This chapter argues that the tradition within the individualism-holism debate of importing arguments from the micro–macro discussion in other disciplines (e.g., philosophy of mind and philosophy of biology) significantly has hampered our understanding of the “individual-social” relationship. While, for example, the “neural-mental” and “atomic-molecular” links represent empirical “gives rise to” relationships, in the social sciences the micro–macro link is a purely analytical “qualifies as” type of relationship. This disanalogy is important, since it has significant implications for the individualism-holism debate: (a) it implies a phenomenally monist social ontology and (b) it disqualifies the notion of social macro causation.

Social science has, from its very beginnings, been characterized by debates over the true nature of society and about how to best understand and explain it. At the heart of these discussions lies the question of the causal structure of the social world. Two overarching positions on this issue can be identified: causal individualism and causal holism. While causal individualism argues that we can account sufficiently for the types of causal relationships of interest to social scientists simply with reference to processes involving actions, interactions and mental properties on the part of individuals in physical settings, causal holism argues that social causation also involves higher level phenomena and/or entities, such as “macro social organisms”, “structures” or “institutions”. This compilation thesis makes the case for the former perspective. More specifically, the thesis aims to do two things: 1) To provide a clear account of causal individualism based on an explicit social ontology; and 2) To defend this position against the most influential versions of causal holism. It is argued that contemporary embodiments of causal holism in social scientific meta-theory (e.g. the notion that there are micro-macro mechanisms in the social sphere, the idea that social phenomena may be “micro realization robust” and the belief that social macro entities can have a downward causal effect on individuals) all stem from one and the same more fundamental error, i.e. that of treating the analytical micro-macro relationship in social science as if it were empirical.

This article argues that empirical social scientists can be freed from having to account for micro-to-macro transitions. The article shows, in opposition to the (still) dominant perspective based on Coleman's macro-micro-macro model, that no micro-macro transitions or mechanisms connect the individual level to the macro level in empirical social science. Rather, when considering that social macro entities and properties are micro manifest rather than macro manifest, it becomes clear that the micro-macro move in empirical social science is purely conceptual or analytical.

This article argues that the tradition within the individualism-holism debate of importing arguments from the micro-macro discussion in other disciplines (e.g., philosophy of mind and philosophy of biology) significantly has hampered our understanding of the individual-social relationship. While, for example, the neural-mental and atomic-molecular links represent empirical gives rise to relationships, in the social sciences the micro-macro link is a purely analytical qualifies as type of relationship. This disanalogy is important, since it has significant implications for the individualism-holism debate: (a) it implies a phenomenally monist social ontology and (b) it disqualifies the notion of social macro causation.