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The Experiential Defeasibility and Overdetermination of A Priori Justification
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2008 (English)In: Journal of Philosophical Research, ISSN 1053-8364, Vol. 33Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The question whether a belief justified a priori is indefeasible in general and experientially indefeasible in particular has received different answers. In a recent and interesting paper “Experientially Defeasible A Priori Justification”, Joshua Thurow argues that many a priori justified beliefs are defeasible by experience. The argument takes the form of an objection against Albert Casullo’s recent book A Priori Justification where Casullo, according to Thurow, denies that if a justified belief is non-experientially defeasible, then that belief is also experientially defeasible.

This paper examines Thurow’s two arguments in the first two sections I-II. In the last section, III, an alternative line of argument for Thurow’s thesis is suggested that employs other parts of the framework that Casullo provides – especially the thesis of the overdetermination of justification. It will be argued that the prospects for this suggestion are brighter than for both of Thurow’s arguments.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2008. Vol. 33
Keyword [en]
a priori justification, defeasibility, overdetermination, holism
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-16242ISI: 000259586900015OAI: diva2:182762
Available from: 2008-12-16 Created: 2008-12-16 Last updated: 2011-01-10Bibliographically approved

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Janvid, Mikael
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