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Against the Character Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
Number of Authors: 12019 (English)In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

One way to frame the problem of moral luck is as a contradiction in our ordinary ideas about moral responsibility. In the case of two identical reckless drivers where one kills a pedestrian and the other does not, we tend to intuit that they are and are not equally blameworthy. The Character Response sorts these intuitions in part by providing an account of moral responsibility: the drivers must be equally blameworthy, because they have identical character traits and people are originally praiseworthy and blameworthy in virtue of, and only in virtue of, their character traits. After explicating two versions of the Character Response, I argue that they both involve implausible accounts of moral responsibility and fail to provide a good solution to the problem of moral luck. I close by noting how proponents of moral luck can preserve a kernel of truth from the Character Response to explain away the intuition that the drivers are equally blameworthy.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2019.
Keywords [en]
moral luck, character, moral responsibility
National Category
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-170861DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2019.1617755ISI: 000474072400001OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-170861DiVA, id: diva2:1338631
Available from: 2019-07-23 Created: 2019-07-23 Last updated: 2019-07-23

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