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Rule-Following and Charity: Wittgenstein and Davidson on Meaning Determination
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-7483-7060
2017 (English)In: Wittgenstein and Davidson on Thought, Language, and Action / [ed] Claudine Verheggen, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 69-96Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

The project of this chapter is to explore some relations between the rule-following considerations and radical interpretation. I spell out the sense in which the rule-following considerations are about meaning determination, and investigate whether the principle of meaning determination used in the early Davidson's account of meaning determination - the principle of charity - provides an answer to what I shall call "Wittgenstein's paradox". More precisely, I am interested in one aspect of the paradox: the "problem of objectivity". My question then is whether meaning, as determined by charity, is such that the correctness of the applications of meaningful expressions is an objective matter. After running us through the basics of the radical interpretation account of meaning determination I argue that the principle of charity does seem to fall prey to the problem of objectivity. After unsuccessfully trying to rescue objectivity by means of Lewisian natural properties, this is the verdict I in the end endorse.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 69-96
Keywords [en]
rule-following, meaning determination, radical interpretation, principle of charity, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson, David Lewis, Wittgenstein's paradox, natural properties, foundational semantics
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-155268DOI: 10.1017/9781316145364.005ISBN: 9781316145364 (electronic)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-155268DiVA, id: diva2:1198291
Available from: 2018-04-17 Created: 2018-04-17 Last updated: 2018-06-29Bibliographically approved

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