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Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-3112-0673
2017 (English)In: Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition / [ed] Philip Robichaud, Jan Willem Wieland, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 146-162Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

This chapter combines the familiar Strawsonian idea that moral blame and credit depend on the agent’s quality of will with an independently motivated account of responsibility as grounded in a normal explanatory relation between agential qualities and objects of responsibility. The resulting “explanatory quality of will condition” on moral responsibility is then further motivated by being shown to account for the effects on moral blame and credit of justifications, excuses, and undermined control in cases where agents are fully aware of what they are doing. Having been independently motivated, the explanatory quality of will condition is then applied to cases involving lack of awareness. Though this condition involves no explicit epistemic condition on responsibility, it is shown how it accounts for the degrees to which lack of awareness can excuse.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. p. 146-162
Keywords [en]
responsibility, ignorance, epistemic condition, explanatory condition, quality of will
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy; Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-150591DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198779667.003.0008ISBN: 978-0-19-877966-7 (print)ISBN: 978-0-19-182471-5 (electronic)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-150591DiVA, id: diva2:1169499
Projects
Explanations of responsibility
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2015-01488Available from: 2017-12-27 Created: 2017-12-27 Last updated: 2017-12-28Bibliographically approved

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