

Arguably, more elements should be added to the reclaimed narratives of the past in order to include the most difficult aspects of the past. Such inclusion could be possible if one tries to unite two essential processes of learning – “learning from” and “learning about” as theorized by Freud.769 From the material analyzed one could see that the difficult past is known, but it is connected to the process of “learning about” which, in contrast to “learning from,” lacks personal attachment from the knower to the object of knowledge. Building such an attachment proves to be hard in a nation focused on the need to safeguard and secure its own existence. So long as the (imagined or real) threats to Ukraine’s existence persist, the memory of the nationalist movement will be based on a defensive narrative that precludes any attachment to difficult knowledge.

The Ukrainian writer and politician Volodymyr Vynnychenko in the 1920s, while analyzing the causes of defeat of the Ukrainian revolution in 1917-21, wrote that it is not possible to read Ukrainian history without a sedative.770 The mythical structure of memory seems to provide such a sedative. Whether one really needs such a sedative remains a somewhat open question.

In general, the whole study demonstrated that a focus on a small point in space and time sheds light on a bigger picture relevant in order to understand the transformation processes pertinent for the European context at least. This is in respect regarding questions of coming to terms with the legacies of Nazism and communism oscillating between the dangers and opportunities involved in self-determination of nations.

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Postscript

When I started to write this book the history presented here seemed so close that it was not yet perceived as history. When finishing the book, though, I look back at the period analyzed as if it were a closed epoch. The past became history in front of my own eyes. The reordering of meaningful worlds, though, seems only to have started or even be about to start. In the meantime, Benjamin’s angel of history continues his flight with “his face … turned toward the past… [He] would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise… The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward.”771 Is it not too futile an enterprise just to want to make the debris whole? As long as one seeks meaning in the past to understand one’s own present, such an enterprise seems unavoidable. Thus, the work of reordering may not really have a dénouement at all.

Stockholm, October 2014

Sammanfattning på svenska

I denna avhandling har jag försökt förklara varför de smärtsamma minnena av andra världskrigets ukrainska nationaliströrelse, representerad av Organisationen för ukrainska nationalister (OUN) och dess militära gren Ukraina upprorsarmén (UPA) återuppstod i det postsovjetiska Ukraina, närmare ett halvsekel efter kriget. Mer specifikt har jag strävat efter att se hur och av vem hågkomsten skapades, samt vilka delar av det förflytta som återkallades och vilka som glömdes eller snarare ignorerades. För att avgränsa diskussionen om detta minne koncentrerade jag min studie i en analys av en särskild minnesrepresentation på en väl avgränsad geografisk plats: monument uppförda i det västukrainska området Rivne oblast. Studien baserar sig på en analys av produktion och reception av monument, tätt sammanvävd med monumentens lokala, regionala, nationella och internationella sammanhang.


och med vilka syften? Detta är några av de frågor som huvudsakligen vägledde min undersökning.

Mina studieresultat visar ett snårigt, invecklat minnesarbete, skapat genom ett intensivt samspel mellan privat och offentligt, gräsrötter och ämbetsmän, lokala och nationella möten. Politiska aktörer har försökt att åstadkomma en direkt koppling mellan den nationella identiteten och ett föreslaget officiellt minne, men min studie visar att de misslyckats eftersom betydelserna är alltför flytande i det pluralistiska sammanhanget. Följaktligen misslyckas försöken att skriva in minnet av UPA som en kärna i det ukrainska nationella minnet. Som min studie vidare visar misslyckas minnesaktörerna till och med att konstruera ett homogent regionalt minne, eftersom samhällen och grupper håller fast vid många olika minnen som skiljer sig från den hegemoniska bild som förs fram av de politiska partierna. Studien visar att bilden av hur ärendet av minnet av UPA som en kärna i det ukrainska nationella minnet. Studien visar att bilden av hur ärendet av minnet av det som enhetlig, i själva verket inte alls är så enkel.


I den process där det samhälleliga minnet omordnades använde sig minnesaktörerna av minnet både som ett verktyg för omdaning och som ett objekt som var i behov av att omdanas.

Sovjets stigmatisering och negativa stereotypisering av OUN och UPA utgjorde i sig själv en tillräckligt stark bevekelsegrund för att människor och sammanslutningar som strävade efter Ukrainas självständighet från Sovjetunionen skulle utveckla dessa organisationer. I slutet av 80-talet då ämnet väcktes till liv av de gryende nationaldemokratiska grupperna i Ukraina visste man överhuvudtaget välligt lite om de här organisationerna. Den historiska forskningen kring ämnet var mycket begränsad på grund av
svårigheten att få tillgång till arkiven och detta gjorde att kännedomen om OUN och UPA huvudsakligen skapades av ukrainska exilhistoriker och enstaka historier som berättades av familjemedlemmar, vänner och släktingar. Exilhistorikernas skrifter var också de begränsade på grund av de oåtkomliga arkiven och influensen från den dominerande minneskulturen som uppstod i exilgrupperna och huvudsakligen utvecklades av deras ättlingar från östra Galizien. Erfarenheterna av UPA där skilde sig avsevärt från dem i Volynien. I en miljö präglad av liten kännedom från arkivkällor och ett överflöd av personliga minnen från människor som var direkt involverade i OUN och UPA blev dessa organisationers förflutna en del av minneskulturen i det postsovjetiska Ukraina. Lockelsen för denna särskilda del av historien grundades först och främst i dess antisovjetiska natur.


I diskussionen om det politiska användandet av minnet av OUN och UPA har jag differentierat nationaldemokraternas användande av detta minne från nationalisternas eller de högerextrema partiers användande av minnet. Jag har understruktut att de högerextrema partierna hänvisade till minnet av OUN och UPA i så stor utsträckning att de hänförde sitt arv till OUN. Det finns en väsentlig skillnad i användningen av minnet av OUN och UPA beroende på om det är nationaldemokrater eller högerextremister som använder det. Skillnaden uppenbaras när man försöker besvara frågan: Vad är det som man kommer ihåg? Problemet är inte, för att parafrasera den ukrainske historikern Yaroslav Hrytsak, hågkomsten av OUN och UPA, utan om huruvida man minns dem som fascistiska organisationer? Som den aktuella studien har visat används OUN och UPA i nationaldemokraternas minne mer som metaforer för den antisovjetiska och antikommunistiska kampen för självständighet än som historiska enheter. Detta minne har mytologiserats avsevärt. Som myt utplånar den all problematisk kännedom som den historiska forskningen avslöjar om dessa organisationers tveksamma aktiviteter och övertygelser. De högerextrema partierna däremot tillbakavisar inte denna problematiska kännedom utan accepterar OUN:s och UPA:s historia i full utsträckning. Utifrån detta perspektiv är högerextremisternas användning av minnet av

Proeuropeiska sloganer uttrycktes vid sidan av UPA-sloganer. Bara ett mytologiserat minne tömt på historiska bevis och fakta kan göra användningen av minnet av OUN och UPA i de proeuropeiska demokratiska protesterna möjlig. Minnet i sig självt har omvandlats under protesterna eftersom sammanhanget är avgörande för formandet av minnets innebörd. Därför har sloganerna som användes av UPA på 40-talet och de som användes av demonstranterna under ceremonierna till minne av för de som sköts på gatorna 2014 fått helt olika innebörder. Minnet av OUN och UPA fortsatte vara betydelsefullt under den rysk-ukrainska konflikten i östra Ukraina 2014. I detta krigssammanhang fick minnet åter igen nya karaktärsdrag. Genom en ny kontext förändras följaktligen minnet av OUN och UPA dramatiskt. Sammanfattar man de olika politiska användningarna av minnen kan man generellt konstatera att minnen politiseras allra mest i tider av sociala uppror och politiska kamper. Något som är ännu viktigare att belysa är att minnet av OUN och UPA i tider av konflikter, revolutioner, dramatiska förändringar i allmänhet hänvisas till av "vanliga" människor då det i egenskap av myt är en förebild för kampen mot historiens fasor, ger förhoppning om att svårigheterna ska övervinnas och ger näring åt övertygelsen att inget är förgäves.

Jag har i mina fallstudier noga undersökt den komplexa processen av monumentbyggande i staden Rivne och i dess utkanter till minne av personligheter inom UPA. Varje fallstudie visar att minnesarbete består av en blandning av förhandlingar, konflikter och överenskommelser såväl i politiska...
som vardagliga kretsar. Den ingående studien av den enskilda regionen och dess relation till centralmakten hjälpte mig att förstå hur ett projekt för nationell identitet som formats av regionen och som sampsparar med andra liknande projekt har spridit sig till hela landet. Studien visade sig vara givande vad gäller monument som katalysatorer och minnessymptom då diskussionerna kring monumenten avslöjade de mest relevanta samtalsämnnena i den offentliga sfären.

Analysen av hur minnet av OUN och UPA berättas visade, inomramarna för ett projekt, att minnen används som ett verktyg för att etablera historisk rättvisa och som en resurs för att ge ontologisk trygghet och symbolisk självtämmande i tider då samhället genomgår turbulenta händelser. Analysen av både skapandet och mottagandet av minnena visade att OUN:s och UPA:s historia återupplivades vid händelser av dramatisk instabilitet, när faror och hot mot samhället var som mest påtagligt. I detta hänseende blir minnet med sitt införlivande i ritualer och fysiska uttryck ett användbart verktyg för att övervinna sådana faror. Genom att ge exempel på och ge förhoppningar, så som visades, hjälper minnena till att övervinna historiens bojor.

presidentvalet till i princip vilken annan presidentkandidat som helst. Under Euromajdan 2013-2014 återupplivades minnet av OUN och UPA med ny kraft av tusentals demonstranter.


Hela studien visade att fokus på en liten plats i rum och tid kastar ljus över en mycket större skildring som är relevant för förståelsen av omvandlingsprocesserna som åtminstone i ett europeiskt perspektiv är relevanta när det gäller frågor om att acceptera arvet från nazismen och kommunismen som pendlat mellan faror och möjligheter i nationernas självbestämmande.
Annex 1. Decalogue of the Ukrainian Nationalists

The “Decalogue of the Ukrainian Nationalists” was written by Stepan Lenkavs’kyi, a member of the OUN who, after the death of Bandera, became the leader of the OUN. The “Decalogue” was first published in 1929.

1. Gain the Ukrainian State or die in the fight for it.
2. You shall not allow anyone to taint the glory and honor of your nation.
3. Remember the great days of liberation struggles.
4. Be proud to inherit the fights for Volodymyr’s Trident.
5. Take revenge for the death of the great knights.
6. Talk about the cause not with whom you can but with whom you should.
7. Do not hesitate to do the most dangerous thing for the most important cause.
8. With hate and reckless fight shall you take on the enemies of your nation.
9. No orders, no threats, no torture, no death shall force you to reveal a secret.
10. You shall fight for glory, wealth, and the territory of the Ukrainian State.
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