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Defeating Looks
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-7483-7060
2016 (English)In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

In previous work, I have suggested a doxastic account of perceptual experience according to which experiences form a (peculiar) kind of belief: Beliefs with what I have called “phenomenal” or “looks-content”. I have argued that this account can not only accommodate the intuitive reason providing role of experience, but also its justificatory role. I have also argued that, in general, construing experience and perceptual beliefs, i.e. the beliefs most directly based on experience, as having different contents best accounts for the defeasibility of experiential reasons. In this paper, I shall have a closer look at the evidential or inferential relation between looks-propositions and the contents of perceptual beliefs and argue for a form of what I shall call “Pollockianism” about experiential reasons: such reasons are good unless defeated. Questions to be investigated include: Does the resulting picture of perceptual justification contain an externalist element? Is it compatible with Bayesianism? And how does it do with respect to problems that have been raised for other forms of Pollockianism such as dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism?

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016.
Keyword [en]
Epistemology of perception; Representational content of perceptual experience; Prima facie reasons; Looks; Phenomenal properties; Experience and Folk-psychology
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-137915DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1186-xOAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-137915DiVA: diva2:1065015
Projects
The Nature of Belief
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2013-737
Available from: 2017-01-13 Created: 2017-01-13 Last updated: 2017-03-20

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