Intuitionism and the anti-justification of bivalence
2008 (English)In: Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism — What has Become of Them?, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands , 2008, 221-236 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
Dag Prawitz has argued (Prawitz 1998) that it is possible intuitionist- ically to prove the validity of ‘A → there is a proof of [A]’ by induction over formula complexity, provided we observe an ob ject language/meta- language distinction. In the present paper I mainly argue that if the ob ject language with its axioms and rules can be represented as a formal system, then the proof fails. I also argue that if this restriction is lifted, at each level of the language hierarchy, then the proof can go through, but at the expense of virtually reducing the concept of a proof to that of truth in a non-constructive sense.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands , 2008. 221-236 p.
, Synthese Library, 341
Intuitionism, Bivalence, Prawitz
Research subject Theoretical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-40816DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-8926-8.11ISBN: 978-1-4020-8925-1OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-40816DiVA: diva2:132778