Change search
Link to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Alternative names
Publications (10 of 50) Show all publications
Glüer-Pagin, K. & Spectre, L. (2024). Where is the Motivation in Motivated Numeracy?. Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Where is the Motivation in Motivated Numeracy?
2024 (English)In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology, ISSN 1878-5158, E-ISSN 1878-5166Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

In a series of very influential papers, Dan Kahan argues for “the identity protective cognition thesis”: the claim that politically motivated reasoning is a major factor explaining current levels of polarization over matters of fact, especially in the US. An important part of his case consists of experimental data supporting the claim that ideological polarization is more extreme amongst more numerate individuals. In this paper, we take a close look at how precisely this “numeracy effect” is supposed to come about. Working with Kahan’s own notion of motivated reasoning, we reconstruct the mechanism that according to him produces the effect. Surprisingly, it turns out to involve plenty of motivation to reason, but no motivated reasoning. This undermines the support he takes the numeracy effect to provide for the identity protective cognition hypothesis.

Keywords
Motivated reasoning, Fact polarization, Identity protection, Motivated numeracy, Knowledge resistance, Dan Kahan
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-231185 (URN)10.1007/s13164-024-00737-w (DOI)001234529100001 ()2-s2.0-85194722543 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2024-06-24 Created: 2024-06-24 Last updated: 2024-06-24
Damstra, A., Vliegenthart, R., Boomgaarden, H., Glüer, K., Lindgren, E., Strömbäck, J. & Tsfati, Y. (2023). Knowledge and the News: An Investigation of the Relation Between News Use, News Avoidance, and the Presence of (Mis)beliefs. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 28(1), 29-48
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Knowledge and the News: An Investigation of the Relation Between News Use, News Avoidance, and the Presence of (Mis)beliefs
Show others...
2023 (English)In: The International Journal of Press/Politics, ISSN 1940-1612, E-ISSN 1940-1620, Vol. 28, no 1, p. 29-48Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

While increasing scholarly attention has been devoted to news avoidance, there are only few studies taking the distinction between intentional and unintentional news avoidance into consideration, and none that has investigated the linkage between the two types of news avoidance and knowledge about politics and society. To fill this void, this study explores this relationship while distinguishing between knowledge related to uncontested issues and knowledge related to issues that have been subject to public controversies (climate change, vaccination, genetically modified organisms, crime, and immigration). Relying on a large-scale survey among Swedish citizens conducted in 2020 (N = 2,160), we find that the relationship with patterns of news use is substantially different across these types of beliefs. Among other things, the results suggest that knowledge of uncontested issue domains is positively related to news use, but knowledge of contested issue domains is not. The intentional avoidance of news is only negatively related to knowledge of contested issues. Taken together, the results suggest that the mechanisms driving beliefs related to uncontested versus contested issues are substantially different.

Keywords
media effects, knowledge, news avoidance, misinformation
National Category
Media and Communications
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-197212 (URN)10.1177/19401612211031457 (DOI)000673727000001 ()2-s2.0-85110010529 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2021-09-29 Created: 2021-09-29 Last updated: 2023-02-01Bibliographically approved
Glüer, K. & Wikforss, Å. (2022). What is knowledge resistance?. In: Jesper Strömbäck; Åsa Wikforss; Kathrin Glüer; Torun Lindholm; Henrik Oscarsson (Ed.), Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments: (pp. 29-48). London: Routledge
Open this publication in new window or tab >>What is knowledge resistance?
2022 (English)In: Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments / [ed] Jesper Strömbäck; Åsa Wikforss; Kathrin Glüer; Torun Lindholm; Henrik Oscarsson, London: Routledge, 2022, p. 29-48Chapter in book (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

We provide a characterization of knowledge resistance in terms of resistance to available evidence and a philosophical guide to the concepts central to empirically investigating it: knowledge, evidence, and rationality. Knowledge requires true, justified belief, so we emphasize the importance of focusing on factual judgements the truth of which can be investigated by empirical methods. We understand evidence in terms of probabilification, and discuss its content and its testimonial nature in the central cases. We propose that knowledge resistance always involves epistemic irrationality. An important psychological mechanism resulting in such irrationality is motivated reasoning, and politically motivated reasoning has been proposed as the main explanation of fact polarization. We discuss challenges to the detection of motivated reasoning, stressing the rationalizing role of prior belief. When priors line up with motivations, these two factors are difficult to disentangle. But even where polarization results from differences in prior belief, there might be irrationality, for instance in the form of unjustified beliefs about which sources of evidence are trustworthy. Therefore, we propose to not only investigate knowledge resistance in a narrow sense, involving a direct, epistemically irrational response to evidence subjects have, but also in a wider sense, resulting for instance from selective exposure.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
London: Routledge, 2022
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-212257 (URN)10.4324/9781003111474-2 (DOI)2-s2.0-85134790549 (Scopus ID)978-0-367-62928-1 (ISBN)978-0-367-62925-0 (ISBN)978-1-003-11147-4 (ISBN)
Available from: 2022-12-06 Created: 2022-12-06 Last updated: 2022-12-06Bibliographically approved
Glüer-Pagin, K. (2020). Illusory Looks. In: Katja Maria Vogt, Justin Vlasits (Ed.), Epistemology after Sextus Empiricus: (pp. 48-74). Oxford University Press
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Illusory Looks
2020 (English)In: Epistemology after Sextus Empiricus / [ed] Katja Maria Vogt, Justin Vlasits, Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 48-74Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

One debate the Pyrrhonian skeptics had with the Epicureans concerned the relation between sense perceptions and beliefs. The debate centers on the Epicurean claim that all perceptions are true, a claim rejected by the Skeptics, who proceed on the assumption that there is no judgment component in perception, and it echoes widely through today’s philosophy of perception. In the past the author has defended a non-standard version of intentionalism, according to which (visual) experiences indeed are beliefs, but have contents—so-called looks-contents—that, if ever, very rarely are false. This chapter works out how this view can nevertheless account for non-veridical experience. It harnesses the rational role of experience to work out a precise way of characterizing non-veridical experience in terms of misleadingness.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford University Press, 2020
Keywords
non-veridical experience, illusion, hallucination, intentionalism, epistemology of perception, content of perception, belief theory of experience, phenomenal character of experience
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-185067 (URN)10.1093/oso/9780190946302.001.0001 (DOI)9780190946302 (ISBN)
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2013-737
Available from: 2020-09-15 Created: 2020-09-15 Last updated: 2022-02-25Bibliographically approved
Glüer, K. (2018). Defeating looks. Synthese, 195(7), 2985-3012
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Defeating looks
2018 (English)In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 195, no 7, p. 2985-3012Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In previous work, I have suggested a doxastic account of perceptual experience according to which experiences form a (peculiar) kind of belief: Beliefs with what I have called “phenomenal” or “looks-content”. I have argued that this account can not only accommodate the intuitive reason providing role of experience, but also its justificatory role. I have also argued that, in general, construing experience and perceptual beliefs, i.e. the beliefs most directly based on experience, as having different contents best accounts for the defeasibility of experiential reasons. In this paper, I shall have a closer look at the evidential or inferential relation between looks-propositions and the contents of perceptual beliefs and argue for a form of what I shall call “Pollockianism” about experiential reasons: such reasons are good unless defeated. Questions to be investigated include: Does the resulting picture of perceptual justification contain an externalist element? Is it compatible with Bayesianism? And how does it do with respect to problems that have been raised for other forms of Pollockianism such as dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism?

Keywords
Epistemology of perception, Representational content of perceptual experience, Prima facie reasons, Looks, Phenomenal properties, Experience and Folk-psychology
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-137915 (URN)10.1007/s11229-016-1186-x (DOI)000435975000008 ()
Projects
The Nature of Belief
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2013-737
Available from: 2017-01-13 Created: 2017-01-13 Last updated: 2022-02-28Bibliographically approved
Glüer, K. (2018). Interpretation and the Interpreter: On the Role of the Interpreter in Davidsonian Foundational Semantics. In: Derek Ball; Brian Rabern (Ed.), The Science of Meaning: Essays on the Metatheory of Natural Language Semantics (pp. 226-252). Oxford University Press
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Interpretation and the Interpreter: On the Role of the Interpreter in Davidsonian Foundational Semantics
2018 (English)In: The Science of Meaning: Essays on the Metatheory of Natural Language Semantics / [ed] Derek Ball; Brian Rabern, Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 226-252Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

According to Donald Davidson, “what a fully informed interpreter could learn about what a speaker means is all there is to learn; the same goes for what the speaker believes” (Davidson 1983, 148). This is a foundational claim about the nature of semantic properties: these are evidence-constituted properties. They are determined by the principle of charity on the basis of data about the behaviour of the speaker(s). But what exactly is the role of the interpreter in the Davidsonian account of meaning determination? Is she merely a dramatic device or an essential element of the metaphysical picture? In this paper, I investigate whether we can get help in answering these questions from David Lewis’s (1983) distinction between natural and unnatural properties.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford University Press, 2018
Keywords
Donald Davidson, David Lewis, radical interpretation, foundational semantics, principle of charity, interpretationism
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-164999 (URN)10.1093/oso/9780198739548.003.0008 (DOI)9780198739548 (ISBN)
Available from: 2019-01-21 Created: 2019-01-21 Last updated: 2023-03-07Bibliographically approved
Glüer, K. & Wikforss, Å. (2018). Reasons for Belief and Normativity. In: Daniel Star (Ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity: (pp. 575-599). Oxford University Press
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Reasons for Belief and Normativity
2018 (English)In: Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity / [ed] Daniel Star, Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 575-599Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

In this chapter, we critically examine the most important extant ways of understanding and motivating the idea that reasons for belief are normative. First, we examine the proposal that the distinction between explanatory and so-called normative reasons that is commonly drawn in moral philosophy can be rather straightforwardly applied to reasons for belief, and that reasons for belief are essentially normative precisely when they are normative reasons. In the course of this investigation, we explore the very nature of the reasons-for-belief relation, as well as the ontology of such reasons. Second, we examine the idea that the normativity derives from the internal connection between reasons for belief and epistemic justification, distinguishing between two distinct normativist accounts of justification, a weaker and a stronger one. We argue that neither line of argument is compelling. Pending further arguments, we conclude that normativism about reasons for belief is not supported.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford University Press, 2018
Keywords
reasons, normativity, normative reasons, reasons for belief, ontology of reasons, epistemic justification, epistemic reasons reasons, normativity, normative reasons, reasons for belief, ontology of reasons, epistemic justification, epistemic reasons
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-138151 (URN)10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.0026 (DOI)9780199657889 (ISBN)
Projects
The Nature of Belief
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2013-737
Available from: 2017-01-16 Created: 2017-01-16 Last updated: 2023-03-07Bibliographically approved
Glüer, K. & Pagin, P. (2018). Växelsemantik (Switcher Semantics). Filosofisk Tidskrift, 39(3), 36-51
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Växelsemantik (Switcher Semantics)
2018 (Swedish)In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 39, no 3, p. 36-51Article in journal (Other academic) Published
Keywords
Compositionality, general compositionality, switcher semantics
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-164889 (URN)
Projects
Switcher Semantics
Available from: 2019-01-20 Created: 2019-01-20 Last updated: 2022-02-26Bibliographically approved
Glüer, K. (2017). Rule-Following and Charity: Wittgenstein and Davidson on Meaning Determination. In: Claudine Verheggen (Ed.), Wittgenstein and Davidson on Thought, Language, and Action: (pp. 69-96). Cambridge University Press
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Rule-Following and Charity: Wittgenstein and Davidson on Meaning Determination
2017 (English)In: Wittgenstein and Davidson on Thought, Language, and Action / [ed] Claudine Verheggen, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 69-96Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

The project of this chapter is to explore some relations between the rule-following considerations and radical interpretation. I spell out the sense in which the rule-following considerations are about meaning determination, and investigate whether the principle of meaning determination used in the early Davidson's account of meaning determination - the principle of charity - provides an answer to what I shall call "Wittgenstein's paradox". More precisely, I am interested in one aspect of the paradox: the "problem of objectivity". My question then is whether meaning, as determined by charity, is such that the correctness of the applications of meaningful expressions is an objective matter. After running us through the basics of the radical interpretation account of meaning determination I argue that the principle of charity does seem to fall prey to the problem of objectivity. After unsuccessfully trying to rescue objectivity by means of Lewisian natural properties, this is the verdict I in the end endorse.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cambridge University Press, 2017
Keywords
rule-following, meaning determination, radical interpretation, principle of charity, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson, David Lewis, Wittgenstein's paradox, natural properties, foundational semantics
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-155268 (URN)10.1017/9781316145364.005 (DOI)9781316145364 (ISBN)
Available from: 2018-04-17 Created: 2018-04-17 Last updated: 2022-02-26Bibliographically approved
Glüer, K. (2017). Talking about Looks. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 8(4), 781-807
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Talking about Looks
2017 (English)In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology, ISSN 1878-5158, E-ISSN 1878-5166, Vol. 8, no 4, p. 781-807Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In natural language, looks-talk is used in a variety of ways. I investigate three uses of 'looks' that have traditionally been distinguished - epistemic, comparative, and phenomenal 'looks' - and endorse and develop considerations in support of the view that these amount to polysemy. Focusing on the phenomenal use of 'looks', I then investigate connections between its semantics, the content of visual experience, and the metaphysics of looks. I argue that phenomenal 'looks' is not a propositional attitude operator: We do not use it to ascribe propositional attitudes to subjects, but to directly ascribe looks to objects, where looks are relational properties. However, I go on to argue that, given the way we use phenomenal 'looks', these relational properties are ultimately best understood as phenomenal relational properties, i.e. in terms of relations involving experiences. Along the way, I endorse Byrne's argument against Jackson's claim that phenomenal 'looks F' only takes predicates for colour, shape, and distance, and raise the issue of compositionality for the resulting view according to which phenomenal 'looks F' is context-dependent in a way that allows it to take a vast range of predicates. I conclude by arguing that these considerations concerning the natural language use of 'looks', and in particular its phenomenal use, are water on the mills of phenomenal intentionalism, a position in the philosophy of perception according to which experiences are propositional attitudes with phenomenal looks-contents.

National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-149962 (URN)10.1007/s13164-017-0350-7 (DOI)000414287900005 ()29104706 (PubMedID)
Available from: 2018-01-02 Created: 2018-01-02 Last updated: 2022-02-28Bibliographically approved
Organisations
Identifiers
ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0002-7483-7060

Search in DiVA

Show all publications