A gas in a box is perhaps the most important model system studied in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. Usually, studies focus on the gas, whereas the box merely serves as an idealized confinement. The present article focuses on the box as the central object and develops a thermodynamic theory by treating the geometric degrees of freedom of the box as the degrees of freedom of a thermodynamic system. Applying standard mathematical methods to the thermody- namics of an empty box allows equations with the same structure as those of cosmology and classical and quantum mechanics to be derived. The simple model system of an empty box is shown to have interesting connections to classical mechanics, special relativity, and quantum field theory.

The accumulation of knowledge concerning the character and transformations of substances from ancient times constitutes progress in chemistry, which has accelerated enormously since the end of the seventeenth century. The chapter focuses on some themes in the development of theorising and conceptual clarification at the macroscopic and microscopic levels during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This covers the general understanding of substances in relation to phase and the general notion of a mixture, the distinction between daltonides and berthollides, and issues connected with the notion of molecular structure. Together with the enormous body of factual material accumulated particularly over the last two centuries, this is progress in chemistry. The epistemological approach seems to give the best account of it amongst philosophical views on progress currently on offer.

Classical atoms—“part-less, ontologically irreducible simples” as the conference flyer puts it—are not the atoms of modern chemistry and analogies with the latter can be construed in various ways. They have figured in the historical development of concepts of chemical affinity but without, as Alan Chalmers and I have independently argued, making any significant contribution to empirically justified theories. A purely combinatorial conception of the formation of compounds by juxtaposing atoms is associated with Daltonian atomism. I review the merits of this idea as a solution to problems posed by developments in early nineteenth century chemistry and go on to suggest that subsequent developments in chemistry are as much in agreement with ideas associated with Aristotle as with the ancient atomists, if not more so. The basic issues can be understood without getting involved in detailed chemistry and I hope what I have to say will be of interest to philosophers concerned with the metaphysics of matter but with no special knowledge of chemistry.

This undergraduate textbook introduces some fundamental issues in philosophy of science for students of philosophy and science students. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with knowledge and values. Chap. 1 presents the classical conception of knowledge as initiated by the ancient Greeks and elaborated during the development of science, introducing the central concepts of truth, belief and justification. Aspects of the quest for objectivity are taken up in the following two chapters. Moral issues are broached in Chap. 4, which discusses some aspects of the use and abuse of science, taking up the responsibilities of scientists in properly conducting their business and decision-makers in their concerns with the import of science for society. Part 2 contrasts the view of scientific progress as the rejecting of old hypotheses and theories and replacing them with new ones, represented by Karl Popper, with the conception of progress as accumulating knowledge, saving as much as possible from older theories, represented by Pierre Duhem. A concluding chapter defends the natural attitude of taking the theories of modern science to be literally true, i.e. realism, in the face of arguments drawn partly from the history of scientific progress in criticism of this stance.

Must potentiality be grounded in actuality? A central issue in the philosophy of chemistry, going back to Aristotle, is an instance of that very general question: when elements combine, are they actually present in the compound substance which results, or are they only potentially present, in the sense that they can be recovered on separation? Atomism down the ages has been widely understood to endorse the former view, while Aristotle famously defended the latter view, arguing that on the atomist account it is difficult to distinguish genuine chemical combination from mere juxtaposition of the elements. We examine how far, and in what respects, modern chemical theories, enriched by their interaction with physical theories such as quantum mechanics, vindicate atomism over Aristotle. Our conclusion is that the endorsement is only partial: modern chemistry agrees that elements survive in compounds, but must reject the atomist assumption that, when elements are ‘regenerated’ from a compound, the portions of matter that result can be identified with those that constituted the elements before combination.

The idea that the extension of a chemical substance is fixed by determining what stands in the relation of being the same substance to a paradigm sample plays a substantial role in chemistry, and procedures of identification which don’t make direct use of the method can be traced back to ones that do. But paradigm samples are not typically selected by ostension, as in Putnam’s version of this procedure. The relevance of ostension is questioned after a discussion of the establishment of paradigm specimens in the analysis of some contents of crude oil and an examination of the general features of the same substance relation which takes into account the temporal dependency and the consequent role of characteristic features of substances.