A Defense of Quinean Naturalism
2008 (English)In: Naturalism, Reference, and Ontology: Essays in Honor of Roger F. Gibson, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., New York , 2008Chapter in book (Other academic)
This paper argues that a naturalized epistemology of the kind presented by W.V. Quine preserves everything worthwhile in traditional epistemology. Arguments against Quinean naturalism by such writers as Laurence BonJour, Jaegwon Kim, Richard Rorty, Barry Stroud, and Donald Davidson are criticized. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, Quinean naturalism does not reject a priori justification. The important point is that epistemology is contained in science. There is no ‘first philosophy’, and, in particular, epistemology is not a normative discipline. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which Quinean naturalism provides an answer to Cartesian scepticism.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., New York , 2008.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-17106ISBN: 978-1-4331-0229-5OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-17106DiVA: diva2:183626