This paper studies the theories defended by John Buridan and Nicole Oresme on the presence of the soul in the body, with a special focus on the interpretation of the Augustinian principle - or 'holenmeric' principle - according to which the soul is in the whole body and is wholly present in every part of it. The first part of the paper introduces the different types of composition involved in the medieval discussions over the soul and its parts and shows how different psychological theories prior to 1350 employed this typology of part/whole relations to clarify the soul's presence in the body. The next part of the paper presents how the theories designed by John Buridan and Nicole Oresme were motivated by problems raised by these earlier accounts of the soul's presence and undertook to solve them from the perspective of a reductionist conception of parthood. It is argued that, despite their common commitment to a reductionist stance, the solutions endorsed by Buridan and Oresme represent two opposite ways of applying a nominalist metaphysics of parts to psychological matters.

This paper investigates the late medieval controversy over the causal role of substantial forms in the generation of new substances. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, when there were two basic positions in this debate (section II), an original position was defended by Walter Burley and Peter Auriol, according to which accidents alone—by their own power—can generate substantial forms (section III). The paper presents how this view was received by the next generation of philosophers, i.e., around 1350 (section IV), and how, even though some of the initial theoretical motivations for this view were quickly abandoned, the view was still defended by several philosophers in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (section V). It is finally shown that this theory, still discussed by Suárez and early modern scholastics, and despite being generally rejected, contributed in its own way to the evolution of hylomorphism in the late Middle Ages and, to a certain extent, its gradual decline (section VI).

This paper aims at tracking down, by looking at late medieval and early modern discussions over the ontological status of artifacts, the main steps of the process through which nature became theorized on a mechanistic model in the early 17th century. The adopted methodology consists in examining how inventions such as mechanical clocks and automata forced philosophers to modify traditional criteria based on an intrinsic principle of motion and rest for defining natural beings. The paper studies different strategies designed in the transitional period 1300–1600 for making these inventions compatible with classical definitions of nature and artifacts. In the first part of the paper, it is shown that, even if virtually all medieval philosophers acknowledged an ontological distinction between artifacts and natural beings, these different strategies demonstrate a growing concern about the consistency of the art/nature distinction. The next part of the paper studies how mechanical clocks, even before the Scientific Revolution, served as theoretical models for applying mechanistic views to different objects (be they cosmological, physical or biological). The epistemological function of clocks appears to stem from different factors (like the specific manufacturing of late medieval clocks as well as the evolution of 16th-century mechanics) that are listed in this second part of the paper. These factors, combined with the definitional issues raised by automata, explain that clocks became the symbol of a new approach to natural philosophy, characterized by the collapse of the art/nature distinction and the “mechanization of nature”.

This article investigates the philosophical elaboration of the concept of perfectional form (forma perfectionalis) in Dietrich of Freiberg's works. Although Dietrich draws on the traditional notion of perfection to a certain extent, it appears that in his view, what he calls perfectional forms represent a special type of form distinct from the classical division between substantial and accidental forms. The main part of the article analyzes the different uses of this concept made by Dietrich, from his theory of light to his views on the essence of the intellect. The final part of this study aims to evaluate the influence of Dietrich's theory on the so-called German Dominican school. It is argued that, while Dietrich's influence on Nicholas of Strasbourg is possible but cannot be firmly established, his theory was explicitly taken up and extended to a more metaphysical dimension by Berthold of Moosburg.

This paper analyzes Paul of Venice’s theory of measurement of natural properties and changes. The main sections of the paper correspond to Paul’s analysis of the three types of accidental changes (local motion: section II; augmentation: section III; alteration and qualities: section IV), for which the Augustinian philosopher sought to provide rules of measurement. It appears that Paul achieved an original synthesis borrowing from both Parisian (Albert of Saxony in particular) and Oxfordian sources (especially Richard Swineshead). It is also argued that, on top of this theoretical synthesis, Paul managed to elaborate a quite original theory of intensive properties that marks him out not only from the nominalist framework of his Parisian sources but also from the usual realist treatments of the problem. Finally, it is shown that, to a certain extent, Paul undertook to apply the mathematical and logical tools inherited from the Calculatores tradition to empirical problems of natural philosophy, leading to reevaluate his role in the evolution of scientific thought in early 15^th-century Italy (section V).

This paper offers an overview of the history of the axiom/in-ma dat ease, which was commonly quoted during the Middle Ages to describe formal causality. The first part of the paper studies the origin of this principle, and recalls how the ambiguity of Boethius's first formulation of it in the De ninitate was variously interpreted by the members of the School of Chartres. Then, the paper examines the various declensions of the axiom that existed in the late Middle Ages, and shows how its evolution significantly follows the progressive decline of the Aristotelian model of formal causality.

This paper analyzes Hugolinus of Orvieto’s treatise on the perfection of species, which was written around 1348-1349, and compares Hugolinus’s main theses with the positions of other theologians of the same period. The first part of the paper examines the main concepts (nobility, latitude, degree) that Hugolinus uses to present his conclusions. Then, the views of Hugolinus on the order of perfections and the way to measure them are studied in comparison with previous approaches to the same problem (in particular those of John of Mirecourt and Peter of Ceffons). The final part of the paper indicates how the weaknesses of Hugolinus’s positions explain to a certain extent the theories that John of Ripa and Jacques Legrand will develop concerning the problem of specific perfections.

This paper presents a version of hylomorphism that intends to solve problems faced by contemporary hylomorphism. After showing that attempts to understand form as sets or relation of essential properties fail at taking into account the dynamic development of substances, the paper suggests another version of hylomorphism able to solve these difficulties. A functionalist version of hylomorphism is then defended: the best way to understand how form can be present throughout all the developmental stages of a substance is to understand it as a certain kind of function.