Endre søk
RefereraExporteraLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Referera
Referensformat
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Annet format
Fler format
Språk
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Annet språk
Fler språk
Utmatningsformat
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Democracy and the Common Good: A Study of the Weighted Majority Rule
Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
2013 (engelsk)Doktoravhandling, monografi (Annet vitenskapelig)
Abstract [en]

In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters’ well-being.

The main result of my study is that this argument for the weighted majority rule — that it maximises the common good — can be improved along the following three main lines. (1) The argument can be adapted to other criteria of the common good, such as sufficientarian, maximin, leximin or non-welfarist criteria. I propose a generic argument for the collective optimality of the weighted majority rule that works for all of these criteria. (2) The assumption of self-interested voters can be relaxed. First, common-interest voters can be accommodated. Second, even if voters are less than fully competent in judging their self-interest or the common interest, the weighted majority rule is weakly collectively optimal, that is, it almost certainly maximises the common good given a large numbers of voters. Third, even for smaller groups of voters, the weighted majority rule still has some attractive features. (3) The scope of the argument can be extended to decisions with more than two options. I state the conditions under which the weighted majority rule maximises the common good even in multi-option contexts. I also analyse the possibility and the detrimental effects of strategic voting. Furthermore, I argue that self-interested voters have reason to accept the weighted majority rule.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Stockholm: Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University , 2013. , s. 222
Emneord [en]
Weighted majority rule, common good, collective optimality, well-being, welfare, self-interest, stakes, proportionality, democracy, preference aggregation, Condorcet jury theorem, strategic voting
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
praktisk filosofi
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-92851ISBN: 978-91-7447-738-2 (tryckt)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-92851DiVA, id: diva2:642464
Disputas
2013-09-20, De Geersalen, Geovetenskapens hus, Svante Arrhenius väg 14, Stockholm, 13:00 (engelsk)
Opponent
Veileder
Tilgjengelig fra: 2013-08-29 Laget: 2013-08-22 Sist oppdatert: 2013-08-22bibliografisk kontrollert

Open Access i DiVA

Berndt Rasmussen Democracy and the Common Good(2542 kB)1778 nedlastinger
Filinformasjon
Fil FULLTEXT01.pdfFilstørrelse 2542 kBChecksum SHA-512
58cba5e25788a8f6cbc1b2692b3d60da876876603b5abcf918aad3409844ae9d6cbae6ad65662996951d695e884f37b11ce8df52375cf12b00ccc4b737a99e5f
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

Søk i DiVA

Av forfatter/redaktør
Berndt Rasmussen, Katharina
Av organisasjonen

Søk utenfor DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Totalt: 1778 nedlastinger
Antall nedlastinger er summen av alle nedlastinger av alle fulltekster. Det kan for eksempel være tidligere versjoner som er ikke lenger tilgjengelige

isbn
urn-nbn

Altmetric

isbn
urn-nbn
Totalt: 1904 treff
RefereraExporteraLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Referera
Referensformat
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Annet format
Fler format
Språk
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Annet språk
Fler språk
Utmatningsformat
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf