Original Article

The EU's internal security strategy: A historical perspective

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Abstract The adoption of an Internal Security Strategy (ISS) in the European Union (EU) in 2010 raised not only expectations but also a number of questions from EU scholars and practitioners. Where did it come from? Who was behind the strategy? What will be its effect on actual cooperation and policy outcomes? This article takes a historical perspective to help answer these questions. We examine the ISS from three perspectives – its origin, its formulation and its eventual content – and examine how these perspectives illuminate the likely impact of the ISS. Using some ‘ideal-type’ benefits attributed to strategies generally – including political-symbolic benefits, cohering effects and operational guidance – we assess whether the history of the ISS is likely to enable or constrain success. While further research is needed, our analysis of developments in the months after adoption of the ISS suggests that its history may serve to undermine its impact on both cooperation and policy.

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Introduction

The adoption of an Internal Security Strategy (ISS) for the European Union (EU) caught many Brussels watchers off-guard. Appearing rather quickly from the hands of the Spanish Presidency in 2010, the ISS was adopted without widespread debate in the early months of that year. Since then, commentators have taken aim at the ISS, what it means for the EU, and what it may (or may not) represent for the future of internal security policymaking in the EU. Most analyses, however, fail to take into account the historical, institutional and political context from which the ISS emerged. This article shows that the ISS has a much longer lineage than typically assumed, and argues that the background of the ISS must be accounted for if we are to gauge its potential to shape the future direction of EU internal security cooperation.

We examine the history of the ISS from three perspectives – its origin, its formulation and its eventual content – and examine the extent to which those perspectives offer clues as to the future impact of the ISS. As a set of evaluation metrics, we outline the standard goals of strategy and study the ISS and its evolution against that backdrop. Those goals include political symbolism (to signal renewed intent), administrative cohesion (to create a common narrative) and operational guidance (to connect means with ends). Those metrics allow us to assess whether the historical trajectory and eventual outcome of the ISS is likely to achieve what a strategy is intended to achieve: to change behaviour and shape cooperation in more coherent ways.¹

This article conducts a process tracing of the creation of the ISS, drawing on multiple sources of data to illuminate links between various stages of its evolution and eventual outcomes (George and Bennett, 2005). The data gathered include EU official documents, drawn from electronic archives and from sources within each of the EU's institutions. We also conducted interviews with key policy officials, some at high levels of the Commission's administration. Press clippings from newspapers documenting Brussels policy events were used as verifying data, while secondary sources including academic articles and think tank papers rounded out the analysis. In addition to uncovering historical details that might inform current practice, the data collection effort here serves another purpose with an eye to posterity: to document the untold story of a key piece of EU policy.

The ISS represents a unique strategic initiative within the 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' (AFSJ), a dynamic focus of EU cooperation formerly termed 'Justice and Home Affairs'. Over the past 20 years, cooperative efforts in this area – including border security, police matters, customs questions, criminal justice and immigration – have ramped up considerably. Increased activity has not necessarily led to increased cooperation effectiveness, however. Such policy questions touch upon core notions of national sovereignty, raise legal questions and highlight cultural incompatibility problems that can stand in the way of effective cooperation and can even lead some member states to 'opt out' (Monar, 2012). In fact, one putative goal of the ISS was to build symbolic consensus over the future of cooperation in this contested area.

The article begins by discussing some ideal-type benefits of strategy before looking at the history of the ISS in three sections. First, we examine the origin of the idea to create a strategy for internal security, showing that the idea was vaguer and took a more circuitous route to fruition than typically assumed. Second, we look at the process through which the ISS was written, revealing that the process was controlled by a relatively small group in the Council through the entrepreneurship of the then-Spanish Presidency of the EU. Third, we study the eventual content of the ISS and discuss its skewed set of objectives and tools and its intergovernmental (rather than Union) character. We conclude the analysis by taking stock of developments after the ISS as an indication of its effect on outcomes and behaviour. The conclusion recounts the findings and questions the next steps in strategic thinking on EU internal security.

Assessing Strategy

The notion of a 'strategy' for internal security raises expectations for what it might do; that is, what effect it could potentially have on organization and outcomes. The literature on strategy, although scattered across the fields of business management and international relations, offers a series of indications about what benefits of strategy (for example,

developing a strategic plan) might have in principle. We outline those benefits here, as a backdrop for our history of the ISS and as a set of measures for assessing whether the ISS can be interpreted as a strategic success.

A strategy is typically defined as a plan for mobilizing resources towards the attainment of an objective or a set of objectives. McKeown (2011) puts it more elegantly when he argues that 'strategy is about shaping the future' – it is an attempt to achieve 'desirable ends with available means'. This definition is about planning for and plotting towards an improved future; a future perceived or desired by a strategy's formulators. Strategy is viewed as important since the present (in addition to not featuring the characteristics of a desired future) is constrained by limited resources, unruly bureaucracies and uncertainty about how broader contexts will impinge on the direction of an organization. These constraints, coupled with a desire to slip from their grasp by setting longer-term objectives, point to the value of strategy. In short, strategy provides three potential benefits (cf. Rumelt, 2011):

1. Signalling renewed intent, or a break from the past, is part of the political-symbolic role played by strategy. Strategy often follows a shift in a polity or organization's circumstances (for example, the election of a new President) or crisis-induced change (for example, an attack). It represents a highly evocative statement about a desire to reach new or revised goals and sometimes comes with a symbolic, descriptive concept that can be easily understood by outsiders (Biscop, 2004, 2009).
2. Generating a sense of common purpose is part of the cohering role that strategy might play. Strategy is invariably oriented towards internal actors in particular, since one goal of strategy is to improve cohesion of purpose within complex, fragmented organizations. They attempt to gain 'buy-in' from complex organizations accustomed to doing things in different ways and sometimes for different purposes (Rumelt, 2011). National security strategies are often a case in point: they are intended to encourage the various parts of sprawling government apparatuses to mobilize their respective resources towards a common goal.
3. Providing indicators and measures for day-to-day policymaking is another potential benefit of strategy. Strategy by definition is normally not particularly detailed, but it can provide a reminder of how existing means for pursuing newly stated aims. Operational actors can see how their activities fit the broader picture, and what kinds of signposts indicate progress towards success (McKeown, 2011). The literature on strategy often recommends 'translating' broad strategy into sectoral or other micro-level activities as a way for strategy to influence action on the ground (Rumelt, 2011).

These functions of typical strategies are highly stylized, of course. Few real-life strategies match this ideal-type picture. But they do offer a useful set of metrics against which to examine not just the ISS itself, but also how its history may have contributed – and continue to shape – its potential for changing behaviour within the EU.

The Origin of the ISS

While some strategies are intended to signal newfound intent at the highest levels, or to mark a break with the past and the pathway to a new future, the ISS had more pedestrian origins. The ISS can be traced to the proposal for a committee of high-level internal security officials from national levels – eventually known as COSI (Comité permanent de sécurité intérieure).

The idea for COSI was born almost a decade before it went into operation, proposed first in 2002 by the then-Spanish Presidency of the EU, in recognition that the attacks of 11 September 2001 illuminated the cross-border nature of crime and security threats. Just as the Political and Security Committee coordinates the operational issues associated with external security missions in the EU, the perception was that internal security required better coordination. The proposal was rejected (Arteaga, 2010, p. 5) but resurfaced when the European Convention (2002) was convened later to consider a major treaty change for the EU.

The European Convention's Working Group X on internal security was busy laying the groundwork for the 'AFSJ' provisions of the draft Constitutional Treaty when it took up the issue of coherence and efficiency in EU internal security cooperation. It proposed an internal security committee with a more operational (as compared with policymaking) role, and in their final report, argued for 'a more efficient structure for the coordination of operational cooperation at high technical level to be created within the Council' (European Convention, 2002). This was the official inception of COSI, which was incorporated into the new multi-year planning for internal security cooperation, The 'Hague Programme' in 2004. The Council was formally invited to set up a 'Committee on Internal Security' (Council of the European Union, 2005), and a flurry of Council documents discussed what precisely the role the committee would be (Statewatch, 2005).

As Luxembourg took over the rotating presidency of the EU in January 2005, the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty still seemed to be on track. The Presidency took on the challenge of establishing COSI and, in issuing guidance to an upcoming Council of (Justice) Ministers meeting, offered the first glimpse of a strategy. Ministers were asked to consider 'the basis of an integral concept covering police and judicial aspects of operational coordination' (Luxembourg Presidency, 2005). That action, which most likely reflected early internal discussions, helps to explain the origin of a strategy – to guide the work of a committee on internal security operational coordination. The Constitutional Treaty was rejected via two referenda only a few months later, but the Madrid train bombings in March 2003 and the subsequent London transport attacks in July 2005 ensured that the question of internal security policy coherence remained high on the agenda.

The motivating effects of recent terror attacks were felt strongly as the EU moved to review its internal security cooperation in 2006. The Council's contribution to a review of the Hague Programme prioritized advancement of an 'Architecture of Internal Security' and encouraged 'a process for the establishment of a reference framework for EU internal security' (Council of the European Union, 2006a, p. 2), signalling (albeit obliquely) that internal discussions were moving from the notion of a 'concept' to a 'strategy' (Interview 3, 2010). Only a few months later, a Communication by the Commission stated that 'it is time to develop an agreed Internal Security Strategy' (European Commission, 2006, p. 331), and the Council's 'Report on the Review of The Hague Programme' specified that such strategy 'should build upon the ongoing inter-institutional work in the area of counter-terrorism and protection of critical infrastructures' (Council of the European Union, 2006b, p. 9).

With the notion of a strategy on internal security firmly planted (but not moving particularly fast), the torch was passed to the 'Future Group'. This informal group of ministers was formed in January 2007 following the joint initiative of the then-German Interior Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble and Franco Frattini, then-European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs. According to their terms of reference, the Future Group offered a platform for open and informal reflection on new ideas and proposals for the development of

the AFSJ (Future Group 2008a; see also Future Group, 2007, p. 1). It had a fairly wide membership but only a subset of member states. Ministers of Interior from Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, France, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Spain, Belgium and Hungary were joined by the President of the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), a representative of the Secretariat General of the Council, and Franco Frattini representing the Commission. Deliberations revealed a proposal by the Luxembourg Minister for a wide-ranging 'EU Internal Security Policy' to guide JHA ministers (Future Group, 2007, p. 5). The Future Group's (2008a) final report instead opted to recommend an 'Internal Security Strategy' (p. 22), a finding noted by the Council in its conclusions (Council of the European Union, 2008a, b). Perhaps more importantly, several governments holding upcoming Presidencies of the EU took part in the discussions and 'signed up' to the idea of strategy – including France and Spain (Future Group, 2008b).

The 2008 French Presidency reintroduced the idea of an ISS into official debate. Council texts on the future of JHA cooperation noted the 2006 Council mention of an ISS, and introduced a discussion in the Article 36 Committee ('CATS', Comité de l'article trente-six, which had a coordinating role regarding police and judicial cooperation in the EU) on what an ISS might look like. The French may have had a strategic interpretation of the role ISS might play, reflected in their question of whether an ISS formulation process, if undertaken, might require an 'improved strategic analysis system' (Council of the European Union, 2008b).

By 2008, the review of the Hague Programme was well underway and a successor programme – the 'Stockholm Programme' – was in the making. The Stockholm Programme, adopted in late 2009, gave advocates an opportunity to link the ISS with the launch of a new multiyear internal security programme (Arteaga, 2010, p. 2). Simultaneously, the final ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, including the COSI provisions carried over from the Constitutional Treaty, was taking place through a referendum in October 2009 in Ireland. The convergence of the formal authorization of COSI, the birth of the Stockholm Programme, and the continuing attention paid to the idea of an ISS, together opened a window of opportunity for the ISS to come into being.

The origin of the ISS from the Commission's perspective is difficult to gauge. Following their 2006 intervention, the ISS featured prominently in Commission texts again only in 2009. One might surmise that the Commission had cause to consider carefully the possible benefits of an ISS. Not only was the potential 'ownership' of such a strategy unclear, but its 'jurisdiction' might even prove complicated: Would a strategy cover Commission competences, Council political direction, EU agencies or all of the above? Even though treading carefully in such questions, the Commission may have warmed to the idea. In June 2009, the Commission adopted a Communication in which the ISS was one of four ideas for developing an 'An AFSJ Serving the Citizen'. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Commission's approach was wide-ranging, including a broader variety of goals and objectives and focusing on its own competences (European Commission, 2009, p. 262).

At the start of the Swedish Presidency (2009) in July, the ISS was for the first time placed as an individual item on the agenda of the JHA Council at an informal Council meeting. Later that year, drafts of the Stockholm Programme were circulated that contained an explicit call to define a 'comprehensive Union internal security strategy' (Council of the European Union, 2010f),² first calling on the Council to do so, and in later drafts, calling on both the Council and the Commission. That dual call sowed the seeds of confusion (House of Lords, 2011, p. 8) and raised questions of which institution was responsible and which would take

leadership. Furthermore, the conception of what the ISS was intended to do seems to have expanded over time: originally conceived as an ‘integral concept’ to guide the COSI committee, articulations in the Stockholm Programme used terminology such as the importance of developing a ‘comprehensive ... strategy’ to ‘further improve security in the Union and thus protect the lives and safety of citizens of the Union and to tackle organized crime, terrorism and other threats’ (European Council, 2010b, p. 5). As the Stockholm Programme was being finalized in the end of 2009, and as the final JHA Council meeting of the Swedish Presidency took place, this expansive – and somewhat confusing – language was adopted by the European Council (Council of the European Union, 2009b).

In short, the origin of the ISS is linked to the drive to create a guiding concept for the work of a coordinating committee for internal security in the Council: COSI. It was not conceived as a method for fomenting a change in policy direction or for signalling grand intentions. The story of its origin, which we traced along a meandering path, shows how a modest initial proposal survived a series of obstacles to be taken up officially more than a decade later (Bunyan, 2010, p. 6). Yet the origin of an ISS was still associated with controversy, in that the role of the Commission and the Council in instigating the ISS was never made entirely clear. This ambiguity, along with its rather banal origins (from a strategic perspective), meant that one possible benefit from strategy – to signal political-symbolic intent – was undermined from the start.

The Process of Creating the ISS

With the need to develop an ISS firmly planted, the Spanish Presidency (first half of 2010) took it upon itself to start the formulation process. The ISS was part of the Presidency’s AFSJ agenda priorities as early as March 2009, when the government presented ideas at a meeting of European ministers at the G6 meeting in Berlin (Hillebrand, 2010b, p. 39). Through 2009 the drafting process got underway but with very little publicity. The Spanish Ministry of the Interior formed a small working group to produce an initial text and the group consulted very little with ‘outsiders’ such as the Commission. If a form of ‘policy entrepreneur’ can be identified, it was Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, the then-Spanish Interior Minister. Rubalcaba was on the record arguing that ‘“[t]here is no common strategy for internal security. The Spanish Presidency will work at filling this gap”. Rubalcaba wants this internal security strategy framework to be as clear and concrete as possible so that European citizens realise that the EU works hard to protect them’ (Acker, 2010, p. 44).

While this may have been the case, Rubalcaba engaged in only a modicum of ‘shuttle diplomacy’ on the issue. Some member state governments only received notice of the draft towards the end of 2009. A full draft strategy was circulated on 3 December 2009 among EU interior ministries (Hillebrand, 2010b, pp. 39–40) while a meeting of senior national officials from interior ministries in Madrid on 17–18 December 2009 were asked to comment on the draft, which was titled ‘Towards a European Security Model’ (Gruszczak, 2010, p. 3). All of this was aimed at gaining consensus in advance for the 20–22 January 2010 informal ministerial meeting planned in Toledo, Spain.

The tight timeline left little room for consultation, even with other governments, excluding perhaps the other holders of the ‘trio’ presidency – including Belgium and Hungary – which featured the ISS as part of the joint agenda, although that agenda was published after the Madrid meeting (Council of the European Union, 2009d and Council of the European Union,

2010a). Copies of the draft were sent in January 2010 to delegations (Council of the European Union, 2010d) and to the JHA Council (Council of the European Union, 2010b). At that time, the European Parliament's LIBE Committee was formally notified and shown copies of the draft (Council of the European Union, 2010c). This left many Parliamentarians angry at the closed nature of the process, with few opportunities for meaningful consultation and input before the Toledo meeting in January 2010. National parliaments were also largely cut out from discussions (Busuioac and Curtin, 2011, p. 15). The Commission, too, felt largely cut out of the process – or, at a minimum – that the process was being driven firmly by the Council and the Spanish Presidency (House of Lords, 2011). The Council did, however, consult with some of the EU's agencies – namely Europol, Eurojust and Frontex – for assistance in the listing of threats (Council of the European Union, 2010h). While the Spanish Presidency asked for a combined threat assessment from three agencies, the result was rather haphazard and lacked coherence (Brady, 2011, pp. 77–78; see also Bigo, 2010).

Following some last minute adjustments to include 'road traffic accidents' as one of the listed internal security threats, the ISS was adopted on 25 February 2010 (Council of the European Union, 2010e) and approved by the European Council one month later (European Council EUCO 7/10). Even with the ISS adopted, the Parliament continued its criticism – having been cut out not only of the ISS drafting process but also of the original discussions on COSI (Hillebrand, 2010b, p. 40) at a time when the Lisbon Treaty made the Parliament an equal legislator on many JHA matters. The Commission, too, had a hard time interpreting the content and meaning of the ISS. What was the relationship of the ISS to the Commission-driven Stockholm Programme? Was the ISS to shape policy beyond the operational considerations covered by COSI, as originally intended? As one Commission cabinet member put it, 'It is hard to know what to do with [the ISS]. We need to give it focus and match it with available instruments' (Interview 2, 2011).

To summarize, the process of formulating the ISS was kept within a fairly small circle, and an intergovernmental circle at that. The Commission kept its distance, while the Parliament and national parliaments expressed deep concern over the lack of consultation. While some EU agencies were asked for input, very little attention from the press or general public can be discerned. If one goal of strategy is to create 'buy-in' and generate direction within fragmented institutional landscapes, the process by which the ISS was formulated may have undermined that aim.

The Content of the ISS

An advantage of strategy is the ability to link means with ends, which, along with a statement of priority and indicators of success, can provide day-to-day guidance for policymaking. This turns our attention to content. The subtitle of the ISS suggestively suggests the EU should move 'Towards a European Security Model', a concept subsequently defined as a 'set of common tools' and a commitment to a long list of normative 'principles' including solidarity, inclusion of relevant actors, a commitment to civil liberties and prevention work in addition to addressing 'sources of insecurity'. The text begins with a list of threats and challenges, listed as terrorism, serious and organized crime, cybercrime, cross-border crime, violent itself, natural and man-made disasters as well as phenomena such as road traffic accidents. It then shows the responses that are taking place – and that ostensibly should take

place – such as prevention work, improving response capacities, coordinating EU agencies and roles, such as the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, more effectively, improved information sharing based on mutual recognition, and improved evaluation and follow-up activities.

After going through the normative principles that constitute a European Security Model (principles largely corresponding the European Charter of Fundamental Rights), the document concludes with a set of ‘strategic guidelines for action’. A list of 10 objectives, which expand upon but overlap with the ‘responses’ section described earlier, could be described as a ‘Christmas Tree’ of wishes in a number of disparate working areas and at different operational levels: more intelligence-led policing, better focus on democratic freedoms, more integrated border control and improved information exchange, to name some examples (Council of the European Union, 2010e). The wide ranging and normative nature of some of these tasks raises questions about the original intent of the ISS: to give direction to COSI, an operational committee intended to coordinate actions rather than draft policy and monitor civil liberties, for instance.

Considering the process by which it was created, it might not be a surprise that the ISS is a Council document in more than just name. It focuses mainly on issues of an inter-governmental nature rather than on Union competences. In fact, the ISS presents a model of intergovernmental cooperation in only some areas of internal security; thus Arteaga (2010) suggests the ISS presents a ‘sub-model’ at best (p. 4) while Carrera and Guild (2011, p. 3) go further in saying the ISS can be seen as an attempt to reintroduce third pillar decision making in a post-Lisbon environment. In any case, the ISS seems narrow and inconsistent with the current legal framework for EU decision making in internal security cooperation – a framework in which the Community Method now applies to most issue areas. This inconsistency limits the potential for the ISS to guide day-to-day decision making in the policy field – one of the key benefits that strategy might have.

Further, the power of the European Security Model to guide decision making is undermined by the fact that the ‘action objectives’ in the ISS do not correspond very well to the ‘principles’ of the model. Much is left undefined and imprecise, including the specific nature of threats, the actors responsible for different tasks and measures of success. Imprecision is not totally uncharacteristic of strategies in general, but for the ISS it undermines the potential benefit of the strategy since the EU’s internal security field is already so fragmented and reliant on national implementation (Carrera and Guild, 2011; Allum and Den Boer, 2013).³

In short, the content of the ISS argues for a particular model of security but does not follow through with coherent principles, follow-on objectives and signposts for progress. The ISS has been labelled by some as ‘more a mission statement than a strategy, simply outlining that the EU has a role in internal security’ (Brady, 2011, p. 71). Whatever the case, the story of the content of the ISS is one which casts doubt on whether it is capable of guiding cooperation at either the political or operational level.

Analysis: After the ISS

What happened in the aftermath of the ISS? Looking at policy and institutional developments offers an indication of whether the ISS is affecting cooperation. We can start with the Commission, which was requested in the final paragraph of the ISS to ‘adopt a Communication on the Internal Security Strategy which will include action oriented

proposals' (Council of the European Union, 2010g, p. 18). The Communication, adopted by the Commission in November 2010, was titled 'The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five Steps Towards a More Secure Europe' (European Commission, 2010 673). The Commission narrowed the discussion to just five strategic directions, but with more substance and detailed action proposals. The central threats are drawn from the ISS: serious and organized crime, terrorism, cybercrime, border security and natural or man-made disasters. The more diffused threats such as 'violence itself' and phenomena such as 'road traffic accidents' are excluded in the communication.

Through their Communication on the ISS, the Commission sought to pay homage to the ISS but to improve upon its weaknesses; in the words of one insider in the Commission, 'we had to do something in relation to the ISS, but the choice was made to create a more strategic document in substance and not just title; with that document in place, we hoped to leave the ISS behind' (Interview 1, 2010). The Communication also represented an attempt by the Commission to reintroduce its views on questions of strategy and to remind national governments of its 'added value' (Brady, 2011, p. 66). In some respects, the Commission Communication achieved those goals. As Brady (2011) argues, the Communication is the only document that has managed to 'bring a set of priorities to EU action in this area', in contrast to both the Stockholm Programme and the ISS (p. 71).⁴

The Commission's Communication did not put questions of ownership to rest. Discussions on the ISS continued to take place in parallel: informally within the JHA Council structures as COSI was being established, and within the Commission. As a result, frictions first generated in the origin of the ISS have persisted. Malmström (2010), Commissioner for Home Affairs, for instance, refers to 'my strategy' while the ISS is simply 'the Council proposal' (pp. 10, 13). The Council holds the opposite view, and in fact expresses frustration that the Commission has become too involved in shaping the follow-up to the ISS. In Brady's (2011) words, the Council 'does not even like this communication document ... It does not like the Commission putting its stall out like this; it is very shocking for some of them' (p. 86). Scherrer *et al* (2011) argue that on the ISS, there is a strong cleavage between the Commission and a handful of member states hostile to ambitious JHA initiatives. That cleavage helps explain the 'incapacity to alter courses of action previously agreed upon, based on the difficulty to find an agreement on new orientations' (Scherrer *et al*, 2011, p. 33). The United Kingdom, in particular, argues that the Commission's response runs 'counter to the focus of the ISS and COSI on practical measures and cooperation instead of new EU legislation' (Storr *et al*, 2010, p. 118).

Institutional conflict over the ISS extends to the European Parliament. Not only was the Parliament displeased with the origin, formulation and content of the ISS (as described above), but it reserved some criticism for the Commission's Communication too. The rapporteur of the LIBE committee states that 'neither the Member States nor the Commission have as yet envisaged any role for Parliament in this process' and repeats that 'the European Parliament is now a fully-fledged institutional actor in the field of security policies, and is therefore entitled to participate actively in determining the features and priorities of the ISS and of the EU Security Model' (European Parliament, 2012 0207, pp. 5–6). It should be noted, however, that the Commission has accepted some of the Parliament's requests, including a proposal for a 'parliamentary policy cycle' where the parliament together with national parliaments could debate the Commission's reports on the ISS (European Commission, 2012 542).

Adding more confusion, at COSI's first meeting in March 2010, a decision was made to 'develop, monitor and implement' the ISS (Hillebrand, 2010a), thus adding yet another

implementation approach to the ISS. Interior Ministers, perhaps frustrated with the Commission's approach, stated in July 2010 that the ISS 'will be translated into an operational strategy' and put in place in 2014 with the assistance of COSI and Europol (Council of the European Union, 2010i). Europol was assigned to define criminal phenomena and analyse statistics, while COSI had the role of 'drawing up an operational action plan for any priorities identified by the JHA Council' (in Hillebrand, 2010a). It could be noted here that COSI has had a difficult start, with unclear membership criteria and a confusing role in 'operational' internal security issues (Shapcott, 2010, p. 18). Europol has played a strong role in helping to set COSI's agenda, for instance, by helping to implement the Harmony Policy Cycle. That process involves expert groups stipulating concrete actions that can help achieve general objectives. For COSI, therefore, the ISS has been supplanted by the Harmony Policy Cycle (Bossong and Rhinard, 2013). ISS has thus failed to live up to even the most modest expectations of providing COSI with an 'integral concept' (Luxembourg Presidency, 2005) to guide its operations.

Conclusion

This article offered a historical perspective on the creation of the ISS, showing that the particular context and nature in which the strategy developed had a formative effect on its eventual impact. We demonstrated the ISS's potential – and unrealized potential – by assessing the ISS against the ostensible benefits of strategy, in general. Those benefits are to signal renewed intent to a broad audience, to improve coherence among a fragmented institutional landscape and to provide indications and measures for day-to-day policymaking. While few strategies may achieve these 'ideal goals', and continued research needs to be conducted, current evidence suggests the ISS seems to be failing to achieve any of them.

We found that the notion of creating an ISS for the EU dates back more than a decade, but far from a wide ranging, political-symbolic exercise, the original idea for an ISS was to give direction to a single committee operating in the EU. Thus, while catching Brussels observers off-guard and raising expectations of newfound intent, the ISS in reality was a fairly narrow, institutional exercise. We also found that the ISS was formulated in a fairly small, Spanish-centred drafting group. That group, led by the Spanish Minister of the Interior did not consult widely or early among EU institutions or civil society. Thus, any potential cohering effect of the strategy, to draw together agencies, institutions and governments towards a common purpose, was lost. Finally, we found that the ISS contains very little information helpful for guiding – or signposting – daily activities. Strategies rarely contain detailed information, but they do help lower-level officials to connect means with ends and to justify certain action steps. The ISS thus fails in the third benefit that a strategy can provide an organization or polity. These historical features of the ISS's evolution provide plausible explanations for the limited effect of the ISS, at least in the short term. Additional data collection on future developments, however, is required before strong conclusions can be drawn.

This article offers a rare perspective of the ISS, including historical detail, which should be useful for academics and practitioners alike. Not only is the 'story' of the ISS important to recount for posterity's sake, but it also gives us analytical traction on why the ISS may not prove as influential as some might hope. With the benefits of hindsight, it may have been a mistake to call the Council's document a 'strategy', since it neither contains the traditional

elements of strategy nor does it help set a long-term, focused vision for a broad array of actors. A strategy worthy of the name would have included a broader set of actors in consultation, adopted a commonly held set of priorities worth mobilizing resources towards, set out a set of metrics for achieving success and perhaps created a symbolic notion with broader appeal than the rather vacuous 'European Security Model'. A review of the ISS is scheduled for 2014, but the prospects of altering course and developing a full-blown strategy look unlikely at a time when the 'political consensus that has driven JHA cooperation over the past decade is fraying on several fronts' (Brady, 2011, p. 66). Ironically, such a situation may make strategy more relevant than ever, but it also makes the creation of strategy – among diverse member states and EU institutions – more difficult than ever.

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Notes

- 1 For a more detailed analysis of outcomes after the ISS, see Bossong and Rhinard (2013).
- 2 Earlier drafts of the Stockholm Programme were circulated on 6 October 2009 (Stockholm Programme draft, 2009, 6/10), on 16 October 2009 (Council of the European Union, 2009a) and on 2 December 2009 (Council of the European Union, 2009a).
- 3 Indeed, those two facts throw into question the wisdom of trying to achieve a single 'model' for EU internal security cooperation at all (Burgess, 2010, p. 4).
- 4 It can be debated whether the Commission's Communication brought something substantively new. The Parliament criticized both the Council's ISS and the Commission's Communication as lacking substance 'in terms of a hierarchy of priorities and justifications for the course of action proposed' and the content is criticized as 'recycling' earlier policies on internal security issues, 'to reiterate past orientations and to reframe past initiatives' (Scherrer *et al*, 2011, p. 33; see also Rees, 2010, p. 62).

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