Integration theories assume that ingroup partnering (endogamy) among individuals of immigrant background declines as their exposure to majority society increases. We examine this for Sweden, a country with a large and diverse immigrant population. We study cohorts born 1986–1998 who either immigrated as children or were born in Sweden, thereby excluding pre-migration partnerships. We analyse both temporal and spatial exposure using population register data (n>1,000,000) covering both marriages and consensual unions. Our findings show high levels of endogamy by origin group, particularly among those with parents from the Middle East and Africa, where endogamy rates at country level range from 40% to 60%. Partnering with someone of majority background is rare, especially among women. The time exposure hypothesis finds some support as endogamy is higher the older a person was upon immigration. Also, for the second generation, endogamy declines with the family’s time in Sweden, although it remains high even after many years for several groups. Surprisingly, we find little evidence that spatial segregation drives endogamy. Ingroup partnering persists even with few co-ethnics in the neighbourhood, perhaps due to online meeting opportunities. Cultural attraction and aversion mechanisms appear to be more decisive than the opportunity structure for partnering.

Swedes uphold progressive attitudes regarding family, sexuality, and gender norms. At the same time, Sweden has had generous immigration policies for decades. This leads to challenges for children of immigrants, who must navigate between expectations from their family and the surrounding society. Therefore, this study asks whether children of immigrants’ attitudes relating to family, sexuality and gender roles adapt and approach those of their Swedish-background peers, using the Swedish branch of the CILS4EU survey (n = 5434). We account for dynamics in three ways: We compare attitudes of first- and second-generation immigrants; compare attitudes of youth to those of their parents; and study change in youth’s attitudes over time. In favour of acculturation, we find that second-generation immigrants have more liberal attitudes than first-generation immigrants, that immigrant-background youth are closer to majority peers in attitudes than their parents are to majority parents, and that gender norms of immigrant-background youth move closer to those of Swedish-background youth over time. For attitudes relating to family and sexuality, however, we find a divergence in attitudes over time, but not because immigrant-background youth become less liberal: Their views do become more liberal, but majority youth see an even stronger change in the same direction. 

In many Western countries, researchers have documented ambitious educational choices among students of immigrant origin, for example, the tendency to choose academically more demanding routes than others at given levels of school achievement (e.g. grades, GPA). While this may indicate integration, some warn against an ‘immigrant optimism trap’, because choosing more demanding tracks at lower levels of GPA may increase risks of non-completion. Using longitudinal Swedish population data (n ≈ 90,000), we estimate an upper secondary ‘ethnic completion gap’ of 12 per cent to the detriment of students of immigrant background. We then address the ‘trap hypothesis’ via two analyses. The first shows that if students of immigration background would make similar educational choices as other students at the same GPA, the completion gap would shrink by 3.4 percentage points. The second analysis, based on simulations, suggests that restricting admission to academic programmes based on prior GPA, would lead to a massive relocation of low- and mid-GPA students to—usually less demanding—vocational programmes, but would only reduce the completion gap by 2.2 percentage points. These changes must be considered marginal in view of the substantial restrictions of choice that either of these measures would entail. We conclude that completion gaps are not primarily a result of unfounded immigrant optimism, and that optimistic choices are likely to be a net positive for integration by improving the chances of immigrant youth to reach tertiary-level qualifications and professional occupations.

Rising inequalities in rich countries have led to concerns that the economic ladder is getting harder to climb. Yet, research on trends in intergenerational income mobility finds conflicting results. To better understand this variation, we adopt a multiverse approach that estimates trends over 82,944 different definitions of income mobility, varying how and for whom income is measured. Our analysis draws on comprehensive register data for Swedish cohorts born 1958 to 1977 and their parents. We find that income mobility has declined, but for reasons neglected by previous research: improved gender equality in the labor market raises intergenerational persistence in women's earnings and the household incomes of both men and women. Dominant theories that focus on childhood investments have blinded researchers to this development. Methodologically, we show how multiverse analysis can be used with abduction-inference to the best explanation-to improve theory-building in social science.

Diskussionen om integration i Sverige behöver förnyas. Den är visserligenpassionerad och livlig men bygger till stor del på framhävandet av enstakafall, anekdotiska belägg och känslor. I diskussioner där starka känslor är in-blandade kan det vara svårt att ta till sig information som inte passar den åsiktman redan har – faktaresistensen drabbar oss alla. Men med en förhoppningom att politiker, samhällsdebattörer, studenter, forskare och människor i all-mänhet har både intresse och respekt för hur verkligheten faktiskt ser ut villvi med denna bok bidra till en kunskapsgrund som kan göra integrations-debatten mer konstruktiv.

Att beskriva integration som lyckad eller misslyckad är vilseledande, då slutsatserna beror på vad man syftar på – som inkomst, utbildning, värderingar eller religiositet. Vår studie visar att integrationen bland unga i Sverige är både långt borta och nära, beroende på vilken dimension som avses, skriver sociologiprofessorerna Jan O Jonsson och Carina Mood.

Alla har sett de återkommande rubrikerna om att fattigdomen, alternativt barnfattigdomen, ökar. Men fattigdomen har faktiskt inte ökat sedan mitten av 1990-talet i Sverige. Det som har ökat är istället förekomsten av teoretiskt tvivelaktiga och urvattnade mått på fattigdom. Vi redogör för de grundläg-gande teorierna bakom olika fattigdomsmått och argumenterar för använ-dandet av mått som är förankrade i vanliga människors uppfattning om fattig-dom. Ett sådant mått bör utgå från brister i ekonomiska och/eller materiella resurser och operationaliseras som materiell deprivation eller som ’absolut inkomstfattigdom’, där inkomsterna relateras till olika socialt bestämda nöd-vändigheter. Ett sådant mer renodlat fattigdomsmått bör komplettera, men inte förväxlas med andra väsentliga samhällsfenomen, till exempel ojämlik-het och levnadsnivå; skilja sig från dem operationellt, precis som de skiljer sig teoretiskt.

We are used to headlines saying that poverty increases, but poverty has in fact not increased in Sweden since the 1990s. What has increased is instead the use of theoretically questionable and diluted measures of poverty. We describe the basic theories behind different types of poverty measures, and argue that we should use one that is grounded in ordinary people’s concep-tion of poverty. Such measure should be based on the notion of shortage of economic or material resources, and be operationalised as either material deprivation or ‘absolute income poverty’, where incomes are related to soci-ally determined necessities. Such a ‘pure’ poverty measure should comple-ment but not be confounded with other important societal phenomena, such as inequality or level-of-living; differ from them in the definition just as they differ theoretically.