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Indeterminacy and the analytic/synthetic distinctions: a survey
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. (Teoretisk filosofi)
2008 (English)In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, Vol. 164, 1-18 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

It is often assumed that there is a close connection between Quine’s criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction, in ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’ and onwards, and his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, in Word and Object and onwards. Often, the claim that the distinction is unsound (in some way or other) is taken to follow from the indeterminacy thesis, and sometimes the indeterminacy thesis is supported by such a claim. However, a careful scrutiny of the indeterminacy thesis as stated by Quine, and the varieties of the analytic/synthetic distinction, reveals that the two claims are mutually independent. Neither does the claim that the distinction is unsound follow from the indeterminacy thesis, nor that thesis from unsoundness claim, under any of the common interpretations of the analytic/synthetic distinction.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Dordrecht: Springer , 2008. Vol. 164, 1-18 p.
Keyword [en]
Indeterminacy, analyticity, meaning
National Category
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-40814DOI: 10.1007/s11229-007-9213-6ISI: 000258535700001OAI: diva2:132775
PAVAAvailable from: 2008-12-31 Created: 2008-12-31 Last updated: 2009-06-25Bibliographically approved

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