A Pragmatic Defense of Millianism
2008 (English)In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, Vol. 138, no 2, 271-289 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
A new kind of defense of the Millian theory of names is given, which explains intuitive counter-examples as depending on pragmatic effects of the relevant sentences, by direct application of Grice’s and Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory and uncontroversial assumptions. I begin by arguing that synonyms are always intersubstitutable, despite Mates’ considerations, and then apply the method to names. Then, a fairly large sample of cases concerning names are dealt with in related ways. It is argued that the method, as applied to the various cases, satisfies the criterion of success: that for every sentence in context, it is a counter-example to Millianism to the extent that it has pragmatic effects (matching speakers’ intuitions).
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2008. Vol. 138, no 2, 271-289 p.
Names, Millianism, Pragmatics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-17085DOI: 10.1007/s11098-006-9037-0ISI: 000253008000009OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-17085DiVA: diva2:183605