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Democracy and the Common Good: A Study of the Weighted Majority Rule
Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
2013 (Engelska)Doktorsavhandling, monografi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Abstract [en]

In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters’ well-being.

The main result of my study is that this argument for the weighted majority rule — that it maximises the common good — can be improved along the following three main lines. (1) The argument can be adapted to other criteria of the common good, such as sufficientarian, maximin, leximin or non-welfarist criteria. I propose a generic argument for the collective optimality of the weighted majority rule that works for all of these criteria. (2) The assumption of self-interested voters can be relaxed. First, common-interest voters can be accommodated. Second, even if voters are less than fully competent in judging their self-interest or the common interest, the weighted majority rule is weakly collectively optimal, that is, it almost certainly maximises the common good given a large numbers of voters. Third, even for smaller groups of voters, the weighted majority rule still has some attractive features. (3) The scope of the argument can be extended to decisions with more than two options. I state the conditions under which the weighted majority rule maximises the common good even in multi-option contexts. I also analyse the possibility and the detrimental effects of strategic voting. Furthermore, I argue that self-interested voters have reason to accept the weighted majority rule.

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
Stockholm: Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University , 2013. , s. 222
Nyckelord [en]
Weighted majority rule, common good, collective optimality, well-being, welfare, self-interest, stakes, proportionality, democracy, preference aggregation, Condorcet jury theorem, strategic voting
Nationell ämneskategori
Filosofi
Forskningsämne
praktisk filosofi
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-92851ISBN: 978-91-7447-738-2 (tryckt)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-92851DiVA, id: diva2:642464
Disputation
2013-09-20, De Geersalen, Geovetenskapens hus, Svante Arrhenius väg 14, Stockholm, 13:00 (Engelska)
Opponent
Handledare
Tillgänglig från: 2013-08-29 Skapad: 2013-08-22 Senast uppdaterad: 2013-08-22Bibliografiskt granskad

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Berndt Rasmussen Democracy and the Common Good(2542 kB)1780 nedladdningar
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Berndt Rasmussen, Katharina
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Filosofiska institutionen
Filosofi

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Totalt: 1780 nedladdningar
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