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Counterfactual Skepticism and Multidimensional Semantics
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2017 (English)In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

It has recently been argued that indeterminacy and indeterminism make most ordinary counterfactuals false. I argue that a plausible way to avoid such counterfactual skepticism is to postulate the existence of primitive modal facts that serve as truth-makers for counterfactual claims. Moreover, I defend a new theory of ‘might’ counterfactuals, and develop assertability and knowledge criteria to suit such unobservable ‘counterfacts’.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2017.
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Philosophy
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URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-155566DOI: 10.1007/s10670-017-9918-yOAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-155566DiVA, id: diva2:1201161
Available from: 2018-04-24 Created: 2018-04-24 Last updated: 2018-04-25

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