Perspectives on the Occupy Central Demonstrations in Hong Kong

A Critical Discourse Analysis on English-language Press in Hong Kong S.A.R, Taiwan and China

Natalie CHOI
Acknowledgements

My deepest gratitude to Dr Caroline Kerfoot for her supervision and guidance throughout this academic endeavour. Her insights, encouragement and most of all patience were invaluable throughout the writing process and vastly improved the quality of this dissertation. To those nearest and dearest, a massive thanks for the confidence and support. To Love, “sorry, sorry, tanks” for the endless provision of tea that kept me going.
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Abstract
This paper is concerned with media perceptions and how these manifest as hegemonic practices. Exploring the theme ‘language and politics’, against the backdrop of the Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) demonstrations in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), this paper sheds light on the discursive constructions of media representations in three ‘Chinese’ regions as well as on how such representations constitute vested interests. By addressing mediatised social, political and institutional discourses in the ‘Chinese’ context, this leads to an exploration as to how perceptions are embedded within larger socio-political discourses of sovereignty and legitimacy. The focus of analysis is the English-language press in Hong Kong (HK/HKSAR), China (PRC) and Taiwan (ROC). Critical discourse analysis is carried out on a series of thirteen newspaper articles with the objective of making explicit the invisible ‘work’ that discursive strategies do in influencing interpretations and understanding of a political event in a non-Western context. Guided by Martin & White’s (2005) appraisal theory, the analysis views newspaper discourses not only as value-laden texts but by doing so also reveals readers’ and writers’ stance thus dispelling the myth that ‘news’ is objective. Findings depict varied perspectives on the Occupy Central demonstrations – Mainland and HK newspapers’ treatment were rather critical, while Taiwanese perceptions tended towards the analytical. This difference suggests HK and Mainland media as ideologically aligned – hegemonic – and positions Taiwanese media as potentially counter-hegemonic. Amidst issues of declining press freedoms, considerable variations were also found among the HK newspapers suggesting the presence press plurality. Overall, findings confirmed just how influential a role the media plays as an extension of and in the realm of politics as well as in shaping public opinion. Through the lens ‘language and politics’, this paper explores the notion of ‘language’ and ‘discourse’, its functions and significance within non-English/Western national media systems. Such an examination thus highlights concepts and issues relevant in the field of bi-/multilingualism in society.

Keywords
critical discourse analysis, appraisal theory, media analysis, English-language newspaper, hegemony, sovereignty, democracy, Occupy Central, politics, multilingualism

1 The term ‘Chinese’ is used in inverted commas throughout this paper and is mainly employed as an umbrella term to refer to the regions of Hong Kong, Taiwan and China for expediency. However, the inverted commas also denote that caution should be exercised when using the term as a referent to either language, culture and/or people as it may index different norms depending on context. This point is further elucidated in the introductory part of this paper as the term ‘Chinese’ is viewed as a social construction.
2 The data is taken from two newspapers per region with two news articles per newspaper, with the exception of Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post (SCMP) where 3 news articles were analysed.
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ABBREVIATIONS
CCP Chinese Communist Party, PRC political party
CD China Daily (China)
CDA Critical Discourse Analysis
CP The China Post (Taiwan)
DHA Discourse-Historical Approach
DPP Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwanese political party
GT Global Times (China)
HKFP Hong Kong Free Press
HK/HKSAR Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong)
KMT Kuomintang Nationalist Party, Taiwanese Political Party
MA Media Analysis
NPCSC Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, PRC Legislative Body
OCLP Occupy Central with Love and Peace
PRC People’s Republic of China (China)
ROC Republic of China (Taiwan)
SCMP South China Morning Post (Hong Kong)
SFL Systemic Functional Linguistics
TS The Standard (Hong Kong)
TT Taipei Times (Taiwan)
1 INTRODUCTION

In June 2014, a white paper was issued by China’s central government (PRC) concerning the special administrative region of Hong Kong (HK). Entitled *The Practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” Policy in HKSAR* (State Council PRC 2014), it not only sought to reiterate the commitment to the legal-political framework that both regions have been engaged in since 1997 but also set out a timeframe and conditions for implementing universal suffrage in Hong Kong. Buried in the text is a stipulation that read, “The ultimate aim of selection of the chief executive will be one by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedure…” (State Council PRC 2014). While motivations as to the reason for the release of the white paper may only be speculated upon, it raised important questions as to the extent of Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy” within the agreed framework and the freedoms that this autonomy supposedly entailed (Article 2, The Basic Law of HKSAR 2012:2).

Spurred by the release of the white paper, the Occupy Central with Love and Peace group (OCLP) along with two other student organisations – Scholarism and the HK Federation of Student – launched a civil disobedience campaign protesting the central government’s proposals for universal suffrage. Their message was simple, “Say ‘No’ to ‘democracy with Chinese characteristics’” (OCLP 2015a). The issue of universal suffrage is not new to HK politics, but rather has been a long outstanding issue on the political agenda, dating back to before the handover in 1997. So, not only did the campaign – which began at the end of September 2014 – bring to the fore social and political tensions that had been long brewing within the region, it also marked the beginning of one of HK’s longest and most significant demonstrations to date.

Media coverage of the event, both locally and abroad, can be said to have been quite extensive – a quick search with keywords relating to e.g. Umbrella movement, generates a myriad of news articles, blogs, commentaries etc. International media outlets, such as the BBC (2015a), reported different reaction of behalf of both the Hong Kong press and Mainland Chinese press. During the preliminary research stages, which involved readings of various news articles, a pattern was emerging whereby the HK and PRC governments tended to be depicted as the authoritarian giants ‘blocking’ the road to democracy against the students/demonstrators fighting for a basic right. Whether this is actually the case or not, such ‘David and Goliath’ media narratives may not be that uncommon especially concerning grassroots movements such as the OCLP. However, what also became clear as the readings progressed was that similar versions of the same narrative kept on (re)appearing; so, how is it that certain articles published around the globe seemingly appear to express the same views? If anything, it shows that discourses are able to transcend borders, becoming more amenable as they are re-written and circulated around. The press as an area of focus is not just where social and political issues are discussed, argued, lobbied and reported but also where they are reproduced, repeated, recontextualised and thus transformed (Blackledge 2005:13). Surely, this demonstrates just how influential and powerful a role ‘news’ has in society but also that they make up and are part of larger public and institutional discourses.

It is with this in mind that I came to question the media’s role in representing social/political events, such as the one described above. How are news stories weaved together? What is deemed vital information or non-vital? What message(s) is the news emitting? Van Dijk (1996:10) notes, “media power is generally symbolic and persuasive, in the sense that media primarily have the potential to control to some extent the minds of readers or viewers, but not directly their actions”. So, if mass media is able to wield such influence, to the point of ‘potential control’ then hegemony is not just discursively articulated but may also be enacted.
Noting the ‘persuasiveness’ of the media then also implies that there may be some complicity in output of the messages that media discourses carry, and if so, for whom and in whose interest? Such discourses naturally do not exist on their own but rather are thrown together with other genres and styles of discourses i.e. informal/formal accounts of events, a manifesto, public information on a pamphlet – these may be infinite… So, how do discourses inform each other and/or disseminate power, inequalities and ideologies?

The overarching focus of this dissertation may be summed up under the theme ‘language and politics’. The aim of this paper is to analyse media representations of the Occupy Central demonstrations as reported by the English-language press in Hong Kong (HK/HKSAR), China (PRC) and Taiwan (ROC). Each of the above regions and/or governments can be said to have some sort of a stake in the events concerning democratisation in HK. While the ‘one country, two systems’ currently applies to Hong Kong and Macau3 (previously under Portuguese rule), it had originally been conceived by the late Deng Xiaoping for Taiwanese ‘reunification’; and to a certain extent may still be seen by the PRC government as a potential special administrative region (Tok 2013). News perspectives from each of these regions are thus significant. While the analysis is mainly focused on the discoursal aspects of media coverage, it eventually leads to a wider examination of how media discourses contribute to potential hegemonic forces as operating within society. As such, this paper also addresses these concepts in relation to larger national discourses, namely that of sovereignty/governance and legitimation within the ‘Chinese’ context.

This paper contributes to the field of bi-/multilingualism in that it treats English-language discourse in predominantly non-English contexts. In doing so, it (re)locates the traditionally treated ‘periphery’ as the centre. Furthermore, this dissertation provides insight on a linguistic market where English-language discourses may also be qualified as ‘Chinese’ discourses as findings subsequently demonstrate that such discourses emanating from the HK, Taiwan and China press on the OCLP demonstrations originated from within locally produced media institutions. The notion of what ‘language’ means and does is deconstructed and the significance of ‘context’ foregrounded. More concretely, though, the presence of an English-language press in these ‘Chinese’ regions means that there is also a demand for it. While the above points inevitably give rise to other pertinent issues relating to the role and politics of English in postcolonial settings, these are only treated indirectly and implicitly in this paper as they fall outside the scope of analysis.

At this point, one could question what is meant by the ‘Chinese’ context? With China, Taiwan and Hong Kong having had different historical experiences, how are these consolidated? As we shall see further below, the concept of ‘Chinese’ is itself subject to change owing to distinct historical, cultural, political, economic and social experiences.

1.1 NATIONAL CONTEXT

With the outline of the dissertation sketched, this part seeks to provide a more detailed account of how the OCLP demonstrations fit within the wider context of its occurrence. Repercussions and/or implications of the Umbrella movement were not just immediately felt by Hong Kong society but also held significance for other regions i.e. China and Taiwan. The relationship between China, Hong Kong and Taiwan is certainly not an easy one to define, nor is it possible to ‘trace’ every intersection at which they have, at one point or another, crossed. Historically

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3 Macau is also frequently mentioned alongside Hong Kong when it comes to special administrative regions of the PRC, hence its inclusion. However, it is not a focus in this paper. It was previously under Portuguese colonial rule, and in 1999 sovereignty returned to China.
and culturally tied to each other, their geographic proximity to one another has, to a certain extent, also ensured economic as well as socio-political relations.

Chinese history has most always conceived of these other two regions as part of the Chinese empire and their ruling dynasties, albeit on the fringes (Shih & Jones 2014). Located far enough from the dynastic capitals of the Mainland, over the years, both areas were seen as refuges for those fleeing political, social and/or economic persecution. Defeated by Kublai Khan’s army, the last vestiges of the Song dynasty (960-1279) fled and settled in the outlying islands of Hong Kong; similarly, towards the end of the 17th century, as the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) rose to power, the last of the Ming loyalists retreated to Taiwan (Shih & Jones 2014). These two instances may be seen as the first wave of ethnic Han Chinese migration from the Mainland to the islands of HK and Taiwan – originally inhabited by ethnic minority groups such as the Yao and Aboriginals respectively (Broadbent & Brockman 2011; Shih & Jones 2014). Since then, almost any conflict on the Mainland has essentially meant that those who were able to flee looked towards Hong Kong or Taiwan as either places of transit or safe haven.

The end of 19th century was marked by conflicts with European colonial powers. The two Anglo-Chinese wars (1839-1842; 1858-1860) – better known as the Opium Wars – culminated not only in the defeat of the Manchurian forces but also lead to a series of ‘unequal treaties’, which ended in the perpetual cession of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Peninsula and a 99-year lease of the New Territories to the British Empire (Bolton 2002; Flowerdew 2012). Defeat by the Japanese in the First Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895), saw the perpetual cession of the islands of Taiwan and Pescadores to the Japanese (Shih & Jones 2014). Having ‘lost’ land to European imperialists, both regions then became the symbol of a “century of humiliation” for China – some literature suggests that this period ended when the Communists claimed victory in 1949, however other literature also refer to the end as when Hong Kong returned to China in 1997, a 150 years later (see Cohen & Zhao 1997; Lee et al. 2002; Tok 2013; Young 2013). Regardless, having now ‘fallen into’ the hands of foreign forces, Hong Kong and Taiwan became a constant point of contention between China – the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government specifically – and Britain and Japan (Tok 2013).

Certain parallels may thus be drawn between Taiwan and Hong Kong, although both colonial experiences differed substantially from one another. Taiwan under colonial rule held symbolic significance for the Japanese, not only in that it was their first (and only) colony, it also meant that Japan could now be considered as one of the colonial powers along with Britain and France; it conducted its own mission civilisatrice by “culturally re-engineering the inhabitants of Taiwan” (Shih & Jones 2014:5). In Hong Kong the Opium Wars, waged for the sole purpose of trade, succeeded in ‘opening up China’ for further commercial exploitation – British interest in Hong Kong thus “adhered to the principles of liberal, laissez-faire economics and the related doctrine of the non-interference of government in social affairs” (Bolton 2002; Shih & Jones 2014:6). Colonial rule meant a new leaf had been turned, but at what cost? The ‘local’ populations of both regions were subject to a new culture, new language, new system, new rulers; internal rebellions were commonplace (Shih & Jones 2014).

Such cultural, political and social contrasts between ‘rulers and ruled’ is that Japanese colonial ‘re-engineering’ of Taiwan “sought to integrate Taiwan into the hierarchy of the colonial administrative mechanism and into a new web of economic relationships with Japan in the world capitalist system” – development of infrastructure, industry and the set up of institutions, meant the beginnings of a modern civic society (Shih & Jones 2014:7). On the other hand, priority accorded to economic interests in Hong Kong ensured prosperity but also led to a widening gap between HK’s (British and Chinese) elite and the ‘coolie’ classes, frequently exploited for their labour,

the co-option of the Chinese elite in the latter part of the nineteenth century provided not so much a counter-weight to the influence of the European elite as added ballast to its continued rule […]

Furthermore, as it was deemed by the ruling metropolitan, London, that “colonies were meant to make money, or at least be self-sufficient”, there was a “reluctance to sanction spending on welfare and infrastructure [while the colonial] administration emphasised hard work and self-help as the route to success” (Shih & Jones 2014:6).

So, while Taiwan underwent rigorous assimilationist measures by the Japanese, HK colonial administration’s practice of non-integration meant that both state and society were politically, socially and culturally divorced from each other. It could be argued that due to the separation from China and vastly different historical experiences, affinities attached to the term ‘Chinese’ also took on different values, hence the emergence of ‘new’ Chinese cultural identities (Bolton 2002). This process, as we shall see further below, was sooner felt in Taiwan than in HK.

The political landscape in China, at the beginning of the 20th century, altered drastically. The last imperial dynasty of China – under the Manchurians – ended with the Revolution of 1911, ushering along with it the ‘founding of the Republic’; it also saw the emergence of the interim ruling Kuomintang Nationalist Party (KMT) and Chinese Communist Party (Lee et al. 2002; Zhao & Broadbent 2011; Tok 2013). Victory of the allied forces during WWII signalled the end of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan. Yet as one conflict ended, a civil war then broke out between the KMT and CCP in China, resulting in the defeat of the KMT who retreated to Taiwan to set up a ‘government-in-exile’ of the Republic of China (ROC), leaving Mao to declare the Mainland as the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Each government perceived itself as the “sole legitimate government”, which to this day is still contested (Broadbent & Brockman 2011; Tok 2013; Shih & Jones 2014:8). Meanwhile HK, still under the British rule, also experienced an influx of people from the Mainland as Mao embarked on the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, which brought famine, poverty and political persecution on a mass scale. Post-WWII HK society thus comprised an amalgam of migrants -

| the majority were Cantonese-speakers from Guangdong, along with some merchants from Shanghai, as well as Mandarin-speaking intellectuals from the north, [...] some refugees identified with the Nationalist cause, while other refugees who fled to HK during the Cold War still clung to some forms of Communism… (Shih & Jones 2014:9) |

It could be argued that the fabric of HK society was multicultural and pluralistic in composition and to a certain extent still had ‘cultural anchorage’ to China (Shih & Jones 2014). In comparison, by the time the KMT had settled in Taiwan, nearly an entire generation of people had only known life under Japanese rule. They considered themselves ‘locals’ or benshengren to the KMT Nationalists and those that followed, who were seen as ‘outsiders’ or waishengren (Shih & Jones 2014). Divisions between the two worsened as internal conflicts ensued, which led to a dictatorial way of governing by the KMT “by building party-state infrastructure into every sphere of native society” (Ho & Broadbent 2011:233); martial law was also declared which lasted 38 years, until 1987. The 80s-90s era in the ROC saw many years of one-party rule rapidly dismantled and replaced by a strong civil society and democratisation of the government – embodied by the formation of the first opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) that came to be broadly representative of Taiwanese values (Ho & Broadbent 2011; Shih & Jones 2014). Simultaneously, the CCP was imposing its dictatorial rule over China – all aspects of privacy were abolished as the “nation-wide Communist Party apparatus […] penetrated all local organizations to ensure ideological conformity” (Whyte 1974)

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4 ben sheng ren 本省人 - character composition includes the words for ‘root/origin/source’ + ‘province’ + ‘person’ meaning a local or native, while wai sheng ren 外省人 comprises ‘outside/external’ + ‘province’ + ‘person’ and refers to a foreigner (MDBG dictionary 2015).
in Zhao & Broadbent 2011:380). By the end of Mao’s era, Chinese society had not only endured a stringent political regime marked by tyranny, but had also been culturally, socially and economically isolated from the world. The 80s then saw China ‘open up’ economically as Deng Xiaoping embarked on “a policy of economic reform that allowed more capitalist initiative, while trying to exercise tight political control” (Zhao & Broadbent 2011:280).

Meanwhile as Taiwan essentially saw a regime change, the continuity of British rule in HK was at its peak. The British colonial administration’s non-interventionist approach had maintained and even ensured a certain distance between rulers and ruled, so much so that “unable to participate in government, many residents threw themselves wholeheartedly into economic pursuits” (Chiu 2011:315). Although the government adopted a hands-off approach, it nevertheless adopted policies that aimed at and encouraged businesses to flourish; Hong Kong developed “a self-regulating market economy in which the state imposes few restrictions” (Chiu 2011:315). The social and economic conditions thus left its citizens largely up to their own devices when it came to earning a living, giving the impression that common economic interests outweighed other divisions. The 60s and 70s saw extensive investment in infrastructure providing HK people with a social welfare system, public transport, public housing and education; economically the city only continued to prosper (Bolton 2002; Chiu 2011). As social and economic progress continued, steps were also taken signalling cultural recognition. Adding to the multilingual facet of HK, Cantonese became more commonplace in public domains such as law, government and the media, ‘Chinese’ was added as a co-official language along with English in 1974 (Bolton 2002). This variety differs from the Mandarin varieties used in the PRC and ROC. It was also around this time that the notion of a HK identity was truly beginning to form - descending from generations of refugee migrants and sojourners, this category of Hongkongers has thus developed as a distinct historical subject, known as Heunggongyahn (Hongkongers 香港人), also defined in terms of an ‘ethnic group’ with its common features of exile from China, refugee experiences, British colonial rule, and particular ways of life (Shih & Jones 2014:9).

So while both Taiwanese and Hong Kongers attached importance to their colonial past (to varying degrees) and even though gaping cultural divides were present between rulers and ruled, both somehow considered their ‘Chinese-ness’ to be even more distinct than that of Mainland China. Resistance to KMT rule in Taiwan in the aftermath of the WWII and the Cold War periods as well as current Chinese rule over HK in contemporary history serves as evidence of this cultural and political schism therefore the appearance of a mainland/non-mainland dichotomy. A monograph by Garrett (2015, Preface) remarks, “[w]ith more than 50,000 protests of varying sizes and issues having occurred since the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in July 1997, the community has come to visually embody the label, the ‘city of protests’”. This is not to say that life under the British was trouble-free either; power resided with an emissary sent from London, an appointed Governor and a government comprised of the Executive and Legislative Council – to which positions one had to be appointed or nominated (Chiu 2011).

The signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 stipulated terms under which HK was to return to Chinese sovereignty. In 1997, Hong Kong ceased being a colony and became a special administrative region of the PRC. The legal-political framework of ‘one country, two systems’ was devised ensuring HK’s ability to function as a special administrative region. Article 5 of the Basic Law – HK’s version of a constitution – explicitly states, The socialist system and policies shall not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years (Basic Law HK SAR government 2012:2).
Come 1997, HK would enter into a period of transition where presumably after 50 years the ‘two systems’ would/should ‘converge’, or even become irrelevant resulting in ‘one country’ (Zheng & Yew 2013).

The events of Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 increased worries in Hong Kong as to issues of democracy; it also served to further “consolidate the social and political distinction between HK – the ‘city of law’ – and Mainland China, where the government used armed force to repress protests” (Shih & Jones 2014:12). The inevitable return to Chinese sovereignty spurred on reforms and legislation regarding political representation. Manifestations of these concerns saw an increase in social movements calling for democratisation as it also witnessed an “astonishing flourishing of human rights discourse and legal activism, all of which contributed further to its sense of itself as a ‘city of law’”; furthermore, the successful establishment of the Bill of Rights ensured legal protection and the freedoms of citizens in post-handover HK (Chiu 2011; Shih & Jones 2014:12). Yet for all the pre-handover uncertainties, “post-handover euphoria rapidly gained ground amidst glowing reports of continuing economic prosperity” (Wang & Wong 2013:3). Indeed, ‘Chinese’ investment into HK has steadily increased since then with the expanding of the communications, tourism and infrastructure sectors – such investments were solidified by the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement pact (CEPA) (Zheng & Yew 2013). There seemed then, to be continuity in matters relating to economic and financial interests, although this also meant greater inter-dependency between the two regions it was less so on social and political levels – aspects forming the focus of this dissertation.

The above detailed account certainly demonstrates that the intertwined histories of these three regions are more than convoluted and by no means complete; rather it is a brief glimpse into their past. Yet, among all the confusion, what is clear is that while all three regions were at one point considered the ‘same’, conflicts catalysed by both internal and external factors have made it so that they also pursued paths that led to three interpretations of Chinese-ness that are not easily consolidated under one fixed definition of a Chinese identity. China, Hong Kong and Taiwan can also be seen to make up part of what certain academics have termed ‘cultural China’. If anything, all three may even be considered ‘nations’ in themselves as each managed to construct their own “imagined political community […] as both inherently limited and sovereign”, albeit to varying degrees (Anderson 2006:6). HK and Taiwan have symbolised simultaneously a ‘century of humiliation’ as well as the seat of dissent; composed of migrants from all over the Mainland who were persecuted by the ruling entity, they were also formed by generations of people who have almost always been seen as holding differing political, social and economic views. It is not hard to understand that certain solidarity would develop between the two, as the PRC was constructed as their common ‘Other’.

1.2 MEDIA CONTEXT

The idea of “ceding the ‘capitalist jewel’ to a Communist regime” did not sit well with Britain, as Hong Kong’s return would be seen not as a “de-coloniz[ation] [but rather] re-coloniz[ation] with the metropole simply shifting from London to Beijing” (Lee et al. 2002:2; Carroll 2007 cited in Bolton 2011:69). As such, the period preceding the handover was saturated with ‘spun’ media discourses/narratives from both Britain and the PRC,

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5 Perceived as “interference in its internal affairs (because the reforms would run beyond the handover)”, much of these reforms were reversed by the newly CCP-appointed chief executive Tung Chee-hwa after 1997, at the behest of Beijing (Flowerdew 2012:4).

6 The term was coined by Tu Wei-ming and designates the “interaction of three symbolic universes” linked either by ethnicity, diaspora and those who seek to ‘understand China intellectually and bring their conceptions of China to their own linguistic communities’ (for a more detailed definition see Tu 2005:154-155).

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China’s media essentialize British colonialism as inherently evil while touting Chinese nationalism as inherently supreme […] The British largely ignore their inglorious colonial beginnings. Instead, they de-essentialize the evilness of colonialism by emphasizing that Hong Kong is Britain’s creation as a free, stable, and prosperous enclave against relentless turmoil in the PRC. (Lee et al. 2002:18)

Regionally, the PRC, ROC and HK also added their own narratives as to how the handover was perceived,

The PRC media resort to heightened emotions in narrating a story of festivity of a family-nation […] Hong Kong media single out their society and way of life as rooted in capitalism and international cosmopolitanism, distinct from the new sovereign […] The Taiwan media use family separation to defuse the PRC’s mythical family-nation… (Lee et al. 2002:149)

Such competing discourses, then, necessarily signal the media’s complicity in furthering certain messages and interests. As “media texts are constructed in the multi-layered organizational, cultural, economic, and political frameworks” of the three separate regions, they expose a “domestic system of commonsense knowledge” as well as highlight that importance must be accorded to the national media system in which news is discursively constructed/produced (Berger & Luckman 1967 in Lee et al. 2002:4). The media, then, becomes the site where cultural, social and political spheres intersect as “discourse is at the heart of a nation as an ‘imagined community’” (Anderson 1983 cited in Lee et al. 2002:3). News reports from OCLP demonstrations constitute another site for struggle – both concretely and abstractly - whereby all three nations are once again ‘locked’ into a discursive battle.

The HK press first developed under British rule with its beginnings naturally marked by “tie[s] to the colonial and business elite” (Lai 2007:9). The HK Chinese press catered, from early on, to ideological and propagandist interests – first rallying against the ruling Qing dynasty and later advocating either Nationalist or Communist interests (Lai 2007; Shih & Jones 2014). However, it has also been noted that “historically, Hong Kong had one of the most draconian media laws under British rule” despite the concept of ‘free press’ existing in Britain since the 17th century (Chan 2002:110; Lai 2007). Nevertheless, while ‘radical press’ dominated the first half of the 20th century, this had gradually changed by the latter half with commercial press overtaking partisan interests (Lai 2007). As the handover to Chinese sovereignty grew closer, there was a period where the “press were able to become increasingly independent and critical as a result of the weakening of government authorities” (Lai 2007:187). This coincided with Britain’s – and to a certain extent China’s – wish to oversee a ‘smooth return’. Yet, while steps were being taken by the outgoing colonial administration regarding liberalisation/democratisation which enabled the development of an independent and critical HK press, China were also ‘mobilising’ resources that would effectively take control of the press in post-handover HK. Businessmen with ‘pro-China affiliations’ had already been sought out by the CCP government to take over several media establishments in HK, thus ensuring ‘favourable media coverage’ (Lai 2007). These new heads at the helm of HK media companies necessarily meant interference with news content (Lai 2007:181). Caution was to be exercised in the treatment of typically Chinese taboo subjects such as the “subversive and separatist […] dissident states Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet”, the activities of the Falun Gong group and naturally any views disaligned with the CCP party (Lai 2007:118-120). According to the annual report by Freedom House’, HK press has “suffered a continuous decline in the last 5 years”. HK press status has been concluded to be ‘partly free’ as Beijing’s policy towards HK media seeks to bend it to serve its own purposes (Freedom House 2015b). Not only was there a rapid decline of ‘pro-Taiwan’ and ‘anti-CCP’ press outlets – either marginalised involuntarily or

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7 Freedom House (2015) is an “independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of freedom around the world”. It publishes annual reports on the ‘state of freedom and democracy’ around the globe of which Freedom in the World and Freedom of the Press.
voluntarily severed links – physical violence and/or political coercion on several occasions towards journalist as well as increasing practice of self-censorship have been recorded and reported by the Freedom in the Press 2015 report, further curbing the ‘free press’ conditions in HK. It seems undeniable then that “Beijing’s enormous economic power and influence over HK businesses, politicians, and media owners allow it to exert considerable indirect pressure on the territory’s media…” (Freedom House 2015b).

The Chinese press, on the other hand, can be seen as an overt orchestration of three primary actors: the CCP, Xinhua news agency and the Propaganda Ministry. Freedom House’s (2015a) report considers it “one of the world’s most restrictive media environments” and as such it is classed as ‘not free’. Essentially, the Chinese media’s role - since its inception as CCP government mouthpiece in 1949 – has been to relentlessly promote the Party’s agenda and its achievements, it also acts to show that the CCP are largely still the ‘ones in charge’. Young (2013:33) remarks that near total control of the media helps create the impression of consensus and uniformity in an otherwise-fragmented society where large differences exist between rich and poor, and urban and rural, and where those gaps are growing wider as the country embraces an open economic policy. The forging of such a consensus is crucial to maintaining social order and harmony, casting a real or imagined cloak of legitimacy around the Party’s latest policies by showing how everyone agrees with them and how they benefit both the common person and broader society.

So, while the myth may, to a certain extent, hold true that the central government keeps a tight lid on things when concerned with the press, in its 60 years as an ‘ideological/social stability tool’, it also had to adapt to the changing nature of communications. Emerging from a long period of isolation (post-Mao era), there was then not only a need to ‘rebuild’ the country i.e. modernisation, but also a need to revamp the Party’s image and with it, a new tactic was adopted concerning the press –

Chinese media began portraying China as a country of laws, as the Party sought to convince outside investors who were crucial to its economic development that they would be treated fairly and not be subject to whims of local officials (Young 2013:19).

It also meant that media establishments that had previously benefited from government subsidies no longer did and instead had to rely on market forces i.e. advertising and gaining readership; however, this does not mean state ownership was entirely relinquished, these still exist on some level within the media institutions (Young 2013). Freedom House (2015a) reports that most of the revenue gathered by the media today does indeed stem from advertising and subscriptions, in a sense proving successful commercialisation of the Chinese media. Today, many Chinese-language newspapers offer ‘other language’ editions of the news e.g. People’s Daily, Global Times - ranging from English to Arabic. In some ways, more leeway is accorded when Chinese news is reported in another language – “on sensitive issues where the message is meant for outsiders, English has become Xinhua’s language of choice” (Young 2013:73). Furthering the ease of delivering news on topics deemed sensitive is that of ‘fixed formulations’ or tifa – one of the many tools in the Propaganda Ministry and Xinhua’s arsenal (Alvaro 2013). This is a lexicon of approved terms for referring to specific groups, issues and/or events thus ensuring that everyone is ‘on the same page’ (Alvaro 2013; Young 2013). Guidelines, as mentioned earlier, on the treatment of certain ‘taboo’ subjects are naturally still de rigueur and tightly enforced, although the range in variety of subjects has since also expanded i.e. not just Party agenda. Since Xi Jinping took over CCP leadership, “a trend of ideological tightening” has been remarked regarding crackdowns on press manoeuvrability (Freedom House 2015a). A policy requiring journalists to sit an ideological exam to renew their press cards was also put forward in 2013 as well as collaborations with foreign (including HK and Macau) journalists forbidden and the banning of wordplay in commercial broadcasts/advertisements (Freedom House 2015a).
Taiwanese media, on the other hand, has been hailed as “one of the freest in Asia” by the Freedom House report (2015c). The media environment is said to be roughly akin to that found in ‘Western’ democracies whereby the media adopt the role of watchdog “protect[ing] citizens from the state and contribut[ing] to political accountability and transparency” (Rawnsley & Gong 2012:104). In its early days, Taiwanese press closely resembled that of the PRC’s with all press outlets essentially catering to the party’s purposes, the KMT in this case -

(M)edia ownership provided a useful and strategic form of communications control and influence. By co-opting and embedding media enterprises within the state structure, the KMT created a byzantine patron-client network that ensured loyalty, deference and obedience, especially among those media professionals with vital ‘gatekeeping’ responsibilities, such as editors (Rawnsley & Gong 2012:99)

As pressures to democratise were mounting, following the end of martial law era in 1987, one of the KMT’s first steps was to loosen its grip on the media. Recognising that an independent media was key in a democratic society, an ex-Director of the Government of Information Office8 (GIO) said,

“The government is […] under the surveillance of the media, and it is not suitable for the government to use administrative means or the law to punish them. That would raise criticisms about freedom of the press being hampered” (Shaw Yu-ming cited in Rawnsley & Rawnsley 2006:228)

Separation of media and politics, though, was easier said than done. This was not ‘fully’ achieved until 2003, upon amendment of the Radio and Television Act when it was made ‘officially illegal’ for anyone affiliated with the government to invest in media businesses (Rawnsley & Gong 2012). The DPP government, which initiated the amendment, promptly gave up its shares in the media (Rawnsley & Rawnsley 2006). Freedom House (2015c) records some 360 newspapers in circulation as well as over 280 TV channels available. Yet, with media pluralism firmly in place, the press and broadcasters nevertheless still operate within a ‘highly polarised’ political environment, subsequently leading to the criticism that they are necessarily either pro-KMT or pro-DPP (Rawnsley & Rawnsley 2006; Freedom House 2015c). Issues concerning freedom of speech, responsibility and privacy began surfacing impacting the quality of Taiwanese journalism, “the political role and responsibilities associated with serious journalism are being eroded as sensationalism and entertainment – and therefore profit – become the main driving forces for the media” (Rawnsley & Gong 2012:106). While journalists and politicians rose as the two primary groups opposing each other, this relationship was also characterised by mutually beneficial ties both had in “pursuing divergent (though overlapping) purposes” (Rawnsley & Gong 2012:99). Nevertheless, the progress that Taiwanese media has made since 1987 seems to be praised as nothing short of remarkable by academics, politicians and journalists themselves hence indicative of not only social and political pluralism but also democracy.

Shaped by distinct historical socio-political processes, not only have the media environments of HK, ROC and PRC developed differently from one another but the media themselves in the way they operate and the role they play in each of these societies. As it stands, the outlook on global press freedom seems rather bleak despite living “in a time of seemingly unlimited access to information and new methods of content delivery”; this was reflected as the lowest point in over a decade (Dunham, Nelson & Aghekyan 2015). Each of the media contexts presented above are best seen in terms of operating on a spectrum with the ROC on the ‘freest’ end and the PRC on the ‘restricted’ end and HK falling somewhere in the middle but tending towards the restricted. Nevertheless, it could also be argued that they all display some form

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8 The Government Information Office formed part of the KMT’s “censorship agencies” under martial law era, roughly what the Propaganda Ministry is to the PRC (Lee 2000:112). Post-martial law era, it was charged with the provision of information to the general public concerning government policies and actions; in 2012 the GIO was ‘dissolved’ and its duties distributed between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Culture (Liu 2012)
media pluralism as mass media increasingly becomes digitalised. With the use of the Internet as the norm in all three societies, this has led to a degree of concessions on behalf of the CCP, as they are unable to monitor every corner of the Web (Young 2013). HK enjoys unrestricted access to the digital world and as such, even with majority control of the printed press under ‘pro-China’ affiliated owners, other external sources of information and news are still widely available (Freedom House 2015b). What they all share though, is a degree of ‘political subservience’ to the PRC government – either due to ownership or out of political ‘courtesy’; this is counterbalanced by independence in non-political areas of the news (Linz 1974 in Lee 2000:111). It should also be noted that such issues are not constrained to this particular context but also affect other ‘fuller’ democratic polities (Rawnsley & Gong 2012).

With this in mind, this paper aims to take a closer look at how a political event such as the Occupy Central demonstrations in Hong Kong have been portrayed by the English-language press in Hong Kong, Taiwan and China.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Having outlined both national and media contexts of the abovementioned regions, the following research questions will be addressed in this dissertation:

1. How does the English-language press in HK, Taiwan and China perceive the events surrounding the Occupy Central movement?
   - Which discursive strategies are most salient and how are they used in the representation(s) of social actors/events?
   - What, if any, evaluations are made in the reporting of the event?
2. How do such media representations constitute hegemonic (social/political/cultural) discourses/practices and how do they contribute to serving different interests?
3. How do these mediatised political discourses reflect the larger socio- and geo-political framework of ‘One Country, Two Systems’?

1.4 LIMITATIONS

Drawbacks are naturally part of any project undertaking. The first concerns my limited knowledge of ‘Chinese’ and as such explains the focus of English-language press over Chinese-language press. Other issues concerning representation crop up as well in that if English is not seen as a ‘major’ language in these three regions, how then is it possible to derive any significant conclusions? A comparative study between English and Chinese news concerning the OCLP demonstrations would have certainly yielded a more convincing picture, however it could be argued that hegemonic discourses found in the English-language press in the PRC, ROC and HK attest to the transcendence of discourses across cultural and linguistic borders and thereby does not ‘lessen’ the project. Furthermore, the fact that there is English-language press published in these three regions may also be taken as sign that there is a demand in these societies.

Relying on critical discourse analysis (CDA) as the methodology also entails a time-consuming process and thus places restrictions on the amount of data analysed. As CDA is based on interpretation, this paper may never claim to have conducted a ‘full’ analysis, nor does it. Alternative readings of the data are certainly always possible as each person taking on the role of discourse analyst is subject to different political leanings as well as cultural backgrounds amongst other things. Regardless, the conclusions drawn may give insight into how the English-

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10 The politics of English is addressed in World Englishes by Jenkins 2009.
press operates within a system within which it is not the primary language as well as demonstrates the adaptability and dynamism of discourses as they shift across ‘spaces’.  

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS - THEORY

It would be appropriate firstly to define what exactly is meant by the term ‘discourse’. In its most basic sense, it refers to “an extended piece of text, or its verbal equivalent, that forms a unit of analysis” (Macey 2001:100). Linguistically speaking, discourse comprises words, which when combined in a certain manner make up sentences/utterances and form a body of written or spoken text.

Diverse conceptualisations of the term ‘discourse’ exist, ranging from the straightforward “language above the sentence or clause” (Stubbs 1983:1) and “the study of any aspect of language use” (Fasold 1990:65) to the more complex “instrument of communication” (Beneviste 1971:110) and “a type of social practice” (Fairclough 1992:8) (all cited in Jaworski & Coupland 2006:1-2). A further distinction may be made between the singular use of ‘discourse’ – “language use in general” - and the plural ‘discourses’ – “sets of meanings expressed through particular forms and uses which give expression to particular institutions or social groups” (Foucault 1984; Kress 1989 cited in Flowerdew 2012:6-7). Simply put, “[d]iscourse is thus infused with the ideological assumptions of its creators. Discourses may present subjective versions of reality with a view to imposing particular ideologies onto subjects [...] thus reflect[ing] power struggles within society” (Flowerdew 2012:7)

Yet for all the variability in definitions, these all allude to the ‘meta’ nature of discourse – that is, while it purports to be perceived as something concrete i.e. words on a page or the phonological manifestations of those words, its defining characteristic lies in its engagement with less tangible aspects i.e. conveying meaning.

Blommaert (2005:4) notes, “discourse is what transforms our environment into a socially and culturally meaningful one”, so what is it that makes it meaningful or understood by everyone? This makes up the basis and essentially central preoccupation of discourse analysis; it “has principles in common with the Saussurian view that language constructs social realities through its use of culturally agreed sign systems” (Litosseliti 2010:125).

What qualifies discourse analysis as ‘critical’? First we need to establish how CDA operates, it “adopts a macroanalytical view of the world in that it takes the notion of discourse in its widest sense as social and ideological practice [and] specifically considers how language works within institutional and political discourses […] in order to uncover overt or more often, covert inequalities in social relationships” (Litosseliti 2010:126). If inequities and inequalities exist in social relationships, this also implies that there is an element of dominance or power of one entity over another, which affect such relationships. Van Dijk (2001a:354-355) conceptualises power as the “social power of groups or institutions” and as a form of control which “presupposes a power base of privileged access for scarce social resources”. Here we may introduce the notion of ‘ideology’ or ‘hegemony’, that is the “power of dominant groups […] integrated in laws, rules, norms, habits […] exercised in obviously abusive acts of dominant groups members, but may [also] be enacted in the myriad of taken-for-granted actions of everyday life” (van Dijk 2001a:355). It is because of the ways in which power, inequalities and dominance manifest themselves – sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly – that DA takes on its ‘critical’ facet. Simply put, CDA is concerned with examination and evaluation highlighting and making visible the ‘inner workings’ of how discourses maintain, construct and resist such notions; it calls into question the ‘normal’ state of things. CDA works with an agenda and “should make proposals for change and suggest corrections to particular discourses, [it]
openly professes strong commitments to change, empowerment and practice-orientedness” (Blommaert 2005:25-26). However, we are also reminded that the “ultimate ambition remains explaining discourse, not explaining society through the privileged window of discourse”, ‘discourse’ is the object of analysis (Blommaert 2005:66).

Due to its orientation CDA has a tendency to focus on specific themes/issues in domains such as politics, media, education to name but a few, and not exclusively from a linguistic perspective either - cultural theory, sociology, media and communications, anthropology etc. - which also speaks to its ‘cross-disciplinary’ nature.

To recap, CDA assumes the following (Jaworski & Coupland 2006; van Dijk 2001a; Litosseliti 2010; Flowerdew 2012; Lin 2014):

- **Language as social practice** – “language is intrinsically ideological and plays a key role in naturalising, normalising and thus masking, producing and reproducing inequalities in society” (Litosseliti 2010:127-128)

- CDA is committed and has an emancipatory agenda, is ‘problem-oriented’ - language is a vehicle/instrument wielding power, that persists and produces inequities which should be resisted and so changed

- It addresses the mechanisms of “texts [as] manifestations of discourses” by linking the micro (language use, verbal interaction and communication) to the macro (power, dominance and inequality) (Flowerdew 2012:7; van Dijk 2001a:354)

- It ‘deconstructs’ (reveals) asymmetric social practices and relationships within society, but “a critical orientation is not merely ‘deconstructive’; it may be ‘reconstructive’, reconstructing social arrangements” (Jaworski & Coupland 2006:29)

- CDA emphasises the role of the researcher (reflexivity) – “the need to make the object under investigation and the analyst’s own position transparent and justify theoretically why certain interpretations and readings of discursive event seem more valid than others” (Lin 2014:214)

Most of those dealing with CDA as a discipline are also quick to note that “it does not provide a ready-made, how-to-do approach to social analysis, but emphasises that for each study a thorough theoretical analysis of a social issue must be made, so as to be able to select which discourse and social structures to analyse and to relate” (van Dijk 2001b:98). Therefore, CDA is both systematic and flexible in what it orientates itself towards and how it goes about being operationalized.

Another fundamental question is whether ‘CDA is an approach, a theory or a method?’ - this seems rather a point of preference for terminology (see Flowerdew 2012:197-198). The most appropriate (even diplomatic) answer might be that of Fairclough’s (2001:121 cited in Flowerdew 2012:7), “CDA is in my view as much theory as method” with the approach to theory and method as determined (in my view) by the broader issue of which platform (paradigm) CDA operates on/from – this dissertation works from a postcolonial perspective. Thus, CDA theory guides and informs the method to be adopted – “the ability to actively reproduce the best products of the thinkers of the past by applying the production of instruments they left behind” (Bourdieu 1997:65 in Blackledge 2008:299), “CDA brings a range of social and linguistic theories into dialogue, allowing analysis of the linguistic practices […] to be situated in their social, cultural, and historical contexts” (Blackledge 2008:299).

### 2.1.1 Criticisms of CDA

Naturally CDA is not without its critics. While “[d]iscourse promotes itself as being aware, liberated and liberating”, the undertaking of the method itself gets called into question because of its qualitative trait (Jaworski & Coupland 2006:30). That is, CDA relies heavily on interpretations, making it hard to verify any claims made on behalf of the analyst and consequently this dissertation (Denscombe 2010:86, 289).
Notable critics include Widdowson (1995, 1996, 1998 cited in Blommaert 2005:31) who stressed the biasness of CDA “under the guise of critical analysis [which] begs questions about representativeness, selectivity, partiality, prejudice, and voice (can analysts speak for the average consumer of texts?)”. To this, Fairclough (2003:14-15) claims, “[t]here is no such thing as an ‘objective’ analysis of a text, if by that we mean an analysis which simply describes what is ‘there’ in the text without being ‘biased’ by the ‘subjectivity’ of the analyst”. Although these two quotes have merely been placed in opposition to one other (rather than Fairclough actually responding to Widdowson as such), this does bring up further questions of what is actually meant by Widdowson’s comment – if CDA is ‘biased’ and if this could conceivably be removed from the equation, what is the discourse analyst left with? Analysis itself is merely a form of questioning, scrutinising and problematisation; the manner in which the analysis is interpreted and delivered however, may be construed as ‘biasness’. Yet, in academia, there are rules and constraints as to how one presents the results of their findings so as to minimise subjectivity – “Widdowson is, strangely enough, missing the fact that there is no value-free CDA, that, ultimately there is no value-free science” (Gouveia 2003:57 cited in Blackledge 2005:17).

Another aspect is that of selectivity, that data is specifically picked for analysis. This inevitably leads to the critique that analysts would tend towards picking discourses based on their pre-supposed ideas of which conclusions to draw (Blommaert 2005:32-33; Jaworski & Coupland 2006:30-31). Yet, while it may be that ideas and assumptions are previously held before analysis, it could be argued that no researcher delves into a project without previously exercising their own intuitions that there is indeed something ‘worthy’ to be found.

Blommaert (2005) himself has taken up CDA’s shortcomings which include CDA’s tendency towards biasness. Moreover, he adds that CDA has tended to focus too much on “particular kinds of societies” i.e. “First-world societies” and “particular kinds of time frame” (Blommaert 2005:35, 37).

The first of these concerns – a focus on ‘particular kinds of societies’ – relates not only to whether it is a general complaint on the western/occident-centric tendency of CDA but is also a complaint about academic discourses as stemming from ‘these kinds of societies’, where derived perspectives may not always transcend borders (Blommaert 2005:35-36). In observations such as “[i]n scholarship that aspires to a critique of the present system, it would be very unwise to assume universal validity for our ways of life. CDA takes far too much sharedness for granted when it comes to discourse in contemporary societies across the world”, Blommaert (2005:36) does well to caution against the impulse of drawing over-large generalisations. Yet, in pointing out this tendency it seems that he himself commits the very act of assuming that another statement made by Chouliaraki & Fairclough (1999:3) could apply to a village in Tanzania (Blommaert 2005:36). It is worth briefly mentioning Shi-xu (2004 cited in Flowerdew 2012:11) who sees CDA as a discipline primarily rooted in Western traditions that “claim to be objective and universal, but are, […] rather the tools of Western imperialism”. He also laments the work done on ‘non-Western discourses’ through the eyes of (assumed) Western discourse analysts as imposing “Westcentric definitions and judgements of non-Western situations”. To counter these, Shi-xu (2004) advocates for a deconstructive approach as well as for the adoption of seeing things from ‘in-between’ cultures as a point of departure i.e. indigenous methodological approaches (Flowerdew 2012:11). While it is not clear to what ‘indigenous’ approaches Shi-xu is referring, Flowerdew (2012) notes that this kind of CDA as advocated by Shi-xu falls inline with the discipline of positive discourse analysis (PDA). PDA has been discussed as a development to CDA, “an approach [with] a positive style of discourse analysis that focuses on hope and change, by way of complementing the deconstructive exposé associated with critical discourse analysis” (Martin 2004:29 in Flowerdew 2008:204). Flowerdew (2008:204) cautions that that such an “enterprise [may] turn[] into a form of propaganda on behalf of the status quo”. As harsh as Shi-xu’s critiques appear, he does seem to
make a point, in line with Blommaert (2005:35) on the focus having been too fixated on “particular kinds of societies”. Nevertheless, we should not forget that “CDA does not deny, but explicitly defines and defends its own socio-political position. That is, CDA is biased – and proud of it” (van Dijk 2001b:96). Regardless, it would seem that these issues probably relate to wider concerns of access involving the ‘central-periphery’ divide and the increasing use of English in academia.

In addressing “particular kinds of time-frame”, Blommaert (2005:37) alludes to the lack of attention paid to the importance of “a sense of history” (see Flowerdew 2012 for CDA in Historiography). He argues for the need to “take history seriously, for part of the critical punch of what we do may ultimately lies in our capacity to show that what looks new is not new at all, but the outcome of a particular process which is systemic, not accidental” (Blommaert 2005:37). Reiterating a previous comment in Discourse (2005:35), the point of conception of a piece of discourse starts long before it appears and ends long after; history as it is approached in CDA is currently too narrow and instead should switch to a panoramic view.

2.2 MEDIA ANALYSIS - THEORY

Another facet to complement CDA is that of media analysis (MA), considering this dissertation focuses on news articles.

Concerned with “representations of social relations [and their use] in the construction of social life and social relations”, the introduction of MA helps widen the scope to aspects not necessarily covered by CDA i.e. that of production, consumption and organisation of the ‘news’ (Purvis 2008:330). Cotter (2001:419) provides a list of topics shared by both CDA and MA, of which:

- Narrative/sociolinguistic elements that construct or underlie news discourse
- Implications of quotation and reported speech
- Exercise of power, bias, ideology in the press
- Effects of media in perpetuating social imbalance

MA is critical and lends itself to narrative, stylistic and comparative modes of analysis whereby the task at hand is not only to make visible the hidden and implicit mechanisms at work within a text but, by doing so through the linguistic “discourse-level elements and explanations”, the analysis should “reveal important understandings of the role of culture and politics in the production of news discourse and delineate the variable aspects of news practice not apparent in solely western media-focused treatments” (Cotter 2001: 418-419).

Purvis (2008:328) also provides several analytical frameworks from which to analyse media. Out of the four frameworks mentioned (see Purvis 2008 for more details), two are considered for analysis. The first is ‘media in relation to its cultural relations’, that is “in relation to wider aspects of social and cultural dynamics [and] its relationship to cultural identities, social and political formations, and contexts of audience or user interaction” (Purvis 2008:329). Given some of the newspapers’ political leanings and in this media context exist within a linguistic market where English is not the majority language, it is important to briefly draw attention to the press’ ‘public’. Analysis in this dissertation will take into consideration how the press in HK, Taiwan and China target, address and so construct their ‘public’. A ‘public’ may be conceived of as a “rhetorical addressee […] understood to name something about the texts’ worldliness, its actual destination, which may or may not resemble its addressee” (Warner 2002: 416). In attempting to appeal to as wide a public as possible while targeting those it truly seeks, a text’s public is thus also open-ended and exists by virtue of its addressee (Warner 2002). How newspapers imagine their public is revealed by applying the appraisal framework as well as aspects of MA (see 3.1.1 and 3.2.1). It also takes into consideration the ‘media in its political-economic relations’, that is “as commodities, constructed in spheres where the financial and
the economic dynamics are made intelligible in the spheres of the social, the ideological and the cultural” (Purvis 2008:329). In this way not only is ‘news’ a tool in the construction of how we understand our ‘world’ but also due to the fact that it is part of a “mass communications system [it] takes much of its meaning from the wider political economy in which the text circulates” (Purvis 2008:329).

Another aspect of media analysis which should be taken up is that of news framing. In its most basic form, framing may be referred to the organisation and presentation of news events (de Vreese 2005:53). Frequently attributed to Goffman (1974), framing builds on Gumperz’s (1992) notion of “construct[ed] interpretive universes in which utterances are set and offered for interpretation” with the idea that “multiple frames [may] be operating at the same time – different potential sets of interpretive universes, between which the interlocutors can choose or shift footing” (Blommaert 2005:46). Framing is also a process as it ‘communicates’ messages through discourse, it “is the process whereby communicators act – consciously or not – to construct a particular point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be viewed in a particular manner, with some facts made more noticeable than others” (Kuypers 2010:300).

This highlights the interaction between an agent - a journalist - capturing, organising and selecting aspects of a story and producing it in order for others - an audience - to read and interpret. Two characteristics stand out, that of ‘saliency of information’ and deliberate ‘control’, undermining the purportedly objective aspect of news discourse.

In the context of political framing, Lawrence (2010:265) highlights that various layers of framing exist as well; any discourse pertaining to report on political matters, events or stemming from organisations or individuals within society have its ‘preferred frame’ of putting information ‘out there’ so to speak. Added to this is the media’s frame and whether or not it chooses to align itself with such groups/individuals by adopting the given frame or even ‘reframing’ in the reporting of such events (Lawrence 2010:265). Lawrence (2010:265) is quick to note that journalists/editors also “contribute their own frames”, however this is not seen as a purposeful action on their behalf but rather “part of the norms and routines of the news business”. While it could be claimed that this is not ‘purposeful’, analysis in the subsequent sections point to a certain degree of manipulation on behalf of the author/editor. This is certainly true when reading an editorial/opinion piece, however it may be that as ‘news’ is not neutral, in trying to achieve neutrality/objectivity journalists are inadvertently contributing their frames.

Hence, “the media are not simply intermediaries between political actors and the mass public. Journalists can actively limit the public’s right to access and evaluate different policy platforms and thus diminish the quality of political dialogue […] potential[ly] inhibit[ing] pluralism by block[ing] out the preferred themes of interest groups and politicians” (Callaghan & Schnell 2001:203 cited in Kuypers 2010:301).

2.3 PERSPECTIVES

This dissertation largely departs from a postcolonial perspective, that is to say (in its most basic form) a perspective that considers the effects of colonialism, or more precisely imperialism (see 2.4.1 for further detail) on a territory i.e. effects on the political, economic, cultural and linguistic aspects of society. It should be noted, though, that the term ‘postcolonial/post-colonial’ has itself generated much debate within academic circles (For further discussions see Hall 1996; McClintock 2004; Loomba 2004). The adoption of such a perspective for this paper was motivated by the fact that Hong Kong is generally considered an ex-colony of Great Britain, thus the need for some focus to be placed on certain lines of questioning/reasoning during analysis and discussion i.e. consequences of Great Britain’s colonial legacy on institutions such as government and the media. The background outlined earlier should have gone some way to redress criticisms taken up by Blommaert (2005) concerning context and historicity as well as by Loomba (2004:1109) concerning tendencies
for “analyses of ‘postcolonial’ societies [to] too often work with the sense that colonialism is the only history of these societies”. The following paragraphs goes on to detail and pinpoint what it might mean to adopt a postcolonial perspective.

Considering the focus is on topics related to regions located in Asia, which may not conform to traditional Western outlooks or theories, it was important to consult other sources relating to treatment of such ‘other discourses’. Chen’s (2010) *Asia as method* posits that traditional outlooks on projects undertaking research to do with ‘Asia’ have assumed a universality which may not necessarily conform to or be sufficient in explaining the event under examination. As such, Chen (2010:1) devises an approach that “develops a more adequate understanding of contemporary cultural forms, practices, and institutions in the formerly colonized world”. While HK and Taiwan may not be seen as having been colonised in the traditional sense, their histories nevertheless form part of the larger discourses available concerning ‘Asian’ studies. This perspective as put forward by Chen (2010) stems from his problematisation of the processes of colonisation, imperialisation and the cold war and how these have in fact not ended yet but rather due to unfinished processes of de-colonisation, these have further contributed to the modern “international forces of globalisation” (Chen 2010:159). Themes of the subaltern, self/other and various dichotomies traditionally handled by postcolonial studies are further deconstructed thus shifting the normative point of reference away from West to a more local point,

Rather than continuing to fear reproducing the West as the Other, and hence avoiding the question altogether an alternative discursive strategy posits the West as bits and fragments that intervene in local social formations in a systematic, but never totalising, way. [...] The operating site is local, but at the same time internationalist localism actively transgresses nation-states’ boundaries. It looks for new political possibilities emerging out of the practices and experiences accumulated during encounters between local history and colonial history – that is, the new forms and energies produced by the mixing brought about by the modernisation. [...] The task for Asia as method is to multiply frames of reference in our subjectivity and world-view, so that our anxiety over the West can be diluted, and productive critical work can move forward. (Chen 2010:223).

This leads to Shi-xu’s (2004) *A Cultural Approach to Discourse*, which in a sense may be considered an extension of *Asia as method*. Shi-xu’s (2004:6) intended area of focus is those discourses “where urgent cultural issues, especially questions of cultural relationship in the contemporary world, for example domination, exclusion, rebuilding or transformation, are at stake”. As this paper considers English media discourse from China, Hong Kong and Taiwan on an event involving (directly or indirectly) all three of these regions, Shi-xu’s (2004) approach is eminently suitable. Shi-xu (2004:43) then suggests that the researcher depart from an ‘in-between-cultural stance’, thus allowing the researcher to “construct, not certain or true knowledge, but a culturally dialogical, creative, double vision [and] formulate innovative values and cultural-political objectives”. This entails incorporating western and non-western traditions of discourse approach, taking into account the global and local contexts in which discourses emerge and exist within, all the while “complement[ing] and inspire[ing] each other, in order to achieve academic democracy, produce scientific innovation and enrich the international research culture as a whole” (Shi-xu 2004:87). The combination of *Asia as method* and culturally sensitive perspective taken on in this paper seeks to blur the lines between centre-periphery, perhaps even cast it aside and depart from an all together different/alternative platform.

With special focus on media studies and globalisation theory, *De-westernizing media studies* by Curran & Park (2000) also informed the kind of perspective this paper wishes to adopt. Once again, their argument moves away from the centre-periphery format of conceptualisations and advocates for a rather more nuanced outlook on media systems i.e. the role of media in global systems (Curran & Park 2000:11-12). They lament the all too familiar habit of having historically favoured ‘perceiving the world through Western eyes’ and argue
that while phenomena such as modernisation and the more ‘recent’ globalisation have tended towards the transnational, the importance of nations should not be disregarded so easily, “media systems are shaped not merely by national regulatory regimes and national audience preferences, but by a complex ensemble of social relations that have taken shape in national contexts” (Curran & Park 2000:12). As such, the authors stress the importance of understanding the role of media in society, as part of a larger network of social practices shaped by various national settings; considering the differences in national settings allows for a better comparative outlook to be undertaken, so narrowing the centre-periphery gap.

Although the above elements orientate towards a near rejection of occident-centric points of view, what they illustrate is that Western normative points of references are insufficient in the treatment of ‘non-Western’ discourses. There is a need not only to move away from centre towards the periphery but more importantly to dis- and re-locate such points of references. It creates, what Bhabha (1994:39) terms, the ‘third space’,

...alien territory [which] may reveal that the theoretical recognition of the split-space of enunciation may open the way to conceptualising and international culture, based not on an exoticism of multiculturalism of the diversity of cultures, but on the inscription and articulation of culture’s hybridity.

It is not about ‘either/or’ but rather a combination and thus collaboration between what is traditionally deemed the ‘occident’ and ‘orient’. Mirroring this is “Hong Kong’s unsettled and unsettling location between China and the West [which] produces [...] multiple ambivalences” (Ang 2001:1); while the postcolonial may, at times, cover a panoptic field of view, it is these ambiguities and complexities that form the basis for the paradigm from which this paper departs. Such a consideration thus brings use closer to what Shi-xu (2004) and Chen (2010) conceptualise as an ‘in-between-cultural stance’ and ‘multiplicity of frames of references’.

2.4 TERMINOLOGY

As Taiwan, Hong Kong and China are classified differently, rather than use value-laden terms such as ‘country’ or ‘territory’, this paper settles on the terms ‘nations’ and/or ‘regions’ for all three. A reference to these regions by name – which may also entail particular political connotations – is in no way intended as such. While such a reference by name i.e. HK/HKSAR, ROC, PRC, refers largely to the geographical location, it may at times also refer to the government; any other usage will be made explicit. The various acronyms for each region are used throughout as well as their complete names, more instances of one referent is not an indication of preference nor stance but rather for practical reasons and in part so as to avoid repetition. It has equally been noted that the designation of the change of sovereignty of Hong Kong as either ‘handover’ or ‘return’ may denote political affiliation (see Shi-xu 2004; Flowerdew 2012), both terms are employed throughout without any particular connotation.

This section seeks to provide some definitions for terminologies and concepts, which make up the basis of this dissertation. These relate to the field of postcolonial theory and the concept of hegemony. It should be borne in mind that these concepts do not always have a fixed definition, but rather are subject to variations depending on their use in other disciplines and contexts.

2.4.1 ‘–ISMS’ – COLONIALISM, IMPERIALISM, NEOCOLONIALISM, POSTCOLONIALISM

While the ‘colonial’ and ‘imperial’ are frequently seen to be the same process albeit from opposite ends, Said (1993 cited in Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin 2007:40) clarifies by conceptualising “colonialism as a consequence of imperialism”; where “imperialism means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant
territory; colonialism […] is the implanting of settlements on distant territory”. Neocolonialism – colonialism’s contemporary – on the other hand is found to not have differed so much from its ‘traditional’ form where ‘relation[s] between the coloniser and colonised was locked into a rigid hierarchy of difference deeply resistant to fair and equitable exchanges, whether economic, cultural or social” (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin 2007:41). Postcolonialism stands as the odd one out in the list as it simultaneously captures – broadly speaking - all of the above concepts under the study of effects of these ‘-isms’, be they cultural, political, social or economical,

‘Post-colonialism/postcolonialism’ is now used in wide and diverse ways to include the study and analysis of European territorial conquests, the various institutions of European colonialisms, the discursive operations of empire, the subtleties of subject construction in colonial discourse and the resistance of those subjects, and, most importantly perhaps, the differing responses to such incursions and their contemporary colonial legacies in both pre- and post-independence nations and communities. (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin 2007:168)

Seminal to the study of postcolonialism is that of Said’s (1979) Orientalism - “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’”. So not only does it highlight the West’s historical, cultural and political perceptions of the East, this line of thinking seeks to maintain these perceptions through “a library or archive of information […] bound [by] a family of ideas and a unifying set of values proven in various ways to be effective” (Said 1979:41-42). Such processes of essentialism are not confined to the ‘West’ on the ‘East’. In a publication on the Hong Kong handover, Lee et al. (2002:110) detailing the media narratives that emerged shortly before and during the event noted,

The Chinese media […] often attribute Hong Kong’s astonishing economic prosperity […] to the hard work of the local Chinese (People’s Daily, June 20) and the support of mainland China throughout the years (People’s Daily, June 3). […] Whenever the PRC media stress the importance of maintaining the cherished social framework to protect Hong Kong’s prosperity, they largely ignore the role of the British in establishing such legal and economic infrastructure. (Lee et al. 2002:115).

Furthermore, Young (2013:41) notes the PRC media’s inclination towards relying on “Chinese nationalism to discredit the West” as well as,

Chinese media have proven quite adept in times of trouble at casting the country as a victim. This kind of ploy appears almost from the start of the People’s Republic, with Chinese painting itself as victim of US aggression during the Korean War 1950-1953.

Hence, by choosing to emphasise exclusively on certain characteristics over others, the ‘East’ also participates in aspects of ‘Orientalism’ albeit in its own way. Such ideas still hold true today in that ‘we’ all have certain preconceived notions about what is and is not; while ‘East/West’ do pertain to geographical locations, such dichotomies are also very much about l’imaginaire. East/West thus may also be replaced by other such binaries as the Self/Other, Black/White etc. The crucial point to make here, though, is that these are not fixed contrastive entities but rather dynamic and complementary to one another. In other words, Orientalism (1979) stands for the “controlling power of representations”, such representations are better analysed and understood in terms of hegemony (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin 2007:168).

2.4.2 IDEOLOGY & HEGEMONY

Blommaert (2005:158) captures rather well the multifarious nature of the term ‘ideology’,

Few terms are as badly served by scholarship as the term ideology, and as soon as anyone enters the field of ideology studies, he or she finds him/herself in a morass of contradictory definitions, widely varying approaches to ideology, and huge controversies over terms, phenomena, or modes of analysis.
Perhaps the only aspect of ideology that can be agreed upon is that of its ‘adaptability’ into the various disciplines. Without attempting to provide the range of different meanings that ideology has taken on, suffice to say that what this dissertation mostly relies upon are Althusser’s view of ideology as well as Gramsci’s notion of hegemony.

Let us return to the notion of ‘family of ideas and unifying set of values’ as the most basic definition for ideology (Said 1979:41-42). Characterising such ideas and values is their insidiousness, which “penetrates the whole fabric of societies and communities and results in normalised, naturalised patterns of thought and behaviour” (Blommaert 2005:159). The Oxford Dictionaries (2015) defines hegemony as “leadership or dominance, especially by one state or social group over others”. Gramsci’s development of the concept of hegemony accounted for two levels of the political, not only could it be a macro issue i.e. the state, but also related to the micro aspect, “how seemingly private or personal aspects of daily life are politically important aspects of the operation of power” i.e. civil society (Ives 2004:71).

Whereas the state establishes and reproduces the dominance of a ruling group or class through direct forms of domination ranging from legislation to coercion, civil society reproduces its hegemony by ensuring that the mass of the population ‘spontaneously’ consents to the general direction imposed upon social life by the ruling groups. (Macey 2001:176)

Althusser’s ‘ideological state apparatus[es]’ tie in in that these bring in the possible means by which hegemonies and by extent ideologies are dispersed; such state apparatuses refer to various societal institutions and organisations such as the education system, the family, the media, the church etc. (Macey 2001; Blommaert 2005). Much like Gramsci’s ‘consent’, Althusser works with ‘interpellations’, “appeals to individuals to act in particular ways, ways that reflect dominant ideologies” (Blommaert 2005:162).

As mass media becomes increasingly accessible in people’s daily lives, not to mention in certain regions of Asia where communications/technology are seen to be at the forefront of modernity, this then brings about questions as to the interactions of consent and coercion by the media as a state apparatus.

2.4.3 SOVEREIGNTY & GOVERNANCE

The handover of Hong Kong is frequently described as the ‘passing over of sovereignty’ between Britain and China; but what does ‘sovereignty’ mean? A possible and most likely synonym would be the ‘passing over of control’ between Britain and China. As such, ‘sovereignty’ is most readily assumed as comprising,

the bearer (of sovereignty) possess[ing] the quality of a supreme (or absolute or final) authority over a body. All concepts used in this definition – who the bearer is, what this supreme authority involves, and what type of body it controls – acquire inter-subjective meanings in accordance to grand shifts in world norms (Tok 2013:28).

The practice of sovereignty then entails governing, that is, the act of leading, controlling and administering a ‘body’ or nation. Ties may be drawn to imperialism – “the acquisition of an empire of overseas colonies”- whereby considering how Hong Kong came to be referred to as a (now former) ‘colony’ and special administrative region, conditions preceding and succeeding the Handover may be seen in terms of ‘acquisition’ of power and/or right (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin 2007:112). Admittedly, this may be a rather crass way of referring to Hong Kong’s history; nevertheless, since the ceding of Hong Kong to the British in the late 19th century, the issue of sovereignty has always been a point of contention (Flowerdew 2012:3).
3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGY

This section outlines in further detail the different aspects adapted from the various strands of CDA and the data collection process. It also addresses some of the issues taken up in a previous section (2.1.1) on the criticisms of CDA methodology – via the approach of ‘triangulation’ (Wodak 2001) and accounts for the author’s reflexivity. An overview is provided at the end of this section summarising the use of CDA and MA in its entirety.

Combining both CDA and MA allows for a more thorough analysis of the news articles. While CDA places focus on the discoursal i.e. linguistic aspect, MA allows for the analysis to cross into the news genre. Guided by Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) and the appraisal frameworks (constituting the CDA strand of analysis), the emphasis is placed on the functional aspects of discourse – “how a text means […] what a text means” (Eggins 2004:329) – as well as on the evaluative power of discourse. The CDA adapted in this paper aims for analysis to be explanatory (more than interpretive, see Eggins 2004 Chapter 11), in conjunction with the MA framework, the functional aspect of text is further delved into as the production, consumption, organisational and framing elements of the news genre are examined. Meaning and context are thus constantly borne in mind.

3.1 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS – METHOD

3.1.1 SYSTEMIC FUNCTIONAL LINGUISTICS & APPRAISAL – FAIRCLOUGH, MARTIN & WHITE

Due to CDA’s ‘receptiveness’/openness to incorporation by other disciplines, methodologies and approaches, it is no wonder that Michael Halliday’s (1978, 1994) Systemic Functional Linguistics should be a strong front-runner for this partnership. It provides not only a good basis for linguistic textual analysis but also a systematic method. One of the core principles of SFL is that it views texts as ‘multi-functional’ and therefore

…texts simultaneously have ‘ideational’, ‘interpersonal’ and ‘textual’ functions. That is texts simultaneously represents aspects of the world […] enact social relations between participants in social events and the attitudes, desires and values of participants; and coherently and cohesively connect parts of texts together, and connect texts with their situational contexts. (Halliday 1978, 1994 cited in Fairclough 2003:26-27)

Fairclough’s (2003:29) dialectical-relational approach conceptualizes discourses as “different from one another [but] not totally separate” and as entities that ‘enact’, ‘inculcate’ and ‘represent’ levels of textual practices i.e. genres, styles and modalities. As such there is interplay between internal (semantics, grammar, vocabulary, phonological) and external (social structures, practices and events) relations of a text (Fairclough 2003:35-36). The crucial aspect to be gleaned from Fairclough’s (2003) version of CDA is the linguistic analysis of internal factors as well as his way of understanding representation of social events and actors through processes and recontextualisation (see Fairclough 2003 - Chapters 5, 6 and 8). Furthermore, the connections drawn to themes of governance, hegemonic struggles, ideologies and legitimation also inform this study (Fairclough 2003:7). SFL thus brings to the fore “the realizational relationship extending all the way from the most abstract levels of context (ideology) through to the very concrete words, structures, sounds and graphology of text” (Eggins 2004:328).

A further aspect developed within the SFL strand is that of the appraisal framework proposed by Martin & White (2005). Appraisal - or The language of evaluation (2005:1) – deepens the interpersonal aspect of SFL in that it concerns itself “with the subjective presence of writers/speakers in texts as they adopt stances towards both the material they present and those with whom they communicate”. Three ‘domains’ form the appraisal framework: attitude,
engagement and graduation; these further branch out to other sub-domains, however for the purpose of this dissertation only that of engagement and graduation will be used. Engagement is concerned “with [the] sourcing of attitudes and the play of voices around opinions in discourse, [g]raduation attends to grading phenomena whereby feelings are amplified and categories blurred” (Martin & White 2005:35). As engagement hones in on the ‘play of voices’, the concept traditionally treated under the heading ‘modality’ is thus extended from exploring the degree to which speakers/writers commit to the proposition expressed to the treatment of interactions of (textual) voices and positions within a text as well (Martin & White 2005:95). The more these voices and positions interact with one another or with other voices and positions, the more engagement may be described as heteroglossic; the less alternatives and interactions, the more the text is construed as monoglossic (Martin & White 2005). The elements that make up the heteroglossic characteristic of a text is further qualified as either dialogically expansive or contractive. If locutions or propositions advanced appear to ‘attribute’ or ‘entertain’ other alternatives, textual space is thus given and so dialogically expansive (Martin & White 2005). However, should locutions or propositions advanced appear to ‘disclaim’ (deny or counter) or ‘proclaim’ (pronounce, concur or endorse), textual space is thus limited or minimised and so dialogically contractive (see Martin & White 2005:134 for a full taxonony of the engagement system). Graduation, on the other hand, deals with the intensity and ‘degree of investment’ that propositions carry with them. Analytical categories of graduation may be separated as either “resources for intensification (force) and [resources] for adjusting boundaries (focus)” (Martin & White 2005:40). Force may either be intensified e.g. slightly/very nervous, or quantified e.g. few/many protesters; however, as focus deals with ‘prototypicality’ – scaling traditionally non-scalable concepts – it is either sharpened or softened e.g. true democracy (see Martin & White 2005:154 for an overview of the graduation system). The features of engagement and graduation thus allow for examination of the linguistic resources that “temper[ ] what we say” (Eggins 2004:181), and in doing so reveal the attitudinal and intersubjective stances found in text.

This approach overlaps with aspects of MA in that reader-writer relationships are explored and examined,

Our framework has a prospective or anticipatory orientation in that we are concerned with the way in which the text builds for itself an audience and presents itself as engaging in various ways with this audience. (Martin & White 2005:135)

As this framework focuses on judgements and stances, it proves a useful element in the analysis of media discourse which appears to be ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’, “journalism represents ‘opinion statements […] embedded in argumentation that makes them more or less defensible, reasonable, justifiable or legitimate as conclusions” (van Dijk 1996:24 cited in Richardson 2007:65). Furthermore, the treatment of political topics by media discourse sees the issue of positioning and stances at stake and hence all the more likely that ‘appraisal’ is at work.

Elements of SFL and the appraisal frameworks thus make up the core levels of first analysis - word, sentence and text. It lays the groundwork for more general levels of analysis such as intertextuality and interdiscursivity as defined below.

3.1.2 DISCOURSE STRATEGIES – BLACKLEDGE

In Discourse and Power in a Multilingual World, Blackledge (2005; 2008) uses a condensed version of Wodak’s (2001) discourse-historical approach (DHA) to study the theme of language and citizenship in Britain. He draws from DHA the discursive and argumentative strategies known as topoi, “the common-sense reasoning typical for specific issues” which “belong to obligatory, either explicit or inferable, premises” (Van Dijk 2000:97 cited in Blackledge 2005:68, 67). Such strategies treat the more general level of CDA, that of intertextuality,
interdiscursivity and recontextualisation. Examining intertextual and interdiscursive aspects means focusing on the different types of ‘other’ texts and types of genres that a piece of discourse may relate to, may implicitly incorporate or may be embedded within (Blackledge 2005:10-12). As these aspects are identified, recontextualisations of discourse are thus made noticeable. These elements make visible the transformations of discourses across different spaces i.e. contexts; while the source of a certain discourse might never fully be ‘discovered’, the fact that a text is able to ‘link’ to another already speaks to the ‘ease’ of discourses being able to shift, be repeated and so recontextualised (defined as ‘entextualisation’ by Blommaert 2005:47). This idea that discourses may move through various contexts is what Blackledge (2005:12; 2008:303) sees as moving across ‘chains of discourses’ which are “neither straightforward nor unidirectional, but are likely to be circular, reflexive, tangential, and fractured” (c.f. ‘orders of discourse’ as a network of social practice in Fairclough 2003:24).

Much like other critical discourse analysts, Blackledge’s (2005:20) adaptation of CDA entails establishing content (context), discourse strategies and linguistic means. His emphasis on Bakhtin’s notion of dialogicality and voice is also treated in specific relation to CDA on printed media (as intertextuality) and also makes up an important part of the analysis for this paper (the appraisal framework also illuminates aspects of ‘voice’).

### 3.2 Media Analysis - Method

As was outlined earlier, MA deals with “the news story [...] and the process involved in producing the texts” and how these “mediate, represent and construct the world to subjects” (Cotter 2001:416; Purvis 2008:327). Thus, discourses that are regarded as ‘news’ should be treated as a) a story, b) constructed and c) as dealing with representations. It is important, at this stage, to reiterate that ‘news’ is not ‘natural’; it is socially and culturally situated as being the object of an agent reporting, representing and constructing ‘it’ as ‘news’ (Caldas-Coulthard 2003 cited in Blackledge 2005:66; Purvis 2008:331). The danger then becomes that what is perceived as ‘news’ may be taken to be objective and truthful. This naturally impacts the way people understand and (re)act to the social world (Caldas-Coulthard 2003 cited in Blackledge 2005:67).

#### 3.2.1 News Organisation, Classification & Narrative Structure – Purvis, White

Both Purvis (2008) and White (1997) treat the topic of news structures. Purvis (2008:331-332) provides a more general summary of how to conduct MA by identifying general features pertaining to the organisation of a news article; these are summarised as:

- What type of news is it – e.g. opinion, editorial etc.
- Placement and appearance of text e.g. front-page, section, weekend, weekday
- Identifying the message(s) being conveyed and how are they framed
- Examining the linguistic elements in the text – repetition, indirect or direct
- Quotes, linguistic devices etc.
- Examining the sources used in the text – single or multiple?
- What is explicitly mentioned, what is left implicit?

White (1997:25) delves a little deeper into the deconstruction of such discourse structures and see them as “complex rhetorical devices” composed specifically in order to construct social realities. By breaking down text into different sections – headline, lead and body – White (1997) exposes how each part works to convey the ‘newsworthiness’ of a news article. He conceptualises these different parts of a news story/report in spatial terms with “the headline/lead act[ing] as nucleus and the […] sub-components [body following title] act[ing]
as its satellites” (White 1997:15). Not only does a news story/report follow a narrative – for without the narrative, the news (paradoxically) becomes uninteresting – they also follow an ‘orbital textual development’; that is as the body of the text is further broken down into ‘satellites’, these all in some way are relatable back to the most important part of the text i.e. the headline and serve to reinforce the point being made (White 1997:15, 24). Invoking the image of an orbiting satellite speaks to the ‘radical editability’ of a news story/report, meaning that each part of the text is not bound to a strict chronological narrative order (White 1997:15). The ability to identify this vital aspect is significant as it reveals that not only that the journalist/editor is able to manipulate the informational output but also that the ‘news’ is composed with an agenda – …the generic structure of the ‘hard news’ requires that the reporter construes events and statements in terms of the purported risk they pose for the social order and that this construal is an act of ideologically and culturally determined interpretation. (White 1997:23)

Compositional phases of a news story/report (White 1997:9, 11-13):
- Headline, lead (nucleus) – engaging and providing the audience with the “most important” information
- Body, sub-components (satellites) – elaborates, qualifies, explains, appraises what was introduced by the headline and lead; by developing the point further they act as reinforcements

3.2.2 NEWS FRAMING – DE VREESE

De Vreese (2005:53-54) suggests a deductive way of frame identification and summarising previous studies on framing theory condenses which ‘framing devices’ to look for which may ‘constitute a frame’. Following Entman (1993:52 cited in de Vreese 2005:54, Kuypers 2010:301), frames are detected via “the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgements” (see de Vreese 2005:54 for a comprehensive list of ‘focal points’). This dissertation focuses on what is termed ‘generic frames’ that is frames which “transcend thematic limitations and can be identified in relation to different topics […] over time and in different cultural contexts”; thus it draws from five types of frames (derived from Semetko & Valkenburg 2000 cited in de Vreese 2005:56):
- conflict frame
- human interest frame
- responsibility frame
- morality frame
- economic consequences

3.3 OVERVIEW OF CDA (SFL/APPRaisal) & MA

The sum of what has been presented will be shown schematically. The taxonomy is adapted from Richardson (2007:47) who has employed CDA on newspaper articles and thus has already triaged the relevant aspects of SFL and CDA. It is also adapted from an overview on CDA by Flowerdew (2008:199-203) who summarises a list of the features as used in the various ‘tool-kits’ of CDA practitioners.

Table 1- Overview of Methodology

| Structuring of Propositions | Word (lexis) | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------|-----------------|
|                             | Choice of words | Naming/Reference |
|                             | (Fairclough 2003; Blackledge 2005) | Word level |
|                             | Sentences 1 (syntax & transitivity) | Sentence level |

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While the table might suggest each element as clearly categorised, these may naturally overlap during analysis. The concepts of context, intertextuality, interdiscursivity and recontextualisation may be seen to belong to a more ‘general level’ of analysis. These do not feature in the table, as these will be referred to throughout. This invokes the practice of triangulation, which seeks to ensures the validity of findings, as explained in 3.5 below.

In summary, the CDA as set forth in this paper departs from a micro-analytical perspective of examining the linguistic at word-sentence level and moves onto more macro-analytical forms of text-discourse level by looking at the result of such formations as discursive effects and practices; this highlights the ‘realisational relationship’ of the various levels (Eggins 2004:328). These are further linked to broader social theories of ideology, hegemony and governance.

### 3.4 Data

This part presents the English-language newspapers published in the regions of Hong Kong S.A.R, Taiwan and China (3.4.2–3.4.4). The chosen newspapers are available in printed form in the respective regions and are all published on location. It also outlines the process by which such data was collected.

#### 3.4.1 Data Collection

A total of six newspapers were chosen – two per territory – from which articles were selected. The process of choosing which English-language newspapers was in some cases very straightforward, as the choice was limited to only two printed English newspapers, such as in Taiwan. In the case of Hong Kong, the two most renowned English newspapers were chosen. The reason behind choosing ‘by reputation’, as it were, was that statistics regarding highest readership versus highest circulation were inconsistent; the best reliance the author had was via claimed highest readership and/or circulation, without any statistics to back up this claim. For China, the selection was a little more difficult. With the People’s Daily (the PRC government’s main news outlet) offering an English version to the news and China Daily having several editions – of which HK and US edition among others – English language news outlets were not in short supply. While any English-language newspaper in China (or in any other non-English speaking country) necessarily targets an international audience, both China Daily and Global Times are distributed nationwide and do not mainly rely on translations of their Chinese counterparts (Xinhua 2009).
It should also be noted that data was pulled from the newspapers’ websites rather than from a hardcopy of the newspaper. Although a multi-modal analysis also provides valuable insights into the questions posed in this dissertation, it is not a priority in analysis in this dissertation; it is important note that the layout might have differed between the online article and hardcopy article.

So as to set the selection criteria for the articles – date and search terms – three timelines were consulted of how events unfolded. These timelines were found in the British newspaper The Guardian, Hong Kong’s SCMP and on the web platform Timeline. The timelines were ‘cross-checked’ to find a suitable time frame from which to pull the articles. Rather than settle on a specific date, a week’s time frame was settled upon – between the 12 and 19 December 2014. This was the week that immediately followed the so-called ‘end’ of the demonstrations in Hong Kong. While the focus on the beginning or even middle of the event might be deemed ‘more interesting’ so to speak, the main reason for choosing the final time frame was so that the content might show some form of reflection over the preceding months as the demonstrations had been unfolding.

Using the ‘advanced search’ function on each of the newspapers’ websites, specific keywords/search terms were typed into the field. Firstly, “Hong Kong demonstrations/protests” search terms were used; refusal to use either “Occupy Central” or “Umbrella movement” in this initial stage was to be able to see how the events were referred to in the articles. If the first search terms did not yield enough or appropriate articles, only then would “Occupy Central/Umbrella movement” be used as the search terms. Essentially the criteria were simple, the article had to treat the topic of the ‘end’ of the demonstration in Hong Kong. Although articles classified as ‘news’ were preferable (as these are supposedly ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’) ‘editorial/comment’ articles were also pulled and included in the data. As a result, a total of 13 articles were selected for analysis. Once data was gathered and six articles settled upon for thorough analysis, it was found that two of those articles differed slightly in pattern. Four of the six were all published on the same day – 16 Dec 2014 – except for the SCMP, which was published the day before (and updated the 16 Dec) and the Taipei Times, which appeared on the 13 Dec 2014. Such deviations would not be worth mentioning except for the fact that upon noticing that most of the articles chosen shared the same publication date, it seemed odd that the Taipei Times would not have also published an article treating the ‘end’ of the Occupy Central movement that day as well. Upon returning to their website, using amended keywords and date specifications, an article was in fact found published on the 16 Dec 2014. It will be included as a secondary article as it was not originally found the first time round.

3.4.2 HONG KONG S.A.R - THE SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (SCMP), THE STANDARD (TS)

One of the first English-language newspapers to have been established in the colony back in 1903, SCMP has been regarded not only as ‘quality’ press in Hong Kong but also been a symbol of status (Chan 2002). Catering to the small minority of expatriates at the time, its stance has traditionally been representative of “the interests of the British government and the local Establishment” (Chan 2002:101). Given the ‘loss’ of British interests in Hong Kong, it might still be up for debate as to whether SCMP may still be ‘pro-establishment’. Self-proclaimed ‘a world-class media company in Asia’, SCMP is “perfectly placed to offer […] knowledge within th[e] region to bridge the East-West divide” (SCMP Group 2015 – Mission Statement).

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11 The Guardian is a British liberal broadsheet newspaper. Timeline is a news web platform claiming, “When others break the news, we break the history behind it;” the news is presented along with an in-depth historical overview of its context.
Regardless, being one of the main local news outlets published in English, it targets a mainly liberal readership (Flowerdew, Li & Tran 2002). In a study - conducted in the mid 1990s on English-language newspaper stances in Hong Kong - The Standard was found to be more impartial when reporting news stories; long considered SCMP main competitor, it “has always remained a distant second” (Chan 2002:102). On its website, it claims to be the ‘biggest circulation English daily newspaper’ catering to a ‘diverse audience’, not to mention that it is also a free newspaper (The Standard 2015 – About us).

3.4.3 TAIWAN – TAIPEI TIMES (TT), THE CHINA POST (CP)

These are the only two (published) English-language dailies found in Taiwan. The Taipei Times was founded in 1999, as a subsidiary of the Liberty Times group (pro-DPP) – one of three of Taiwan’s highest circulating Chinese news publication (Rawnsley & Rawnsley 2006:7). Presenting itself as a ‘voice long absent in the Taiwanese media’, it seeks to report the news from a Taiwanese perspective (Taipei Times 2015 – About Us). The older China Post, founded in 1952, claims itself to be ‘Taiwan’s leading English-language daily newspaper in readership’ (China Post 2015 – About). It boasts a “strong KMT background” (Lams 2008:155). Distinct styles in the treatment of local news may be telling as to where each of these newspapers’ priorities lie; TT favour local news coverage by presenting it as front page news while CP tends to place international news coverage first over local news (Lams 2008:155-156).

3.4.4 CHINA – CHINA DAILY (CD), GLOBAL TIMES (GT)

One of China’s ‘leading English-language news organisation[s]”, CD is not only a daily national newspaper within its borders but also publishes a further six editions globally ranging from Hong Kong to Latin America (China Daily 2010 – About Us). Frequently seen as a ‘modified English language version’ of the PRC government’s mouthpiece the People’s Daily, it nevertheless considers itself as “an authoritative provider of information, analysis, comment and entertainment for global readers with a special focus on China”; it has been in circulation since 1981 (China Daily 2010; Alvaro 2013:148). The English version of the Global Times, launched in 2009, prides itself on being the “key to understanding China’s changes” stating “[t]he Chinese public is not satisfied with old orthodoxies and stale stories […] providing in-depth coverage of controversial stories” (Global Times 2015 – About Us). The English edition launch did not go unnoticed either. Attracting much attention, it has been compared to the American news outlet Fox News, while the ‘staid’ CD pales in comparison (Branigan 2009; Larson 2011). While Chinese media (both English and Chinese) has generally sought to avoid controversies, GT broke the mould by reporting on the 1989 Tiananmen Square ‘crackdown’ (see Canaves 2009; Larson 2011; Branigan 2014).

Regardless, both of these newspapers may still be considered ‘liberal’ – in comparison to their Chinese counterparts – partly due to the fact they are published in English as well as in the topics they treat (Young 2013).

3.5 REFLEXIVITY

In order to redress some of the criticism taken up - notably that of representativeness, selectivity and validity – this following section deals with my own motivations and accountability with regards to the analysis. This section mainly relates to the notion of ‘validity’, to ensure that analysis is actually undertaken instead of deriving conclusions based on intuitive or educated guesses.
A way of ensuring validity then, is from Wodak’s (2001) discourse-historical approach, which uses the idea of ‘triangulation’. It considers the following four levels (from Wodak 2001:67):

- the immediate, language or text internal co-text
- the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses
- the extralinguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific ‘context of situation’
- the broader sociopolitical and historical contexts, which the discursive practices are embedded in and related to

Therefore, constant back-and-forth between these four levels should lessen the risk of bias (Meyer 2001:29-30).

With the view of making my role as transparent as possible, I will briefly acknowledge my position in relation to the topic of the dissertation so that any conclusion drawn subsequently may be properly justified.

The decision to write on this topic stemmed from the occasional question to me of ‘what do you think?’ as the OCLP demonstrations were gaining momentum and making international coverage towards the end of 2014. The general position I have taken on the event is that of being in line with the Umbrella Movement/OCLP demonstrations – is democratisation not a desirable process for any nation? Nevertheless, I also recognise the complexities that such a process would entail in a place like Hong Kong. While researcher positionality has been mentioned as a vital step in any CDA study – “the political standpoint of the analyst should never be entirely absent, as it may be impossible to analyse political language behaviour unless one exercises one’s political intuitions” (Chilton 2004 in Blackledge 2008:298) – a primary concern became whether or not I would be able to ‘exercise such political intuitions’ if I had never lived in Hong Kong. Moreover, were there any implications in that I was a student studying in a European institution writing on a ‘Chinese’ subject? What kind of biases would I bring into the analysis? Could I claim authenticity or shared-ness with those whom the paper was about? Echoing Ien Ang (2001:24),

My personal biographical trajectory compels me to identify myself neither as fully ‘Asian’ nor as completely ‘Western’ […] I am aware that in speaking about how it is that I don’t speak Chinese, while still for the occasion identifying with being, and presenting myself as, an ‘Overseas Chinese’, I am committing a political act.

This brings us back to the notion of ‘hybridity’ and the possibility of “draw[ing] on a researcher’s personal-cultural and […] diasporic knowledge and experience as critical interpretative resources” (Shi-xu 2004:5-6).

4 Discursive Strategies

4.1 Analysis

This section presents the analysis of the word-sentence level and as such focuses on the micro-analytical aspect. It answers the first of the research questions posed at the beginning of this dissertation:

1. How does the English-language press in HK, Taiwan and China perceive the events surrounding the Occupy Central movement?
   - Which discursive strategies are most salient and how are they used in the representation(s) of social actors/events?
   - What, if any, evaluations are made in the reporting of the event?
A summary of results and discussion from both the primary and secondary articles’ analysis is detailed in section 5.2.

As it stands, the findings presented mainly stem from six newspaper articles – one per newspaper, two newspapers per region. Secondary articles - of which some were editorials - were also analysed at and will be included briefly as well in the findings (see Appendix II for in-depth summaries). On the whole, the articles chosen for analysis may be said to belong to the domain of ‘news’, which purports to be objective and neutral in the reporting of events, unlike editorials or commentary where explicit stance-taking is more common (Martin & White 2005). Deciding to analyse this domain of news is more telling of discursive and rhetorical strategies as journalists write under the veil of objectivity.

Findings are presented thematically to allow for better comparison among the six newspapers. Due to the similarity of the content of the articles, extracts were selected so as to avoid repetition.

4.1.1 NAMING & PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES

The focus here is on referential strategies in the newspapers, which is worth looking at since “the way that people are named in news discourse can have significant impact on the way in which they are viewed” (Richardson 2007:49).

In the China Daily (CD) article, mainly figures of authority dominate and are explicitly named i.e. ‘Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying’, ‘Hong Kong Police Commissioner Andy Tsang Wai-hun’. The opposing side are only referred to as ‘protesters’, ‘others’ and ‘those’ remaining nameless, faceless and invisible (China Daily 2014).

The Taipei Times (TT) in Taiwan stands in stark contrast to CD’s referential strategies as the names of supporters of the movement are exclusively mentioned e.g. ‘teenage student leader Joshua Wong’, ‘Occupy Central campaign group leader Benny Tai’. Anyone linked to the authorities is simply referred to as the ‘government’ or ‘officials’. Synecdoche is employed to refer to the PRC government,

a. The demonstrators are calling for fully free elections for the territory’s leader in 2017, but Beijing has insisted a loyalist committee vet the candidates, which protesters say would ensure the selection of a pro-China stooge. (Taipei Times 13 Dec 2014)

By backgrounding the authorities and key figures opposing the Occupy movement, this strategy allows a focus on the demonstrators and their cause. Use of the term ‘pro-China stooge’ is also telling as it reads in a mocking tone. ‘Stooge’ is defined as a “subordinate used by another to do unpleasant routine work” (Oxford Dictionaries 2015), relegating the position of chief executive of the HKSAR as secondary to that of the PRC loyalists/government. In a certain way, it could also be meant as a reinforcement of Beijing’s power of the HKSAR, however the ironic tone suggests otherwise. While this may be an obvious snide remark at the PRC government, ‘stooge’ is in fact a euphemism for ‘puppet’ which had it been employed would have conveyed a more telling image and thus less subtle.

The Mainland Chinese Global Times’ (GT) representation of important figures on both sides of the conflict is rather balanced, in the sense that one never appears without the other. Compared to its PRC counterpart China Daily, GT actively engages with the heteroglossic backdrop of the text by giving ‘space’ to social actors, which are explicitly named and affiliated with their respective ‘camps’. Use of synecdoche was also found in the GT article, albeit to different effect,

b. Zhang Dinhuaui, deputy director of Shenzhen University’s Center for Basic Laws of Hong Kong and Macao told the Global Times that the main victim of the whole Occupy movement is Hong Kong itself because the local economy was severely impacted. (Global Times 16 Dec 2014)
This strategy employed by GT is used to “conjure away responsible affected or involved actors to keep them in the background”, here the ‘main victim’ is left implicit to interpret either as the people of Hong Kong or the HKSAR government (Blackledge 2005:23). Fairclough (2003:201) mentions that naming may be generic and/or specific. In the GT article, protesters tend to be collectivised e.g. ‘a dozen protesters’ or ‘a small group of protesters’ while ‘police’ are seen as a more unified entity (Global Times 2014). The difference lies in the use of articles where ‘police’ frequently appears as a noun without an article – depicting law enforcement as a monolithic entity – while use of an indefinite article, when mentioning Occupy demonstrators sees them as one of many.

As remarked earlier, TT generically identifies authorities and specifically names key figures in the Umbrella movement. Generality is thus used in a different manner, enabling the article to read as a ‘David and Goliath’ narrative – individuals fighting against an imposing/powerful force. The only named person who is expressed as aligning against the movement was a “46 year old civil servant, who gave his name as George” but this is set in direct opposition to a supporter of the movement – ’34 year old Kim Lo’ (Taipei Times 2014).

The Standard (TS) in HK directly quotes sources from key figures on both sides of the movement who were identified through their political standing or group membership e.g. ‘Chief Executive Leung Chun-yin’, ‘Federation of Students core member Ian Chan Kok-hin’ (Standard 2014). Synonyms other than ‘protesters’ were used in designating social actors e.g. ‘activists’, ‘demonstrators’, usually occurring as a single noun with no qualifying adjective. One exception is noticeable, which also appeared in the SCMP article:

c. Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying yesterday declared an end to 79 days of democracy protests after police cleared the last remaining occupy Central camp and arrested a handful of peaceful protesters. (Standard 16 Dec 2014)

d. Hong Kong’s leader declared an end to 78 days of mass protests by pro-democracy demonstrators after police today cleared the last major camp and arrested 17 peaceful protesters. (SCMP 16 Dec 2014)

The idea that a protester might be arrested for their actions is not uncommon for most readers; nevertheless, the fact that the protesters are, in both cases, qualified as ‘peaceful’ does beg the question as to whether the arrests were truly necessary. Noticeable is also the description of the word ‘camp’ - SCMP chose ‘major camp’ unlike ‘remaining […] camp’ in TS – and the difference in quantifying how many were arrested. While both HK newspapers treat the significance of the camp as a given – indicated by the definite article ‘the’ (Richardson 2007:63) – in choosing an intensified term such as a ‘major’, the SCMP reinforces the importance of the ‘end’ of the Occupy Central movement, treating the clearance as a milestone in the unfolding of the events.

Turning to the differences in quantification, while ‘17’ seems a bit higher than a ‘handful’, in the context of the paragraph in which it appears, it is offset by the appearance of ‘78 days’ - in this sense, ‘17’ does not seem like much at all. Use of ‘handful’ by TS is also intentional, however, in that it is vague about how many were arrested, making the reader focus on ‘peaceful’ instead. It forces the reader to further question actions by the police – which had been a continuous source of contention throughout the events of the Occupy Central movement. The double meaning of the word ‘handful’ is also speculated upon, while the word (in this case) may refer to an amount of something, it may also be defined as “a person or group that is very difficult to deal with or control” e.g. they were a handful (Oxford Dictionaries 2015). Although unlikely that TS meant for ‘handful’ to be an indirect reflection of the protesters

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12 Use of tear gas prompted debates about the level of force that was used by the Hong Kong police during the events of Occupy Central (Branigan & Kaiman 2014). This was possibly when the umbrella incidentally became the icon of the movement as well, although two other articles from The Atlantic (Yeung 2014) and Quartz (Guilford 2014) might suggest otherwise.
behaviour, it still deserves a small mention, as the authors’ propensity to ‘play’ with words is also noticeable through the headline “Occupied no more”. Not only have they conjugated the name of the movement ‘Occupy Central’ into a past participle but also recontextualised it in an idiomatic expression ‘— no more’. So while the decision to use ‘handful’ might appear innocent enough, it is also just as plausible that this could have also been a reproach as to the demonstrators’ behaviour, especially that there are other ways of expressing a small amount.

The Taiwanese China Post’s (CP) use ‘high-credibility’ sources from both sides of the reported conflict, and are all identified by job title and name e.g. ‘chief executive Leung Chun-ying’, ‘Pro-democracy lawmaker Fernando Cheung’ (China Post 2014). Following TS predicational strategies – linguistic assertions qualifying people, things, events etc. (Riesigl & Wodak 2001 in Blackledge 2005:22) - various synonyms are used in referring to protesters e.g. ‘pro-democracy demonstrators’, ‘activist’, ‘campaigners’. Similar to the TT article, terms such as ‘pro-democracy’ are significant in its predication, which have so far not appeared in any of the HK nor PRC newspapers.

Representing the chief executive as a ‘wolf’ and ‘vampire’ deserves a small mention. An incident had broken out involving a cuddly toy wolf from Ikea named Lufoisg. HKSAR’s chief executive had already been nicknamed “the wolf” as he was seen as kowtowing to the central government and so seen as deceiving the people of Hong Kong, not to mention that his name in Cantonese is nearly a homophone for the Cantonese word for ‘wolf’ as well (BBC 2013). As such, Lufoisg became an “anti-government symbol” and “unlikely symbol for political dissent” (Vine 2013; Qi 2013); unfortunate was also the Lufoisg’s name translation into Chinese, which when slightly altered could also sound like a profanity. 13 Further adding fuel to the fire, CY Leung, in a Chinese New Year message, “hoped that all people in Hong Kong [would] take inspiration from the sheep’s character and pull together in an accommodating manner to work for Hong Kong’s future” thus conjuring up the image of the ‘wolf leading the sheep astray’ and possibly implying that the people should ‘blindly follow’ their leader (Lee & Yu 2015). Although one could speculate as to what the chief executive meant by such a statement, as CY Leung is frequently seen as pandering to the central authorities, such a message was taken by the general public as attempting to abate negative opinions about the Mainland Chinese influence in HK.

e. Leung is vilified by protesters who cast him variously as a wolf and a vampire and have repeatedly asked for him to step down (China Post 16 Dec 2014)

A passive construction is used in the above sentence, highlighting the object of the sentence as important information, in this case the chief executive. The verb ‘to cast’ may have been used ironically as well, in that the toy was hurled towards him during a town hall meeting (Huffington Post 2014).

Like the GT, South China Morning Post’s (SCMP) representation of key figures on both sides of the movement are more or less ‘balanced’, where an authoritative figure is referred to it is always in contrast to a non-authoritative figure. However, in some cases social actors are explicitly named; for authoritative figures predicational strategies usually identify them by introduction of their title i.e. ‘Legislative Council President Jasper Tsang’, ‘Lawmaker Chan Ka-lok’ (SCMP 2014). On the other hand, those deemed as supporters of the Occupy movement – some of which were named – were more likely to be identified via categories such as age or appearance i.e. ‘a man in his 90s known as ‘Grandpa Wong’’, ‘a sit-in protester clad in a yellow jacket’ (SCMP 2014). While this seems like an innocent enough way of identification of social actors, there is a noticeable pattern in that those who are seen to oppose the Occupy movement are more likely to be identified through their job – depicting them as standing members of the

13 ‘Wolf’ and ‘vampire’ are but a few depictions of HKSAR’s chief executive (Huffington Post 2014)
community – unlike those who support the movement who all seem to belong to a certain demographic. Identifying social actors exclusively via age or appearance in comparison to job titles allows SCMP to divide participants as either supporters or non-supporters of the demonstration. This is most noticeable in some reported quotes by those ‘affected’,

f. Kevin Yeung, 50, who works in a bank nearby said he was glad to see the protesters go
   Barry Ho, managing director of a dispensary on Yee Wo Street who has seen revenues drop by 30 per cent, was relieved by today’s clearance
   (SCMP 16 Dec 2014)

One of the more interesting sources is one who expresses both relief as the clearance is announced but also support for with the movement,

g. Tang Wai, in his 60s who lives a few streets away, came down to watch the police operation. He said though it had inconvenienced commuters – including his grandson, who had to take a taxi to school each day – he agreed with the cause.
   (SCMP 16 Dec 2014)

Although the above source expresses both sides of the issue, he is represented as ‘agreeing with the cause’ and so identified as ‘in his 60s’ suggesting that SCMP sees him firmly as a supporter of the movement. While referencing to external sources is commonplace in news reporting, the significance of how sources are identified presents a more telling picture. Concerned with the ‘relationship of alignment/disalignment vis-à-vis the various value positions referenced by the text’, the appraisal framework problematizes the notion of solidarity between reader and writer (Martin & White 2005:116). In this particular context, the predicational strategies identified show that those who support the clearance of the Occupy Central tents tend to be presented as ‘high’ standing members of society – voicing just reasons for doing so – while those who support the cause are treated as ‘low credibility’ sources, “sources who have low social status or who are shown to be in the minority” (Martin & White 2005:116). Such a pattern not only points to SCMP’s alignment as siding with the authorities but also that the authors of the article are “aligning the addressee into a community of shared value and belief” (Martin & White 2005:95).

4.1.2 TRANSITIVITY

Transitivity is concerned with “the relationship between participants and the roles they play in the processes described in reporting” (Richardson 2007:54). Analysis undertaken concentrates on grammatical relations between lexical items i.e. agency, subject/object, activated/passivated, impersonal/personal etc… (Fairclough 2003:145-146).

Both TT and TS, in Taiwan and Hong Kong respectively, newspapers’ instances of transitivity were quite straightforward. All social actors in TS are personalised and activated, that is agency is clearly assigned. All social actors in TT are personalised and activated, that is agency is clearly assigned. In the TT article, social actors were mostly in positions as agents, which gives the reader the impression that they are possibly seen on equal terms.

a. A few demonstrators staged a sit in…
   The last activists left the area…
   …police cleared […] and arrested a handful of protesters
   (Standard 16 Dec 2014)

b. …activists vowed that their struggle would continue.
   …police cleared the territory’s main pro-democracy protest camp
   (Taipei Times 13 Dec 2014)

Verbs used to describe demonstrators’ actions in TS and TT sees them as ‘reacting’ to certain actions i.e. protesters are described as ‘calling for’, ‘packing up’, ‘leaving’ an area due to the police clearance rather than initiating an action (Standard 2014; Taipei Times 2014). Processes carried out by authorities tended towards being material while processes carried out by demonstrators were mental or verbal (Fairclough 2003:141). Should there be any significance
to it, it would be to highlight the authoritative figures’ “capacity for agentive action, for making things happen, controlling others”, while the demonstrators’ mainly verbal/mental processes are contrasted as being more passive (Fairclough 2003:150).

Representations in the SCMP in HK followed a more noticeable pattern in that any figure such as the police or relating to such authority are never the explicit agent when protesters are being arrested – either by omission or by separating subject and verb.

c. A total of 955 people had been arrested as of today for offences relating to the Occupy protests. [OMISSION]
   …police cleared the last major camp and arrested 17 peaceful protesters [SEPARATION] (SCMP 16 Dec 2014)

Actions as described with ‘police’ involved, either explicitly or implicitly, are usually mitigated in the sense that their actions were depicted as appropriate and attenuating the severity of the situation,

d. Police also took away 17 protesters who held an impromptu sit-in…
   Seven Occupy supporters […] were led away with the rest to a police vehicle.
   Police issued another warning for them to leave.
   Police warned remaining sit-in participants to leave.
   (SCMP 16 Dec 2014)

Such mitigating strategies perhaps formed part of the larger discussion on police force used during the event of Occupy Central. The police are also personalised via descriptions of how they helped wounded protesters as well as were the object of violence e.g. “Some 130 police officers were injured during the protests and 221 protesters received medical treatment through arrangements made by the police” (SCMP 2014). Further examples demonstrating police ‘helpfulness’ are also reported,

e. Tsang said they could seek help from the police if protesters “resist vigorously and threaten the safety of the staff members.”
   Police spokesman Kong Man-keung […] warned that anyone who resisted, provoked the police or used violence would be met with “minimal, proportional force” and may be arrested.
   (SCMP 16 Dec 2014)

An assumption is made that if an eruption of violence should occur, it would be the demonstrators initiating this; this is captured by the vague term ‘anyone’. Adjectives ‘minimal’ and ‘proportional’ are used to lessen the emphasis of ‘force’ which, if written by itself would have focused on the impact it implies. Police are portrayed as ‘just there to help’, though this may only be the case should protesters “threaten the safety of staff members” (SCMP 2014). So, constraint on behalf of the police is not only mandated, it is reported on by the media and noticed by members of the public; indirectly referencing an Occupy Central supporter, “a masked man clad in a black jacket” SCMP (2014) report that,

f. He refused to give his name, but said he came to Causeway Bay to document the police operation, which he described as very restrained. (SCMP 16 Dec 2014)

While demonstrators are given space and voice in the SCMP article – yet always in contrast to the authorities’ voice – they are consistently depicted as being a thorn in the authorities’ side,

g. Au Yeung Tung, who is also a member of the pro-democratic party ADLP, arrived and started shuffling in slow-motion to illustrate the “pace of democracy in Hong Kong over the years.”
   60-year old retired teacher Fung Tak-wah, who refused to leave…
   Others refused to give up the cause…
   Grandpa Wong […] refused offers of a wheelchair, preferring to walk with a cane as he was hauled away.
   (SCMP 16 Dec 2014)

In the CP in Taiwan, both students and demonstrators are found in subject and object positions, that is affecting processes and affected by processes. Authorities on the other hand tend to only be activated i.e. depicted as ‘doing the action’. Motivations for such
activation/passivation may possibly be to represent one side as stronger and the other weaker. A look at the co-text suggests that exclusive activation of authorities serve to highlight injustice upon protesters – this refers to the debate on police brutality during the demonstration,

h. Police chief Andy Tsang defended the behaviour of his officers – which has been criticised for being heavy-handed. He described police action as “appropriate” and the ending of occupy as “comparatively peaceful”. Nevertheless, the force had received almost 2000 complaints from members of the public over its behaviour, he said. Most of those were related to “neglect of duty” and “unnecessary use of authority”. (China Post 16 Dec 2014)

Criticisms have clearly been directed at the police – in line with debates on police force, mentioned earlier. The choice not to reproduce the police chief’s words in its entirety may also be indicative of the author as disapproving of and disagreeing with the police forces’ actions and therefore distancing him/herself from the proposition referenced by the external source. This fits into the passivation of the demonstrators/students, as they are represented as being the object of ‘brutal’ force. On the other hand, such a representation of the demonstrators also sees them as being resistant and even defiant towards authorities, “with some shouting ‘We will be back’ and ‘Fight to the end’” (China Post 2014).

The GT’s first half of the article seems to be dominated by authorities in subject positions – doing all the action – with a “dozen protesters” and “large number of people” being involved, arrested and cleared (Global Times 2014). On the other hand, the second half of the article sees key figures of the movement as dominating and as subjects of their actions. Although this may give the illusion of balance, the association and clarity of who is doing what is quickly cast in a bad light in the rest of the article with the introduction of a survey poll (further explored in 4.1.4).

In a similar vein to HK’s SCMP (2014), CD’s representations see authoritative figures as the main actor (subject), with protesters, demonstrators frequently in the object position either as needing help or being ‘cleared away’,

i. "…authorities cleared the last two illegal occupation protest sites. Police have made 955 arrests in relation to the occupation movement […] A total of 130 police officers have been injured and 221 protesters admitted to hospitals with police help. (China Daily 16 Dec 2014)

Police have also been humanised in this piece, depicting them as helping those injured.

4.1.3 ENGAGEMENT & GRADUATION

This part concerns modality – “judgements, comment and attitude in text and talk, and specifically the degree to which a speaker or writer is committed to the claim he or she is making” (Richardson 2007:59). It examines the extent to which writer(s) engage with a piece of discourse and intended audience, qualifying the writer-reader relationship (Martin & White 2005).

Engagement in the SCMP article in HK suggests that the authors tend towards a high degree of commitment to the propositions advanced.

a. ‘Occupy is over’: Hong Kong chief executive announces end to protests as Causeway Bay is cleared. [HEADLINE/ATTRIBUTION]
b. Hong Kong’s leader declared an end to 78 days of mass protests by… [LEAD PARAGRAPH/ENDORSEMENT]
c. “With the completion of the clearance work in the occupation site in Causeway Bay, the illegal occupation action that has lasted for more than two months in Hongkong is over,” Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying said, adding that they had caused a “serious loss” to the local economy and damaged the rule of law. [ENDORSEMENT/PROOUNOUCEMENT]
d. “Now I think we should reflect on an important issue. That is, what is the kind of democracy that Hong Kong should pursue? I think it should be ‘democracy with the rule of law’ that Hong Kong, as well as other advanced democracies, are pursuing,” said Leung, speaking to reporters after a ceremony of a local foundation. [ENDORSEMENT/PRONOUNCEMENT]

e. “If we only talk about democracy, but not rule of law. It is not true democracy. It is only anarchy,” he added. [ENDORSEMENT/PRONOUNCEMENT]

(SCMP 16 Dec 2014)

A simple attribution as to who said what constitutes the headline of the SCMP article (example a), however it is in the beginning of the lead paragraph and the three subsequent quotes that the endorsement is really made by the authorial voice (example b, c, d, e). Endorsements are distinct from attribution in that the authorial voice “takes over responsibility for the proposition, or at least shares the responsibility for it with the cited source” (Martin & White 2005:127). This is further reinforced by the fact that when authors do announce their stance explicitly, by “typically bringing in the external source to lend support to their argument”, the attributional element becomes void when the text is then taken as a ‘rhetorical whole’ (Martin & White 2005:116). These endorsing quotes eventually contribute to an emergent image whereby the protesters are depicted as troublemakers and authorities as dutiful. The introduction of external sources lends weight to this argument. Some “formulations which involve authorial emphases or explicit authorial interventions” or pronouncements (examples c, d, e) displays strategies of ‘double voicing’ which have the effect of maintaining and/or blurring boundaries between the various voices within the text i.e. author, social actors, newspaper (Blackledge 2005:76, 79; Martin & White 2005:127). Having established that external sources lend support to arguments framed by the article, quotes should thus be seen as an extension of the authorial voice. The chief executive’s ‘I think’ and rhetorical question simultaneously entertain as well as concur in that he is seen as expressing an idea that is widely held, by immediately providing an answer to his own question (example d). Taken as a whole the quote expresses a proclamation “where dialogic alternatives are confronted, challenged, overwhelmed or otherwise excluded” (Martin & White 2005:117), which in this case is the significance of ‘democracy’. The ‘double-voice’ aspect comes in as both authorial and external source’s voices merge as well as being “directed both toward the referential object of speech [readers], and toward another’s discourse, toward someone else’s speech [demonstrators]” (Bakhtin 1994:105 in Blackledge 2005:17). The effect of this contributes to an intensification of voice by the authors in line with the government.

Engagement and evaluation strategies were harder to pinpoint in the other HK newspaper, the Standard. Clearance of demonstrators’ tents forms the focus of the TS article as seemingly ‘normal’ descriptions of police and demonstrators are given.

f. A few demonstrators staged a sit-in as police cut away barricades and tore down banners and shelters in Causeway Bay.

g. Another police clearance outside the Legislative Council began shortly after 2pm when security staff issued a warning for activists to leave.
   Almost immediately, about 30 to 40 activists began packing up tents and other equipment, moving them to nearby Tim Mei Avenue.

h. The last activist left the area outside Legco at around 3:50pm, with cleaners moving in to clear the rubbish and debris.
   In Causeway Bay, police began the clearance of the Yee Wo Street site at 10.25am.

(Standard 2014)

Normative descriptions of this type sees authorial voice as having no investment in the situation i.e. “where there is no overt indication […] as to where the authorial voice stands with respect to the proposition” (Martin & White 2005:112). Upon first reading, TS seems to give a ‘balanced’ view of the events, as no overt judgements or value-laden vocabulary is used. A closer look at how authorial voice engages with other textual elements i.e. external sources reveals the authorial stance. Two sources are directly quoted,
i. He added: “Other than economic losses, I believe the greatest loss Hong Kong society has suffered is the damage to the rule of law by a small group of people” [chief executive CY Leung]

j. “Leung Chun-ying still needs to face the Legislative Council, face the public and face political reform... people should not be afraid of the government, the government should be afraid of the people,” he said [Civic Party lawmaker Kenneth Chan Ka-lok]

(Standard 16 Dec 2014)

Full reproduction of quotes, in this case, could be taken as endorsements. Prefaced by ‘he added’ (example i) not only grounds the quote in an individual subjectivity but also indicates distancing on behalf of authorial voice. On the other hand, because the attribution of source to quote is made at the end of the sentence (example j), not only does it ensure smooth transition from one paragraph to the next but also strongly suggests that the quote be seen as an extension of authorial voice and thus an endorsement. So, even though both examples are seen as acknowledging two points of view, in example j the subjectivity is that of the authors’ rather than that of the external source (Martin & White 2005). Indirect quotes were also present, enabling authorial voice to interpolate where needed as in the following examples:

k. Legco president Jasper Tsang Yok-sing said earlier security personnel should request the assistance of police, but it turned out to be unnecessary.

l. Lawmaker Fernando Cheung Chiu-Hung […] said he was only there to support the activists and to monitor if police used excessive force.

m. Civic Party lawmaker Kenneth Chan Ka-lok, who was among those arrested, said the government had failed to respond to the activists.

(Standard 16 Dec 2014)

Pronouncements on behalf of authorial voice also allows for appraisal of certain actors and/or situations to be explicit. Not only does authorial voice directly challenge what the Legco president has said, it also counters it – indicated by ‘but’ – and dismisses Tsang’s comments/actions as futile (example k). Specifically interfering to add ‘who was among those arrested’, authors bring to the attention of the readers that it was not only demonstrators i.e. students who were arrested but also political figures - perhaps a reflection on how indiscriminate the police were in their clearance (example m). This is further alluded to by Fernando Cheung’s comment stating that he was there to ‘monitor’ the police (example l). Indirectly quoted sources, in some cases, allow authorial voice to converge with that of the external sources i.e. double-voicing where two voices speak as one. Overall TS’ sympathies tend towards supporting the Occupy Central demonstrations as external voices introduced were critical of the HK government’s handling of the events. Nevertheless, as engagement was hard to discern in the article, this also suggests that a certain distance is maintained by the authorial voice.

By comparison, engagement was clearer in the TT article as both expansive and contractive propositions were found. Voice was given to a range of social actors who supported the Umbrella movement, except for two – George (TT 2014, para. 14) – a supporter of the clearance and Willy Lam – a political analyst from the University of Hong Kong, whose views seem neither to condone nor condemn the actions of the Umbrella movement,

n. “They need to pull together to create a viable coalition of stakeholders […] They need to act together to lobby and negotiate with the [Hong Kong] administration and Beijing. That would also give the Hong Kong people the impression that they speak with one voice and are much more organized.” (Willy Lam, Taipei Times 13 Dec 2014)

Entertaining propositions – which make space for dialogic alternatives (Martin & White 2005:104) - were expressed through use of modal auxiliaries and the ‘if’ conjunction,

o. …their struggle would continue.

…which protesters say would ensure...

“If we win the support of…”

“If the problem of political reform…”
This choice of modality signals the author’s willingness to “make allowances for, and hence to make space for, alternative voice” (Martin & White 2005:108), which in this article would be that of the HKSAR government and Beijing. It construes the heteroglossic backdrop of the text by giving space to all the voices.

Deny and concede/counter pairings were found, suggesting a complex writer-reader relationship,

p. …police cleared the territory’s main pro-democracy protest camp with mass arrests, but [COUNTER] activists vowed that their struggle would continue.

The demonstrators are calling for fully free elections for the territory’s leader in 2017, but [COUNTER] Beijing has insisted a loyalist committee vet the candidates…

Demonstrators say their lengthy occupation has put the democracy movement on the map with Beijing and the local administration [CONCEDE] […] However [COUNTER], it has achieved no political concessions from either Hong Kong’s leaders or Beijing, who both branded the protests “illegal”.

“If we fight a long war we definitely do not [DENY] have the… resources the government has” “If the problem of political reform is not [DENY] handled appropriately, I believe [that in] the next phase there will be new resistance actions” (Taipei Times 13 Dec 2014)

The interplay between denying, conceding and countering makes it difficult to assess exactly the degree to which the author is committing to what is being written. The denial is voiced by external sources, which may be taken as a separation between authorial voice and external source, thus implying that the denial is directed away from the reader (Martin & White 2005:119). On the other hand, because the denials are voiced by an external source, this may also be taken as an endorsement on behalf of authorial voice and so act as an extension of it, suggesting that the denial may be directed at the reader him/herself (Martin & White 2005:119-120). Furthermore, concede/counter pairings also point to different possible authorial alignments; by expressing views belonging on both sides of the issue (example p), TT seems to be anticipate different readers’ reactions. This may be telling of the readership the TT caters to i.e. that solidarity is never fully ensured at every turn thus the need to concede and counter every possibility. Dialogic variety in this piece may be taken as an attempt to critically analyse the situation, by providing alternative viewpoints i.e. both sides are given ‘space’.

The Taiwanese CP similarly engages in a seemingly dialogically expansive manner as attributional propositions are advanced throughout via multiple uses of reporting verbs. The first half of the article is dedicated mainly to the voice of ‘high-credibility’ sources. Despite CY Leung’s voice as dominating the first half of piece, this is punctured by the authorial voice inserting itself after each quote to counter or attempt to lessen what has just been said.

q. “Following the completion of clearance work in Causeway Bay, Occupy area, the episode of illegal occupation activities for more than two months is over”, chief executive Leung Chun-ying told reporters Monday.

He said that the demonstrators had led to “serious losses” in sectors including tourism and retail. [AUTHORIAL VOICE]

“Other than economic losses, I believe the greatest loss Hong Kong society has suffered is the damage to the rule of law by a small group of people”, he added.

Leung is vilified by protesters who cast him variously as a wolf and vampire and have repeatedly asked for him to step down. [AUTHORIAL VOICE]

(China Post 16 Dec 2014)

Continuing the chief executive’s quote, the author switches to indirect quotation, highlighting “serious losses” as the only salient piece of information to be taken from the original quote. Why the explicit switch? Incidentally this same example appears in exactly the same fashion in the beginning of the SCMP (2014) article; the difference though is that while there was also a switch from direct to indirect quote, the subsequent direct quotations in the SCMP contribute
to the main argument of the article that Occupy Central had been extremely damaging and a nuisance to Hong Kong society. The quotation, in the CP, used for “serious losses” not only indicates that it is a recontextualisation but also that it perhaps should not be taken entirely seriously either. The CP authorial voice interrupts in order to elaborate or provide context, such is the case in the second example above. Combined with mention of ‘stooge’, predicating the chief executive of HKSAR as a ‘wolf’ and ‘vampire’ contributes to the questionability of his role as chief executive. Yet as follows in the article, it is also noted “[b]ut Beijing has backed his administration throughout the occupation” (China Post 2014). The ‘but’ is an indication of something unexpected, that despite the alleged deviousness of the HKSAR leader, his administration has received the support of China’s central government. The fact that authorial voice seems to interrupt every so often after a direct quote may be interpreted as instances of pronouncement – “authorial interpolations and emphases […] directed against some assumed or directly referenced counter position” – and a form of distancing as each interruption is also taken to be challenging and confronting what has just been said (Martin & White 2005:128); authorial voice thus is seen as disaligning with the official authoritative position in the article.

The second half of the article is introduced by a sub-heading – ‘Comparatively peaceful’ Ending – which shifts the focus onto pro-democracy voices as well as descriptions of the clearance. Representation of the Occupy Central figures as resistant and defiant continue as lawmaker Fernando Cheung is quoted,

r. “In the Legislative Council, we will do our best to resist through an uncooperative campaign” by, for example, voting down budget requests and the government’s electoral reform package, Cheung said. “There will be more action,” he said.

s. More than 900 people were arrested during the occupation with more than 200 protesters and 100 police officers hurt, he added.

(China Post 16 Dec 2014).

Fernando Cheung’s participation is also noteworthy in that in this article he is depicted as directly and actively engaging with the Occupy Central movement but in the HK newspaper the Standard he is represented as having a more passive role “support[ing] the activists and monitor[ing] if police used excessive force” (see 4.1.3, l). His quote is reinforced by the two quotes by the demonstrators at the beginning of the CP article – “We will be back” and “Fight to the end” - and as such may be seen as a sort of endorsement on behalf of the authorial voice. Co-textual analysis also suggests that external sources in this second half serve as support to align with the Occupy Central movement. The more telling discursive strategy in this section is that of graduation via quantification of people arrested and injured (example s). Repetition of ‘more than’ each preceding those affected but not before the noun ‘police’ may be an indication of responsibility – even though police officers had also been injured. This particular example also sees a switch from direct to indirect referencing of an external source, which leads to the possibility that authorial voice switched to be able to negatively appraise behaviour of the police in the handling of events.

t. Students who spearheaded the street protests were among the sit-in group in Causeway Bay Monday.

(China Post 16 Dec 2014)

Use of the verb ‘spearheaded’ depicts students as taking the offensive, in an almost attacking manner. The paragraph preceding mentions Mong Kok, “scene of some of the most violent clashes since the campaign began”; with the imagery of a spear following this, this could also be a form of blame being assigned to the students (China Post 2014).

Engagement in the Mainland Chinese CD article, in contrast, strongly suggests the journalists as committing to the propositions the article has advanced, that the ‘respect of law’ shall be adhered to. It is common for ‘hard news’ reports to simply acknowledge indirectly/directly quoted sources, which is what the CD has done. Martin & White (2005:113) attribute this as a dialogically expansive move, which in most cases it would be, however the
co-text suggests that authorial voice is interacting with other specific voices to counter and challenge them rather than to persuade them. This is demonstrated through the only directly quoted source, which is used as support/justification for the main argument announced in the headline “HK chief calls for respect of law”,

u. Leung also told reporters that Monday’s operations mark an end to the illegal occupation movement. He called for full respect of the law from those who pursue democracy in Hong Kong.
“"If we talk about democracy without addressing the rule of law, it wouldn’t be a real democracy, but merely anarchy,” Leung said. (China Daily 16 Dec 2014)

Endorsement of source’s utterances occurs repeatedly throughout the article e.g. ‘He reiterated’, ‘CY Leung called on’, ‘He called for’. Not only are these propositions grounded within “an individual subjectivity [but] primarily with the subjectivity of the authorial voice [as] the proposition [is construed] as maximally warrantable” (Martin & White 2005:127). Attributing verbs used also speak to how something was said by the external source. A small comparison is made between the attributive styles of SCMP and TS which saw the chief executive as ‘announcing’ and ‘declaring’ while CD have somewhat softened how something was expressed. CD sees the chief executive as ‘appealing’ for the respect of law, as such this may be seen as normalising the chief executive’s actions – it is better for politicians to be seen as ‘implying’ the public rather than ordering the public. Furthermore, no voice is given to the other side; while protesters are mentioned which may point to the heteroglossic backdrop that the text is set against and may also be taken as the authorial voice engaging with alternative voices, it is only doing so contractively i.e. to confront and fend off thus restricting ‘their’ space.

Graduation was also worth looking at in this piece, specifically the notion of focus – whereby categories, which are not usually ‘scalable’, become scalable and which have the effect of emphasis (Martin & White 2005:137).

v. Hong Kong’s Chief executive […] called on Monday for full respect for the rule of law…
“"If we talk about democracy without addressing the rule of law, it wouldn’t be a real democracy…”
…to ensure that democracy in Hong Kong has a sound legal basis.
(China Daily 16 Dec 2014)

While instances of sharpening focus “often strongly flag a positive attitudinal assessment”, in the CD article when taken with the rest of the co-textual influences, this suggests otherwise (Martin & White 2005:139). Lexical items used in conjunction with such sharpening tend to be overtly negative words e.g. ‘divisive’, ‘clashes’, ‘anarchy’, ‘bloodshed’ thus leading to the conclusion that sharpening is used for negative effect rather than positive. It also indicates a “maximal investment by the authorial voice in the value position being advanced and hence to strongly align the reader into the value position advanced” (Martin & White 2005:139).

In contrast, the degree to which GT journalists commit to the propositions advanced are somewhat lessened as mainly attributive propositions are made through extensive use of indirectly reported speech. There were two direct quotes in the entire article, both of which were used as support for specific arguments. The chief executive’s quote supports the argument that the protests were illegal while Zhang Dinghua’s quote - an outside voice supposedly impartial to either the cause of the Umbrella movement or the HKSAR authorities – supports the argument that financial losses were indeed the greatest consequences suffered.

Instances of attributing in the form of acknowledgements with verbs such as ‘said’, ‘told’ and ‘declared’ gives the impression that the author has no investment in the propositions mentioned. When it is explicit that the external source attributed i.e. by announcing the source of the quote first, only then may the ‘no investment’ façade work; however, should the attribution feature at the end, this may instead be taken as instances of double-voicing.

w. Hongkongers should consider what kind of democracy the city should pursue, he added.
Hong Kong and the central governments need to work harder in explaining policies to people who still have doubts over political reform, Tang said.

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It seems then, that the author, in the last possible minute, attributes what has just been written to an external source, making such propositions rather deceptive. Internal authorial voice and external voice merge “los[ing] their distinctiveness” thus creating the impression of ‘one voice’ (Blackledge 2005:17).

All sources referenced – directly and indirectly - have ‘high credibility’ in that they occupy important publicly recognised posts – these are mostly key figures on both sides of the Occupy Central movement. The two experts referenced at the end of the article are academics at Mainland Chinese universities and represented as experts on HKSAR i.e. Zhang Dinghuai, deputy director of Shenzhen University’s Centre for Basic Laws of Hong Kong and Macau and Tang Dahua of the Peking University’s Hong Kong and Macao Studies Centre (Global Times 16 Dec 2014). The most striking thing is that there seems to be a whole department devoted to ‘Hong Kong and Macao’ studies as well as a centre handling (teaching?) the Basic Laws of HKSAR and Macao in the Mainland (GT 2014, para. 17, 19); while law might be the most obvious subject taught in these departments, it still begs the question what precisely such studies might entail? Furthermore, just by looking at the content of what they are reported to have said, it seems odd that a pair of (presumed?) law academics should comment on the economic state of HKSAR, with one assuming that it is simply a case of misunderstanding and hence the reason for the conflict,

x. “A number of countries, such as Australia, had previously issued travel alerts for Hong Kong. This shows that the international competitiveness of Hong Kong was severely affected,” he [Zhang Dinghuai] said. Hong Kong and the central governments need to work harder in explaining policies to people who still have doubts over political reform, Tang said. (Global Times 16 Dec 2014)

It is interesting to note that no HKSAR academics are consulted on the situation, this is similar to the poll that appears half way through the article, thus in a way exerting their authority on the matter i.e. Mainland officials have the ‘right’ to comment on HK as it is part of the PRC. Some counter strategies are used, depicting the protesters as quite resistant (and persistent), although this is not done in a good light as the text further illustrates by use of a public poll.

y. Despite [COUNTER] all protest sites having been dismantled, protesters said they will not give up their demands for open nominations…

Legislator Tang Ka-piu told Global Times that he would not be surprised if there were some small-scale civil disobedience movements […] However, [COUNTER] he does not think actions will be effective or long-lived…

It is interesting to note that no HKSAR academics are consulted on the situation, this is similar to the poll that appears half way through the article, thus in a way exerting their authority on the matter i.e. Mainland officials have the ‘right’ to comment on HK as it is part of the PRC. Some counter strategies are used, depicting the protesters as quite resistant (and persistent), although this is not done in a good light as the text further illustrates by use of a public poll.

Counters tend to “project onto the addressee particular beliefs or expectations” such as the two examples above, which is usually taken as an ‘aligning value’ i.e. that both writer and reader are on the same page, so to speak (Martin & White 2005:121). The first example expects the reader to consider the movement over as all protest sites are cleared, yet the counter move draws the reader back in by confirming the opposite of what is expected. Simultaneously, though, the second example works in the same way but to confirm the opposite i.e. that the movement will eventually fizzle out. Discursively both of these examples constitute a ‘concede + counter pairing’ whereby the author assumes its audience as in some way resistant to what is about to be written. In this case, the writer does not see its reader as willing to agree that movement is essentially over; “the writer bids to win the reader over – by the concessional first step, the writer validates the reader’s contrary viewpoint by acknowledging that it is understandable and has a rational basis”, it is only after this move that the writer may set him/herself against the reader through the counter move (Martin & White 2005:125-126). The propositions classified as ‘entertain’ also indicate, to a certain extent, that the assumed reader may be unwilling to agree with what is being reported on e.g. “They also said a new Occupy protest may take place
next year”, “About 73% of people on the Chinese mainland […] said they believed Occupy protests in Hong Kong have failed…” (Global Times 2014). By acknowledging other possibilities, the author “validate[s] other viewpoints […] thus provid[ing] for the possibility of solidarity with those who hold alternative positions” (Martin & White 2005:108-109).

Yet it is the proclamations in the form of endorsements that ultimately reveal the author’s intentions; in such instances, the internal authorial voice takes over or shares the responsibility with the cited source (Martin & White 2005:126-127). Taking into account the amount of indirectly reported speech (8 instances) versus directly reported speech (2 instances) - where the author has deliberately re-written the quotes in the former thus recontextualising them – also emphasises the importance of the two directly reported quotes in that the journalist chose to keep them. Following the chief executive’s direct quote, an endorsement is made in the clause, “Leung also pointed out that the illegal protests…” (Global Times 2014). The second direct quote may also be taken as framed in the authorial voice as the quote itself serves to ‘drive the point home’ e.g. “This shows…” is an indication that author through the external source’s voice takes his words as ‘maximally warrantable’ (Martin & White 2005).

Graduation (force and focus) analysis reveals an upscaling of force e.g. ‘great impact on HK’s economy’, ‘severely impacted’, ‘severely affected’ and sharpening of focus e.g. ‘real democracy’ (Global Times 2014). This has the effect of magnifying attitudinal and evaluative feelings thus guiding the reader. Evaluation is carried by both the text and the reader, allowing the reader a degree of interpretation. Nevertheless, in some instances, triggers are provided for the reader to interpret a not overly negative word as precisely that.

z. HK Chief Executive Leung Chun-Ying declared an end to the illegal [TRIGGER] Occupy protest Monday after police dismantled the last Occupy protest site…
   Police were not deployed and the protesters left the site peacefully.
   Commissioner of the HK Police Force said the task was challenging and complicated as the illegal [TRIGGER] protest lasted for a long time…
   (Global Times 16 Dec 2014)

In the above examples, in addition to the heavy negative appraisal in lexical choices e.g. ‘economic losses’, ‘main victim’, ‘failure’, triggers are used to make the situation seem worse than what it might have been. In the first and third example above, ‘illegal’ serves to qualify and justify both ‘dismantling’ and ‘challenging’. For my part, the verb ‘dismantle’ was quickly associated with the noun ‘bomb’, perhaps making the situation sound graver than it had been, although the act itself of dismantling such a device is probably a good thing. In the third example - ‘challenging’ and ‘complicated’ - which once again may also be positively as well as negatively charged, the use of ‘illegal’ implies that such challenges were not welcome. A quick search in the British National Corpus – primarily a written corpus from the late 20th century – shows the top 3 noun collocations with the verb ‘deployed’ to be troops, forces and arguments (British National Corpus 2013); once again invoking a possibly more serious image than the it may have deserved.

4.1.4 PRESUPPOSITIONS

Presuppositions or assumptions in their most general sense are “a taken-for-granted, implicit claims embedded within the explicit meaning of a text” (Richardson 2007:62). Here, the analysis focuses on the presuppositions embodied in a text i.e. reported speech, which through incorporation into a text highlights the presence of intertextuality and interdiscursivity (Fairclough 2003:39).

Referring to the first quote in the TS piece (see 4.1.3, i) by the chief executive, his statement assumes that it is agreed upon that ‘economic losses’ were the most significant consequences incurred by Hong Kong. Terms such as ‘other than’ and ‘the greatest loss’ further implicate that while ‘economic losses’ were widely believed to be the single most significant
effect of the movement, there was in fact a far greater consequence, that of the “damage to the rule of law” (Standard 2014). Mention of the government figures sympathetic to the Occupy Central movement as “monitor[ing] if police used excessive force” also assumes a certain sharedness on behalf of the reader – that they are aware of previous violent incidents between police and protesters. Why would the police have to be ‘monitored’, are they not supposed to be the ones doing the protecting? Lawmaker Kenneth Chan Ka-lok is quoted “…people should not be afraid of the government, the government should be afraid of the people” (The Standard 2014); this presupposes that the general atmosphere of the Occupy Central movement has instilled a sort of fear on behalf of the people that ‘their’ government should cause ‘them’ harm.

Similarly, in the SCMP article, not only is an inherent sharedness assumed with their readers with regards to writer/reader alignment but presuppositions also demonstrate the newspaper’s alignment with the current discourse espoused on the events of Occupy Central.

a. “Now I think we should reflect on an important issue. That is, what is the kind of democracy that Hong Kong should pursue? I think it should be ‘democracy with the rule of law’ that Hong Kong, as well as other advanced democracies are pursuing”
   “If we only talk about democracy, but not the rule of law. It is not true democracy. It is only anarchy.” (SCMP 16 Dec 2014)

Both propositional and value assumptions are made via these two quotes. The propositional assumption – “about what is or can be or will be the case” (Fairclough 2003:55) – is encapsulated by the clause ‘as well as other advanced democracies’, treating Hong Kong as part of the nations considered ‘advanced democracies’, even though the issue of universal suffrage is essentially what is being contested. The value assumption is present in the second quote in that ‘true democracy’ is seen to be the ultimate goal i.e. “what is good or desirable” (Fairclough 2003:55). There is a certain element of intertextuality/interdiscursivity as well that is involved; it sees the chief executive re-appropriating words and slogans of the protesters by redefining what is meant by ‘true democracy’, that is ‘democracy with the rule of law’. He simultaneously delegitimises the protesters’ meaning of ‘true democracy’ as ‘anarchy’.

In this SCMP article CY Leung appropriates and redefines the word ‘democracy’ as a means of ‘taking back discourse’ (SCMP 2014, para. 3; CD 2014, para. 10) this also applies in the CD article, through the use of the same quote (example a). What is to be taken from this is that the discussions thus far have clearly not been about ‘democracy with the rule of law’ and that CY Leung has set out to set the record straight. The entire CD article is essentially built around the argument that the law is of utmost importance and priority and that the movement has breached such a law. In detailing the ‘newsworthiness’, White (1997:3-4) outlines three potential sources around which the subject matter of ‘hard news’ typically involve: aberrant damage, power relations and normative breach. All have “some perceived threat to the social order” as a common factor, which in relating to the CD article represents just that (White 1997:5). Representations in the CD article thus work to demonstrate that such a breach of social order has occurred.

b. …the peaceful end to the protests show that police used the right tactics of high restraint for most of the time to avoid bloodshed. (China Daily 16 Dec 2014)

The above example is another example of presuppositions at work, although it is also somewhat contradictory in the implications it alludes to. Mention of the ‘right tactics’ and ‘high restraint’ imply that perhaps previously this has not been the case when police and protesters had ‘met’, yet if such tactics had not been employed ‘bloodshed’ might have broken out. While protesters seem to be the target of blame in the CD article, this sentence also alludes to the fact that police could have also been responsible for the ‘bloodshed’ had the situation ever gotten ‘that far’. There is also contrast between the words ‘peaceful’ and ‘bloodshed’.

Like the CD, the GT displays some strong implicit claims. Value and propositional assumptions are made e.g. ‘Hongkongers should consider…’, “Universal suffrage should
follow…” - both marked by the conditional mood ‘should’ and implying that what is being said has yet to occur (Global Times 2014). One of the HK legislators is referenced as expressing that although some “small-scale civil disobedience movements” might continue after the clearance, they will not last long “as the majority of citizens will register their disapproval” (Global Times 2014). His voice is used to express the common man’s opinions, there is an element of ‘sharedness/universality’ in his assumption where voice of the legislator and the public then are merged as one – as well as the author’s – difference is thus reduced and consensus established (Fairclough 2003:42). Hidden implications are embedded as well, most notably towards the end of the article,

c. When asked if respondents are confident about the future development of Hong Kong, more than 30 percent are confident and 46.6 percent said they have “some confidence,” but much depends on Hong Kong itself.

…although the Occupy movement failed, many deeper problems remain to be solved. The movement also indicates the diversity of Hong Kong society opinions, which need to be properly guided. Hong Kong and the central governments need to work harder in explaining policies to people who still have doubts over political reform, Tang said. (Global Times 16 Dec 2014)

The comparative adjective ‘deeper’ takes for granted the already present problems and presents the Occupy movement as deepening such issues. Use of ‘future development’ without explaining what kind of development is also left implicit – the most plausible of which is political development or economic development as is revealed in the following paragraph; while ‘properly guided’ begs the question ‘by whom?’: Judging by the following sentence, one can only assume that guidance falls on the “Hong Kong and central governments” (Global Times 2014).

The most significant presupposition, though, is presented in the GT article in the form of a graphically represented poll question – “Do you think the Occupy movement is a complete failure?” (Global Times 2014). Multiple-choice answers were also provided – ‘no’, ‘yes’, ‘not sure’ and ‘yes, but they could be back in other forms’. Within the phrasing of the question is embedded the perceived inefficacy of the Umbrella movement. Furthermore, three of the answers point to the various degrees of failure of the movement; the ‘yes’ and ‘yes, but…’ answers may be considered the most absolute confirmations of “complete failure” (Global Times 2014). Those answering ‘no’ are only acknowledging the lesser degree of failure of the movement, whether or not those polled mean to refute it entirely; in fact what may be considered the negating answer is the ‘not sure’ option as that abstains from taking a stance. That the question could have been posed in a different way e.g. ‘Do you see the Occupy Movement as a) a failure b) a success?’ gives the impression that the Global Poll Centre did not want the public to think for themselves, rather confirm an already widely held notion. Noteworthy as well is that the poll was made by the own newspaper’s Global Poll Centre, which may have had its own agenda in undertaking the poll. In fact, by seeking confirmation from the public it serves as corroboration that “the illegal Occupy protest has had a great impact on Hong Kong’s economy, including tourism, retail businesses and the transportation sector” (Global Times 2014). It is also worth considering the pool from which poll answers were collected, it was conducted in “seven major Chinese mainland cities including Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou” (Global Times 2014) – not only does this speak to the type of information that Mainland Chinese may be getting from other (internal) news sources but also that opinions of the Hong Kong people are missing as well. Nevertheless the poll is explicit in that it does state it was conducted exclusively in the Mainland and not in the SAR itself, regardless gauging the opinion of the society/community in which the Occupy Central movement was held could have also yielded important information, albeit an unwelcomed other perspective. This may be taken as GT’s way of entertaining the alternative voices, just not the ‘right’ voices.
In the Taiwanese newspaper TT, propositional, value and existential assumptions are also found (Fairclough 2003).

d. Instead, the movement needed to galvanize support of young voters, many of whom engaged in politics for the first time during the mass protests. [EXISTENTIAL/VALUE]

e. “If the problem of political reform is not handled appropriately, I believe [that in] the next phase there will be new resistance actions” [PROPOSITIONAL]

f. Analysts said the pro-democracy movement – from students to legislators – would have to become more coherent if it is to achieve any political concessions. [PROPOSITIONAL]

(Taipei Times 13 Dec 2014)

Embedded in example e is the implication that the likelihood of political reform is rather slim, hence possible new forms of resistance. In example f, specific mention of lack of unity is alluded to e.g. ‘would have to become more coherent’; the fact that ‘political concessions’ are even mentioned also point to the fact that there might be concessions to be made – not something that other articles have even vaguely mentioned or implied. There is also an element of recontextualisation here in the ‘lack of coherence’, which could read as ‘failed protest’ alluding indirectly to the illegitimacy of the movement. Although ‘political concessions’ could also read as ‘achieve legitimacy’ as well. Richardson (2007:63-64) points out ‘wh-questions’ as an indication of presuppositions presence - of which ‘Why has it (Occupy Central) not been successful?’ , ‘Why have no concessions been achieved thus far?’ and ‘How should/could the movement be successful?’ - in providing answers to these questions, the author then claims to have the answers for the reader, which in turn may be taken as a form proclamation even though it places and engages the reader as aligning in a particular way.

Despite the overall text of the TT article giving ample space to the ‘minority’ voices, lexically the movement is not positively depicted either e.g. ‘lengthy occupation’, ‘splintered in different directions’, vexed relationship’ (Taipei Times 2014).

In the CP, embedded assumptions are once again captured by the chief executive’s reported quotes e.g. “Other than economic losses…”, “If we just talk about democracy…”, also present in some of the other articles analysed as well (CP 2014, para. 10, 13). The Police chief is represented as defending police officers’ behaviour revealing that there may have indeed been cause for mounting a defence. Mong Kok, “scene of some of the most violent clashes”, is also described as “the working-class commercial district”, such a link may implicitly be referring to ‘organised violence’ as reports of triad involvement had also been documented during the Occupy Central movement. 14 This stands in contrast to the other two locations, the “busy shopping district of Causeway Bay” and “[t]he main Admiralty camp […] the heart of the business district”; Mong Kok may in fact also be considered a ‘busy shopping district’ (China Post 2014).

The following section (4.2) treats the sum of the discursive strategies as media perceptions and representations.

### 4.2 Media Perceptions & Representations

This section summarises the discursive strategies identified as well as the various evaluations made in the newspapers; differences and similarities between newspapers and regions are detailed (4.2.1). A summary of the secondary articles’ analysis is also included and discussed in conjunction with the results of primary articles’ analysis (4.2.2). This section seeks to answer the first question posed at the beginning of this dissertation:

1. How does the English-language press in Hong Kong, Taiwan and China perceive the events surrounding the Occupy Central movement?

14 Examples in the Guardian (Branigan & Batty 2014) and SCMP (Staff Reporters 2014) newspapers report that triads may have also had a hand in the clashes, a ‘fact’ that has yet to be confirmed.
So as to focus the analysis, two further lines of questioning was devised:

- Which discursive strategies are most salient and how are they used in the representation(s) of social actors/event?
- What, if any, evaluations are made in the reporting of the event?

Richardson (2007:64) views journalism as “best approached as an argumentative discourse”, hence news which purports to be objective and/or neutral simply is not, instead there is an element of persuasion at work on behalf of the writer/journalist. The methodology was adapted to reveal implicit evaluations, identify the various voice interactions (external and internal), analyse rhetorical tropes as well as how representations are discursively constructed. The following elements were identified as the different kinds of discursive strategies in operation at the micro level:

- Naming and predicational strategies
- Transitivity
- Engagement/graduation
- Presuppositions

All of these elements were found in every article with certain strategies varying in amount depending on the newspaper.

4.2.1 SUMMARY OF DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES & EVALUATIONS: MEDIA PERCEPTIONS & REPRESENTATIONS – DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN NEWSPAPERS

In the Hong Kong SCMP article (pro-establishment), predicational strategies made up a significant part of how the situation was represented. By identifying social actors either through their job or age/appearance, they could either be seen as ‘high’ standing members of society or as “sources who have low social status or who are shown to be in the minority” (Martin & White 2005:116). In this case, those who were depicted as credible happened to be those supporting the clearance of the Occupy tents, while those supporting the movement were considered to be in the minority. In combination with the mitigation of actions on behalf of the authorities, this contributed to depicting the protesters as a constant source of trouble throughout the events. As the ‘other’ HK newspaper, the Standard (liberal) seemed less partial in the representation of the Occupy Central movement. Factual descriptions of the clearance combined with a predominantly attributive nature of authorial voice meant that evaluations were hard to pin down. Referral throughout the article of the time at which specific actions occurred also contributed to the ‘normalcy’ and ‘facticity’ of the news report.

A second feature of SCMP’s discursive strategies was the successfully creation of an overall image of chaos where participants involved were either the cause of trouble or attempting to solve the situation. Such effects then necessarily highlight the police/authorities as dutiful while simultaneously ‘putting down’ the protesters. This particular pattern not only points to SCMP’s alignment with the authorities but also that the authors of the article are “aligning the addressee into a community of shared value and belief” (Martin & White 2005:95). The strength of the Standard article by contrast lies in the reporting of the clearance i.e. descriptions of what happened and who did what. Martin & White (2005) classify this as use of ‘reporter voice’ giving the illusion of objectivity as the news is reported in a ‘matter-of-fact’ way.

A third feature was evaluations made by the newspapers. While evaluations made on behalf of SCMP authors can be seen to be embedded in the negative and positive portrayals of social actors as well as their actions, in the TS these evaluations were triggered via graduation of certain lexical elements and tended to be located in externally quoted sources. White (2004:8)
states that it is typical in ‘hard news’ texts “for attitudinal assessments to be located in materials which is attributed to outsides sources”. Such is the case in TS article, where the evaluative work is largely done through the voices of directly reported speech, which stand in opposition to one another; this differentiates itself from the SCMP article where quotes were used as endorsements and pronouncements of a stance. While SCMP’s overall outlook on the issue obviously tends towards the negative, for TS outlook can neither be said to be positive or negative. Instead, in its abstention of “inscribed authorial judgements” it “positions the reader via its selective use of [carefully nuanced] values of engagement [and] graduation”, which in itself also operates ideologically (Martin & White 2005:183). Treatment of the topic at hand can be said to have been quite different between these two newspapers.

With regard to the Taiwanese media, the China Post (pro-KMT) article displays interactions between a diversity of voices, strongly suggesting that overall engagement is dialogically expansive. However, selectiveness in challenging some voices rather than others also indicates dialogical contractiveness on behalf of authorial voice as well. Naming strategies were few but significant in that they carried strong judgements of the chief executive. Evaluations are realised mainly through the text, with negative judgements directed towards government officials. The Taipei Times (pro-DPP), however, as engaging almost exclusively with supporters of the Umbrella movement was the most telling in its use of strategies in its reporting on the event; when mentioning the authorities were only ever mentioned so as to be able to challenge or confront thereby restricting their space thus minimising their voice. Evaluation is carried by both the text and the reader positioning: the concede/counter pairings suggest not only that the readership of such an article is anticipated to be divided as different propositions are subject to concessions offered by the author (see 4.1.3, p); in addition, obviously laden lexical choices such as with the terms ‘vexed relationship’, ‘pro-China stooge’ and ‘symbolic bid’ also indicate evaluations made on the author’s behalf.

The China Post’s strategies served mainly to highlight the ‘unfairness’ of the situation through switches between direct and indirect reporting of quotes, which allowed authorial voice to either endorse or appraise words and/or actions by social actors. Negative depiction of the authorities, notably the chief executive reinforced the inequality of the situation. On the other hand, the Taipei Times’ strategies work in order to bolster the movement. Strategies consisted of a combination of denials and assertions serving to reinforce the notion of “keep[ing] up [the] fight for free elections” (Taipei Times 2014). Overall, both newspapers can be said to be similar in the representation of the social events and actors, but dissimilar in how they achieved it.

Turning to the PRC newspapers, the China Daily (pro-establishment) can be said to stand at the opposite end of the spectrum to the Taiwanese TT newspaper in that it prioritised voices of the authorities. While the article itself does most of the evaluative work - by the sheer volume of negative appraisal employed i.e. ‘illegal’, ‘divisive’, ‘clashes’- it is nevertheless difficult to discern whether the authorial voice is anticipating disalignment from the reader or whether it assumes solidarity with the reader. Engagement and graduation analysis paint a strong proclamation of propositions put forward by journalists in the CD, however whether these are directly confronting the reader or confronting a 3rd party is unclear. Presumably, CD’s main audience are foreigners and expats, so authorial voice may construe reader as disaligned to begin with and thus need to convince its audience through strong arguments. By contrast, the Global Times (pro-establishment) used strategies which aimed to show itself to be more ‘open’ to dialogue as it engaged with supporters of the Occupy Central movement. Although this was done purposefully to be able to assign blame, it nevertheless gave the semblance of actively engaging all social actors. One defining feature of the GT article was use of other semiotic elements, a visual evaluation of the events in the form of a graphically rendered survey poll. A GT reader could have just as well only looked at the graph in order to get the gist of the article, proving after all, that a picture is worth a thousand words.
Both Mainland newspapers essentially work to represent the movement in a negative light as proclamations dominate the discursive landscape and undesirable consequences are highlighted. Similarities in the newspapers are endorsement and presuppositions as the most prominent discursive strategies; not only do both authorial voice and voice of external sources converge to create a single authoritarian voice but also in embedding implicit claims within the text there is little room left for contention. Where evaluations are carried via the text in CD, the use of a visual confirming the failure of movement was more influential in the GT.

Considerable external differences and similarities may also be drawn i.e. between the press from different regions. Differences occurred most between the Taiwanese and Mainland newspapers. One significant element was in the type of sources introduced in the Taipei Times and Global Times. While TT opted to consult a political analyst from the University of Hong Kong (see 4.1.3, n), GT decided on bringing in legal experts from the Mainland universities (see 4.1.3, x); this shows, in a certain sense, that TT perceives the event as a political issue rather than a legal one. Consequently, questions concerning what kind of jurisdiction the ‘one country, two systems’ has over the HKSAR and how is it interpreted are brought up. Insistence on the ‘rule of law’ and biasness in the representation of authoritative figures in HK and Mainland newspaper may mean more similar views. An example of this is in the SCMP and CD where the chief executive redefines ‘democracy’ (see 4.1.4 a). Such a strategy may be seen as a form of controlling discourse; legitimation through authorisation, “by reference to authority of tradition, custom, law, and of persons in whom some kind of institutional authority is vested” and through rationalisation, “by reference to the utility of institutionalized action, and to the knowledges society has constructed to endow them with cognitive validity” (Fairclough 2003:98). Such issues also related to notions of governance at work, which in its general sense refers,

...any activity within an institution or organization directed at regulating or managing some other (network of) social practice(s) [and] are characterised by specific properties of recontextualisation – the appropriation of elements of one social practice within another, placing the former within the context of the latter, and transforming it in particular ways in the process. (Bernstein 1990, Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999 in Fairclough 2003:32)

This is further explored in the next section on discursive effects and practices. Nevertheless, similarities were also found between The Standard and both Taiwanese newspapers in their form of reporting. Such observations, though, may not be surprising considering the geopolitical alliances these nations have with one another.

**4.2.2 DISCUSSION OF MEDIA PERCEPTIONS & REPRESENTATIONS**

Three discursive strategies – naming, predicational and transitivity - were key in deciphering news perceptions and representations of social actors and events (see 4.1.1 and 4.1.2). On their own, the findings from 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 paint an already clear picture of what happened i.e. start and end of the OCLP demonstrations and who was involved i.e. government officials, police officers, demonstrators and citizens. However, examination of intersubjective stance – engagement (see 4.1.3) – revealed another layer of analysis in the construction of representations as it dissected writer-reader relationship thus bringing into play two further actors in the analysis itself, the articles’ author(s) and reader(s) (Martin & White 2005). Combined with the findings on presuppositions (see 4.1.4) present in the texts, these further determined the degree to which assumptions were merely accepted or contested.

A measure of where representations fell – negatively or positively for example – and that remained a constant throughout the articles was the depiction of law enforcement. In the articles where the OCLP movement tended to be condemned, these saw a positive depiction of police officers i.e. clearing up the mess and returning the city to order – SCMP, China Daily and
Global Times; in articles which more or less condoned the OCLP movement, police officers tended to be the target of attitudinal assessments and criticism – the Standard, the China Post and Taipei Times. Divided this way, each newspaper is clearly aligned as either ‘pro-democracy’ or ‘pro-China’. While these terms should not be taken as antonyms, in the context of the newspapers, these terms have come to mean opposites; whether ‘pro-China’ necessarily means ‘anti-democracy’ is an issue very much left implicit in some of the articles.

A final aspect in the construction of media perceptions and representations is the role of journalists in media. This point further elucidates the conditions under which media operates in Mainland China. In all the articles published on the Mainland, authorial voice is consistently seen as endorsing the authorities’ stance on the matter of the Umbrella movement. Such practice, while unsurprising considering the press’ role as Party mouthpiece is nevertheless revealing in that the OCLP movement may be seen to represent a genuine challenge to Party politics and ideology. As the ‘Chinese’ media gains more autonomy in non-political matters i.e. business, entertainment etc., in matters deemed politically sensitive, the Party still exerts a considerable amount of control (Ma 2000; Young 2013). Young (2013:74) notes that “domestic media closely watch their Xinhua [official news agency] newsfeeds to make sure they are staying on key in terms of what is acceptable to report, how to report, and what remains off limits”; a quick comparison between China Daily (2014), Global Times (2014) and Xinhua (2014) English news outlet indicate similarities in the messages being put out concerning the HK demonstrations. Regardless of journalists’ stance in the matter, the fact that the messages are more or less similar suggest not only close adherence to the party line but also means less manoeuvrability in reporting hence treatment of the OCLP demonstrations as potentially threatening in some way.

Findings of secondary articles were also revealing and taken together with the primary data set, these demonstrate a rather more nuanced outlook in perceptions and representations of the events of Occupy Central and the social actors as stemming from different regions. Of the seven articles analysed, two were editorials while the other five belonged to the ‘news’ category. While subject matters varied considerably more than the main articles, the OCLP demonstrations remained a constant point of contention, thus ensuring continuity. Owing to space limitations, only a brief summary will be given here (see Appendix II for in-depth summaries).

Two additional articles were looked at from SCMP, with both displaying rather different stances on the OCLP demonstrations. The first of these – published 13 Dec 2014b – may be seen as a reinforcement of the primary article analysed in that it also ultimately aligned itself with authoritative figures. The second of these – published 14 Dec 2014c – represented both ‘camps’ on a more equal basis. Furthermore, it succeeded in showing that the conflict was not confined to borders e.g. between HK and the PRC, but rather that it was rooted in ideological differences between involved groups. The Standard’s (2014b) presented a different outlook from the primary article whereby it is seen as aligning with authoritative figures lamenting the OCLP demonstrations. Lack of distinction in naming officials demonstrated a blurring of the PRC and HK political spheres thus minimising the ‘two systems’ aspect of ‘one country, two systems’. Representations between the primary TS article and the secondary article thus considerably differed indicating a degree of diversity in opinions and to a certain extent press plurality.

The two mainland newspapers’ articles served as a magnification of the disapproval first communicated in the primary set of articles analysed. Classified as an editorial, the China Daily (2014b) article leaned heavily on presuppositions and commonsensical arguments, the causal links drawn and treated as logical can be seen as arbitrary. Room for contention was thus eliminated highlighting “the communicative context as single voiced [thus] ‘monoglossic’ and ‘undialogised’” (Martin & White 2005:99). Global Times (2014b) depicts HK as subordinate
to the PRC as President Xi is seen as voicing his support for the chief executive in handling the OCLP demonstrations (left implicit in the article). While the primary GT article treated the OCLP events directly, this news article treats it indirectly all the while still able to represent the hierarchical relationship between the two regions thus emphasising the ‘one country’ aspect.

In Taiwan, both secondary articles for Taipei Times (2014b) and China Post (2014b) also contributed to strengthening views as put forward in the primary data findings. In this way, they work in a similar fashion to the Mainland supporting articles. The editorial in the Taipei Times (2014b) relied on comparisons e.g. HK vs. ROC, HK/ROC vs. PRC; by adopting this strategy TT maintains this mainland vs. non-mainland dichotomy. Evaluations were not just reserved for the central authorities but also for those participating in the OCLP movement; representations of the OCLP see it as fragmented and unable to reach consensus even among themselves (Taipei Times 2014b). Despite this ambiguous outlook on the events, it still favoured the Umbrella movement. China Post’s (2014b) article is better understood as a commentary rather than ‘news’, as it reported on the CD editorial (2014b). Discursive strategies ensured a clear oppositional stance on the matter as brought up by China Daily (2014).

Together, analysis of primary and secondary articles presents a slightly broader view of how representations of an event/participant are constructed through certain perceptions. Such perceptions, though, are necessarily ‘filtered’; most immediately this is felt by doing so through the outlook of the newspaper i.e. in its political affiliations and/or policy, indirectly the press may be seen as functioning within distinct ‘national media systems’ as they are “constructed in the multi-layered organizational, cultural, economic, and political frameworks” of the domestic/local system (Lee et al. 2002:4). Variability within the HK and Taiwanese newspapers was felt on two different levels. HK news displayed variability in stances whereas in Taiwanese newspapers variety was mainly displayed on a textual level – emphasis on different discursive strategies in achieving the same alignment. On the other hand, between Taiwanese and Mainland newspapers, variability manifested as differences in overall message output. The ROC news articles tended to be critical of Beijing and HK governments’ actions and so could be seen as supporting the OCLP movement; the PRC news articles tended to decry the Umbrella Movement as media voices took every opportunity to speak out against the OCLP group. While a number of reasons may be attributed to the general similarities and differences across all articles, what it is most indicative of is the national systems in which each media operates within – HK and Taiwanese media systems as displaying some degree of press plurality while Mainland press as adhering to stricter conditions.

Further exploration into how each of these systems work in order to make the ‘global seem local’ seems all the more important in understanding discursive strategies as employed in the construction of images of an event and/or participants, such as that of the Occupy Central movement. Taken together, such strategies also point to ‘higher levels’ of analysis such as news framing/topoi, intertextuality/interdiscursivity and news organisation, which in turn constitute discursive effects. Such effects then manifest themselves as social practices and contribute to notions of hegemony; the implications of which are connected to national discourses of sovereignty/governance and legitimacy. The next section focuses on these macro-level influences that can be discerned in media perceptions and representations.

5 Discursive Effects & Practices

5.1 Analysis

Findings in this section present the text-discourse level of analysis, focusing on rhetoric and narrative structure. Analysis is deepened as realisations of discursive strategies into discursive effects are explored in terms of vested interests and hegemony (5.2.1). Section 5.2 combines
the summary of results and discussion. The notions of interests and hegemony are further explored in relation to ‘wider’ cultural and socio-political concepts such as sovereignty and legitimacy (5.2.2). Observations made here pertain to the second and third research questions,

2. How do such media representations constitute hegemonic (social/political/cultural) discourses/practices and how do they contribute to serving different interests?
3. How do these mediatised, political and institutional discourses reflect the larger socio-/geo-political framework of ‘one country, two systems’?

5.1.1 TOPOI & FRAMING

As argumentative strategies, topoi and framing focus on the ‘common-sense’ reasonings used to get a point across. They are an indication of the type of frames invoked by journalists which “organis[e] idea[s] or storylines that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them (de Vreese 2005:53). The following extracts exemplify how arguments made can be reinforced through various argumentation devices, topoi are essentially “warrants or ‘conclusion rules’ [which] connect the argument with the conclusion or claim” (Riesigl & Wodak 2001:75 in Blackledge 2005:67). They are mainly signalled by causal links e.g. ‘if —, then —’.

a. SCMP (16 Dec 2014)

“The public protest zone is supposed to be open for the public to protest [in]. Now the protesters’ occupation is in fact depriving others of the right to use the area… It posed threat to public hygiene and safety…” [ABUSE] [voice of Legislative Council President Jasper Tsang]

“With the completion of the clearance work in the occupation site […], the illegal occupation action that has lasted for more than two months in Hong Kong is over,” Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying said [AUTHORITY], adding that they had caused a “serious loss” to the local economy [FINANCE] and damaged the rule of law [ABUSE].

“I’ve never seen anything take such a toll on business,” [BURDENING/FINANCE] he said, adding it made the Sars outbreak in 2003 rosy by comparison. [voice of a supporter of the clearance]

b. the Standard (16 Dec 2014)

He [the chief executive] added [AUTHORITY]: “Other than economic losses [FINANCE], I believe the greatest loss Hong Kong society has suffered is the damage to the rule of law [BURDENING/WEIGHING DOWN] by a small group of people.”

“Leung Chun-ying still needs to face the Legislative Council, face the public and face political reform… people should not be afraid of the government, the government should be afraid of the people,” he [Civic Party lawmaker Kenneth Chan Ka-lok] said [AUTHORITY].

c. China Daily (16 Dec 014)

…security officers at the legislature evicted all protesters in less than two hours.

…all that remained from the 79-day divisive occupation movement were about a dozen tentes and some messy piles of furniture left on a sidewalk outside the Legislative Council complex in Admiralty district. [BURDENING]

Hong Kong Chief Executive [AUTHORITY] […] called on Monday for full respect for the rule of law and the constitutional framework [LAW/RIGHT] governing the special administrative region’s election overhaul.

He reiterated that election of the city’s future leaders by universal suffrage must follow provisions of the Basic Law [LAW/RIGHT] and decisions made by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee [AUTHORITY], to ensure that democracy in Hong Kong has a sound legal basis.

d. Global Times (16 Dec 2014)

Leung also pointed out that he illegal Occupy protest has had a great impact on Hong Kong’s economy [FINANCE], including tourism, retail businesses and the transportation sector, with figures on exact economic losses [FINANCE] expected to emerge gradually.
…the main victim of the whole Occupy movement is Hong Kong itself because the local economy was severely impacted [FINANCE].

“A number of countries, such as Australia, had previously issued travel alerts for Hong Kong. This shows that the international competitiveness [FINANCE] of Hong Kong was severely affected,” he [Zhang Dinghuai] said.

e. Taipei Times (13 Dec 2014)

“They need to pull together to create a viable coalition of stakeholders,” Chinese University of Hong Kong political analyst Willy Lam said. “They need to act together to lobby and negotiate with [Hong Kong] administration and Beijing. That would also give the Hong Kong people the impression that they speak with one voice and are much more organised”. [Willy Lam] [ADVANTAGE/USEFULNESS]

“If the problem of political reform is not handled appropriately, I believe [that in] the next phase there will be new resistance actions” [DANGER/THREAT], Occupy Central campaign group leader Benny Tai said.

f. the China Post (16 Dec 2014)

Leung is vilified by protesters who cast him variously as a wolf [NAME] and vampire [NAME] and have repeatedly asked for him to step down.

Pro-democracy lawmaker Fernando Cheung, who was on hand to observe the police operation and arrests [ABUSE referred to], said the closing of the site did not mean the end of the civil disobedience campaign.

Three argumentative strategies were shared among most of the articles - topoi of authority, burdening/weighing down and finance; the exceptions were the Taiwanese newspapers. Topos of abuse appeared only in the SCMP and CP newspapers, while topos of law/right exclusively in the CD. Nevertheless, CD and TT did share one topos, that of danger/threat. The TT was also the only newspaper to use arguments of advantage/usefulness and equality.

Blackledge’s (2005:70) definition of topos of abuse “of given rights by a minority group” is clear in the SCMP article – implied through the use of ‘supposed to’ and ‘in fact’, pointing to the protesters as having taken advantage of given rights. Such abuse, though, in the CP article is highlighted as abuse by the authorities, specifically the police that had been “criticised for being heavy-handed” (CP 2014, para. 14). This is further corroborated by the fact that “almost 2000 complaints” were lodged citing “neglect of duty” and “unnecessary use of authority” (CP 2014, para. 17-18), example f above shows that due to such abuse of authority, this merited supervision.

Intriguingly, the topos of danger/threat is invoked by both CD and TT. Analysis so far has shown that the stances adopted by both of these newspapers are anything but symmetrical as is to be expected given their divergent political stances and hence interesting to see here how both newspapers use the same underlying argument to emphasise particular aspects of their arguments for and against specific issues.

In a quote referencing the chief executive labelling the movement as “anarchy”, not only does CY Leung effectively manage to delegitimise Occupy Central’s call for universal suffrage but also suggests that the danger of chaos will ensue, should this path continue – where discourse is just about “democracy without addressing the rule of law” (CD 2014, para. 10). Use of the verb ‘to evict’ aligns the authorial voice with the chief executive’s as it also deems the protesters’ occupation ‘illegal’.

On the other hand, the danger argument is made for the opposite side of the spectrum through the voice of Benny Tai (example e above), arguing for political reform to be handled “appropriately” otherwise “new resistance actions will form” (Taipei Times 2014). This is further reiterated by the demonstrators’ call for “fully free elections” so as to not have a “pro-China stooge” at the helm. Metaphors are also employed in the TT article, evoking some rather strong imagery. Joshua Wong is quoted as saying “If we fight a long war…” conjuring a powerful image of two belligerent sides (TT 2014, para. 8), the imagery does not stray far from what ‘anarchy’ may look like. Consequences of the ‘civil disobedience’ movement have been
to “put democracy on the map with Beijing”, its significance is manifested as a physical locality making its mark – etched into Hong Kong’s geographical landscape/history as it were (TT 2014, para. 5).

Interestingly, the topos of advantage/usefulness appeared only in the TT and is expressed through the voice of the political analyst Willy Lam (example e); as such, he is given the role as ‘neutral’ arbitrator, his words may be taken as call for consolidation after the clearance. Tied to this is the topos of equality, “based on the principle that all should have equal rights if an action or policy brings about inequality or injustice”, although this topos is embedded within the argument for universal suffrage as the Umbrella movement sees it (Blackledge 2005:71).

Topos of law/right appeared exclusively in the CD article through implicit mention of the ‘one country, two systems’ framework governing HK and its constitutional document, the Basic Law. This further cements the CD article as standing firmly against the events of Occupy Central.

It is clear that the frames invoked by most of the newspapers are that of responsibility, conflict and economic consequences. Only the TT and CP are not explicit in framing their discourse via the economic consequences frame. CD displays a strong responsibility frame, presenting “respect of law” as the most important point to be taken from the events. By giving voice almost exclusively to authoritative figures in both the HKSAR and PRC governments and through mention of official constitutional documents, CD journalists subsequently construct a space where authority, law and rights are the solution to the problem of the Occupy Central protests. Fairclough (2003:91) identifies this as ‘higher-level semantic relations’ that span the entire article, known as the ‘problem-solution relation’. This is equally obvious in the GT article where economic consequences of the movement lead to the solution that a more thorough explanation of policies is needed by the “Hong Kong and central governments” to the people of Hong Kong (GT 2014, para. 20).

5.1.2 INTERTEXTUALITY, INTERDISCURSIVITY & RECONTEXTUALISATION

While several points have already been mentioned concerning intertextuality, interdiscursivity and recontextualisation, this section looks a little more closely at those elements that spanned more or less all the articles analysed.

Other intertextual and interdiscursive elements worth mentioning here is the use of quotation marks with the word ‘illegal’, which was employed in all of the articles. The newspapers, which used quotation marks when qualifying the protests as ‘illegal’, were the four newspapers from Hong Kong and Taiwan, while the two from China did not. While the use of quotation marks generally signals the presence of external sources, in some cases they may also signal an ironic or sarcastic tone. Regardless, they draw attention to certain lexical items in the text such as exemplified below:

a. Leung said with the completion of clearance work in Causeway Bay “the episode of illegal occupation is over.” (Standard 16 Dec 2014)

b. “With the completion of the clearance work in the occupation site in Causeway Bay, the illegal Occupation action that has lasted for more than two months in Hong Kong is over”, Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying said, adding that they had caused “serious loss” to the local economy and damaged the rule of law. (SCMP 16 Dec 2014)

c. “Following the completion of clearance work in Causeway Bay Occupy area, the episode of illegal occupation activities for more than two months is over” chief executive Leung Chun-ying told reporters Monday. (China Post 16 Dec 2014)

d. However, it has achieved no political concessions from either Hong Kong’s leaders or Beijing, who both branded the protests “illegal”. (Taipei Times 13 Dec 2014)

e. Leung’s appeal came after authorities cleared the last two illegal occupation protest sites. (China Daily 16 Dec 2014)
Hong Kong Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying declared an end to the illegal Occupy protest Monday after police dismantled the last Occupy protest site and arrested more than a dozen protesters. (Global Times 16 Dec 2014)

There is a clear difference already in the styles used by each newspaper. Where both PRC newspapers have decided to recontextualise CY Leung’s quote and present it as ‘fact’, the Taiwanese and Hong Kong newspapers have chosen to directly report the quote. The Taipei Times (example d) may be seen as the paper distancing itself most from the proposition in that not only has it chosen to delete entire quote, leaving just the word ‘illegal’ but also that it attributes both leaders of HKSAR and PRC as having specifically and shamefully called out the protests as ‘illegal’. The Standard (example a) also chose to reproduce only a select part of the quote, suggesting distancing. Minor differences are found between the SCMP (example b) and CP (example c) quote, although both papers opted for reproducing the quote in its entirety. While both of these quotes themselves have been shown to contribute to endorsement strategies in the newspapers (see 4.1.3, a, q), the fact that ‘illegal’ still appeared within quotation marks – and in comparison with the PRC newspapers (example e, f) – suggest that the state of illegality over the demonstrations was not taken to be a given but rather contested. Young (2013), however, does note that in Mainland news practice, quotation marks also denote a put down e.g. “The successful clearing operation officially spelled defeat for the “umbrella revolution” – the Hong Kong version of the “color revolution”” (see Appendix II, CD 2014b).

Another quote by CY Leung that appeared across several articles and differed slightly from paper to paper, illustrates further the notion of recontextualisation. It is worth taking a quick look at how these differed, once again demonstrating that as discourse moves from domain to domain or even between individuals, certain aspects get cut, added, and so modified.

g. “If we just talk about democracy without talking about the rule of law, it’s not real democracy but a state of no government.” (China Post 16 Dec 2014)

h. “If we only talk about democracy, but not the rule of law. It is not true democracy. It is only anarchy.” (SCMP 16 Dec 2014)

i. “If we talk about democracy without addressing the rule of law, it wouldn’t be a real democracy but merely anarchy.” (China Daily 16 Dec 2014)

j. “Democracy without law is not a real democracy but anarchy.” (Global Times 16 Dec 2014)

All of the above quotes serve more or less to discredit the idea of ‘democracy’ as ‘anarchy’ if the notion of ‘law’ is not associated with it. The GT (2014) rendering of the quote is the most straightforward and direct; the ‘but’ positions ‘democracy’ and ‘anarchy’ as antonyms (example j). Use of ‘only’, on the other hand by SCMP (2014), conceptualises ‘anarchy’ as a symbiotic part of democracy, just not ‘true democracy’ (example h). CD’s (2014) use of an indefinite pronoun ‘a real democracy’ considers that it is just one of many types of democracy; in using the verb ‘to address’, this also implies a certain formality over the verb ‘to talk about’ (example i). Finally, the CP opted for ‘state of no government’ that somewhat softens the tone over ‘anarchy’ (example g). Another version of the quote also appeared, in Reuters (Pomfret & Kwok 2015) and BBC (2015b) articles, where the chief executive states, “As we pursue democracy, we should act in accordance with the law, or Hong Kong will degenerate into anarchy”. Both articles were reporting on CY Leung’s policy speech – dated 14 Jan 2015. Perhaps the more official setting of delivering those words in a formal speech explains in part the differences found between 2015 and 2014 - with “in accordance with the law” as expressing more formality; noteworthy is also how the beginning has changed to “as we pursue democracy”, suggesting that it is no longer a question of ‘if’ but that they are already underway. Differences may also be attributed to different translations of the quote, which were likely to have been originally delivered in Cantonese (see video in Reuters, 00:37 onwards).

While Blackledge (2005) has observed that sources of quotes may never fully be discovered, an attempt was made to find the source of CY Leung’s quote. An indication that
the quote may have been originally been given in Cantonese was speculated upon as it seemed to differ slightly every time it was printed (see above, examples g- j). It was narrowed down as having first been uttered in a TV interview, reported by the Chinese newspaper Mingpao (2014). The article shows that discourse does not have to ‘travel far’ in order to be amended; there is a discrepancy between what CY Leung says in the video and the transcription of what he is reported to have said. Differences may be attributed to the quote as being reported indirectly and/or that written ‘Chinese’ differs considerably from spoken ‘Chinese’, especially that it was delivered in Cantonese. Regardless, the modification was a minor one, it was the deletion of ‘real’ (真) before the word ‘democracy’ (民主). Since the quote in the English-language newspapers did contain the word ‘real/true’, it could be said that the English translation remained faithful to what was uttered in the TV interview. Yet, it is also worth speculating on how much the quote would have differed had the translation been taken from the transcription below the video. It would have looked something like: ‘If we just talk about democracy without talking about the rule of law, it’s not [ ] democracy but a state of no government/anarchy’. Without the ‘real/true’ qualifying ‘democracy’ the statement seems more absolute while with the adjective, ‘democracy’ is then conceptualised as something scalable/gradable not to mention the presupposition that ‘fake democracy’ also exists. The section of sovereignty and legitimation delves further into this notion.

Both the SCMP (2014, para. 60) and TS (2014, para. 17) mention “forms of ‘non-cooperation’”, yet the initiative is attributed to the student leaders and the pan-democratic factions, respectively. Although students demonstrating on behalf of OCLP may also be included as forming part of the ‘pan-democratic’ groups, these small and potentially unnoticeable differences speak to how arguments or even information is able to be ‘transformed’ (even the minor changes). Perhaps a clearer example of arguments shifting and being transformed across such ‘chains of discourse’ are through the references made in the following quotations by,

k. Barry Ho (a businessman) - “I’d rather they try to achieve their goal through legal and peaceful means.”
Kelvin Yeung (a banker) – “I agree with the need for true universal suffrage…” (SCMP 16 Dec 2014)

l. Kim Lo (supporter of the movement) – “I am so depressed it’s gone […] I think now we have to sit down and think what we want. We need to spread the message, to help the seed grow. I don’t think we should go back on the streets yet.” (Taipei Times 13 Dec 2014)

These sentiments (in example k, l) are echoes of the chief executive of HKSAR who called out the Occupy Central as an ‘illegal occupation’, by redefining the meaning of ‘democracy’ in terms of true and false and urging the people to reflect on the ‘kind of democracy’ they would like (SCMP 2014; Standard 2014). In this case, points put forward by the chief executive may be seen as ‘moving down’ the chain, as they are first expressed by an authoritative figure and then reiterated by the people. Blackledge (2005:13) notes that such “recontextualisation[s] may move the argument into an increasingly non-negotiable materiality” – although his examples demonstrate an argument as moving ‘up’, “gaining a more authoritative voice” - by the same token, an argument ‘moving down’ gains legitimacy as the arguments reach more people.

Following on this point, the notion of interdiscursivity - “intertextual relations of genres and discourses within a text” (Blackledge 2005:11) – is best exemplified through the term ‘rule of law’. All the news articles that employed the term (CD was the most ‘vocal’ and no instances were found in the TT) relate directly to several official documents such as the Basic Law of HKSAR (HK Government 2012), the white paper issued by the PRC’s central government in the summer of 2014 reiterating the ‘One country, Two systems’ framework as well as the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 – an agreement made between Britain and the PRC stipulating conditions for Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty. To make things more complex, the term ‘rule of law’ becomes intertextually more ambiguous as the British colonial administration
and the PRC government have employed it; both have claimed ‘responsibility’ for it as well as
given their own interpretations. While the PRC government defines it as “basic principle of the
Party as it leads the people in governing the country” (china.org.cn 2014), the last governor of
HK, Chris Patten has defined it as “that vital protection against arbitrary government” (Patten
1996:13, The 1996 Policy Address). They essentially imply a similar interpretation although
the way of articulating it slightly differs. It is equally interesting to note that ‘the rule of law’
according to the PRC government was pronounced at the 15th National Congress of the
Communist Party - which took place in 1997 - the same year Hong Kong returned to the PRC
and a year after Patten’s last policy address. This is worth speculating upon as during the years
preceding and following 1997, there had been considerable focus on how the ‘Hong Kong way
of life’ would continue. ‘Rule of law’ also indexes a specific social practice, “the appropriation
of elements of one social practice within another [and by] placing the former within the context
of the latter, and transforming it in particular ways in the process” (Bernstein 1990; Chouliaraki
& Fairclough 1999 in Fairclough 2003:32). In this case, we have the ‘rule of law’ as indexing
the social practice of governance historically – HK under the British administration - as well as
en actualité – HK under Chinese sovereignty; the issue of governance between the PRC and
the ROC is further treated in 5.2.

Another important remark is the absence of voice of any PRC government official within
the articles. While the articles from China Daily (2014) and Global Times (2014) may
themselves be representative of the Mainland officials’ voice, for all the times that they are
indirectly referred to i.e. ‘Beijing’, ‘National People’s Congress Committee’, there is
surprisingly no single quote by anyone affiliated to ‘the party’ or a representative; only one
allusion is made in the TT (2014). At this stage, reasons may only be speculated upon. Either
Beijing’s refusal to comment on the matter could be taken as a form of non-acknowledgement
thus disregarding the possibility that the demonstrations could be considered a direct challenge
towards ‘them’ or journalists have sought to actively constrict ‘space’ of one of the key social
actors. The latter of these interpretations seem unlikely, as several of the newspapers have been
shown to actively engage with a plurality of voices on the matter (see Appendix II), leaving
such a refusal to be interpreted as purposeful.

5.1.3 ORGANISATION & NARRATIVE STRUCTURE

In terms of narrative structure, White (1997) identifies an ‘orbital textual development’ in
newspaper articles, in which every part of the article is essentially composed in order to ‘serve’
the headline of the news piece, constantly reinforcing its point. Each part is not chronologically
bound and so is predisposed to “radical editability”, such flexibility points to its ‘orbital’
characteristic (White 1997:15).

Owing to the similarity in content of the articles, five out of the six articles display such
orbital development. The exception was the Global Times (2014) article, which displayed some
discrepancies between the lead paragraph – mentioning the “plan to investigate, arrest protest
ringleaders within three months” – and the bulk of the content in the article, which did not focus
on how such investigative procedures might be conducted; only a brief paragraph treats this
point.

Linked to this point is that of press agency reports; some recognisable names are Agence
France Presse (APF), Associated Press (AP) and Reuters (Richardson 2007:106). Such news
suppliers sell copies of pre-written reports to other newspapers and broadcasters; Richardson
(2007:106) notes that while such pre-written reports are hardly ever included ‘as is’ in the
newspaper, if they are included some may be “in a form so close to the original that the news
agency responsible is ‘bylined’ at the top of the article”. Such is the case with the two Taiwanese
newspapers and HK’s South China Morning Post: both the TT and CP credit no author, only
AFP and/or AP whilst SCMP credits several authors as well as stating “with additional reporting from AFP” right at the end of the article (SCMP 2014). Below are examples from the newspapers, which credited AFP and/or AP – these show how content of the news agency report is “edited in accordance with specific requirements of the newspaper, including stylistic, political and simple ‘spatial’ requirements” (van Dijk 1988 cited in Richardson 2007:106):

a. Normal traffic resume after more than 70 days, with a policeman on a motorbike leading the first batch of cars through the eastbound lanes of Yee Wo Street. (SCMP 16 Dec 2014)
b. Trucks and cleaning teams moved in to remove the debris, and roads around the site, which have been closed for weeks, reopened. (China Post 16 Dec 2014)
c. Rush-hour traffic yesterday streamed through the heart of Hong Kong for the first time in more than two months after police cleared the territory’s main pro-democracy protest camp with mass arrests, but activists vowed that their struggle would continue. (Taipei Times 13 Dec 2014)

Noticeable differences are present in sentence structure – where SCMP and TT have ‘traffic’ in the subject position and thus see this as a crucial piece of information (example a, c); CP’s inclusion of the traffic resuming is treated as a secondary clause, lessening the importance of it (example b). A quick look showed that the point at which this information appeared in the article also differed; traffic information was included in the TT article’s lead paragraph treating it as rather important, while in the CP traffic is not mentioned until after the lead and even later in SCMP. This makes for a problematic comparison, though, as date variables cannot account for whether these newspapers used the same wire copy. Implications as to voicing, then, become more complex as international news agencies are credited as exclusive sources in the Taipei Times and China Post. As AFP and AP tend to cater to the global, their readership is then also seen as reflecting this diversity. By crediting international news agencies, this could also be taken as a form of endorsement in itself – trusting that AFP and AP have a reputation for reporting “quickly, accurately and honestly” (Associated Press 2015). A comparison between another Taipei Times article – published on the 16 Dec 2014c, like the other five – and the China Post’s sees the exact same text used. Sections referring to the police commissioner Andy Tsang, the pro-democracy lawmaker Fernando Cheung are not present in the Taipei Times published 16 Dec 2014c; this ‘extra’ information found in the CP could be attributed to the Associated Press’ wire copy instead. At this point, it may be worth considering that the Taipei Times’ article could be the closest to the original news agency copy on which other newspapers based their reporting on as they only bylined AFP. Another minor difference, but potentially significant change is the insertion/removal of ‘but’ in the examples below,

d. But Beijing has backed his administration throughout the occupation. (China Post 16 Dec 2014)
e. Beijing has backed his administration throughout the occupation. (Taipei Times 16 Dec 2014c)

An interpretation of this change may be how the CP and TT engage with their audience. As the ‘but’ is seen as superseding previous information provided, CP in this sense perhaps anticipated that their audience would be shocked by the fact, whereas TT anticipated that this was common knowledge among their readers and so did not need to specify. On the other hand, this may also be a stylistic choice on behalf of both newspapers.

This last part briefly treats the news placement of the article. The following is a list of the news sections under which each article appeared:

- SCMP – News, Hong Kong, Protests
- The Standard – Local News
- China Daily – China/HK Macau Taiwan
- Global Times – Politics, HK/Macau/Taiwan
- Taipei Times – News/Front-page
- The China Daily – China/Local News

The categories/tags under which each article was identifiable are worth examining as they reveal an immediate frame for how topics are to be treated and understood, “‘where’ a story ran
in a newspaper or on television news can make a significant contribution to how the media messages are interpreted by audiences” (Purvis 2008:332).

The striking observation about the SCMP is that it also has a section specially dedicated to Occupy Central, which raises the question as to why the SCMP (2014) article analysed did not carry the tag ‘Occupy Central’? Moreover, why was it explicit in using the ‘Hong Kong’ tag considering the OCLP demonstrations took place in HK? Although it may have essentially boiled down to the newspaper’s stylistic preference, it is also possible that due to the content of the article i.e. treating the so-called ‘end’ of the demonstrations, it was more appropriate to classify the article under ‘Hong Kong’ as it concerned the entire nation and thus potentially reaching a wider audience. Similarly, the Standard’s choice to leave Hong Kong implicit by just categorising its article under ‘Local News’ works in the same manner; TS may have considered it superfluous to have to specifically mention the location of the event it was reporting on. Both categories may be seen as indexing the ‘local’. Another observation is that SCMP may be considered the more ‘prestigious’ newspaper and thus catering to a more international audience i.e. people living abroad concerned with HK news, so the reasons as to the tag ‘Hong Kong’ may be understandable; the Standard, which may also be seen as catering to an international audience albeit within HK, retains a more local character by simply attributing it to ‘Local News’.

The Mainland newspapers’ classifications were quite similar in that both contained the ‘HK, Macau, Taiwan’ tag. Global Times’ designation ‘Politics’ seems rather misplaced as the content of the article did not refer much to political reform but rather departed from a legal point of view (see 4.1.3, x). The tag ‘HK, Macau, Taiwan’ is equally interesting in itself as it shows these three regions as perceived on equal par by China (or at least the newspapers); this may be a show of hierarchy reminding us HK, Macau and Taiwan are subordinate to the PRC. With Hong Kong and Macau officially considered special administrative regions of China, the addition of Taiwan to the list also indicates China’s desire for Taiwan to be part of those special administrative regions (Tok 2013).

The widest differences though occur between the two Taiwanese newspapers. Where Taipei Times opted for the more classic, ‘neutral’ news categories – by describing the actual article placement, The China Post decided to classify it as ‘Local News’ within ‘China’. Where the SCMP’s use of the ‘Hong Kong’ tag may be seen as unnecessary – as the OCLP took place in HK – in the case of CP, such an explicit tag would have been more useful to distinguish that ‘Local News’ in this case is not local to the Mainland but rather local to HK. Nevertheless, it may reveal the overall newspaper’s stance towards both special administrative regions (Macau and HK) that they are perceived as firmly under the sovereignty of the PRC, thus emphasizing the ‘one country’ aspect. The CP does boast a “strong KMT background” (Lams 2008:155) which may explain its views on where HK and Macau stand vis-à-vis the PRC. By publishing its article as ‘Front-page’, Taipei Times accorded a certain degree of importance to the OCLP demonstrations. A secondary article analysed from the TT (2014b) sees TT authors drawing comparisons between HK’s Occupy Central and Taiwan’s Sunflower movements, which may be indicative of some form of solidarity between both HK and Taiwan. A further remark is that the TT article (2014) was also published on a weekend – Saturday 13 Dec 2014 – which also meant that there may have been less coverage and so fewer misgivings about publishing on the front-page.

Looking at the newspapers’ webpages provides a little insight into the types of classification they use in order to make an article identifiable. Websites which list sections from top to bottom are the China Post, the Standard and Global Times, while those who list from left to right are SCMP, China Daily and Taipei Times. Although the way these newspapers divide their sections may have less to do with representativeness of hierarchies/priorities accorded, and more to do with facilitation of navigation of the website, it is nevertheless appropriate to
briefly dwell on the impact such classifications may have. As an example, SCMP’s news sections are: China, Hong Kong, Asia etc. and the Standard’s: Editorial, Top News, Local, Business, China etc. In this way, it may be easy to conclude that SCMP prioritises China’s affairs over Hong Kong’s and vice versa in the Standard purely based on the ordering of sections listed. So while, it may be an oversimplification to state that such order of listings is representative of how each newspaper perceives the importance of certain types of news, it could also be argued that it is in this ‘normality’ of such news section listings where hegemony in fact lies, as it seems so easy to take for granted that things are the way they are.

In the introductory section of this dissertation, it was shown that both Hong Kong and Taiwan’s ‘Chinese’ identities developed in parallel and in contrast to that of the Mainland’s ‘Chinese’ identity, which in turn revealed a mainland/non-mainland dichotomy as fundamentally part of the islands’ ‘Chinese’ cultural identities. So, while agency as to the adoption of such a binary identification system has mainly stemmed from HK and the ROC, by the same token, the fact that both Mainland newspapers’ grouped HK, ROC and Macau under the same tag also shows that certain institutions such as the media in China are also seen to be upholding the dichotomous relationship between mainland and non-mainland. The significance of this is that the PRC has most always conceived of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan as intrinsically part of China – with Taiwan seen as a “renegade Chinese province” (Kaeding 2014:111). This mainland/non-mainland binary – seemingly maintained by Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Mainland – demonstrates perhaps just how entrenched these schisms are (be they cultural, social, political etc.). That the media in all three regions, especially the Mainland, chose to delineate ‘HK, ROC, Macau’ as their own category rather than use label ‘national’ for example, equally reflects how such divisions may be considered hegemonic. They have become institutionalised and systemic and as we shall see further below, wield much influence in socio-political arenas.

5.2 HEGEMONY & VESTED INTERESTS, SOVEREIGNTY & LEGITIMACY

This last section builds on the above analysis to consider how media perceptions and representations constitute hegemonic discourses and practices as well as how they contribute to serving different interests (5.2.1). Additionally, these mediatised, political and institutional discourses are discussed in terms of sovereignty and legitimacy and related to the context of the socio- and geo-political framework of ‘one country, two systems’ (5.2.2).

Having established how the English-language press in Hong Kong, Taiwan and China perceive the events surrounding the Occupy Central demonstrations, it is also important to explore the impacts that such representations and consequently perceptions, may have. Findings presented in sections 4.1 and 5.1 exposes not only the ‘inner’ mechanisms of discursive strategies but also the sum of these strategies as discursive effects and practices. A genre in itself, news discourse

…fulfils particular functions; has been created in accordance with particular production techniques and in specific institutional settings; is marked by particular relationships between other agencies or political, judicial and economic power; is characterised by particular interpersonal relations between writer and reader; and is consumed, interpreted and enjoyed in ways that are specific. (Richardson 2007:76-77)

‘News’ is not only a series of word-sentence/text-discourse interactions but acts simultaneously as the focus of a readership, the product of editors and journalists as well as the vehicle for messages. Taken together topoi, frames, narrative organisation and structure reveal the overall ‘direction’ of the article as well as how it should be understood. As mentioned at the end of the section 4.2.2, news is ‘filtered’ through domestic news systems in order to make the ‘global
seem local’, thus the need for context to be adjusted. This is where the processes of intertextuality, interdiscursivity and recontextualisations come in; not only do they allow for certain parameters to be adjusted, they are also used to “chart shifts of meanings either within one genre […] or across semiotic dimensions” (Blackledge 2005:121). ‘Chains of discourses’ are a sign that discourses i.e. information, arguments, representations, are dynamic – the same piece of discourse may take on different meanings as contexts of reproductions also change,

[r]econtextualisation always involves transformation, and that transformation is dependent on the goals, value and interests of the context into which the discursive practice is being recontextualised (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999 in Blackledge 2005:122)

5.2.1 DISCUSSION: INTERESTS & HEGEMONY

2. How do such media representations constitute hegemonic (social, political, cultural) practices and how do they contribute to serving different interests?

It is useful to take a closer look at how ‘voices’ are used as representative of various interests. Intertextuality, interdiscursivity and voice go hand in hand, as an argument made by a source is reproduced, reiterated, repeated and thus recontextualised (Blackledge 2005:13). Effectively, this points to whose interests ‘gain authority’ and whose ‘diminish either partly or entirely’ (Blackledge 2005:14). It is in this arena that hegemonic discourses reside and are made visible, as a version of the same utterances and written texts appear in several ‘locations’. Richardson (2007:112-113) reminds us that “[n]ewspapers do not exist in a social vacuum, [they] reflect physical and social qualities of communicating agency (publishers) and their relationship to other systems”. News is a form of institutional discourse, which has the potential to exert not only influence but also power and authority (van Dijk 2001a).

In one of the SCMP’s (2014c) secondary articles, two Beijing officials are seen as expressing a need for ‘deep reflection’ in the aftermath of the OCLP demonstrations. A day later, the SCMP (2014) quotes HK’s chief executive as reiterating and expanding on what this ‘reflection’ might entail e.g. “Now I think we should reflect on an important issue […] what is the kind of democracy that Hong Kong should pursue?” (SCMP 2014, para. 3). The initial quotes by the Beijing officials refer to “how to contribute to the nation’s security” and “a role in protecting the country’s sovereignty” (SCMP 2014c). In CY-Leung’s quote (see 4.1.3, d), not only does he repeat the idea of reflection but also adds specificity as to what requires reflection and also in a manner more encompassing of the HK people by formulating it as a direct question to the people. Recontextualisations can be seen as occurring vertically, from national officials to local officials. Further examples where ideas may be seen as ‘moving down’ chains of discourses are those concerning the issue of ‘illegality’ of the demonstrations. In section 5.1.2 (example k, l), we saw reiterations of arguments initially made by the chief executive by members of the public; as such, recontextualisations may be seen as moving from official to non-official as well as from the political to social sphere.

A second manifestation of how arguments may become magnified as they are recontextualised is via a governmental website detailing the process of HK democratisation in 2017, entitled 2017, Make it happen! Method for selecting the Chief Executive by Universal Suffrage (HK Government 2015a) was set up. It is an archive of information for the public to chart the goings-on of the development of the political process; different sections include that of ‘Key facts’, ‘Multimedia’ and ‘First/Second consultation rounds’, presumably between HK and PRC officials. Two observations may be made. Firstly, concerning the sub-section ‘Back to the Basic Law – Seminar on Universal Suffrage for the Chief Executive Election’ (HK Government 2015a). It is unclear who exactly is the target of the seminar, nevertheless the fact that a seminar was set up certainly seems like some of the propositions voiced by the officials concerning HK’s need for “re-enlightenment” and “education campaigns” are being undertaken

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Another sub-section, ‘Essays by the Task Force’ lists texts written by the Chief Executive, the Chief Secretary for Administration (Carrie Lam 2014a/b), the Chief Justice (Rimsky Yuen 2014) and the Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs (Raymond Tam). Further exploration of other governmental websites found no equivalent forum where pan-democratic politicians express their views. Their space is literally restricted on the official level and even though they are able to participate politically in the Legislative Council, the decision not to include a wide array of perspectives on the matter of democratisation is possibly exploited to give the impression of a ‘united front’ in the HK administration. To a certain degree, the pan-democratic factions’ silence is institutionalised.

The essays written by the various members of government, constantly refer to how the process of universal suffrage should be implemented in HK as either “…consistent with the Basic Law” (Chief of Justice, Rimsky Yuen 2014) or “…in accordance with the Basic Law and the relevant Interpretation and Decisions of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC)” (Chief Secretary of Administration, Carrie Lam 2014a). Specifically, in one of the essays entitled The Rules for Electoral Reform (Lam 2014b), the Chief Secretary writes,

Third, in handling democratic development matters, we must strictly follow the law. This is a core value of Hong Kong. Article 45 of the Basic Law states that "The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the chief executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.” (Lam 2014b)

This links to CY-Leung’s quotes where he defines ‘democracy’ as “democracy with the rule of law” (see 4.1.4, a) as he takes legal jargon and substitutes with a catch phrase of sorts in order to make it intelligible to the public. Thus, CY-Leung’s recontextualisations occur horizontally and are the result of deletion, rearrangement and substitution of two documents - the essay written by Chief Secretary Lam and the Basic Law document. The chain of discourse established may be conceptualised as either national to local and/or public to private as arguments shift across various domains in society.

Most of the arguments presented so far are seen to be ‘moving down’ the chain of discourse, Blackledge (2005:13) reminds us that they are “neither straightforward nor unidirectional, but are likely to be circular, reflexive, tangential, and fractured”. Additionally, as messages and discourses are being promulgated via the medium of newspapers i.e. has the potential to reach the whole nation, it would be easy to believe the news as the most powerful context (Blackledge 2005:123). There is, however, another context which grants increased authority and legitimacy, that of the legal domain.

As HK is not considered a democracy, politically speaking, the term ‘free’ is best employed in this case rather than ‘democratic’. As we shall see in section 5.2.2, in non-democratic societies such as China, the line between political and legal domains/discourses is not only frequently blurred but also works in a symbiotic manner to maintain the current status quo. Jurisdictionally, HK falls under the purview of China’s central government yet is exempt from certain policies and laws enacted on the Mainland.

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Although there had been other longstanding issues within the HK region concerning democratisation, the white paper issued in August 2014 by China’s central government was widely seen as the catalyst for the demonstrations. Various social groups mobilised against the proposition of ‘universal suffrage with Chinese characteristics’, embarking on a near two month long civil disobedience campaign which became known internationally as the Umbrella
Movement. From the newspapers article examined, one thing is clear, the status quo of Hong Kong society had been disrupted. While the ‘normal’ state of affairs could have been interpreted according to the activists’ perspective i.e. that the proposition made in the white paper sought to (further?) suppress HK freedoms, local and regional media outlets were quick to adopt the elite’s point of view by steering the issues away from democratisation and closer to that which suited the governing authorities i.e. impact on the economy. As such, the status quo was essentially defined by the ruling authorities, which the Umbrella Movement was seen to have upset. The point to be made here is that of what happened after the demonstrations. As the demonstrations ‘ended’ in December 2014, the beginning of 2015 saw the publication of several official documents by the HK Government (2015):

- Report on the Recent Community and Political Situation in Hong Kong (2015c)
- Chief Executive's policy address of 2015 Uphold the Rule of Law, Seize the Opportunities, Make the Right Choices – Pursue Democracy, Boost the Economy, Improve People’s livelihood (2015d)
- 2017 Seize the Opportunity – Method for Selecting the Chief Executive by Universal Suffrage, Consultation Document (2015b)

All published in January 2015, these documents can be seen as the result of the discussions brought about by the events of the Umbrella Movement. One of the main arguments manifested itself as the economic stability discourse, which as it shifted down the chain of discourse saw some of the general populace adopting and repeating (see 4.1.1, f; 5.1.1, a) and so gained more voices and thus legitimacy; by the same token, the economic stability discourse shifted upwards as well as the arguments were made official (again) through the publication of the above governmental documents. Consensus was firmly established. The title of the policy address encapsulates the sum of these arguments rather succinctly. ‘Uphold the rule of law’ is a direct reflection on the demonstrations that were widely seen to be a “series of unlawful rallies” (HK Government 2015d), ‘seize the opportunities’ and ‘make the right choices’ urges the people to accept what has been promoted as ‘universal suffrage’ by both Mainland and Hong Kong governments. Negative consequences and representations of the protests are implicitly expressed in the three catch phrases, which as a whole ‘anticipates the voices in opposition’ (Blackledge 2005:142).

The importance of news framing further elucidates the non-negotiability of discourses as they move along chains of discourse,

...to study framing [...] is to study power: the power to shape – and distort – public perceptions; the power to promote – or marginalize – competing perspectives on public problems; and the power, therefore, to promote or inhibit the political goals of various societal groups” (Lawrence 2010:272)

To recap, the most prominent frames used were those of responsibility, conflict and economic consequences. The PRC newspapers emphasised most on that of responsibility, the HK press on the financial difficulties while the ROC newspapers’ variety in topoi made it difficult to pinpoint just one framing of events, thus indicating restraint in laying blame as well as an attempt at analysing the situation rather than being critical towards it. Repeated referral to the OCLP demonstrations as ‘illegal’ (see 5.1.2, a-f) provided a basis from which to anchor several of the newspapers’ main arguments, mainly the HK and PRC newspapers. The alleged unlawfulness of the Umbrella Movement demonstrations provided a platform from which to be able to address accountability, highlight the financial difficulties the demonstrations were seen to cause and construct the conflict in terms of ‘Us vs. Them’. Yet, for all the sources that alleged the demonstrations to be ‘illegal’ not only did grassroots movement groups not seem to provide

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15 Semetko & Valkenburg’s (2000 in de Vreese 2005:56) study of news framing on national print and television news in the European political context concluded the responsibility frame as “the most commonly used frame followed by conflict and economic consequences frame”.

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a response contradicting the statements, there was no mention (in the articles or other readings) about a clause in the Basic Law of HKSAR, which stipulates,

Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and to strike. (Article 27, The Basic Law of HKSAR 2012:11)

Moreover, justifications as to the OCLP’s breach of the law seemed to have been left implicit in the articles analysed. While this line of questioning may have been obvious enough to ignore\(^\text{16}\), it does raise questions as to why certain lines of enquiry are brought up over others.

The responsibility frame is briefly worth discussing here in that it remains ambiguous as to who is deemed accountable. On the one hand, the OCLP demonstrators’ were holding the HK administration responsible for just accepting ‘universal suffrage with Chinese characteristics’ as proposed in the State Council’s White Paper (2014), on the other hand the HK government was seen to be mainly laying blame on the protesters as a form of attributing responsibility for the social disruption caused, while voices emanating from Beijing maintained the onus is on the HK government to ‘educate’ their citizens concerning political issues (see 4.1.3, w; Appendix II). As the responsibility frame was mostly used in the PRC newspapers, this strongly suggests that Mainland officials are holding the SAR’s administration responsible. The HK newspapers mostly played off of the conflict and economic consequences frame. Perhaps this is no surprise as historically the region had been built prioritising economic prosperity and so the most significant social disruption would manifest itself in terms of financial consequences. It allows the events of the Umbrella Movement to be understood as ‘monetary losses’ suffered on behalf of business owners and consumers as the media reaches a wide public (see 4.1.1, f, 5.1.1, a). Such arguments not only overshadow more pertinent issues such as human rights as well as undermine the right to certain constitutional freedoms such as freedom of speech and assembly – which had been conveniently ignored by the media. Both Taiwanese newspapers saw elements of responsibility attribution as well, although this was aimed towards the HK authorities’ treatment of protesters, it was nevertheless more common across the other articles that protesters were seen as responsible for the perceived chaos in Hong Kong. Van Dijk (2003:85) notes,

[unless the readers or listeners have access to alternative information, or mental resources to oppose such persuasive messages, the result of such manipulation may be the formation of the preferred models of specific situations, which may in turn be generalised to more general, preferred knowledge, attitudes or ideologies.]

The point of ‘alternative information’ is interesting because of the context in which English-language news reports are produced in HK, ROC and PRC. Assuming the majority of the local population in all three regions are predominantly ‘Chinese’ speakers, English-language press may then be taken as the alternative source of information. However, if we take into account that the target audience of the English press in these regions tend not to be ‘Chinese’ speakers, then what further/other alternative sources of information could/would van Dijk’s quote be referring to? A likely answer in this case would be the alternative sources of international media outlets operating within the regions such as the International Herald Tribune in HK; access to digital media outlets also seems like a possibility in all three regions albeit limited in the PRC. As arguments are repeated by different sources, and information disseminated across various media outlets, it is then easy to see not only how political discourses are transformed into public discourses as they move from the institutional/political realm to the societal/civic realm; these arguments become more pervasive as they solidify as ‘common-sense’ reasonings (Blackledge

\(^{16}\) A suggested reason is that OCLP/Umbrella Movement self-identified as a "civil disobedience campaign" and as such never contested the issue of 'illegality'. OCLP (2015b) published online a 'Disobedience Manual' detailing the processes of what it means to undertake such a campaign as well as how to deal with the consequences:

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2003; van Dijk 2003). As such, media messages along with official political discourse may be seen as serving the HK government’s (and by default China’s) interests. An interesting perspective would be that of the Chinese-language media’s political discourse side-by-side with the English-language discourses found, as it would certainly shed more light on the similarities and/or differences of how linguistically divergent discourses on the same topic operate.

If we were to speculate, for a moment, as to what an alternative framing of events could have looked like, the range of issues and discourses might have appeared more diverse. The goals as set forth by the OCLP encompass the values of “Democracy, civic participation, non-violence” (OCLP 2015a). A quote by Martin Luther King Jr. on the OCLP blog (2015) headlines the introductory page, “One has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws”. This in itself points to the activists’ ‘preferred frame’ as it were, as it would have provided a platform from which to address the potentially ‘flawed’ political system currently operating in HK as well as raise the issues of democratisation and civic participation. Looking back on the articles from both Mainland newspapers and SCMP (2014), the focus was on social disruption rather than ‘larger’ issues mentioned above. Even the other articles, from the Standard (2014), the China Post (2014) and Taipei Times (2014), which all seemed less pro-establishment, did not use the morality frame either and instead focused on much of the same material. Only one article, from the Taipei Times (2014b) directly addressed the topic of ‘Asian’ democratisation. Simply put, had the ‘morality frame’ been evoked by the English-language press in HK, not only would it have provided a discursive space from which the OCLP could properly articulate its views but also allowed for the rights of citizens to be emphasised on more assertively. Moreover, had the media chosen to adopt the grassroots movement’s ‘preferred model’, they would have also been seen as adopting the role of watchdog. Instead, framing of the various arguments as expressed by a variety of sources have led to an elite preferential frame/model of the handling of events. Through predominantly negative representations of the Umbrella Movement activists, positive depictions of law enforcement as well as upholding of politicians’ word on the issues at hand, both HK and Mainland English-language press essentially cement public understanding of demonstrations as an inherently negative event. Van Dijk (1996:16) cautions,

> Once given the (carefully selected) ‘facts’, although presented in a seemingly objective fashion, the readers will themselves produce the preferred models of the elites and may even act accordingly: An active consensus will replace passive or tacit consent. Ideological control in that case is virtually total, or ‘hegemonic’, precisely because persuasive text and talk are no longer seen as ideological but as self-evidently true...

The Taiwanese English press, while tending towards reporting the OCLP demonstrations using a ‘liberal voice’ stand in the minority. Van Dijk (1996:13) notes that such manipulation as a form of media enactment is usually evaluated in negative terms, because mediated information is biased or concealed in such a way that the knowledge and beliefs of the audience are changed in a direction that is not necessarily in its best interest.

While space was accorded to the demonstrators’ and various pan-democratic HK lawmakers in all the articles, except for the CD, the voice of those opposing the Umbrella movement – notably the Chief Executive as well as other Beijing officials and some members of the public – has not only seemed ‘louder’ but also able to steer debate in a direction which has favoured their interests.

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17 A meeting was held between several student representatives and government officials, and was televised live in October 2014. By this account, it can be said that space was accorded to the OCLP/Umbrella Movement as both groups entered into dialogue. It was deemed that neither side reached a compromise (BBC 2014; Pomfret & Baldwin 2014)
As voices of the various social actors are reported on and represented in a myriad of ways, the manner in which each representation is contextualised then acts to either enhance or dim the interests vested in the outcome of a particular event. As the English-language media report on the OCLP demonstrations through the preferential frames and arguments of the authorities not only may the media be seen as dismissing their role of ‘watchdog’ but also as adopting an explicit stance in events. Van Dijk (1996:28-29) notes,

[t]hat the news media generally do not act as major opponents of political or corporate policies and interests is not because of their powerlessness, but because of the fundamental similarities of ideological positions. […] there is no question that the news media are being controlled by these other power elites […] it can be said that their common ideologies are jointly produced, each acting within its own sphere of influence and control, but each also dependent on the other.

The sum of these ‘strategies-as-effects-and-practices’ can thus be understood as “the establishment, maintenance and contestation of the social dominance of particular social groups: achieving hegemony entails achieving a measure of success in projecting certain particulars as universals” (Fairclough 2003:41).

5.2.2 DISCUSSION: SOVEREIGNTY & LEGITIMACY

3. How do these mediatised political/institutional discourses reflect/play within the larger socio-/geo-political framework of ‘one country, two systems’?

Although Deng Xiaoping had overseen the Sino-British negotiations concerning Hong Kong’s return to ‘Chinese’ sovereignty and is widely seen as the architect of the ‘one country, two systems’ framework, by the time the Handover took place, it was President Jiang Zemin who attended the July 1st ceremony. The much-anticipated event was – and perhaps still is, for the PRC - “a matter of national pride and honour [with] the eventual handover […] akin to ‘using snow to clean up the blood of the hundred years of national humiliation’” (Jiang 1997 cited in Tok 2013:111). The issue of sovereignty was – and to a certain extent, still is – conceived as a highly contentious matter concerning HK (perhaps more so concerning Taiwan) but also held symbolic importance for China. Hong Kong’s iconic status for Beijing is captured in a comment made to Margaret Thatcher during the Sino-British negotiations by Deng Xiaoping (2008:12-13 in Tok 2013:113):

If China in 1997 […] cannot recover Hong Kong, no one in the Chinese leadership and in the government can answer to the Chinese people […] if Hong Kong remained unrecovered after fifteen years, there will be no reason for the [Chinese] people to trust us, and any Chinese government should relinquish its power and leave the political scene. There is no other option.

Expounding on this point, Tok (2013:113) emphasises,

Hong Kong was hence the ultimate symbol of Chinese nationalism and of the CCP’s legitimacy […] The two systems must survive Hong Kong. In this deal, the Mainland Chinese regime stands to gain the most from the successful implementation of the arrangement, though the stakes are just as high: its political and international credibility hangs in the balance.

Article 5 of the Basic Law of HKSAR (HK Government 2012:2) stipulates, “The socialist system and policies shall not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years”, a promise kept in the immediate period following 1997. Beijing had explicitly forbidden “Chinese officials at lower levels […] to interfere in the affairs of Hong Kong and senior officials in Beijing had scrupulously avoided even making unnecessary public comments on Hong Kong affairs” (Wang & Wong 2013:14). This may explain in part the absence of any PRC voices in the articles (see 5.1.2).

Insight into social and political discourses found in the English-language media operating in all three regions has shed some light as to how discursive spaces provide a platform from
which to contest certain socio-political matters. Within the context of ‘one country, two systems’, such discourses then become all the more important as they “draw out different symbolic resources to interpret historical events in such a way as to exert critical influences on the dynamics of struggle over political and cultural identities” (Lee et al. 2002:128). Fairclough (2003:101) states,

> the effectiveness of such hegemonic meaning-making is not guaranteed of course – it takes place within a struggle over meaning, and depends for instance on how pervasively these meaning relations are repeated in various types of texts, and how successfully alternatives are excluded

We have seen the extent to which these ‘meaning relations’ are made through the media, policy documents and reiterated by the general public. While the English-language press in Taiwan seems to mostly resist the Mainland’s media hegemony concerning discourses on the OCLP demonstrations – thus potentially positioning itself as counter-hegemonic - the HK media may be viewed as tacitly accepting the elite authoritarian frames/discourses from Beijing.

In order to further understand how such frames and discourses contribute and further the issue of sovereignty/governance and legitimacy, we must first look at how ‘sovereignty’ is conceptualised by the PRC. In Managing China’s Sovereignty, Tok (2013) argues that China’s perception of ‘sovereignty’ is largely misunderstood, it is not an ‘all or nothing’ absolute conceptualisation but rather a complex, layered – even flexible – notion based on the current situation at hand.

Until the late 19th century, China’s vision of the world had operated under the concept of tianxia (天下, lit: all under heaven),

> the tenets of Confucianism formed the backbone of this system, where the world, known or unknown, was seen as both unified and hierarchical. China […] was deemed centre of this tianxia cosmos – hence the name ‘middle kingdom’ […] The Son of Heaven, yet another Chinese construct, reigned supreme over this cosmos. However, the superficiality of this supreme authority meant that direct rule or governance was not essential to its reign (Tok 2013:47).

The western concept of ‘sovereignty’ had been adopted in the late 19th century, after defeat of the Manchu dynasty by foreign forces during the Opium Wars, when the Qing dynasty decided they needed to change tact concerning foreign diplomacy (Tok 2013). However, in order to make such alien concepts intelligible to the Chinese public, “[such] ideas were frequently expressed not in their own terms, but in relation to traditional Chinese values and teachings” (Tok 2013:43). Through countless translations of the term ‘sovereignty’ into Chinese, the final product came to mean both ‘power’ and ‘right’ or at least the “idea of power [that had] the propensity to give rise to right” (Tok 2013:42). Emphasis thus was placed on the ‘right’ of governance i.e. de jure over de facto sovereignty,

> The Mainland’s approach towards its sovereignty has been eclectic. This eclecticism can only make sense when sovereignty is divided into its de jure and de facto components. Beijing’s focus has always been to preserve and retain a de jure face of China’s sovereignty, whereas it has been seen, from time to time, to be shifting its position – willingly or otherwise – on de facto sovereignty (Tok 2013:161)

In this light, the treatment of the PRC vis-à-vis its administrative and autonomous regions and provinces – special or otherwise – as well as Taiwan differs considerably from one to the other. If we consider for a moment, the naming of its respective regions, it is interesting to note that Tibet – classified as an ‘autonomous region’ – entails more self-governance nominally than Hong Kong – a special administrative region – yet, in practice, Hong Kong seems more self-governing than Tibet does; Hong Kong has its own passport, customs border control and is able to participate internationally in organisations such as the WHO and WTO, albeit under the name ‘Hong Kong, China’ (Tok 2013). In fact, the PRC may also be seen as encompassing three types of judicial systems as the Mainland, Hong Kong and Macau all operate under different law systems (Tok 2013). These few examples confirm the PRC’s separation between de jure
and *de facto* type governance(s). As long as the notion “that a single sovereignty resides in Beijing is not fundamentally challenged” (Tok 2013:3), the PRC generally maintains a distance in handling ‘internal’ affairs of its special administrative regions. However, judging by the media treatment, it would seem that the OCLP demonstrations did confront the PRC’s sovereignty by questioning the proposition of ‘universal suffrage with Chinese characteristics’ which led to the demonstrations in 2014 and as such set in motion a course whereby Chinese sovereignty had to be re-emphasised within the polity.

Although, the PRC voices seemed rather muffled concerning the OCLP issue (exceptions in the secondary articles), a great deal of ‘indirect’ interference on behalf of Beijing may be seen in the handling of the demonstrations. As arguments made by HK authorities tended to focus on economic consequences, responsibility and emphasis on ‘democracy with the rule of law’, not only did this highlight the extent of the disruption to the status quo, it also served to bring into focus the degree to which media discourses converged with that of political discourses. In this way, we are able to see just how the media functions as an extension of the political branch as a ‘state ideological apparatus’ (Althusser 2006). By aligning itself with the media line of the PRC, HK media essentially positioned itself on dominant side of the conflict – it is included as an agent for maintaining the status quo which sees economic balance and the rule of law as order. Such a collusion is further reinforced by the fact that those in charge of the media in HK have pro-China affiliations (Lai 2007) – “that the news media generally do not act as major opponents of political or corporate policies and interests is not because of their powerlessness, but because of the fundamental similarities of ideological positions” (van Dijk 1996:28-29).

The socio-cultural arguments present in the secondary articles further attest to the fact that the PRC’s *de jure* sovereignty had been directly challenged. Emphasis lay heavily on the lack of cultural unity on behalf of Hong Kongers (see Appendix II). This sees the PRC revalorising the notion of ‘nationality’/‘nationhood’ and belonging in an attempt to bridge the cultural gap between the Mainland and HK in order to properly construct their ‘imagined community’. Anderson (2006:7) attaches importance to the idea of ‘community’ in that “the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship”. So while, such cultural arguments may allude to equality between HK and the PRC – ‘there is no distinction because we share the same national and culture identity’ – simultaneously such arguments also conceive of “how Hong Kong can play a role in protecting the country’s sovereignty and interest” which also emphasises the hierarchy between both regions (SCMP 2014c).

Displays of the ‘two systems’ aspect of the framework is increasingly blurred and dismissed in favour of the ‘one country’ aspect. While the business and media elites are seen to contribute to such blurring of social spheres – through indirect support of the State – the PRC’s *de jure* sovereignty is also ensured legally.

The sum of these manifestations is further sought in the co-option of various sectors in society deemed to represent the interests of the people. The HK Government’s (2015b:9) document entitled *2017 Seize the Opportunity* explains the methods by which universal suffrage is to be attained in HK as well as details who the ‘broadly representative nominating committee’ will comprise:

- industrial, commercial and financial sectors
- the professions
- labour, social services, religious and other sectors
- members of the Legislative Council, representatives of members of the District Council, the Heung Yee Kuk, HK deputies to the National People’s Congress and representatives of the HK members of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

By having these expressed in written form, such inclusion and the assumption that these sectors make up the interests of the people, and hence should be satisfactory for universal suffrage to proceed in HK, further cements the position that a consensus has been reached. Visibility of such dominant arguments via repetition and recontextualisations across various societal and political domains points to, what Young (2013:33) referred to, as “create[ing] the impression of consensus and uniformity in an otherwise-fragmented society where large differences exist between rich and poor, and urban and rural…” Coupled with the analysis of both primary and secondary articles, not only does it point to the HK authorities – and by default the PRC authorities – as the dominant frame of reference for interpretations and understanding of a situation but also ensured that their interests were prioritised as the basis from which to establish consensus and maintain status quo. Such mediatised and institutional/political discourses on the OCLP demonstrations, then, appear to further the PRC’s notion of sovereignty – thus legitimacy – through ultimate focus on ‘centring institutions’ which “involves either perceptions or real processes of homogenisation and uniformisation: orienting towards such a centre involves (real or perceived) reduction of difference and the creation of recognisably ‘normative’ meaning” (Blommaert 2005:75)

In this sense, the concept of tianxia still remains an underlying force in how China views and exerts its sovereignty over HK and so, Taiwan and Macau. It was the “very ideological foundation on which imperial courts of China were founded, and the myth of that supremeness required constant reaffirmation and legitimisation [and] a cultural and political inclination to gravitate towards the centre” (Tok 2013:32, 47).

Playing on China’s penchant for employing the family allegory, one way to conceive of the relationship is that of a mother and her 3 children - whereby the children are out playing, but when the time comes for them to go home, only two out of the three do so. In this scenario, both Hong Kong and Macau are perceived as the ‘good’ children who’ve returned home, while Taiwan is seen as the ‘bad’ child who has yet to do so. The PRC’s tendency to view itself as the ‘motherland’ is a well-noted phenomenon, to the point that it is even echoed in official documents (see Lee et al. 2002; Flowerdew 2012 for more in-depth study of metaphors in Chinese political/institutional discourse):

a. As a result, Hong Kong got rid of colonial rule and returned to the embrace of the motherland… (State Council PRC, 2014)

b. The red flag represents the motherland and the bauhinia represents Hong Kong. (Basic Law HKSAR 2012:84)

It is striking enough that the PRC refers to itself as the ‘motherland’ in official documents, however the more striking thing may in fact be how this tendency has also ‘spread’ to the general public,

c. I feel like a child who has grown up under the care of a foster mother, but now it is time to reunite with my natural mother. I treasure the warmth I feel in the arms of my foster mother and worry my natural mother is a fierce woman. I feel anxious. –A HK citizen, South China Morning Post, June 20 1997 (cited in Lee et al. 2002:109)

While the quote by the HK citizen expresses ambivalence, the common factor linking all of the above examples is the implied hierarchical relationship between China and Hong Kong (examples a, b), and Britain, China and Hong Kong (example c). Hong Kong in most cases, it seems, is perceived as the one holding the least authority. Nonetheless, it depicts the gravitational pull that the PRC is seen to have as well as highlights the extent to which influence is exerted; it is here that the crucial points lie in understanding how legitimacy is attained via
the exercise of governance in the ‘Chinese’ realm – ‘constant reaffirmation’ and ‘cultural and political inclination’ – “[t]he Middle Kingdom syndrome, or the Middle Kingdom complex, may have made it psychologically difficult for the Chinese leadership to abandon its sense of superiority as the centre…” (Tu 2005:147). The construct of ‘sovereignty’ thus has a historical, almost mythical, hold on the PRC which determines its handling of HKSAR and the ROC.

6 CONCLUSION

The press reports in all three regions on the Occupy Central demonstrations in Hong Kong portrayed an overwhelmingly negative view of the events. Analysis conducted on articles from English-language newspapers in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan mainly saw the OCLP demonstrators and supporters as instigators of disorder and those in positions of authority as the gatekeepers of order and the rule of law.

The movement ‘Occupy Central with Love and Peace’ has been repeatedly castigated and singled out by the loyal and senior central regime members for using civil disobedience to threaten the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. They have subsequently been accused of colluding with external and foreign powers to overthrow the Hong Kong and Chinese governments, and a variety of supporters associated with the movement have encountered what many considered as police and political harassment. (Garrett 2015:21)

Yet, while the English-language press may have portrayed the demonstrations as a disruption of the status quo via adoption of elite framing of events, such discontent may also be viewed from another perspective. The degree to which social and political discontent has manifested itself in Hong Kong may be also encapsulated by the fact that more than 50 000 protests have been recorded since 1997, earning HK the moniker of “city of protests”; furthermore, the day of the Handover, July 1st has also become a traditional day of demonstration (Garrett 2015:v). Differences in perception and representation manifested mostly between the ROC and PRC newspapers while most similarities were shared among the PRC and HK newspapers. Even though Taiwanese news articles displayed a degree of divergence when it came to representing the events and overall message output, the discursive strategies employed still relied on negative appraisals. The focus of such appraisals, though, varied between ROC and HK and PRC newspapers. Similarities found between Mainland and HK media indicate an ideological alignment – hegemonic – between the two nations and positions Taiwanese media as potentially counter-hegemonic.

This paper set out to examine media perceptions and representations on the 2014 Occupy Central demonstrations in Hong Kong. It sheds light on the power of language in media and politics as manifested through the discursive strategies, effects and practices that mediatised political and institutional discourses wield in ‘Asia’. This paper equally aspired to address Shixu’s (2009 cited in Flowerdew 2012:11) complaint on the imposition of “[w]estcentric definitions and judgements of non-Western situations”. The combination of a range of ‘non-Western’ and ‘Western’ analytical and theoretical frameworks employed in this dissertation aimed to influence researcher positionality so that the point of departure for analysis could come as close to what Bhabha (1994) deems a ‘third space’ and that of a “reflexive ‘tweener’” (Luke 2002 in Lin 2015). Even though, at times, analysis fell back on ‘Western’ normative points of references, through the problematisation of ‘Asian’ perspectives on the OCLP demonstrations this paper de-constructed and highlighted the significance of notions such as ‘Chinese’ and ‘democracy’ in the ‘Asian’ context. In doing so, this dissertation has demonstrated and explained that such concepts do not always neatly abide by fixed nor static categorisations but rather are subject to change and transformation depending on context. The OCLP demonstrations which took place in Hong Kong not only focalised outstanding socio-political
issues within the polity in relation to its closest neighbour, the PRC but also presented a reality that could and would have consequences in Cross-Straits relations with the ROC.

While the object of this dissertation is not to dissect the Umbrella movement in terms of success or failure, this point deserves some mention as the analysis demonstrated media discourses as cultivating hegemonic practices. Briefly discussing the outcome of OCLP is important for understanding and interpreting the reasons for why the dominant discourse is the one that it is and how it came to be so.

In Gramscian terms, we are thus able to see two competing hegemonies – that of political society i.e. the State, HKSAR and PRC governments and that of civil society i.e. the Occupy Central movement. Based on the results of the analysis, we are able to conclude that the State did achieve hegemony as arguments and representations made in the media fostered the illusion of established consensus across all levels of society in Hong Kong. The pinnacle of this hegemony was when such arguments were finally legislated into policy processes in HK. The document 2017 Seize Opportunity (HK Government 2015b) managed not only to demonstrate its claimed ‘universal’ appeal but also highlighted the OCLP’s perceived failure of asserting their views as being able to cut across all intersections of society.

Further reflected in the media treatment of the OCLP demonstrations were the challenges that the PRC government faced concerning sovereignty over Hong Kong. Disruptions to the status quo in Hong Kong were deemed by the central authorities as a threat to ‘Chinese’ sovereignty which in turn ‘provoked’ Beijing to reinforce the ‘one country, two systems’ framework as a reminder that Hong Kong is now a special administrative region of China. Debates concerning political reform – democratisation – tended to focus on and were confounded by discourses of economic stability as well as socio-cultural similarities in the aftermath of the OCLP protests. This begs the question as to which platform the debates were taking place on – cultural, political, economic or social? Either this is indicative of how political issues are able to cut across all societal domains or of a process whereby certain issues are thrown into the limelight to obscure more legitimate ones. However, perhaps this insistence on the ‘one country’ aspect has been misplaced by the central authorities as it would seem that the ‘two systems’ aspect of the governing framework already provides a discursive and perhaps even legal space within which political reform – as desired by the OCLP group – could flourish and without the PRC ‘losing face’. Nevertheless, not only does this demonstrate the extent to which such systems are politicised in ‘Asia’ but also that in Hong Kong, dominant interests have been and still are consistently upheld through a systemic social and institutional hegemony.

[t]he current Hong Kong governance model is an outdated system that is ill-suited for modern Hong Kong. It is an extension of the original colonial model, one that is managed by a handful of professionals and business elites. Supported by an efficient public service system and an independent judicial system, the model’s main purpose is to reproduce an environment conducive to businesses (Zheng & Tok 2013:96).

Having had the experience of a British colony and Chinese special administrative region, HK has experienced conditions which are nothing short of unique. While such circumstances have fostered HK into a world-renowned financial centre with a singular geo-political standing, the repercussions of the OCLP demonstrations in bringing up political reform is only subject to further conjecture as to how the PRC handles ‘other’ regions such as Taiwan and Macau.

Despite the negative portrayal of the demonstrations, what they certainly did achieve was to highlight the degree of discord between the State and its people, bring to the fore issues of democratisation in a region not known for ‘democratic’ ideals and also generate new forms of socio-political participation. The Hong Kong Free Press (HKFP) has emerged “amid rising concerns over declining press freedom in Hong Kong and during an important time in the city’s constitutional development” (HKFP 2015 – About Us). Not only does this confirm the
importance that the role of media may play in constructing and shaping perceptions on topics but also that, in the context of HK, there is space from which new and critical voices may be heard.

Eighteen years have passed since Hong Kong became a Chinese special administrative region, and although this period may be deemed by some as ‘too short’ to assess ‘Chinese’ rule in Hong Kong, it could equally be argued that an entire generation of voters has also emerged. This generation distinguishes itself by breaking the common misconception that “Hong Kong had no identity or culture of its own” (Shih & Jones 2014:10). The Umbrella Movement broke the mould of colonial and post-colonial laissez-faire mentalities by not only ‘having a say’ but also aspiring to civic and political participation.
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Official/Governmental Texts


**APPENDICES**

**Appendix I**

**Newspaper Articles**

**Hong Kong**

- **SCMP 2014**
  Chan, Samuel, Alan Yu, Tony Cheung & Ng Kang-chung. 16 Dec 2014. ‘Occupy is over’: Hong Kong chief executive announces end to protests as Causeway Bay is cleared. *South China Morning Post*, sec. News HK Protests.

- **SCMP 2014b**

- **SCMP 2014c**
  SCMP Staff Reporters. 14 Dec 2014. Hong Kong needs to be ‘re-enlightened’ on law following Occupy protests, says top Beijing official. *South China Morning Post*, sec. News HK Politics.

- **TS 2014**

- **TS 2014b**

**Taiwan**

- **CP 2014**

- **CP 2014b**

- **TT 2014**

- **TT 2014b**

**China**

- **CD 2014**

- **CD 2014b**

- **GT 2014**

- **GT 2014b**

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Appendix II

The following presents in-depth summaries for the analysis of the secondary articles.

1. Hong Kong

1.1 South China Morning Post (2014b) Now Hong Kong must face the big questions in wake of Occupy by Tony Cheung & Fanny W. Y. Fung; Section: NEWS > Hong Kong OCCUPY CENTRAL; Sat 13 Dec 2014

All social actors deemed ‘high credibility’ are identified by their job title and name e.g. Chen Zuoer, former deputy director of the HK and Macau Affairs office, Professor Lau Siu-kai etc… Among them are association directors, lawmakers, and academics. Those identified as supporters of the Occupy Central demonstrations, on the other hand, are not named but rather collectivised e.g. students, activists, citizens, they. Use of synecdoche is also used to background certain actors,

a. Now Hong Kong must face the big questions in wake of Occupy [HEADLINE]
b. And the chance of minor improvements to Beijing’s framework could have also vanished… (SCMP 13 Dec 2014)

While ‘Beijing’ in example b most likely refers to the PRC government, in the headline ‘Hong Kong’ may refer to the people or its government, it is left implicit. Many instances of ‘entertain’ were present in the article:

c. They had hoped they could force authorities to give in…
d. Some local academics also believe it is not too late to restart dialogue.
e. Beijing appeared to be toughening its stance towards Hong Kong. (SCMP 13 Dec 2014)

Use of entertaining propositions necessarily open space up for alternative voices, be it supporters of the Occupy Central movement or those against. Reporting verbs such as ‘said’ are mainly used when direct quotes are introduced clearly attributing the speaker to its quote. Concerning indirect quotes, however, authorial voice seems more willing to speculate as to its delivery,

f. …as Beijing has made it clear that it will not back down.
g. On August 31, the National People’s Congress ruled that HK could pick its leader by “one man, one vote” in 2017…
h. Students, activists and citizens urged Beijing to scrap the ruling, saying it deprived them of a “genuine choice” of candidates.
i. Chen Zuoer […] reiterated that he thought Occupy Central was HK’s version of a “colour revolution” …
j. But Chan believed there was still something that the HK government and the pan-democratic camp could do – mainly by making use of the “multiparty platform”, which Lam has pledged to consider establishing…
k. Lau also urged the pan-democratic camp to “rethink” how they want to handle their relationship with the central government. (SCMP 13 Dec 2014)

Noteworthy is the use of verbs ‘to urge’, ‘to believe’ and ‘to make clear’ - without the quote being explicitly reproduced, the authors are making direct evaluations as to how it might have originally been said/inferring from everything that has already been said, how it is to be interpreted (examples f, h, j). Use of the verb ‘to rule’ (example g) reinforces the PRC government’s claim to govern HK as the NPC has the final say as to how ‘universal suffrage’ should be carried out. Two exceptions in the use of verbs ‘to stress’ and ‘to call for’ are associated with direct quotes in the examples below,

l. In an interview with the China News Service, Chen […] called for a “rethink and planning on how to rule Hong Kong”
m. He stressed the need to understand the “three pairs of concepts that must not be treated as equals”

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Use of the verb ‘stressed’ following by ‘call for’ in example k and l may also be seen as a partial authorial intervention, emphasising that Chen’s words are to be taken seriously. Although, in example j by not reproducing the quote fully this could also be seen as authorial distancing itself from the quoted source.

Graduation sees a sharpening of force i.e. by scaling not typically scalable categories. Such sharpening, according to Martin & White (2005:139) “indicates maximal investment by the authorial voice in the value position being advanced”. Thus, authorial voice is seen to be in agreement with the propositions being advanced, most notably via the directly quoted sources used throughout the article. Mention and even comparison of the OCLP demonstrations as a “colour revolution” further serves to highlight the illegitimacy of the demonstrations as ‘colour revolutions’ are typically considered to be ‘anti-establishment’ (example i)

Lexical choices also point to overt evaluations being made on behalf of authorial voice,

n. The shouting is over and the talking must begin… [LEAD]
o. Lawmakers and academics who spoke to South China Morning Post were generally pessimistic about the prospect of achieving universal suffrage…
p. …Wu Chi-wai said that by suggesting that national interest was more important that regional prosperity… (SCMP 13 Dec 2014)

Voice is essentially given to figures holding office within the HK government, while that of the demonstrators or any leader of the OCLP or students’ movement is virtually silenced – they are mentioned but not consulted or seen to be contributing to the ‘dialogue’. While content of the direct quotes express ambivalence and uncertainty, it is unclear whether such comments are there to ‘appease’ Beijing or whether they serve to show that HK administration is not fully aligned with the central government.

Arguments pointing to the importance of “development interests and maintaining [of] a region’s prosperity and stability” naturally indicate topoi of finance (Blackledge 2005; SCMP 2014b). In another example,

q. “It can also adopt a more inclusive style of governance to mend ties, and roll out policies to alleviate social grievances” [Professor Lau Siu-kai]

The topos of authority is used to ‘legitimise’ the HK administration’s governance over Hong Kong. By proposing, that the ‘local administration’ re-evaluates its ‘style of governance’ may mean that the professor ultimately attributes responsibility to the local administration. Yet earlier in the article, he also treats the OCLP demonstrations as illegal e.g. “Beijing is also kind of shocked to see people [fighting for democracy] through illegal actions… and thus inclined towards [being more] conservative” (SCMP 2014b). Another interesting aspect in the quote is the explicit intervention by the author i.e. through use of brackets; such interpolations indicate instances of pronunace as well as signal that some of their readership may not have fully caught on to the professor’s reference thereby “acknowledging the heteroglossic diversity” of the text (Martin & White 2005:128).

Intertextuality is equally present through Chen’s words, “[t]he actual significance of the waves of struggle surrounding the power to rule is no less than that of the 1997 handover. [The former could be] even more complicated” (SCMP 2014b). Bringing up the ‘issues’ of sovereignty, which had been a point of contention throughout the negotiations preceding 1997, is another way of likening the consequences of the OCLP protests with a much larger issue and highlights the PRC’s view that OCLP was seen to directly challenge the central authority on issues of governance (for further discourses on the handover of HK see Lee et al. 2002).

1.2 South China Morning Post (2014c) Hong Kong needs to be ‘re-enlightened’ on law following Occupy protests, says top Beijing official by Staff Reporters; Section: News > Hong Kong Politics; Sun 14 Dec 2014
Most social actors are referred to by name and job title e.g. Zhang Rongshun, vice-chairman of the legislative affairs commission under the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Dr Chan Kin-man, a co-founder of Occupy (SCMP 2014c). Only ‘high credibility’ sources are used in the article i.e. indirectly and directly quoted. Mention of others e.g. ‘citizens’, ‘Hongkongers’ are not seen to be aligned with either OCLP or the authorities but rather collectivised and mentioned ‘in passing’ (SCMP 2014c).

Authorial voice is seen as engaging with a variety of voices on both sides of the OCLP movement – important figures on both sides of the ‘conflict’ are directly quoted. Nevertheless, it is also difficult to discern authorial voice, as some quotes are not fully reproduced while others are,

a. Hong Kong needs “re-enlightenment” to give citizens a better understanding “one country, two systems”, a top Beijing official said…

b. He urged Hongkongers to “reflect deeply” on how to contribute to the nation’s security and other interests [Zhang Rongshu, vice-chairman of the legislative affairs commission under the National People’s Congress Standing Committee]

c. Chen, former deputy director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office said the city should “learn” from the protests, adding: “There is a need to have a deep reflection on how Hong Kong can play a role in protecting the country’s sovereignty and interest”. (SCMP 14 Dec 2014)

In example a and b, authorial voice may be seen as distancing itself from the proposition advanced as only a small fraction of the original quote is reproduced. Example c on the other hand displays both use of singly quoted word and fully reproduced quote. A quick look at the content of the quotes which were fully reproduced suggest that authorial voice may be endorsing Beijing’s discourse on governance i.e. how to better run HK in the wake of the OCLP demonstrations, while singly quoted instances may be seen as highlighting key words. Yet half way through the article, with a simple ‘but’ the author manages to reveal his/her true intentions – thus the section preceding ‘but’ may be seen as an instance of concession towards its readers (example d). The first half of the article works towards establishing that HK may “need to be ‘re-enlightened’” by presenting externally referenced sources’ arguments as valid; only once this is acknowledged does the authorial voice set itself against it. The second half is followed by reactions on behalf of one of the OCLP co-founders as well as the Democratic Party chairwoman. Here instances of endorsement are used,


e. “To say Hong Kong needs re-enlightenment is to further [encourage] ignorance, because we don’t lack understanding” said Dr Chan Kin-man, a co-founder of Occupy. […] [ENDORSE]

f. Alex Chow Yong-kang, secretary general of the Federation of Students, said any attempt to tighten Beijing’s approach would lead to more confrontation. Democratic Party chairwoman Emily Lau Wai-hing called Zhang’s remarks “puzzling” [PRONOUNCE/ENDORSE] (SCMP 14 Dec 2014)

Following the counter move, endorsement is highlighted by directly quoted sources partial to the OCLP movement. Adding to the argument is that even that of an “affiliate of the official China News Service” is brought it in to support what the OCLP co-founder and Democratic Party chairwoman have said (example g, h).

g. Meanwhile, a commentary dated Saturday from Chinanews.com, an affiliate of the official China News Service, struck a more optimistic note, expressing “confidence” at the city’s development amid China’s rise. [PRONOUNCE]

h. “The fact of Hong Kong’s prosperous development has invalidated those comments that badmouth Hong Kong” it said. “Whether it is in the good times or the hard times, the central government has always been supporting of Hong Kong” [ENDORSE] (SCMP 14 Dec 2014)

By introducing another PRC source, the article attempts to show that conflict is not confined to borders i.e. between HK and the PRC, but rather between groups with two different ideas of
universal suffrage. Through these pronounce/endorse instances, then, “the internal voice […] shares responsibility for the proposition with its cited source” (Martin & White 2005:126).

Referral to ‘Hong Kong’s development’ (or lack thereof) appears twice in the article, although with different meanings attached:

i. The problem with the principle, he added was a lack of “development”. “Now we should encourage further development, set a visible goal after reaching consensus so the ‘one country, two systems’ principle can further evolve” Zhang said.

j. “The fact of Hong Kong’s prosperous development has invalidated those comments that badmouth Hong Kong” it [Chinanews.com] said… (SCMP 14 Dec 2014)

Example i clearly means legal/political development while example j alludes to economic development. It seems then when it comes to political development concerning Hong Kong, this point is sorely contested among PRC authorities while economic development on the other hand is treated as given – “whether in good times or the hard times, the central government has always been supporting Hong Kong” (SCMP 2014c).

Topos of authority is evoked throughout the first half of the article as direct quotations seem to ‘fall in line’ with Beijing’s discourse on sovereignty and governance over HK; the title of the article itself already holds the topos as “Hong Kong needs to be ‘re-enlightened’…” (SCMP 2014c). Topos of culture/identity also seems to be the basis for which ‘re-enlightenment’ is necessary, “[i]t seems that some people [in Hong Kong] still cannot find an identity with the country […] there is a need to have a re-enlightenment about the ‘one country, two systems’ principle and national identity” (Zhang, SCMP 2014c). A strong presupposition is made as well in example c, “There is need to have a deep reflection on how Hong Kong can play a role in protecting the country’s sovereignty and interest” (SCMP 2014c). ‘Country’ refers to the PRC, not Hong Kong as it is officially considered a special administrative region belonging to the PRC rather than its own entity, further reinforcing China’s sovereignty claims over HK part of China.

Intertextuality and recontextualisation is signalled by the term “re-enlightenment” employed in the article and by the source. Like the ‘rule of law’ (see section 5.1.2), it refers back to a certain point in Chinese history – that of the Cultural Revolution where many were sent to rural areas of the nation to be ‘re-educated’. Not only has the term been slightly altered, from ‘education’ to ‘enlightenment’ but by doing so it could also be argued that a ‘re-enlightenment’ may be different from a ‘re-education’ despite what it essentially indexes. As the Cultural Revolution sought to purge China of elitist (capitalist) ‘rebels’ and unite China under Maoism, it could be argued that mention of ‘re-enlightenment’ may be a revised and updated version of what is needed for HK and its people to consider themselves ‘Chinese’. The one identity, one language and one ideology discourse as put forward by the PRC assumes and stresses the homogeneity of what is considered China.

1.3 The Standard (TS 2014b) Reboot pushed for public to grasp ‘one country’ by Eddie Luk;
Section: TOP NEWS; Mon 15 Dec 2014

All social actors are properly identified i.e. by name/job title. Yet the job titles seem somewhat misleading as it is unclear whether or not sources are HK or PRC officials. This could be taken as a sign that both HK and PRC’s political sphere is treated as one, thereby blurring the ‘two systems’ aspect of the framework.

Direct quotes introduced for support of arguments put forward, as such these also act as an extension of authorial voice. The Basic Law and ‘one country, two systems’ framework is the point of contention between the authorities and the people i.e. OCLP supporters and democratic groups in HK. The first half focuses on Zhang Rongshun’s comments – a PRC
official who seems to hold 2 positions – not all of his quotes are fully reproduced, save one. This gives the impression that authorial voice might be attempting to distance itself from the source, however when his quote is fully reproduced and taken in conjunction with the rest of the text, these tend towards endorsement. Furthermore, figures mentioned in the second half of the article, are introduced to corroborate Zhang’s arguments, voicing their full support for the ‘enlightenment’ (TS 2014b). OCLP and democratic factions are mentioned although only to be countered, thus restricting their ‘space’. Additionally, they are depicted as spreading false information – “the opposition camp has been giving ‘an alternative and misleading’ interpretation of the Basic Law and ‘one country, two systems’”— as well as demonstrating a lack of understanding – “Democratic Party lawmaker Emily Lau Wai-hing said she does not understand what Zhang means…” (TS 2014b). Nevertheless, heteroglossic background of the text is engaged with but exclusively for the purpose of furthering arguments rather than showing a balanced view. Elements of double voicing, specifically authorial voice and sources’ voice, can be seen to be merging as one. Graduation in the form of up-scaling and sharpening e.g. ‘important task’, ‘needs to be explained more’, ‘deeply reflect’, ‘gain more understanding’ suggest the authorial voice as construing propositions advanced as maximally warrantable (Martin & White 2005).

Topoi of authority, culture, security and national identity are all evoked and emphasise the ‘one country’ aspect of the framework. The ultimate goal though is that of “maintain[ing] Hong Kong’s long-term prosperity and stability” thus making topoi of finance the priority.

Intertextuality is equally present as the Sino-British Declaration is mentioned. By ‘rehashing’ the past, the author is then also able to dismiss it as ‘the past’ and so should be forgotten. Concerning the British lawmakers who were rejected, this constitutes the larger message of the PRC to HK and indirectly to Great Britain that they should not “interfere with the mainland’s internal affairs” (TS 2014b). This also makes up part of a larger national discourse that the PRC has previously espoused - during the event of the Handover when HK returned to Chinese sovereignty – demonstrating that responsibility no longer lies with Great Britain, which the Declaration saw the relinquishment of (see Lee et al. 2002). Reference to the declaration as a ‘theme’ is somewhat puzzling, perhaps ‘discourse’ is what is meant – there might have been incidents of students breaking out the colonial HK flag as a means of protest, indicating a return to ‘better times’ even though under the British, HK was never conceived as a democratic society.

A problem-solution narrative runs through the entire article, with the author/source putting forward proposals for what can be or should be done to ‘sort’ Hong Kong out. One of these is “more education campaigns […] to enhance understanding of the spirit and design of the Basic Law” (TS 2014b); such notions then seem to fit Althusser’s (2006) concept of ideological state apparatus as a vehicle for change (for better or worse). Through a Gramscian perspective, by inciting change via civil society, the government then is seeking consent rather than the use of coercion. Mention for the need to “build up the notion of the Chinese in HK and Macau” speaks to the PRC’s attempt at consolidating the various facets of ‘Cultural China’ under ‘one country’.

2. Taiwan

2.1 The China Post (CP 2014b) China media says Hong Kong protest movement ‘defeated’ after clearance by Laura Mannering & Aaron Tam, AFP; Section: China > Local News; Saturday 13 Dec 2014

The CP’s article is a report on the editorial, which appeared in the China Daily (see below). Discursive strategies present are that of distancing, pronouncement and countering. Via the many attributions it makes in the article, notably ‘what the China Daily wrote’, it grounds the
propositions advanced in a single subjectivity as well as through use of ‘scare’ quotes (Martin & White 2005:113).

a. “The defeat of the ‘umbrella revolution has … sent a clear message to hostile forces both local and overseas” the government-published China said in an editorial.
b. “On matter of principle, the central government will never make any concessions.”
c. “And in a free and prosperous civil society such as Hong Kong, there is simply no soil for political schemers to advance their agenda” (China Post 13 Dec 2014).

Combined with explicit interpolations by the authorial voice following a series of direct quotes contradicting and/or countering the quotes, this further indicates distancing while rebuking the propositions of China Daily.

d. Protesters are calling for fully free leadership elections for the semi-autonomous city in 2017, but the Chinese government has insisted a loyalist committee vet the candidates. Campaigners say this would ensure the selection of a pro-Beijing stooge.
e. The China Daily editorial was echoed by Rita Fan, Hong Kong’s delegate to Beijing’s rubber-stamp parliament. (China Post 13 Dec 2014)

Use of the term ‘stooge’ is a direct reflection on China’s governance over Hong Kong, implying not only that ‘universal suffrage’ in HK would be limited but also that HK authorities are necessarily under the central government’s control (example d); ‘rubber-stamp parliament’ may equally be taken as direct reproach of the central government (example e). While various voices are given ‘space’ within the article, these are only present so that authorial voice may counter them – via pronouncements, they “present that voice as challenging or heading off a particular dialogistic alternative” (Martin & White 2005:128) i.e. that of the CD (2014b) editorial. Distancing is also displayed via the deletion of parts of quotes, leaving only a single or several words in quotation marks; this suggests that these terms may be contested in some way as well e.g. “HK pro-democracy movement ‘defeated’”, “branding the protests ‘illegal’” (China Post 2014b).

Evaluations are carried by both text and readers, where ‘triggers’ are used e.g. ‘freedoms being eroded’, ‘lengthy occupation’, ‘police swept away’ and ‘police swoop’ (China Post 2014b).

Like the Taipei Times, CP has also chosen to use ‘external’ sources i.e. reports by an international news agency – Agence France Presse. The significance of this may be interpreted as CP endorsing and perhaps even siding with ‘international views on the OCLP demonstrations. It also acts to blur voices of ‘local’ and ‘international’, as CP chose to use an AFP report.

2.2 Taipei Times (TT 2014b) Reflections on Taiwan, HK’s civic movements by Chung Ming-lun & Adrian Chiu

Section: Editorials; Monday 15 Dec 2014

TT’s article is also an editorial, which indicates that appraisal language is likely to be overtly present. In comparison to CD editorial, though, TT’s discursive strategies can be said to be more ‘subtle’. Although while the CD op-ed was essentially geared towards ‘sending a message’, this TT editorial is explicit in mentioning that the piece is a ‘discussion’, and so will be presenting “some reflections and implications of the two socio-political movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong” (TT 2014b). Authors’ arguments are subsequently listed e.g. ‘first’, ‘second’ etc… Furthermore, the fact that two authors are credited at the beginning of the editorial also contributes to the transparency of the article i.e. readers know who and where information stems from and that an agenda might be pushed forward.
The main rhetorical strategy used in this editorial is that of drawing comparisons, not just between Hong Kong and Taiwan’s social movements – Umbrella and Sunflower movements, respectively – but also setting up the PRC as their common ‘Other’,

a. These two movements demonstrated that political power must be in the hands of the people, not the party-state and a few policy stakeholders and power holders on the minimal basis of democracy (Taipei Times 15 Dec 2014)

The PRC government is also subject to comparisons e.g. ‘one-party state’, ‘non-democratic government’ and ‘regime’ (TT 2014b). Nevertheless, potentially negative connotations are also implied e.g. ‘radical occupation’, “non-violent occupation” and “Umbrella movement” (TT 2014b). Use of quotation marks may suggest that the terms within are in some way contested and hence may be a form of distancing on behalf of the authorial voice. Other rhetorical tropes such as use of idiomatic expressions and academic and political ‘jargon’ further contribute to the argumentative nature of this editorial e.g. “protests raised worldwide concerns”, “paving the way”, “principles of checks and balances” (TT 2014b). While it is common for journalists to quote external sources such as officials and experts etc. to support particular points, this practice is mirrored in the newspaper itself employing two academics to write a commentary piece. Noteworthy is that they both seemingly belong to the Chinese diaspora. Not only does this speak to Taipei Times’ cosmopolitan characteristic but that they also recognize and thus value other perspectives.

Instances of deny/counter are present as well, especially when mentioning the PRC government. While these may constitute authorial voice as engaging with a diversity of voices, it is only doing so to challenge and confront them. The editorial is essentially built up on proclamations, which in itself is dialogically contractive i.e. caters to the interest of pushing forward a particular argument. Endorsement is indicated by use of the verb ‘to demonstrate’ “provid[es] grounds for the writer to presuppose […] warrantability” (Martin & White 2005:126). Evaluations are carried by both the text and the reader, with ‘triggers’ used periodically e.g. ‘active volcanoes’, ‘social cleavage’, ‘neglected issue’ etc. (TT 2014b)

The most telling element of the editorial is in its willingness to address the intricacies of the civic movements themselves. The second half of the article acknowledges that even though democratic movements may be ‘right’ morally speaking, in practice they also suffer from internal divisions. The issue, then, is not black and white as most other articles suggest but rather entails complexities that are not easily resolved. Overall, the topic at hand is treated within its larger geo-political context of “Asian democratization”; although it does not present an entirely balanced view of the situation, it nevertheless is willing to address the possible flaws the movements may contain (Taipei Times 2014b).

3. China
3.1 China Daily (CD 2014b) ‘Umbrella Revolution’ defeated by China Daily; Section: Opinion/Editorial; Friday 12 Dec 2014

Classified as an ‘opinion/editorial’ means that appraisal language is more overt, as is the case in this CD article. It is rife with presuppositions and commonsensical arguments suggesting that the writer assumes a great deal of ‘sharedness’ with its readership:

a. The political adventure, supported by outside forces that have been scheming to counter the rise of China, went against the overall interests of Hong Kong society and the nation – as well as the will of Hong Kong residents.

b. Even worse, it has attacked established beliefs about the rule of law – one of the cornerstones of the city’s stability and prosperity.

c. It has also become clearer that the “one Country, Two Systems” principle has been designed not only to maintain stability and prosperity in the SAR…
d. *This explains well why* constitutional reforms in the SAR, including electoral reforms for the selection of its chief executive must be conducted in strict accordance with the Basic Law…

(China Daily 12 Dec 2014)

Emphases on such presuppositions not only serve to ‘cement’ what is being advanced as a given but also that there is no room for contention. Use of the present and preterit tenses throughout the article also further reinforce this notion of commonsensical argument as right and past actions has completed – in this case, it presents the OCLP demonstrations as not only ‘defeated’ but also a thing of the past whereby those who participated have ‘learnt their lesson’ i.e. the problem has been solved. Combined with the extensive use of modal verbs e.g. ‘must’, ‘should’, authorial voice views its arguments as right. Linking phrases such as ‘so’, ‘aside from’, ‘even worse’ and ‘after all’ also contributes to the ‘logical’ conclusions being drawn. This forms part of a larger national discourse of the PRC representing itself as the having provided the solution to the problem at hand (Young 2013).

Use of quotation marks around the terms Occupy Central and Umbrella Revolution is also an indication of authorial voice distancing itself from the idea the terms carry as well as gives off the impression that it is not to be taken seriously, as though the terms were contestable in some way. Young (2013:36) remarks “use of quotation marks […] indicate a putdown”. Furthermore, CD’s referral to the movement as a ‘revolution’ further serves to delegitimize and invalidate the demonstrations as illegal and threatening to (perceived) social order. Comparison to “colour revolution” also denote this idea of illegality that the text is trying to put across. Evaluation is carried most entirely by the text itself, this is most noticeable through lexical choices,

- …supported by outside forces that have been *scheming* to counter the rise of China…
- The “Occupy” movement has *inflicted* great damage…
- Even worse, it has *attacked* established beliefs about the rule of law…
- The defeat of the “umbrella revolution” has also sent a clear message to *hostile forces* – both local and overseas…

(China Daily 12 Dec 2014)

The image CD is painting of those who participated in the OCLP demonstrations is that of a belligerent force going directly against the PRC’s lawful façade.

Topoi of authority, culture, law, advantage/usefulness are all present in the article indicating that issues of “sovereignty, security and development of the whole Chinese nation” is of utmost importance (CD 2014b). Topos of authority is especially present in that no author is credited at the beginning of the article, but rather ‘China Daily’. This fits into the traditional model of the media acting as the government’s mouthpiece to spread, propagate messages directed at the local population or to that of outsiders (Young 2013). Considering that the readership of CD is most likely to be foreigners, and thus more likely to ‘need convincing’ when it comes to solidarity, it may be why such strong use of evaluative language is present in the article. Nevertheless, as the media does act as ‘the messenger’ to outside “hostile forces” (CD 2014b), it could be argued that the article’s strong use of appraisal language may also be geared towards sending a strong message that China will not back down and those who challenge its sovereignty will not be tolerated. Metaphors such as “torn the SAR’s social fabric apart” and “the Basic Law must be implemented both in letter and in spirit” also serve to reinforce the PRC’s stand.

Instances of proclaim and disclaim work together not only to dispel challenges seen by the OCLP movement as setting but also to affirm the PRC’s position on the matter. Additionally, it actively constricts other voices while promoting that of the authorial and authoritative voice – they converge to become one voice clearly acting in the interest of the PRC government.
3.2 Global Times (GT 2014b) President Xi voices full trust, support to HK chief executive by Xinhua; Section: China; Friday 19 Dec 2014

Only two social actors are represented in this article – Xi Jinping and CY Leung, leaders of the PRC and HK – both considered ‘high credibility’. The main discursive strategy used is that of graduation. Extensive use of adverbs/adjecitives qualifying actions is indicative of an intensification of force and focus e.g. ‘full trust’, ‘highly recognizes’, ‘properly handle’, ‘do its work well’, ‘unswervingly maintain’ (Global Times 2014). Repetition of terms ‘full trust’ reinforces the PRC’s backing of “the HKSAR government and its police force” (Global Times 2014b). Two direct quotes are present which serve as endorsements, once again reiterating support from the central government. Both heads of states are mentioned signifying that both are seen as equals – “Xi and Leung are here to attend celebrations marking the 15th anniversary of Macao’s return to the motherland” (Global Times 2014); although Xi Jinping’s name is bold suggesting more importance accorded to him. Absence of alternative voices i.e. from the democratic groups, displays a monoglossic backdrop from which the authorial voice has decided to engage with. Topoi of authority, law and advantage/usefulness form the basis of the main ‘arguments’ advanced in the article,

a. President Xi Jinping said [AUTHORITY] Friday that China’s central government has full trust in Leung Chun-ying, chief executive of the HKSAR.

b. Xi said [AUTHORITY] that over the recent couple of months, the HKSAR government and its police force have fulfilled their duty with courage, which resulted in improvement [ADVANTAGE/USEFULNESS] in the current situation in HK.

c. He expressed the hope that the SAR government will continue to properly handle the constitutional development according to law [AUTHORITY/LAW]

d. He said the HKSAR government will unite and do its utmost to do its work well, promote the constitutional development according to law… [LAW]

(Global Times 19 Dec 2014)

Hong Kong is depicted as needing/receiving the approval of the PRC, the ‘motherland’ – “Leung expressed gratitude to the encouragement of Xi and the support of the central government” (GT 2014b) – and furthermore as being grateful. Use of the preterit form of ‘result’ in example b also presupposes that after the clearance of the OCLP tents, HK society has returned to ‘normal’ and so better. Barring the fact that the event at which both heads of state are attending is referred to as a ‘celebration’, use of the term ‘return’ also implies a positive situation (cf. ‘handover’ in Tok 2013).