Meritarian Axiologies and Distributive Justice
2007 (English)In: Hommage à Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, 2007Chapter in book (Other academic)
Standard welfarist axiologies do not care who is given what share of the good. For example, giving Wlodek two apples and Ewa three is just as good as giving Wlodek three and Ewa two, or giving Wlodek five and Ewa zero. A common objection to such theories is that they are insensitive to matters of distributive justice. To meet this objection, one can adjust the axiology to take distributive concerns into account. One possibility is to turn to what I will call Meritarian axiologies. According to such theories, individuals can have a claim to, deserve, or merit, a certain level of wellbeing depending on their merit level, and the value of an outcome is determined not only by people’s wellbeing but also by their merit level.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Justice, desert, merit, axiology
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-20154OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-20154DiVA: diva2:186679