As the development and use of artificial intelligence (AI) continues to grow, policymakers are increasingly grappling with the question of how to regulate this technology. The most far-reaching international initiative is the European Union (EU) AI Act, which aims to establish the first comprehensive, binding framework for regulating AI. In this article, we offer the first systematic analysis of non-state actor preferences toward international regulation of AI, focusing on the case of the EU AI Act. Theoretically, we develop an argument about the regulatory preferences of business actors and other non-state actors under varying conditions of AI sector competitiveness. Empirically, we test these expectations using data from public consultations on European AI regulation. Our findings are threefold. First, all types of non-state actors express concerns about AI and support regulation in some form. Second, there are nonetheless significant differences across actor types, with business actors being less concerned about the downsides of AI and more in favor of lax regulation than other non-state actors. Third, these differences are more pronounced in countries with stronger commercial AI sectors. Our findings shed new light on non-state actor preferences toward AI regulation and point to challenges for policymakers balancing competing interests in society.

This article develops a novel approach for studying the influence of supranational institutions in international cooperation. While earlier research tends to treat member states as a collective yielding influence on supranational institutions, we unpack this collective to explore differentiated supranational influence. To this end, the article makes three contributions. First, it develops a method for measuring differentiated supranational influence that makes it possible to identify which member states give ground when a supranational institution is influential. Second, it theorizes the sources of differentiated supranational influence, arguing that states are more likely to accommodate a supranational institution when they are more dependent on the resources of this institution. Third, it illustrates the usefulness of this approach empirically through an analysis of the influence of the European Commission in European Union bargaining. The analysis suggests that our approach can measure and explain differentiated supranational influence under conditions of both heightened crisis and everyday politics.

Artificial intelligence (AI) represents a technological upheaval with the potential to change human society. Because of its transformative potential, AI is increasingly becoming subject to regulatory initiatives at the global level. Yet, so far, scholarship in political science and international relations has focused more on AI applications than on the emerging architecture of global AI regulation. The purpose of this article is to outline an agenda for research into the global governance of AI. The article distinguishes between two broad perspectives: an empirical approach, aimed at mapping and explaining global AI governance; and a normative approach, aimed at developing and applying standards for appropriate global AI governance. The two approaches offer questions, concepts, and theories that are helpful in gaining an understanding of the emerging global governance of AI. Conversely, exploring AI as a regulatory issue offers a critical opportunity to refine existing general approaches to the study of global governance.

La inteligencia artificial (IA) representa una revolución tecnológica que tiene el potencial de poder cambiar la sociedad humana. Debido a este potencial transformador, la IA está cada vez más sujeta a iniciativas reguladoras a nivel global. Sin embargo, hasta ahora, el mundo académico en el área de las ciencias políticas y las relaciones internacionales se ha centrado más en las aplicaciones de la IA que en la arquitectura emergente de la regulación global en materia de IA. El propósito de este artículo es esbozar una agenda para la investigación sobre la gobernanza global en materia de IA. El artículo distingue entre dos amplias perspectivas: por un lado, un enfoque empírico, destinado a mapear y explicar la gobernanza global en materia de IA y, por otro lado, un enfoque normativo, destinado a desarrollar y a aplicar normas para una gobernanza global adecuada de la IA. Los dos enfoques ofrecen preguntas, conceptos y teorías que resultan útiles para comprender la gobernanza global emergente en materia de IA. Por el contrario, el hecho de estudiar la IA como si fuese una cuestión reguladora nos ofrece una oportunidad de gran relevancia para poder perfeccionar los enfoques generales existentes en el estudio de la gobernanza global.

L'intelligence artificielle (IA) constitue un bouleversement technologique qui pourrait bien changer la société humaine. À cause de son potentiel transformateur, l'IA fait de plus en plus l'objet d'initiatives réglementaires au niveau mondial. Pourtant, jusqu'ici, les chercheurs en sciences politiques et relations internationales se sont davantage concentrés sur les applications de l'IA que sur l’émergence de l'architecture de la réglementation mondiale de l'IA. Cet article vise à exposer les grandes lignes d'un programme de recherche sur la gouvernance mondiale de l'IA. Il fait la distinction entre deux perspectives larges : une approche empirique, qui vise à représenter et expliquer la gouvernance mondiale de l'IA; et une approche normative, qui vise à mettre au point et appliquer les normes d'une gouvernance mondiale de l'IA adéquate. Les deux approches proposent des questions, des concepts et des théories qui permettent de mieux comprendre l’émergence de la gouvernance mondiale de l'IA. À l'inverse, envisager l'IA telle une problématique réglementaire présente une opportunité critique d'affiner les approches générales existantes de l’étude de la gouvernance mondiale. 

Contemporary society has witnessed major growth in global governance, yet the legitimacy of global governance remains deeply in question. This book offers the first full comparative investigation of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Empirically, it provides a comprehensive analysis of public and elite opinion toward global governance, building on two uniquely coordinated surveys covering multiple countries and international organizations. Theoretically, it develops an individual-level approach, exploring how a person’s characteristics in respect of socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust shape legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. The book’s central findings are threefold. First, there is a notable and general elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. While elites on average hold moderately high levels of legitimacy toward international organizations, the general public is decidedly more skeptical. Second, individual-level differences in interests, values, identities, and trust dispositions provide significant drivers of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, as well as the gap between the two groups. Most important on the whole are differences in the extent to which citizens and elites trust domestic political institutions, which shape how these groups assess the legitimacy of international organizations. Third, both patterns and sources of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs vary across organizations and countries. These variations suggest that institutional and societal contexts condition attitudes toward global governance. The book’s findings shed light on future opportunities and constraints in international cooperation, suggesting that current levels of legitimacy point neither to a general crisis of global governance nor to a general readiness for its expansion. 

International organizations (IOs) experience significant variation in their decision-making performance, or the extent to which they produce policy output. While some IOs are efficient decision-making machineries, others are plagued by deadlock. How can such variation be explained? Examining this question, the article makes three central contributions. First, we approach performance by looking at IO decision-making in terms of policy output and introduce an original measure of decision-making performance that captures annual growth rates in IO output. Second, we offer a novel theoretical explanation for decision-making performance. This account highlights the role of institutional design, pointing to how majoritarian decision rules, delegation of authority to supranational institutions, and access for transnational actors (TNAs) interact to affect decision-making. Third, we offer the first comparative assessment of the decision-making performance of IOs. While previous literature addresses single IOs, we explore decision-making across a broad spectrum of 30 IOs from 1980 to 2011. Our analysis indicates that IO decision-making performance varies across and within IOs. We find broad support for our theoretical account, showing the combined effect of institutional design features in shaping decision-making performance. Notably, TNA access has a positive effect on decision-making performance when pooling is greater, and delegation has a positive effect when TNA access is higher. We also find that pooling has an independent, positive effect on decision-making performance. All-in-all, these findings suggest that the institutional design of IOs matters for their decision-making performance, primarily in more complex ways than expected in earlier research.

Do international shaming efforts affect citizens’ support for government policies? While it is a frequent claim in the literature that shaming works through domestic politics, we know little about how and when international criticism affects domestic public opinion. We address this question through an originally designed survey experiment in Sweden, which (i) compares the effects of international shaming in two issue areas—human rights and climate change, and (ii) tests whether government responses to criticism moderate the impact of shaming. Our main findings are fourfold. First, we find substantial effects of international shaming on domestic public opinion. These effects hold across both issue areas and irrespective of whether citizens support government parties or not. Second, human rights shaming has a stronger impact on citizens’ support for government policies than climate shaming. Third, shaming is most effective among citizens who are more supportive of climate action, human rights, and international cooperation. Finally, our findings are mixed with respect to the effect of government responses. While government responses do not moderate the effects of human rights shaming, they seem to mitigate the effects of climate shaming. 

Scholars and policy makers debate whether elites and citizens hold different views of the legitimacy of international organizations (IOs). Until now, sparse data has limited our ability to establish such gaps and to formulate theories for explaining them. This article offers the first systematic comparative analysis of elite and citizen perceptions of the legitimacy of IOs. It examines legitimacy beliefs toward six key IOs, drawing on uniquely coordinated survey evidence from Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the United States. We find a notable elite-citizen gap for all six IOs, four of the five countries, and all of six different elite types. Developing an individual-level approach to legitimacy beliefs, we argue that this gap is driven by systematic differences between elites and citizens in characteristics that matter for attitudes toward IOs. Our findings suggest that deep-seated differences between elites and general publics may present major challenges for democratic and effective international cooperation.