Informativeness and Moore's Paradox
2008 (English)In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, Vol. 68, no 1, 46-57 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
It is argued that a) non-intentional systems can exhibit what is intuitively reconizable as Moorean absurdity; b) that main-stream accounts of Moore's paradox cannot explain this; c) that an alternative account focused on informativeness (or information-giving) can explain it; d) that an account of assertoric force as prima facie informativeness is plausible; e) that the informativeness account of Moorean absurdity can explain standard examples of Moore's paradox in virtue of this theory of assertion.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell , 2008. Vol. 68, no 1, 46-57 p.
Assertion, information, Moore's paradox, evidence, belief
Research subject Theoretical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-40812DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00712.xISI: 000251808500007OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-40812DiVA: diva2:132763
ProjectsVagueness and Context Factors