Justicialist Party:
Peronism and Institutionalization in Argentina

Camilo Alvarado
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Abstract

This study aims at examining the level of institutionalization of the argentine party system as well as the Justicialist party. The paper presents two parallel analyses on the argentine party system and the Justicialist Party using two different perspectives on the concept of institutionalization. The first is a qualitative analysis using Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) theory and operationalization of institutionalizations of party systems. This part analyses presidential and parliamentary electoral results in the period between 1995 and 2013. The second part of the study is a qualitative analysis of the Justicialist Party within the theoretical framework proposed by Randall and Svåsand (2002). This section analyses the origins of the party and its history throughout the 1900’s focusing on the character of the party, the relationship between the party as a whole and its leader(s) as well as the relationship between the party as a whole and its different factions.

Keywords

Institutionalization, Political Party, Party System, Justicialist Party, Peronism, Argentina
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ACyS – Acuerdo Cívico y Social – Social and Civic Agreement (Coalition, CC-ARI and UCR)
ARI – Argentinos por una República de Iguales, later Alternativa por una República de Iguales – Argentines/Alternative for an Equal Nation
ApR – Acción por la República – Action for the Republic (PJ)
ATJE – Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación – Alliance for Work, Justice and Education, known as ”the Alliance” (Alliance UCR and FREPASO)
CC – Coalición Cívica - Civic Coalition (Earlier CC-ARI, earlier known just as ARI)
CF – Alianza Compromiso Federal – Federal Compromise Alliance (PJ)
CGL – Confederación General del Trabajo – General Confederation of Labour
CJC – Concertación Justicialista para el Cambio – Justicialist Concertation for Change (Alliance PJ and UCeDé)
DINE – Dirección Nacional Electoral – National Electoral Office of Argentina
FAP – Frente Amplio Progresista – Broad Progressive Front
FMP – Frente Movimiento Popular Unión y Libertad – Popular Union and Liberty Movement Front
FpV – Frente para la Victoria – Victory Front
FR – Frente Renovador – Renovation Front
FREJULI – Frente Justicia Unión y Libertad – Justice, Union and Liberty Front (Not to be confused with Frente Justicialista de Liberación – Justicialist Front for Liberation – also known as FREJULI which was active in the elections of 1973)
FREPASO – Frente País Solidario – Solidary Nation Front
FT – Frente de Todos – Everyone’s Front
MPN – Movimiento Popular Neuquino – Popular Movement of Neuquén
PJ – Partido Justicialista – Justicialist Party
PRO – Propuesta Republicana – Republican Proposal
R – Recrear para el Crecimiento – Recreate for Growth
UCeDé – Unión del Centro Democrático – Democratic Center Union
UCR – Unión Social Radical – Social Radical Union
UDES – Unión Para el Desarrollo Social – Union for Social Development
UNA – Una Nación Avanzada – An Advanced Nation
UP – Unión Popular – Popular Union
1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Argentina is the home of one of the most iconic political movements in Latin America in the last century: Peronism. In the later part of the 1900’s and early 2000’s this movement has been embodied by the biggest political party in the country (Levitsky 1998: 82) and one of the biggest democratic parties in the world (Levitsky 2001: 30), Partido Justicialista de la República Argentina (PJ; Justicialist Party).

PJ was born in the mid 1940’s led by Juan Perón, one of many immensely popular and charismatic Latin American leaders in the 1900’s, in the class of Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in Colombia, José María Velasco in Ecuador, among others. Throughout this century peronism has suffered many backlashes; perhaps the most significant one of which was the coup d’état that took place in 1955. Perón and his political movement had gained momentum and popularity, among other things by attempting to begin a mobilization and incorporation of working classes (Peeler 2009: 59). This coup d'état resulted in Perón being exiled to Spain in 1960 and PJ, or the Peronist Party, as it was known in its beginnings, being dissolved and proscribed until the early 1970’s (McGuire 1997: 22, 23).

These events did not in any way deliver a final blow to peronism and PJ. On the contrary, the years of no peronism between 1955 and 1973 seem to have created a sort of vacuum in the political landscape in the country that would eventually be reclaimed by Perón himself. The return of Perón on June 20th 1973 resulted in violent revolts in Buenos Aires. Left and right-wing underground peronists that had been growing stronger during this period blamed each other for these events (López Alonso 1982: 278). The following year Perón was elected president receiving 61.8% of the votes only to die of natural causes nine months later (López Alonso 1982: 283-295). The last coup d’état in Argentina took place in 1976 (López Alonso 1982: 353-355); This regime lasted until 1983, the year in which the current democratic system in the country began. The presidential election that took place in 1983 was won by UCR’s (Unión Cívica Radical, Radical Civic Union) candidate Raúl Alfonsín (McGuire
1997: 21); This presidential election together with the 1999 election are the only ones that PJ has not won between since the last democratic period began\(^1\).

Argentina is also home to one of the oldest parties in the region, UCR. The country, as noted, has gone through great political and social turmoil throughout the 1900’s, including many violent revolts, protests and a total of eight interruptions of the democratic system. However, the UCR/PJ dichotomy in the party system does not seem to have been affected by the political instability in the country. Every democratically elected president since 1912 has been a candidate for either PJ or UCR (McGuire in Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 224). The continuous violent interruption of democratic practices, and the proscription and prosecution of peronism and peronists for almost two decades in the 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s did not abolish this political movement (Levitsky, 1998: 82). Quite the opposite; Peronism became an integral part of the Argentine political landscape, and his political legacy transcends even today in a way that other populist leaders and their political movements in the region did not.

Peronism, and its most important vessel PJ, has since its beginnings been characterized by charismatic and personalistic leaders, great popularity of the party, powerful union organizations and lack of organization and structure within the party (McGuire 1997: vii-ix). Furthermore, peronism is a powerful but famously vague ideology\(^2\). Many scholars agree that these, and other factors, have hindered the institutionalization of PJ\(^3\); yet by using quantitative approaches, like Mainwaring and Scully’s operationalization, the stability of the party system does not seem to have been affected. Levitsky (2001) has described argentine politics as ‘Organized Disorganization’\(^4\); this paradoxical aspect of argentine politics, specifically its party system, is one of the motivations for this study. This paper presents two parallel studies in relation to Argentine party politics and PJ particularly. The first is a quantitative analysis of the Argentine party system between 1997 and 2013. The second presents a qualitative analysis of PJ.

\(^1\) Data from before 1995 presented by McGuire (1997:20-22), data after 1995 collected by the author for the purposes of the analysis in chapter 3.

\(^2\) Manzetti (1993: 36) discussed by Randall amd Svåsand (2002: 22)

\(^3\) e.g. McGuire 1997, Levitsky 1998, Peeler 2009, among others.

\(^4\) Title of Steven Levitskys article from 2001
The study, as noted, is carried out within the theoretical framework of institutionalization. Samuel Huntington defined institutionalization as “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability” (1968: 12). This concept can be used as a tool of analysis in any democratic or non-democratic organization or system, the concept has been widely studied, debated and adapted. However, I will focus on the concept of institutionalization in relation to party systems and political parties. (a more detailed description is done in section 1.3 as well as in chapter 2). In their study Mainwaring and Scully (1995), using their four criteria of institutionalization (explained in chapter 2) found that Argentina had a somewhat high level of institutionalization (see table 2.2). The second motivation for this study is to find whether this pattern has continued after that volume was released.

This document is divided into five chapters: This first chapter stakes the aim, research questions, hypothesis, as well as the limitations of the study; Chapter two presents the theoretical framework and the methodology employed in the analysis. The third chapter presents the first analysis, that is a quantitative analysis of the argentine party system during the period between 1995 and 2013 using Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) conceptualization and operationalization of institutionalization (explained in chapter 2); Chapter four presents the second part of the study, a qualitative analysis of PJ using Randall and Svåsand’s criteria of an institutionalized political party (also explained in chapter 2); Chapter five answers and discusses the research questions and presents the conclusions of the study.

1.2 Aim, Research Questions & Hypothesis

The aim of this study is to analyze the argentine party system and the most important political party in Argentina, PJ, from an institutionalization approach. This paper consists of two parallel studies using two different theoretical perspectives. The first part of the study uses Mainwaring and Scully’s approach of institutionalization, which aims at determining the level of institutionalization of the party system. This part of the paper is a quantitative study where

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1 Mainwaring and Scully mean that Huntington applies his concept of Institutionalization to democratic as well as non-democratic systems. The authors point out that their conceptualization of institutionalization only applies to democratic systems (1995: 479)
the unit of analysis is the Argentine party system as a whole. The second part of this paper is based on Randall and Svåsand’s approach on institutionalization, which is aimed at examining the level of institutionalization of a single political party. This theoretical approach proposes a qualitative study of several aspects of a political party, in this case PJ.

At first glance the two theoretical approaches employed in this study might seem contradictory or opposed to each other, which would suggest a triangulation design (Bryman 2008: 700). This is not the case due to the simple fact that the approaches have different units of analysis; instead the two studies ought to be regarded as parallel analyses. Furthermore, given the major theoretical and methodological differences described below, these two approaches can neither be argued to be opposed nor complementary. Rather, as previously described, this paper proposes two separate analyses, which may or may not complement each other. More importantly, the two studies might together provide some insight into the political landscape in Argentina and the PJ, as well as some empirical feedback to the theories, more so than if they were presented independently.

Two research questions will work as the guidelines for this research:

- Is the Argentine party system as a whole institutionalized? And is PJ itself institutionalized?
- How do the two theoretical and methodological approaches differ in their portrayal of Argentine party politics?

The hypothesis of this study is that the Argentine party system can be regarded as institutionalized from a quantitative perspective, but closer and more qualitative analysis of the PJ will reveal an ongoing process of deinstitutionalization which has been progressing since 1995.

1.4 Concepts

The definition of institutionalization in relation to party systems inevitably varies depending on the criteria or dimension that each theoretical approach proposes, as these criteria shape and determine the actual meaning of the concept (A discussion on this concept is presented in section 2.1). However, I adopt Mainwaring and Torcal’s argument that “an institutionalized party system, then, is one in which actors develop expectations and behavior based on the
premise that the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behavior will prevail into the foreseeable future. In an institutionalized party system, there is stability in who the main parties are and how they behave” (2006:206). In this regard, Selznick (1957: 5), argues that ”a non-institutionalized organization is viewed by its members as an expendable tool, a rational instrument engineered to do a job”6.

Three other concepts are important to point out: Party, faction and movement. There are several definitions of these, especially of political party. It is important to highlight that peronism can be regarded in different contexts as a party, faction and/or movement.

Firstly, I will use McGuire’s definition of party (1997: 7): “An organization whose leaders and members seek control the state exclusively through elections involving competitions with other parties”7. Furthermore, given the quantitative nature of the first part of this study, I will employ a much simpler definition, or operationalization of this concept. In this part of the analysis party simply means the ‘label’ under which politicians are elected to office.

Secondly, as to the definition of faction, I employ Randall and Svåsand’s definition: ”any relatively organized group that exists within the context of some other group and which (as a political faction) competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part (…) represented as the antithesis of cohesion” (Randall & Svåsand 2002: 19)

Lastly, in relation to political movement, I will also employ McGuire’s definition: “a set of people who share a common political identity and whose leaders aspire to full and permanent control of the state through the most readily available means, electoral or not.” (McGuire, 1997: 7).

1.3 Limitations

This paper aims at studying PJ from an institutionalization perspective; These two themes are both broad and far from unambiguous. Firstly, the limits of the concept of institutionalization are to be mentioned. Many authors have argued that in the specific study of party systems,  

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7 McGuire mentions that similar definitions are provided by Sartori (1976), Collier & Collier (1979), and Mainwaring and Scully (1995)
institutionalization is a concept whose importance is widely accepted and uncontested in a way that is very uncharacteristic in the field of social studies (discussed more in detail in section 2.1). Nevertheless, the institutionalization approach and institutionalization as a more general concept have been widely debated and several alternative approaches have been proposed in relation to the study of democratic systems and institutions. These discussions are only mentioned briefly in this paper given the above mentioned focus on political parties and party systems and the apparent academic agreement on the importance of the concept specifically and exclusively in relation to party systems.

Secondly, PJ is clearly the most important and influential party in Argentina. However the party is also known for its lack of uniformity and political and structural ambiguity. This gives rise to a methodological issue, due to the fact that the quantitative theory and method employed in the first part of this study does not have clear criteria as to how such cases should be tackled. Thus the methodology employed, specifically the grouping of political parties in order to perform the calculations, and the analysis that follows those calculations, (Described in detail in section 2.2), will inevitably be potential subjects of debate.

Another crucial aspect of the political landscape in Argentina is the high number of local political parties and movements and their importance. Parties like Movimiento Popular Neuquino (Popular movement from Neuquén, MPN) in the province of Neuquén and Frente de Todos (Everyone’s Front, FT) in the provinces of Chaco and Corrientes have been very important for Argentine politics and maybe even the party system in the country. Nevertheless, given the set focus on the party system at the national level as a whole and PJ specifically, this phenomenon of local parties will not be tackled and remains a subject for future study.

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8 This apparent consensus is discussed more in detail in chapter 2.
9 This became apparent after the analysis of the electoral material which was collected for the first part of the study.
2. Theory & Method

2.1 Theoretical Framework

2.1.1 Institutionalization

The concept of institutionalization proposed a tool that has been widely used in examining and analysing democratic institutions. The works of Samuel Huntington, the ‘father’ (Randall and Svåsand 2002: 10) of this theoretical concept, have been very important in the development of the concept of institutionalization both in relation to party systems as well as at a more general level. Huntington’s works in the 1960’s marked the beginnings of the study of institutionalization in democratic systems. He proposed four criteria, ‘a classic formula’ (Diamond and Linz 1989: 21), for determining the level of institutionalization of political institutions: adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence. However, when it came to deductive studies, these criteria faced two major and interrelated criticisms. Firstly, these criteria are not very useful in empirical analysis because Huntington’s conceptual approach is not accompanied by methodological guidelines that suggest how the criteria are to be approached and studied; Secondly, it was argued that Huntington did not provide any practical operationalization of the concepts.

Some authors modified Huntington’s ‘classic formula’ and provided more operationalizable indicators in regards to the four criteria. One example is Dix’s (1992) operationalization of Huntington’s four criteria. He uses historical data and change in rolls of opposition to determine adaptability; fractionalization indexes to measure coherence; presence of catch-all parties to determine autonomy and three other more qualitative factors to determine complexity: personality-dependent parties, multiplication of organizational subunits and presence of catch-all parties. However, given the focus of this paper I will use other theoretical and methodological approaches, explained below. A large number of authors have
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suggested different theories and methods for examining and analyzing the level of institutionalization of different political institutions. All of these approaches propose specific criteria for studying and measuring different aspects of any given system (see table 2.1). Some of the criteria are exclusive to one approach, such as Randall and Svåsand’s (2002) reification. Some approaches adopt similar criteria, but propose different methods of analysis, and some come in direct conflict with one another in some respects. Furthermore, Meleshevich argues that all of these approaches have at least one criterion for determining the level autonomy in the party system, and another for determining the stability of the system (2007, 12). For the purpose of this paper I will focus on two approaches that aim at studying political parties and party systems specifically.

2.1.2 Institutionalization of Party Systems

In the specific case of studies of party systems, the concept of institutionalization becomes arguably more relevant. The importance of the concept of institutionalization in relation to party systems began being debated in the 1990’s (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006: 204) and there is nowadays a ‘rare consensus’ (Meleshevich 2007: 11) at the academic level that the level of institutionalization of a party system is a crucial factor in any successful democratic system. Diamond and Linz argue that “the historical evidence… suggests that the crucial consideration for democracy is… the degree of party institutionalization. All of our cases call attention to the institutional strength or weakness of parties as a determinant of success or failure with democracy.” (1989:21). In this regard, an ‘institutionalized’ party system or political party is synonymous with a ‘good’ party system or political party. This seems to be a tacit assumption in the studies on this subject that is also adopted in this study, in this case explicitly. Even if there is agreement on the importance of this concept of institutionalization of parties and party systems, it is less clear what this concept actually means (Randall and Svåsand 2002: 6).

Even if the importance of institutionalized party systems is agreed upon and to a certain degree assumed, there are several approaches to examining the level of institutionalization of

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12 These authors applied Huntington’s four criteria of institutionalization in their extensive studies on developing democracies. Their analysis of the party systems in the countries consisted of brief qualitative case studies of the party systems, within the framework of Huntington’s criteria. Granted their focus was not specifically on party systems, they did analyse the party systems but provided arguments which are not based on reliable, quantifiable data and therefore make them hard to be applicable in other contexts.
party systems and political parties (see table 2.1). Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) volume on this subject is one of the most important theoretical and methodological approaches to examining levels of institutionalization of party systems. Their framework has been used by many authors in different studies on this subject, particularly in the study of the developing world, and especially in the context of Latin America. Their approach is based on four criteria that determine the level of institutionalization of a given party system: (i) Stability in inter-party competition, (ii) stable and deep roots of the political parties in society, (iii) legitimacy of the electoral processes and parties and (iv) well organized and independent political parties (see table 2.2).

Peeler (2009:112) argues that this model has two problematic aspects: Firstly, he argues that the material aspects of this approach are problematic due to the fact that only the first two criteria rely on quantifiable and reliable data. These first two criteria are determined by examining election results and shifts and patterns in them. The second two criteria are less clear in terms of the methodological approaches and rely more on qualitative case studies, which provides reliability and operationalization concerns. Secondly, Peeler argues that this methodical approach does not take into consideration historical factors, which, according to him, implies validity concerns in the sense that the criteria fail to provide accurate examinations of the factors that they intend to determine. Mainwaring and Torcal’s (2006) study of 32 different countries from different continents and used Mainwaring and Scully’s theoretical approach. However they only employed on the first two criteria and did not use the second two criteria “given spatial constraints and because of the difficulties of obtaining valid empirical information for all four dimensions for a wide range of countries…” (2006: 205). This supports Peeler’s critique that studies done using the third and fourth criteria can be difficult to compare and might have reliability problems. This is also the motivation to the use of the first two criteria only in the first part of this study.

The aim of this section of the paper will be to determine the level of institutionalization of the Argentine party system and to find any patterns or shifts in the system since 1995. These

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13 e.g. Boudon 2000; Peeler 2009; Payne, Zovatto and Mateo Diaz 2006; Meleshevich 2007, Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Dargent and Munoz 2011.
two criteria provide reliable and valid operationalization of the data, which in turn will make the results comparable and testable. Furthermore, this section of the paper will analyze the electoral periods after 1995, given that Mainwaring and Scully’s study has already done a similar analysis of this specific party system (see table 2.2). This excludes the historical validity concerns mentioned by Peeler.

2.1.3 Institutionalization of Political Parties

None of these approaches debates whether the institutionalization of a party system, includes or is equivalent or different from the institutionalization of the political parties themselves. In their article Randall and Svåsand (2002) argue that this is a very important distinction and that the former does not necessarily imply the latter. That is to say, an institutionalized party system, determined using the criteria that other authors propose, may well be the home of uninstitutionalized political parties, or vice versa. These authors propose four alternative criteria, or dimensions: (i) Systemness, (ii) value infusion, (iii) decisional autonomy and (iv) reification. In this part of the study, I will use the first (systemness) and fourth (reification) criteria of this approach. Systemness is described as the increasing scope, density and regularity of interactions that constitute the party’ (2002: 13). The first part of this study will

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Note: Criteria are spelled out in the accompanying text. 3.0 = high; 2.5 = medium high; 2.0 = medium; 1.5 = medium low; 1.0 = low.

Table 2.2 Party Institutionalization in Latin America (Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 17)
provide some insight into some of the criteria that constitute this dimension (thoroughly explained in section 2.2.2).

Reification determines whether the party exists in the ‘public imaginary’, that is the party is an integral part of the cultural, social and political traditions in society (this criterion is also thoroughly explained in section 2.2.) Furthermore, this criterion addresses a problem which Levitsky has pointed out in relation to the study of institutionalization in relation to parties and party systems: “most comparative and theoretical work on political parties does not incorporate informal rules and procedures into discussions of party institutionalization” (1998: 87).

Levitsky (1998) and McGuire (1997) have already applied the second dimension, the concept of value infusion, in analyzing peronism in Argentina. Both of their studies led to the conclusion that peronism and PJ are weakly and relatively (respectively) institutionalized in regards to this particular dimension of institutionalization. Hence, I will not use this criterion in the study. The third dimension, decisional autonomy, deals with sponsorship and external connections of the party. However, the authors do not point to specific points of reference in order to tackle this dimension. In this regard I will only discuss PJ’s connections with worker’s unions, but I will do it in the context of the first dimension (systemness).

Their approach is more qualitative than the approaches discussed on the analysis on party systems. To some degree, this implies that these criteria are not operationalizable to a greater extent, and are therefore not so applicable in extensive comparative studies. However, they present new ways of examining party system and political party institutionalization in case studies or studies with a limited number of cases. Furthermore, Randall and Svåsand’s theory is applicable in systems that have more than one party, and it is aimed at democracies in the developing world. Meleshevich argues that “an appropriate set of measures would significantly strengthen their thoughtful theoretical model…”(Meleshevich 2006:23). The main critique on this approach rises from the lack of a clear methodological approach, which will be discussed below. These criteria provide the theoretical basis for the second part of this study, which aim to determine the level of institutionalization of PJ itself.

2.2 Method & Material
As mentioned in the introduction, two separate sections using two different theoretical and methodological approaches comprise this study. The first section employs Mainwaring and Scully’s approach and consists of a quantitative analysis whose single unit of analysis is the Argentine party system. This section provides a qualitative examination of the level of institutionalization of PJ. The material for this part of the study is retrieved from primary and secondary sources in the form of Argentine electoral records collected by the author. In this section focus will lie only on parties, factions, movements and coalitions, not on candidates or politicians.

The second section consists of a qualitative case study of the PJ. In this section the unit of analysis is the party itself, which is analyzed using two of Randall and Svåsand’s criteria for determining the level of institutionalization of a party. This section employs secondary sources in the form of McGuire’s (1997) and Levitsky’s (1998, 2001) studies on PJ as well as some of the results and the electoral material collected in the first part of this study (chapter 3).

As mentioned in section 1.3, this not triangulation study given that Randall and Svåsand’s perspective does not present an alternative approach to Mainwaring and Scully’s or any of the other theories on institutionalization of party systems. Instead they provide an alternative approach, which does not necessarily disprove, nor complements, neither this theory nor any other theory that employ party systems as units of analysis. Below is a detailed description of the methods, the criteria and the material used in each of the two parts of the study.

2.2.1 Mainwaring and Scully’s Institutionalization

Mainwaring and Scully (1995) propose four criteria for examining the level of institutionalization. However, for the noted reasons, this analysis will only use the first and second criteria. According to Mainwaring and Scully’s operationalization in order to determine the level of institutionalization in relation to these two criteria, presidential and parliamentary elections are to be studied. For the presidential elections, which take place every four years, I will use first round electoral results of the 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 presidential elections. The election results for 1995 are included in the calculation in order to assign a numerical value to the 1999 as explained in the following section.

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14 Primary source: Dirección Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Office of Argentina); Secondary sources: Inter-Parliamentary Union, Observatorio Electoral Ibero-Americano, Georgetown University’s Political Database of the Americas and El Clarín. See reference section.
The authors argue that the lower chamber of parliament is more relevant given that normally in bicameral parliaments the lower chamber is the one that is directly elected. In the case of Argentina the lower chamber, Cámar de Diputados, consists of 257 seats. Parliamentary elections are held every two years, and in each election half of the chamber is elected; Diputados serve for a period of four years. I will analyze the parliamentary elections of 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013. Similarly to the presidential elections, the results for the 1995 election are included in the calculations in order to assign a numerical value to the 1997 election.

One could argue that the higher chamber should also be taken into consideration whenever these officers are directly elected in open elections. However I will not include the higher chamber of parliament in Argentina, Senado de la Nación, in this study for two reasons. First, because these officials are elected locally in each province and each province has a limited number of seats in the Senado. This means that a voter in a province which has only two seats might vote differently or ‘strategically’, more so than in a province which has three or more seats. Secondly, local parties are an important phenomenon in Argentina. Some parties, like MPN and FT have traditionally been strong in specific regions. This phenomenon falls beside the focus of the analysis in this study.

Below is a detailed methodological description of the calculations done in section 2. All the data used in these calculations has been collected by the author from: Dirección Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Office of Argentina, DINE), Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Observatorio Electoral Ibero-Americano (Obelia), Georgetown University’s Political Database of the Americas and El Clarín (see reference section). All the tables in chapter 3 (Table 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3) are made by the author.

2.2.1.1 Stability in Inter-party Competition

The first criterion aims at determining the level of stability and inter-party competition. This is, according to the authors themselves, the most important criterion given that it intends to measure “stability in the rules and the nature” (Mainwaring and Scully 1995:5) of any given party system. In this sense, in institutionalized party systems there should not be radical shifts

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15 FN Some of the data, for example the database of the University of Georgetown presents some of the data without all the electoral tables being accounted for. This means a margin of error of 4% (in some cases data from only 96% of the electoral tables is presented).
in parties’ voting shares from one electoral period to the next. In other words major changes in a party’s vote shares from one election to the next is an indicator that the system is not stable and hence not institutionalized. These shifts are measured using Pedersen’s volatility index. Volatility for any given electoral period or for a longer accumulated period is expressed as a percentage which represents half of the accumulated percentage of votes lost by all parties which decreased their vote shares in relation to the previous election together with half of the accumulated percentage of votes gained by all parties who increased their vote share in relation to the previous election. This calculation is done for both the presidential elections and the parliamentary elections. A mean volatility is then calculated for each of these, which represents the total volatility for the studied period in the case of this study between 1995 and 2013\textsuperscript{16}.

A party system in which elections are continuously hard fought-between the same two parties (e.g. Republicans and Democrats in USA) are likely to have low volatility both in relation to single elections as well as in a broader historical perspective. If for example in one election the democrats had 40\% of the votes and the republicans 60\% and in the next election democrats had 55\% and the republicans 45\%, volatility for that period (the second election\textsuperscript{17}) would be 15\%. Democrats gained 15\% and Republicans lost 15\%, half of the sum of these two amounts to 15\%.

Several methodological considerations are to be highlighted in regards to this part of the study. Firstly, in the calculations for the parliamentary elections I have only considered the major parties, which have had some significance at the national level, this is due to the phenomenon of localized parties in Argentina, mentioned in section 1.4. These parties have a very small share of the votes at the national level and are therefore not relevant in this regard. Secondly, Parties in Argentina have almost in aleatory ways changed names, merged and formed alliances through the years. I have grouped all the peronist factions and some peronist coalitions through the years under PJ; In the same way, several parties and coalitions are grouped under UCR. The reason for this is that this approach does not intend to find cracks or flaws in the organization of the parties themselves (that is the aim of the second part of this study between 1995 and 2013\textsuperscript{16}).

\textsuperscript{16} As mentioned before 1995 is only taken into account to assign a numerical value to the following elections, i.e. 1997.

\textsuperscript{17} As explained above, volatility for a given election is calculated in relation to the previous election.
study). Rather this criterion aims at glancing into the stability of the party landscape in relation to the electorate.

Thirdly, parliamentary elections are, as mentioned before, held every two years, as opposed to every four years in the presidential elections and in many other parliamentary systems in the region. This is potentially of great relevance given that shifts and patterns would appear more gradual. For example, a given party, X, had 50% of the votes in 1999, 40% in 2001 and 30% in 2003, while another party, Y, had 50%, 60% and 70% respectively. Volatility for each of the elections, 2001 and 2003, would be 10%. If elections had only taken place in 1999 and 2003, with the same results (50% and 30% for X, 50% and 70% for Y respectively), the volatility index for 2003 would double to 20%. This is an important methodological consideration that Mainwaring and Scully do not mention, albeit one that has to be taken into account in analyzing the results.

2.2.1.2 Stable and Deep Roots of the Political Parties in Society
The second criterion determines whether there are ‘stable and deep roots of the political parties in society’. This criterion is determined by comparing parties’ vote shares in presidential and parliamentary elections. In an institutionalized party system, the vote shares in both elections should ideally be equivalent. This would indicate that the parties deeply penetrate society and that their electoral base is stable. If a party’s vote share varied significantly between the presidential and lower chamber election, this would be an indicator of a lower level of institutionalization in regards to this particular criterion.

This can be determined using a similar calculation to the volatility index; In this case the difference between parliamentary and presidential election vote shares for a given period are also expressed as a percentage. In this case this percentage represents the variations of all the parties that increased their vote share in the presidential elections compared to the parliamentary elections together with the variations of those parties that decreased their vote share in the presidential elections compared to the parliamentary elections.

The first two considerations made in the previous criterion apply also for this one: On the one hand I have only taken into account parties with more than 4% in either the presidential or the parliamentary elections for each of the periods. On the other hand, I have grouped parties and coalitions into PJ, UCR, Coalición Civica (CC; Civic Coalition), Frente Amplio Progresista (FAP; Broad Progresive Front) and Acción por la República (ApR; Action for the Republic).
As mentioned in section 1.2, these only represent labels; the grouping was done by finding parties or coalitions that were independent from each other throughout the electoral periods, regardless of ideology or other political aspects.

2.2.2 Randall & Svåsand’s Institutionalization

Randall and Svåsand (2002) in their article argue (as Meleshevich, Diamond and Linz, et. al) that the importance of institutionalization of party systems is widely recognized. However, their approach is based on their critique towards most other theories of party system institutionalization, that they tend to focus on the party system as the unit of analysis and ignore the level of institutionalizations of the parties themselves. In order to tackle this issue, the authors propose four criteria for determining the level of institutionalization of a given party. Each of the criteria is composed by an external or internal dimension, each of which has a structural aspect and an attitudinal aspect (see table 2.3). As explained in the theoretical framework section, this theoretical approach does not provide methodological considerations. For the purposes of this paper I propose some ways of examining the criteria that the theory provides. The material used in this section of the paper are secondary sources which shed some light onto each of the dimensions proposed in this theory in regards to PJ. Below is a detailed description of the methodological implications of each of the criteria.

2.2.2.1 Systemness

The first criterion in this approach is what the authors describe as ‘systemness’18. This criterion aims at determining “the increasing scope, density and regularity of interactions that constitute the party” (2002: 13). The authors mean that this might be entangled and confused with the concept organization of the party. The differences lies in that the latter two concepts imply a set of ‘rational’ and ‘rigorous’ structures, rules or formal directives typical of western political parties, which the authors mean are not necessarily essential to an the institutionalization of a political party. In other words, informal traditions or procedures may well be part of an institutional party. In order to determine the level of systemness the authors propose five criteria:

18 Concept proposed by Angelo Panebianco (1988), used and explained by Randall and Svåsand (2002: 13)
Table 2.4 Randall and Svåsand’s Four Dimensions of Party Institutionalization (2002: 13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>Systemness*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudinal</td>
<td>Value Infusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Criteria which will be used in this study

The first criterion relates to the origins, the birth, of the party and its ‘genetic model’. According to Randall and Svåsand, this concept has two aspects, a balance of which should result in a more institutionalized party. On the one hand, whenever a party has ‘penetrated’ society it usually reaches a higher level of institutionalization. That is to say, a ‘top-down’ or ‘center-to-periphery’ approach of an idea or movement spilling down onto society is usually a positive factor in terms of a process of institutionalization of the party. On the other hand, a process of ‘diffusion’ or a party ‘germinating from below’ may also result in more institutionalized party systems. This is the opposite of the previous example, that is a bottom-up, grassroots-like process of party-building. Another key aspect that is mentioned in regards to this first criteria is that in the third world, a party which has endured a period of authoritarian regime, may have some advantages in relation to institutionalization if the party was consolidated, or to some degree institutionalized, before the interruption of democratic processes. In order to tackle this criterion, I will make qualitative analysis of McGuire’s (1997) and Levitsky’s (2001, 1998) studies of the development of peronism, focusing on the ‘genetic model’ of this political Movement.

The second criteria analyses the economic resources of the party, specifically the funding. The authors argue that in the third world parties are unlikely to retrieve significant funding from widespread membership. This makes it crucial for the process of institutionalization whether the party is able to have significant funding. Given spatial and time constraints, this paper will not analyze this criterion.
The third criterion examines the relationship between the party and the leaders of the party, more specifically the concept of charisma. In Latin America, many leaders have had great success and parties become very big on account of this. This strong leadership might lead to pragmatic leadership and cohesive, effective coalitions. However, Randall and Svåsand argue that parties purely based on charisma suffer from the ‘antithesis’ of systemness. Panebianco argues that parties survive on the leaders charisma “are parties which pass like a meteor over the political firmament, which spring up and die out without ever institutionalizing” (Panebianco 1988: 53). For this analysis I will use McGuire’s study on peronism as well as the results of the study in chapter 3 of this paper in order to determine whether peronism and PJ is a party that feeds on charisma.

The fourth criterion analyses the relationship between the party as a whole and the factions of the party. In regards to this the authors argue that factionalism is generally regarded as having a negative effect on a party’s cohesion. However, they argue that factions within a party can have a positive effect, for example that factions may increase a party’s ability of adaptation in certain contexts, or when a faction has more substance than the party as a whole. The authors are particularly ambiguous in relation to how to examine this particular criterion mainly because it remains unclear whether factionalism is good or bad or a mix thereof. Hence, I will not place much emphasis on this issue even if it is a clearly important aspect of a political party in relation to systemness. Furthermore, I will briefly analyze and discuss factionalism within peronism together with the above-mentioned second criterion in chapter 4.

The fifth and last criterion to examining systemness is the level of clientelism within the party. The authors argue that clientelism is, as can be assumed, negative for the level of institutionalization. However, they argue that clientelism can assume different forms and therefore have different impacts in different contexts. Clientelism is arguably a crucial aspect in argentine politics and PJ. However, it is a complex matter that given spatial and time constraints will not be studied in this paper. It remains a subject for future study.

2.2.2.2 Reification
The second dimension that will be studied in relation to Randall and Svåsand’s approach is what they describe as ‘reification’. This is the attitudinal and external dimension in the

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approach, and it aims at determining whether “the party’s existence is established in the public imagination (…) and becomes an increasingly taken for granted feature of the political horizon” (2002: 14). This is important inasmuch as the establishment of the party in the public imaginary affects the behavior of political actors within and outside of the party. According to the authors party reification depends to some degree on the organizational structure and especially the access to means of communication that the party has. However, most importantly reification is ‘a function of longevity’. In other words, reification is for the most part determined by whether the party has a distinct and relevant place in the history of the country, as well as whether the party has ‘symbolic value’.

I will focus the analysis on the second, and according to the authors, most relevant aspect of reification, namely symbolic value and historical place. In the case of Argentina, PJ seems to fulfill both of these criteria quite clearly. Furthermore, what I will try to determine is whether the historical context and symbolic value actually is a factor in the behavior of internal and external actors, or whether PJ has simply become a ‘brand’ under which politicians see more opportunity nut which does not affect their behavior. The material in analyzing this criterion will be McGuire’s (1997) and Levitsky’s (1998, 2001) analysis on PJ.
3. The Argentine Party System 1997-2013

3.1 Presidential Elections

3.1.1 1999

The presidential elections of 1995 were the first after a constitutional reform which among other things allowed for the president to be reelected for a second four-year period. This resulted in the first reelection of a president since Juan Perón himself was reelected in 1951 (IDU, 1995). In this case, Carlos Ménem, riding the economic success of his neoliberalist reforms swept home the elections in the first round getting 49% of the votes. A newly formed coalition, FREPASO (*Frente País Solidario*, Solidary Nation Front) played a major role in this electoral period. FREPASO and UCR candidates came in second and third place accounting for 28% and 15% of the votes, respectively.

By the time of the general elections of 1999, the country, under the leadership of PJ’s Carlos Ménem had increasing economic and social problems (Álvarez-Rivera, 2013). Ménem, who seeked reelection, was not able to run because the constitutional reforms before the 1995 election only allowed for one reelection. These elections resulted in the major, and only, defeat of the PJ in recent times. ATJE, (*Alianza por el Trabajo la Justicia y la Educación*, Alliance for Labour, Justice and Education; a coalition of UCR and FREPASO) or ‘the Alliance’ as it became known in this time, and its candidate, Fernando de la Rúa, confortably won the election with over 48% of the votes. PJ in a coalition with UCeDé (or *Unión del Centro Democrático*, Democratic Center Union) named *Concertación Justicialista para el Cambio* (Justicialist concertation for Change, CJC), reached only 38% of the votes. One important aspect of this electoral period was the rise of a new party *Acción por la República* (Action for the Republic, ApR)\textsuperscript{20}; ApR accounted for 10% of the votes in the presidential run. This presidential election resulted in a volatility level of 12%, this does not represent a high level of volatility, even if there were significant political shifts. Three aspects of of this are

\textsuperscript{20} this party is treated separately due to the lack of coalitions in its history.
Table 3.1 Volatility in the Presidential Elections 1999-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Coalition</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PJ*</th>
<th>UCR*</th>
<th>ApR</th>
<th>ARI/CC</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>FAP</th>
<th>Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-9,4</td>
<td>+4,5</td>
<td>+10,1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>+22,4</td>
<td>-46,2</td>
<td>-10,1</td>
<td>+14,2</td>
<td>+16,2</td>
<td></td>
<td>54,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-7,5</td>
<td>+14,6</td>
<td>+8,9</td>
<td>-16,4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>+14,8</td>
<td>-5,8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+16,8</td>
<td></td>
<td>18,7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean Volatility 27.4%

important. First, the high vote share of ATJE represented only a 4,5% increase in their vote share in relation to the previous election. However, in the previous election UCR and FREPASO ran separately. Second, PJ decreased their share by almost 10%; this does not increase the level of volatility, however in this context, it represented the difference between victory and defeat in the first round. Third, the biggest portion of the volatility in this election is accounted by ApR and their considerable vote share, keeping in mind that the party had not had a significant presidential candidate in previous elections.

3.1.2 2003

The presidential elections of 2003 were the first and only presidential elections in the studied period in which no candidate won the election in the first round. However, a second round of voting was not necessary because one of the candidates, Carlos Ménem, resigned from the competition. The 2003 elections had a volatility level of 54% and thus represent by considerable margin the highest level of volatility in the studied period. These elections are important in many ways, and they represented a shift in argentine politics. Several aspects of this can be discussed.
Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, they were the first presidential elections in which PJ did not select one single candidate to represent the party. Instead, three candidates ran for president with a peronist flag. The importance of this is crucial in relation to the political landscape of the country. However, in relation to volatility this in fact represented an unexpected change. The three justicialist candidates together accounted for little over 60% of the votes. This is a radical increase from the 38% in 1999, and this shift implies a high level of volatility for this period. Furthermore, the implications of this fragmentation are not explained by these calculations. Another option in regards to the measurement, could have been to take each of the candidates as belonging to different and new parties. This would result in ever higher figures of volatility but would not provide any insight into the political and social implications of the fragmentation.

Secondly, in the same way that PJ, or the peronists, increased their vote considerably (even if they were fragmente) the UCR, and its candidate sank to an unprecedented low 2, 3%. In comparison to the 49% of the vote share they had reached as a part of ATJE in the previous election this marks the most radical vote shift in the studied period. A new party, *Recrear para el Crecimiento* (Recreate for Growth, R) accounted for a significant 16,4% of the votes, further increasing the level of volatility.

Thirdly, this election was the arena for a new political contender which previously had precarious vote shares but which would become important in the following elections: ARI. This party received little over 14% of the votes, equivalent to the vote share of the least popular justicialist candidate for this election. This is another indicator of high volatility.

Fourthly, it was the first time five candidates received a significant share of the votes (in this case more than 14% each), this is another indicator of high volatility for the period. One important aspect of this fact, is that in the case that the peronists had chosen a single candidate, the number of candidates would have been reduced to the usual three (traditionally PJ, UCR and a third party).

### 3.1.3 2007

The 2007 presidential elections featured four big candidates. Two of them representing PJ or factions of it: Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (ex-president Néstor Kirchner’s wife), candidate for PJ faction FpV won the election in the first round with almost 46% of the votes. the other party with a PJ flag, FREJULI (*Frente Justicia Unión y Libertad*, Front for Justice,
Union and Liberty\textsuperscript{21} came in fourth place with little over 7\% of the votes. ARI continued their strong opposition to PJ in electoral results and again came in second place, this time as a part of a new coalition \textit{Coalición Cívica} (Civic Coalition, CC). By this point it seems as if ARI, or CC, have displaced the traditional opposition party UCR as the second biggest political movement in the country. Nevertheless, UCR, this time as a part of yet another new coalition, \textit{Una Nación Avanzada} (An Advanced Nation, UNA) came in third place, and increased their results from 2\% to almost 17\%.

Volatility for this period decreased considerably from the highest level in 2003 to 24\% in 2007, the second lowest in the studied period after the 1999 elections. This means that the level of volatility decreased by more than half in relation to the previous election. This shows some level of stabilization, however, a volatility level of 24\% still is high. Several factors explain the decrease, even if volatility level remained high. Firstly, PJ, or FpV and FREJULI, maintained the highest vote share by ample margin, and ARI, strengthened its position as the second biggest movement. Secondly, UCR, improved significantly and again became an important actor in the presidential elections, even if they failed at becoming a serious threat for the PJ candidates. Thirdly, R, a movement that had become very important in the 2003 elections had by this point no relevant candidate and lost nearly the totality of its vote share in relation to the previous election.

\subsection*{3.1.4 2011}

The 2011 presidential elections had the second highest level of volatility out of the four studied presidential elections, and meant an increase in this measure from the previous election. Three factors determined this. Firstly, The most relevant factor was the dramatic decrease of CC vote share. This party received the seventh biggest vote share, less than 2\% of the votes, after they had gotten a second place with 23\% of the votes in the previous presidential election. Secondly, a new socialist coalition, with no clear ties with either PJ or UCR, FAP received little over 16\% of the vote share and claimed a second place in the presidential run.

Thirdly, PJ again won the presidential election in the first round, this time in a more convincing fashion than they did in the previous election. They increased their vote share by

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Not to be confused with the 1970's FREJULI, Frente Justicialista por la Liberación - Justicialist Front for Liberation}
14.8% to an overwhelming 54% of the votes. Similarly to the 2003 elections, this presidential run featured three PJ candidates, as opposed to the 2007 elections which had featured only two. Fernández de Kirchner was the favorite candidate throughout as she sought reelection representing PJ faction FpV. The movement FREJULI was replaced in these elections by two other PJ factions, a peronist coalition, *Alianza Compromiso Federal* (Federal Compromise Alliance, ACF) and Union Popular (Popular Union, UP). The candidate for ACF was a representative of yet another PJ faction, *Peronismo Federal* (Federal Peronism, PF).

One last factor was the decreased vote share of UCR. In this election UCR formed an alliance which received the name UDESO, *Unión para el Desarrollo Social* (Union for Social Development). UDESO accounted for little over 11% of the votes, meaning a decrease of almost 6% of UCR’s vote share in 2007.

### 3.2 Parliamentary Elections

#### 3.2.1 1995-2001

The elections of 1995, as mentioned above saw the birth of a new coalition, FREPASO which came in second in the run for president but only third on the parliamentary election. PJ was the clear winner of these increasing their number of seats in the chamber by 12. UCR failed at increasing their share of the votes and instead lost a total of 14 in the chamber in relation to the previous election.

In the parliamentary elections of 1997, FREPASO and UCR, joined forces and formed ATJE\(^{22}\). By this period Ménem’s neoliberal agenda had started to become troublesome due to rising unemployment and inequality, among other issues (McGuire 1997: 22). This became apparent in the results, in which Ménem’s PJ decreased their seat share in the chamber from 131 to 118. ATJE this electoral increased the vote and seat shares, in comparison to FREPASO and UCR in 1995, they increased their seat share by 20, and gained in some traditionally PJ constituencies, including the PJ-iconic Buenos Aires. There were some politically important shifts during

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\(^{22}\) *In some constituencies, FREPASO and UCR ran separately.*
Table 3.2 Volatility in the Parliamentary Elections 1997-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PJ</th>
<th>UCR</th>
<th>ApR</th>
<th>ARI /CC</th>
<th>PRO</th>
<th>Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>-6.7 %</td>
<td>+4.6 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-2.6 %</td>
<td>-3.4 %</td>
<td>+3.8 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>+3.7 %</td>
<td>-20.5%</td>
<td>-3.8 %</td>
<td>+7.2 %</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-1.1 %</td>
<td>-8.9 %</td>
<td>-1.3 %</td>
<td>+0.8 %</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>+4.2 %</td>
<td>-5.3 %</td>
<td>-0.8 %</td>
<td>+6.2 %</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>+19.6%</td>
<td>+1.9 %</td>
<td>+7.4 %</td>
<td>-6.1 %</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>+18.0%</td>
<td>+18.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>+17.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>+10.8%</td>
<td>-16.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>-15.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>+8.4 %</td>
<td>+11.4 %</td>
<td></td>
<td>+6.7 %</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.3 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean Volatility 13.0%

* In a coalition with ARI/CC earlier operationalized separately due to its quantitative importance in the previous four elections.

Period, perhaps the most important one was the fact that PJ lost absolute majority in the chamber. However, in relation to volatility and Mainwaring and Scully’s first criterion the variations do not imply major changes in comparison to the previous election. The parliamentary election of 1999 did not account for any significant shifts in the vote or seat share of the major parties and alliances. Both PJ and ATJE decreased their vote share in relation to the previous parliamentary election by less than 4%. ApR increased their vote share also by little less than 4%. This election resulted in the lowest volatility levels for both
Table 3.3 Variation of vote shares of the parliamentary elections in relation to the presidential elections 1999-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Year</th>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>PJ</th>
<th>UCR</th>
<th>ApR</th>
<th>ARI/CC</th>
<th>FAP</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4,4 %</td>
<td>-4,9 %</td>
<td>-2,5 %</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,9 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>24,2 %</td>
<td>11,9 %</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,2 %</td>
<td>21,2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7,1 %</td>
<td>-6,1 %</td>
<td></td>
<td>-8,4 %</td>
<td>10,8 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-12,1 %</td>
<td>1,2 %</td>
<td></td>
<td>-13 %</td>
<td>8,8 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

presidential and parliamentary elections in the studied period.

This electoral period is also characterized by the lowest level of variation between the presidential election and the parliamentary election. The three biggest parties in this election, PJ, UCR and ApR had presidential vote shares that were within 5% of the vote shares that they received in the parliamentary election. This means that the 1999 electoral period showed a very high level of institutionalization of the Argentine party system. Both in relation to volatility (first criterion) and equivalence of the presidential and parliamentary electoral results (second criterion). However, as the rest of the analysis will show, this period also represented the beginning of a period in which the Argentine party system would witness increasing levels of volatility and lack of stability. It is important to highlight that this electoral period was not only the period with highest levels of institutionalization according to the studied criteria; it was also the only period in this study that did not have PJ as a winner.

The parliamentary election of 2001 marked a test for ATJE’s, or ‘the Alliance’s’, government. PJ reclaimed a majority in the chamber. However this was not because of a significant
increase in their vote share; PJ increased their votes by only 3.7%. By this period ATJE had started falling apart with many top politicians leaving the coalition. ATJE decreased their vote share by little over 20%, implying a high level of volatility for this parliamentary election; Volatility during this election more than tripled from less than 5% in 1999 to almost 18%. This period also gave birth to a new party, *Argentinos por una República de Iguales*\(^23\) (Argentines for a Nation of Equals, ARI). Some of the politicians that formed this party were dissidents of de la Rúa’s ATJE. This rising new party accounted for 7% of the votes, further increasing the level of volatility for this period. Two other important aspects of this electoral period can be highlighted. Firstly, it marked the beginning of direct elections for the higher, chamber of parliament, the Senate. Secondly, the total of blank votes was higher than in previous elections, accounting for almost 12% of the votes.

### 3.2.2 2003-2007

The parliamentary elections of 2003 did not represent such dramatic shifts as the presidential elections did in the same electoral period. In fact, the level of volatility was the lowest in the country since the turn of the millennium; only the 1997 and 1999 elections had lower levels of volatility. The most important change in this election in comparison to the previous was that UCR continued a decreasing trend in their vote share. UCR went from 23,1% of the votes in 2001 to 14,2% in 2003. The three other parties, PJ, ApR and ARI received a vote share within 2% in relation to the previous election. This electoral period represented the return of PJ to leadership of the country. In 2003 the level of volatility decreased to 6.1% from 2001, showing some degree of stabilization. Furthermore, this electoral period also marked the beginning of increased levels of variation between presidential and parliamentary results. This variation rose from almost 4% in 1999 to over 21% in 2003. This is the highest level of variation between the parliamentary and presidential elections in the studied period. This change represent, according to the criterion, decreasing levels of stability and penetration of the political parties into society. This is somewhat of a paradox, given that this in election PJ reclaimed leadership of the country.

The 2005 parliamentary elections came in the middle of a PJ administration, and this represented a test to Néstor Kirchner, as they did for de la Rúa in 2001. One relevant aspect of

\(^23\) later changed names to *Alternativa por una República de Iguales*, Alternative for a Republic of Equals
this election is that PJ split into two factions. Ironically, out of these two factions, the smallest one, which had least popular support, kept the ‘trademark’ name Partido Justicialista. The bigger faction, lead by president Kirchner became known as Frente para la Victoria (Victory Front, FpV). This had undoubtedly impact in the argentine party system. However, and as mentioned in section 1, for the calculations in this, and future elections, I have not made distinctions between the factions but rather grouped them under the name PJ. Volatility in the parliamentary elections for this period rose only by 2%, showing some level of continued stability from 2003. This shift was the result of UCR decreasing their vote share to their lowest result in the studied period, 8,9%. In spite of their continued decreasing trend, UCR still stood for the second highest vote share. This was a result of increasing vote shares of local parties, which were on the rise across the country. Furthermore, A new party, Propuesta Republicana (Republican Proposal, PRO), received 6% of the votes, which accounted for some of the volatility during this period. PRO became a movement of some stability in future elections.

The 2007 represented a considerable strengthening period for PJ, more specifically, one of its factions: FpV. FpV accounted for more than half of the seats that were elected during this period. This represented an increase of almost 20% in relation to the previous election. ARI significantly strengthened their position as second biggest party, they increased their vote share by little more than 7%. UCR increased their vote for the first time since 1997, even if slightly (less than 2%). In relation to the variation between the presidential and parliamentary elections, this period resulted in a significant decrease, from the highest level in 2003 to, 10,8% less than half of the variation level of 2003. This variation is explained on the one hand by the lower vote share of the PJ in the presidential election in relation to the parliamentary election (a decrease of 7,1%). On the other hand a better presidential election by UCR as well as CC.

### 3.2.3 2009-2013

The 2009 elections represented a very eventful electoral period in Argentina. They took place amidst a PJ, more specifically FpV administration, and they were perhaps the most interesting in relation to levels of volatility in the period of this study. Several aspects can be highlighted: Firstly, this electoral period as the previous one featured PJ, led by its biggest faction FpV, as the biggest party. However PJ significantly decreased their vote share in relation to the previous election. PJ accounted for the biggest portion of the high level of
volatility for this period. They decreased their vote share by 23%. Secondly, the two major opposition parties, or coalitions in the previous four elections, ARI/CC and UCR, joined forces and formed a new coalition, Acuerdo Cívico y Social (Civic and Social Agreement, ACyS). Together they increased their vote share significantly, by 18%. This meant the birth of a new alliance that at least temporarily would become the main opposition party. Thirdly, PRO, the coalition that had formed before the 2005 elections, increased their share by 18% and became an important actor in the parliamentary elections. These factors account for the highest level of volatility in the studied period at 29.5%.

In the 2011 parliamentary elections showed a decrease in the levels of volatility, which had peaked in the 2009 elections. However the level of volatility did remain at a considerably high level, 21.3%. This election accounted for the second highest volatility in the studied period. The factors that contributed to this were exactly opposite to the factors that caused the volatility peak in 2009: On one hand PJ reversed their downfall in 2009 and increased their vote share significantly, and on the other opposition parties UCR and PRO significantly decreased their share of the votes in relation to the previous election.

The level of variation between the presidential and parliamentary election also decreased in relation to the previous general electoral period in 2007. The main factor for this change was the fact that both PRO and PJ had a higher vote share in the presidential elections than in the parliamentary elections. Both parties had roughly 13% more votes in the latter.

The latest parliamentary election in the country shows signs of some stabilization in relation to volatility. None of the parties gained or lost dramatic portions of their vote shares as had been normal in the electoral periods of 2007, 2009 and 2011. The biggest variation was UCR’s increase of 11.4%. Both PJ and FAP increased their vote share by less than 9%. Two important aspects of this election can be mentioned. The first is the consolidation of a new coalition, Frente Renovador (Renovation Front, FR), led by a traditional PJ Politician Sergio Massa. for the calculation I have counted FR’s share as PJ votes, However, it remains to be determined whether Massa and his party will represent significant opposition in the future or whether FR as countless coalitions and alliances in the Argentine party system will be dissolved. The second is the increase of FAP’s vote share, which together with their success in the previous presidential election may be evidence of the consolidation of a new opposition party.
3.3 Summary

Table 3.4 Mainwaring and Scully’s First and Second Institutionalization Criteria in Argentina 1983-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Volatility - Presidential</th>
<th>Volatility - Parliamentary</th>
<th>Mean Volatility</th>
<th>Variation Presidential/Parliamentary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1893-1993*</td>
<td>27.2 %</td>
<td>12.7 %</td>
<td>20.0 %</td>
<td>3.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-2013</td>
<td>27.4 %</td>
<td>13.0 %</td>
<td>20.2 %</td>
<td>12.1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 8-9

PJ, or some faction of it, won three out of four presidential elections in the studied electoral periods and lead the voting in seven out of the nine parliamentary elections studied. This provides a picture of the parties huge importance and popularity in the country.

The period after Ménem’s administration featured PJ’s lowest vote share as they lost the presidential election in 1999 as well as the parliamentary elections of 1997 and 1999. Ménem’s troublesome administration between 1989 and 1999 marked a decline in the popularity of PJ. The electoral period after that show the highest level of volatility in regards to the presidential election. In other words, PJ’s return to being the most popular party in 2003 marked the period with the most instability in relation to volatility levels in the presidential election. Furthermore, with the exception of the period between 1997 and 1999, PJ dominated both the presidential as well as the parliamentary elections throughout the studied period. As mentioned in the methodological considerations of chapter 2, volatility levels for the parliamentary elections did no show levels that compared to the presidential elections. Rather than providing some insight into institutionalization of the party systems, this provides some
theoretical considerations as to the approach, given that elections every other year differ greatly from elections carried out every four years.

In relation to the first criterion of institutionalization, the Argentine party system had a level of volatility of 27.4% in the presidential elections and 13% in the parliamentary elections. This means no variations in volatility in either the presidential or the parliamentary election in comparison to Mainwaring and Scully’s study before 1995. This is a surprising result given the relative instability and turmoil that was discussed in this chapter. In other words, in relation to this particular criterion for institutionalization, the Argentinian party system has remained unchanged after 1995 and has a ‘medium high’ (see table 2.2) level of institutionalization.

As for the second criterion, variation levels between the presidential and parliamentary elections went from 3.3% in Mainwaring and Scully’s study before 1995, to 13% between 1995 and 2013. This means, according to the criteria discussed in chapter 2, that parties are not to the same degree ‘key actors in shaping political preferences’ (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 9) as they were before 1995. This variation for the period between 1995 and 2013 is equivalent to the level of variation that the authors found in countries like Peru and Paraguay before 1995. In other words, the level of institutionalization in relation to this criterion has sank to ‘low’ (see table 2.2). This change can arguably be attributed to the personification, or ‘charismatization’ of presidential elections (further discussed in the following chapter).

Taking into account both of the criteria, one can conclude that the level institutionalization, of the Argentine party system has decreased, albeit slightly, since 1995, according to two of Mainwaring and Scully’s criteria.
4. Partido Justicialista de la República Argentina

4.1 Origins: The ‘Genetic Model’ and the ‘Public Imaginary’

The history of peronism and the PJ began in the mid 1940’s as a centralized political movement with the charismatic and personalistic leadership of Juán Perón at its spearhead (Levitsky 2001: 35). The party originated at the top level of argentine politics and relied on the charismatic character of its leader and founder. Thus, a first glance at the history of peronism points at a penetrating movement that from top to bottom permeated society. As discussed in chapter 2, this ‘penetration’, or top-down approach would imply some level of institutionalization, even if some level of germination from below would further improve the level of institutionalization. However, the history of the origins and consolidation of this party provides plenty of events and traits, which makes this analysis somewhat puzzling and theoretically complex.

By the early 1940’s workers unions in the country had become fragmented and weak. Perón reorganized and regrouped these groups and created the Confederación General del Trabajo (CGL; General Confederation of Labour). Actions like these meant that groups like CGL, would owe allegiance to Perón, or his memory, (Randall & Svåsand 2002: 22), marking a cornerstone in the consolidation of peronism and PJ in the second half of the 1900’s. Perón’s convictions in relation to working and lower classes planted roots that grew deep into the argentine society, a fact which would ensure the consolidation of PJ even after the decades of proscription and even after the death of Perón in 1974 (Levitsky 2001: 30). Furthermore, McGuire argues that the reason for this allegiance to Perón and his memory, stemmed from ‘increased levels of wealth, power and status of the urban working class’(1997: 50). Whichever the case, loyalty to Perón grew swiftly and perhaps permanently in the 1940’s.
As mentioned in chapter 1, the coup d’état in 1955 resulted in PJ being dissolved and proscribed. This, of course meant a radical change in the structure of peronism and determined a hinder for the evolution and consolidation of the party. However, this period of proscription gave PJ another one of its most relevant traits in relation to its ‘genetic model’. Peronism went ‘underground’ and became a clandestine and decentralized movement that lived on within the union groups, ‘neighborhood networks’ and other underground groups that remained faithfully loyal to Perón. During these decades these groups became a series of ‘self-constituted commandos’ formed by these union and neighborhood groups (Levitsky 2001: 34-36). These activists formed agrupaciones, working groups, at the local level which little contact with each other or with each other. Meanwhile, at the national level peronism became ‘a loose federation of different groups loyal to Perón’ (Levitsky 2001: 36).

Peronism survived the period of proscription and reentered the political arena in the country in grand fashion. As noted, Perón returned to the country in 1974, amidst violent revolts among peronists (López Alonso 1982:278), and peronism reclaimed power, if briefly, between 1973-1976. The coup of 1976 and the period of dictatorship that followed again relegated peronism to an ‘anarchic state’ of clandestine and local activity (Levitsky 2001: 37).

Democracy was definitely reinstated in 1983, and peronism again reclaimed power in 1989. However, even after the periods of clandestine organization and neighborhood networking, peronism in the beginning of the XXI century still consisted largely of formal and informal networks consisting of unions, NGO’s, clubs, cooperatives, soup kitchens, neighborhoods, people’s homes, etc., and it could be described as an ‘informal mass party’(Levitsky 2001: 30-35).

Two aspects of these events are to be highlighted. First, the disappearance of peronism as a formal institution at a point of peaking popularity in the 1950’s unequivocally meant the establishment of peronism as an important figure in the public imaginary; perhaps partly as a replacement of its existence in the political formality in the country. Whether it was a peronist activist locally maintaining alive hope and the illusion of a peronist future, or an anti-peronist pondering and fearing the ghost of peronism and its potential return; it is safe to assume that every Argentinian had Perón and peronism in the back of their minds at some point during the proscription years.

Secondly, the proscription meant that peronism went from being a top-down political movement which penetrated society, to the exact opposite: a grassroots, clandestine
movement which survived solely in underground local spheres. This complemented the genetic model of peronism and made it a highly institutionalized (at least in regards to one of Randall & Svåsands criteria, the genetic model), yet proscribed political movement.

4.2 1989-2013: Factions and Leadership

In 1989, PJ won its first presidential election since the beginning of the last democratic period in Argentina. Upon taking office, Ménem adopted a series of measures, which undermined PJ as it had been from its origins until the last dictatorship between 1976 and 1983. McGuire argues that Ménem ‘filled the cabinet with extra-party technocrats, erstwhile anti-peronists committed to liberalizing the economy, and personal favorites with few ties to the party (1997: 22). PJ activity, which as discussed above, had been a key aspect of the genetic model of the party declined, and there was little resistance in the party towards Ménem’s agenda. PJ party leader Antonio Cafiero resigned in 1990; this opened the way for Ménem’s ‘neutralization’ of the party apparatus and a further weakening of PJ. This in turn allowed for the government to reform the constitution in order to allow Ménem’s reelection (McGuire 1997: 22). It is hard to determine whether these actions alone weakened PJ to the point of losing a big part of their voter-base and losing the following presidential and parliamentary elections, as discussed in chapter 3.

A weak PJ, and its candidate Eduardo Duhalde lost the 1999 election to the Alliance’s (ATJE) candidate Fernando de la Rúa. This was the last time that a single PJ candidate represented the whole movement in the elections. As mentioned above, it is difficult to determine whether Ménem single handedly harmed PJ in such a transcending way. This remains a subject of future studies.

The 2003 elections were the first, which featured three PJ candidates, and as discussed in the previous chapter represented a period of instability in regards to the party system as well as for PJ. The first PJ candidate was Carlos Ménem, this time running for a coalition led by UCeDé. Néstor Kirchner, who would win the election after Ménem defaulted in the second round, ran for FpV. The last PJ candidate was Adolfo Rodríguez Saa, running for FMP. At

24 The electoral information presented below is gatherer from chapter 3 of this paper.
this point it one could argue that parties, or rather factions of PJ, began becoming instrumental to individual politicians’ political ambitions. After this point all of the election featured new parties and coalitions, which could have been the result of lack of cohesion. This also meant that the need for one leader to spearhead PJ was no longer there. Instead individuals became in principle free to create a new political label to campaign under.

The 2007 elections followed the trend of more than one PJ candidates. However, in this elections FpV Candidate, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, had a far superior vote share than any other candidate. Alberto Rodríguez Saá had again ran for president, this time under the label FREJULI. An interesting fact is that FREJULI was also the name, or label, under which Perón himself had campaigned in 1973 (López Alonso 1982: 259). The abbreviation, however stood for different names (Frente Justicia, Unión y Libertad – Justice, Union and Liberty Front in 2007, Frente Justicialista por la Liberación – Justicialist front for Liberation in 1973). This is a clear indicator that Rodriguez Saá was in some way trying to manipulate the collective memory of the argentines. Closest to Fernández de Kirchner in vote share was Elisa Carrió, running for CC, which had earlier been known as CC-ARI, which earlier named just as ARI. The trend of using parties and coalitions as just labels had become a practice common even outside PJ.

The 2009 elections again featured a convincing victory of FvP and Fernández de Kirchner. Alberto Rodríguez Saá one more time campaigned with a PJ flag, this time under the label CF. Another new movement was featured and came in second place in the presidential campaign: FAP with candidate Hermes Binner.

All of this suggests that the relationship between the party and the party leader, as well as between the party and factions of the party as Randall and Svåsand suggest are irrelevant and even non-existent in the PJ of the new century.

4.3 Summary

Three aspects are important in relation to this part of the study, two of them in relation to Randall and Svåsand’s first dimension, systemness. First, PJ is a political party with that has ‘penetration’ or, ‘top-down’ origins. However, the proscription period and the political turmoil of the second half of the 1900’s brought a whole new grassroots-like, ‘germination
from below’ or ‘bottom-up’ character to PJ, which is still active. According to the authors, and as discussed in chapter 2, it is ideal that a party has some degree of both. Whether the bottom-up side of PJ had prospered without the period(s) of proscription is left to ponder upon. Furthermore, one crucial aspect is to be mentioned: PJ undoubtedly reached some level of institutionalization before the period of proscription given the swift growth in the popularity of the party in the 1940’s and 1950’s. In this respect, and according to the authors, the party set the grounds for a new period of consolidation and institutionalization beginning in the 1980’s. In this regard the party can be argued to have a relatively high level of institutionalization.

Secondly, the instability and lack of organization and cohesion, especially in the late 1990’s and 2000’s talks for a lack of systemness. The fragmentation of the party into several ‘factions’, which, more than factions, seem to be instrumental organizations to serve individual politicians’ ambitions, which do not clearly adopt any ideology, shows a process of deinstitutionalization. The 2003 presidential election analyzed in the previous chapter is a good example of the party splitting into three factions, seemingly only to sever individual politician’s ambitions. In this regard PJ has lacking relationships between the party and its leaders as well as between the party and its factions; both signs of a low level of institutionalization.

These two first aspects provide interesting and paradoxical theoretical feedback: two of the criteria that Randall and Svåsand suggest in order to determine one of the dimensions of institutionalization (systemness) provide opposite empirical evidence.

Thirdly, and in relation to the author’s fourth dimension of institutionalization, the discussion and analysis of the literature on the history of PJ, shows that PJ likely exists and even is an integral part of the collective imaginary of the argentine people. This also suggests that PJ has achieved some level of institutionalization.
5. Conclusions

The two perspectives employed in this research have provided some insight into the level of institutionalization of the Argentine party system, as well as PJ itself. In 1998 Levitsky pointed out that “peronism has been firmly entrenched in Argentine society - both organizationally and as a political identity - for more than 50 years, despite decades of proscription and repression” (Levitsky 1998: 79). It is still undoubtedly the case that peronism and PJ remains the major actor in Argentine politics.

The first, quantitative part of this study shows that there has been little change in relation to the level of institutionalization of the party system. As described in section 3.3, the figures that Mainwaring and Scully found in their analysis of the Argentine party system before 1995 coincide to some degree with the figures that this study has provided of the period after 1995.

Furthermore, the Argentine party system shows at least two signs of a potential process of deinstitutionalization: Firstly, the variation between the presidential elections and the parliamentary elections in the period of this study are higher than they were previously. Secondly, the large number of different political parties, factions, coalitions and movements taking place in the elections, especially the presidential elections show that parties are not cohesive and stable. This can be the result of the candidates becoming more important than the parties themselves, however these arguments fall outside the theoretical and methodological framework of this study of the party system and remain a matter of future study.

In relation to the second part of this study, the analysis has shown that PJ is a unique and very important political actor in the country. The qualitative criteria used to study PJ have provided interesting, yet contradicting characteristics of PJ. Two of these, according to the criteria proposed in the literature, provide some ground for a well-institutionalized party and are signs of high ‘systemness’ and ‘reification’. On the one hand, PJ’s core is a combination of a top-down and a bottom-up movement. On the other, PJ undoubtedly exists, and is an important figure, in ‘the public imaginary’.

The third analyzed criteria shows a sign that PJ is on a path of deinstitutionalization. The analysis of chapter 3 shows that the party has broken down into different factions, and has
formed numerous coalitions in the studied period. This is evidence that the relationship between PJ and the party leaders and the different factions are declining.

The two parts of the study, and both theoretical approaches, show that PJ and the party system in Argentina are to some degree institutionalized, even if there have been some signs both quantitative and qualitative, of a process of deinstitutionalization in the 2000’s.

Furthermore, the near future of Argentine politics, beginning with the 2015 election will surely provide some verdict as to whether the PJ will live on as such, or rather factions like FpV will take on the legacy of peronism.
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3.2 Volatility in the Parliamentary Elections 1997-2013

3.3 Variation of vote shares of the parliamentary elections in relation to the presidential elections 1999-2011

3.4 Mainwaring and Scully’s First and Second Institutionalization Criteria in Argentina 1983-2013
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**Data**


