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Quine's relativism
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2006 (English)In: Theoria, Vol. 72, no 4Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

It has been claimed that “the central problem of relativism is one of giving it a coherent formulation, making the doctrine more than the platitude that differently situated people may judge differently, and less than the falsehood that contradictory views may each be true”. W.V. Quine has claimed that relativism is paradoxical and unacceptable; nevertheless, his own views concerning truth and the underdetermination of theories by data amount to an interesting and plausible form of relativism.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2006. Vol. 72, no 4
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-21152OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-21152DiVA: diva2:187678
Available from: 2007-04-23 Created: 2007-04-23 Last updated: 2011-01-11Bibliographically approved

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