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Publications (10 of 56) Show all publications
Pagin, P. (2023). Linguistic Conventions or Open-Ended Reasoning: Some Questions for Una Stojnić. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 23(69), 261-274
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Linguistic Conventions or Open-Ended Reasoning: Some Questions for Una Stojnić
2023 (English)In: Croatian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1333-1108, E-ISSN 1847-6139, Vol. 23, no 69, p. 261-274Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This short paper has the character of a critical notice of Una Stojnić’s book Context and Coherence: The Logic and Grammar of Prominence (Stojnić 2021). It is mainly concerned with Stojnić’s strong claim that linguistic phenomena related to prominence and coherence, in particular the interpretation of pronouns, are governed by linguistic conventions and are not pragmatic in nature. On these matters, my views are opposite to Stojnić’s.

Keywords
Coherence, convention, pragmatics, prominence, pronouns
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-227696 (URN)10.52685/cjp.23.69.2 (DOI)001171258100003 ()2-s2.0-85181960902 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2024-04-05 Created: 2024-04-05 Last updated: 2024-04-05Bibliographically approved
Ball, D., Gauker, C. & Pagin, P. (2022). Belief, Introspection, and Constituted Kinds. Selected Papers from the Fifth Philosophy of Language and Mind Conference. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 13(1), 1-5
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Belief, Introspection, and Constituted Kinds. Selected Papers from the Fifth Philosophy of Language and Mind Conference
2022 (English)In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology, ISSN 1878-5158, E-ISSN 1878-5166, Vol. 13, no 1, p. 1-5Article in journal, Editorial material (Other academic) Published
National Category
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-208780 (URN)10.1007/s13164-022-00629-x (DOI)000777200500001 ()2-s2.0-85127377318 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2022-09-06 Created: 2022-09-06 Last updated: 2022-09-06Bibliographically approved
Pagin, P. & Marsili, N. (2021). Assertion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Assertion
2021 (English)In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E-ISSN 1095-5054Article, review/survey (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Asserting is the act of claiming that something is the case—for instance, that oranges are citruses, or that there is a traffic congestion on Brooklyn Bridge (at some time). We make assertions to share information, coordinate our actions, defend arguments, and communicate our beliefs and desires. Because of its central role in communication, assertion has been investigated in several disciplines. Linguists, philosophers of language, and logicians rely heavily on the notion of assertion in theorizing about meaning, truth and inference.

The nature of assertion and its relation to other speech acts and linguistic phenomena (implicatures, presuppositions, etc.) have been subject to much controversy. This entry will situate assertion within speech act theory and pragmatics more generally, and then go on to present the current main accounts of assertion.[1]

By an account of assertion is here meant a theory of what a speaker does (e.g., expresses a belief) in making an assertion. According to such accounts, there are deep properties of assertion: specifying those properties is specifying what asserting consists in. There must also be surface properties, which are the properties by which a competent speaker can tell whether an utterance is an assertion, for instance that it is made by means of uttering a sentence in the indicative mood.

We shall classify accounts according two parameters. Firstly, we distinguish between normativeand descriptive accounts. Normative accounts rely on the existence of norms or normative relations that are essential to assertoric practice. Descriptive accounts don’t. Secondly, we distinguish between content-directed and hearer-directed accounts. Content-directed accounts focus on the relation between the speaker and the content of the proposition asserted, while hearer-directed accounts focus on the relations between speaker and hearer. Some theories have both normative and descriptive components.

Keywords
Assertion, communication, norms, commitments, intention
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-202548 (URN)
Note

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is edited by Edward N. Zalta.

Available from: 2022-03-04 Created: 2022-03-04 Last updated: 2024-01-23Bibliographically approved
Pagin, P. (2019). A general argument against structured propositions. Synthese, 196(4), 1501-1528
Open this publication in new window or tab >>A general argument against structured propositions
2019 (English)In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 196, no 4, p. 1501-1528Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The standard argument against ordered tuples as propositions is that it is arbitrary what truth-conditions they should have. In this paper we generalize that argument. Firstly, we require that propositions have truth-conditions intrinsically. Secondly, we require strongly equivalent truth-conditions to be identical. Thirdly, we provide a formal framework, taken from Graph Theory, to characterize structure and structured objects in general. The argument in a nutshell is this: structured objects are too fine-grained to be identical to truth-conditions. Without identity, there is no privileged mapping from structured objects to truth-conditions, and hence structured objects do not have truth-conditions intrinsically. Therefore, propositions are not structured objects.

Keywords
Propositions, Structure, Graph theory, Truth-conditions, Unity
National Category
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-168577 (URN)10.1007/s11229-016-1244-4 (DOI)000463169600013 ()
Available from: 2019-05-23 Created: 2019-05-23 Last updated: 2022-03-23Bibliographically approved
Pagin, P. (2019). Belief Sentences and Compositionality. Notional Part. Journal of Semantics, 36(2), 241-284
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Belief Sentences and Compositionality. Notional Part
2019 (English)In: Journal of Semantics, ISSN 0167-5133, E-ISSN 1477-4593, Vol. 36, no 2, p. 241-284Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper presents an account of notional belief attributions, that is, belief attributions where the belief content is fully specified. The proposal combines a Hintikka style possible-worlds semantics for the belief operator and a structured meanings approach for giving a structured mode of presentation of the belief content. The semantics is not standard compositional, but it satisfies a more general notion of compositionality, explained in the paper. This notion, general compositionality, allows semantic switching: the semantic function relevant for an embedded term is distinct from that which applies to the term in which it is embedded. The general relation between compositionality and hyperintensional contexts is discussed in detail. In the first section, it is argued that we need to combine structured and unstructured meanings.

National Category
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-173059 (URN)10.1093/jos/ffy018 (DOI)000482410700003 ()
Available from: 2019-09-20 Created: 2019-09-20 Last updated: 2022-02-26Bibliographically approved
Pagin, P. (2019). Compositionality in Davidson's Early Work. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 7(2), 76-89
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Compositionality in Davidson's Early Work
2019 (English)In: Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, E-ISSN 2159-0303, Vol. 7, no 2, p. 76-89Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Davidson’s 1965 paper, “Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages”, has (at least almost) invariably been interpreted, by others and by myself, as arguing that natural languages must have a compositional semantics, or at least a systematic semantics, that can be finitely specified. However, in his reply to me in the Żegleń volume, Davidson denies that compositionality is in any need of an argument. How does this add up?

In this paper I consider Davidson’s first three meaning theoretic papers from this perspective. I conclude that Davidson was right in his reply to me that he never took compositionality, or systematic semantics, to be in need of justification. What Davidson had been concerned with, clearly in the 1965 paper and in “Truth and Meaning” from 1967, and to some extent in his Carnap critique from 1963, is (i) that we need a general theory of natural language meaning, (ii) that such a theory should not be in conflict with the learnability of a language, and (iii) that such a theory bring out should how knowledge of a finite number of features of a language suffices for the understanding of all the sentences of that language.

Keywords
Donald Davidson, meaning theories, learnability, compositionality, semantics, natural language
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-185066 (URN)10.15173/jhap.v7i2.3485 (DOI)
Available from: 2020-12-16 Created: 2020-09-15 Last updated: 2022-02-25Bibliographically approved
Pagin, P. (2019). Enrichment, coherence, and quantifier properties. Journal of Pragmatics, 154, 92-102
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Enrichment, coherence, and quantifier properties
2019 (English)In: Journal of Pragmatics, ISSN 0378-2166, E-ISSN 1879-1387, Vol. 154, p. 92-102Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In Pagin 2014 I provided a new account of pragmatic enrichment. Building on the theory of coherence relations defended by Andrew Kehler, I proposed a four step scale of coherence strength. According to the account, free enrichment takes place, subject to constraints, when it raises the degree of coherence. It turned out that there is an intriguing interaction between coherence raising and determiner semantics: certain determiners license coherence raising while others tend to block them. In this paper I investigate the phenomenon. I try to identify the determiner properties that license coherence raising, and provide an explanation of why they do. 

Keywords
Enrichment, Coherence, Coherence raising, Determiners, Persistence, Prominence
National Category
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-176667 (URN)10.1016/j.pragma.2018.01.012 (DOI)000497254600007 ()
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2016-02458
Available from: 2019-12-17 Created: 2019-12-17 Last updated: 2022-02-26Bibliographically approved
Pagin, P. (2019). Propositional Content by Peter Hansk (Review) [Review]. Language, 95(2), 377-380
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Propositional Content by Peter Hansk (Review)
2019 (English)In: Language, ISSN 0097-8507, Vol. 95, no 2, p. 377-380Article, book review (Other academic) Published
Keywords
Propositions, assertion, force, content, Peter Hanks, speech acts
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-185068 (URN)10.1353/lan.2019.0036 (DOI)
Available from: 2020-09-15 Created: 2020-09-15 Last updated: 2022-02-25Bibliographically approved
Marshall, R. (2018). How Donald Trump’s bullshit earned him a place in the history of assertion. 3:am magazine
Open this publication in new window or tab >>How Donald Trump’s bullshit earned him a place in the history of assertion
2018 (English)In: 3:am magazineArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.)) Published
Abstract [en]

Peter Pagin‘s area is philosophy of language, and within philosophy of language he has primarily taken an interest in the foundations of semantic theories and semantic concepts. In the last few years he has worked on the principle of compositionality for natural language. He has tried to develop two thoughts: on the one hand that compositional semantic theories contribute to explain the success of linguistic communication, and on the other hand that precisely this explanatory role is the foundation of semantic concepts like truth and reference.

National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-164892 (URN)
Available from: 2019-01-20 Created: 2019-01-20 Last updated: 2022-02-26Bibliographically approved
Glüer, K. & Pagin, P. (2018). Växelsemantik (Switcher Semantics). Filosofisk Tidskrift, 39(3), 36-51
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Växelsemantik (Switcher Semantics)
2018 (Swedish)In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 39, no 3, p. 36-51Article in journal (Other academic) Published
Keywords
Compositionality, general compositionality, switcher semantics
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-164889 (URN)
Projects
Switcher Semantics
Available from: 2019-01-20 Created: 2019-01-20 Last updated: 2022-02-26Bibliographically approved
Organisations
Identifiers
ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0002-5250-1881

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