Since the 1990s, a new model for market control organized through tripartite standards regimes (TSR), has expanded globally and affected most market exchanges through standard-setting, accreditation, and certification. This article investigates business-consumer relations under this regime, with a specific focus on the functions of accreditation and certification. In our case study of Sweden, a new picture of consumer protection under late capitalism evolves. Seeing it as a form of neoliberalization, the article uncovers a transition between two regimes of control; from one built on a potential conflict between consumer and business interests, to one based on the assumption that business interests are beneficial for all parties. Although business interest was formulated as pleasing the consumer-or the customer-by both certification firms and the Swedish Accreditation Authority, in practice consumer interest as something worth protecting was made abstract in the era of the TSR.

L’article retrace l'histoire du premier système d’aide sociale étudiante de l'État-providence social-démocrate suédois, un système sélectif d’aides, réservé aux étudiants issus des classes populaires. Moins connu, ce système sélectif introduit en 1939, a précédé le système actuel du prêt étudiant, établi en 1965 et conçu pour toucher les étudiants de toutes les classes sociales. Cette étude présente les raisons qui ont présidé à la mise en place du système sélectif, la manière dont il a atteint l'objectif d'élargissement du recrutement social des étudiants et les arguments mis en avant pour justifier son démantèlement. Si l'effet égalisateur du système sélectif était significatif, les prêts étudiants semblaient néanmoins plus compatibles avec l'idée émergente, importée de l'école de Chicago, que l'éducation pouvait être considérée comme un investissement dans le capital humain, générateur de revenus futurs (et donc finançable par un prêt) plutôt que comme un droit. Le cadre théorique de l’institutionnalisme historique permet d’analyser le passage entre deux modèles diamétralement opposés, au sein du même régime social-démocrate.

The article traces the history of the first student finance system of the Swedish Social Democratic welfare state, a selective system of grants earmarked for students from working-class backgrounds. Introduced in 1939, this lesser-known system preceded the current loan-financed system set up in 1965 to reach students from all classes. The reasons for introducing the selective system, how the system met the objective of broadening the recruitment of students from across the social spectrum and the arguments behind the dismantling of the system are analysed. The selective system had a powerful equalising effect but student loans were, however, more compatible with the emerging idea, imported from the Chicago School, that education could be considered an investment in human capital, a generator of future income (and therefore funded by a loan) rather than a right. Historical institutional theory is used to analyse the shift between two diametrically opposed models that existed within the same Social Democratic regime.

The article highlights the history of the early gift-based and selective student finance system of the social democratic welfare state in Sweden, targeting students from the working classes. This lesser-known system, introduced in 1939, preceded the present loan-financed and universal system established in 1965 designed to reach students from all classes. The arguments for launching the selective system, how this system met the objective of broadening the social recruitment of students and the arguments behind the dismantling of the system are analysed. The equalising effect of the selective system was strong, but student loans were nevertheless more compatible with an emerging idea, imported from the Chicago School, that education could be considered an (loan-financed) investment in human capital, that provides future yields rather than a right. Historical institutional theory is used to analyse the shift between two diametrically opposed models that took place within the same Social Democratic regime.

The purpose of the article is to examine financial models for higher education. The economic governance of universities during different time periods is an under-explored area. Three models have been tested in Sweden: “universitetsautomatiken” (1958–1976), “sektorsanslag” (1977–1992) and “grundbulten” (1993–). The models are described, compared and related to overarching savings models for central govern-ment administration. During the first financial model, which was particularly gener-ous, there were no such savings models. However, the less generous funding models implemented after the structural crisis in the mid-1970s interacted with increasingly severer saving models that makes annual deduction of appropriations: “tvåprocen-taren” (1978–1992) and “produktivitetsavdraget” (1993–). A mechanism for resource erosion has been built into the financing system since 1977 according to the main result of the study.