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Charity and Error-Theoretic Nominalism
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-7570-2697
2015 (English)In: Ratio (Oxford. Print), ISSN 0034-0006, E-ISSN 1467-9329, Vol. 28, no 3, 256-270 p., DOI: 10.1111/rati.12070Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

I here investigate whether there is any version of the principle of charity both strong enough to conflict with an error-theoretic version of nominalism about abstract objects, and supported by the considerations adduced in favour of interpretive charity in the literature. I argue that in order to be strong enough, the principle, which I call (Charity), would have to read, “For all expressions e, an acceptable interpretation must make true a sufficiently high ratio of accepted sentences containing e”. I next consider arguments based on Davidson's intuitive cases for interpretive charity, the reliability of perceptual beliefs, and the reliability of “non-abstractive inference modes”, and conclude that none support. I then propose a diagnosis of the view that there must be some universal principle of charity ruling out. Finally, I present a reason to think (Charity) is false, namely, that it seems to exclude the possibility of such disagreements as that between nominalists and realists. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2015. Vol. 28, no 3, 256-270 p., DOI: 10.1111/rati.12070
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-145306DOI: 10.1111/rati.12070OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-145306DiVA: diva2:1128327
Funder
Swedish Research Council
Available from: 2017-07-25 Created: 2017-07-25 Last updated: 2017-07-25

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