Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Presuppositions, again
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Romance Studies and Classics.
2019 (English)In: Philosophical Insights into Pragmatics / [ed] Piotr Stalmaszczyk, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2019Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Presupposition is surely one of the most debated notions in the linguistic and philosophical literature. Historically, there are two main theoretical approaches to presuppositions. According to the first one, the semantic view, presuppositions are semantic implications, that is, truth-conditional relations between propositions and statements. In this sense, presuppositions are considered properties of sentences and a presupposed proposition is a necessary condition for the truth of the presupposing statement. In the second approach, the pragmatic view, presuppositions are not properties of sentences but rather properties of speakers or of linguistic performances given a certain context of utterance. From this view, a presupposed proposition is a condition for the felicitous utterance of the presupposing statement in a given context.

Traditionally, it is assumed that semantic presuppositions differ from classical entailments, as presuppositions, unlike classical entailments, project under negation: if we compare a context of entailment to a context of presupposition, we should see that entailments, but not presuppositions, disappear under negation. This presentation aims to propose a revision of the semantic notion of presupposition. I argue that most standard cases of presuppositions are classical entailments. Moreover, I claim that all presuppositions that are classical entailments are also pragmatic presuppositions, while not all pragmatic presuppositions are also classical entailments. I contend that factive verbs offer a paradigmatic example of this distinction, as the factivity related to know is semantic, hence a classical entailment, whereas the factivity related to regret is merely pragmatic. This claim stands in contrast to Karttunen’s (1971) well-known analysis of factive verbs and his distinction between true factives (that is, emotive factives) and semifactives (that is, cognitive factives).

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2019.
Series
Philosophische Analyse, ISSN 2198-2066, E-ISSN 2198-2074
Keywords [en]
Presupposition, Classical entailment, Constancy under negation, Projection, Factivity, Know, Regret
National Category
Philosophy General Language Studies and Linguistics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-159510ISBN: 9783110623765 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-159510DiVA, id: diva2:1244345
Available from: 2018-08-31 Created: 2018-08-31 Last updated: 2018-09-06Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text in DiVA

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Colonna Dahlman, Roberta
By organisation
Department of Romance Studies and Classics
PhilosophyGeneral Language Studies and Linguistics

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

isbn
urn-nbn

Altmetric score

isbn
urn-nbn
Total: 4532 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf