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Being and Betterness
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2010 (English)In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 22, no 3, 285-302 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In this article I discuss the question of whether a person's existence can be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence. Recently, Nils Holtug and Melinda A. Roberts have defended an affirmative answer. These defenses, I shall argue, do not succeed. In different ways, Holtug and Roberts have got the metaphysics and axiology wrong. However, I also argue that a person's existence can after all be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence, though for reasons other than those provided by Holtug and Roberts

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cambridge University Press , 2010. Vol. 22, no 3, 285-302 p.
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URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-17073DOI: 10.1017/S0953820810000208ISI: 000281675300004OAI: diva2:183593
Available from: 2009-01-06 Created: 2009-01-06 Last updated: 2011-11-18Bibliographically approved

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