Är könet en konstruktion?: Ett inlägg i den aktuella debatten
2000 (Swedish)In: Lambda Nordica: Tidskrift om homosexualitet, ISSN 1100-2573, Vol. 6, no 1, 6-25 p.Article in journal (Other academic) Published
Abstract: This article examines an argument in much current feminist theorizing of gender, that the old distinction between (biological) sex and (cultural) gender can no longer be sustained. Much of this theorizing is taken from Judith Butler's influential work "Gender Trouble" (1990). It would seem that Butler's critique of the sex/gender distinction has already turned into a given truth in Sweden. Rather than examining Butler, the article focusses instead on articles by Swedish scholars. It turns out that the scholars who argue that sex cannot be separated from gender have redefined biological sex as what was earlier perceived as gender. The concept "sex" is used in a whole range of different ways: for example to describe people's gendered expectations and demands on individuals of either sex; it is used as the principle which leads us to think of all humans as either male or female; or it seen as a discourse, a régime, as in Butler's discussion of the heterosexual matrix. However, all scholars discussed still take biological dimorphism in the human species for granted. That is, biological sex is first redefined as what was earlier described with the concept of gender (with some new arguments, certainly, the new and important discussion about heterosexuality not least), even while the existence of biological men and women is taken for granted. The new critique is thus still based on the fact that biological men and women exist. It seems, then, that the newer uses of the concept "sex" are not comparable to earlier uses, <em>even while that earlier biological use is taken for granted in the new critique.</em> This can be seen for example when Sara Danius, after a fierce critique of the sex/gender distinction, admits to the existence of a "banal" and "pragmatic" sex. That "sex", I would argue, was just the sex implied in the sex/gender distinction. The article should not be read as an outright defence of the distinction between sex and gender, but rather as an analysis of the arguments that have been brought forward to critique that distinction. As I hope to have shown, these arguments have not been convincing.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2000. Vol. 6, no 1, 6-25 p.
Genus, queerteori, Judith Butler, kön, kön/genusdistinktionen
Research subject History
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-27290OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-27290DiVA: diva2:213702