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Electoral rules and government spending in parliamentary democracies
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
2007 (English)In: Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, no 2, 155-188 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy where electoral competition inside coalition governments induces higher spending than under single party governments. Policy preferences of parties are endogenous and derived from opportunistic reelection motives. The electoral rule affects government spending, but only indirectly: proportional elections induce a more fragmented party system and a larger incidence of coalition governments than do majoritarian elections. Empirical evidence from post-war parliamentary democracies strongly supports these predictions.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2007. Vol. 2, no 2, 155-188 p.
Keyword [en]
electoral rules, party systems, coalition governments, fiscal policy, electoral accountability
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-19840ISI: 000250778200003OAI: diva2:186364
Available from: 2007-05-15 Created: 2007-05-15 Last updated: 2011-01-11Bibliographically approved

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Persson, Torsten
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ReferencesLink to record
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