Freedom as Non-domination and Democratic Inclusion
2017 (English)In: Res Publica, ISSN 1356-4765, E-ISSN 1572-8692, ISSN 1356-4765Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
According to neo-republicans, democracy is morally justified because it is among the prerequisites for freedom as non-domination. The claim that democracy secures freedom as non-domination needs to explain why democratic procedures contribute to non-domination and for whom democracy secures non-domination. This requires an account of why domination is countered by democratic procedures and an account of to whom domination is countered by access to democratic procedures. Neo-republican theory of democracy is based on a detailed discussion of the former but a scant discussion of the latter. We address this lacuna by interpreting the two most influential principles of inclusion, the all-subjected principle and the all-affected principle, in light of neo-republican commitments. The preliminary conclusion is that both principles are able to capture relations of domination between the democratic state and the people controlled by it in the relevant sense. Yet, the state has virtually unlimited powers to control residents, but only limited powers to interfere in the lives of non-residents. Republican aspirations are therefore more in tune with the all-subjected principle according to which only residents in the territory of the state should be granted rights to political participation.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Neo-republicanism; Non-domination; Democracy; Inclusion; Residents
Political Science (excluding Public Administration Studies and Globalization Studies)
Research subject Political Science
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-137425DOI: 10.1007/s11158-016-9348-8OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-137425DiVA: diva2:1062582