The association between higher education and political attitudes is well-recognized, and research suggests that socialization amongst peers is one of the most probable mechanisms explaining a possible attitudinal change. However, identifying a socialization effect is difficult due to self-selection mechanisms and limitations in data availability. This article empirically investigates the underlying peer socialization by employing a longitudinal network study of undergraduate students in Swedish and Finnish top-ranked business schools (N = 2651). The study tests the hypotheses that (1) attitudes within a cohort converge over time, and (2) socially embedded students experience more attitudinal change during their studies than students who do not engage with their peers. The paper leverages the Covid-19 pandemic as an exogenous shock that severely affected the networking dynamics of specific cohorts since it moved their education off campus. It is thereby among the first studies to directly test the relationship between socializing behaviors within higher education and political attitudes using both subjective and objective measurements. Contrary to previous conjectures, the findings challenge a general socialization mechanism to foster political attitudes. Instead, they point toward the importance of self-selection mechanisms in studies of higher education and for the specific student composition.

The annexation of Crimea, the subsequent insurgency of Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas region of Ukraine in 2014 and the current full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine have led to different responses from political elites, diasporas and migrants currently residing in different European countries. The historic decision of Sweden to send defence weapons to Ukraine as well as to apply for NATO membership after the invasion in 2022, as compared with mostly ‘soft’ support before, is just one of the examples of this shift. The political role of diasporic and migrant organizations in lobbying for support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia has also significantly increased: party leaders and high-level politicians are more frequently at the demonstrations for support for Ukraine organized by diasporas. In this article I analyse Swedish Parliamentary debates and arguments for different types of action for Ukraine between 2014 and 2022. I specifically focus on the space occupied by Ukrainian diasporic and migrant individuals/organizations in such debates and arguments.

Since the eruption of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, both Ukrainian and Russian diasporas in Sweden have been reframing themselves through memories, narratives and symbols. They have been revised in connection to the initial Russian-backed insurgency in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea (2014), the “homeland” as well as previous diasporic mobilizations in the country of residence. Revising the memories, narratives and symbols to fit the new reality of a full-scale war also has meant renegotiating group boundaries in the solidarity with Ukraine movement. In this study, I focus on the collective memory and group boundary-making within the pro-Ukraine movement and demonstrations in Stockholm, Sweden, and investigate the change in solidarity patterns, specifically performed during the initial mobilization due to the annexation of Crimea, Russian-backed insurgency in the eastern Ukraine, and the first months of Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

Ethnicized armed conflicts are usually studied in their territorial dimension and analyzed through the patterns of involvement of different direct and indirect actors. Mostly the focus lies on the multiple ways these direct and indirect actors affect the processes and outcomes of such conflicts. While direct actors mostly participate in the fighting itself, indirect ones can involve transnational advocacy organizations and diasporic groups. Diasporas in this perspective are usually considered to be either “peace-makers” or “peace-wreckers”. Less research has been done on the effects the ethnicized armed conflict in the “homeland” can have on diasporic communities.

In this dissertation, I develop theoretical conceptualization of the intersection of armed conflict in the “homeland” and diaspora. I focus on a specific case of Ukrainian-Russian conflict and Ukrainian, Russian and conflict-generated diasporic groups in Sweden.

I argue that the ethnicized armed conflict in the “homeland” can become deterritorialized. In other words, ideas, attitudes and ethnicized narratives of such conflicts can become detached from a certain geographical location and settle in the transnational space of interactions. Such conflict deterritorialization can in its turn trigger diasporization processes elsewhere. It can also mobilize the pre-existing diasporic organizations for “homeland”-related activism. If diasporic individuals and communities use the symbols, ideas and narratives of the conflict in the “homeland” in defining the Other, as well as their relationships and networks, another process – conflict reterritorialization – is at play. This process can subsequently shift group boundary making and maintenance processes.

Together, the concepts of conflict deterritorialization and reterritorialization help explain the patterns and mechanisms of the armed conflict in its meaning dimension. In addition, such theoretical conceptualization enables the analysis of the effects the conflict might have in the diasporic setting, including the processes of politicization.

Using the specific case of Ukrainian-Russian conflict (2014-ongoing) I analyze the collaboration networks of Ukrainian, Russian and conflict-generated organizations active in Sweden between 2013 and 2016 and interview Ukrainians and Russians from Ukraine living in Sweden. I show that both patterns of conflict deterritorialization and reterritorialization are present in this specific diasporic setting to different degrees.

Study 1 theoretically conceptualizes conflict deterritorialization as a diasporization process using previous findings from different case studies. Study 2 investigates the mechanisms of diaspora politicization and the role of conflict-generated diasporas in facilitating these mechanisms. In Study 3 I find that during the most violent period of war in eastern Ukraine, the attitude towards the conflict might have become a leading factor for collaborations between diasporic organizations. And, finally, Study 4 explores the potentiality of armed conflict in the “homeland” to contribute to a shift in ethnic group boundary making processes in the diasporic setting.

Taken together the four studies aim to shed light on the non-territorial meaning dimension of the ethnicized armed conflicts theoretically and empirically. Thus, the dissertation contributes to the development of the holistic understanding of war and diaspora while taking into account the importance of contexts, factors and conditions of the country of residence, the “homeland” and the transnational space.

This paper investigates whether the Maidan Revolution in Kyiv (late 2013–early 2014) and the ongoing armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine (early 2014) have been reflected in the collaboration networks of Ukrainian and Russian organizations in Sweden between 2013 and 2016.

I use ERG models to account for the probabilities of ties between the organizations, depending on the network structure and individual attributes such as ethnic identification and the choice of a side to support in the conflict.

Results suggest that it is support for a certain side in the conflict, and not ethnic self-identification, which drives the clustering of the networks during the most violent period.