An econometric Analysis of the European Commission's Merger Decisions
2005 (English)In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, ISSN 0167-7187, Vol. 23, no 9-10, 717-737 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Using a sample of 96 mergers notified to the European Commission and logit regression techniques, we analyse the Commission's decision process. We find that the probability of a phase-2 investigation and of a prohibition of the merger increases with the parties' market shares. The probabilities increase also when the Commission finds high entry barriers or that the post-merger market structure is conducive to collusion. We do not find significant effects of “political” variables, such as the nationality of the merging firms.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2005. Vol. 23, no 9-10, 717-737 p.
Competition law; Antitrust; Merger; Merger regulation
Economics and Business
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-23509DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.08.006OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-23509DiVA: diva2:192422
Part of urn:nbn:se:su:diva-3192004-12-162004-12-162010-07-27Bibliographically approved